Dec 1st, 12:00 AM - 12:00 AM

Care Worker Migration and the Responsibility for Rectifying Injustice

Jordan Desmond

Canadian Journal of Practical Philosophy, Volume 7

Selected Papers from the 2020 CSSPE/SCEEA Conference

Care Worker Migration and the Responsibility for Rectifying Injustice

Jordan Desmond

Abstract: Contemporary patterns of care worker migration have given rise to structural injustices for both the states from which such workers tend to migrate and the care workers themselves. In this paper, I critically examine an account of assigning rectificatory responsibility for these injustices offered by Eckenwiler and suggest that, though there is considerable insight to be gleaned from the account, its acute focus on two particular sorts of responsibility-generating relationships limits is efficacy. In response, I propose a model of assigning rectificatory responsibility that focuses on the opportunities or aid that *all* sorts of relationships to injustice generate.

Bio: Jordan Desmond is a doctoral student in philosophy at Queen's University, Kingston.

Keywords: care worker migration, Lisa Eckenwiler, rectificatory injustice, rectificatory responsibility, transnational justice.

Health workers are migrating at "unprecedented rates" from low-income countries with low supplies of health workers to higher income destinations.[1] Among those migrating are care workers such as nurses and direct care workers (DCWs).[2] These workers are of vital importance to health care provision, given their status as the "principal providers of basic health services."[3] As such, global disparities and shortages in care workers are liable to undermine significantly public health efforts in the low-income countries from which they tend to emigrate. Complicating matters is the fact that these patterns of migration are often accompanied by considerable injustices to both states and individuals that have been shaped by the social, political, and economic structures in which these acts of migration are embedded. Efforts to identify which agents might be responsible for rectifying these 'structural' injustices must therefore untangle a complex web of international interaction occurring among states, non-government organizations, and

[1] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," *Public Health Ethics* 2, no. 2 (2009) 171.
[2] Eckenwiler, 171.
[3] Eckenwiler, 171.

individuals. What is needed is a framework through which we can identify the litany of moral considerations, such as economic and political power, geographic proximity, and epistemic privilege, in light of which such actors might be said to possess obligations of rectificatory action.

In "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," Lisa Eckenwiler presents a comprehensive account of the various injustices involved in mass care worker migration, traces their social, political and economic causes, and sketches a brief but promising picture of how we might go about assigning rectificatory responsibility for them.[4] In the following, I critically examine Eckenwiler's model and argue on behalf of an approach to attributing responsibility that focuses on opportunities for effective moral action. I will begin in Section I by providing a brief outline of the sorts of injustices Eckenwiler identifies as occurring as a result of the care worker migration crisis. In Section II, I examine and defend the guiding principles of her account of *transnational justice*. In Section III, I will argue that the more particular attributions Eckenwiler makes entail limitations in scope and motivational capacity that undermine the potential efficacy of the account. In Section IV, I provide a rough outline of an opportunity-focused approach to attributing rectificatory responsibility and argue that it is offers a more promising model while retaining the key contributions of Eckenwiler's account.

I

As Eckenwiler rightly notes, the structural injustices endemic to the care worker migration crisis are manifold. Existing global health disparities continue to be exacerbated due to the tendency for migrant care workers to emigrate away from low-income countries in the global South.[5] Many countries in the global South are therefore facing significant shortages in DCWs that

[4] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," 171.

