Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
action, decision, deep disagreement, deliberation, misology, reasoning, skill, understanding, virtue
Start Date
22-5-2013 9:00 AM
End Date
25-5-2013 5:00 PM
Abstract
The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody serious argumentative (and even moral) vices.
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Response to Submission
David M. Godden, Commentary on: Chris Campolo's "Argumentative virtues and deep disagreement"
Reader's Reactions
David M. Godden, Commentary on: Chris Campolo's "Argumentative virtues and deep disagreement" (May 2013)
Included in
Argumentative virtues and deep disagreement
University of Windsor
The theoretical possibility of deep disagreement gives rise to an important practical problem: a deep disagreement may in practice look and feel like a merely stubborn normal disagreement. In this paper I critique strategies for dealing with this practical problem. According to their proponents these strategies exhibit argumentative virtue, but I will show that they embody serious argumentative (and even moral) vices.
