Location

McMaster University

Document Type

Paper

Start Date

1-6-2005 9:00 AM

End Date

1-6-2005 5:00 PM

Abstract

: I explore the logic of counterexamples by possible conjunction in order to extend their use to estimate the degree of support of premises; address some problems with my proposal; discuss some ways of teaching this extended use; and argue that conditional probability fails to express the degree of support of premises. The scant literature on this topic sometimes presents the degree of support of premises P1…Pn for conclusion C in terms of conditional probability, Pr(C/ P1…Pn). I will argue that the degree of support is better expressed by the probability of the conditional statement expressing the inference, Pr(If P1…Pn, then C); and prove that Pr(C/ P1…Pn) is not equivalent to Pr(If P1…Pn, then C).

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Jun 1st, 9:00 AM Jun 1st, 5:00 PM

The Overall Evaluation of Arguments: How Probable/Acceptable is a Conclusion Given the Evaluation of the Truth and Support of its Reasons?

McMaster University

: I explore the logic of counterexamples by possible conjunction in order to extend their use to estimate the degree of support of premises; address some problems with my proposal; discuss some ways of teaching this extended use; and argue that conditional probability fails to express the degree of support of premises. The scant literature on this topic sometimes presents the degree of support of premises P1…Pn for conclusion C in terms of conditional probability, Pr(C/ P1…Pn). I will argue that the degree of support is better expressed by the probability of the conditional statement expressing the inference, Pr(If P1…Pn, then C); and prove that Pr(C/ P1…Pn) is not equivalent to Pr(If P1…Pn, then C).