[5] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," 174.

impose considerable strain on systems of public health provision.[6] Additionally, migrant workers themselves face enormous challenges, including feelings of dislocation, lower-tier jobs with lower wages, insufficient health insurance and, in some cases, restrictions on their ability to travel freely and visit home.[7] To make matters worse, undocumented workers, who are now coming to make up a greater and greater percentage of direct care workers in high income countries, face the additional threat of deportation.[8]

Giving rise to many of these challenges is the fact that, as immigrants, migrant care workers tend to possess diminished bargaining power in their labour relations and are thereby vulnerable to exploitative practices by their employers without sufficient protection or advocacy.[9] These injustices are further compounded by the fact that migrant care workers tend overwhelmingly to be women. Often, gender norms and cultural stereotypes work to undermine the autonomy of women in these positions.[10] For instance, the perception of women from the global South as "caring, obedient and meticulous workers" constrains the types of work they will have access to in destination countries. In addition, women are often unlikely to have a say in how their remittances to home get spent.[11]

Thus, not only does the broader issue of global disparity in the level of health services exist, but mass care worker migration carries additional structural injustices to the autonomy and working conditions of workers themselves that are in desperate need of rectification. Let us now

[6] Lisa Eckenwiler, Christine Straehle and Ryoa Chung, "Global Solidarity, Migration and Global Health Inequality," *Bioethics* 27, no. 7 (2012): 384.
[7] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice,"175.
[8] Eckenwiler, 175.
[9] Eckenwiler 175.
[10] Eckenwiler, 175.
[11] Eckenwiler, 175.

turn to a promising framework through which we might assign responsibility for these rectificatory efforts.

II

Eckenwiler argues that the most convincing accounts of transnational justice will (1) *ground our responsibilities in our connections to those who perpetuate and suffer from injustice* and (2) *conceptualize responsibility for rectifying a structural injustice as distinct from blame for past wrongdoing*.[12] In this section, I will examine each of these principles and suggest that they comprise necessary components of a plausible framework for attributing responsibility for structural injustice.

The first principle emphasizes the necessity of framing approaches to attributing responsibility in cases of structural injustice as *relational* or *role-based*.[13] Non-relation transnational accounts of responsibility, such as those that focus on our common humanity, fail to recognize the importance of the structural and institutional nature of relationships at the global level and thus lack the nuance necessary to assess responsibility adequately in these cases.[14] An important implication of the structural approach is that rectificatory efforts can focus on the nature of one's connections to injustice and the particular opportunities for moral action which they afford.[15] Not all agents will possess the same opportunities for moral action. For instance, states to which we have assigned responsibility will possess drastically different opportunities to rectify the structural injustices of the care worker migration crisis from the NGOs and particular individuals residing in these states because each is connected to the injustice in a different way. If

[12] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," 176.
[13] Eckenwiler, 176.
[14] Eckenwiler, 176.
[15] Eckenwiler, 177.

an account of global justice fails to pay adequate attention to the diversity of these connections, it will fail to grasp the particularity of our opportunities for moral action. Appropriately assigning responsibility to rectify structural injustices will thus necessitate a constant reflection on these connections and the opportunities they afford.

The second principle of Eckenwiler's account focuses on the necessity of "conceptualiz[ing] moral and political responsibility as distinct from blame for past wrongs."[16] This seems to trace a distinction drawn by Claudia Card, who argues that we must distinguish between "forward-looking" and "backward-looking" accounts of attributing moral responsibility.[17] Backward-looking attributions of responsibility identify "what has been done" and assess the extent to which we can be praised, blamed, punished or rewarded for our contributory actions.[18] While such attributions certainly account for a considerable amount of our day-to-day attributions of responsibility, Eckenwiler rightly notes that it may prove counterproductive to focus on attributing blame for structural injustice, given both the difficulty of doing so and the fact that it is not obvious how doing so will serve rectificatory efforts.[19] A more fruitful approach might then be to focus on forward-looking attributions.

Forward-looking attributions of responsibility typically point to positive obligations to respond to a certain state of affairs in some way.[20] In the context of injustice, then, we might characterize forward-looking attributions of responsibility as attributing to some agent, or set of agents, an obligation to rectify the injustice or contribute to rectificatory efforts. In doing so, we sidestep the issue of tracing the complex causal contributions of various agents and actors and

[16] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," 176.
[17] Claudia Card, *The Unnatural Lottery* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 25.
[18] Card, 25.
[19] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," 176.
[20] Claudia Card, *The Unnatural Lottery*, 28.

instead focus on how we might best approach the question of positive rectification. Attributions of blame may no doubt prove important in other respects, but it is not clear an answer to this question is *necessary* in order to identify who might be charged with forward-looking responsibility.

