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Millennial Development: A Case Study of Namibia's Vision 2030

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MILLENNIAL DEVELOPMENT: A CASE STUDY OF NAMIBIA'S VISION 2030

by
Laura Connoy

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through Sociology
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2011

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Author's Declaration of Originality

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the neoliberal governmentalities of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and how they shape the policies, practices, and perceptions of poverty within the context of Namibia and its *Vision 2030* policy. Within this field, I emphasize that the techniques of partnerships, responsabilization, and benchmarking aim to shape particular spaces, and the individuals occupying them, and achieve millennial development targets and goals. These neoliberal techniques guide the actions of the poor and shape ideas of poverty and poverty reduction, as well as legitimize the interventions of development and government institutions designed to manage the lives of the poor. The ability for national and international actors to mold certain individuals into self-regulating subjects is a crucial aspect in transforming social relations in the region and in understanding the strategies and activities associated with *Vision 2030* and the MDGs.

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Chapter 1
Introduction: “*The millennial moment*”¹

At this moment, there are 4 years, 250 days, 9 hours, 48 minutes and 55 seconds until the year 2015. What is the importance of this countdown? 2015 is the deadline for the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a globally applied framework which aims to solve the world’s development issues through quantifiable targets and deadlines. In this year, the world will come to realize how many people are poor, sick, malnourished, and underdeveloped and how many nations have failed in their ability to develop their country and to “make poverty history”. Billions of people will be affected.

In order to achieve the time-bound goals of the MDGs, this framework needs to be applied to, and worked through, developing nations and their national development policies. I am interested in how the MDGs aim to ameliorate multiple, various and truly global issues as well as transform the developing world. The MDGs employ neoliberal practices and discourses in order to develop and shape African countries and individual behavior. I am interested in how this global framework and its neoliberal discourses have been integrated into national contexts. One of the countries that are currently in the grasp of this framework is Namibia. This country and its development plan *Vision 2030* have been and continue to be technically managed and governed by the global framework of the MDGs. In order to demonstrate this argument, my analysis will attend to the

¹ Comaroff and Comaroff. 2000. Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming. *Public Culture* v.12(2), pp. 291-343 (quote located on pg.326).

discursive practices² and technical procedures located within both global and national frameworks.

My goal for this thesis is to ask how and to what extent millennial development³ programmes govern national development policies, and how in turn, those national policies come to shape the individuals they aim to develop. These systems of governance engage with neoliberal techniques in order to manipulate, measure and manage poverty. In order to examine development as a technology of government, which shapes and directs individuals by producing remedies, expertise, and training, this thesis will address several questions: as regimes of practices and programmes seeking to create novel ways of thinking about and pursuing global development and poverty reduction, what “new” kinds of development strategies are envisioned through millennial development policies? Are these discursive strategies used as techniques within a larger global governing structure? What implications does the utilization of these discourses, and the forms of knowledge and ‘truths’ they produce, have for the framing and production of poverty and poverty reduction? In light of these questions, I acknowledge the relevance and importance of the development and governmentality literature, and of discourse analysis, in order to shed light on the governing strategies associated with poverty reduction within national and global millennial development practices. Examining neoliberal rationalities

² Discourse is important to examine, since it structures practices and has very real effects, which shapes the world in which we live and how we interpret it (Ferguson 1990:18).

³ Although I discuss what millennial development entails in Chapter 2, please see Ilcan and Lacey (2011), Ilcan and Phillips (2010) and Comaroff and Comaroff (2000) for an extended analysis.

within the context of development will demonstrate how the “new”⁴ and “unique” methods associated with the MDGs and *Vision 2030* are merely methods of “governing at a distance” (Rose and Miller 1992; Dean 1999). I am aware of the limitations of this approach and how governmentality theory tends to disregard or discount agency. I acknowledge the fact that Namibians are fully conscious of, and involved in, the modification and transformation of millennial development practices and programmes.

This thesis is going to examine the poverty reduction goals and strategies of the MDGs, and its neoliberal governing techniques of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking, in order to demonstrate how spaces⁵, and individuals within these spaces, are monitored against its strategies, targets and goals. The practice of partnerships has been revised and reinforced in development due to the influence of the World Bank’s ex-President James Wolfensohn’s “Proposal for a Comprehensive Development Framework” (PCDF), which requests “a broader approach to partnership and to management of the development process” (1999:21). According to this article, partnerships should: encourage government leadership, ownership and implementation of development policies and programmes; and align donor and recipient actions in order to maintain coherence and avoid duplication (ibid:24-27). Working with and through open and democratic concepts, and involving national governments and international

⁴ Duffield states, “what is singular about development is its institutional ability to both survive and prosper. Despite periodic crises of confidence, it unfailingly reinvents itself as ‘new and improved’” (2007:227).

⁵ I understand space as “a political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered, and controlled” (Elden 2007:578).

governmental organizations, donors, developing countries, academia and non-governmental organizations legitimizes and justifies the presence of partnerships and hence development practices and programmes in developing countries.

Responsibilization techniques are legitimized through the argument that a less centralized system of development reflects the opinions and wishes of local communities, rather than those of politicians, or national and international agencies (Nekwaya 2007:24). Considered to be one of the major “buzzwords”⁶ within development policy, this technique has very real effects upon our current understanding and portrayal of poverty and poverty reduction within millennial development policies. Drawing upon the notions of freedom and empowerment, it is not difficult to understand how and/or why this technique has been so easily implemented, yet, upon closer examination and consideration, this rationality has placed the accountability of development upon the shoulders of individuals in developing nations. Finally, the benchmark is a point of reference, located within a level plane, which measures performance and achievement of developing countries, by identifying disparate points and aiming to align them. This process has the ability to make visible development deficiencies and nonconformists. Typically, benchmarking involves two parties, the exemplar (demonstrator) and the anomalar (seeker). The goal is to not simply copy, but rather learn how to improve one’s performance through behavior modification, innovation and invention (Moriarty & Smallman 2009:486). I aim to contribute to the limited but nonetheless valuable literature

⁶ According to Cornwall & Brock, buzzwords “are an ever-present part of the world that are made and sustained by development agencies. They facilitate a multiplicity of contingent, situational and relational meanings...” (2005:1046).

on the governmentalities and discourses of the MDGs and (millennial) development as a whole by considering how these practices are not only utilized by the MDGs at a global level, but how they permeate and transform national policies and understandings of poverty and shape the actions of those considered to be poor or underdeveloped.

I view the MDGs not as a neoliberal governing project per se, but rather as encompassing neoliberal “moves” and discursive practices which govern the modern developing subject and can be seen not only in the interconnections between the targets and goals of the MDGs, but also the application of the MDGs within specific national contexts. Promoted as “new” ways of knowing and conducting development, the MDGs govern the behaviour of individuals through self-reflection and self-mastery and contain “technical and institutional alignments” which generate global consensus, global ordering and global hierarchical arrangements (Craig and Porter 2006:4). Global ordering and global consensus building connects and binds the global to the national to the local. This connection produces “collective legitimization” (Death 2010:6) in the sense that the MDGs create and apply a solid global framework which is difficult to work against due to its all-encompassing nature. The sheer enormity and hegemonic power of the MDGs allows for the regulation of life, and the creation of subjects and citizens through a focus on subjectivities and aspirations, rather than through repression and control. Working through subjectivities justifies the presence and practices of the MDGs. The multiple and various linkages of the MDGs make this program a technology of governance par excellence.

It must be stated however that the outcomes of development programs are not always bad; they often bring changes that people want (roads, infrastructure, health care,

etc.). Therefore, my goal is not to condemn the MDGs, for they are calling global attention to issues that billions of people are unfortunately experiencing. What I seek to understand is the rationale behind millennial development policies, what it seeks to change, how it seeks to change it, and the discourses and techniques it applies, and how these practices affect the populations they seek to change, as well as our understanding of development and poverty reduction.

Methodology

The objective of this thesis is to analyze the neoliberal governmentalities of millennial development, and how these governmentalities shape the policies, practices and perceptions of poverty within the context of Namibia. The power and influence of millennial development policies lies in its neoliberal discursive practices which allow for the implementation and legitimization of practices and programmes to create a world without poverty. They are products of allied interests based upon and implemented through calculation, persuasion, and rhetoric and aim to fulfill the multiple objectives and targets of the MDGs. Discourse analysis will shed light on the specific forms of knowledge, conduct, and expertise associated with this millennial development framework and how it works as a technique of governance. It will allow for the acknowledgement of the problematic practices and assumptions located within development programmes.

Discourse is a practice that influences ways and means of being and doing, and produces, influences and works through or within, social effects (Fairclough 2003:11). According to Fairclough, discourses represent the world in a particular way and

constitute “interactive processes of meaning-making” (ibid:10). However, it is highly dependent upon the audience’s ability to access, comprehend, and use the discourse, hence the prevalence of open, vague, and humanitarian⁷ undertones within much of the development discourse. An important aspect of this type of analysis is that discourse should not be considered in isolation because it acts upon and influences other discourses (ibid:3) in an act of intertextuality, meaning that specific discourses can only be and should only be understood with reference to other discourses (ibid:39-40). This is particularly evident with millennial development discourses, in that partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking, although each powerful in their own right, work together in order to further solidify the development process. Examining specific texts and the social structuring of language are key to understanding the structures of social practices⁸ (ibid:3). Discourse figures in social practice in three ways: ways of acting, ways of representing and ways of being (ibid:26). In this sense, it is “inseparable from ‘reality’ and embodies not only rhetoric and text, but also the actions of those actors employing discourses” (Mert 2009:109-110). Analyzing discourse allows one to focus on undetermined meanings, contestations and interpretations (ibid:110).

Throughout the thesis, I have drawn upon particular African examples in order to demonstrate the importance and relevance of millennial development in this region, as well as to contextualize the development initiatives and issues occurring in Africa and

⁷ I am using humanitarian to describe the inclusive and pro-poor approaches to, and nature of, development.

⁸ Social practices can be seen as articulations of different types of social element which are associated with particular areas of social life (Fairclough 2003:25).

Namibia in particular. Africa has bore the brunt of numerous development initiatives, yet it continues to be located within the global shadow as an “inconvenient continent”, since after decades of implementing various development initiatives, Africa continues to remain poor⁹ (Ferguson 2006b). The prevalence of poverty in the region legitimizes the presence and practices of dominant development organizations and developed Western nations who “deal with” or rather govern, dominate, restructure and authorize over Africa “by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it...” (Said 1979:3). Discursive practices make such actions possible, allowing these spaces to be shaped and reshaped in order to fit the dominant practices at the time. This ability to govern is unacknowledged due to the ahistorical nature of development discourses which “obscures the political realities of the development industry” (Kothari 2005a:48). The discourses of development do not so much reflect reality, as it does construct it, which in turn, excludes alternative ideas and knowledges (Lie 2007:55). Development discourses have created and maintained “a vast institutional apparatus” which has very real and truly effective social, economic, cultural and political transformative forces (Escobar 2007:19).

This thesis sheds light on the ability and power of discourse to restructure social relations within millennial development, and how they contribute to the process of meaning making. I will specifically examine the effects of the discourses of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking in Namibia. These concepts excel at molding and

⁹ For instance, globally, the number of people living on less than \$1 per day declined from 1.281 billion to 1.089 billion; in Sub-Saharan Africa, the amount increased from 227 million to 313 million (Hanjra 2008:185).

shaping individuals due to their vagueness and ambiguity, which generate a sense of compromise to allow for the application, enrolment, and hence success of neoliberal governing techniques and discourses in developing regions (Mosse 2005:230). I have chosen to examine Namibia not only because it was a key player in the design and implementation of the MDGs, but also because Namibia is among the very few countries which has experienced the apartheid¹⁰, was the second last African country to gain its independence¹¹ and is infamous for having the highest levels of inequality in the world. Considering the issue of independence, it is important to keep in mind that, in Africa, domination has been exercised by entities other than the state, such as transnational organizations (International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and UN) that are not in themselves governments, but work with First World states. These organizations impose development strategies (macroeconomic interventions, curtailing social spending and restructuring state bureaucracies, etc.) leading to an erosion of the sovereignty of nation-states. Such governance represents a kind of transfer of sovereignty away from African states into the hands of international governing bodies (Ferguson 2006b:100). Not only has Namibia gained independence from South Africa, only then to be governed by international development organizations and financial institutions, but independence also nationalizes the issue of poverty and inequality, and makes it an attribute of the country, rather than as an effect of its history as a colony, or as recipient of apartheid ruling

¹⁰ Namibia, Lesotho and South Africa are the only countries in Africa which directly experienced the apartheid.

¹¹ Namibia gained independence March 21, 1990 and the state of Eritrea gained independence May 24, 1993.

(Ferguson 2006b demonstrates this issue in his examination of Lesotho). I believe these issues make Namibia an interesting and unique case study in the context of millennial development and will provide a fascinating analysis of the implementation and effects of millennial development governmentalities, neoliberal rationalities and discursive practices.

In order to examine the discourses of millennial development programmes and policies, I analyzed relevant and contemporary research reports, documents, UN statements and development plans on the MDGs and Namibia's *Vision 2030* to highlight the UN's ability to "govern at a distance". Working with and through a governmentality lens was quite challenging since little critical research exists for this region. Of note is Ilcan and Lacey (2011), who's work on Namibia and the Solomon Islands sheds light on the neoliberal reforms promoted by aid programs which govern the poor through the concepts of privatization, empowerment, and partnership. My contribution to the development literature furthers this analysis on Namibia, by examining not only how millennial development and its neoliberal discourses of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking, govern the poor at a global level (through the MDGs), but also how it is applied and works to govern at a local level (through Namibia's *Vision 2030*). I consider how these discourses work to not only shape our understanding of the poor and poverty reduction, but also how the governmentalities of millennial development shape the poor into becoming the perfect neoliberal citizen. I relied heavily on the Google and Google Scholar search engines in order to find various documents on Namibia as well as Namibian government policies. I also relied on government websites, UN websites and articles, and commentaries in *The Namibian*, one of the country's main newspapers.

The principle data sources used for this analysis include: United Nations (2010) *The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010* which provides the latest information on data gathered on the MDGs; the National Planning Commission's (2008) *2nd Millennium Development Goals Report: Namibia 2008, Progress at Mid-Term 1 September 2008* offers a regional interpretation and application of the MDGs in Namibia; Government of the Republic of Namibia (2004) *Namibia Vision 2030: Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development*, and the National Planning Commission website (http://www.npc.gov.na/vision/vision_2030bgd.htm), supply the discourses that work to legitimize the practices of the MDGs and of *Vision 2030*; Frayne (2000) and Melber (2005) provide a poverty profile and give a brief history of development planning in the region, as well as the effects of apartheid, and post-colonialism; Mabizela (2005) and Marope (2005) provide information on educational transformations occurring in the country and the need for Namibians to be involved in the creation of a knowledge-based economy; finally the Bank of Namibia's (2008) *10th Annual Symposium Publication* makes available the information on structural transformation, economic growth and policy options for Namibia.

In addition to these documents, relevant websites for analysis include: *The United Nations End Poverty 2015 Millennium Campaign* website (<http://www.endpoverty2015.org/>); United Nations Development Programme website (<http://www.undp.org/mdg/>); United Nations *We Can End Poverty 2015* Millennium Development Goals website (<http://www.un.org/en/mdg/summit2010/>); the National Planning Commission website (<http://www.npc.gov.na/>); and the Republic of Namibia *Vision 2030* website (<http://www.grnnet.gov.na/aboutnam.html>). These key sources

provided me with information and documents which allowed me to examine descriptions and understandings of poverty at both a global and national level, and how the neoliberal discourses of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking legitimize, describe and connect poverty to local and global development programmes, policies, practices and solutions.

Internationally, poverty is understood or portrayed as a monetary issue. This quantitative understanding of poverty depoliticizes and localizes the issue of poverty. Rather than considering specific contextual concerns, “the poor” are not only generalized, but are shaped into citizens that can eliminate their own poverty through various techniques and practices. Considering poverty in Africa, it is not uncommon to discuss macroeconomic instability, geography, ethnic fractionalization and conflict, poor policies, poor government, weak institutions, or low human capital (Bigsten and Shimeles 2007:162), rather than the systemic and structural effects of colonialism, racism, neoliberalism, and the imperialistic practices of development and financial institutions. Applied at a national level, poverty in Namibia is seen as a consequence of high rates of unemployment, population growth, rural to urban migration, as well as the inability of the economy (Frayne 2004:490). This understanding complements the global perception of poverty as an economic and monetary issue. However, at a local level, Namibians are aware of the influence that South Africa had and continues to have over the country (Klerck 2008:358) which creates various barriers for Namibians in their economic activities and developments (Knutsen 2003:555). What this basic description of poverty demonstrates is the influence that global understandings of poverty have over national

assessments, as well as how this blanket approach obfuscates the causes and concerns of the poor at local levels.

The following chapter asks how and to what extent millennial development programs engage in techniques to shape, measure and govern poverty. I aim to examine development as a technology of governance that shapes and directs individuals by producing remedies, expertise, and training and I aim to demonstrate how this governing technology operates through neoliberal rationalities of governance.

Chapter 2
 Governing Millennial Development: “*First Thoughts on a Second Coming*”¹²

The processes and practices of millennial development¹³, rather than sustaining the harsh top-down economic restructuring practices of the Structural Adjustment era, has begun to incorporate and promote (social) innovation, improved services, as well as aiming to free individuals from their surrounding social, political and economic environment. This form of development appeals to the individual since people are now empowered and involved in the development process. There are contradictions however, in the sense that development includes recipients but marginalizes their ideas and concerns, produces desire for development but decreases certainty, magnifies difference but undercuts consciousness (Comaroff and Comaroff 2000:298). Rather than focusing on egalitarianism, individuals are left to fend for themselves in trying to “clamber aboard the good ship Enterprise” without the necessary resources to work within the current economic order (ibid:299). Such a framework not only places blame upon the individual, but it also perpetuates and has the ability to create and constantly reinforce a dichotomous understanding of the world: “us” and “them”, “developed” and “underdeveloped”. “Millennial development” promotes a more inclusive, pro-poor and humanitarian

¹² Comaroff and Comaroff. 2000. Millennial Development: First Thoughts on a Second Coming. *Public Culture* v.12(2), pp.291-343.

