Location

University of Windsor

Document Type

Paper

Keywords

defeasible, epistemic value, Godden, presumption, risk of resentment, social considerations, Walton

Start Date

22-5-2013 9:00 AM

End Date

25-5-2013 5:00 PM

Abstract

The involvement of social considerations in our ordinary conception of presumption and corresponding plain practice of presuming things raises doubts as to whether they afford epistemically satisfying bases for rational argumentation. To some (e.g., Nicholas Rescher) this involvement illuminates important modes of discursive inquiry; to others (e.g., Douglas Walton and David Godden) it points to the need for theoretically based reform or regulation of our ordinary practices. This paper attempts to clarify and defend the epistemic value of ordinary presumptions.

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May 22nd, 9:00 AM May 25th, 5:00 PM

The epistemic relevance of social considerations in ordinary day-to-day presumptions

University of Windsor

The involvement of social considerations in our ordinary conception of presumption and corresponding plain practice of presuming things raises doubts as to whether they afford epistemically satisfying bases for rational argumentation. To some (e.g., Nicholas Rescher) this involvement illuminates important modes of discursive inquiry; to others (e.g., Douglas Walton and David Godden) it points to the need for theoretically based reform or regulation of our ordinary practices. This paper attempts to clarify and defend the epistemic value of ordinary presumptions.