Document Type

Paper

Start Date

15-5-1999 9:00 AM

End Date

17-5-1999 5:00 PM

Abstract

From a pragma-dialectical perspective, argumentation rules do not receive their normative import from any "metaphysical necessity." They are, pragmatically speaking, binding only to the extent that reasonable participants regard them as useful for res olving disputes. This may be misleading with regard to the second pragma-dialectical rule relating to the burden of proof. If the obligation to defend a proffered standpoint is a constitutive rule of competent speech, then the obligation denoted by the burden of proof is more binding upon speakers than a pragmatic approach to the subject would have us believe.

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Igor Zagar, Commentary on Thomson

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Igor Zagar, Commentary on Thomson (May 1999)

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May 15th, 9:00 AM May 17th, 5:00 PM

Are all the pragma-dialectical rules pragmatic?

From a pragma-dialectical perspective, argumentation rules do not receive their normative import from any "metaphysical necessity." They are, pragmatically speaking, binding only to the extent that reasonable participants regard them as useful for res olving disputes. This may be misleading with regard to the second pragma-dialectical rule relating to the burden of proof. If the obligation to defend a proffered standpoint is a constitutive rule of competent speech, then the obligation denoted by the burden of proof is more binding upon speakers than a pragmatic approach to the subject would have us believe.