Location

McMaster University

Document Type

Paper

Start Date

1-6-2005 9:00 AM

End Date

1-6-2005 5:00 PM

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to connect Leibniz’s and Toulmin’s conceptions about practical and deliberative rationality. When trying to rationally justify contingent judgments Leibniz, like Toulmin, defends a weighing argumentative method. Thus, in Leibniz we can discern the balance between the legitimate demands of formal models of rationality and the lessons of a practice “situated” on a historical, social, and evaluative context (theoria cum praxi).

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Jun 1st, 9:00 AM Jun 1st, 5:00 PM

Leibniz and Toulmin: Rationalism without Dogmas (Pluralism, Pragmatism, and Gradualism)

McMaster University

The aim of this paper is to connect Leibniz’s and Toulmin’s conceptions about practical and deliberative rationality. When trying to rationally justify contingent judgments Leibniz, like Toulmin, defends a weighing argumentative method. Thus, in Leibniz we can discern the balance between the legitimate demands of formal models of rationality and the lessons of a practice “situated” on a historical, social, and evaluative context (theoria cum praxi).