Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2012

Publication Title

Journal of Multinational Financial Management

Volume

Forthcoming November 2012

DOI

10.1016/j.mulfin.2012.10.004

Keywords

Investor protection, Corporate governance, Outside directorship, Internationalization

Abstract

Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in U.S., there has been a general tendency to globally harmonize regulations and practices of board governance. The purpose of this study is to compare among countries how well the board of directors constrains earnings management. Using a sample of firms from 23 countries, we document some evidence that higher outside directorship on the board is associated with lower earnings management in the international context. We also find that there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of board outside directorship in constraining earnings management between high and low investor protection countries. Our findings mitigate a concern that harmonized corporate governance in low investor protection countries may not work.

Comments

NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in the Journal of Multinational Financial Management. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in the Journal of Multinational Financial Management and is available here.

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