Document Type

Paper

Start Date

15-5-1999 9:00 AM

End Date

17-5-1999 5:00 PM

Abstract

This paper argues that recent theoretical attempts to understand fallacious reasoning fail because these theories presuppose problematic accounts of the nature of argument. The paper outlines an alternative view of fallacious reasoning based on Wright 's recent work on the concept of an argument. This alternative view suggests that fallacious reasoning results from a kind of incompetence. Such failures of competence, however, are not nearly as common as traditional accounts of fallacious reasoning su ggests. Moreover, the very possibility of being tempted by fallacious reasoning depends on our being very competent in normal cases.

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Hudecki, Commentary on Turner

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Hudecki, Commentary on Turner (May 1999)

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May 15th, 9:00 AM May 17th, 5:00 PM

Fallacies and the concept of an argument

This paper argues that recent theoretical attempts to understand fallacious reasoning fail because these theories presuppose problematic accounts of the nature of argument. The paper outlines an alternative view of fallacious reasoning based on Wright 's recent work on the concept of an argument. This alternative view suggests that fallacious reasoning results from a kind of incompetence. Such failures of competence, however, are not nearly as common as traditional accounts of fallacious reasoning su ggests. Moreover, the very possibility of being tempted by fallacious reasoning depends on our being very competent in normal cases.