¹³ According to Sachs the process encounters “the most challenging development questions of our generation” (2005:x). The MDGs represent a “‘global effort’ in the service of a greater global cause...” and are truly “a labour of love” (ibid).

practice, in that it works on and through the involvement, aspirations and capabilities of the poor rather than the application of objective and highly economic and scientific policies of prior decades. However, the process continues to work through the concepts of progress, improvement and modernization, which maintain the classifications of worse or better, and inferior or superior and tends to echo the not so distant imperialist past (Goudge 2003:202, Ferguson 1990:15). It is important to challenge these dichotomies, for they have very real effects upon regions, communities¹⁴, and individuals.

Perhaps the most evident and truly unfortunate example of the effects of development dichotomies is the Rwandan genocide of 1994. Long and Mills (2008) have recently examined the outcomes, actions and inactions resulting from imperialist and colonial legacies (ibid:390). The extremely profound and powerful implications of such legacies lead international organizations to be unable to see beyond colonial binary oppositions (ibid:390). This issue is demonstrated by the complicity of the UN Security Council with the genocide of 1994. Rwandans were translated or portrayed as “black, impoverished and...of little interest...” (ibid:404), which in turn rationalized the inaction of the UN (ibid:405). Member states subordinated Rwanda’s need for assistance through independent decisions and considerations about political and strategic best interests which de-legitimized Rwanda’s need for assistance due to its portrayal of lacking any form of “significant strategic value for the developed world” (ibid:404). The ability to portray Rwandans as inferior or backward legitimized the translation of Rwandans as

¹⁴ I use community in its most basic sense, which “implies relations that give identity and meaning to its members” (Mathie and Cunningham 2008:6).

“tribal members at war who simply needed to heed their own peace agreement”, rather than as a humanitarian or genocidal event (ibid:401).

Furthering the issue of development dichotomies, one may consider the Epupa Falls Dam Project in Namibia. Located along the Cunene River, this project has been in negotiations since the 1990s, and appears to be in the final stages of discussion. In order to generate electricity for homes, and to also stimulate and attract an international business sector, the country has decided that harnessing hydro power is the most compatible option. Unfortunately, this project will create severe consequences for the Himba pastoralists in the surrounding region, particularly due to the loss of Epupa falls, biodiversity, and ancestral graves. The loss of these cultural and social aspects will have a significant impact on Himba identities, lifestyles and production systems (Corbett 1999:5-6). Not only will the Himba become more dependent on the economic and social security of the state (ibid:8), they will also be exposed to a higher incidence of malaria due to the still or slow moving water of the dam (ibid:10). Although the project is associated with job creation, the majority of the Himba will not secure employment due to a lack of “marketable skills” and lack of proficiency in English leading them to gravitate towards informal settlement patterns around the construction town, increasing the risk of crime, alcoholism, prostitution and disease (ibid:11).

Although the damn project is considered to advance Namibian development, it is having negative consequences for the Himba who live in the surrounding region. Unfortunately, due to their portrayal as tribal, inferior, and possibly backward, the Himba have not been consulted by the government or project managers or involved in the development process, nor have had their needs attended to. The Himba know that their

concerns will be overlooked and they will not be able to have a say in the project (ibid).

This issue is clearly stated in Councilor Tjिताura's (Headman under Chief Kapika)

address the Namibian government:

Government, how is it that you only reckon with those who are educated like yourselves and you don't consider those who are not? The only way out of this debacle is to understand that independence and freedom are meant for a person who wears modern garments and not for a Himba like myself

(5minMedia 2010: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xg26jt_himba-people-fighting-against-the-epupa-dam_people)

Dichotomous understandings produced by/through development alter images and perceptions of individuals and communities in negative and condescending ways. As seen in the Epupa Falls Dam project, the need to be modern does not necessarily benefit those who are deemed to be not modern, hence the need to be aware of the practices and (un)intended consequences of development and the application of the term underdevelopment.

To be labeled as underdeveloped not only sheds light on actual inconsistencies and inequalities located within various spaces throughout the world, but it also places a particular space within a solidified and hegemonic development apparatus, consisting of programmes and policies aimed at correcting this dilemma. There are many signs and signals of underdevelopment which particularly concern the lack of: skills, capacity, freedom, creativity and material well-being, modern institutions and efficient technologies, services, amenities and forms of assistance, transportation, communications and public administration, as well as minimal standards of housing, education, food,

water, and health/health care (Udombana 2000:755-56). In this sense, to be developed, or underdeveloped, “encompasses all aspects—economic, technological, organizational, and managerial” as well as spiritual and material (ibid:757). Alongside acting as a method of description, it is also used as a method of comparison which distinguishes between and hierarchically categorizes the most to least developed (ibid:757).

The United Nations have been particularly influential addressing and dealing with underdevelopment by implementing “painful adjustments”, transformations and a “total restructuring” of society in order to develop and to achieve “material prosperity and economic progress” (Escobar 1995:4). The idea and teleological process of development has created and “produced its opposite: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation and oppression” (ibid:4). Producing and creating an underdeveloped individual or region creates an “underdeveloped subjectivity” which is a universal and homogenous conception of individuals who are labeled and specified as powerless, passive, poor, and ignorant, “usually dark and lacking in historical agency... hungry, illiterate, needy, and oppressed by its own stubbornness, lack of initiative, and traditions” (ibid:8). This descriptive and comparative process signifies the dominance over “developing” spaces, rather than its actually existing realities (ibid:9). Informed and defined by types of knowledge, systems of power, and forms of subjectivity (ibid:10) is what makes development and underdevelopment true apparatuses of governance.

Development organizations, policies and programmes perceive the causes and effects of underdevelopment as “an object, a fact” (Esteva 2003:11). It is a comparative adjective whose base of support is the Western, and highly unacceptable and indemonstrable assumption of a homogenous and “linear evolution of the world”; it

disconnects the multiple and various interconnections of the globe (i.e. economic, social, political relations) and instead, “substitutes one of its fragments, isolated from the rest, as a general point of reference” (ibid:11-12). Take into account the issue of poverty, whereby rather than considering or referencing regional or national contexts, or the multiple and various forms of poverty, the actors of millennial development have instead quantitatively generated who and how many poor people there are globally, based upon income. While these global commitments have accorded poverty reduction exceptional attention, the majority of the programs geared toward “making poverty history” tend to mask contextual concerns¹⁵. The application of these strategies tends to create or maintain spaces of “underdevelopment”, filled with poverty, war and disease.

By far one of the most well known and visible spaces of underdevelopment is Africa. This space tends to carry a double message: that this unjust suffering should be repaired, but that “this sort of thing” happens “over there” as an inevitable tragedy of the ignorant, the simple and the uncivilized (Sontag 2003:71; Ferguson 2006a:19). The continent is discussed in urgent tones pertaining to its crises, problems, failures and moral

¹⁵ In order to address the causes and consequences of poverty, and those living within it, we must expand our current understanding of poverty; it is not simply a matter of material deprivation, but also social exclusion, inadequate opportunities, marginalization, and vulnerability (Woolcock 2009:9; Craig & Porter 2005:239). Although there is some mention or understanding of poverty as a lack of basic human needs (such as the case with the UNDP who employ “the notion of ‘human poverty’, measured in terms of education, health [and] housing...”), it appears that the most common measure of poverty is monetary poverty (Pieterse 2002:1025).

challenges, which allow Western societies to portray and describe Africa as a radical underdeveloped other, hence creating, implementing and justifying further development strategies and programmes.

Conceiving of Africa as underdeveloped allows for certain forms of development programs to be located within many African countries which may not necessarily address the issues of poverty within that region. For example, Kotir and Obeng-Odoom consider the increasing presence of microcredit projects in the Lawra-Nandom district in Ghana and how although there are cases where microcredit initiatives alleviate monetary poverty and generate high levels of employment and development, there are other cases which suggest a worsening of poverty (2009:85). An estimated seventy percent of the region is living below the poverty line of ₵900,000.00 (about US\$100) per adult per year (ibid:90). Citizens here are highly dependent upon agriculture, but the increasing risks associated with this occupation (low soil fertility, population density, low levels of investment, low returns) have lead individuals to search for alternative occupations and sources of income. Due to this changing economic environment, many microcredit institutions have been established in the region (ibid:90) which charge two to eighteen percent interest and give money “often *on condition* that the borrower can provide collateral security” which can vary from ones house, land or livestock, to cars or jewelry (ibid:96); unfortunately, resource-poor households are at a serious disadvantage with this aspect (ibid:96).

Although this type of project can temporarily improve one’s quality of life, it may also increase one’s debt if they are unable to repay the loan (ibid:96). Interestingly, thirty-five percent of respondents stated the loans did not contribute to community development and twenty percent stated they were not sure if it did. This may indicate that microcredit

may not necessarily equate with development or poverty reduction (ibid:99) since it appears that microfinance programs may only perpetuate poverty leading to the creation and implementation of newer development projects. Applying or implementing development projects which are not based upon the contextual causes of poverty may create more rather than less poverty. This inability to address the issue of poverty tends to perpetuate the discussion of the continent in urgent tones pertaining to its crises, problems, failures and moral challenges, which allow Western societies to portray and describe Africa as a radical underdeveloped other, hence legitimizing the creation, implementation and justification of further development strategies and programmes which again may not necessarily address the underlying contextual issues of poverty. Focusing on educational development and reform projects within developing African countries, Bosu et al (2011) examine a stifling universalist education framework within the Ghanaian and Tanzanian context. The millennial development programmes implemented in these countries emphasize a homogenous educational system which does not take into account context or “local educational mores” (ibid:67). Teachers are provided with highly structured and quite lengthy handbooks which promote bureaucratic compliance and stifles individual agency (ibid:71). The greatest concerns in the Ghanaian and Tanzanian context are community and family poverty, poverty reduction and gender disparities (ibid:67). Rather than focusing on teenage pregnancy (sexual knowledge), teen drop-out rates, social and cultural stigmas (ibid:72) or poverty and the hardships that children have to endure within such situations (ibid:74), the framework promotes a depoliticized, decontextualized and marketized curriculum which does not address the issues at hand in these countries; instead, it places blame on the individual, rather than on

larger systemic or structural issues. In this case, without addressing the concerns of Ghanaians or Tanzanians, development projects will fail to provide the changes that are needed and wanted in the region, leading to further implementations and embeddings of development projects. In this sense, development is the solution to its failure.

Although there have been numerous development programmes implemented in Africa, focusing on children, health, gender, post-conflict reconstruction, etc., socio-economic discrepancies continue to exist¹⁶. What justifies this unsuccessful, unrepresentative and biased process is the failure of development. Failure legitimizes development's continued presence upon the global stage, allowing it to generate new forms of intervention, policies and practices (DeVries 2007:34) for the purpose of identifying and correcting "newly created" deficiencies (Li 2007:19). Placed within the context of millennial development, the failure of previous development programs has legitimized the implementation of current programs on a global level. The "new" and "unique" nature associated with this framework appeals to our need for a better, modern and perhaps more humanitarian, approach to development. In this sense, failure has been transformed into a "motor", rather than as a deterrence, for the reproduction of development. It is through such critical understandings of development that Ferguson (1990) has labeled the process as an "anti-politics machine", in the sense that the detachment from previous practices, experiences and failures not only depoliticize development, but also decontextualizes or desystematizes issues located in the development process which in turn leads to the maintenance and possible enhancement of

¹⁶ Whether or not these discrepancies exist despite development or because of development can be debated.

its power (270). Failure allows for the creation of new rationalities, governmentalities and technologies which allows development to be such an effective “instrument of domination” (DeVries 2007:34) and technique of governance.

Foucault has broadened the operation of the practices of governance by pushing the idea of governmentality outside of the nation-state and applying it within new theoretical and political territories. Due to his interest in political rationalities, the genealogy of the state, and the genealogy of the subject, Foucault came to formulate the theoretical framework of governance and governmentality in order to analyze the connections between technologies of the self and technologies of domination. He shed light on the fact that in order to these technologies, one must consider the political rationalities that constitute and fortify them in order to acknowledge the link between forms of power and processes of subjectification. In his genealogical method, Foucault demonstrated how government entails management, self-control, guidance, and direction, leading him to define government as conduct, or as "the conduct of conduct" which ranges from governing the self to governing others. The key concept of governmentality plays a critical role in Foucault's analysis of power due to the fact that it can link technologies of the self with technologies of domination, and demonstrate that power can exist and work without violence (see Foucault 1980, 1990, 1991, 1995, 2003, 2007, 2008).

It is this idea of power beyond the nation-state that is quite relevant in examining millennial development programmes, for one can now relate governmentality to the international, the global and the supra-national (Larner & Walters 2004). For example, Ilcan and Phillips (2010) focus on the governing discourses of millennial development

programmes which they state “enable[s] new ways of shaping social and economic affairs in the field of development...” (844). They consider the developmentalities of the MDGs, a form of governmentality, which recast and reformulate development problems and solutions by relying on three forms of neoliberal rationalities of government: information profiling, responsabilization, and knowledge networks, and their calculative practices. These rationalities work to not only “shape global spaces” but also formulate “new capacities” for individuals and groups (ibid:844).

Governmentality prompts individuals to consider how governing involves particular methods, representations, knowledges, expertise, calculations and measurements, types of authority, practices, policies and programmes, techniques (interviews, case records, brochures, manuals) and vocabularies regarding that which is to be governed. They shape and govern conduct, and aim to bring about productive social change by working through the desires and aspirations of those who are governed and allow organizations to legitimately intervene within particular spaces in multiple and varying ways (Rose et al. 2006; Wilson 2006; Larner & Walters 2004, DeVries 2007:34). Merlingen (2003) describes the governmentalities of international (development) organizations best, in that it is “conceptualized as ubiquitous in presence, microphysical and diffuse in nature, circulating in movement and producing countries, civil societies and individuals in its effects” (370). For example, the governmentalities of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking are fluid, apolitical and ahistorical in nature, allowing them to not only be applied everywhere and anywhere, but also transform the people and places where such rationalities are located. These techniques govern the actions of the poor and ideas of poverty and poverty reduction due to their elusive nature.

Development governmentalities facilitate the emergence and proliferation of the governing arrangements of international agencies in the form of policy-making and administration in the economic sphere and self-managing in the public sphere (Swyngedouw 2005:1992). Although there are many benefits working with and through a governmentality framework, there are also limitations. It is important to be aware of the fact that governmentality theory obfuscates agency. I acknowledge the fact that Namibians are fully conscious of, and involved in, the modification and transformation of millennial development practices and programmes and are not idly accepting the ideas and portrayals of poverty and underdevelopment put forth by millennial development policies.

The governmentalities of the MDGs are technocratic in nature and place a great deal of emphasis upon local or individual “deficiencies”. Technocratic remedies define and make visible the boundaries of spaces by transforming the space into “an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics...” which can be assembled or placed within particular development techniques (Li 2007:7). The ability to locate deficiencies within clearly defined spaces creates, maintains and legitimizes the implementation of development policies and programmes. Creating and defining spaces makes certain problems “thinkable and governable” (Phillips and Ilcan 2004:395) and enables the creation of “subjects” of development who can be, and are, “targets of the technologies of development” (DeVries 2007:35). Technocratic development does not so much seek solutions, as it gives “problems” a visible, actual, and authentic reality; it is through this “illuminating” strategy that particular treatments and observations are implemented (Escobar 1995:42). These solutions legitimize development through its

emphasis on and production of new and advanced knowledges, languages and methods (Kothari 2005b:428).

The technocratic practices of the MDGs reframe context specific issues and realities and place them within a decontextualized and hence depoliticized global framework (Woolcock 2009:11, Wilson 2006:502). This is currently being witnessed in Uganda with its Poverty Eradication Action Plan. Although there has been recent success in the country with its poverty reduction strategy, there are concerns that the poorest have been left out of the process and have benefitted little. The technocratic languages and discourses located within the policy framework are geared toward the “economically active”, hence excluding the poorest individuals from the process (Hickey 2005:995). What has resulted is the under- and misrepresentation of Uganda’s poorest groups within the global and national poverty reduction policies and projects (ibid:995). This technocratic agenda has “prioritize[d] the technical over the political, and focus[ed] on state efficiency, rather than issues of ‘state reform’ or ‘social and political change’” (ibid:996). Another example of the technocratic practices of development can be seen in the Millennium Villages project¹⁷. According to Ilcan and Phillips (2010), technical assistance is being provided by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) in virtually

¹⁷ The Millennium Villages project is led and executed by the communities on the ground in Africa. The overall aim is to make an investment toward a sustainable end to extreme poverty and for communities to strengthen their local governments and institutions and to ensure that their development will become sustainable and self-sufficient (<http://millenniumvillages.org/about/>).

every region of the world in order to enhance the capacity of governments and groups to collect statistical information ranging from gender, to agriculture, to education (858). These technical procedures are creating spaces of development, as seen in the idea that villages “can escape poverty by identifying their problems and transforming themselves to meet the MDGs” (ibid:858). Populations within these villages are not only “made responsible for choosing the most ‘powerful, practical technologies’ that will dissociate themselves from their impoverishment”, but they are also on the receiving end of self-problematizing critiques, which can result in “discoveries of new ethical politics and newborn identities” (ibid:858). The technocratic tendencies associated with development are now an omnipresent reality, whereby poor countries are now subject to numerous programs, calculations and interventions, dictated by supranational institutions and development experts (Escobar 1988:430) which may not always provide the solutions needed and may possibly complicate matters further. Technocratic, economic reasoning deployed in the majority of development strategies are justified through a regime of economic correctness, technical justification and scientific capitalism (Ferguson 2006b:71) which problematizes the social realm and legitimizes the formation and application of “new technologies of government” (DeVries 2007:35). What is produced is the notion that development is “both the problem and solution” to underdevelopment (ibid:35).

