Jun 6th, 9:00 AM - Jun 9th, 5:00 PM

Dissensus as Value and Practice in Cultural Argument: The Tangled Web of Argument, Con/Dis-sensus, Values and Cultural Variations

Michael David Hazen
Wake Forest University

Dissensus as Value and Practice in Cultural Argument: The Tangled Web of Argument, Con/Dis-sensus, Values and Cultural Variations

MICHAEL DAVID HAZEN

Department of Communication
Box 7347, Reynolda Station
Wake Forest University
Winston-Salem, North Carolina 27109 U.S.A.
hazen@wfu.edu

ABSTRACT: This paper will initially explore the assumptions about dissensus and consensus embedded in the values of cultures such as the dimension of individualism/collectivism. This will lead into an examination of how the emerging ideas about cultural forms of argument relate to dissensus and consensus in cultural practices. Finally, the paper will explore the ways that argument as dissensus can bridge the gap between cultural values and practice.

KEY WORDS: argument, collectivism, consensus, culture, dissensus, individualism, values

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between the concepts of con/dis-sensus in the argument process and the dimensions of cultural value variation. To carry out this purpose, seven steps will be necessary: 1) an examination of what dissensus means and what we know about it, 2) the development of a brief rationale for the study of dissensus in the context of argument and cultural variation, 3) a brief explanation of the conceptual approaches to the systematic variation of cultures, 4) an examination of the assumptions about the con/dis-sensus process and argument embedded in standard dimensions of cultural value variations, 5) the formulation of a strategy for studying the relationship between argument and culture, 6) an examination of how argument and the process of con/dis-ssenus works in cross-cultural conflict situations and 7) some conclusions about the relationship between argument, the process of con/dis-sensus, and the dimensions of cultural value variations.

Most discussions about dissensus in the argument process have occurred in the West and in the context of the public sphere (Willard, 1987). In addition, treatments of dissensus have usually treated it as a universal value especially in the sense of what "should" be done in public life, which implies that the operation of the public sphere is best when disagreement occurs. However, the fact that dissensus as a process seems to be most prevalent in and works best in the context of Western cultural values, raises a number of questions about the relationship between culture and dissensus. Does this mean that argument as dissensus does not exist in other cultures, that it has been overlooked or that it takes on other forms? Therefore, it is of importance to look at the relationship between the con/dis-sensus process, argument, and the dimensions of cultural variation.

Hazen, M.D. (2007). Dissensus as value and practice in cultural argument: The tangled web of argument, con/dis-sensus, values and cultural variations. In H.V. Hansen, *et. al.* (Eds.), *Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground*, CD-ROM (pp. 1-43). Windsor, ON: OSSA.

1. WHAT IS DISSENSUS IN THE CONTEXT OF ARGUMENT?

For theoretical, etymologically and stylistic reasons, the phrase con/dis-sensus will be used to refer to the process of disagreement and agreement in argument. Use of the word "dissensus" is relatively rare in everyday language and thus does not appear in most dictionaries. Its roots are in Latin (via French) and related etymologically to the word "consensus." Since in both cases, the Latin is a compound of a prefix and the same root, it is plausible to join the two words in a short-hand way. Furthermore, it makes conceptual sense to combine these two terms because, in argument, they are, theoretically, the opposite ends of the same continuum. The advantage of such a construction is that it emphasizes their theoretical joining in the argumentation literature and provides greater clarity when the discussion focuses on the process.

The term "dissensus" is not a common word in everyday usage, even in the field of argumentation. Therefore, it is useful to outline the parameters of its meaning and a logical starting point is with its dictionary definitions. There are few dictionary definitions of dissensus, so it is easier to start with its conceptual opposite, "consensus." The *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines 'consensus' as "agreement in opinion" or more specifically, "the collective unanimous opinion of a group of people" (1971, p. 523). The OED does not provide a definition for 'dissensus,' but *Webster's New Millennium Dictionary of English* defines it in two ways: "widespread dissent" and "difference of opinion" (Kipfer 2003-2006). These definitions seem to provide two levels of differentiation for the conceptual opposites, consensus/dissensus. First, they suggest a threshold definition which simply focuses on whether there is any agreement or disagreement present in the situation. Second, they suggest a stronger definition of the concept when they indicate that a substantial group of people are in agreement or have a difference of opinion as in "widespread," "a group of people" or even the "collective unanimous opinion" (however this unaniminity is not suggested for the dissent), thus defining consensus and dissensus in terms of a substantial number, majority or unanimous group. Thus, the dictionary definitions suggest that dissensus can be looked at as simply the presence or absence of disagreement or as the number of people involved in agreeing or disagreeing.

There are few research projects that have attempted to systematically explore the concept of dissensus. In the literature on conflict in social interaction and groups, there is a set of studies that explored the ideas of "conflict of interest" and "value dissensus" (Druckman & Zechmeister 1970, 1973; Cosier & Dalton 1988). In these studies, value dissensus is defined as "differences between parties in values or beliefs concerning the same social object or objective" (Druckman & Zechmeister 1970, p. 431) and conflict of interest (or competition) is defined as differences between people in preferred distributions of some scarce resource. Thus, in this case, dissensus is associated with the more intractable kind of conflict where the differences are the result of value disparities or what they call, at one point, ideological orientation. Their general finding is that value dissensus can lead to more intense and polarized, less satisfying, and less productive conflicts. These studies use the word "dissensus" in the sense of a particular kind of disagreement, i.e. that involving values or beliefs rather than some less intense object of focus. These studies support a third dimension of meaning that is based on the object of disagreement.

The one project in the field of argument that has attempted to apply the concept of dissensus to argument is the Valuing Dissensus Project of Willard, Hynes, Willihnganz and others. In Willard's initial article, dissensus was defined simply as "conversation involving disagreement" (1987, p. 145) and in his 1989 book, he speaks of "arguments [as] conversations in which opposition is present" (p. 12). He also uses the term interchangeably with words such as conflict, competition, strife, dissension and dissent. Willard does place some limits on its application when he says that it is not just any disagreement but needs to involve certain forms and processes to be successfully applied. Furthermore, in an important footnote in his original article, he seems to limit its presence to certain situations where he says that his project is focused on political and organizational life and that he "wouldn't extend [it] …intact to the interpersonal domain" (1987, p. 157), however Hynes (1992) has suggested such an extension. By 1989, he draws two other important formal limitations. First, that not all dissensus is argument because there needs to be an understanding between the parties that there is a disagreement and that it is acknowledged in some way (explicit or implicit) in the interaction (p. 53 & 66). And second, dissensus should not be thought of as just any form of disagreement such as "disagreement for disagreement's sake" or any other similar form of argumentativeness. It is not an individualistic form of disputatiousness but instead requires a degree of coorientation and interdependence to function properly (p. 149).

Throughout the discussions of dissensus, an increasing number of process templates are added that are treated as essential to the "valuing" of dissensus. In his 1989 book, in discussing dissensus and rationality, Willard equates dissensus with social comparison and idea-testing (p. 149) and at another point; he equates it with tolerance of disagreement in organizations (p. 11). He further codifies these ideas when he discusses dissensus in the context of "good will" and "playing by the rules' (p. 150 & 236). The result is that by 2001, the group goes so far as to argue that dissensus is "[n]ot just any disagreement…[but]valuing dissensus requires a high degree of professionalism and dispassion in tandem with a commitment to shared procedural rules" (Willihnganz, Hart & Willard 2001, p. 147).

The process of valuing dissensus is more complicated than just random disagreement or disagreement for disagreement's sake. In a 1993 article, they argue that the dissensus project as related to the structure of an organization involves interaction over competing claims, the tension of ideas, and opportunities for collective disagreement (Willihnganz, Seibert & Willard) and in 1991, Hynes outlined a series of ways that an organization could institutionalize dissensus. The idea of dissensus has also been extended to the public sphere (Hynes 1990) and democratization (Hynes 1992). In a 2001 article, they try to integrate the dissensus project in organizations with O'Keefe's theory of Message Design Logic by arguing that a person displaying expressive Message Design Logic (MDL) (communicating to express their own thoughts and feelings despite the context) is not constructively contributing to the dissensus process in organizations even though a person employing conventional MDL or rhetorical MDL can make a constructive contribution.

Thus, Willard's project begins with a plea for valuing dissensus in political and organizational life in the form of disagreement but soon goes on to outline a series of delimiting conditions for dissensus argument and a process that can maximize the values of dissensus in organizations and public life.

At this point, we can see four ways of understanding dissensus and consensus: 1) the conceptual distinction between people's agreement and disagreement, 2) the quantitative

distinctions involved in specifying the number of people involved in the agreement or disagreement, 3) the object or topic that the agreement or disagreement is focused on, and 4) a series of situational and procedural rules for the process.

Finally, Rossi & Berk (1985) have suggested some further distinctions about varieties of consensus and dissensus in the realm of sociological norms where they distinguish between four dimensions of dissensus. The first dimension, strength of domain structure, has to do with the degree of clarity among the disputants about what the focus of agreement or disagreement is. The second dimension, threshold differences, has to do with the degree of agreement or disagreement about the importance of the issues under discussion. The third dimension, domain dissensus, has to do with the agreement or disagreement about whether the issues are ones of kind or degree. The fourth dimension, segmentation of dissent, has to do with whether there are any clear socio-demographic distinctions between the groups agreeing or disagreeing.

In summary, the four sources discussed suggest a taxonomy of meaning dimensions for the idea of con/dis-sensus (Figure 1). Under the first dimension, the nature of the disagreement, there is an increasing level of complexity involved in the nature of the disagreement. It begins with the threshold idea of whether any disagreement is present, which comes both from the dictionary definition and Willard's work. The next level, concerning the object or topic of disagreement, comes from the work on group conflict and the remaining three items concerning clarity, importance, and degree v. kind come from Rossi and Berk's discussion. The second dimension of meaning, having to do with the amount of disagreement and whether the disagreement is segmented along the lines of any existing groups, comes from the dictionary definitions and from Rossi and Berk's work, respectively. The third dimension concerning spheres and the fourth dimension concerning the nature of the interaction come from the Valuing Dissensus Project.

Before the relationship between dissensus and cultural variations can be addressed, it is necessary to draw one more distinction that is present in the Valuing Dissensus Project; namely that between the descriptive and the normative. Much of the literature on dissensus is couched in normative language. Thus, Willard (1987) in his original article argues that "dissensus should be seen as an end in itself," that argument should be defined in terms of dissensus, and that it should be promoted as a political principle, i.e. should be valued societally (p. 145). However, there is also the question of the degree to which dissensus is practiced in a particular society? Thus, it will be necessary to examine the question of how much and in what ways dissensus is practiced in other societies before addressing the second question of how much dissensus is or should be valued in other societies? However, it should be realized that the idea of cultural value dimensions often has as much to do with what "should be" as "what is."

2. WHY STUDY DISSENSUS IN THE CONTEXT OF ARGUMENT AND CULTURAL VARIATION?

Willard in his original essay argued that dissensus should be an end in its own right and valued just as much by a society as consensus is valued. While this initial position seemed to privilege disagreement for its own sake, in reality, it proved to be more of a rhetorical flourish.

FIGURE 1
DIMENSIONS OF MEANING FOR DISSENSUS

1. NATURE OF THE DISAGREEMENT
   - A. Threshold: Is there any disagreement present?
   - B. Object/Topic: What are the objects or topics of disagreement in the discussion?
   - C. Clarity: To what degree are the parties clear about what is being disagreed on?
   - D. Importance of the Issues: Is there agreement or disagreement about the importance of the issues?
   - E. Kind or Degree: Is there agreement or disagreement about whether the differences are of kind or degree?

2. NUMBER OF ENTITIES OR GROUPS DISAGREEING
   - A. Size of disagreement among the entities: How many or what percentage of the people disagree?
   - B. Segmentation of Entities: Are there any clear socio-demographic distinctions between the groups disagreeing?

3. SPHERE
   - A. Sphere: What is the sphere or situation in which there is discussion?

4. INTERACTIVE ASPECTS OF DISAGREEMENT
   - A. Presence of Disagreement in the Interaction
     1. Is there any disagreement acknowledged in the interaction?
     2. Is the object/topic, importance, clarity, or degree of disagreement acknowledged in the interaction?
   - B. Relational Aspects of the Interaction
     1. Is there good will toward the others in the interaction?
     2. Is there professionalism and dispassion in the interaction?
     3. Is there a degree of coorientation and interdependence in the interaction?
     4. Is there tolerance of disagreement in the interaction?
   - C. Task Aspects of the Interaction
     1. Is there social comparison and idea testing in the interaction?
     2. Is there interaction over competing claims?
     3. Is there tension of ideas in the interaction?
     4. Are there opportunities for collective disagreement in the interaction?
   - D. Structural Aspects of the Interaction
     1. Do the parties play by the rules in the interaction?
     2. Is there a commitment to shared procedural rules in the interaction?

The question of why we should value dissensus by itself still remains and over time, several reasons have emerged. First, it is argued that dissensus leads to better decisions in that it mitigates against things such as group think. The insistence on disagreement is seen as insuring that a range of alternatives are given full consideration. The implication is that once all of the alternatives are fully considered, then the best decision is made. This position is backed by evidence in several fields (group conflict, group decision-making, and organizational decision-making) that dissensus can lead to better decisions.

The value of a range of viewpoints for effective decision-making would seem to be a truism but Willard and associates argue that "the primary reason for valuing dissensus, then, is to create a countervailing influence for movements toward completion and sameness" (Willihnganz, Seibert & Willard 1993, p. 202). They believe that the literature on organizational cultures fosters an atmosphere of sameness that eventually makes the organization dysfunctional.