The principles identified above demonstrate the promise of Eckenwiler's account. An account of attributing responsibility that lacked these qualities would be considerably impoverished in its efficacy. Nevertheless, there is reason to doubt that Eckenwiler's account offers an exhaustive picture of how we ought to go about attributing responsibility for rectifying the structural injustices of care worker migration. In the next section, I will take up the question of where this account may face limitations which undermine its promise.

III

Presumably, a virtue of a theory of forward-looking responsibility is that it is effective in bringing about a desirable state of affairs. Thus, in matters of injustice, we should think a theory of forward-looking responsibility is better, *ceteris paribus,* if it would more effectively bring about circumstances of rectification. Two qualities of a such a theory that will be of importance to its efficacy are the scope of agents identified as possessing responsibility and the motivational force attributions of responsibility are likely to have for such agents. In other words, the scope of agents identified ought to be sufficient to bring about *comprehensive* rectification and the motivational force of the attributions ought to be sufficient to *compel* the identified agents to act in the ways necessary to do so. With these criteria in mind, let us return to Eckenwiler's account and the more particular attributions it makes, and assess the extent to which they are satisfied.

Briefly, Eckenwiler identifies two sorts of agents to whom we ought to look in attributing rectificatory responsibility for the care worker migration crisis: *(i) those who benefit from the*

injustice and *(ii) those who "participate in the structures that contribute to injustice."*[21] In order to test the efficacy of the account, we should assess how attributions on the basis of these categories fair in terms of scope and motivational force when applied to a particular proposal for rectification. The idea is that if Eckenwiler's account fails in these respects, then it will likely lack the sort of efficacy we might desire from such an account. Thus, I will assess the extent to which Eckenwiler's account can attribute responsibility in a way that is sufficient to instantiate a particularly promising proposal from Joan Tronto for addressing the more personal injustices done to migrant care workers.[22]

Recall that many of the injustices faced by migrant care workers can be traced to their status as immigrants, documented or undocumented, to destination countries. For instance, in certain countries, when care workers "cease being useful as domestic servants they are subject to immediate deportation."[23] Thus, the fact that their capacity to continue to live in a higher income country depends on their being consistently employed lessens their bargaining power in negotiations with employers and leaves them vulnerable to exploitative practices. Further, many newly-arrived migrant workers are divorced from the political autonomy that comes with the ability to participate in political institutions and this may present a barrier to having their interests adequately reflected in the legislature or fostering a sense of belonging to the countries in which they work. In contrast, citizenship of a state often affords one a sense of belonging that is accompanied by a number of rights and protections that shield one from exploitative practices and give one an avenue for recourse against harm and injustice. Given that societies tend to "conceive

[21] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," 176.
[22] Joan Tronto, "Care as the Work of Citizens," in *Women and Citizenship*, ed. Marilyn Friedman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 130-145.
[23] Tronto, 134.

of citizens in terms of the contributions they make"[24] and contemporary models of citizenship understand paid labour to be a constitutive factor,[25] Tronto thus proposes that we redefine citizenship so as to confer upon immigrant care workers the status of citizen by virtue of the invaluable contributions they make to the societies where they are employed.[26] The issue that concerns us here is determining how we can provoke such a change in the understanding of citizenship through the assigning of responsibility.

While citizenship is in many respects a concrete political status, it is nevertheless a concept grounded in a shared conception among members of given community.[27] If there is no shift in attitudes toward citizenship in the members of a community, it is unlikely that changes in concrete legislation will ever occur. Thus, in order to carry out this sort of proposal, we require an account of responsibility that both attributes to citizens a duty to reflect on their attitudes towards citizenship and motivates them to carry out such a duty through collective political action. With this in mind, let us assess Eckenwiler's account.