Considering the not so impressive resume’ of development programmes, one may question what is development for? What is its purpose? Is development a state of being or a stated objective? (Wai 2007:93) As a technique of governance, development has functioned and continues to function as a mechanism for, and practice of, control,

domination and power, which “reorder[s] space, imagine[s] and transform[s] societies, rewrite[s] socioeconomic and political landscapes and replace[s] one reality with another” (ibid:73). The discursive and technocratic practices of development construct people as underdeveloped “projects to be acted upon” (ibid:73). This form of construction is assisted by: the promotion of Westernized and Eurocentric concepts, approaches and models, which portrays Africans, for example, as “backward” and “primitive” and in need of rescue by “modern” Western practices and technologies (ibid:77); the conceptualization of development in “‘rational’ economic terms” (ibid:79); and the language of development which stifles alternative and dissenting viewpoints (ibid:80). Such practices construct and manage state and society in the sense that they are undergoing a “managed reorganization” by international development policies which work through rationalities in the technical, economic, social and cultural realm (Mosse 2004:642).

Acting as a technology of governance, millennial development encompasses and/or represents a new modality of development. It works through the implementation of unsupervised traits, and neoliberal characteristics and strategies, to bring about highly governed results and governable individuals. The “new” practices associated with the millennial development framework of the MDGs govern the “conduct of conduct” (Foucault 1982) of those individuals it acts upon in order to achieve particular objectives. Viewed in this light, examining the neoliberal governmentalities of the MDGs will shed light on the significance of the technologies and mentalities that operate within this global framework.

Millennial Development as a Neoliberal Governing Apparatus: *All Aboard for 2015*¹⁸

Neoliberalism has become a powerful hegemonic apparatus due to its ability to permeate and settle within any nation-state or policy, no matter the political, social or economic context. It is incredibly transformative and works in highly elusive ways. By far one of its most insidious aspects is its promotion and use of moral concepts of individualism, inclusion, and empowerment in order to not only shape and structure policies and reforms but to also shape the behaviours of all of those involved in the process.

Considering the increasing prevalence and transformative power of neoliberal discourses, it is important to consider the “particular form” and “particular consequences” which follow its application and implementation (Fairclough 2003:5). Under the rubric of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking, individuals/countries fail because they are “not competitive enough”, due to personal or cultural reasons which do not allow individuals to “enhance their own human capital”, and leads to deeper and more intrusive neoliberal policies (Harvey 2007:34) to correct the issue. These discourses localize poverty through its emphasis on the state or the individual which in turn “blinds” populations from considering or questioning structural inequalities, or the role of the state in providing employment and social services (O’Reilly 2010:184). Ruckert (2007) maintains that poverty reduction strategy papers aim to restore political hegemony through novel neoliberal governing strategies and discourses of inclusive, pro-poor development and poverty reduction strategies and programmes, which promote and work

¹⁸Death, Carl. 2010. “Governing Sustainable Development: Partnerships, protests and power at the World Summit”. Routledge: New York. A play on words from Alistair Findlay’s cartoon “all aboard for 2002” mentioned on page vii.

through the concepts of empowerment, participation and economic security (93). Cornwall and Brock (2005) state that the “essentially contested” “buzzwords” of participation, empowerment and poverty reduction within the MDGs are “definitionally” vague concepts which convey a moral authority and promote an agenda for transformation which in turn lend legitimacy and justification to development actors (1043-46). Sheppard (2010) considers the role of neoliberal discursive supplements in the remaking of global capitalist governance, and how they are promoted as the solution to underdevelopment; they generate an image of a “flattened world” whereby all countries are able to equally develop (185-6).

Larner (2000) states that there are three ways in which to understand neoliberalism: as policy, ideology or governmentality. Viewing the practices of the MDGs as consisting of neoliberal governmentalities sheds light on how this global framework consists of neoliberal moves, rather than working within or implementing an all-encompassing neoliberal ideology or rigid neoliberal policy. Neoliberal practices and discourses represent “a system of meaning that constitutes institutions, practices and identities in contradictory and disjunctive ways” (ibid:12). What is so paradoxical about this strategy is that it promotes individualism through the problematization of the state, yet, it involves practices and methods of governance which aim to “encourage” individuals to “conform to the norms of the market” (ibid:12). This political rationality is “oriented to specific objectives” through governing human behaviour (Rose et.al 2006:84). The ultimate aim is to govern “free subjects” in order to achieve “self-mastery” and “self-responsibility” (Ong 2007:4). Working through a “disciplinary rubric” located within “structures of opportunity” (Craig and Porter 2003:54), these practices and

methods provide and/or think of new ways to govern populations and regions that center on such mechanisms as decentralization, privatization, and individualization (Peck & Tickell 2002). The following are examples of neoliberal discourses which promote and represent efficiency in order to help individuals and nations to compete at a local, national and international level and are emphasized as remedies to underdevelopment and poverty (Lyon-Callo 2004:10): competition, fiscal responsibility, individual rights, deregulation, market-logics, lean government, privatization, “growth-chasing” economic development, promotion of best-practice policy, innovation and capacity building, and good governance (Shore 2008:284). International policies and agencies have been permeated by these neoliberal practices and have transformed “the poor” into subjects who suffer “from disorders of the self” and who can be remedied through self-improvement activities, such as training and education, in order to “reform” their deficient characteristics and behaviours (ibid:18). Some of the most prevalent neoliberal discursive techniques that constitute this process are partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking.

Partnerships between donor countries/institutions and recipients are to provide, develop and establish an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system and make available benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications (UNDP.org). Yet this is an elusive method of neoliberal governance, in that it fosters patterns of governance through its ability to create “new” programs by linking individuals to communities; it has the ability to mold communities into sites of change by encouraging individuals to become responsible for building a stronger community and self (Brodie 2000:123).

The responsabilization of the individual is another neoliberal governing mechanism of millennial development. It is achieved through the creation of the notion of freedom, in the sense that, as appreciative, free beings, individuals are required to conduct themselves responsibly (Rose et al 2006:91). Acting as an apparatus of rule, responsabilization discourse involves tools, techniques and programs in order to assist individuals to enhance their skills and to promote participation, communication and knowledge training, which should lead to social and economic change (Ilcan and Phillips 2010). Responsibilities are bestowed upon nations and individuals through the multiple MDG documents produced by the UN, the programs created (as seen with “Women Feed the World”), and the visual and calculative devices such as graphs, tables, and timelines (as seen in the MDG Monitor discussed below) (ibid:856,859). This “shifting of responsibility” onto the local means the poor are now seen as the key “instruments” to reducing their own poverty; it is now their responsibility to participate in competitive national and global structures and programmes by selling their labour and goods in the context of free trade and human capital, unprotected by intermediaries, and located, constrained and defined by their spaces of residence (Porter & Craig 2004:415-416) in order to achieve the benchmarks set forth by global development organizations, policies and programmes.

Benchmarking is a calculative practice, based upon global measurements and standards, which aims to improve one’s performance through behavior modification, innovation and invention (Moriarty & Smallman 2009:486). As a neoliberal aspect of the governing techniques of development, benchmarking promotes calculative practices through the language of targets, schedules, comparable data and indicators, best practices,

scoreboards, maps, tables, and costs, which aim to not only encourage individuals, groups and places to “reinvent” and “improve” themselves, but to also develop better tools to measure and monitor performance and progress (ibid:487, Bruno 2009:269; Shore 2008:282). These practices legitimize the presence of development and government institutions, trained experts, and professional reformers, which “‘manage’ and ‘regulate’ the lives of ‘the poor’ in the interest of ‘normalizing’ them” (Lyon-Callo 2004:18). Through an analysis of these three discourses, I not only intend on exposing the governing strategies of each technique, but also how they complement each other, and work within and towards the overall global governing framework of millennial development.

I have chosen to examine the MDGs as an example of millennial development thinking. The MDGs were implemented during the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, where 189 nations adopted and 147 Heads of State signed the Millennium Declaration¹⁹.

¹⁹ Ahmed and Cleeve (2004) provide a brief historical account of the MDGs. Within the past ten years, the UN, World Bank and IMF, alongside other leading development organizations, have introduced and established “an agreed universal framework of international development goals and targets” to be reached by 2015 (ibid:16). The authors take into account the 1995 UN Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen, which established goals of reducing poverty fifty per cent, as well as the 2nd Tokyo International Conference on African Development in 1998, which incorporated these poverty reduction goals into its Agenda for Action, as the initial phases of the MDGs. These goals were further adopted in 2000 by the OECD and UN’s Copenhagen plus five Conference, and referred to as the UN Millennium Development Goals. Following its official recognition,

The UN member states committed themselves to reaching and achieving the eight, time-bound, measurable goals, which details global aims and responds to the world's main development challenges, which include: to eradicate hunger and poverty; achieve universal primary education; promote gender equality; reduce child mortality; improve maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS; ensure environmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership (UNDP.org). This regime of practices and programmes have “transformed the face of global development”²⁰ (Alston 2005:757) through the creation and implementation of novel ways of thinking about and pursuing development, which have captured the imagination of both international development agencies and national governments due to its limited and selective prioritization of objectives, its measurements to provide accountability, and its time-bound nature meant to bring precision (ibid:756). It aims to achieve these goals through economic growth, (ie. resource transfers, trade liberalization, policies, and institutions), which should enhance productivity and increase per capita income (Akoum 2008:229)²¹.

the goals were embodied in the New African Initiative at the African Leaders Lusaka Summit in 2001, as well as “established by a consortium of experts from the UN in consultations with IMF, the World Bank, and other specialized agencies of the UN system” (ibid:16).

²⁰ Stated by ex-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.

²¹ There is concern however, that such a narrow focus on the economy will exclude other issues related to development, such as social, economic and political dimensions, since an economic approach only looks at small parts of the “development problem” (Akoum 2008:229). It should be noted as of this moment, there is no direct causality between

The increasing importance of the MDGs can be seen within the expanding development literature. Vandemoortele (2009) considers “the MDG conundrum”. The MDGs are being misappropriated to gain support for a specific, donor-centric, development strategy or policy framework which is accomplished through the benchmarks that are difficult to meet in developing African countries, due to their “one-size-fits-all approach”, leading to “excessive Afro-pessimism” (ibid:355). Easterly (2009) furthers this argument by claiming the MDGs are unfair to Africa due to its poorly made and arbitrary design, as well as aggressive, unrealistic and ahistoric nature of its benchmarking practices that are based on relative performance indicators which tend to make African successes look like failures (26-8). Taking more of a regional approach to the MDGs, Hayman (2007) examines the different perspectives of donors and recipients with regards to the poverty reduction efforts in Rwanda and how the discourses they employ “mirrors international poverty reduction agenda[s], [while] looking well beyond this goal” (371). This has created a struggle between the various policies and goals of agencies and actors, which sheds light on the irrelevance of the MDGs and its inability to represent regional needs (ibid:371-2). Jones and Chant further this argument in their examination of the effects of the MDGs on low-income, urban women and men in Gambia and Ghana. Education, training and employment are promoted as “remedies” to poverty yet these solutions impose costs on these individuals and illuminates the disparities between the perceived and actual role of the development strategies imposed

economic growth and the creation of new businesses, or whether entrepreneurship leads to economic growth (Klapper, Amit and Guillen 2010:140).

on the country (Jones and Chant 2009:184-5). Although these authors discuss and demonstrate the unfeasible and inapplicable practices of the MDGs in Africa, I find the existing literature to be somewhat inadequate in the sense that it leaves the reader wanting for more information on the examination of the MDGs as a global governing apparatus which not only influences the development practices and policies of nations, but how it molds these nations, and those residing within them, into becoming a product of millennial development. I believe more research needs to focus on how international organizations working with and through national and local actors not only frame the poor through the practices of the MDGs, but how they transform the conduct of those actors.

The MDG literature tends to focus on the effective role that aid can have upon poverty reduction and/or development strategies (Sachs 2005, Dalgaard and Erickson 2009, Clemens, Kenny and Moss 2007). Emphasis has been placed on the challenges associated with the implementation of the MDGs and how acknowledging these challenges can inform future goal setting (Waage et.al 2010) as well as how the MDGs are “unfair” to Africa (Easterly 2009) particularly focusing on the need to expand the concept of poverty (Sumner 2009) and human rights (Nelson 2007, Van Ginneken 2009) within the continent, as well as consider the various and numerous complexities on the ground (Jones and Chant 2009, Hayman 2007). Much emphasis has been placed on assessing and evaluating country performance towards reaching the MDGs (Ahmed and Cleve 2004, Gaiha, Imai and Nandhi 2009, Adler, Yazhensky and Tarverdyan 2010). Taking an alternative, and much needed approach, I aim to contribute to the limited but nonetheless valuable literature on the governmentalities of the MDGs (Tarabini 2010, Ilcan and Phillips 2010, Ilcan and Lacey 2011 are of note), and the discursive practices of

millennial development (Cornwall and Brock 2005) by analyzing the neoliberal governmentalities of millennial development, and how these governmentalities shape the policies, practices and perceptions of poverty within the context of Namibia and its *Vision 2030* policy. I emphasized the techniques of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking, in order to display how spaces, and the individuals within these spaces, are molded, monitored and shaped in order to complement and fulfill millennial development strategies, targets and goals. These governmentalities work to govern the actions of the poor and ideas of poverty and poverty reduction and legitimize the presence of development and government institutions, trained experts, and professional reformers, which manage and regulate the lives of the poor. Analyzing *Vision 2030* through a governmentality lens has allowed me to demonstrate how this vision works within and towards larger UN frameworks which guide the relationships between recipients and donors. Namibians are lead into believing that development is not only in “their hands”, but they are also a vital ingredient in the development process. In other words, the ability for not only the state, but also individuals to mold themselves into self-regulating subjects, capable of meeting the criteria of *Vision 2030*, is a crucial aspect for the transformation of the country and the achievement of *Vision 2030* and the MDGs.

The MDGs are one of the most important pacts ever made for international development. These goals have substantially shaped development dialogue and discourse, to the extent that development agencies and countries worldwide judge all of their activities on their contribution to, and achievement of, the MDGs. Namibia has come to endorse the global framework of the MDGs, and has incorporated them within their national poverty reduction framework, *Vision 2030*. This vision, launched in June 2004,

aims to shape the lives of the poor and reduce poverty; its stated goal is to “improve the quality of life of the people of Namibia to the level of their counterparts in the developed world by 2030” (<http://www.grnnet.gov.na/aboutnam.html>). It is a document that details Namibia’s current and future development programmes, strategies, objectives and goals through eight themes: inequality and social welfare; human resources development and institutional capacity building; macro-economic issues; population, health and development; Namibia’s natural resources sector; knowledge, information and technology; and factors of the external environment. With its main goal of poverty reduction, *Vision 2030* is at the centre of Namibia’s national agenda (ibid). Acting as a “national vision” and a “perception of the future”, *Vision 2030* “presents a clear view of where Namibia is, where it wants to go from here, and over what time frame” and will guide and provide direction to not only government ministries, but also to the private sector, NGOs, civil society and regional and local government authorities (ibid). This framework is “about the people”²², in that it will provide “social, economic and overall well-being” through the “creation of a diversified, open market economy” (ibid). Emphasis is placed on skills development, competitiveness, and capacity-building

²² The reason why the policy is seen as the “people’s policy”, or “for the people”, is due to the fact that many of the goals were formulated through a national opinion survey, regional consultations and national dialogue. Along with surveys and consultations, (<http://www.npc.gov.na/vision/vision2030.html>:38), a “Media Programme” was designed and implemented in order to “publicize aspects of the visioning process (through radio, television and print media) and encourage public participation...”

(<http://www.npc.gov.na/vision/vision2030.html>:Chapter2).

projects, which will “transform” Namibia into a “knowledge-based society”²³ with a “totally integrated, unified, flexible and high quality education and training system” (ibid). Therefore, in order to achieve the goals of *Vision 2030*, Namibians are encouraged to transform themselves, along with their actions and knowledges, in order to become a developed society.

Discussions of economic growth, income inequality, and new imaginations of the poor and poverty appear in, and underscore, both the MDGs and *Vision 2030*. The policies are connected through multiple offices, programmes, goals, projects, policy documents, speeches, and reports whereby knowledge and expertise are circulated, transferred and applied through newsletters, web pages, working papers, manuals, and other publications. *Vision 2030* connects directly to the MDGs and to development demands from international development organizations, such as the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, government departments, and private sector firms. While it is believed that the success of *Vision 2030* will bring about sustainable agriculture, peace, social justice, and gender equality (ibid) and connect to the first among the eight MDGs to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger” (MDG 2009), I question how and to what extent this national program shapes and governs poverty through the “novel” practices of

²³ *Vision 2030* focuses on the promotion of a knowledge-based economy due to the fact that “households who depend on...subsistence farming as the main sources of income have a higher incidence of poverty than the average national poverty incidence” (UNDP: Strategy and Policy Unit 2010: 24-6).

partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking, which act as neoliberal governing techniques.

