Document Type
Paper
Start Date
15-5-1999 9:00 AM
End Date
17-5-1999 5:00 PM
Abstract
There exists reasoning popularly characterized as "prejudiced" that may nevertheless be both sound and prudential, and this reasoning involves the application of exactly the same inductive correlational strategies applied without moral objection in non -human cases. While such reasoning may be rationally unobjectionable, it may yet be morally objectionable because its methods inherently entail a risk of unfairness to others. This raises the interesting philosophical possibility that arguments may be a ppraised and found wanting on other than rational grounds, that arguments may be subject to moral defects in addition to defects of rationality.
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Response to Submission
Jcaqueline M. Davies, Commentary on Schachter
Reader's Reactions
Jcaqueline M. Davies, Commentary on Schachter (May 1999)
Included in
Prejudice, prudence and fairness
There exists reasoning popularly characterized as "prejudiced" that may nevertheless be both sound and prudential, and this reasoning involves the application of exactly the same inductive correlational strategies applied without moral objection in non -human cases. While such reasoning may be rationally unobjectionable, it may yet be morally objectionable because its methods inherently entail a risk of unfairness to others. This raises the interesting philosophical possibility that arguments may be a ppraised and found wanting on other than rational grounds, that arguments may be subject to moral defects in addition to defects of rationality.