In order to make an effective assessment, I will focus on what I take to be the broader of Eckenwiler's two attributions: the participatory attribution. The hope is that, should the broader of the two attributions fail to effectively realize the proposed solution, then it should *a fortiori* cast doubt on the one more constrained attribution. Nevertheless, such a conclusion is not of absolute necessity to the broader argument being made in the paper. As I will later demonstrate, both the participatory and benefit attributions are accommodated by the more expansive opportunity-focused approach

[24] Joan Tronto, "Care as the Work of Citizens," 139.
[25] Tronto, 139.
[26] Tronto, 140, 142.
[27] Tronto, 138.

Eckenwiler's reference to "participat[ion] in the structures that contribute to injustice"[28] as a basis for responsibility seems to admit of a strict or a modest interpretation. Under the strict interpretation, we might say agents participate in such structures only insofar as there exists a strict causal relation between their actions and the instantiation or perpetuation of the structures. However, if we interpret Eckenwiler's position in the strict sense, not only will it be incredibly difficult to determine who has played a causal role in bringing about the injustices in question,[29] but it seems likely there will be a number of citizens who are excluded from any sort of forward-looking responsibility. We can conceive of citizens who neither participate in, nor contribute to, any of the injustices being done to immigrant care workers (at least in the sense of discrete, recognizable causal contributions). If responsibility is attributed only "to the extent"[30] that this is the case, they will seemingly remain outside the scope of responsibility. This is problematic particularly because, as noted, citizenship as a political construct relies on a shared conception of what it means to be a citizen. In order to alter this shared conception, the responsibility to modify one's definition of citizenship cannot fall only on a select few who have causally contributed to an injustice. The scope must be sufficiently inclusive so as to attribute this responsibility to the citizens of a community taken as a whole (or close to it); otherwise, the change is unlikely to occur.

Admittedly, Eckenwiler likely intends the notion of participation to be interpreted in a much looser sense. She writes that such a clause applies even if our participation or contribution is unintentional or mediated over time.[31] In this way, the scope of responsible agents is likely to be much larger than it would be under the stricter interpretation. However, expanding the scope of

[28] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," 176.
[29] Eckenwiler, 176.
[30] Eckenwiler, 176.
[31] Joan Tronto, "Care as the Work of Citizens," 176.

responsible agents in this particular way seems to come at a cost to the motivational force of attributions of responsibility. Specifically, we are unlikely to be able to motivate individuals to *take* responsibility on the basis of contributions that are unrecognized, unintentional, or mediated over time. By widening our interpretation of participation, we sacrifice the motivational force that comes with pointing to clear-cut cases of contribution or participation in injustice and demanding rectification. Instead, we rely on agents to motivate themselves to discharge duties on the basis of participation they themselves are unlikely to recognize.

The problem, then, is that no matter how we interpret even Eckenwiler's broader suggestion for attributing responsibility, we seem to be left unable to sufficiently carry out what would be a particularly effective way to respond to the structural injustices of care worker migration. Either the scope is far too limited to carry out rectificatory actions effectively, or the attributions will implicate agents in a way that fails to motivate them to carry out whatever duties accompany the attribution. In the next section, I propose an opportunity-focused expansion of Eckenwiler's account that is intended to address these concerns.

IV

With the strengths and limitations of Eckenwiler's account in mind, this section will proceed in three steps. I will begin by outlining how the opportunity framework can accommodate and explain both of the guiding principles upon which Eckenwiler's position is based, and which I argued constitute necessary conditions of a plausible account of transnational justice. I will then demonstrate how the more particular attributions Eckenwiler makes can be accommodated by the opportunity framework. Finally, I will argue that by approaching responsibility from the perspective of opportunity to make effective contributions, we can extend the scope of responsible agents in a way that generates more resources with which to respond to the injustices of the care

worker migration crisis. To show this to be the case, I will return to Tronto's proposal with the opportunity framework in mind.