Portraying the MDG framework and its practices as novel forms of development obscures its history and hence legitimizes its presence and its techniques. The MDGs are the latest link in the development goal setting chain²⁴. They are descendents of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Development Decade of the 1960s and the multiple UN summits of the 20th century which focused on poverty and hunger, health, disease, and children (Waage et.al 2010:3). Considering the numerous years, summits and conventions that constitute the MDGs²⁵, this global framework can be described as comprising a “global governance architecture” which is defined as an overarching system of institutions that comprises “organizations, regimes, and other forms of principles, norms, regulations, and decision-making procedures” (Biermann et al 2009:15) as well as “policy-makers, practitioners and experts...civil society actors... [and] virtually every major international development agency” which produces multiple reports about the progress made towards development initiatives (Alston 2005:756-7). Therefore labeling the MDGs as a new strategy or understanding of development is largely rhetorical; it veils the actual occurrences within, and effects of, development policies and programs.

²⁴ Development programmes prior to the implementation of the MDGs focused on market reforms and economic stabilization as prerequisites to development. This highly flawed, controversial and stagnant outlook led to the formation of a millennial development framework and its promotion of softer forms of development focusing on partnerships, pro-poor policies, and inclusion (Cleeve and Ndhlovu 2004:9).

²⁵ See footnote 19.

The institutions and actors that comprise the MDGs work through a framework which entails dissatisfaction, questioning and a demand to govern better. It is because of the failure of previous development policies and programmes that the millennial development practices of the MDGs have been promoted and legitimized as a novel form of development allowing for the governing of subjects in developing countries. Actively supporting and implementing millennial development policies and programmes not only localizes the issue of poverty, but it aims to shape the lives of the poor within these underdeveloped regions through particular discursive practices in order to create self-disciplined and responsible individuals who are capable of taking themselves out of their own poverty. Larger structural issues are diminished, forms of assistance and social services are downsized, and benchmarks are epitomized.

Celebrating the virtues of self-management, self-responsibility, individuation, and calculation (Swyngedouw 2005:1998,2003) portrays the MDGs as empowering for the socially, culturally, economically and politically marginalized, but they are “an integral part of the consolidation of an imposed and authoritarian neo-liberalism” (ibid:1998). According to the UNDP, in order to achieve the MDGs, the goals must be implemented at the national and local level and must work to produce clearly defined timelines and requirements (http://www.undp.org/poverty/topics1_mdg_based_national_planning.shtml). The strategies must also be based on, and surround the needs of, poor individuals, communities and countries, meaning the MDGs must be implemented nationally, and work within all sectors in order to achieve medium and/or long-term results (ibid).

To facilitate those nation-states working within the MDG framework, the UN/UNDP adheres to four steps: launching inclusive planning processes; taking inventory; conducting detailed assessments to estimate what is required to achieve the MDGs; and finally developing national strategies that draw upon MDG needs assessments (ibid). The ultimate aim is to “develop the capacity of local actors” in order to assist with, and achieve, target and goal planning and setting, as well as to strengthen local institutions to ensure the achievement of the goals and to establish links between national policies and local practices (ibid). The individuals within these spaces must maintain ownership over the development process and must participate or be involved in actions to achieve the goals (http://www.undp.org/poverty/topics5_xc_mdg_localization.shtml). Localizing the MDGs will “draw attention to pockets of poverty” and identify underdeveloped areas in order to improve services (ibid). If further assistance is needed, the UN will provide “training programmes” on MDG-based development strategies (http://www.undp.org/poverty/topics1_mdg_based_national_planning.shtml). These actions demonstrate how structural issues are diminished, and local “deficiencies” are highlighted in the development process. If communities or nations are unable to reach the goals, or create a decent timeline, than corrective measures will be employed in order to assist with these transformative practices. By nationalizing and localizing development the poor will now not only “identify local issues” which inhibit development, but they will also contribute to and be involved in new categories and prescriptions (Craig and Porter 2006:80). In this sense, the poor are involved in creating and governing themselves and the actions needed in order to reach the development goals.

It is therefore important to question what kinds of ‘subjectivities’ or ‘selves’ are required within millennial development programmes. It appears that individuals are required to be “‘flexible’, active, ‘self-managed’ and ‘self-disciplined’” which will allow the individual to be productive, cost-effective and able to “‘govern themselves’ through the exercise of introspection, calculation and judgment” (Shore 2008:283-4). The perfect subject will therefore be one who is focused and dedicated to the national objective through voluntary initiatives, and who will “‘make the most of their own existence by conducting their life responsibly” (Rose 1996:45). The discursive practices surrounding poverty reduction not only shape individuals but also reshape alternative approaches to and voices of development, allowing for the dominance of a development model consisting of neoliberal development governmentalities (Kothari 2005b:429). What has been created are not methods and modes of development and/or poverty reduction, but a “‘new’ global agenda for development” (Tarabini 2010:205), a “‘one size fits all” (Craig and Porter 2006:87) approach that favours particular neoliberal techniques and remedies. Such an agenda can, for example, be seen in both Kenya’s and Botswana’s development plans and poverty reduction strategies.

Kenya prepared a National Poverty Eradication Plan (NPEP), which spans from 1999 to 2015, and gives prominence to poverty reduction. This plan views poverty and development as a political necessity, moral obligation, and economic requirement. Guided by the MDGs, the plan’s major components focus on social integration, economic growth, and setting out a framework which will detail the actions of government, civil society, the private sector and donor partners (Oyugi 2008:11) who will be responsible for the implementation of the policy. In order to accomplish this national development

plan, Kenya formulated and implemented its Vision 2030 policy “which aims at making Kenya a ‘newly industrialized middle income country providing a high quality life for all its citizens by the year 2030” (ibid:12). Botswana is also working through a similar framework due to its endorsement of the MDGs. Botswana’s main development goals focus on poverty alleviation, increasing employment and social integration. These goals have been nationalized and articulated within Botswana’s National Development Plan, Vision 2016. The major components of this plan include: economic growth and diversification, employment, and entrepreneurship development (ibid:12). Comparing Kenya’s and Botswana’s approaches to development and poverty reduction, verifies the “one size fits all” argument in that although each country has their own unique identification, each are working within a similar development framework: pursuing economic growth, incorporating and strengthening institutions of governance, focusing on infrastructural development, and investing in human capital, or capacity-building (ibid:12).

The all-encompassing and pervasive practices of neoliberal discursive techniques have therefore become engrained in millennial development thinking and have now become a commonsense interpretation of the world which have had serious consequences upon ways of thought and practice (Harvey 2007:23) and have created serious inequalities and disintegration in the form of “politico-social exclusion...exacerbated poverty, social disparities, economic degradation, violence and social disintegration” (De La Barra 2006:126)²⁶. Rather than seeing the failure of development as the effect of a

²⁶ These inequalities are due to: the lack of democracy; levels of violence, both personal and institutional; the unlimited drive for profits and power; the lack of respect for the

particular practice or framework, blame is instead placed upon the individual, or the local, due to the neoliberal advancement of entrepreneurial freedoms, individual liberty, and free trade (ibid:126).

Neoliberal techniques and discourses of development view social inequality as a result of individual differences, inabilities, or incapacities and works to not only identify and produce boundaries of poverty and underdevelopment, but they also transform these “problem” spaces into spaces of opportunity and places of possibility; these spaces are now “sites of development, not proof of development’s failure” (Ferguson 2007:75). The following chapter will examine how the neoliberal techniques of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking, have transformed people and places into sites of possibility by examining how they work individually and collectively as governing techniques, at both a national and international level.

state of law at international, national and local levels; unfair markets and the manipulation of foreign exchange rates (De La Barra 2006:134-35).

Chapter 3

The “*Three Faces*”²⁷ of Millennial Development: Partnerships, Responsibilization and Benchmarking within the MDGs

Neoliberal discourses have had a very powerful effect upon our current understanding of underdevelopment and poverty. The poor are now portrayed as deprived of capacity, which justifies their incorporation into the development process and the application of global development frameworks. These frameworks, and the organizations that endorse them, whole-heartedly believe that in order to reduce or alleviate the effects of poverty, the focus must be placed on partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking. Described as methods which will “empower” and “involve” the poor within and throughout the development process (UNDP 2010), these practices involve neoliberal techniques of governance.

Partnerships of the MDGs

*“...where there is partnership, there are gains”*²⁸

Partnerships aim to bring together the multiple and various development partners into a single framework in order to ensure direction, correspondence and complicity. Located within the framework of millennial development, partnerships join local development

²⁷ Comaroff and Comaroff. 2000. *Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming*. *Public Culture* v12(2), pp.291-343. This quote is a play on words from their subtitle “Three Faces of Millennial Capitalism” on page 309.

²⁸ Remarks delivered by the Secretary-General at the High-level Event on the Millennium Development Goals, New York, 25 September 2008. Located on page 58 of the United Nations’ “The Millennium Development Goals Report 2009” (MDG 2009).

issues to global programs. The MDGs emphasize partnerships between developed and developing countries in order to create a local, national and international environment which is “conducive to development and the elimination of poverty” (MDG 2009:80). The concept has gained so much importance, that one of the goals of the MDGs focuses specifically on it: to develop a global partnership for development through addressing the special needs of LDCs (least developed countries) (<http://www.undp.org/mdg/basics.shtml>). The UN emphasizes the fact that they are voluntary agreements and multi-stakeholder initiatives which aim to implement inter-governmentally agreed upon sustainable development goals (Mert 2009:111).

It is difficult to deny partnership strategies, particularly due to the bombardment of videos, case studies, maps, charts and latest feeds, portraying and/or discussing the opinions of civil society, advocates and envoys, as well as success stories, emphasizing the *need* to implement partnership policies globally. The UNDP site has a variety of colourful and quite attractive links that visually display the positive effects of partnerships. Their “Picture This: We Can End Poverty” photo contest provides a winning photo which best represents partnerships: entitled as “New Horizons”, a picture displays Camila Gonzalez “studying at home on a computer she received through Uruguay’s ‘One Laptop per Child’ programme” (<http://www.undp.org/picturethis2010/mdg8.shtml>). The site also offers a variety of national success stories. For example, the country of Benin is “on track to ensure primary education for all by 2015...” due to the policies that were created and implemented through the partnership between the UNDP and the Government of Benin. The site displays a picture of a young boy, smiling, holding a chalkboard that says “j’aime mon ecole”, allowing the onlooker to visually see

the positive effects of these partnerships, in the form of school supplies, assistance, and access to cleaner drinking water (<http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2010/september/benin-on-track-to-achieve-universal-primary-education.en>). Malawi is currently “on the road to fighting poverty”; one village in particular used to be a “hunger prone area” with low yields, unaffordable fertilizer and seeds, and have malnourished children with no access to clean water. However, “a lot has changed” since the introduction of the Millennium Villages Project, which is a partnership between the UNDP, the Earth Institute at Columbia University and the Millennium Promise²⁹. The project has intervened in rural areas in order to “alleviate poverty and provide access to education and other basic necessities” (<http://content.undp.org/go/newsroom/2010/september/malawi-on-the-road-to-fighting-poverty.en>). Households have been given seeds and fertilizer, and have been taught improved farming techniques, allowing farmers to produce a surplus of crops, and to provide villagers with food security and income (ibid). Providing detailed and intimate photographs and stories works to create or unite feelings of compassion and approval (Sontag 2003:18). The pictures aim to demonstrate the validity of partnerships.

There are also numerous MDG YouTube video links on the UN websites, where anyone has the option of watching videos ranging from gender equality and female empowerment, to starving children, or dying HIV/AIDS patients. Although most of the

²⁹ The Millennium Promise is the leading international non-profit organization committed to supporting the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals to halve extreme poverty by 2015. The Millennium Promise oversees the Millennium Villages project (http://www.millenniumpromise.org/our_mission.php).

videos tend to incorporate the power of partnerships, there are many that are strictly dedicated to the topic. One video entitled “UN Millennium Campaign Goal 8 Global Partnership” narrates that “we have the money and the means, what we want is action” and that without action on global partnerships, “poor countries will not achieve the first seven goals: ending poverty and hunger; providing education for all and stopping deadly diseases like AIDS” (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EXDDNFLDiFw>). Various images are shown, more than likely located within developing countries, of people doing daily tasks in what seems to be strenuous, depleted and dirty environments. Information is provided about the degree of poverty associated with farmers/ing in developing countries, with slow, sad music playing in the background. Dead fields and crops are shown in Africa, associated with statistics on the amount of children and adults who die from starvation. When all hope seems lost, upbeat and cheerful music plays along with Ugandan school children singing in school uniforms, where 2 million extra children now attend school, due to the better health care centers and systems in the region, as well as the flowing water and drugs which are provided through partnerships (ibid). Portraying partnerships between international, national and local actors and institutions as the most important element in the development project and as “one of the most important deals in history” makes it difficult for anyone to disagree with the practice (ibid).

The partnerships of the MDGs are portrayed as necessary to fulfill the needs and desires of the two billion victims of poverty. The UNDP states that “it is up to us” to assist with the needs of these individuals (http://www.undp.org/poverty/focus_mdg_strategies.shtml). Although it unclear as to who represents “us”, the UNDP has clearly chosen to fulfill that role in their declaration to:

Provide leadership and... coordination to develop capacity in countries to assess what is needed to achieve the MDGs, to conceptualize policies and to design strategies and plans. For this purpose, UNDP organizes consultations and training, conducts research, develops planning and information management tools... provide[s] hands-on support to countries to scale up implementation of initiatives to achieve the MDGs... [and] assist[s] countries to report on their progress (ibid).

It is through the mechanisms of partnerships that governing bodies are able to join local representations of poverty to the administrative mechanisms of global development initiatives and to improve development practices (Craig & Porter 2005:240). This process is legitimized through the creation and granting of freedom, whereby developing African states “are expected to exercise their agency responsibly and in ways consistent with international norms and values” (Abrahamsen 2004:1462). Through inclusion, states are molded into becoming compliant, self-governed and accountable members of the global community.

Acting as a method of advanced neoliberal rule partnerships are “voluntary and coercive at the same time” which generates “new forms of agency and new forms of discipline” that provide the disguise for the dominance of Western states and international governing agencies (ibid:1454). Poor countries are to now be active in achieving the MDGs: “They must do their part to ensure greater accountability to citizens and efficient use of resources. But for poor countries to achieve the... goals, it is absolutely critical that rich countries deliver on their end of the bargain with more and more effective aid, more sustainable debt relief and fairer trade rules, well in advance of

2015” (<http://www.endpoverty2015.org/en/goals/global-partnership>). Partnership techniques not only localizes blame, in the sense it is the duty of the country to properly implement the MDGs, but it also enables larger and more powerful development partners to subtly structure and shape the outcome of the program and the participants themselves due to their “absolutely critical” role. Voluntarily entering into and engaging with partnership structures molds and shapes the conduct of millennial development participants. Of course one can always debate about just how voluntary these partnerships are. It is possible that countries enter into partnerships due to the possible repercussions they may face by the international community. What makes partnerships an elusive development governmentality is its ability to work not through direct domination or imposition, but rather, through its ability to simultaneously exclude and incorporate, in order to create and produce the perfect neoliberal state.

The current rhetorical practice of partnerships merely conceals the power of international agencies. According to Mosse, “power lies in the narratives that maintain an organization’s definition of the problem...” (2004:646). Placed in the context of millennial development, it is important to consider how the UN/UNDP defines the problem of poverty and underdevelopment. The organizations claim that in order to pursue development, a country must “create productive and gainful employment” as well as “effective and efficient social safety nets to protect those who cannot work or who earn too little” (http://www.undp.org/poverty/focus_inclusive_development.shtml). The key however, to achieving the MDGs, is through “enhanc[ing] public services by building schools and hospitals, training teachers and doctors, and providing access to water, sanitation and transportation, all of which requires...[w]ell-designed fiscal

policies...” (ibid). By detailing the needs of underdeveloped countries, the UNDP solidifies its presence as a major development partner, and hence shapes and influences the development process within the region.

Partnerships in the African context emerged as a “new framework” whereby, rather than being seen as a neo-colonial practice of intervention, it was instead a mode of “returning power” to the region (Abrahamsen 2004:1455). For example, the MDG Achievement Fund (MDG-F) emphasizes the egalitarian and harmonious nature of the relationships between partners, who range from farmers up to governmental organizations. According to the MDG-F, programmes are developed in consultation with government and civil society in order to generate national ownership policy frameworks (<http://www.mdgfund.org/page/ourprogrammes>). A pie chart is also provided which displays the percentage, and perhaps influence, that each partner has in the process. Even with the promotion of democracy, inclusion, ownership and egalitarianism, there continues to be tension surrounding partnerships, for it is believed that partnerships are simply a veil for the continued implementation of structural adjustment programs by international development and financial institutions (Mercer 2003:745). Although the partnerships of the MDGs describe developing countries as no longer “*recipients*”, but “*agents of their own development*”, they continue to be monitored by larger governing bodies, donors, institutions, etc. (ibid:746). As referenced above, it is important to note that although civil society, and local and national governments appear to represent about seventy percent of the graph, what needs to be considered is the power that the remaining actors have over the process, such as academic institutions, international governmental organizations, non-governmental organizations, and international financial institutions.

In order to properly implement a development policy, countries must work with and through MDG-based planning and policy implementation and its multiple and various international and national partners since they provide guidance and standards. Therefore, in order for regions to develop, certain policies should be nationally owned and implemented to not only partake in their own development, but to also coordinate with globally assigned goals and standards. Namibia's *Vision 2030* is but one of many nationally owned yet globally framed development initiatives made in the image of the MDGs. This development plan serves as "the country's road map" to development standards and has been "fully and systematically integrated" within the Millennium Development Goals (NPC 2008:iv). Some of the other Sub-Saharan African countries which have mainstreamed the MDGs into their national frameworks are Mauritius (Vision 2020), Nigeria (Vision 2020), Tanzania (Vision 2025), Zanzibar (Vision 2020) and Zambia (Vision 2030) (<http://www.undp.org/mdg/countries.shtml>). The partnerships endorsed by and located within the MDGs are a method of "governing at a distance", in that the promotion of country-led and locally owned development strategies generates the illusion of "being in the driver's seat", yet populations and states remain under the guidance of the IMF, World Bank and UN (Rojas 2004:107).