It should be noted that if dissensus was to be valued in itself, then if there had been a full consideration of the arguments and a decision had been made, disagreement would be expected to still continue, which does not seem to be Willard's position.

Second, it also has been argued that in organizations that are increasingly multicultural, dissensus is important to insure that groups are not marginalized and everyone can participate in decision-making. The Valuing Dissensus Project argues that "organizations need the benefits of considering multiple perspectives, hearing differing arguments, and entertaining the possibility of different actions and conclusions if they are to make decisions to sustain themselves in turbulent and changing times" (Willihnganz, Seibert & Willard 1993, p. 201).

Third, one could also argue for the importance of dissensus as a normative principle, namely that of freedom of expression as an inherent human right. The rights to speak, to expression one's self and to disagree are seen as rights espoused in various documents of the United Nations and other organizations.

Fourth, it is also argued by some that dissensus is an aspect of human nature. Burke (1969), in his dramatistic theory, sees two fundamental principles working in human affairs; namely those of unity and division. These are the two same processes involved in the argumentative con/dis-sensus process.

Finally, as has been previously mentioned, a strong argument can be made for the study of dissensus in non-Western cultures. Since most of the theory and research about argument and disagreement has its origins in the West, there are important questions about its applicability to other cultures with different value structures. For example, is disagreement in the argument process equally acceptable in all cultures?

3. WHAT ARE THE PATTERNS AND DIMENSIONS OF CULTURAL VARIATION?

Having gained some understanding of the different dimensions involved in the con/dis-sensus process, it is now necessary to gain a similar understanding of the nature of cultural variations. The question of how to explain similarities and differences between cultures has occupied scholars and disciplines for many a century, so there is no lack of material on, or approaches to, the subject. However, the question is how can we best approach patterns of cultural variation so as to relate them to dissensus and argument?

In Fiske, Kitayama, Markus & Nisbett's (1998) review of approaches to the study of the relationship between cultures and cognitions, their classification systems of approaches to cultural variation can be thought of as a starting point. The two simplest approaches, the focus on universals and the idea of relativizing particularism, are to some degree mirror opposites of each other. For a long time, the study of cultures was focused on finding the universal commonalities between cultures (e.g. anthropology looked at kinship; psychology at personalities; sociology at groups; communication at persuasion), however, in recent years, the universal approach has been criticized on the basis of descriptive research findings and of ideological assumptions. As a result, the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme of the relativizing particularism approach where everything of importance is seen as different between cultures, i.e. particular and relative (Hazen 2006; Hazen & Fourcade 2007). For our purposes, the problem with both of these approaches is that they are extremes and are simplistic in their ways of dealing with cultures.

A third long standing approach is that of temporal sequences where cultures are seen to follow a temporal pattern in their development (e.g. Marxism's theory of the progression of dialectical materialism; and modernization theory's progression of development processes). A more recent fourth approach looks at generative structures that are seen as the key to the process of cultural similarities and differences (e.g. Chomsky's approach to language) and a fifth approach looks at cultural complexes around which cultures are organized (e.g. kinship, bureaucracy).

While the temporal sequences, generative structures, and cultural complexes approaches each has its own strength, they all can be subsumed under the sixth approach that of cultural dimensions (typologies & dimensions). It has received the most attention because: 1) it has proved to be the most heuristic in terms of research and theorizing, 2) it has shown an ability to adapt and change, and 3) it represents the most common approach to the question of cultural similarities and differences used by disciplines such as psychology, anthropology, sociology, and communication.

There are at least three forms of the cultural dimensions approach that merit attention. All of the forms are based on the assumption that a culture is best represented by the values and beliefs that a group of people hold in common which are seen as being related to other aspects of life. An approach to culture based on values and beliefs provides a nice complement to the idea of communication and argument as behavioral processes taking such forms as messages, interaction sequences, etc. Culture and communication can then be studied as complementary and reciprocal processes.

The earliest of the approaches was developed by Kluckhohn and Stodtbeck (1961) in their anthropological study of Southwestern United States' Native American groups. They concluded that there are an underlying set of questions that all humans face and that there are a limited set of answers to the questions, which are reflected in the different cultural value orientations. They suggested that these questions and value dimensions focus on: 1) time, 2) the relationship between humanity and its natural environment, 3) how humans relate to each other, 4) people's primary motive for behavior, 5) the nature of human beings and 6) space. While this taxonomy is rarely used today by itself, it has heavily influenced the subsequent systems that have been developed.

The second approach is that of Schwartz, who developed his system out of the work of Kluckhohn and Stodtbeck. Schwartz (1999) extended the values approach to include ten individual values (power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction,

universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity & security) and seven cultural values (conservatism, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, hierarchy, egalitarianism, mastery & harmony) that can organize cultural similarities and differences.

The third approach was initially developed by Hofstede (1980) and was later refined by Triandis (1988) and others. Hofstede (1980) in a multi-country study of IBM employees found that cultures can be differentiated on the basis of four value dimensions: 1) individualism/collectivism (the degree to which individuals are autonomous from or integrated into groups), 2) power distance (the degree to which people accept or do not accept that power is unequally distributed), 3) uncertainty avoidance (the amount of tolerance for or avoidance of uncertainty and ambiguity) and 4) masculinity/femininity (the degree to which gender roles are set and males are assertive and competitive). Later on, Hofstede added a fifth dimension, time orientation, based on the work of Bond.

Triandis (1988) has worked on several of Hofstede's, and of Kluckhohn and Stodtbeck's dimensions but has especially concentrated on the individualism/ collectivism dimension. He and his associates developed a number of measurement techniques for the dimensions, provided evidence that individualism and collectivism are separate dimensions, and added the ideas of a vertical (hierarchical) and a horizontal (egalitarianism) dimension to the factors of individualism and collectivism (1995).

The newest development in this line of research is know as the GLOBE study (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, Gupta 2004), which purports to be a study of leadership, cultural value systems and organizations in 62 societies. The study measures 18 cultural dimensions: uncertainty avoidance practices and values, future orientation practices and values, power distance practices and values, institutional collectivism practices and values, humane orientation practices and values, performance orientation practices and values, in-group collectivism practices and values, gender egalitarianism practices and values, and assertiveness practices and values. As can be seen, they have added a layer of data based on practices to go with the traditional layer of values. They claim that seven of the dimensions come from Hofstede's work, that the eighth, humane orientation, comes from Kluckhohn and Stodtbeck's, and that the ninth, performance orientation, comes from McClelland's work on achievement motivation. Hofstede's individualism/collectivism dimension is split into an in-group collectivism dimension and an institutional collectivism dimension, while Hofstede's masculinity/femininity dimension is split into a gender egalitarianism dimension and an assertiveness dimension.

Hofstede (2006B) has replied to the GLOBE study, arguing that its dimensions are not equivalent to his dimensions and that the GLOBE scales are not measuring what they say that they are. Hofstede re-analyzed their data using factor analysis and argued that the 18 dimensions reduce to five meta-factors, three of which are related to his (Hofstede's) individualism, uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation scales. Parts of a fourth dimension are related to his masculinity-femininity dimension and the fifth factor is GNP/capita.

The relationship between the dimensions in the taxonomies developed by the various scholars can be seen in Figure 2. Throughout the rest of this paper, the primary focus will be on the dimension of individualism and collectivism because of its centrality to the research on cultural variations. As will be seen, the distinctions between the different dimensions often break down as they are conceptually refined. As a result, our discussions

FIGURE 2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TAXONOMIES OF CULTURAL VALUE DIMENSIONS

Kluckhohn & Stodtbeck	Hofstede	Triandis	Schwartz	GLOBE
	Individualism Collectivism	Vertical Ind	Affective Autonomy	In-Group Collectivism
Humans Relate to Each Other		Horizontal Ind	Intellectual Autonomy	Institutional Collectivism
		Vertical Coll	Conservativism	
	Power Distance	Horizontal Coll	Hierarchy	
			Egalitarianism	Power Distance
Relate to (Nature)	Uncertainty Avoidance		Mastery	Uncertainty Avoidance
			Harmony	
Activity Orientation	Masculinity Femininity			Gender Egalitarianism
				Assertiveness
Time Orientation	Long/Short Term Orientation			Future Orientation
Nature of Human Beings				Humaneness
Space Orientation				
				Performance Orientation

of the relationship between con/dis-sensus and cultural variations will touch on a number of the dimensions.

Finally, it should be mentioned here that the cultural values approach has been criticized by some as reflecting a binary emphasis on cultural dichotomies (only two opposition positions) which create rigid contrasts between cultures (Hermans & Kempen 1998). However, if Hofstede's work is examined closely, it can be seen that he emphasized from the beginning that the dimensions are continuums and that studies show that individual countries are widely scattered on the continuum of each dimension thus reflecting a number of finely nuanced differences. Other criticisms have focused on the fact that there is variability on any particular dimension in a culture and that any individual may not reflect the cultural value. Hofstede acknowledges all of these are limitations when he talks about the cultural value ratings for countries as being aggregate numbers for the hypothetical average citizen who may differ from any real individual (1991).

4. WHAT IS THE THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS, ARGUMENT AND CULTURAL VARIATION?

Now that some understanding has been gained about both the meaning of the con/dis-sensus process and about the patterns of cultural variation, the next step is to look at the con/dis-sensus process and cultural variation together. The following discussion is meant to sketch the broad outlines of the generally accepted theoretical relationships between the two phenomena.

4.1 *What general links exist between cultural value variations and the con/dis-sensus process?*

A cursory look at the cultural value dimensions would seem to suggest a number with relationships to the argumentative dimensions of consensus and dissensus. For example, in Hofstede's framework, there are hints of relationships to disagreement, particularly in the questions used to measure the cultural value dimensions. Power distance has to do with the willingness of people to accept power differences in their society, thus people who are in a high power distance society are willing to defer to those in power, while those in a low power distance society are not as willing to accept and defer to those with power. Masculinity (and femininity) has to do with styles of interaction that embody the masculine values of assertive, ambitious and competitive behavior (according to Hofstede). Uncertainty avoidance has to do with people's reactions to unstructured situations where a high level of uncertainty avoidance can lead to a desire for strict codes of behavior and adherence to them. Finally, individualism (and collectivism) asks whether persons see themselves as integrated into and deferring to a group or as operating on their own and relating to groups based on the person's self-interests. For example, in discussing the consequences of individualism for national structures, Hofstede sees high individualism as providing room for protest, press freedoms, and defending one's own interests (1980, p. 238).

Triandis, in extending the conceptualization of individualism and of collectivism, integrates power distance into the formulation by creating the idea of vertical (hierarchical) and horizontal (egalitarian) forms of individualism and collectivism. He starts by linking

individualism to self-reliance and collectivism to in-group harmony. In his various measurement scales associated with the different value systems, the apparent roles for dissensus and consensus can be seen in the wording of the items: horizontal-individualism "I prefer to be direct and forthright when discussing with people"; vertical individualism "I enjoy working in situations involving competition with others"; horizontal collectivism "It is important to maintain harmony within my group"; vertical collectivism "I hate to disagree with others in my group" (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk & Gelfand 1995, pp 255-256).

Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier (2002), in a massive review and meta-analysis of the studies on individualism and collectivism, further reinforce such distinctions related to the con/dis-sensus process when they mention contrasts between "restraint in emotional expression, rather than open and direct expression of personal feelings" and between "harmonious relationships with close others" rather than the independence of self (p. 5). Furthermore, in their review of the various scales that have been used to measure individualism and collectivism, they find that there have been seven individualism components and eight collectivism components that account for 88% of all of the items in the studies. Some of the components that are of interest here are: the individualism domains of "compete" ("It is important to me that I perform better than others on a task"), "direct communication ("I always state my opinions very clearly"), and "independent" ("I tend to do my own thing, and others in my family do the same"); and the collectivism domains of "harmony" ("I make an effort to avoid disagreements with my group members"), "advice" ("Before making a decision, I always consult with others") and "hierarchy" (I have respect for the authority figures with whom I interact") (p. 9).
It is apparent from a cursory view that consensus and dissensus have a significant number of echoes in the conceptual formulations of the various cultural value dimensions.

4.2 *How does argument (communication) relate to cultural variation and the con/dis-sensus process?*

The discussion up to this point has focused on cultural variations in values and their apparent relationship to consensus and dissensus, however it is also clear that a lot of this discussion uses examples that are illustrative of different communication styles (e.g. the quotations on the previous page from Singelis et al, 1995 and Oyserman et al, 2002). It is important to extend the correlations between culture value dimensions and the con/dis-sensus process to the level of interaction where argument actually occurs. This was emphasized by Willard and his associates when they drew a distinction between dissensus that is not argument because it is not actualized in interaction and dissensus which is argument because it is situated in the argumentative (communication) process.

Correlations between argument and cultural value dimensions have been suggested in the work of several researchers. For example, Gudykunst (1998) argues that "[t]here are systematic variations in communication that can be explained by cultural differences in I-C" [individualism-collectivism](p. 107). He goes on to argue that the correlations with individualism and collectivism respectively can be seen in terms of low-context and high-context communication (direct, explicit v. indirect, implicit), self-disclosure (differences in in-group/out-group communication dimensions), uncertainty (differences in types of uncertainty and uncertainty reduction processes), communication rules (for intergroup

communication), face-negotiation (self-face v. other-face), turn-taking in conversations (synchronization and length of turns), persuasive strategies (direct, individual v indirect, group oriented), and conflict management (direct v indirect styles). If these correlations are examined closely, it also will be seen that these communicative features provide a wealth of argumentative resources for instantiating consensus and dissensus in many and varied ways within particular cultural contexts.

