Location

University of Windsor

Document Type

Paper

Keywords

design theory, Kauffeld, Fred, presumption

Start Date

18-5-2011 9:00 AM

End Date

21-5-2011 5:00 PM

Abstract

This paper responds to Kauffeld’s 2009 OSSA paper, considering the adequacy of his “commitment-based” approach to “ordinary presumptive practices” (which explains the communicative force of presumptions socially, through the moral motivation agents have to meet their obligations) to sup-ply an account of presumption fit for general application in normative theories of argument. The central issue here is whether socially-grounded presumptions are defeasible in the right sorts of ways so as to pro-duce “truth-tropic” presumptive inferences.

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May 18th, 9:00 AM May 21st, 5:00 PM

Presumptions in argument: Epistemic versus social approaches

University of Windsor

This paper responds to Kauffeld’s 2009 OSSA paper, considering the adequacy of his “commitment-based” approach to “ordinary presumptive practices” (which explains the communicative force of presumptions socially, through the moral motivation agents have to meet their obligations) to sup-ply an account of presumption fit for general application in normative theories of argument. The central issue here is whether socially-grounded presumptions are defeasible in the right sorts of ways so as to pro-duce “truth-tropic” presumptive inferences.