Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
arguments, inferences, epistemology, Biro, Lumer, Feldman, Freeman, Goldman, Hitchcock, Hoffmann, Huss, Siegel, Weinstein
Start Date
22-5-2013 9:00 AM
End Date
25-5-2013 5:00 PM
Abstract
In a 2006 paper I claimed that the virtue arguments or inferences must have is not that they be truth-preserving, but that they be entitlement-preserving (in Brandom’s sense of that phrase). I offered two reasons there why such a conception of argument virtue is needed for a satisfactory treatment of defeasible arguments and inferences. This paper revisits that claim, and assesses the prospects for a more thorough defence than was offered in that paper.
Creative Commons License
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Reader's Reactions
Scott F. Aikin, Commentary on: Robert Pinto's "Truth and the virtue of arguments" (May 2013)
Included in
Truth and the virtue of arguments
University of Windsor
In a 2006 paper I claimed that the virtue arguments or inferences must have is not that they be truth-preserving, but that they be entitlement-preserving (in Brandom’s sense of that phrase). I offered two reasons there why such a conception of argument virtue is needed for a satisfactory treatment of defeasible arguments and inferences. This paper revisits that claim, and assesses the prospects for a more thorough defence than was offered in that paper.