Examples of the argument aspects of cultural variation can be seen in several studies. Ng, Loong, He, Liu and Weatherall (2000) in looking at European and Chinese family discussions in New Zealand, saw the emphasis on the individual in individualistic cultures as encouraging "self-expression and speaking one's mind freely" while the adherence to the group in collectivistic cultures, "leads to self-censoring, and even compromised talk, for the sake of maintaining social harmony." (p. 27). They further argued that "single-addressee turns have a relatively exclusive, individualistic focus…" [as used in the European New Zealand families] while "multi-addressee turns that are directed to two or more persons have a more inclusive, collectivistic focus" [as used in the Chinese New Zealand families](p. 29).

Another example is provided by Moemeka (1996) who specifically looks at communalistic societies in Africa and observes that personal matters and individual grievances are not allowed to be voiced when they are in conflict with the community's interests. Furthermore, members of the community are not allowed to talk back to a leader and even when they are called on to 'speak their mind' in open discussion of public issues, their views and any expression of them became irrelevant when a decision has been made.

In a third study, Kim and Sherman (2007) looked at how people in individualistic and collectivistic cultures value self expression. They found that in one study, European American students were more likely to mention self expression of thoughts and feelings as the reason for communicating than were Korean students (80% to 31%) while Koreans were more likely to mention communication with others as the reason for communication than were the European American students (68% to 39%). In a second study, they found that European Americans were more likely to rate self-expression as more important than East Asian Americans while the East Asian Americans were more likely to rate interdependence with others higher than the European Americans.

Thus, examples of possible correlations between the con/dis-sensus process in argument and cultural value variations can be seen in the literature on individualism and collectivism (Figure 3). There is a general equation of individualistic cultural values with forms of direct communication that often include disagreement (dissensus) and collectivistic cultural values with forms of communication that emphasize the group and preserve the harmony of the group (consensus). A similar analysis could be extended to uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-femininity, and power distance.

5. WHAT IS A USEFUL STRATEGY FOR EVALUATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARGUMENTATIVE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS AND CULTURAL VARIATION IN A DESCRIPTIVE SENSE?

So far, questions about argument and cultural variations have been addressed in only the most general and theoretical terms. It is now necessary to look at the relationship between argument and cultural value dimensions in a descriptive sense. The literature on cultural

FIGURE 3
THEORETICAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CULTURAL VALUE DIMENSIONS, THE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS AND ARGUMENT

CULTURAL VALUES DIMENSIONS	CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS	ARGUMENTATIVE MANIFESTATIONS
1. Individualism	Defense of personal values	Direct, Explicit
Autonomy	& interests	Statements
Uniqueness	-Protest	Disclosure to all
		Ind Oriented Strategies
Collectivism	Deferring to the group	Implicit, Indirect
Disclosure to In-group		
Interdependence	Harmony	Group Strategies
2. Power Distance	Defer to Power or not	Politeness Strategies
High---Vertical	Respect for Authority	Silence before Leader
---Hierarchical		
	Contend with Authority	
Low---Horizontal		
—Egalitarian		
[Horizontal Ind]	[Direct w/ People]	
[Vertical Ind]	[Enjoy competing]	
[Horizontal Coll]	[Harmony Important]	
[Vertical Coll]	[Hate to disagree]	
3. Competition	Perform better	Argumentative Beh
High—Mastery	Compete to Win (win-lose)	
Low—Harmony	Avoid Disagreements	
4. Masculinity—Femininity	Assertive, ambitious, competitive	Gender-based Arg
Gender Roles		
	Nurturing & Accommodating	
Assertiveness		
5. Uncertainty Avoidance	Desire for adherence to	Rules Based Arg
codes and rules		
		Situation Based Arg
6. Time Orientation		
Short Term		
Long Term		

variation is voluminous, even though the literature on argument and cultural variation is limited, so a strategy is needed for exploring the role of argument in cultures.

A first step in a strategy is suggested by the fact that while there is not much research on argument and cultural variations, there is a lot of literature on conflict and cultural variations. Therefore, since there is a clear relationship between disagreement and argument, and many theorists go on to define argument in terms of controversy (especially when dealing with what O'Keefe calls argument$_2$), it is a natural step to look at the literature on conflict and cultural variation. However, since the literature on conflict and even conflict and culture is large, it is advantageous to adopt further steps in our strategy.

A second step come from the fact that a clear theoretical connection has already been established between argument and individualism (masculinity, low power distance and low uncertainty avoidance), the more intriguing question has to do with the relationship between argument and the cultural variation of collectivism in actual practice. This is also of theoretical interest because most societies that have been labeled as collectivistic are non-Western, which allows us to explore the charge that argument and dissensus as presented in the argumentation literature are only a western phenomenon.

A third strategic step is to look at the underlying meanings of individualism and collectivism. For example, recent research on cultural variations has led to the conclusion that the simple continuum of individualism-collectivism of earlier research may be more complex than originally thought. This new, more complex research about individualism and collectivism goes beyond the simple relationships outline in Section 4 and opens up new ways of thinking about the relationship between argument and individual/collectivism.

The fourth strategic step results from the fact that if the concepts of individualism/collectivism are more complex, then questions about the placement of particular countries on the individualism-collectivism continuum may need to be re-thought. Furthermore, there is controversy about whether some countries have changed as they have become more global and whether Hofstede's categorizations still hold. In examining the dynamics of conflict and argument in these "collectivistic" cultures, the lens of con/dis-sensus may help us to better understand what is happening in these countries because of the behavioral nature of argument.

Thus, our strategic approach suggests that we explore the relationship between argument as expressed in the con/dis-sensus process and cultural variations within the situational context of conflict as present and dealt with in countries labeled as collectivistic. Furthermore, the placement of such countries and the exploration of the nature of collectivism allows us to gain further insights into the ways that argument and dissensus might function. Before exploring argument and cultural variation in the conflict situation, it is useful to examine the last two steps in more detail because they represent alterations in the relationships outlined in Section 4.

5.1 *The complexities of individualism and collectivism as dimensions of variation in cultural values.*

One of the most significant developments in understanding variations in cultures, post-Hofstede, has been the realization that the concepts are more complex that simple dichotomous continuums. This has been especially true in the case of individualism-collectivism but to a lesser degree with the other dimensions of cultural variation. For

example, a study by Tyler, Lind and Huo (2000) suggest that there may be a similar phenomenon going on with the dimension of power distance. In that study of power distance and conflict resolution across cultures, there may be at least three parts to the power distance dimension and one of them may relate directly to a subordinate's comfort level in disagreeing with their supervisor.

The following analysis will focus on individualism/collectivism but, as will be seen, some aspects of the other dimensions of cultural variation will be referred to in the discussion. First, an increasing amount of work has come to the conclusion that individualism and collectivism are two separate dimensions of cultural variability. In Hofstede's original work, he only measured individualism and assumed that low individualism equals collectivism. Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai and Lucca (1988) in their work on individualism and collectivism found that the concepts were multidimensional and that they were orthogonal (independent of each other). By 2002, Oyserman, Coon and Kemmelmeier (2002) in their meta-analyses of individualism and collectivism were ready to conclude that individualism and collectivism are best thought of as independent of each other and differentially triggered by contextual and social cues.

Schimmack, Oishi & Diener (2005) have recently attacked Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier's (2002) findings because they did not adjust for national differences in response styles in their meta-analysis. Hofstede (2006A) has also recently attacked Oyserman et al on the basis of the Schimmack et al study, however Schimmack et al see their criticism as focused on one question, that of convergent validity between Hofstede's scales and later forms of measurement, not on the issue of whether individualism and collectivism are polar or orthogonal concepts.

Despite the conclusions of Triandis and Oyserman et al, many researchers still treat Hofstede's scales as a unidimensional measurement of individualism and collectivism or worse yet, assume that a country is individualistic or collectivistic based on Hofstede's original measurements. The danger in this is illustrated in a recent study by Koch and Koch (2007) where they examined the relationship of collectivism and individualism to cooperative behavior in China. In exploring their findings, they took the original Hofstede scales and factor analyzed them, which yielded two independent factors, of equal weighting, one for individualism and one for collectivism. When they used these scales to explain their results, they found that only the individualism factor was related to the differences in cooperative behavior not collectivism. Thus, it is possible for both collectivism and individualism to exist in a culture and in an individual.

The second significant development was Triandis' work (1995; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk & Gelfand 1995; Triandis & Gelfand 1998), where he overlaid individualism and collectivism with a vertical (hierarchical) and a horizontal (egalitarian) dimension. For Triandis, a vertical individualist culture is one where people see themselves as self-reliant/autonomous selves but allow for inequalities due to different status levels while a horizontal individualist culture is one where people see themselves as self-reliant/autonomous selves who are similar and equal in status (egalitarian). A vertical collectivist culture is one where people see themselves as part of an in-group where people have different status levels while a horizontal collectivist culture is one where people see themselves as part of an in-group and see each other as equal in status. This proposal when combined with the conclusion that individualism and collectivism are independent dimensions, results in a four-part categorization of aspects of individualism and

collectivism. The validity of this framework was illustrated in Gourveia, Clemente and Espinosa's (2003) study of individualism and collectivism in Spain, where they found the same four part factor structure as proposed by Triandis.

A third set of developments comes from the research of Schwartz (1999), who works out of similar traditions to Hofstede and Triandis but uses different labels for his dimensions. He made two additions to our thinking by splitting individualism into intellectual autonomy and affective autonomy and by adding a third dimension of harmony/mastery of the natural and social world. Similar to earlier work by Kluckhohn and Stodtbeck, he sees the dimensions of cultural variation as arising from a set of fundamental questions: 1) what is the relationship between an individual and the group (conservativism/intellectual & affective autonomy), 2) how to guarantee responsible social behavior (hierarchy/ egalitarianism), and 3) what is the relation of people to the natural and social worlds (mastery/harmony).

A fourth set of studies have focused on collectivism and argued for a more nuanced understanding of its complexities. In examining Chinese and Japanese collectivism, Dien (1999), distinguishes between collectivism in China, which is authority-directed while retaining a strong sense of individuality (hierarchy & uniqueness), and collectivism in Japan, which is based on a pattern of peer-group orientation. Pirttila-Backman, Kassea and Ikonen (2004) looked at collectivism and individualism in Cameroon using Triandis' scales and found that Cameroonians were primarily collectivistic but there was also a strong strain of individualism, which they called individuality and emphasized the particularity of the person (thus supporting the idea of separate dimensions of individualism and collectivism). Realo and colleagues (Realo, Allik & Vadi 1997; Realo & Allik 1999) developed a more general framework for thinking about collectivism when they divided it into peer related collectivism, family related collectivism and society related collectivism.

A fifth step in understanding individualism/collectivism comes out of Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier's (2002) meta-analysis of the literature. In looking at the numerous studies done on individualism/collectivism, they reviewed and content analyzed the scales used in the various studies. They found that there were seven individualism components and eight collectivism components that make up 88% of the items used in the different studies. The individualism components are: 1) independent [self-reliant] (83% of the scales), 2) [seeking one's own] goals (33%), 3) competition (15%), 4) uniqueness (30%), 5) private (22%), 6) self-knowledge (33%), and 7) direct communication (19%). The collectivism components were: 1) related [to others] (74%), 2) belong [to groups] (39%), 3) sense of duty [to groups] (85%), 4) harmony [with groups] (57%), 5) advice [sought from others] (65%), 6) context [specific] (22%), 7) hierarchy (17%), and 8) [preference for] groups. Several of these aspects have already been discussed and others will appear in the future. What is important here is that individualism and collectivism seem to possess a number of sub-concepts.

A sixth step has come about as a result of scholars attempting to amplify particular findings in Oyserman, Koon and Kemmelmeier's (2002) study. First, Green, Deschamps and Paez (2005) explored three specific dimensions of individualism/collectivism: self-reliance, interdependence, and competitiveness. Their work yielded four combinations/typologies of these variables that could be used to characterize countries: self-reliant/competitive, self-reliant/non-competitive, inter-dependent/competitive, and

interdependent/non-competitive. Second, Brewer and Gardner (1996) argued for splitting the concept of collectivism into two aspects, relational collectivism focusing on interpersonal networks and group collectivism focusing on the group as a whole due to methodological and conceptual confusion. Brewer and Chen (2007) took this a step further by crossing the earlier three-part distinction between the individual, relationships and collectives with a new three part distinction between locus of identity, locus of agency and locus of obligation thus leading to nine conceptual distinctions between various aspects of individualism and collectivism.

Figure 4 provides a visual picture of the progression in thinking about individualism and collectivism. If one were to summarize what can be seen in these studies, it is that there are a number of things that can make up individualism and collectivism and that there are some concepts that seem to cut across individualism and collectivism and combine with them in meaningful ways. It should also be pointed out that these concepts do not form a neat, conceptually tight framework but instead have some overlapping and are sometimes represented in different ways.

5.2 *Countries' aggregate scores on various aspects of the dimensions of individualism and collectivism.*

To examine conflict situations in cultures reflecting collectivistic tendencies, it is necessary to know what countries are viewed as collectivistic especially in light of the new thinking about individualism and collectivism just discussed. A large number of the countries classified as collectivistic are in Asia and Africa. The labeling of cultures as collectivistic or individualistic was first done on a large scale by Hofstede (1980). On the basis of his research, he provides tables that array countries on a continuum from high individualism to high collectivism and similarly for the other cultural values. The research behind these tables was done in the 60s and the 70s, primarily in the business context. Subsequent studies have not been as comprehensive and usually made comparisons between only two or three countries.

