Location
McMaster University
Document Type
Paper
Start Date
1-6-2005 9:00 AM
End Date
1-6-2005 5:00 PM
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to connect Leibniz’s and Toulmin’s conceptions about practical and deliberative rationality. When trying to rationally justify contingent judgments Leibniz, like Toulmin, defends a weighing argumentative method. Thus, in Leibniz we can discern the balance between the legitimate demands of formal models of rationality and the lessons of a practice “situated” on a historical, social, and evaluative context (theoria cum praxi).
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Included in
Leibniz and Toulmin: Rationalism without Dogmas (Pluralism, Pragmatism, and Gradualism)
McMaster University
The aim of this paper is to connect Leibniz’s and Toulmin’s conceptions about practical and deliberative rationality. When trying to rationally justify contingent judgments Leibniz, like Toulmin, defends a weighing argumentative method. Thus, in Leibniz we can discern the balance between the legitimate demands of formal models of rationality and the lessons of a practice “situated” on a historical, social, and evaluative context (theoria cum praxi).
