Location

University of Windsor

Document Type

Paper

Keywords

ethical argumentation, impartiality, objective, objectivity, Parfit, partiality, practical reasons, Singer

Start Date

18-5-2016 9:00 AM

End Date

21-5-2016 5:00 PM

Abstract

On one account, the moral point of view is impartial, hence in this sense objective. On a different account, morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality, hence, in one sense of 'partiality,' bias. Still another view says that in some cases morality is neutral between impartiality and partiality in choosing between alternative actions. My main concern will be with impartiality and partiality (hence with objectivity and bias in corresponding senses of these words) in relation to arguments of the kind presented in first-order ethical argumentation (hence in relation to first-order ethical arguments). Part of my discussion will focus on one type of theory of practical reasons; theories of this type are objective in as much as they hold that practical reasons are based on values that are objective in the sense of being mind-independent. I will refer to selected philosophers, including Wayne Sumner, Russ Shafer-Landau, Derek Parfit and Peter Singer.

Creative Commons License

Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Included in

Philosophy Commons

Share

COinS
 
May 18th, 9:00 AM May 21st, 5:00 PM

Ethical argumentation, objectivity, and bias

University of Windsor

On one account, the moral point of view is impartial, hence in this sense objective. On a different account, morality sometimes seems to recommend partiality, hence, in one sense of 'partiality,' bias. Still another view says that in some cases morality is neutral between impartiality and partiality in choosing between alternative actions. My main concern will be with impartiality and partiality (hence with objectivity and bias in corresponding senses of these words) in relation to arguments of the kind presented in first-order ethical argumentation (hence in relation to first-order ethical arguments). Part of my discussion will focus on one type of theory of practical reasons; theories of this type are objective in as much as they hold that practical reasons are based on values that are objective in the sense of being mind-independent. I will refer to selected philosophers, including Wayne Sumner, Russ Shafer-Landau, Derek Parfit and Peter Singer.