Hofstede's original set of scores for countries have taken on a life of their own and have provided the definitive labels for the categorization of a particular country as individualistic or collectivistic. Furthermore, a large number of the studies have used Hofstede's ratings in a tautological fashion by assuming that since Hofstede labels a country in a certain way that the country can be treated as an example of collectivism or individualism and used as a manipulation of the individualism-collectivism variable allowing subsequent measurement of its assumed effects on other variables. These studies often overlook precautions that Hofstede and other theorists have specified about the application of dimensions of cultural values. For example, all cultures have elements of individualism and collectivism so the ratings should not be thought of as some kind of absolute characterization of a culture. Furthermore, these are cultural generations, which may not apply to specific individuals in any culture and finally, that cultures change over time (Hofstede 1991).

In the original Hofstede study (1980), data was gathered from forty counties but several prominent countries (e.g. China and Russia) were not included because of political considerations at the time. For individualism, the U.S. had the highest level of individualism with a score of 91, Japan was around the middle of the distribution with a

FIGURE 4
CHANGES IN THE CONCEPTION OF INDIVIDUALISM & COLLECTIVISM

HOFSTEDE	TRIANDIS	VARIOUS MODs	OYSERMAN
1. Individualism (Self Reliant)	Vertical Individualism	Intellectual Auto	1. Individualism
		Affective Autonomy	(Seek own goal)
	Horizontal Individualism		(Uniqueness)
	Vertical Collectivism	Relational Collectivism (Peer Collectivism)	(Self Know)
Collectivism (Integration w/ the group)		(Family Collectivism)	(Privacy)
	Horizontal Collectivism		(Direct Com)
		Group/Society Collectivism (Authority Directed)	(Competition)
2. Power Distance (degree of power difference in society)			2. Collectivism
		3. Competitiveness	(Hierarchy)
3. Masculinity/ Femininity (gender differentiation)		Mastery	(Belong to Grps)
			(Duty to Group)
(assertive/nurturing)		Harmony	(Harmony)
4. Uncertainty Avoidance (tolerance for ambiguity)			(Advice Others)
			(Context Beh)
(need for structured situations)			(Rel to Others)

score of 46 (the mean was 51), Hong Kong had a score of 25 and Taiwan was on the low end with a score of 17, which was treated as an indication of a high level of collectivism. On the dimension of power distance, Hong Kong was moderately high with a score of 68, Taiwan had a score of 58, Japan had a score of 54 (the mean was 51), and the United States was lower on the dimension with a score of 40. Later, estimates were made for China, which gave it a score of 20 on individualism, making it highly collectivistic and a score of 80 on power distance, making it a high power distance country.

While some studies have replicated Hofstede's findings for particular countries, an increasing number of studies have noted changes especially whenever any other variables are added. For example, Marshall (1997) compared New Zealand and Indonesia using Hofstede's individualism scales, and found New Zealand to be more individualistic than Indonesia as expected but when he added in the variable of social class, the picture became more complex. Generally, he found that the higher the social class, the higher the individualism rating and at the highest social class level, there was a movement toward convergence between the two countries.

Koch and Koch (2007) looked at the effects of individualism and collectivism on cooperative behavior within a single country, China. They started from the assumption that students from Beijing and a more regional city would differ in their levels of individualism because of the differences in their economic development. Subsequent findings confirmed this on the individualism scale but not on the collectivism scale with significant differences for students from the two cities on individualism scores and in their levels of cooperativeness. A third study by Pirttila-Backman, Kassea and Ikonen (2004) in Cameroon, showed significant differences in both collectivism and individualism for gender (women higher than men on individualism) and region (more urban regions were higher on individualism). Thus, these studies give reason to pause in applying any single rating to a country because of the apparent effects of other factors.

A further step in understanding the aggregate values of countries occurred when Triandis (1988, 1993, 1995) overlaid individualism and collectivism with the ideas of horizontalness (egalitarianism) and verticalness (hierarchy). For example, Triandis, Chen & Chan (1998) in looking at a number of countries including the U.S., Japan, Hong Kong and Korea, found that only Hong Kong was more collectivistic than the others. The most prevalent cultural orientation was horizontal individualism with the U.S. and Japan as primarily horizontal/individualistic cultures, while Hong Kong was seen as a horizontal/collectivistic culture and Korea was seen as balanced between horizontal individualism & horizontal collectivism. Thus, Triandis' findings suggest that some countries that have traditional been contrasted such as the United States and Japan may actually be closer than thought. Two possible explanations for this are that the Japanese have changed over time by becoming more individualistic or that the previous research was conflating two dimensions under the label of a single individualism-collectivism dimension. When the two dimensions are separated, the similarities (and differences) between the two countries are easier to see.

As mentioned earlier, Schwartz (1999) in developing his framework, added a dimension outlining human's relationship to the physical world (mastery v. harmony) and splits individualism into intellectual autonomy and emotional autonomy. When using this framework he found that the three groupings of: 1) the U.S. and Japan, 2) Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore and 3) China tended to be reasonably similar, especially when

contrasted with the rest of the world (for example, large parts of Western Europe). The U.S. and Japan tended toward a combination of a middle level valuation of hierarchy (in society), moderate levels of affective and intellectual autonomy, and a moderately high level of mastery. China while similar to the U.S. and Japan in affective and intellectual autonomy was much higher on hierarchy and mastery while the grouping of Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore was similar to the U.S. and Japan in terms of mastery and hierarchy but was lower on intellectual affective autonomy and higher on conservativism. Again, the placement of the U.S. and the values associated with some traditional collectivistic countries were found to be different than expected.

More recent studies have confirmed what Triandis and Schwartz found and provided further questions about the traditional placements of countries. For example, Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier (2002) in their meta-analysis of all of the studies comparing regions and countries on individualism and collectivism found some evidence to support Hofstede's placements and some evidence to question them. They confirmed that on a general measure of individualism, the United States was higher than Hong Kong, Taiwan, China, Japan and Korea but was lower than Latin America. However, when collectivism was considered as a separate general factor, the United States was seen as being less collectivistic than Taiwan, China and Hong Kong, but more collectivistic than Japan and the same as Korea.

In addition, the particular scales and resulting components of individualism and collectivism can affect the way that particular cultures are thought about. For example, in the case of Japan, Oyserman et al suggest that when differences in individualism between Japan and the U.S. are found that they lie in the particular values for independence, personal uniqueness, personal privacy and direct communication. Furthermore, they argue that when competition is added to the mix, that differences between Japan and the U.S. disappear, "suggesting that competitiveness is a construct unrelated to IND" (p. 16). Differences in collectivism also seem to be sensitive to the reliability of the scales used. In the case of Japan and the U.S., it is when low reliability scales are used that lower U.S. collectivism scores seems to appear but when high reliability scales are used, the findings are reversed, i.e. the U.S. is higher on collectivism. It also appears that ratings of the U.S. as low in collectivism especially in comparison to East Asian countries are accentuated when items related to group harmony, defining the self in context, and valuing hierarchy and group goals are used and when scales accentuating a sense of belonging to in-groups and seeking other's advice are used, then the differences decrease or reverse. Thus, there seems to be an interaction between the aspects of individualism and collectivism that are being measured and how collectivistic certain countries appear.

Finally, Green, Deschamps and Paez (2005) using a taxonomy based on self-reliance, interdependence, and competitiveness, came up with some alternative placements for various countries. In their corresponding analysis of nations, China was categorized as a self-reliant/competitive country (even though it also had a large number of self-reliant/non-competitors), Singapore fell in the self-reliant/non-competitive category, and the U.S., was classified in the interdependent/non-competitive category (even they also have a high percentage of self-reliant/non-competitors).

Thus, these later studies have demonstrated some correspondence to Hofstede but they have also demonstrated a number of ways that countries seem to differ from what Hofstede said (Figure 5). For example, while China does fit expectations in terms of some

FIGURE 5
CHANGES IN COUNTRY RATINGS ON INDIVIDUAL/ COLLECTIVISM SCALES OVER TIME

COUNTRY	HOFSTEDE*		SCHWARTZ*		GREEN ET AL	OYSERMAN*
UNITED STATES	IND	91	AFF INT	64 49	Interdependent	around 45
JAPAN	IND	46	AFF INT	67 50		around 50
CHINA	IND	20	AFF INT	49 37	Self-Reliant	around 25
HONG KONG	IND	25	AFF INT	40 35		around 40
TAIWAN	IND	17	AFF INT	37 33		around 20
SINGAPORE	IND	20	AFF INT	25 24	Self-Reliant	
KOREA	IND	18				around 45

*100 Point Scale w/ 100 equaling high individualism, 1 equaling high collectivism

components such as high levels of hierarchy, greater collectivism on some scales, and less individualism on some scales, it did not fit expectations in that it is seen as more self-reliant (individualistic), more competitive, and less interdependent than previously thought. The U.S. fits expectations in being seen as high on individualism scales such as uniqueness and low on collectivism scales such as preference for working with a group, but it did not fit expectations in that its autonomy ratings were lower than China and roughly equivalent to Japan's while its interdependence ratings were generally higher than China and Japan. The U.S. also seemed to value competition less than China and maybe less than Japan. It is hard to say how accurate these conclusions are because of limitations of sample demographics, the number participants tested and when the data was gathered. However, it is safe to say that more complex data has revealed a different picture than expected from the original Hofstede ratings. This leads to two conclusions: 1) that countries change over time and 2) that the uncovering of multiple aspects of individualism and collectivism has brought about a more complex and less clear picture of the dimensions of values preferred by most cultures.

6 HOW DOES ARGUMENT AND THE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS RELATE TO CULTURAL VARIATIONS IN THE CONFLICT PROCESS?

There are a number of hints about how argument relates to dissensus and consensus in the various cultural studies of conflict. An understanding of the process can be gained by examining: 1) where and to what degree does conflict and disagreement occur? 2) what factors affect cultural variations in the argumentative aspects of conflict? and 3) what is the role of argument (dissensus/consensus) in cultural variations of the resolution of conflict?

6.1 *Where does conflict and disagreement occur in relation to cultural variations in values?*

One of the cardinal tenets of theories of cultural value dimensions is that certain cultures avoid conflict because it is contrary to the values of the culture. If this is true, research should show less conflict in the culture, or at least less overt conflict. The conclusion from the early research (such as Hofstede's) was that conflict and disagreement occurred in individualistic cultures where open disagreement was acceptable as opposed to collectivistic cultures that value harmony. One such study suggesting this kind of finding is Benjamin, Schneider, Greenman and Hum's (2001) study of conflict and friendship in Taiwanese and Canadian children. They found that there is a negative correlation between friendship and conflict for collectivistic Taiwanese children while there is a positive correlation between conflict and friendship for individualistic Canadian children. This seems to indicate that conflict is most likely to be found in an individualistic culture and that its effects are more positive.

However, things are not that simple. In their 1998 study of individual/collectivism and conflict in 23 countries, Smith, Dugan, Peterson and Leung reported the frequency of disagreements for the two conflict scenarios that they studied. They found that there was no significant difference between individualistic and collectivistic cultures in the frequency with which conflict occurs within groups, however they did find that conflict with out-groups was more frequent in high power distant cultures than in low power distant cultures.

They also found that, overall, in-group conflict was more frequent than out-group disagreement for all types of cultures. Furthermore, none of Hofstede's dimensions of cultural variation were related to the occurrence of in-group conflict in collectivistic countries counter to the long standing expectation that collectivistic cultures value in-group harmony. These findings are particularly important because it is usually predicted that their will be less disagreement in collectivistic countries than individualistic countries and that this will especially be true of in-group disagreement where it is expected that harmony needs to be maintained. Since in-group conflict was more frequent in collectivistic societies, something else must be going on other than the expected valuing of harmony and the suppression of conflict.

What is not clear in the Smith et al (1998) study is what the disagreement looks like. In their scenarios, participants responded to questions with wording such as "there are differing opinions in your department," which does not indicate how overt the disagreement is (p. 356). In a second study, Nibler and Harris (2003) provide data on conflict in China and the U. S. where the questions refer to more overt forms of conflict: do "people in your group disagree about opinions regarding what activities the group" should do (p. 622)? Their results show that no matter whether the conflict is about tasks or relationships, or among friends or strangers, the levels of conflict are higher in China than in the U. S. even though it is less so for task conflict among friends. At this point, there seems to be evidence that not only is conflict not less in collectivistic cultures, but that it may even be higher under certain conditions.

One further study speaks to the question of how much conflict exists in collectivistic societies. Koch and Koch (2007) studied Chinese college students from two locations in different parts of China, where one location was presumed to be more individualistic than the other (based on Hofstede's scales), and found that the more individualistic participants were more cooperative than the less individualistic students in what was an out-group situation. Thus, the previous study (Nibler & Harris 2003) showed that levels of conflict are higher in in-group situations than in out-group situations for both collectivist and individualist societies, and this study showed that for out-group situations, the collectivistic participants showed more conflict than the individualistic participants.

On the face of it, these studies seem to contradict the conventional wisdom about the nature of collectivistic societies. While these findings are significant, it is useful to explore further the form that conflicts take in these different cultures. In seeking to explain their results, Nibler and Harris (2003) wonder if the Chinese are more sensitive to group conflict and see it as being more overt than it is in comparison to the West, while Smith et al (1998) speculate about whether disagreements in collectivistic cultures are expressed and handled in "more subtle and indirect ways." There are two studies that cast some light on these questions.

