Author Information

John WoodsFollow

Location

Brock University

Document Type

Paper

Start Date

15-5-1997 9:00 AM

End Date

17-5-1997 5:00 PM

Abstract

In the methodology of theory construction, the concept of "intuitions" is commonly assigned a central role. This is especially true of philosophical and social scientific theories or rational human agency. An equally important trait of such accounts is the theorist's employment of "ideal models" or rational agency. It is frequently supposed that the concept of intuitions and the concept of ideal models link in such a way as to give rise to a coherent and load-bearing notion of "objective normativity." This paper shows, with reference to a wide range of contemporary theories, (a) that the employment of ideal models is otiose, and (b) that the supposedly related concept of objective normativity is groundless.

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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Response to Submission

Robert C. Pinto, Commentary on Woods

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Robert C. Pinto, Commentary on Woods (May 1997)

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May 15th, 9:00 AM May 17th, 5:00 PM

The Normative Impotence of Ideal Models

Brock University

In the methodology of theory construction, the concept of "intuitions" is commonly assigned a central role. This is especially true of philosophical and social scientific theories or rational human agency. An equally important trait of such accounts is the theorist's employment of "ideal models" or rational agency. It is frequently supposed that the concept of intuitions and the concept of ideal models link in such a way as to give rise to a coherent and load-bearing notion of "objective normativity." This paper shows, with reference to a wide range of contemporary theories, (a) that the employment of ideal models is otiose, and (b) that the supposedly related concept of objective normativity is groundless.