Author ORCID Identifier
Location
Room 3
Document Type
Paper
Keywords
burden of arguing, burden of explanation, burden of proof, burden of reasoning, cognitive presumption, deontic function, practical presumption
Start Date
6-6-2020 11:00 AM
End Date
6-6-2020 12:00 PM
Abstract
On the standard view, there are different types of presumptions but, nevertheless, they all asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. In this paper, I distinguish two meanings of the “burden of proof” and argue that two types of presumptions, practical and cognitive ones, allocate the burden of proof in different senses. Consequently, the standard accounts of presumptions are either more fragmented than scholars usually admit, or they have lower explanatory potential.
Reader's Reactions
David Godden, Commentary on Petar Bodlović: "Presumptions, burdens of proof, and explanations" (June 2020)
Included in
Presumptions, burdens of proof, and explanations
Room 3
On the standard view, there are different types of presumptions but, nevertheless, they all asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. In this paper, I distinguish two meanings of the “burden of proof” and argue that two types of presumptions, practical and cognitive ones, allocate the burden of proof in different senses. Consequently, the standard accounts of presumptions are either more fragmented than scholars usually admit, or they have lower explanatory potential.