As a rationality of millennial development, partnerships are in fact an illusion of "contract governance" whereby previously "unequal" relationships are "re-aligned" as partnerships (Phillips & Ilcan 2004:398). This act makes partnerships one of the "major distraction gimmick[s]" (Bond 2006:341) of the MDGs, in that they enforce social transformation and enable development organizations to "govern at a distance" by making it possible to structure and shape the subject without coercion, control or

conditionality (Mercer 2003:746). What is so influential and powerful about the discourse of partnerships, is that it shapes and molds countries into becoming active and responsible agents who will participate with development organizations, governing bodies, or other states/countries, in order to eradicate their own poverty. Partnerships therefore invoke specific technologies which aim to “produce modern, self-disciplined citizens and states that can be trusted to govern themselves according to liberal democratic norms” (Abrahamsen 2004:1454). Acting as a neoliberal rationality, partnerships can be seen as a method to maintain the governing practices of development agencies, as well as produce self-disciplined, neoliberal states and citizens, who are responsible for their own development.

Responsibilization and the MDGs

“...we encourage people to take responsibility for their development and promote development activities that address the actual needs of the people...”³⁰

Due to the failures of previous development projects, which lacked a focus on “pro-poor” involvement, millennial development policies have begun reaching out to and including the poor, in order to make proper and representative decisions, and implement relevant and appropriate mechanisms (Nekwaya 2007:10). So in this sense, millennial development is now defined by the active involvement of not only nations (through partnerships strategies), but also the involvement, and hence responsibilization of individuals living within those underdeveloped regions. Responsibilization is meant to allow the poor to not only “determine their own destination”, but to also empower them

³⁰ Government of Namibia: About Namibia. Chapter 2 – Namibia an Overview, pp.34.

<<http://www.grnnet.gov.na/aboutnam.html>>.

through the development of their “skills and abilities” (ibid:ii). Making individuals responsible for development is not only a foundation of the MDGs, but it is also an essential element to its achievement. It is believed that “local actors—community leaders, local government officials, civil society activists, farmers and entrepreneurs—know best what does and does not work within their communities and they should have the voice and support they need to work their way towards a better quality of life” (http://www.undp.org/poverty/focus_local_development.shtml). This idea is demonstrated in Kenya’s new tracking mechanism. This quite novel initiative allows Kenyans to anonymously report on the success and/or failure of development projects via text messaging. The project will “enable and empower citizens to voice their concerns quickly, efficiently and cheaply...” (<http://www.endpoverty2015.org/en/africa/news/5-months-after-mdg-summit-citizen-tracking-mechanism-launched-kenya/16/feb/11>). It is questionable how those without access to such technologies, being those who live in poverty and in the greatest need of the services, will be able to voice their opinions and needs. Unfortunately, making citizens responsible for the development process may not only stifle the opinions of those who lack the ability to participate, but it may legitimize further cutbacks and restructuring policies due to inabilities to object at the local level.

Responsibilization techniques work through agency, in that it engages with the individual as active, free, informed and responsible subjects who are capable of taking control of development initiatives, as well as their own lives (Abrahamsen 2004:1460). Making the poor responsible for the achievement of development policies is a technocratic governing mechanism of development, whereby spaces are defined and accorded with particular characteristics which work to locate and authenticate

deficiencies within the space. This practice creates subjects of development, who are molded and shaped to fit within larger government and development blueprints. Revealing “deficiencies” legitimizes development practices and programmes. Placed within the context of millennial development, responsabilization offers and formulates new ways of thinking about reducing poverty by making individuals responsible for the achievement of the multiple and various development goals. This technique localizes underdevelopment and poverty through apolitical terms and practices, and “spin and deceit” concepts (Craig and Porter 2003:54), whereby the poor are incorporated into an inclusive framework which avoids any discussion or acknowledgement of inequality or political economy (ibid:54). Through practices of responsabilization, the poor have not only been incorporated into larger universalizing models and blueprints of poverty reduction, but they also embody them. Viewing the poor as responsible representatives of millennial development localizes and responsabilizes the issue of poverty and keeps key crucial issues, for example, property and power distributions, along with other systemic/structural influences, off of the larger global political and development agenda (Craig & Porter 2005:228).

To become a responsible member of development projects and programmes, individuals are encouraged to develop their entrepreneurial skills, in the sense that they are encouraged to be innovative, have organizational capacities, as well as create and maintain connections to local communities, in order to deliver responsible and effective services in a cost-efficient way (Ilcan 2006:864, de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff 2010:66). Individuals should/will receive “relevant training” as well as the “necessary education” needed in order to fulfill their capacities as well as meet the requirements of

today's economy. According to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, education is key to achieving the MDGs, particularly the goals surrounding poverty because it affects individual income and economic growth, leading to economic and social progress. Educating individuals, particularly marginalized individuals, such as women and girls, those who live in rural areas, the poor, and minorities, is "one of the best investments that any country can make..." because "they can earn more income, [and] improve their family's well being..." (<http://www.endpoverty2015.org/en/universal-education/news/education-vital-achieving-other-anti-poverty-targets-ban-stresses/25/sep/08>). The universal need to educate and transform the poor into employable and responsible citizens is then instilled in national mindsets and policies. For example, Namibia is currently "Planning for a Learning Nation" by implementing mechanisms needed to transform the country into a knowledge-based society in schools, colleges and vocational training centers in order to attain the national development goals (ETSIP 2007:v, 2). Attending "high quality" senior secondary education centers, "market responsive" vocational education and training centers, and pre-entry programmes for tertiary education (ibid:3) will improve "the quality, range and threshold of skilled labour" (ibid:2) and hence expand opportunities for the poor. *Vision 2030* states these components will guarantee an "immediate injection of skilled labour of various levels and types" into its economic structure (ibid:3) as well as "ensur[e] an enduring supply of candidates that will take up opportunities for [further] education and training...and lifelong learning" (ibid:3). Through the continual acquisition of skills and knowledge, individuals will be transformed into citizens responsible to themselves, to the state, and to the successful implementation of development goals.

The individual is lead to believe that they are involved with the formation and implementation of the policies necessary to develop their particular region/community. Responsibilization techniques work under the guise that it addresses or responds to the needs and desires of local communities, however, these projects are devised by international development agencies, who are “backed by its rule books, monitors and auditing devices, and [are] designed to *shape* desires and act on actions, setting the conditions so that people would behave as they ought” (Li 2007:231, italics in original). Responsibilization practices of the MDGs therefore represent a “subjectification” of individuals in the developing countries of Africa. Although discussed as “capable, rational, and responsible agents”, individuals are molded and subjected to technocratic, governing practices, in order to accomplish the standards set by the MDGs, which places them under increased scrutiny (Jaeger 2010:76-77). Responsibilization acts as a technology of governance by making groups and populations become self-regulating and responsible, allowing them to achieve the benchmarks of the MDGs as well as be subjected to the monitoring practices of international development organizations, financial institutions and partners.

Benchmarking the MDGs

“Progress is being made, but not fast enough to reach the MDG target[s]”³¹

Benchmarking the MDGs has created pressure and competition among, between and within developing countries due to its emphasis and ability to implement standards,

³¹ United Nations. 2010. The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010. pp. 1-76.

This quote is located on page 13.

deviations, and “notions of efficiency” (Miller 2008:59). This process works to transform its objects into beings that can be measured and compared. The aim is to reveal and to fix existing inconsistencies and predicaments. In this sense, benchmarking is a practice, and a technology, whereby the object, or the individual is “brought into existence” (Kalthoff 2005:73) and then reorganized and shaped in order to complement global development frameworks. The calculative practices associated with this technique have generated particular knowledges about developing countries, naturalized the process of development and emphasized and revered the best performer.

It is through this calculative practice, based upon global measurements and standards, that global and national development programmes govern and shape the social and economic lives of the poor. Targets, best practices, schedules, comparable data and indicators, scoreboards, maps, tables, and costs, are promoted which aim to not only encourage individuals, groups and places to “reinvent” and “improve” themselves, but to also develop better tools to measure and monitor performance and progress (Moriarty & Smallman 2009:487, Bruno 2009:269; Shore 2008:282). Placed within the context of the MDGs, these practices can complement global and/or national frameworks, due to the emphasis placed on country-led development strategies, private-sector led growth, capacity training and cost-effective investments in human development (Hayman 2007:380).

Benchmarks are by far the most notable technique located within the MDGs. Progress towards the MDGs are measured through 21 targets and 60 official indicators³², which allows the UN, and its many governing bodies, to acknowledge “how far the world has come in meeting the goals” (MDG 2010:76). The goal to “eradicate extreme poverty and hunger” is measured by three targets: Target 1a) “halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than \$1 a day”; Target 1b) “Achieve, full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people; Target 1c) “Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger” (MDG 2010). Country data are aggregated at the subregional and regional level, yet the situation of individual countries varies significantly (ibid). For example, while it appears that the majority of Asian countries are on track to meeting Target 1a³³, the majority of the countries in Africa (with data) are not (<http://www.mdgmonitor.org/map.cfm?goal=&indicator=&cd=>). Difficulty implementing or achieving the MDGs may possibly indicate difficulty with target application, the increasing level of ownership by international institutions, the complexity of the targets and indicators, or it may be the issue that the targets are incomplete or imprecise in relation to the goals (Waage et al. 2010:7). Even with such issues, there continues to be pressure to incorporate the goals

³² It is stated that the MDGs were “linked with indicators, for the purposes of measurement, and with goals, for the purpose of conceptual simplicity” (Waage et al. 2010:3).

³³ With the exception of India, Nepal, Bangladesh and Laos (MDGMonitor).

into national frameworks³⁴, as seen in the 60 national MDG reports provided on the UNDP website, with countries ranging from Bahrain, to Chile, to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (<http://www.undp.org/mdg/countries.shtml>). Whether or not the goals were intended to be nationally owned and/or implemented, countries continue to work with and through them in order to demonstrate their compliance with this global governing framework.

The quantitative time-bound framework of the MDGs deciphers whether a country is “moving forward” towards the achievement of the poverty reduction targets of 2015 or “lagging behind” with “unmet commitments” and “shortfalls” (MDG 2010:6). Those who are “making slow progress” toward specific targets, will be noted by the MDG Acceleration Framework (MAF) which will then further implement four “systematic” steps in order to identify “necessary interventions” to achieve the target, locate any possible bottlenecks, identify “high-impact and feasible solutions”, and formulate an “action plan” that will set specific roles for all of those involved in the process (UNDP 2010:7). The power of the MDG benchmark lies in its ability to label, describe and manipulate the progress of countries through “result-based” targeting; by focusing on the proportions of people above the \$1 per day poverty line, or the

³⁴ Waage et al (2010) state that due to “the importance that donors put on the MDGs, governments might feel pressure to show progress against their specific targets, whatever their national priorities might be. The MDGs are frequently mentioned by ministries in the poorest countries, and are often referred to in poverty reduction strategy papers. Fukuda-Parr’s analysis of 22 such papers has shown how almost all of them mentioned the MDGs...” (Waage et al 2010:13).

percentage of people who are employed, contextually specific targets are dismissed (Waage et al. 2010:11). Using these decontextualized results or benchmarks to indicate “progress” or development at a national level complements the argument that the goals were “never intended as national targets” due to the fact that they do not take into account local context, technical feasibility or financial affordability (ibid:14). Because the goals have little relevance or applicability on the ground, countries will tend to have a higher rate of failure. The application of these benchmarks to developing African countries has generated a sense of “defeatism” and “Afropessimism”³⁵ (ibid:14, Vandemoortele 2009:355), as well as an increasing prioritization and problematization of poverty in the region.

The MDGs are unfair to the region in that they are poorly designed to measure the progress occurring within a country, let alone a continent³⁶. It is estimated that Sub-Saharan Africa will need to maintain 7% annual growth in GDP (Easterly 2009:26-9), yet in 2010, it was a respectable 4¾ per cent, and in 2011, it is predicted to reach 5¾ per cent (IMF 2010:3). According to the unrealistic goals of the MDGs, it is not enough, leading to a stigmatization of the continent (Easterly 2009:26-9). According to an MDG report assessing the progress in Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa “continues to considerably lag

³⁵ One of the key issues with the MDGs is how it discriminates against Africa. The acontextual and unachievable nature of the goals has meant that 42 out of 47 African countries “are considered ‘off track’ for at least half of the targets and 12 are ‘off-track’ for all targets” (Clemens, Kenny and Moss 2007:736).

³⁶ “Progress” or “failure” depends on the way that targets are measured (Easterly 2009:26-9).

behind all other regions of the world” (MDG 2009:12). Having goals for Africa without historical precedent generates the image of “Africa as failure” and legitimizes the image of “Western as savior” (Easterly 2009:34). African failure generates “fields of visibility” and allows for the establishment of best practices, goals, possibilities, outcomes, comparison and emulation, which normalizes the monitoring of national results (Bruno 2009:274) in order to transform and accelerate the pace of development (MDG 2010:7). With an emphasis on “failure”, the neoliberal rationalities of the MDGs are justifiably implemented within national policies.

Emphasizing best practices localizes poverty, in the sense that national or individual conduct is judged and shaped by the larger structural indicators of global governing institutions in order to eradicate “their” poverty (Bruno 2009:273-4; Shore 2008:281). This structure of power has created and continues to create visibility, patterns, and economic and social modes of management (Miller 2008:54) allowing poverty and spaces of underdevelopment to become “visible, calculable and operable” (ibid:52). The targets are used as “yardsticks” or “bonds” against which individuals and states judge, order, rank and measure their performance and competitiveness. Those who are unable or unwilling to follow this path are in turn pressured or stigmatized through “naming”, “framing”, and “shaming” techniques (Bruno 2009:273-4; Shore 2008:281-2). The MDG Monitor evaluates the progress of developing countries towards reaching the MDGs through a colour coded map. This website is accessible to any and all individuals who wish to “track” and “learn” about any of the 130 countries listed on the website. The map vividly displays the power of “naming”, “framing” and “shaming”. With just a click of a mouse, anyone is able to judge, rank, measure and compare the progress of a country

through the varying shades of red on the global MDG map ([http://www.mdgmonitor.org/map.cfm? goal=&indicator=&cd=](http://www.mdgmonitor.org/map.cfm?goal=&indicator=&cd=)). Countries are then shamed by the international community, and led to provide explanations for their poverty and solutions. For example, Zanzibar is off track to meet the MDGs due to high population growth rates, leading the government of the country to focus on implementing stricter migration policies and family planning campaigns (<http://www.unpo.org/article/6948>). Some other causes include human capabilities, governance, disease and education. The country aims to achieve the MDGs and mend its deficiencies through its Vision 2020 policy, which provides “strategies to mobilise and utilise domestic financial resources, both public and private, and a framework for attracting external resources to support prioritised expenditure plans” (<http://www.unpei.org/PDF/TZ-zanzibar-strategy-growth-poverty-reduction.pdf>: 2). The policy focuses on “reducing income poverty, improving human capabilities, survival and social well-being and containing extreme vulnerability... education, health, agriculture, tourism, infrastructure...and water, as well as cross-cutting issues like good governance, trade and combating HIV and AIDS” (ibid). The goal is to display the nation’s willingness and ability to alter and transform itself into a country capable of the achieving the MDGs. Displayed at such a visual and quite vivid level, benchmarks have the ability to generate competitive aspirations through comparative evaluation, but competition and competitiveness are ideas and ““ideas do not float freely”” (Bruno 2009:262); they are influenced and/or produced by neoliberal rationalities and governing techniques.

Benchmarking acts as an “indefinite discipline’ of competitiveness”³⁷, which generates new knowledges, experts³⁸, technologies and programmes due to the fact that the benchmark is a moving and unattainable target which cannot be reached, set only to be replaced by the latest best performer (ibid:277). They are unattainable due to its ability to make “organizationally discrete and spatially disparate objects” comparable; the ability to make the “incommensurable commensurable” allows spaces of poverty to be represented as global, and reparable only through numbers, competition, best practice policies, and emulation (Larner and Le Heron 2004:212-215). Making the incommensurable commensurable means benchmarks ignore crucial differences and diminishes contextual complexities. These standards are able to connect billions of people worldwide, along with regions and countries, and compare community practices with others who share little in common, and places them within a global development framework. The use and application of standards and deviations not only naturalizes and universalizes the practices of benchmarks, due to the objectivity and factuality associated

³⁷ Bruno borrows this term from Foucault who defines it as “a procedure that would be at the same time the permanent measure of a gap in relation to an inaccessible norm and the asymptotic movement that strives to meet in infinity” (Bruno 2009:277).

³⁸ The rise of benchmarking and calculation has generated a “reserve army of marginal and casually employed professionals... a regime of bureaucrats, inspectors, commissioners, regulators and experts which... is eroding professional autonomy and threatening... democratic freedoms” (Shore 2008:282-83).

with numbers, but it also transforms individuals who can now be calculated and measured, repaired and resolved.

As a governing practice of millennial development, benchmarking infuses new modes of conduct into developing countries leading to the reorganization of forms of behaviour. Individuals are assessed by, and regulate their own performance through, the concepts of efficiency, economy and cost-effectiveness. This process may be referred to as “regulated self-regulation” (Shore 2008:281). These practices naturalize and legitimize not only the grading, and the hierarchical placement of countries or continents, but also the identification and implementation of corresponding recommendations. The power of a single number can shape and create, define, alter and influence social relations, the way individuals live their lives, and the way they understand the world (Miller 2008:57-8). The benchmark makes development a technology of governance due to the fact that it provides a framework in which spaces are made visible and hence open to judgments and policies that aim to mold them to not only achieve the MDGs, but to also become the perfect neoliberal subject (Power 2003:774).