To begin, I will briefly note what I have in mind when I speak of the opportunity account, though this will no doubt be fleshed out in greater detail as the section develops. The motivation for the account is the idea I noted earlier that, *ceteris paribus*, we should desire an account of transnational justice that maximizes effective responses to injustice. The opportunity framework thus proceeds from the idea that if one possesses an opportunity or a capacity to engage in effective moral action (that is to say, action that meaningfully contributes to the rectification of an injustice), then one possesses a responsibility to do so. Opportunity to lend aid and the responsibility to do so thus go hand-in-hand, and it is this sort of relationship between agents that we should be concerned with in matters of transnational injustice. With this in mind, let us see how this account can nevertheless incorporate the key insights gleaned from Eckenwiler's treatment of transnational justice.

I will begin with the latter and more obviously accommodated of Eckenwiler's two guiding principles. The idea that we ought to conceive of rectificatory responsibility as distinct from blame for past wrongdoing is, I argue, readily demonstrated by the opportunity approach. Under this approach, there is no principled reason for which blame should be tied to forward-looking responsibility. The question of who possesses opportunities to respond to an injustice is a distinct one and must therefore be addressed separate from the question of blame.

The more interesting question is whether the opportunity framework can accommodate Eckenwiler's relational focus. Eckenwiler rightly notes that our attributions of responsibility ought to be sensitive to our connections to those who perpetuate and suffer from injustice. To put it more concretely, Eckenwiler seems to recognize that we can possess certain duties by virtue of our roles

in relation to injustices. However, Eckenwiler's account does not adequately capture *why* we want agents to discharge their role-related duties. What is it about one's social connection to an injustice that renders it of the utmost importance that one take responsibility for discharging the duties associated with it? I believe this sort of sentiment to be best grounded from the perspective of opportunities for moral action. One's roles and relationships enter the equation due to the ways in which they mediate or create opportunities for effective action that would not otherwise exist. In this way, the aim of compelling agents to discharge their role-related duties ought to be an aim of forward-looking attributions of responsibility if and only if, and because, our relationships to certain injustices confer upon us unique opportunities for effective moral action, and compelling individuals to perform these uniquely effective moral actions will help us to respond to injustice most effectively. My argument, then, is not that Eckenwiler is misguided in demanding an approach to transnational justice that recognizes the moral importance of social connections and role-related duties, but that we ought to explain the importance of these concepts by focusing on their capacity to bring about maximally effective responses to structural injustice by attending to the variety of opportunities they generate.

Thus, each of the guiding principles of Eckenwiler's account seem to be well captured under the opportunity framework, but what of the criteria she suggests for attributing forward-looking responsibility in the context of care worker migration?

As noted, Eckenwiler's first suggestion is to hold those who benefit from structural injustices responsible for rectifying them. I am especially sympathetic to this suggestion in the case of care worker migration because the argument seems to closely track a sort of opportunity-focused reasoning. Beyond the fact that doing so accords with certain moral intuitions, Eckenwiler additionally notes that such agents will be able to "adapt to changed circumstances without

suffering serious deprivation."[32] Because the costs of discharging rectificatory duties will, for such agents, be minimized, they are likely to be particularly effective assignees for such duties. In other words, the mere benefitting from an injustice does not in principle demand attributing forward-looking responsibility *qua* the bare fact that the agent has benefitted. Rather, the fact that a given agent benefits from an injustice entails that such an agent possesses a unique opportunity to lend aid. This is because a benefitting agent is likely connected to the structural injustice in a way that allows that person to respond without sustaining serious harm or 'deprivation'. Given that certain agents have already benefitted from the structural injustices of care worker migration, especially economically, they are thereby better situated than others to bear the costs of a moral response to the injustice, particularly if the response demands funding.[33] What is important to note, however, is that high-income countries, for instance, possess this sort of responsibility only because the benefits of importing low-cost workers have made them particularly capable of responding with financial contributions. Thus, by situating Eckenwiler's account in an opportunity framework, we can still make sense of her suggestion that those who benefit possess special obligations to rectify injustice, but we can better explain *why* this is the case by appealing to the opportunity for effective response that this connection affords.

