Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2009

Publication Title

International Journal of Sustainable Transportation

Volume

3

Issue

5

First Page

312

Last Page

338

Keywords

private toll road, profit, road franchising, social welfare, traffic equilibrium

Abstract

Private provision of public roads through build-operate-transfer (BOT) contracts is increasing around the world. Under a BOT contract, a private firm would build a road, charge tolls to road users for a period, and then transfer the road to the government. By viewing a BOT contract as a combination of three variables: concession period, road capacity, and toll charge. We study optimal BOT contracts that maximize social welfare and allow the private sector an acceptable profit. We also study how to reach optimal BOT contracts, either through bilateral negotiations between public and private sectors or through competitive auctions.

Comments

This is an Author's Accepted Manuscript of an article published in the International Journal of Sustainable Transportation 2009 copyright Taylor & Francis, available online here.


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