Location

Brock University

Document Type

Paper

Start Date

15-5-1997 9:00 AM

End Date

17-5-1997 5:00 PM

Abstract

In noting contemporary neglect of Mill's work on fallacy, Hansen and Pinto say that his account is tied more closely to scientific methodology than to problems of public discourse and everyday argumentation. This paper re-examines Mill's fallacies from a rhetorical perspective, assessing the extent to which his examples—drawn from the domain of popular superstition, science, philosophy, and public discussion—fits his theoretical structure. In articulating the relationship between Mill's philosophical assumptions and the discursive practices of the fields from which he draws his examples, it will suggest the ambiguities in Mill's mentalistic, rationalistic, inductivist approach and the inescapable rhetoricity of his examples.

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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.

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Raymie McKerrow, Commentary on Secor

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Raymie McKerrow, Commentary on Secor (May 1997)

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May 15th, 9:00 AM May 17th, 5:00 PM

Mill’s Fallacies: Theory and Practice

Brock University

In noting contemporary neglect of Mill's work on fallacy, Hansen and Pinto say that his account is tied more closely to scientific methodology than to problems of public discourse and everyday argumentation. This paper re-examines Mill's fallacies from a rhetorical perspective, assessing the extent to which his examples—drawn from the domain of popular superstition, science, philosophy, and public discussion—fits his theoretical structure. In articulating the relationship between Mill's philosophical assumptions and the discursive practices of the fields from which he draws his examples, it will suggest the ambiguities in Mill's mentalistic, rationalistic, inductivist approach and the inescapable rhetoricity of his examples.