Gilfand, Nisshii, Ohbuchi, Fukuno, Holcombe and Dyer (2001), in a study of how Japanese and Americans cognitively represent conflict situations, found a dimension that they labeled overt vs. covert, which was used by both American and Japanese participants in interpreting Japanese conflict episodes. The Americans used it to interpret Japanese conflict situations as having issues that were not aired openly while the Japanese used it to interpret their conflict episodes as having open confrontation between parties or not when status issues was involved.

In Tjosvold, Hui & Sun's (2004) second study of undergraduate students in China, they tested the effects of having a direct discussion/disagreement about issues versus avoiding the discussion of differences . The variable was manipulated by emphasizing the importance of direct disagreement and open discussion of views or by emphasizing the importance of keeping one's views to themselves and maintaining a strong sense of agreement. Direct disagreement led to perceived cooperation, curiosity, greater knowledge of opposing views and more liking of the other. The authors conclude that the "results do not support traditional theorizing that direct discussion of conflict dis-confirms face for Chinese….Findings indicate that Chinese people can distinguish between direct discussion of conflict and dis-confirmation of face and react much differently to them" (p. 367).

These two studies indicate that both Chinese and Japanese participants are able to distinguish between overt and covert conflict so it may not be simply a matter of sensitivity and interpretation of what is disagreement and what is overt. The studies also seem to indicate that overt and covert disagreement is understand and accepted in these two collectivistic cultures but that covert disagreement may be a viable alternative because both Americans and Japanese seemed to easily see it presence in Japanese conflicts but not in U. S. conflicts. Gelfand et al (2001) suggest that since the American participants did not know that they were evaluating conflict situations from Japan or the U. S., that in the case of the Japanese conflict situations, "the Japanese stimuli strongly 'engulfed' the perceivers (p. 1068).

Finally, one other study presents an interesting variation on these findings about the cultural values associated with conflict. Gelfand & Realo (1999) looked at the effects of accountability on the kind of conflict behavior in negotiation situations involving individualistic (European Americans and Americans) and collectivistic cultures (Asian Americans and Estonians). They found that when participants in negotiation scenarios had a high level of accountability versus a low level of accountability, that their intentions, behaviors and outcomes conformed in the expected directions to individualistic and collectivistic values. However, when accountability was low that they went in the opposite direction from what was expected. So when accountable, the collectivists behaved in a cooperative fashion and the individualists did not but when accountability was low, the collectivists were not cooperative but the individualists were.

So, what can be concluded about the likelihood of conflict, argument, and the con/dis-sensus process in various cultural milieus? First, there seems to be evidence that conflict and disagreement are likely to occur, especially in an overt form, in an individualistic culture. Second, there also seems to be some evidence that conflict in an individualistic culture as opposed to a collectivistic culture has the potential to have more positive outcomes. Third, the picture is mixed as to how likely conflict is to occur in a collectivistic culture. The theory of collectivistic values and a number of studies suggest that conflict is not as likely to occur in collectivistic cultures, however, other studies suggest that conflict is just as likely to occur, thus the question is still open. It would be interesting to know how many of the studies are based on perceptions, on assumed cultural values, on behavioral intentions and on actual behavior. Fourth, there is evidence that an important distinction in collectivistic cultures is that between overt conflict, covert conflict and implicit conflict. Fifth, there seems to be clear evidence that there are within country variations in levels of collectivism and individualism and therefore, variations in the levels of conflict would also be expected. Sixth, people in collectivistic cultures are capable of

engaging in direct conflict and discussion in a constructive fashion. And seventh, accountability seems to be a powerful factor in the way people respond to conflict in that it makes the cultural values and norms more salient and enforceable.

6.2 *Factors Affecting the Cultural Variations in the Argumentative Aspects of Conflict*

There seems to be at least five factors that affect the way argument and cultural values interact in conflict situations (especially for "collectivist" societies): 1) whether the conflict is with an in-group or an out-group, 2) whether the conflict is over task/intellectual or relationship/emotional issues, 3) whether the orientation of the participants to the conflict is cooperative, 4) the degree of imposition involved in the conflict and 5) the way issues of face are dealt with in the conflict.

6.2.1 *In-groups versus Out-groups*

First, as has already been touched on, whether the conflict and arguments are with members of an in-group or an out-group seems to make a difference. Matsunaga (2005), in a theoretical piece, proposed that collectivistic societies, when dealing with an out-group, tend to situationally define their self-concept more independently, but when dealing with in-groups, they tend to define their self-concepts more interdependently. She also argues that the more salient the group membership, the more likely the person defines themselves interdependently in in-group situations. The conventional wisdom is that the more interdependent the person feels, the less likely they are to engage in conflict, but the more independent they feel, the more likely they are to engage in conflict.

Dolinina and Cecchetto (1998), in a theoretical article focusing on the intercultural argument situation (which is an out-group situation), contend that the parties can establish a relationship ranging from that of equality to that of superiority-subordination, with attendant influences on the levels of politeness used in the resulting argument situation. There is also an implication that the more equality present, the higher the probability of conflict. This is counter to Smith et al's (1998) finding that power distance affects the degree of disagreement found in out-group relations with more disagreements occurring in high power distance countries. It is also of interest in Smith et al's study that conflict within in-groups is more frequent than that with out-groups for all cultures and that individualism and collectivism does not predict its frequency. Koch and Koch (2007) also looked at out-group situations, and found that the higher the individualism score in China, the more cooperative the behavior in conflict situations and the lower the individualism score, the more likely the conflict with out-groups.

Tjosvold in two studies looked at the interaction between Chinese employees and foreign and Chinese managers (in-group and out-group situations). In the first study, Chen, Tjosvold and Fang (2005) looked at the out-group relationship between Chinese employees and foreign managers (American and Japanese). They found that when the manager employed a cooperative approach (integrated different views to find a mutually beneficial solution) to Chinese workers as opposed to a competitive approach (forced others to conform to their own view) or an avoidance approach (tried to smooth over the conflict), that it strengthens their relationship and improved productivity.

In the second study, Chen and Tjosvold (2007) looked at both foreign and Chinese managers. They found that quality leader-member relationships-LMX (in-group relations with employees are characterized by "high levels of information communication, mutual support, informal influence and trust) promoted constructive controversy and rewards for the employee for both sets of managers. They also found that personal guanxi (an informal relationship built on social occasions such as lunches and gift-giving where promises are exchanged for doing favors for each other) was viewed by employees as a factor in building constructive controversy with their managers (both foreign and Chinese) but that it did not predict constructive controversy for foreign managers even though it did for Chinese managers. The out-group situation creates barriers that are harder to deal with than in in-group situations so it was probably harder for a foreign manager and a Chinese employee to develop personal guanxi.

Thus, again the picture is mixed about how in-groups and out-groups affect conflict. Traditional views from a number of research traditions would posit that there is greater likelihood of conflict with out-groups than with in-groups, no matter the type of culture (e.g. social identity theory and contact hypothesis work). When the situation is expanded to look at variations in cultural values, it has been argued that this finding should even be truer in collectivistic cultures than individualistic cultures because of the importance of in-group harmony in collectivistic cultures (Hofstede 1980; Ting-Toomey 2003). However, these studies cast some doubt on the received wisdom in so far as whether the amount of in-group conflict differs between individualistic and collectivistic cultures. For out-group conflict, there is some evidence to support the collective wisdom but even more so for power distance (horizontal/vertical) than collectivism and individualism where a hierarchical or high power distance culture seems to promote more conflict with out-groups.

6.2.2 *Task/Intellectual issues versus Relational/Emotional issues*

Second, it makes a difference in the argumentation as to whether the conflict is primarily centered on intellectual/task issues on one hand or emotional/relational issues on the other hand. Gilfand et al (2001) found that American participants construed both American and Japanese conflict episodes using a dimension that they called intellectual v. emotional. In both cases, the high end of this dimension had to do with conflicts where emotions such as feelings of jealousy, pain, frustration, guilt and shame were present. The low end of the dimension had to do with conflict over facts such as "who did what to whom." While the author's distinguish between the American's construal of intellectual v. emotional and the Japanese construal of *giri* violations, they actually may be tapping into similar dimensions. The Japanese concept has questions of honor and dignity on one end of the scale and questions of sense of duty and obligations on the other end of the scale. The Japanese seem to be treating questions of honor and dignity in an emotional sense and questions of duty and obligation in an intellectual sense.

The Nibler and Harris (2003) study has clearly differentiated variables related to task conflict ("disagreements about fact or opinion") and relationship conflict (disagreements related to personal issues not related to the task), which correlate strongly with the intellectual and emotional. They found that Chinese participants reported higher levels of both task and relationship conflict than did Americans, and that friends reported

greater relationship and task conflict than did strangers even though this was primarily for the American participants. They also found that there was a negative correlation between relationship conflict and group effectiveness overall.

The authors interpret their results as suggesting a task conflict advantage, where "group members feel comfortable enough to freely express and exchange opinions and disagree with each other to achieve optimal outcomes," but only for individualistic cultures (p. 613). While the results are not totally clear, there are some intriguing suggestions to consider in that the Chinese participants had higher levels of conflict, both relational and task, than did the American participants and second, the American outperformed the Chinese on all measures of group efficiency. This is probably not any measure of American superiority, but it does suggest some interesting questions. Does relationship conflict have a generally negative effect on the nature of the group's interaction and its outcome? Is it harder for people to separate relational conflict from task conflict in collectivistic societies? Have Americans had more practice dealing with overt conflict?

Tjosvold and Sun (2000) in studying Chinese businesspeople found that the way that person or relationship conflict is dealt with has a much stronger effect on the outcomes of the conflict than does the handling of task or intellectual issues. When the person and relationship was affirmed (versus dis-confirmed), the outcomes of the conflict were positive.

Thus, there seems to be evidence that cultures distinguish between conflict issues that have to do with the task and those that have to do with the relationship. Furthermore, conflict centered on relationships seems to have a greater potential for negative outcomes, especially in collectivistic cultures. Finally, task conflict, under the right circumstances may have a positive effect on outcomes.

6.2.3 *Conflict Orientation*

Third, the kind of conflict orientation present in the situation can affect the type of con/dissensus process in subsequent arguments, especially when the conflict is overt. Traditionally, the conflict literature has distinguished between cooperative behavior and competitive behavior in negotiations. Deutsch (1973), in his classic studies of conflict and bargaining, distinguished between competition where each individual's goals are mutually exclusive and cooperation where individuals perceived that reaching their goals depends on the other. Most of these studies work from the point of view that cooperation yields better results than competition.

Tjosvold, Johnson, Johnson & Sun (2006) have challenged this view in the cross-cultural context with the idea of constructive competition, which they distinguish from destructive competition. Many studies utilizing competition have operationalized competition in such negative terms that it cannot help but be destructive, e.g. "negotiating with you is a major waste of time" (Olekalns, Robert, Probst, Smith & Carnevale 2005). Constructive competition is viewed as a conflict between people that is competitive but is managed constructively, e.g. effectively completing the task, enjoying the competition etc. Thus, three possible orientations to conflict in China have been established: cooperative, constructive competition, and destructive competition with two of them having possible positive outcomes.

6.2.4 *Politeness*

Fourth, politeness theory has been used in a lot of cross-cultural research because it seems to suggest a range of possible argumentative behaviors that can fit the values and norms of a particular culture. The theory itself does not deal with conflict or different cultural value dimensions, but researchers have extended the theory to these situations. In general, they believe that the more collectivistic the culture, the greater the level of politeness that is used. In addition, they posit a set of conditions such as the level of imposition on the other and the level of obligation to the other person as factors that will determine what politeness strategy is used by a person. As part of the theory, a number of the conditions are seen as threatening to others and thus have an implicit level of conflict involved in them.

Bresnahan and a series of colleagues have tried to explore these constraints in three collectivistic cultures, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, but have found the results to be very complex and not totally understandable. In one part of the study, Bresnahan, Ohashi, Liu, Nebashi and Liao (1999) found that the higher the level of imposition in the request, the more likely that participants would refuse the request and thereby trigger a level of explicit conflict. However, they also found that Chinese in Singapore were more likely to respond favorably to a request, thereby avoiding conflict, while Chinese in Taiwan were more likely to refuse the request but with a number of tactics that employed higher levels of politeness and indirectness to defuse the conflict. What is significant here is that the two favored ways of responding to the situations with the most conflict potential were to avoid them or to use high levels of politeness and indirectness so as to defuse the potential conflict. Thus, politeness research, though limited in its research framework, seems to suggest the use of more covert ways of dealing with potential conflict.

6.2.5 *Face*

Closely related to the work on politeness is that of face. Face seems to have an important effect on argument and conflict, especially in collectivistic situations. Dolinina and Cecchetto (1998) argue that the introduction of intercultural variables (out-group) into argument situations demands that face become part of the argumentative considerations. Tjosvold and colleagues have conducted a series of studies looking at the effects of face and other factors in collectivistic China. In two studies (Tjosvold & Sun 2000; Tjosvold, Hui & Sun 2004), they found that confirming the other's face, as opposed to disconfirming their face, had a significant positive effect on creating cooperative discussion in conflict situations. According to the authors, affirmation of face seems to promote uncertainty about one's own position, exploration and understanding of the other's position, efforts to integrate positions, and confidence in the relationship. On the other hand, disconfirmation of face not only reduced these behaviors but also increased the amount of confrontation in the negotiation. The affirmation or disconfirmation of position seemed have little effect on the type of discussion that occurred.