The governmentalities of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking are powerful techniques which are riddled throughout the MDG framework. Although they each offer separate forms of governance, they also work together and strengthen each other’s presence within the MDGs. Partnerships provide an open, egalitarian and inclusive system which responsabilizes nations and subjects in order to achieve the benchmarks of the MDGs. The compatible and harmonious relationship among these three governmentalities fortifies the neoliberal governing structures of millennial development. I have demonstrated their governing power throughout this chapter via

empirical and theoretical analysis. To gain a thorough understanding of these neoliberal governmentalities of millennial development, the following chapter will provide a case study of Namibia and its *Vision 2030* policy in order to examine how the global framework of the MDGs reshapes Namibian policy, and Namibian citizens, into becoming the ideal neoliberal subject, free from poverty and underdevelopment.

Chapter 4:
Namibia and *Vision 2030*: “the elusive quest for development”³⁹

In order to work towards the global elimination of the poverty and underdevelopment put forth by the MDGs, individual countries are to adopt and implement an MDG-based development strategy. Namibia is one among the many countries that has created a poverty reduction strategy within its national context. *Vision 2030* was formulated in order to “improve the quality of life of the people of Namibia to the level of their counterparts in the developed world, by 2030” (npc.gov.na: Preface:9). This clear and definable framework is to guide Namibia on its path to development and improvement. The policy was formulated to act as a “broad” and “unifying vision” in order to guide the country through its numerous National Development Plans (NDPs), and to “provide direction to government ministries, the private sector, NGOs, civil society, regional and local Government authorities” (ibid:9). In order to achieve an improved quality of life for Namibians by 2030, the Vision works through the concepts and practices of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking. This chapter will provide an analysis of these techniques and demonstrate the influence of millennial development frameworks upon developing countries like Namibia, and the power these neoliberal discourses have within its development practices. A case study of Namibia’s *Vision 2030* policy will display how the neoliberal discursive practices of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking

³⁹ Wai, Zubairu. 2007. Whither African Development? A Preparatory for an African Alternative Reformulation of the Concept of Development. *Africa Development*, v32(4), pp.71–98. Quote found on page77.

work as governmentalities of millennial development, in that they aim to transform spaces and individuals into becoming the perfect neoliberal subject.

Numerous development programmes have been implemented in Namibia⁴⁰, however the country continues to be wracked by poverty; “close to 35 percent of the population lives on less than US\$1.00 per day...nearly 56 percent lives on less than US\$2.00 per day [and] income inequalities are among the highest in the world, with a Gini coefficient of 0.70.” (Central Bureau of Statistics 2008:xiii). Due to these unfortunate circumstances, the country continues to implement various development programmes and works with and through the “novel” methodologies and practices of the MDGs. Much like the MDGs, *Vision 2030* is not “new” in its policies; it is based on numerous years and previous development frameworks. It is through the failings of previous National Development Plans (NDPs), that *Vision 2030* has been implemented and legitimized. Namibia is currently working with and through its third plan, NDP3, which spans a five year period (2007/08-2011/12). The major theme for NDP3 “Accelerating Economic Growth and Deepening Rural Development”, has been influenced not only by lessons learned from the previous NDPs, but also the South West

⁴⁰ Programmes have focused on watershed management, information and communication infrastructure, ICT distance learning and various education projects, local governance and development, AIDS prevention, sustainable development (plants and wildlife conservation), etc. (The International Development Research Centre “Projects in Namibia”. Accessed on February 28, 2011. <http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-83058-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html>). For a list of all of the development projects in Namibia please visit <<http://www.devdir.org/files/Namibia.PDF>>.

Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) 2004 Party Election Manifesto, the directions from a November 2005 Cabinet Retreat, as well as the MDGs (<http://www.nhcdelhi.com/Vision.html>).

Taking previous failures into account, as well as considering the development framework of the MDGs, *Vision 2030* describes development as meeting the needs of the present, by encouraging responsibility, partnerships between all sectors of society, and working to achieve set targets and goals within the following elements: “inequalities and social welfare; peace and political stability; human resources, institutional- and capacity-building; macro-economic issues; population, health and development; natural resources and environment; knowledge, information and technology; and factors of the external environment”⁴¹ (npc.gov.na: chapter 3:38). Formulated with the technical assistance from the World Bank and the financial assistance from the UNDP, these practices aim to significantly reduce the amount of poverty within the country.

Poverty in Namibia is understood as a consequence of high rates of unemployment due to population growth, rural to urban migration, as well as the inability of the economy to expand, or to sufficiently absorb, the needs of the unemployed and unskilled workforce (Frayne 2004:490). Viewed strictly from a technocratic standpoint, poverty in Namibia can be reduced through education and the creation of relevant jobs in order to produce a knowledge-based society and economy. The contextually specific forms of poverty within Namibia have been erased, but they are important to acknowledge, since the country still feels the effects of its colonial past in the form of the

⁴¹ For a list of all of the targets of *Vision 2030*, please see <http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf> pp.61-84.

socio-economic divides that occur along regional-ethnic⁴² as well as class lines (Melber 2005:306), yet *Vision 2030* speaks nothing of, or to, these issues.

Namibia is a former colony of South Africa. The segregationist laws of South Africa's Apartheid system were present in Namibia from 1915 through to 1990. Apartheid is well known for its racial oppression and its divisive and marginalizing tactics as seen in the notions of separate development and self-rule. African reserves (Bantustans) were introduced during this time in Namibia. Laws were introduced which "made it almost impossible for any black person to move outside of those reserves without formal permission from the governing authority", meaning that the black community was dispossessed of land, and disrupted from their socioeconomic and political traditional systems (Frayne 2000:54). The high concentration of people in the tight confines of the Bantustans led to the depletion of natural resources (i.e. soil erosion, deforestation, poaching and over-fishing) forcing local Namibians into wage labour (Lapeyre 2008:3) which created "a pool of ready labor...for use on the white commercial farms; in the mines, both locally and in South Africa; and in the towns as industrial, civil, and domestic labor..." (Frayne 2000:54). This form of systemic discrimination led to the denial of access to basic services for the majority of the population (African

⁴² The 2008 review of poverty and inequality found stark levels of inequity along racial and ethnic lines, for example, poverty is particularly widespread where Khoisan and Rukwangali languages are spoken. The poorest rural households spend an average of about N\$104 per person, per month, compared to N\$5,744 in rich urban households. The wealthiest fifth of the population accounted for 78.7% of income while the poorest fifth of the population lived on 1.4% of the total income (Jauch et al 2009:36).

Development Bank 2009: xv). The apartheid structure has influenced the current developmental, economic and environmental degradation of the country.

Gaining its independence in 1990 meant that Namibia inherited a highly segmented society and economy. Namibia's history with colonialism and the apartheid has affected the majority of the population who continue to experience marginalization and poverty. The dominance of South Africa has been and continues to be a major impediment to Namibian development. The imperialistic practices of South Africa can be seen in its "monopoly control over the Namibian market through dumping, over pricing of intermediate inputs, and restrictive purchasing policies" (Klerck 2008:358) which has produced various barriers for Namibians in their economic activities and developments (Knutsen 2003:555). South African firms undercut prices and (un)intentionally prevent local Namibian firms from starting production which in turn maintains their dominance over the region (ibid:566). These South African chain stores repatriate their surpluses, leading to zero financial investment in the local community (ibid:568). According to one Namibian black entrepreneur, "development is coming in, but mostly from the outside. There is growth, but the income is going out again" (ibid:580). For example, economic activity created in Namibia through the country's decentralization policy has come in the form of South African chain stores which has created permanent jobs in the civil service and temporary jobs in construction (ibid:580). Although economic activity and consumption in Northern Namibia has increased, Knutsen doubts whether this contributes a positive net effect to employment since chain stores tend to out-compete the local stores and employ fewer workers (ibid:581). She discusses two general patterns emerging: "increases in consumption imply increasing imports rather than local production"

(ibid:581); and “networks are largely outward-oriented” in the sense that links to South Africa have gained in importance due to tough price competition which “requires ‘everybody’ to have direct access to the suppliers” (ibid:581). Rather than considering this very particular and quite significant contextual issue, the MDG-based development strategies of *Vision 2030* understand the prevalence of Namibian poverty as a lack of education and/or poor education system, poor governance, corruption, and unequal resource distribution (i.e. land and finances)⁴³ (Albinus 2010). It is these series of localized lacks associated with poverty that legitimizes and depoliticizes millennial development policies and practices.

Considering the policy’s main desire is to eradicate poverty through (economic) growth and social justice measures, it is shocking that there is so little discussion of poverty. There is one brief mention of Namibia’s understanding of poverty, located within its 2004 MDG Report. According to this report, the Namibian government

⁴³ Although this last point is quite important with regards to the causes of Namibian poverty, since Albinus (2010) states that unequal distribution of income "can cause unethical behaviour such as prostitution", crimes such as robberies and fraud, as well as “increase the spread of HIV/AIDS because low-income earners try to acquire extra income through prostitution...”, and increase the prevalence of “teenage and unplanned pregnancies, alcohol and drug abuse”, it is up to the individual to fix the problem of unequal distribution through having smaller family sizes to reduce medical, educational and food costs for parents, as well as attending affordable education and training institutes.

understands poverty as “a phenomenon of multiple dimensions”, which entails such issues as deprivation of essential needs (i.e. health, knowledge, standard of living). However, even with this acknowledgement, the Namibian government places its emphasis upon lack of income, or monetary poverty, because “income and money are extremely important for accessing basic amenities such as food, shelter and clothing” (<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>:5). This technocratic focus upon the monetary dimensions of poverty depoliticizes the issue of poverty and its multiple dimensions. Rather than considering the larger structural issues that hinders a person’s health, access to knowledge, or achievement of a high standard of living, the monetary/technical portrayal and understanding of poverty subjects individuals to specific types of programs, calculations and interventions, dictated by supranational institutions and development experts. Implemented through partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking, these ideas, practices and initiatives may not always provide the solutions needed and may possibly complicate matters further due to its decontextualized emphasis on transforming developing states and individuals into becoming neoliberal subjects.

Partnerships and Namibian Development

“one of the major principles upon which our Vision is based is ‘partnership’”⁴⁴

Working with and through the UN MDG framework, Namibia has come to incorporate the practice of partnerships within its *Vision 2030* policy, as well as within its overall approach to development. The UNDP has influenced Namibia’s view of the importance of partnerships by claiming that it “hold[s] great promise for improved efficiency regarding service provision and resource management” (Gov.of Namibia and UNDP 2002:18), therefore the Government of the Republic of Namibia has in turn placed high importance on the development of partnerships within their *Vision 2030* policy:

One of the major principles upon which [the] Vision is based is ‘partnership’.

Partnership is recognised as a major prerequisite for the achievement of dynamic, efficient and sustainable development in the country. This involves partnership between government, communities and civil society; partnership between different branches of government, with the private sector (the business community), non-governmental organisations, community-based organisations and the international community; partnership between urban and rural societies and, ultimately, between all members of Namibian society

(npc.goc.na: Forward:11).

Partnerships imply that Namibia take on the role of an empowered, self-disciplined member of development, capable of implementing development strategies that aim to

⁴⁴ Government of the Republic of Namibia. 2004. *Namibia Vision 2030: Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development (Summary)*, pp.9.

<<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>>.

fulfill the goals of the MDGs. The *Vision 2030* initiative “promote[s] and nurture[s] partnerships” which are believed to “help...unify all Namibians to achieve their long-term development needs and initiatives...” (ibid: Preface:16), as well as “create synergy” among and between Government and civil society partners (ibid: Chp.4:131). The objective of Namibian partnerships is to ensure the guidance of government and civil society by a comprehensive policy framework and to ensure proper and efficient spending of scarce resources (ibid:131-132). I believe that this emphasis on empowerment and ownership is what makes the practice of partnerships such a unique rationality of governance within millennial development practices; rather than discussing the relationships and roles of the multi- and bilateral partners, the partnerships of millennial development promote country-based strategies and country-led growth.

In order to ease the partnership process in the country, the Government of Namibia formulated a Partnership Policy (NPC 2005:i). The policy was implemented with the financial support from the French and German government. An Advisory Committee was developed consisting of the National Planning Commission Secretariat and representatives of community organizations “to ensure the full participation of all stakeholders in the policy formulation process” (ibid:i). The aim of the policy is to produce a “working partnership for the entire country, its citizens and their organizations...” which will allow community organizations to fully utilize their capacity, advocate on behalf of the people, and promote national development (ibid:i). Rather than controlling the activities of these organizations, this policy, reflecting the goals of *Vision 2030*, will instead “provide a comprehensive framework to guide their operations and to harmonise their activities in order to complement the developmental

efforts of the Government” (ibid:ii). This policy works to connect the local to the global. Bringing together the multiple and various community organizations under the guidance of the government, who is then under the guidance of donors, the MDGs, as well as other development initiatives, allows for the implementation of international norms and values at the local level. The inclusive nature of this partnership policy creates compliance within the community and government.

The practice of partnerships has seduced participants into believing they are either in control of the process or stand on level ground with dominant or prevailing development partners. Considering the historical context of Namibia, partnerships have become particularly desirable; the influence of “community”, “village” and “local people” within millennial development partnerships and projects are in fact used in order to counter accusations of neocolonialism (Power 2003:55). Due to its egalitarian nature, partnerships are considered to be “a classic example of one of the ‘plastic’ words of development” in the sense that the ownership that is attributed to the recipient state is still highly influenced by, and directly involves, agencies and/or donor nations telling the recipients “how their development should proceed” as well needing approval and funding throughout the implementation process (ibid:55-56).

Framing partnerships as a country-led strategy normalizes the presence and practices of development partners in Namibia. Some of these partners include UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, FAO, WHO, ILO, UNESCO, UNAIDS, UNHCR, alongside the EU, Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, United States, United Kingdom and France (UNDAF 2005). The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) contributes to Namibian development in its contribution to developing a new Country Programme Framework

(CPF) in order to “identify... priority areas and planning opportunities” (ibid:32). The IAEA emphasizes and encourages national government ownership over the planning and implementing process, and to incorporate the development initiatives into UN development frameworks (ibid:32). Finnish development assistance entails a bilateral project which aims to support the various Namibian ministries and councils throughout the decentralization process. Alongside bilateral agreements, this partnership entails the cooperation between Namibian and Finnish NGOs as well as other multilateral programmes, in order to reduce poverty in the country. Finland attempts to reduce poverty by working through UN frameworks and standards, such as attending to civil society development, social and gender equality, as well as participation of civil society and increased linkages in trade and investment (ibid:38). These partnerships, which emphasize cooperation and ownership, work within larger UN frameworks that guide the relationships between the partners as well as the aid provided by the donors. Emphasizing the importance of the local in the development process, alongside the benefits of partnerships, normalizes the increasing presence of these organizations and institutions in the country.

Partnerships have opened up new spaces for NGOs to have substantial input into policy making and development. Alongside the multiple international organizations located within Namibia, there are also multiple NGOs which have developed within the country to address ongoing and existing development needs as well as “facilitate international cooperation and knowledge sharing in development work...” (<http://www.nonprofitexpert.com/countries/namibia.htm>). Some of the organizations which have become involved in this partnership process are: Ecumenical Women of

Namibia, Guardian Angels Safety Patrol, Human Rights and Documentation Center, Institute for Management and Leadership Training, International Youth Society National, Khomas Women in Development, Legal Assistance Center, Sister Namibia, The Rössing Foundation, and Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa⁴⁵ (ibid).

Partnerships are emphasized in *Vision 2030* because they will enable states and communities “to play an active role in issues that concern them...[It] builds community pride and promotes ownership...” (NPC 2005:10) as well as “facilitate[s] international cooperation and knowledge sharing in development work, both among civil society organizations, research institutions, governments and the private sector” (<http://www.nonprofitexpert.com/countries/namibia.htm>). For example, the Guardian Angels Safety Patrol, which is affiliated with Guardian Angel Safety Patrol, USA, focuses on crime prevention, youth control and development. They approach, and provide assistance to, those in need (homeless, abused, etc.) by taking them to relevant organizations, shelters or rehabilitation centres (ibid). USAID, an independent federal government agency, “supports long-term and equitable economic growth and advances U.S. foreign policy objectives by supporting: economic growth, agriculture and trade; global health; and, democracy, conflict prevention and humanitarian assistance” in Namibia (ibid). Africare is another example of the many partnerships located throughout the country. Founded by Africans and Americans, the organization promotes “self-help development programs” and “places communities at the center of development” by not only consulting with active communities, but also forming partnerships with other local

⁴⁵ Please see <http://www.nonprofitexpert.com/countries/namibia.htm> for further information on these NGOs as well as a list of other NGOs in the country.

organizations (<http://www.aficare.org/our-work/index.php>). Africare focuses on the following areas: agriculture and food security; health; sanitation and hygiene, humanitarian assistance; women's empowerment, civil society development and governance; microenterprise; and the environment. By working within these areas, Africare aims to "build sustainable, healthy and productive lives and communities..." (ibid). These partnerships invest countries with goals and a sense of "self-understanding" and invite nations and subjects to "participate voluntarily in various programmes to improve...and help themselves" (Abrahamsen 2004:1463). The ultimate aim is for Namibia to be a "stakeholder" in the "identity, project design and implementation" of the development programme (Nekwaya 2007:23). However, these programmes are created and implemented by foreign donor states and/or agencies, and work through specific frameworks, in order to promote growth and development deemed acceptable by global agents and standards.

