Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2009
Publication Title
International Journal of Sustainable Transportation
Volume
3
Issue
5
First Page
312
Keywords
private toll road, profit, road franchising, social welfare, traffic equilibrium
Last Page
338
Abstract
Private provision of public roads through build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts is increasing around the world. Under a BOT contract, a private firm would build a road, charge tolls to road users for a period, and then transfer the road to the government. By viewing a BOT contract as a combination of three variables: concession period, road capacity, and toll charge. We study optimal BOT contracts that maximize social welfare and allow the private sector an acceptable profit. We also study how to reach optimal BOT contracts, either through bilateral negotiations between public and private sectors or through competitive auctions.
Recommended Citation
Guo, Xiaolei and Yang, Hai. (2009). Analysis of a Build-Operate-Transfer Scheme for Road Franchising. International Journal of Sustainable Transportation, 3 (5), 312-338.
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/odettepub/44
Comments
This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in the International Journal of Sustainable Transportation 2009 copyright Taylor & Francis, available online here.