6.2.6 *Summary*

The five factors discussed in this section can be seen as working together in terms of the amount of conflict and types of conflict present in a particular set of cultural value

FIGURE 6
FACTORS AFFECTING THE KIND OF CON/DIS-SENSUS IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS

1. IN-GROUPS OUT-GROUPS

[predict] more conflict in Ind than Coll
[finding] no difference in conflict levels

[predict] more conflict in Ind
[finding] more conflict in Coll
[finding] more conflict in Hi Power Distance

[finding] more conflict in in-groups than out-groups

2. TASK/INTELLECTUAL ISSUES RELATIONSHIP/EMOTIONAL ISSUES

[finding] more conflict for Coll than Ind

[finding] more conflict for Coll
[finding] less conflict is resolved for Coll

3. COOPERATIVE COMPETITIVE(Constructive) (Destructive)

[finding] cooperation leads to more positive outcomes than competition
[finding] constructive competition can lead to more positive outcomes than destructive competition in collectivistic cultures

4. LOW LEVELS OF POLITENESS HIGH LEVELS OF POLITENESS

[predict] collectivistic cultures will use more politeness and have less conflict
[finding] collectivistic cultures use various politeness strategies to avoid conflict
Taiwan—refusal of request (conflict potential) with several high levels of politeness
Singapore—respond positively to request and thereby avoid conflict

5. FACE CONSIDERED FACE NOT CONSIDERED

[predict] face is likely to be considered more in collectivistic than individualistic
[predict] face is more important in out-group situations
[finding] in collectivistic society, confirmation of face has positive outcomes

dimensions (Figure 6). Overall, collectivistic cultures seem to have more conflict in both in-group and out-group situations and the conflict seems to be less beneficial to the outcome of the situation. This simple fact makes conflict seem threatening to a culture, which leads it to interpenetrate its views of conflict with the collectivistic norms about harmony. However, the other factors suggested in this section may provide some ways to make the conflict more useful to the culture. The research seems clear that relational conflict is more destructive so steps to alleviate relational problems or shift the conflict to task issues seem to be beneficial. In addition, certain kinds of cooperative orientations seem to lead to better outcomes. Finally, the types of politeness strategies available may make it possible to address face issues in a less direct fashion and thereby blunt some of the destructive elements of the conflict.

6.3 *The role of argument, the con/dis-sensus process, and varying cultural values in the resolution of conflict*

The role and process of argument in the resolution of conflict under differing cultural value dimensions can be explored in two ways. First, there is a large literature on how people in different cultures prefer to resolve conflicts. In most of this literature, the communicative aspects and argument processes are not spelled out very well but some of the studies about the ways that argument can work in conflict situations under conditions of varying cultural value dimensions. Second, there are a few studies that go into more detail about the argumentative processes in the resolution of conflict, which give us a more detailed picture of the process.

6.3.1 *Studies with hints about the argumentative role of the con/dis-sensus process in conflict resolution.*

First, in studies about how people in different cultures resolve conflict, there are a number of hints at how the argument process works. For example, Gelfand, Nishii, Ohbuchi, Fukuno, Holcombe & Dyer (2001) studied a number of Japanese and American conflict episodes and had Japanese and American participants evaluate them to understand their representations of conflict. They found that both groups, for all of the scenarios, used a universal value dimension based on the dimension of compromise v. win and while the dimension is universal, the Japanese, in line with their collectivistic orientation, interpreted things in terms of compromising as opposed to winning while U.S. participants, in line with their individualistic cultural values, thought about conflict in terms of winning as opposed to compromising. Note that this discussion can supply the opposite sides of a kind of competition/cooperation dimension and is in line with the conventional thinking about conflict and cultural values.

There were also two specific frameworks that cut across both cultures even though they did not apply to all scenarios. Both the Japanese and Americans used a self framework to interpret U.S. conflict scenarios in a negative light (Japanese-differentiating of self from others and U.S.-infringements to self) and also both groups used an overt v. covert framework for interpreting Japanese conflict scenarios as previously discussed (section 6.1). Finally, they also found that Americans tended to use a culture specific intellectual v. emotional framework for interpreting conflict while the Japanese also used a

culture specific *giri* violation framework (duty to repay obligations and to maintain one's reputation) for interpreting conflict scenarios. If all of these frameworks results are examined closely, they seem to be stereotypic interpretations of conflict in Japan and the U.S. and two elements of the study's design add to the feeling of a self-fulfilling prophecy. First, this is a perceptual study so we do not know whether these judgments would correspond to behavior and second, the labeling items for the ratings of conflict dimensions of similarity and difference were provided by the researchers based on previous studies and sociological theories about Japan and the U.S. So, it is hard to know how much confidence to place in these results but it is clear that the framework shows a sensitivity to the way conflict plays out (win/overt versus compromise/covert) and a sensitivity to how others react to the conflict (self, emotions etc.). Furthermore, all of these frameworks have been previously discussed in this paper.

A traditional view is represented also in the views of Gudykunst and the research of Ting-Toomey. In discussing the relationship between individualism/collectivism and the communicative aspects of conflict, Gudykunst (1998) argues, based on Ting-Toomey (1985, 1988), that individualistic cultures perceive conflict as instrumental and prefer direct styles of dealing with it while collectivistic cultures perceive it as expressive and prefer indirect styles of dealing with conflict such as the use of mediators.

Ting-Toomey, in her Theory of Face Negotiation, provides an overarching and traditional framework for looking at interactive strategies for solving conflicts. She postulates that all people are concerned with face especially in probablematic situations such as conflict and that variations in cultural values influence the use of various facework and conflict styles. She also argues that people negotiate to resolve conflict through strategies such as dominating (the use of tactics that push one's own position as the expense of the other), integrating (a concern for a solution that shows high concern for self and for other), obliging (a high concern for other's interests beyond your own), compromising (give and take concessions to reach a middle point solution), or avoiding (eluding the conflict in some way) (1988, 2003; Ting-Toomey & Oetzel 2003). She argues that people in individualistic cultures prefer direct styles such as integrating or compromising while people in collectivistic cultures prefer indirect styles such as obliging or avoiding. Finally, in line with her work, Cole (1990) reports that European Americans tend to use integrating and obliging styles with members of in-groups while Japanese in the U.S. use obliging styles with in-group members and dominating styles with out-group members.

In a general sense, Ting-Toomey's framework makes sense, but there are variations even in the Cole study, and a number of studies that suggest that things are more complicated especially in the so-called collectivistic cultures. The following three sets of research suggest some interesting variations from the usual ways of thinking.

First, a set of studies about the ways that multiple countries try to resolve conflict situations provides some interesting results about specific behaviors. Smith, Dugan, Peterson and Leung's (1998) 23 country study of the relationship of individualism-collectivism (and Hofstede's other dimensions of cultural values) to the handling of conflict and disagreement showed that in individualistic countries, there was tendency to rely on one's own experience and training in dealing with conflicts, while in collectivistic countries, there was more of a tendency to rely on formal rules and procedures no matter whether dealing with in-group or out-group events.

Metcalf, Bird, Shankarmahesh, Aycan, Larimo and Valdelamar (2006) studied cultural tendencies in negotiation behavior for five countries, three of which would traditional be labeled as collectivistic (India, Mexico and Turkey) and two of which would be labeled as individualistic (Finland and the U. S.). They studied ten dimensions of business negotiation behavior and while most of them relate to one of Hofstede's dimensions in some way, a couple of dimensions will be singled out for discussion. On the dimension of attitude toward the negotiation, the responses from the U. S., Finland and Mexico clustered toward a win-win attitude and while India and Turkey showed the largest percentage of responses for a win-lose attitude and only Turkey lacked a sizable group of win-win responses. On the personal style dimension, Finland and the U. S. tended more toward the informal while India, Turkey and Mexico tended more toward the formal. And finally, in terms of communication, Turkey, India and Mexico show a strong preference for a direct style while the U. S. and Finland were more indirect even though only relatively. These findings are particularly interesting because they show some unexpected results. For example, there is much less competition exhibited than usually assumed for all countries and the U.S. and Finland have the least amount of competitive behavior which is usually not expected of individualistic countries. In addition, the collectivistic cultures seem to have a greater preference for direct communication than the individualistic cultures. To some degree, these results sound like out-group situations but the study is not clear about this issue.

Second, several studies focus on specifically exploring conflict in the context of collectivistic societies. Jabs (2005) explored conflict in Uganda, looking at the patterns of conflict response styles among literate and non-literate individuals in a rural part of Ugandan society. She finds that the initial response style of the non-literate people is generally dominating and competing rather than the expected collectivistic tendencies toward accommodation and avoiding. Furthermore, she found that there was little concern for facework among the non-literate people, rather they felt that embarrassment was good for the other party. Only among the literate people was their an initial response of using third party help, which is more in line with traditional collectivist practices, however, as the conflict moved along, the non-literate used third party help in almost all cases to resolve the conflict but the literate move toward more use of direct means of resolution.

There is also a third set of studies that have their origin in Brown and Levinson's Politeness Theory (1978). Kim (2003) has taken elements of Politeness Theory and created what she calls the Theory of Conversational Constraints. She believes that how something is said is influenced by cultural concerns for: 1) clarity, 2) minimizing imposition on others , 3) consideration for the feelings of others, 4) risking disapproval for self, and 5) effectiveness. Minimizing imposition, consideration for the feelings of others and risking disapproval of self are considered to be related to collectivistic cultures and clarity and effectiveness are considered to be related to individualistic cultures.

Miyahara, Kim, Shin & Yoon (1998) utilized elements of the Theory of Conversational Constraints to examine the degree to which participants saw conversational constraints as operating in conflict situations involving two cultures that are traditionally classified as collectivist, Japan and Korea. The concern that most directly relates to collectivistic harmony, concern for not hurting the feelings of others, was not significantly different between the two groups and both cultures rated the concern only slightly above the neutral point (neither agree or disagree with the statement). The most important

concern for both groups was that of clarity and the most significant difference occurred here with the Japanese' greater concern for clarity than the Koreans however, both groups rated it on the agree side. For the other two constraints, avoiding imposition on the other and avoiding being disliked, the Koreans had a higher rating than the Japanese but neither were on the agree side of the continuum and the Japanese were actually on the disagree side. While the authors interpret these results as meaning that the Koreans are more collectivistic than the Japanese, in reality, not only are there differences between these two traditional collectivistic cultures but neither of them are particularly strong in their collectivistic orientation and the Japanese may actually be more individualistic.

If the results of these studies are examined closely (Figure 7), it can be seen that while there is some support for generalizations about conflict resolution styles in collectivistic and individualistic cultures that there are also findings that do not fit, e.g. higher preference for private discussion in individualistic cultures and the higher use of win-lose strategies in some collectivistic cultures. While an extended discussion could follow about why these differences exist, it is more useful in this paper to treat these differences as possible ways that argument and con/dis-sensus process can work in various cultures. It is not being suggested that they always do operate in these different ways, but only that this research raises the possibility and that, as has been shown in some cases, they may involve special conditions.

6.3.2 *Studies about the argumentative role of the con/dis-sensus process in conflict resolution.*

There is a second set of research studies that go into more detail about how the process of conflict works in different cultural settings. Whereas the previous studies provided general strategies for resolving conflict, these studies examine particular communicative behavior allowing us to see how argument and the con/dis-sensus process works in combination with different dimensions of cultural values.

Nibler and Harris (2003), in their study of the group performance of American and Chinese student friends and strangers, examined a series of process measures to help explain the relationship between their conflict and performance findings. The Chinese groups experienced high levels of personal and task conflict and performed poorly while the groups of American friends performed well and "benefited from an uninhibited exchange of individual ideas and opinions." The American groups tended to use process methods such as coming to complete agreement, which led the researchers to conclude that they were "more inclined to use member interaction in their decision making," whereas the Chinese groups made more use of majority rule and a long discussion with a vote, which led the researchers to conclude that they used structured methods and were less inclined to seek a consensus.

Studies by Tinsley (2001, 1998) explored the negotiation strategies used by American, German and Japanese business people in a business conflict negotiation situation. An interesting picture emerged of the strategies used by the three sets of negotiators, who represented countries with different sets of cultural values. The Japanese were posited to have the following cultural values: low individualism/high collectivism (value relationships with various collectivities and align their goals with the in-group), low polychronicity (value dealing with a single thing at a time), low explicit contracting (value

FIGURE 7
THE EFFECTS OF FACTORS INVOLVED IN THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT ON ARGUMENT BEHAVIOR UNDER DIFFERING CULTURAL VALUE SYSTEMS

INDIVIDUALISTIC		COLLECTIVISTIC
1.	*Face*	
[predict] high self face concern		high other face concern
[finding]	high mutual face concern for both	
[finding] higher self face concerns but significance marginal and particular cultures mixed		[finding] higher other face concerns but overall levels for other face are much lower than self or mutual
[findings] concern--threat to autonomy		concern--differentiated from group
2.	*Style*	
Direct Style		Indirect Style
Dominating Style: defend, express	(no difference) aggression	
Avoiding Style:	third party	give in, pretend
	Integrating Style:	
Problem solve Respect Private discussion		Remain calm apologize
Win-win		Win-lose
Informal		Formal
		Non-literate: dominating, competing, little face concern Literate: third party help but later use of dominating Clarity more for Japan v Korea Korea hi Japan: Avoiding imposition Avoiding being disliked
3.	*Resources*	
One's own experiences One's training		Formal rules and procedures

indirect and informal communication), and high hierarchy (value social stratification and status distinctions). The picture of their argumentative strategies from the findings is one where there are a limited number of strategies used with the greatest emphasis on threats based on status and power and some appeals to the nature of the rules. The rest of the time, the Japanese negotiator used non-offensive strategies such as positive statements, requests for information and things that the researchers were not able to classify.

