Location

University of Windsor

Document Type

Paper

Keywords

action, decision, deep disagreement, deliberation, misology, reasoning, skill, understanding, virtue

Start Date

22-5-2013 9:00 AM

End Date

25-5-2013 5:00 PM

Abstract

The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody serious argumentative (and even moral) vices.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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May 22nd, 9:00 AM May 25th, 5:00 PM

Argumentative virtues and deep disagreement

University of Windsor

The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody serious argumentative (and even moral) vices.