Location

Brock University

Document Type

Paper

Start Date

15-5-1997 9:00 AM

End Date

17-5-1997 5:00 PM

Abstract

This paper joins the voices warning against hasty transference of legal concepts of presumption to other kinds of argumentation, especially to deliberation about future acts and policies. Comparison of the pragmatics which respectively constitute the illocutionary acts of ACCUSING and PROPOSING reveals striking differences in the ways presumptions prompt accusers and proposers to undertake probative responsibilities and, also, points to corresponding differences in their probative duties. This comparison highlights significant contrasts between the way presumptions figure in legal reasoning as opposed to deliberation; the comparison also raises theoretically important questions about the norms governing persuasive argumentation. This paper is based on a broadly Gricean account of speech acts.

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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

Response to Submission

James B. Freeman, Commentary on Kauffeld

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James B. Freeman, Commentary on Kauffeld (May 1997)

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May 15th, 9:00 AM May 17th, 5:00 PM

Presumptions and the Distribution of Argumentative Burdens in Acts of Proposing and Accusing

Brock University

This paper joins the voices warning against hasty transference of legal concepts of presumption to other kinds of argumentation, especially to deliberation about future acts and policies. Comparison of the pragmatics which respectively constitute the illocutionary acts of ACCUSING and PROPOSING reveals striking differences in the ways presumptions prompt accusers and proposers to undertake probative responsibilities and, also, points to corresponding differences in their probative duties. This comparison highlights significant contrasts between the way presumptions figure in legal reasoning as opposed to deliberation; the comparison also raises theoretically important questions about the norms governing persuasive argumentation. This paper is based on a broadly Gricean account of speech acts.