The Germans were posited as having cultural values that emphasized high explicit contracting (value overt codes and communication), moderate individualism (value autonomy and self goals), moderate polychronicity (value multi-tasking), and low hierarchy. The German negotiator's use of argumentative strategies from the findings is a little more varied and veiled than the Japanese, but they ultimately has some similarities. The negotiator is most likely to appeal to some kind of rule or regulation and may fence with the other by using positive statements and sometimes negotiating for a deal involving both parties' interests. But there is also a willingness to use negative statements and make threats from a position of power and status.

The American negotiators were posited as working from cultural values of high individualism, moderate polychronicity, moderate explicit contracting and low hierarchy/egalitarianism. Their use of strategies from the findings was the most varied in terms of the options used and in the number of times each of the strategies was used. The two highest strategies were positive statements and appeals to rules and, on occasion, an appeal to status and power, but they also made heavy use of attempts to argue for positions that take into account the others interests, ask questions and interrupt.

Tinsley's studies show three different patterns of negotiation strategies that imply different uses of argument. It is interesting to note the important role of rules for the low and moderate individualistic groups which echoes the findings in the Smith et al and the Nibler and Harris studies.

The third set of studies, dealing with conflict processes, were done by Tjosvold and his colleagues. Tjosvold's set of studies suggest that the levels of conflict are higher than expected in China and that there are several ways of dealing with the conflict that reveal interesting argumentative techniques for both dissensus and consensus. Tjosvold and Sun (2000) show that face is an important consideration in conflict in China. Both this study and his 2004 study (Tjosvold, Hui and Sun) show that if face is confirmed at the beginning of the conflict then it opens up the interaction to disagreement and constructive behaviors. Furthermore, in the 2004 study, they demonstrated that if face confirmation is combined with direct controversy (rather than avoidance of controversy) then constructive debate can ensue that leads to productive outcomes. In their 2000 study, they describe this as "open discussion of differences" and in their 2004 study, they describe this as "open-mindedness." What is intriguing here are their descriptions of constructive conflict. In both studies, they see constructive conflict as involving such things as questioning and uncertainty about one's own views and position; exploring the other's views and positions; asking questions; the ability to identify the other's positions; mutual interest in each other's positions; less confrontation when disagreeing; more cooperative goals; and efforts to integrate their different views.

Up to this point, Tjosvold's emphasis was on demonstrating that cooperative conflict could and does occur among the Chinese. In a 2006 study, Tjosvold, Johnson, Johnson and Sun went further to develop the idea of constructive competition in China.

They found evidence that if an internal motive to compete existed and a strategy of competing fairly (use of equity rule) was used, that these served as powerful influences on the constructiveness of competition. However, things such as task and ego motives, extrinsic motivation and the strategy to obstruct did not contribute to constructive competition. When constructive competition was present, they described it in terms of the experience of engaging in competition, enjoying the competition, wanting to participate, effectively completing the task, feeling supported and capable, and interacting positively with competitors.

Thus, Tjosvold and his colleagues seem to be suggesting that in a collectivistic society such as China, that there are factors that can lead to the productive use of disagreement and competition in conflict situations. In fact, these considerations are not a lot different from those needed in non-collectivistic societies for the effective use of dissensus in argumentative conflicts.

A number of conflict studies have moved beyond the cultural values present in the situations studied and beyond the factors affecting conflict to looking at the particular argumentative and communicative strategies used in the conflicts (Figure 8). Thus, we can see a chain of research that starts with the question of where conflict occurs in different cultures, moves to variations in cultural values associated with the conflict, continues with general factors that can affect the way the conflict plays out, and finally, leads to the global and specific strategies used in the conflicts.

7. WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS, ARGUMENT AND CULTURAL VALUE VARIATIONS?

The drawing of conclusions from an analysis that has shown as many inconsistencies as consistencies in the theory and research can only be tentative at best, particularly when some of the conclusions have not been tested yet. A start point is to consider the following two descriptions:

1. Argument in organizations that can lead to good decision-making is characterized by interaction over competing claims, the tension of ideas, opportunities for collective disagreement, social comparison and idea testing, a context of good will, and a commitment to shared procedural rules.
2. Constructive interaction in the business setting involves exploring the other's views and positions, asking questions, questioning one's own positions, mutual interest in each other's positions, enjoying competition, interacting positively with competitors and efforts to integrate different views.

Of course, the first description comes from Valuing Dissensus Project's ideas about what dissensus should involve in an organization and the second description comes from Tjosvold's research on business in China where he describes the characteristics of constructive competition that leads to positive outcomes. The first project has at times seemed a logical extension of western individualism in the theoretical confines of argumentation theory and the second project seems to suggest bold new ideas about the effective functioning of business in the collectivistic confines of the People's Republic of China. However, what is most striking are the similarities in the two descriptions despite the alien worlds that they inhabit.

FIGURE 8
ELEMENTS OF ARGUMENT IN THE CON/DIS-SENSUS PROCESS AS USED IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION STRATEGIES ACROSS CULTURES

INDIVIDUALISM		COLLECTIVISM
Americans	Germans	Japanese
-Most variety of strategy use -Highest use: positive (19%), rules & procedures (19%) power (12%) mutual interests (10%)	-Highest use is rules and procedures (26%) -Followed by power (18%) -Then, positive (12%) & mutual interests (9%)	-Most limited use of strategies -Highest use: power (27%) -Followed by rules & procedures (20%) & various non-offensive tactics (12%)

Americans	Chinese
Process Methods: -coming to complete agreement -member interaction	Structured Methods: -majority rule -long discussion with vote -less seeking of consensus
	Chinese Are capable of using: -open discussion of differences -questioning own position -exploring other's views -asking questions -identifying other's positions -less confrontation when disagree -enjoying competition -efforts to integrate different views

These two statements represent ideals in both of their worlds, but they also represent what can be, so it is important to know what fosters them. However, it is also important to explore what falls in between as has been attempted in this paper. Despite the lengthy excursions into detailed bodies of research, the goal of this paper, all along, has been to look for the confluences between the idea of dissensus as conceptualized in the con/dis-sensus process and as situated in the argumentative discourse of differing cultural value systems. At this point, it is incumbent to advance some tentative "probes" for consideration in an attempt to make sense out of this paper's lengthy discussions.

First, since disagreement is one of the fundamental human orientations toward life and other people, it is present in all cultures. This statement should be a truism but at times, the literature on cultural variations in values and beliefs appears to suggest otherwise. People have different opinions, people have different interests, and people have different experiences, which provide the grounds for disagreement as suggested by theorists such as Burke (1969) and revisionist researchers such as Smith et al (1998).

Second, there may be various forces in different societies that work against the expression of disagreements such as authoritarian governments, hierarchical societies, the use of status power and the fear of offending others. Several of these factors have become apparent in this analysis but the most vivid reminder is Gelfand and Realo's finding about the effects of accountability on the expression of individualistic and collectivistic values. In collectivistic societies, when people are accountable, they are less likely to express disagreement. From this study, it appears that the following factors can inhibit the direct expression of disagreement: in-group hierarchies, relational face issues, accountability, concern for being liked, concern for avoiding imposition, and concern for the feelings of others.

Third, as a result of these forces inhibiting the expression of disagreement, there exist a range of argumentative forms beyond the ideals presented at the beginning of this conclusionary discussion. It is tempting to try to develop an explicit taxonomy of possibilities but at this point in time, it is more useful (and safer) to present a few possible frameworks. The simplest framework is probably to distinguish between direct disagreement, indirect disagreement and the avoidance of disagreement. Such distinctions have been used by some scholars to distinguish between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, but as can be seen in this paper's discussions, that is too simplistic. Studies have revealed situations where cultures that were thought to be individualistic used more indirect forms of disagreement than were expected and similarly, collectivistic cultures used more direct forms of disagreement than were expected. Furthermore, some scholars have conceptualized disagreement as competition, which they see as independent of the traditional ways of thinking about individualism and collectivism.

One of the possibilities suggested by the direct, indirect and avoiding framework, is the idea of indirect argument. At first glance, this may seem antithetical to the con/dis-sensus process with its emphasis on direct, open disagreement. What would indirect argument mean? It would mean a process where disagreement and the expression and consideration of various ideas would not be explicitly visible in the language of the exchange. While the argument would not necessarily be clear and understood by someone not involved in the exchange, it would be quite clear to those involved. By using indirect forms of language and expression, a cloud of deniability envelopes the interaction thereby protecting the face of those involved. Such processes at least theoretically exist in ideas

like the ringi process in Japan and the various satirical and editorial commentary processes in the former Soviet bloc (Hazen 1989). A further resource for consideration of indirect argument is Hall's idea of message contextuality (ranging from high to low), where as the amount of contextuality in the message increases, more and more of the information and meaning is carried in the various contextual elements and not the explicit message (Hazen & Fourcade 2007).

Fourth, even if the interaction takes a direct or indirect form of disagreement, there are a number of ways that people can seek to resolve the conflict. However, conflict resolution taxonomies are even more fraught with conceptual minefields than those related to expression of disagreement. As a result of the numerous attempts to define conflict resolution strategies in different cultures, labels for strategies have proliferated in the literature, e.g. win-win, win-lose, compromise, dominating, integrating, competitive, cooperative, obliging etc. For purposes of understanding argumentative possibilities for the resolution of disagreement in various cultures, the following simple framework should serve as a useful starting point: 1) approaches using open interaction such as competition or cooperation, 2) approaches using some set outside criterion to resolve the conflict such as rules and procedures, structured interactions, or power and status, and 3) approaches that function in some indirect fashion such as covert interaction, or avoiding. This framework incorporates a number of the options that have been discussed and can be thought of as involving dimensions of directness and of the evaluation of issues and positions.

Fifth, despite the possibilities of different kinds of disagreement and the different approaches to resolving them, there do seem to be a series of factors that can push the disagreement process in directions that can be deemed "constructive," especially in collectivistic societies. Thus, factors such as whether the disagreement is with people in out-groups or in-groups, whether the disagreement is over task or relational issues, whether the persons have a cooperative orientation of some kind, whether politeness levels are used and whether face is taken into account can have positive or negative consequences for the expression of disagreement and for the outcome of the disagreement. For example, Nibler and Harris (2003) in their study of Chinese and American conflict, suggest the idea of a "task conflict advantage" where "group members feel comfortable enough to freely express and exchange opinions and disagree with each other." However, they see this as possibly a culture specific effect because it seemed to only occur for the Americans and not the Chinese. The Chinese, despite high levels of task conflict, were not able to achieve positive group outcomes, which the authors' attribute to the high level of relationship conflict and the inability to resolve it. Some support was found for this in Tjosvold and Sun's (2000) work with Chinese businessmen, where they found that if the other person's face was affirmed, then conflict could have a positive outcome.

Sixth, there is evidence that, despite the ideal nature of the con/dis-sensus process outlined at the beginning of this section and the factors working against it in some of the cultural value systems, the con/dis-sensus process can work in any culture under the right conditions. In this paper, there have been a series of attempts to cite studies and situations where the process is present and works in collectivistic cultures. Perhaps attention should also be directed toward individualistic cultures because there are barriers to its effective operation there also as illustrated by the existence of Willard's project and the thinking of other theorists such as Habermas and von Eemeren.

Seventh, a detailed analysis of the makeup of the various cultural value dimensions is needed to fully understand how cultures work in practice and to look for the precise interfacing with elements of an ideal argumentative con/dis-sensus process. Such an analysis would make clearer not only what argumentative resources are available in different cultural situations but also which ones have the most likelihood of fostering constructive argumentative processes. Instead of thinking about cultural argument as a specific set of discourse forms that have to be used in a particular culture, it is more useful to think about the argumentative resources that are available in any cultural situation (Philipsen 2002; Hazen 2006). Some ideas about argumentative resources in terms of individualism and collectivism are contained in Oyserman et al's analysis of the role of different meaning dimensions in studies of Japan and the U. S. For example, individualism in terms of the uniqueness of the individual seems to be a key distinction between Japan and the United States, thus it would be expected that arguments based on the uniqueness of the individual would have a strong positive impact on Americans. Similarly, individualism based on competition also makes a significant difference with Americans being rated higher on individualism only when competition is not part of the consideration so presumably, Americans would not respond as well to a competition argument as the Japanese.

Finally, one last issue needs to be raised but not answered; that is the issue of the degree of consistency between cultural value dimensions and behavior. A classic issue in social science is the degree of relationship between cognitions and actual behavior, however cultural theorists strongly insist that cultural values and behaviors are highly correlated because of the central importance of the cultural value dimensions to the culture. The question has been rarely addressed in research but the recent GLOBE studies have raised the question by creating paired questions for a cultural value and the associated cultural practices. Their preliminary research seems to indicate that a cultural value and its related cultural practices are not always highly correlated. It is possible that some of the findings discussed in this paper, may be related to such distinctions, especially when it is remembered that the argumentative dimension is usually behavioral and the cultural value dimensions are usually not behavioral.

link to commentary

REFERENCES

Benjamin, W. J., Schneider, B. H., Greenman, P. S. & Hum, M. (2001). Conflict and childhood friendship in Taiwan and Canada. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* 33, 203-211.