It is also important to note the presence of corporations, investments and loans in the partnership process. In 2007, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) approved a Development Policy Loan for Namibia for U.S.\$7.5 million in order to develop and implement specific and detailed development and reform policies representing a method of governing "beyond the state" (Ilcan and Lacey 2011:130). Complementing this strategy, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) has provided small investments, which include "a fisheries project (Pescanova), equity in the country's first indigenous life-insurance company (Namibia Life), and a loan to build a Best Western hotel in the North" (ibid:130). Development partnerships are not only an instrument to implement governing techniques and practices, such as "self-disciplinary or

enforcing standards to prepare for a new path of development...” (ibid:130), but they are also a money-making venture⁴⁶. For example, conservancies in Namibia were created in order to “stimulate the private sector and develop rural communities...” (ibid:132) The Ministry of Environment and Tourism introduced the legislation in 1996 which “gave conditional use of wildlife to communal areas that formed a ‘conservancy,’ or management unit” (ibid:132). By the end of 2006, there were fifty conservancies throughout the country (ibid:132). Local communities are fully engaged in this tourist industry, partnering with the established tour operating companies, which generates significant amounts of income in the form of lodges and resorts built by and with local material and knowledge, as well as wild gaming and trophy hunting (ibid:133-134). Ilcan and Lacey describe this process as representing the “contractualization of development” whereby development now “engages businesses, NGOs, government, and international organizations” and implements devices such as “performance indicators, contracts, competition, and budgets” (ibid:135). The presence of businesses and corporations in the partnership process not only demonstrates the influence that neoliberalism plays upon and within partnerships (as seen in the promotion of and focus on competition, best practices, fiscal generation and management, etc.) but it also demonstrates the validity and importance of examining the governmentalities of millennial development, for

⁴⁶ For example, in September 2009, a report was released stating “a small but elite group of businesspeople and companies, most of whom are closely associated with SWAPO, have emerged as the beneficiaries of concessions awarded over seven prime Namibia Wildlife Resorts Company (NWR) from September 2007” accessing in total of \$300,000,000 (Grobler 2009).

governance is no longer solely the practice of government, but it is a method and technique which can be implemented by multiple and various institutions and corporations.

It is difficult to understand how underdeveloped and poverty stricken regions and individuals can be involved, or seen as equal partners in development projects. For example, in the region of Okavango 93 per cent of the population is considered poor or severely poor. In Ohangwena, it is 64 per cent (Central Bureau of Statistics 2008:9). It is interesting to note that of all the major development projects located in Namibia, it appears that only one is located in Ohangwena⁴⁷, while none are located in Okavango (Directory of Development Organizations 2010). It is therefore not difficult to understand that partnerships in Namibia, although portrayed as consisting of harmonious relationships, are viewed with “mistrust, suspicion, ignorance, confusion, and misunderstandings...” (Hunter & Keulder 2010:90) because of the limited consultations with society. The effects of implementing decontextualized policies and programmes have meant that “poor people and critical voices have been sidelined or marginalized...” (Abrahamsen 2004:1457). This has been made evident in the partnership policies that promote and implement programmes which aim towards social transformation (i.e. educational attainment and achievement, entrepreneurial training, etc.) rather than structural acknowledgement and transformation. For example, the Partnership for

⁴⁷ This is a pilot project funded by the Agropolis Foundation that focuses on agriculture, food, biodiversity and the environment (Directory of Development Organizations 2010).

Economic Growth Programme commissioned by BMZ⁴⁸, and executed by Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Regional and Local Government, Housing and Rural Development, and the National Planning Commission, provides “the basic prerequisites for sustainable economic growth” such as financial and non-financial services, and business strategies. However the programme focuses specifically on microfinancing projects in order to stimulate economic activity and community growth and development (<http://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/afrika/namibia/16992.htm>). This organization works within a technocratic development framework in that it focuses specifically upon business/economic activities and finance, rather than larger systemic or structural issues. As evidenced by Kotir and Obeng-Odoom (2009) in their case study of microfinance projects in Ghana, many of these projects which focus on finance tend to worsen the situation, rather than alleviate it. Implementing programmes and projects generated from partners abroad, not only decontextualizes the experience and cause of poverty in Namibia, but it also acts as a hindrance to development and poverty alleviation projects as well as obscures covert expressions of the power of development partners (Mercer 2003:759). The fact that poverty continues in the region, at severe levels, maintains the power of partners in this country due to the need to implement new and improved development strategies.

Partnerships portray poverty in Namibia as a self-inflicted problem. Although donors provide funding and guidance on proper forms of development, none of it will work if Namibia does not follow these practices. They must take ownership of policy

⁴⁸ Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung is a German development organization.

implementation and reform, and take blame for the failures (Goldsmith 2011:159). This has been clearly stated within the *Vision 2030* policy: the aim of partnerships is to “move from a view that it is the state or government alone that is responsible for sustainable development, towards one that sees responsibility with society as a whole – a full partnership, where the state helps to create the enabling environment for sustainable development and society makes its contribution...” (<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>: 86). Acting as a neoliberal governmentality of development, partnerships are informed by “market-driven truths and calculations” and work through multiple and various regimes, which generate particular concepts that inform “free” states and individuals of the need to self-manage and to work within the “principles of discipline, efficiency, and competitiveness” (Ong 2006:4). It is through the implementation of partnerships that states, as well as individuals, become involved in the process of development. The individual—the Namibian citizen—has now become responsible to meet the need and demands of their community, their state, their national development framework, and the MDGs.

Responsibilizing Namibians

“nation-building will be both a private sector (including civil society) and public responsibility”⁴⁹

In order to fulfill the goals of both the MDGs and *Vision 2030*, the Prime Minister calls on “all Namibians and [their] neighbours and partners around the world to rally behind

⁴⁹ Government of the Republic of Namibia. 2004. *Namibia Vision 2030: Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development (Summary)*, pp.77.

<<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>>.

[the] Vision, build on [their] freedom and make [their] dream of a prosperous Namibia...come true” (http://www.undg.org/archive_docs/7564-Namibia_MDG_Report.pdf: i). Namibians are encouraged to “take responsibility for their own development and promote development activities that address the actual needs of the people and which require increasing community contributions to develop services and infrastructure” (ibid:13-14). The technique of responsabilization located within *Vision 2030* calls not only upon larger governmental and developmental agencies, but it also calls upon “all Namibians”, in the sense that Namibians are not only to be involved in the development process, but they are also to be molded, into becoming responsible, self-disciplinary, citizen-subjects. *Vision 2030* promotes and emphasizes throughout various government institutions and civil society, that it is the duty of individuals to provide the services, gain the educational qualifications, or engage in particular forms of conduct, that are needed to achieve the goals of *Vision 2030*, because “people are the nation’s human wealth” (npc.gov.na: Forward:9).

The emphasis on responsabilization in development policies has strongly influenced ways of thinking about and producing structural changes. The Namibian economy has been experiencing high levels of unemployment, business failure and job loss. The failure rate hovers around eighty-five per cent (Asemota and Asemota 2008:1). *Vision 2030* emphasizes that structures be put in place in order to stimulate entrepreneurship activities: training, financing and incentives are to be implemented since it is believed that businesses fail due to the lack of skilled workforces and poor work ethics (ibid:1-2). With this in mind, the Government of Namibia adopted the Strategic Interventionist Model which is to ensure “training, research, finance, marketing, know-

how, and support to small businesses” in order to create jobs and expand the economy (ibid:2). Alongside this model, the African Development Bank established the National Centre for Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Technology (CEIT) in order to enhance “innovation, entrepreneurship and technology adaptation in Namibians” (ibid:2).

Complementing both programmes, the Polytechnic of Namibia and the Community Colleges for International Development (CCID) established the Entrepreneurship and Workforce Development Project in Higher Education, which aims to “enhance skills base for industry and support initiatives for small businesses to alleviate poverty” (ibid:2). The Namibian development framework appears to be (overwhelmingly) in control of the conduct of individuals by emphasizing the need to build upon entrepreneurial skills.

Working through the concept of responsabilization instills very specific understandings of poverty and poverty reduction. Rather than creating an environment that is open to various forms of input made by various members of society, these practices localize the issue of poverty by focusing on the lacks of the state and the individual.

One of the key aspects of responsabilization is capacity building which will develop relevant skills to fulfill the needs of the nation, as well as the goals of both *Vision 2030* and the MDGs. *Vision 2030* states that capacity building will allow Namibians to be innovative, willing, and able to commit to new challenges in this volatile neoliberal economy (npc.gov.na: Forward:11-12). Capacity building activities include “participatory and communication enhancement techniques, and knowledge training programs, [which] are often designed with the aim of assisting people to acquire particular skills and participate in activities that lead to social and economic change” (Phillips and Ilcan 2004:393). Such activities will produce “a population of healthy, well-educated, skilled,

pro-active and financially stable people with a broad range of talents and positive attitude towards themselves, their fellow citizens, their country and global humanity” (npc.gov.na: Preface:14). This statement leads Namibians into believing that development is not only in “their hands”, but they are also a vital ingredient in the development process. In other words, the ability for individuals to mold themselves into self-regulating subjects, capable of meeting the criteria of *Vision 2030*, is a crucial aspect for the transformation of the country and the achievement of *Vision 2030*. According to the Government of Namibia, it is the responsibility and duty for all Namibians to be “healthy, brave, empowered, innovative, fully employed, confident and determined to succeed” because “everyone has a role to play, on a level playing field, unhindered by race, colour, gender, age, ability, ethnicity, religious affiliation or political inclination” (ibid:34). Portraying Namibia as an egalitarian society displays how *Vision 2030* undermines the inequalities and social and political divisions in the country. These discourses depoliticize the issue of poverty by placing blame on those who are truly unable to access such institutions or activities, due to actually existing financial, geographical, or socio-cultural barriers. The discrepancies located within these discourses are quite apparent, for not only do the poor exist, but they are actually increasing in number and severity.

An explicitly local focus tends to highlight issues of gender, overcrowding, poor sanitation or political corruption as the causes of poverty, rather than the effects caused by the global market, access issues such as tariff and trade restrictions, or economically-based development and adjustments (Craig & Porter 2005:239, Porter & Craig 2004:398). For example, a UN document views Namibian poverty to be caused by some

of the following conditions: “low economic growth, high levels of unemployment... incapacity and loss of life due to HIV/AIDS and other diseases, inadequate access to and quality of education, and widespread environmental degradation” (UNDAF 2005:6). This apolitical framing is also prevalent within government rhetoric, in that the key threats to development within the country are “population growth and settlement patterns”, “increasing water stress”, “poorly planned development and inappropriate industrialization”, “the loss of biodiversity”, “unresolved land issues”, poverty and inequality, “wasteful consumption patterns”, “poor governance”, “underdevelopment of human resources”, disease, “limited research for development”, “unstable macroeconomic environment” (npc.gov.ca: chapter 6:176-177). The erasure of structural issues transforms poverty into a series of localized or individual lacks (education, health, improper local governing practices, etc.) that can be corrected by not only applying and implementing millennial development policies, but by transforming behaviours that are responsible for these deficiencies. Displacing the causes of poverty means the poor are now causes of and answers to poverty and underdevelopment.

As a mechanism of neoliberal governance, responsabilization absolves the government from direct intervention in social service provision for society’s poorest citizens while (re)producing marginalization via personal accountability. What needs to be considered is that responsabilization does not promote or encourage individuals to question the political or economic context, instead, it reinforces the idea that individuals must work to conform to the ideal neoliberal citizen-subject in order to earn the benefits of a developed nation. It is a technology of agency. This type of rhetoric frames the unemployed, poverty-stricken and underdeveloped as “no longer simply victims, but

subjects to be empowered” (Abrahamsen 2004:1460). Individuals are responsible to develop themselves, and their nation.

Responsibilization techniques have affected the way Namibians view poverty, in that it has become a desensitized and perhaps normalized aspect of the society. In President Pohamba’s speech at the first seating of cabinet this year, he stated the need for responsible individuals, and the “dire need of people who want to serve the country selflessly”, not selfishly in order to achieve riches, but to act selflessly “to serve others, without expecting much in return” (Nangolo 2011). Instead of material rewards, the responsible leader will be rewarded with “satisfaction” in seeing the “once marginalized, oppressed, hungry or unemployed, fending for themselves and subsequently assist others” (ibid). This is the ultimate call for the truly selfless, dedicated and responsible Namibian citizen; it should not matter what riches one has, or what one wants to acquire, for they are unimportant when compared to helping others help themselves. Rather than focusing on particular systemic and/or structural causes of poverty and underdevelopment, emphasis is placed on the role of the individual within all levels of Namibian society.

Responsibilization not only localizes and depoliticizes the issue of poverty, it legitimizes the presence of development programmes and policies. Taking the high levels of poverty and inequality in Namibia into consideration, implementing policies and programmes that promote economic growth are not effective methods to reduce poverty. Many of the poor lack the resources necessary to engage in activities that will stimulate economic growth “thus creating a vicious circle in which low growth results in high poverty and high poverty, in turn, results in low growth” (Oyugi 2008:20). Therefore, the Namibian government implemented specific programmes which would work to improve

“the capacities of the poor”, molding individuals into becoming educated, high income earning, developed, responsible Namibians (ibid:20). Many of these programmes are located within training centers and academic institutions. These places offer entrepreneurship courses which have been portrayed as prerequisites for development. The Polytechnic of Namibia is currently revising its curricula to provide training programs and to foster the development of small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMME) which will in turn “enhance economic growth and reduce unemployment” (Ras 2007:327). Taking these entrepreneurial courses will allow the poor to become innovative in their approach to problem solving, adapt “more readily to change”, become self-reliant and creative (ibid:329). It appears that this form of millennial thinking associated with *Vision 2030* does not see a group of unemployed individuals who are unable to access the resources necessary for their advancement in society due to numerous structural barriers. Rather, these responsabilization techniques view the unemployed as “a promising site” of development and a solution to poverty (Ferguson 2007:74).

The development strategies of Namibia’s *Vision 2030* programme have reframed poverty so that it can be remedied through the implementation of particular technical treatments, specifically those pertaining to education and employment. In order to achieve the goal of becoming a “knowledge-based society” with limited amounts of poverty, individuals are to educate themselves in post-secondary school, vocational training centers (VTC), or vocational education and training programmes (VET) which will produce qualified individuals and establish a knowledgeable society (Mabizela 2005:83, Bank of Namibia 2008a:1, Wallenborn 2009:550). Education and training are seen to play a vital role in the development of Namibia because they will provide crucial

values and skills necessary for economic development and a knowledge-based economy (Hayman 2007:373). The need for young people (ages 30 and under) to be educated is prevalent throughout *Vision 2030* which describes the need for them to be “educated, skilled, motivated, confident, assiduous, responsible and healthy, and...empowered [granting them] ample opportunity to play an active role in shaping a better society, which will be their inheritance and their duty to sustain and manage in the future” (<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>: 21). It is the responsibility of the Namibian citizen to educate and train themselves, and to exude new values, in order to achieve the goals of the MDGs and *Vision 2030*. It is by attending these various educational programmes that individuals are molded into the desired citizen-subject. This is particularly evident in the approval by the Namibian Cabinet that all forms of education be aligned and hence molded to fit the economic needs of the country. In order to “steer” individuals, as well as academic institutions, into implementing, or attending such courses, (dis)incentives will be provided or implemented (ARB 2006:16966B).

In order to achieve the goals of *Vision 2030*, people are required to be flexible and critical in their thinking, as well as “capable of adapting to new situations and demands and continuously learning from their own initiative” (<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>: 30-31). To take the initiative, and to be capable and flexible, are in fact “modes of subjectification” which encourage “an ethic of self-help”, in the sense that the poor are considered to be “active agents and not passive beneficiaries of development” (DiMuzio 2008:316). Educated and knowledgeable citizens are transformed into a responsible member of society who can and will provide “solutions to their problems and are made responsible for their own livelihood...” (ibid:316), and not rely on the

assistance or social services provided the government. Such practices are particularly seen in the curriculum of the Polytechnic of Namibia. The institution works within the framework of *Vision 2030* in its desire to transform Namibia into a “winning nation” (Tjivikua 2010:2) by delivering relevant, high-quality programmes, aligned with market requirements and society’s needs (ibid:3). Students are responsible to seize the opportunity of enrollment within the academic institution (ibid:4). The current academic theme, “Re-thinking Competitiveness for Socio-Economic Development”, aims to “reshape [Namibia’s] ways of doing things” through knowledge production, and the creation of “knowledge workers”, allowing Namibians to be better able to “perform on the indicators” and hence “better [their] standard of living” (ibid:5). This institution launched a new entrepreneurship program, ProLearning, in March 2009. The program is geared towards “enabling the means” to create “more successful entrepreneurs in Namibia” (Myrylainen 2009:2) and by reducing the amount of unemployment in the country (ibid:6). The program aims to specifically fulfill the goals of *Vision 2030* by working to: promote the development of SMSEs; to provide business training to individuals in school and out-of-school; to encourage self-employment; “and to ensure that education and training programmes address the demands in the labor market” (ibid:6). What makes this programme particularly attractive is its new learning method that transforms the teacher into a coach, and shifts the responsibility of learning onto the active learner (ibid:50). Importance is placed on active participation, self-direction, responsabilization, and life-long learning (ibid:50).

Unfortunately even with such a well-organized framework, there are few entrepreneurial or educational success stories. For example, a “Start Your Own Business”

course at the Windhoek VTC, has been promoted as allowing individuals to learn what is needed in order to be a successful, contributing, member of society, however many trainees are unsatisfied⁵⁰ with the amount of training received and believe it is insufficient to attain a job in their field (Marope 2005:49,73). This emphasis on entrepreneurial ventures has also affected the mining sector, which is the lead occupation within the country. Mining is described as a hindrance to long-term growth because it does not contribute to the knowledge sector. Yet, there is unemployment among those with post-secondary qualifications and there is evidence of VTC graduates dropping out of their studies due to a lack of jobs (Mabizela 2005:83, Bank of Namibia 2008a:1). There is also the issue of affording tuition. As noted, income is highly skewed in Namibia. The fact of the matter is that “unskilled” workers make about N\$429 a month. Such a limited income excludes individuals from attending academic institutions and gaining the knowledge needed in order to access the benefits of economic growth (Klerck 2008:361). Due to the specific focus on economic development, and the importance of education to achieve it, the poor will continue to remain excluded, not due to structural barriers, but due to “their” inability to “better” themselves.