The second suggestion made by Eckenwiler is that any agent who participates in the structures that contribute to injustice ought thereby to possess a responsibility to rectify it.[34] Again, I believe the sentiment underlying Eckenwiler's claim here is highly plausible. Namely, the nature of our relationships and roles within international structures and institutions will be of the utmost

[32] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice,", 176, citing I. M. Young, "Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model," 128.
[33] An example of this sort of response might be the subsidization of education for health workers in source countries or benefits for health workers in destination countries who choose to work abroad in source countries.
[34] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," 176.

importance in assessing how we ought to understand our responsibilities for rectifying an injustice.[35] However, it behooves us to once again consider why this might be the case. I suggest that it is because of the way our relationships and roles, especially those that are participatory or contributory in nature, afford us unique sorts of opportunities for aid. Alternatively, our relationships to others give rise to duties of care and concern that need not be grounded in any sort of causal contribution to an injustice or harm. It is simply by virtue of the opportunities for effective moral response that relationships to injustice may admit of forward-looking responsibility and corresponding obligations thus arise.[36] To be sure, it is no doubt the case that one's causal history will be relevant to determining one's opportunities for effective moral action and so we need not discount Eckenwiler's suggestion entirely. Assigning responsibility on the basis of causal contributions can be an effective way of rectifying injustice because those who have participated in, or contributed to, a structural injustice are likely to be in a privileged position with respect to the power to dismantle the relevant structures.

In short, the opportunity-focused perspective holds that if one of the goals of forward-looking attributions of responsibility is to produce the most effective outcome in rectifying an injustice, it is entirely conceivable that there are relationships beyond benefit or participation/contribution that will give rise to opportunities for effective moral action. While Eckenwiler's account rightly identifies two particular sorts of relationships as responsibility generating, the opportunity-focused account extends the scope of legitimate attributions of

[35] Lisa Eckenwiler, "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice," 176.
[36] I have in mind here something similar to Robert E. Goodin's argument for explaining special obligations within a universalist framework of global justice (see Goodin, "What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?," 1998).

responsibility to any and all parties for whom there exists the opportunity for effective moral response.

In practice then, adopting the proposed framework will look something like the following sketch. We begin by examining the relations of varying agents to the injustice at hand such as benefit, participation, contribution, geographic location, or epistemic privilege. By examining these relations, we are given a strong starting point from which to assess opportunities for moral response and the most effective ways to acknowledge and rectify the structural injustices of care worker migration. States which benefit financially might be well-suited to provide funding for rectificatory efforts, NGOs with knowledge of the injustice and the structures that contribute to it might be well-suited to coordinate the response and act as a go-between for each of the actors involved, and qualified individuals in close geographic proximity to source countries suffering severe shortages in health workers might be well-suited to migrate temporarily to offer relief. Each of these relationships offers a unique opportunity that may be unavailable to agents with other sorts of relationships. Some will aid in alleviating the causes of structural injustices and some will serve to rectify their harmful effects. By assessing the full scope of relationships and the opportunities corresponding to them, we are able to give a more comprehensive response to ongoing crises.

Earlier, I assessed the strength of Eckenwiler's account on the basis of its ability to instantiate Tronto's proposal for the rectification of the more personal injustices faced by migrant care workers. Now, having situated Eckenwiler's account within an opportunity-focused framework, I would like to return to Tronto's proposal and demonstrate how this variation of the account will more effectively allow us to attribute the responsibility to carry it out.

