Location
University of Windsor
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
defeasible, epistemic value, Godden, presumption, risk of resentment, social considerations, Walton
Start Date
22-5-2013 9:00 AM
End Date
25-5-2013 5:00 PM
Abstract
The involvement of social considerations in our ordinary conception of presumption and corresponding plain practice of presuming things raises doubts as to whether they afford epistemically satisfying bases for rational argumentation. To some (e.g., Nicholas Rescher) this involvement illuminates important modes of discursive inquiry; to others (e.g., Douglas Walton and David Godden) it points to the need for theoretically based reform or regulation of our ordinary practices. This paper attempts to clarify and defend the epistemic value of ordinary presumptions.
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Response to Submission
Reader's Reactions
Derek Allen, Commentary on: Fred J. Kauffeld's "The epistemic relevance of social considerations in ordinary day-to-day presumptions" (May 2013)
Included in
The epistemic relevance of social considerations in ordinary day-to-day presumptions
University of Windsor
The involvement of social considerations in our ordinary conception of presumption and corresponding plain practice of presuming things raises doubts as to whether they afford epistemically satisfying bases for rational argumentation. To some (e.g., Nicholas Rescher) this involvement illuminates important modes of discursive inquiry; to others (e.g., Douglas Walton and David Godden) it points to the need for theoretically based reform or regulation of our ordinary practices. This paper attempts to clarify and defend the epistemic value of ordinary presumptions.
