Document Type
Paper
Start Date
15-5-1999 9:00 AM
End Date
17-5-1999 5:00 PM
Abstract
From a pragma-dialectical perspective, argumentation rules do not receive their normative import from any "metaphysical necessity." They are, pragmatically speaking, binding only to the extent that reasonable participants regard them as useful for res olving disputes. This may be misleading with regard to the second pragma-dialectical rule relating to the burden of proof. If the obligation to defend a proffered standpoint is a constitutive rule of competent speech, then the obligation denoted by the burden of proof is more binding upon speakers than a pragmatic approach to the subject would have us believe.
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Response to Submission
Igor Zagar, Commentary on Thomson
Reader's Reactions
Igor Zagar, Commentary on Thomson (May 1999)
Included in
Are all the pragma-dialectical rules pragmatic?
From a pragma-dialectical perspective, argumentation rules do not receive their normative import from any "metaphysical necessity." They are, pragmatically speaking, binding only to the extent that reasonable participants regard them as useful for res olving disputes. This may be misleading with regard to the second pragma-dialectical rule relating to the burden of proof. If the obligation to defend a proffered standpoint is a constitutive rule of competent speech, then the obligation denoted by the burden of proof is more binding upon speakers than a pragmatic approach to the subject would have us believe.