From the perspective of opportunity, then, one of the most significant connections that must be acknowledged is one's status *as a citizen* of a community wherein immigrant care workers

are employed. This connection is significant *whether or not* one's status as a citizen of the community concerned confers any sort of benefit or has played any sort of contributory role in the injustices. What is important about this connection is that it affords one a unique opportunity for moral action, namely, to modify one's definition of citizenship to include the contributions of care workers and to encourage others to do so. In this way, we can begin to address attitudes regarding care work that undermine the respect these types of workers are afforded in certain societies. By increasing respect and recognizing the contributions of care workers as significant, we can more readily incorporate such work into our conception of citizenship and allow these workers to be protected by state institutions devoted to preventing exploitation. This will address not only material issues such as the disparities in wages, working conditions, and health insurance immigrant care workers face, but will additionally give them greater autonomy and political equality, backed by concrete political institutions, to express their interests in the societies to which they have migrated.

What is important to note is that one's status as a citizen offers one a unique range of potential moral action, just as would one's status as a beneficiary or a contributor. Each of these constitutes a separate social connection with distinct opportunities for moral response. Responsibility can be conferred discretely to each of these categories to the extent that this is the case. Scope is limited under this approach only by opportunity, not by any particular sorts of relations. Furthermore, by appealing to citizenship as a distinct type of connection with distinct opportunities that generate distinct responsibilities, we are more readily able to carry out this proposal then we were with the resources of Eckenwiler's approach. We are able to include *all* citizens in the scope of responsible agents, by virtue of their citizenship, and we are able to motivate them to do so by attending to the recognizable fact that it is their contributions *as citizens*

to the shared conception of citizenship that gives them the opportunity to respond effectively to the structural injustice at hand. They are motivated not by having indirectly and unrecognizably participated in some structure of injustice, but by the fact that their concrete, recognizable political status as citizens generates a corresponding duty to reflect on the ways in which they conceive of citizenship and how these conceptions can harm or benefit others. In this way, inclusive scope need not come at the cost of motivational force. Under the opportunity approach I have presented, the scope and motivational force of such duties go hand-in-hand.

Conclusion

At the outset of the paper. I mentioned the need for a framework that is sensitive to all moral considerations one might think relevant in determining one's moral obligations. The opportunity framework thus serves to explain *why* each of the considerations we might already view as fundamental to assessing obligations is in fact so. Thus, economic power provides one with opportunities to finance rectificatory efforts, to lobby international financial institutions such as the World Bank or the IMF, and to impose sanctions on those who contribute to, or perpetuate structural injustices against, migrant care workers. Political power provides the opportunity to revise legislation in a way that is sensitive to the needs of non-citizen migrant care workers who are vulnerable and away from home. Epistemic privilege provides one the opportunity to consult with actors to find solutions that genuinely reflect the needs of those sustaining harm, rather than the apparent needs that might be projected onto them by outside actors. In each case, a focus on connections and the opportunities that reside therein opens the door to a more robust response. While there is much to be gained from considering Eckenwiler's suggestions for addressing the structural injustices of the care worker migration crisis, there is value to thinking about these

suggestions from the perspective of opportunities to maximize effective rectification. An opportunity-centric framework allows us to overcome the obstacles raised by focusing on *particular* types of connections by rather focusing on the opportunities *all* types of connections afford.

References

Card, Claudia. *The Unnatural Lottery*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996.

Eckenwiler, Lisa. "Care Worker Migration and Transnational Justice." *Public Health Ethics* 2, no. 2 (2009): 171-183.

Eckenwiler, Lisa, Christine Straehle and Ryoa Chung. "Global Solidarity, Migration and Global Health Inequity." *Bioethics* 26, no. 7 (2012): 382-390.

Goodin, Robert. "What Is So Special About Our Fellow Countrymen?" *Ethics* 98 (1998): 663-686.

Tronto, Joan. "Care as the Work of Citizens." In *Women and Citizenship*, edited by Marilyn Friedman. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. 130-145.

Young, I. M. "Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model." *Social Philosophy and Policy* 23 (2006): 102-130.