Location

University of Windsor

Document Type

Paper

Keywords

arguments, inferences, epistemology, Biro, Lumer, Feldman, Freeman, Goldman, Hitchcock, Hoffmann, Huss, Siegel, Weinstein

Start Date

22-5-2013 9:00 AM

End Date

25-5-2013 5:00 PM

Abstract

In a 2006 paper I claimed that the virtue arguments or inferences must have is not that they be truth-preserving, but that they be entitlement-preserving (in Brandom’s sense of that phrase). I offered two reasons there why such a conception of argument virtue is needed for a satisfactory treatment of defeasible arguments and inferences. This paper revisits that claim, and assesses the prospects for a more thorough defence than was offered in that paper.

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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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Scott F. Aikin, Commentary on: Robert Pinto's "Truth and the virtue of arguments" (May 2013)

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May 22nd, 9:00 AM May 25th, 5:00 PM

Truth and the virtue of arguments

University of Windsor

In a 2006 paper I claimed that the virtue arguments or inferences must have is not that they be truth-preserving, but that they be entitlement-preserving (in Brandom’s sense of that phrase). I offered two reasons there why such a conception of argument virtue is needed for a satisfactory treatment of defeasible arguments and inferences. This paper revisits that claim, and assesses the prospects for a more thorough defence than was offered in that paper.