Bresnahan, M. J., Ohashi, R., Liu, W. Y., Nebashi, R. & Liao C-C (1999). A comparison of response styles in Singapore and Taiwan. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 30, 342-358.

Brewer, M. B., & Chen, Y-R. (2007). Where (who) are collectives in collectivism? Toward conceptual clarification of individualism and collectivism. *Psychological Review* 114, 133-151.

Brewer, M.B. & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this "we"? Levels of collective identity and self representation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 71, 83-93.

Brown, P., & Levinson, S. (1978). Universals in language usage: Politeness phenomena. In E. N. Goody (Ed.). Questions and Politeness: Strategies in social interaction. (pp. 56-289). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Burke, K. (1969). *A Rhetoric of Motives.* Berkeley: U of California Press.

Chen, N. Y-F. & Tjosvold, D. (2007). Guanxi and leader member relationships between American managers and Chinese employees: Open-minded dialogue as mediator. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management* 24, 171-189.

Chen, Y., Tjosvold, D. & Fang, S. S. (2005). Working with foreign managers: Conflict management for effective leader relationships in China. *The International Journal of Conflict Management* 16, 265-286.

Cole, M. (1990). Relational distances and personality influences on conflict communication styles. Paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Convention, Chicago.

Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (1971). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cosier, R. A. & Dalton, D. P. (1988). Competition and cooperation: Effects of value dissensus and predisposition to help. *Human Relations* 41, 823-839.

Deutsch, M. (1973). The Resolution of Conflict: Constructive and Destructive Processes. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Dien, D. S-F. (1999). Chinese authority-directed orientation and Japanese peer-group orientation: Questioning the notion of collectivism. *Review of General Psychology* 3, 372-385.

Dolinina, I. B. & Cecchetto, V. (1998). Facework and rhetorical strategies in intercultural argumentative discourse. *Argumentation* 12, 167-181.

Druckman, D. & Zechmeister, K. (1970). Conflict of interest and value dissensus. *Human Relations* 23, 431-438.

Druckman, D. & Zechmeister, K. (1973). Conflict of interest and value dissensus: Propositions in the sociology of conflict. *Human Relations* 26, 449-466.

Fiske, A. P., Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R. & Nisbett, R. E. (1998). The cultural matrix of social psychology. In: D. Gilbert, S. Fiske & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th edition* (pp. 915-981). NY: McGraw Hill.

Gelfand, M. J. & Realo, A. (1999). Individualism-collectivism and accountability in intergroup negotiations. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 84, 721-736.

Gelfand, M. J., Nishii, L. H., Ohbuchi, K-I, Fukuno, M., Holcombe, K. M. & Dyer, N. (2001). Cultural influences on cognitive representations of conflict: Interpretations of conflict episodes in the United States and Japan. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 86, 1059-1074.

Gouveia, V. V., Clemente, M. & Espinosa, P. (2003). The horizontal and vertical attributes of individualism and collectivism in a Spanish population. *The Journal of Social Psychology* 143, 43-63.

Green, E. G. T., Deschamps, J-C. & Paez, D. (2005). Variation of individualism and collectivism within and between 20 countries: A typological analysis. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 36, 321-339.

Gudykunst, W. B. (1998). Individualistic and collectivistic perspectives on communication: An introduction. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 22, 107-134.

Hazen, M. D. (1989). The role of argument, reasoning and logic in tacit, incomplete and indirect communication: The case of Japan. In Gronbeck, B. E. (ed.). *Spheres of Argument (*pgs. 497-503). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Hazen, M. D. (2006). Argument and culture: Seeing one while seeing the other. In van Eemeren, F. H., Hazen, M. D., Houtlosser, P. & Williams, D. C. (Eds.). *Contemporary Perspectives on Argumentation: Views from the Venice Argumentation Conference (pgs.127-150).* Amsterdam: Sic Sat.

Hazen, M. D. & Fourcade, S. S. (2007). Argument and Message Contextuality: A Preliminary Study of Argument Forms and Processes in Different Cultures. In press.

Hermans, J. M. & Kempen, H. J. G. (1998). Moving cultures: The perilous problems of cultural dichotomies in a globalizing society. *American Psychologist* 53, 1111-1120.

Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work Related Values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Hofstede, G. (1991). *Cultures and Organizations.* London: McGraw-Hill.

Hofstede, G. (2006A). Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context". In W.J. Lonner, D.L. Dinnel, S.A. Hayes & D.N. Sattler (Eds.): *Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, Unit 2: Conceptual, Methodological and Ethical Issues in Psychology and Culture.* Bellingham WA: Center for Cross-Cultural Research, Western Washington University. Online at http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~culture/readi ngs.htm.

Hofstede, G. (2006B). What did GLOBE really measure? Researchers' minds versus respondents' minds. *Journal of International Business Studies 37,* 882-896.

House, R. J., Hanges, P. J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P. W. & Gupta, V. (2004). *Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE study of 62 Societies.* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Hynes, Jr., T. J. (1990). Power and value of dissensus. Wake Forest University Argumentation Conference, Winston-Salem, North Carolina.

Hynes, Jr., T. J. (1991). Valuing dissenus and organizations: Being disagreeable for the good of the company. In van Eemeren, F. H., Grootendorst, R., Blair, J. A., & Willard, C. A. (Eds.). *Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Argumentation 1B* (pgs. 867-874). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.

Hynes, Jr., T. J. (1992). The value of dissensus and the development of social change. ISSA-Wake Forest Argumentation Conference, Venice, Italy.

Jabs, L. B. (2005). Collectivism and conflict: Conflict response styles in Karamoja, Uganda. *The International Journal of Conflict Management* 16, 354-378.

Kim, M-S. (2003). Culture-based conversational constraints theory: Individual- and culture-level analyses. In Gudykunst, W. B. (Ed.). *Theorizing about Intercultural Communication (pgs. 93-118).* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Kim, H. S. & Sherman, D. K. (2007). "Express yourself": Culture and the effect of self-expression on choice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 92, 1-11.

Kipfer, B. A. (Ed.) (2002-2006). *Webster's New Millennium Dictionary of English, Preview Edition* Version 0.9.7. Long Beach, CA: Lexico Publishing. Retrieved May 16, 2007, from http://dictionary.reference.com/help/wmde.html.

Kluckhohn, F. R. & Strodbeck, F. L. (1961). *Variations in Value Orientations.* Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.

Koch, B. J. & Koch, P. T. (2007). Collectivism, individualism, and outgroup cooperation in a segmented China. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management* 24, 207-225.

Marshall, R. (1997). Variances in levels of individualism across two cultures and three social classes. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 28, 490-495.

Matsunaga, M. (2005). When collectivists square off for their individuality: The theory of hierarchically-structured self. National Communication Association convention, Boston.

Metcalf, L. E., Bird, A., Shankarmahesh, M., Aycan, Z., Larimo, J. & Valdelamar, D. D. (2006). Cultural tendencies in negotiation: A comparison of Finland, India, Mexico, Turkey, and the United States. *Journal of World Business* 41, 382-394.

Miyahara, A., Kim, M-S, Shin, H-C, & Yoon, K. (1998). Conflict resolution styles among "collectivist" cultures: A comparison between Japanese and Koreans. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 22, 505-525.

Moemeka, A. (1996). Interpersonal communication in communalistic societies in Africa. In W. B. Gudykunst, S. Ting-Toomey, & T. Nishida (Eds.), *Communication in Personal Relationships across Cultures* (pgs. 197-214). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Ng, S. H., Loong, C. S. F., He, A. P., Liu, J. H. & Weatherall, A. (2000). Communication correlates of individualism and collectivism: Talk directed at one or more addresses in family communication. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology* 19, 26-45.

Nibler, R. & Harris, K. L. (2003). The effects of culture and cohesiveness on intragroup conflict and effectiveness. *The Journal of Social Psychology* 14, 613-631.

Olekalns, M., Robert, C., Probst, T., Smith, P. L. & Carnevale, P.(2005). The impact of message frame on negotiators' impressions, emotions and behaviors. *International Journal of Conflict Management* 16, 379-402.

Oyserman, D., Coon, H. M. & Kemmelmeier, M. (2002). Rethinking individualism and collectivism: Evaluation of theoretical assumptions and meta-analyses. *Psychological Bulletin* 128, 3-72.

Philipsen, G. (2002). Cultural communication. In Gudykunst, W. B. & Mody, B. (eds.). *Handbook of International and Intercultural Communication 2nd edition* (pgs. 51-67). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Pirttila-Backman, A-M., Kassea, B. R. & Ikonen, T. (2004). Cameroonian forms of collectivism and individualism. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 35, 481-498.

Realo, A. & Allik, J. (1999). A cross-cultural study of collectivism: A comparison of American, Estonian, and Russian students. *The Journal of Social Psychology* 139, 133-142.

Realo, A., Allik, J. & Valdi, M. (1997). The hierarchical structure of collectivism. *Journal of Research in Personality* 31, 93-116.

Rossi, P. H. & Berk, R. A. (1985). Varieties of normative consensus. *American Sociological Review* 50, 333-347.

Schimmack, U., Oishi, S. & Diener, E. (2005). Individualism: A valid and important dimension of cultural differences between nations. *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 9, 17-31.

Schwartz, S. H. (1999). A theory of cultural values and some implications for work. *Applied Psychology: An International Review* 48, 23-47.

Singelis, T. M., Triandis, H. C., Bhawuk, D. P. S. & Gelfand, M. J. (1995). Horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism: A theoretical and measurement refinement. *Cross-Cultural Research* 29, 240-275.

Smith, P. B., Dugan, S., Peterson, M. F. & Leung, K. (1998). Individualism: Collectivism and the handling of disagreement. A 23 country study. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 22, 351-367.

Ting-Toomey, S. (1985). Toward a theory of conflict and culture. In Gudykunst, W., Stewart, L. & Ting-Toomey, S. (Eds.). *Communication, Culture and Organizational Processes (pgs. 71-86).* Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Ting-Toomey, S. (1988). Intercultural conflicts: A face negotiation theory. In Kim, Y. & Gudykunst, W. (Eds.). *Theories in Intercultural Communication (pgs. 213-235).* Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Ting-Toomey, S. (2003). The matrix of face: An updated face-negotiation theory. In Gudykunst, W. B. (Ed.). *Theorizing about Intercultural Communication (pgs.71- 92).* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Ting-Toomey, S. & Oetzel, J. (2003). Cross-cultural face concerns and conflict styles: Current status and future directions. In Gudykunst, W. B. (Ed.). *Cross-Cultural and Intercultural Communication (pgs. 127-148).* Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Tinsley, C. (1998). Models of conflict resolution in Japanese, German, and American cultures. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 83, 316-323.

Tinsley, C. (2001). How negotiators get to yes: Predicting the constellation of strategies used across cultures to negotiate conflict. *Journal of Applied Psychology* 86, 583-593.

Tjosvold, D. & Sun, H.(2000). Social face in conflict: Effects of affronts to person and position in China. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice* 4, 259-271.

Tjosvold, D., Hui, C. & Sun, H. (2004). Can Chinese discuss conflicts openly? Field and experimental studies of face dynamics in China. *Group Decision and Negotiation* 13, 351-373.

Tjosvold, D., Johnson, D. W., Johnson, R. T. & Sun, H. (2006). Competitive motives and strategies: Understanding constructive competition. *Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice* 10, 87-99.

Triandis, H. C. (1988). Collectivism v. individualism: A reconceptualization of a basic concept in cross-cultural social psychology. In: G. K. Verma & C. Bagley (Eds.), *Cross-Cultural Studies of Personality, Attitudes and Cognition* (pp. 60-95). New York: St. Martin's Press.

Triandis, H. C. (1993). Collectivism and individualism as cultural syndromes. *Cross-Cultural Research* 27, 155-180.

Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism and Collectivism.* Boulder, CO: Westview.

Triandis, H. C. (1996). The psychological measurement of cultural syndromes. *American Psychologist* 51, 407-415.

Triandis, H. C., Bontempo, R., Villareal, M. J., Asai, M. & Lucca, N. (1988). Individualism and collectivism: Cross-cultural perspectives on self-ingroup relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 54, 323-338.

Triandis, H. C., Chen, X. P. & Chan, D. K-S. (1998). Scenarios for the measurement of collectivism and individualism. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 29, 275-289.

Triandis, H. C. & Gelfand, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical individualism and collectivism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 74, 118-128.

Tyler, T. R., Lind, E. A. & Huo, Y. J. (2000). Cultural values and authority relations: The psychology of conflict resolution across cultures. *Psychology, Public Policy, and Law* 6, 1138-1163.

Willard, C.A. (1987). Valuing dissensus. In F.H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J.A. Blair, and C.A. Willard (Eds.), *Argumentation Across the Lines of Discipline* (pp. 145-157). Dordrecht-Holland: Foris.

Willard, C. A. (1989). *A Theory of Argumentation.* Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.

Willihnganz, S., Hart, J. L. & Willard, C. A. (2001). Valuing dissensus, message design logic, and competing organizational demands. In G. T. Goodnight (Ed.), *Arguing Communication and Culture, Volume 1* (pp. 145-152). Washington, DC: National Communication Association.

Willihnganz, S., Seibert, J. H., & Willard, C. A. (1993). Paper training the new Leviathan: Dissensus, rationality and paradox in modern organizations. In McKerrow, R. (ed.). *The Postmodern Challenge* (pgs. 200-205). Annandale, VA: National Communication Association.