Responsibilization practices reposition the citizen within the governing development structure as an employable subject, or a “subject of government” (Fejes

⁵⁰ According to Marope (2005), a study at the Windhoek found that “36 percent of the trainees dropped out before finishing their training. Most dropouts occurred in the first year (39%); 29 percent left in level two, 12 percent in level three, and 20 percent in level four” (Marope 2005:53).

2010:90)—someone who is capable of contributing to, or creating, the Namibian economy and becoming the ultimate neoliberal citizen-subject. The lack of available jobs, or the multiple barriers that Namibians may face while trying to enter into the economic sector, are erased and viewed as a matter of that individual's employability, capability, or specialization. Responsibilization techniques work to normalize and depoliticize unemployment (ibid:90). The responsibility to be educated leads to the importance of adaptability, which is particularly important in the current volatile neoliberal economic structure. In order to be adaptable, one must train and re-train in order to stay employable, and hence, a proper and contributing member of the state (ibid:94). What legitimizes the neoliberal discourse of responsibilization in the Namibian context is the freedom, empowerment, and reflexive nature associated within and alongside it. This technique is a demonstration of the subtle nature of the practices of neoliberal governmentality, which see, shape and regulate the individual. In order to achieve this form of governance over the individual, particular devices are depended upon and emphasized, for instance schooling. These devices are promoted as a means to “create individuals who do not need to be governed by others, but will govern themselves, master themselves, care for themselves” (Rose 1996:45). Placed in a millennial development framework, new demands, knowledges, possibilities and subjects are produced, in order to achieve multiple and various time-bound benchmarks. It is the responsibility of the poor to achieve the national benchmarks of *Vision 2030* and the global benchmarks of the MDGs. These benchmarks complement responsibilization techniques by creating divisions within the population, specifying those who are and those who are not capable or responsible enough (ibid:45) to achieve national and global demands.

Benchmarking Namibia

“Vision 2030 is expected to...move the nation significantly up the scale of human development...”⁵¹

International governmental organizations, along with international non-governmental organizations, governmental authorities and subnational bodies subject populations, particularly in developing countries, to continuous and comprehensive monitoring, regulations and controls (Merlingen 2003:368). These actions render Namibia’s underdevelopment visible through comparison with international institutional standards and countries. Depending on the outcome of the comparison, knowledge is generated, and statistics or benchmarks are implemented in order to correct, control, or advance, the progress of the space. Acting as a governing technique of millennial development, the benchmark “constitutes a field of visibility in which the observed are subjected to the power of the observers through their objectification in the form of archives and their constitution as cases” (ibid:369). Placed on a global level, these spaces are then hierarchically ranked, as “good” or “bad”, “on track” or “off track” (ibid:369). In Namibia, the two MDGs which focus on decreasing child mortality and enhancing maternal health, urgently “need more attention” alongside the “number of hurdles [that] still bar Namibia from attaining Vision 2030” such as “slow economic growth, high levels of unemployment, the fact that most exports are raw materials, the high dependency on imports...and HIV/AIDS” (Kisting 2010). These concrete examples which demonstrate how “off tack” Namibia’s development is, generates not only

⁵¹ Government of the Republic of Namibia. 2004. Namibia Vision 2030: Policy Framework for Long-Term National Development (Summary), pp.9.

<<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>>.

competition but also pessimism and frustration due to the fact the country “lags behind”. Feeling the pressure of the upcoming deadlines of 2015, and 2030, has transformed at least one Namibian’s view (and possibly many others) of the current development structure, by pleading to “please deliver [Namibia] from Vision 2030” (Maletsky 2010).

Implemented at a national level, Namibia faces pressure to demonstrate its willingness to abide by the goals and benchmarks of the MDGs, as well as to incorporate the goals into its national framework. The benchmarks of the MDGs are what constitute and guide *Vision 2030*, in the sense that *Vision 2030* aims “to produce forecasts about future development possibilities for Namibia...[and] to see how some assumed future state would develop step by step...[by] provid[ing] a roadmap...” and defining “necessary actions” (<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>: 57) needed in order to develop. *Vision 2030* sets out facts, objectives and targets, based upon those of the “developed” world, in order to determine and influence, economic growth, (re)distribution of income, socio-cultural development, land reform, education, HIV/AIDS, poverty, housing, employment and infrastructure development. These targets are to be achieved by Government, the nation, and all citizens who must contribute jointly to resolving these issues and rid Namibia of its “social evils” (i.e. tribalism, ethnicity, favouritism, corruption and crime) (Becker 2006:18).

According to the UN and the Government of Namibia, in order to achieve the benchmarks of *Vision 2030*, community organizations need to not only be empowered, but they need to work within “an enabling and incentives-based environment” (Gov. of Namibia and UNDP 2002:18), whereby those who conform to the benchmarks are rewarded with funding. Emphasis is placed upon the achievement of the benchmarks

because it is believed that “foreign professional people and global businesses will perceive Namibia as a good environment in which to invest and from which to do local and international work, thus creating both wealth and employment” (npc.gov.na: Preface:14). Without the achievement of these goals, Namibia may in turn be stigmatized by the international community (Becker 2006:18) as a country that is unwilling or unable to develop. Conforming to the targets and deadlines generates rewards and not conforming (willingly or unwillingly) leads to punishment in the form of the redirection or halting of assistance, material support, and or investments (Abrahamsen 2004:1462). For example, complying with the quantitatively measured target of good governance⁵² allows Namibia to receive funding from donors and investors (Shilimela and Naimhwaka 2005:9-10). The Government has also implemented performance-based/output-based budgeting, in that they allocate funding to development projects “based on expected output or expected impact of the programme in the end” (ibid:11). Such practices display Namibia’s desire to appease global standards and processes of development. In fact so much pressure is placed upon the country and its citizens to conform to, and meet the goals of, both the MDGs and *Vision 2030*, that it is recommended that although “great value is...attached to Namibian tradition and culture...[some] cultural ideas and practices...tend to inhibit progress towards development targets, [so they] may be

⁵² Such practices entail: democracy, transparency, sustainability, accountability, equity/equality, and the practice of the rule of law as well as “ensur[ing] that government structures budget within available resources” and that the priority areas defined by government and donor partners are “given preference in budgeting” (Shilimela and Naimhwaka 2005:9-10)

sacrificed in the interest of the nation” (<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>: 14). Transforming the culture of the nation and of its citizens demonstrates the power of the benchmark in international development—individuals can, should, and will conform in order to meet the goals of the nation and of the globe.

The strict focus on achieving the quantitative goals of *Vision 2030*, rather than examining the much broader social and historical context of Namibia is but one example of the “dangerous obsession” of competition (Bruno 2009:265) associated with benchmarking. For example, *Vision 2030* states that the Namibian economy must grow by seven percent GDP annually, however, the economy has only averaged four percent (<http://www.nhcdelhi.com/Vision.html>). The percentage is applied to a region that is still experiencing the effects of colonialism and socio-cultural and racial marginalization, as well as a transitioning economy from mining to a knowledge-based sector where little to no jobs are created and insufficient training is provided. These are but a few of the factors that are contributing to the current levels and experiences of poverty today in the region, and to the slow growth rate. This quite narrow, and “not socially that deep” (Porter & Craig 2004:392) method and interpretation of poverty and its reduction strategies may mean “neglect of the broader growth context” (Hayman 2007:379-81). It is “economically meaningless, politically misguided and socially damaging” yet the depoliticized, impersonal and localized nature associated with the practice and rhetoric of “quantification”, “statistics” and “scientific objectivity” makes this technology of governance “consensual, desirable, and hence free of debate” (Bruno 2009:277-8). This form of “governing at a distance” aims to produce individuals who can “govern

themselves” through self-evaluation, self-observation and self-critique (Shore 2008:284) in order to meet the development needs of the nation and the world.

The calculative practices within Namibia are now being used to measure, reform and improve the conduct of organizations and individuals all within the name of transparency and accountability. For example, some of the targets for education and training include: to expand access to secondary school education by 2006; to establish a coherent Vocational Education and Training Policy Framework by 2005; to have Vocational Training Centres established in all regions by 2003; to increase the amount of adult literacy to 100% by 2030 (<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>: 62)⁵³. Implementing and working towards set benchmarks creates uniformity in the development plan, in that it does not allow for much variation within projects as seen in the need for the creation of a knowledge-based economy. Namibian schools have incorporated, and “seen a proliferation of technology-oriented degree-level courses” including Bachelors of Technology, Marketing Technology, Civil Engineering Technology, Mechanical Engineering, Bachelors of Technology, and Human Resources Management, Technology, and Public Management (Marope 2005:56). Rather than working with, or even considering, local issues and needs, benchmarks are simply created and applied. *Vision 2030* focuses specifically upon output targets, with little to no reference to contextual causes and/or factors.

⁵³ According to UNICEF the total adult literacy rate (%) 2005-2008 was 88%, and the secondary school attendance ratio 2005-2009, net male was 40, female was 53 (http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/namibia_statistics.html).

The increasing influence and reliance upon calculative strategies within millennial development has created a global audit culture. This type of culture shapes the condition in which people or places exist through the use of modern calculative techniques and principles and has “become a central organizing principle in the governance and management of human conduct – and the new kinds of relationships, habits and practices that this is creating” (Shore 2008:279). Namibia’s “audit culture” is displayed through *Vision 2030*’s accompaniment within all levels of development planning and their monitoring of performance techniques, as well as influencing the design of future national development programmes and projects in the country. An Integrated Results Based Management approach has been introduced to effectively link Namibia’s National Development Plans to both the MDGs and *Vision 2030* objectives by “linking public resources to performance and results, and continuous monitoring of performance through information management systems based on E-Government” (Bank of Namibia 2008b:14). The emphasis on growth-based models and benchmarks has, and will continue to have, a significant consequence upon those living in poverty in Namibia. Namibia and its citizens are to work to achieve the benchmarks set by *Vision 2030*, which include the need for economic growth rates of fourteen percent each year (even though forecasted economic growth rate in 2010 was to be around three percent). The Vision also aims to decrease unemployment rates to five percent (from the current fifty percent) as well as to have a more reputable Gini coefficient (Weidlich 2010). As stated, and as can be imagined, many Namibians lack the resources in which to fully and truly “participate” in or “contribute” to development, however these issues are not considered; the focus is on the achievement of the goals. The fact that Namibians are to dedicate themselves to the

achievement of these goals by 2030 (as well as 2015) is what guides and molds them into calculable, observable and governable subjects.

The benchmarks of *Vision 2030*, inspired by those of the MDGs, play a major role in millennial development, aiding larger governing bodies to implement neoliberal rationalities of governance in Namibia, as seen in an emphasis on flexible and hence manipulable subjects that embody entrepreneurial and competitive behavior. As noted by the Bank of Namibia's Governor, Tom Alweendo, "it is high time Namibians' attitude on work ethics and entrepreneurship changed for the better, adding that more people should be ready to take risks when doing business" (Katswara 2007) in order to achieve the goals of *Vision 2030*. The specific implementation of global structures in Namibia, through *Vision 2030*, entails the shaping and normalizing of conduct, thought, decisions and aspirations in order to achieve the objectives which larger governing bodies consider desirable. Generating competition within and among developing countries in order to achieve a specified goal is not normal. This normalizing procedure "encourages or stimulates self-governance" through comparison, and "induces its objects to relate to how one should act in order to achieve best practice" (Fougnier 2008:318).

Acting as a neoliberal technique of millennial development, the benchmark aims to "govern human life" and to produce "a politics of subjection and subject-making that continually places in question the political existence of modern human beings" (Ong 2006:13). In this sense, individual behavior is constantly questioned and challenged, and many times, the capability of the individual is measured against one's ability to be a citizen. This technique of benchmarking complements the partnership and responsabilization practices of millennial development, in that the practices of partnership

and responsabilization aim to achieve the many benchmarks of millennial development. The quantitative and adaptable nature of the benchmark works to reform, regenerate and renovate the development process, as well as those located within it. Through this process, individuals, communities, states, and even the globe, can be measured and modified, through various other governmentalities in order to suit the needs of the current development framework.

As an “an essential intellectual trait of *Vision 2030*” the combination of pro-poor development and socioeconomic justice on a national scale with the merciless neoliberal dictates emanating from the global framework of the MDGs “represent the reconciliation of the irreconcilable” (Winterfeldt 2007:66). *Vision 2030*’s aim to “improve the quality of life of the people of Namibia” through its themes of equality, social welfare, macro-economic issues, health, and knowledge (<http://www.tech.na/download/Vision2030.pdf>), will not work if it is to be accomplished through the neoliberal rationalities of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking; it will not equal justice in any region. The use and promotion of these terms are meant to stimulate economic activity, and failure to do so will be blamed upon irresponsible and unmotivated citizens, not the (un)intended effects of the all-encompassing structure of millennial development in the Namibian context.

Chapter 5 Conclusion

At this moment, there are now 4 years, 250 days, 2 hours, 18 minutes and 35 seconds, 34 seconds... 33... until the year 2015. Time is passing. The countdown is on to realize how many people will achieve or fail in their ability to develop their country and to “make poverty history”. 2015 will be the time for nations to display how responsible they have been in working with and through MDG-based development frameworks, and how they are contributing to solving the world’s development issues by meeting quantifiable targets and deadlines. This framework envelops 189 countries and over 6 billion people.

Through theoretical and empirical analysis, this thesis has demonstrated how and to what extent millennial development programmes have governed national development policies, and how in turn, those national policies have shaped the individuals it aims to develop, through the neoliberal techniques of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking. These techniques create and produce space and engage in politico-economic and socio-cultural transformation due to their ability to manipulate, measure and manage poverty, and shape and direct individuals by producing remedies, expertise, and training. It is important to be aware of the neoliberal “moves” and discursive techniques of millennial development, for these practices govern the modern developing subject through the application of particular strategies, targets and goals. Promoted as “new” ways of knowing and conducting development, the MDGs govern the behaviour of individuals through self-reflection and self-mastery. Acting as “technical and institutional alignments”, the neoliberal governmentalities of millennial development generate global consensus, global ordering and global hierarchical arrangements (Craig

and Porter 2006:4). The ability to not only regulate life, but to also create subjects and citizens through a focus on subjectivities and aspirations, rather than through repression and control (Mosse 2004:644), is what makes the MDGs a technology of governance par excellence. In order to demonstrate this argument, this thesis addressed the question of how and to what extent millennial development programmes govern national development policies, and how in turn, those national policies come to shape the individuals they aim to develop.

In order to analyze the neoliberal governmentalities of millennial development, and how these governmentalities shape the policies, practices and perceptions of poverty within the context of Namibia and its *Vision 2030* policy, I worked with and through a governmentality framework. I have shed light on how millennial development practices and policies not only guide Namibia, and its *Vision 2030* policy, which was formulated to “improve the quality of life of the people of Namibia to the level of their counterparts in the developed world, by 2030” (npc.gov.na: Forward:9), on its path to development and improvement, but to also transform this space into becoming the perfect neoliberal subject and steward. By examining the neoliberal techniques of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking, in the context of Namibia, I displayed how spaces, and the individuals within these spaces, are molded, monitored and shaped in order to complement and fulfill millennial development strategies, targets and goals. These governmentalities work to govern the actions of the poor and influence ideas of poverty and poverty reduction as well as legitimize the presence of development and government institutions, trained experts, and professional reformers, within developing regions. These neoliberal techniques and discourses of development portray poverty and

underdevelopment as a result of state-level and/or individual inabilities or incapacities and it is through this process that millennial development frameworks identify, produce, and transform these “problem” spaces into spaces of opportunity and places of possibility.

Analyzing *Vision 2030* through a governmentality lens allowed me to demonstrate how this vision works within and towards larger UN frameworks which guide the relationships between recipients and donors. Although the ultimate aim is for Namibia to be a “stakeholder” in the implementation of development practices, the path to development is heavily influenced and guided by foreign donor states and/or agencies, which work through specific frameworks, in order to promote growth and development deemed acceptable by global agents and standards. Namibians are lead into believing that development is not only in “their hands”, but they are also a vital ingredient in the development process. In other words, the ability for not only the state, but also individuals to mold themselves into self-regulating subjects is a crucial aspect for the transformation of the country and the achievement of the benchmarks of *Vision 2030* and the MDGs.

I believe this thesis will contribute to the limited but nonetheless valuable literature on the governmentalities and discourses of the MDGs by considering how the practices of partnerships, responsabilization and benchmarking are not only utilized by the MDGs at a global level, but how they permeate and transform national policies and understandings of poverty and shape the actions of those considered to be poor or underdeveloped. I am however, aware of the limitations of this framework and I

acknowledge the fact that Namibians are fully conscious of, and involved in, the modification and transformation of millennial development practices and programmes.

Again, the goal of this thesis was not to condemn the MDGs, for they truly are calling global attention to issues that billions of people are currently experiencing. The goal was to understand the rationale behind millennial development policies, what it seeks to change, how it seeks to change it, the discourses and techniques it applies, and how these practices not only affect the populations at the receiving end of these policies and programmes, but also how our understanding of development and poverty reduction has changed. Being aware of these issues will allow actors in the development field to not only critique and challenge global development frameworks, but to perhaps find an alternative method to the relatively “new” framework of the MDGs, or an alternative understanding of the meaning of development. Or perhaps one will simply come to an understanding of what this practice has entailed and even currently consists of—governance. However, with only 4 years, 250 days, 1 hour, and 59 seconds left to go, I fear we may be running out of time.

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