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The Debate Over Boycotts: The Effect and Effectiveness of Olympic Boycotts

By

Micaïla Forte

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Kinesiology
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Sport Management and Leadership
at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2024

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The Debate Over Boycotts: The Effect and Effectiveness of Olympic Boycotts

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September 3, 2024

DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

The relationship between the Olympics and politics is a reality that the International Olympic Committee has tried to ensure did not exist from its creation in 1896. However, throughout its history the strong connection between the two has revealed itself through the use and reoccurrence of boycotts. Countries that utilize boycotts on the Olympic stage have always done so as means of taking a political stand.

Using three major Western newspapers as primary sources, as well as numerous secondary sources, the research conducted begins with a quick analysis of some minor Olympic boycotts to establish what boycotts were used for in the early years of the Modern Olympic Games. It then focuses its attention on the four major boycotts that have taken place during the “modern era” of the Olympic Games and analyzes if these boycotts had any effect on political or societal events and proceedings directly following the Olympiads that were boycott. Both short term (within one year of the Olympic boycott happening) and long term (within ten years of the Olympic boycott happening) effects were recorded and analyzed to also determine if the boycotts have any effect at all on the issue at hand.

Through four independent case studies, and a conductive coding analysis, the research has supported the conclusion that there is no evidence of Olympic boycotts being effective when it comes to making political or societal change, or having any significant effects when looking at events that could lead to this change occurring.

DEDICATION

To the trailblazing women in sports, who showed me that breaking barriers is the best way to score. To my family and friends, for being my biggest fans. To my laptop, for being my teammate through countless drafts. And to the multiple coffee shops I frequented while completing this project, I couldn't have done it without you.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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I also would like to thank Dr. Stephen Wenn, who set my love and critical thinking of the Olympics on to a path that cannot be stopped. Without his classes throughout my undergraduate degree, guidance and support, my adoration for sport history would just be a fun quirk I thought I had.

This project is one that has been in the making for a long time. For that, I would also like to thank my family and friends for listening to my “fun facts” and very specific rants surrounding the Olympics and certain historical figures that they really did not care about. Without them, my ramblings would have translated into a number of side projects that got me off topic within this one overarching document.

Lastly, I’d like to thank those at the University of Windsor, Durham College and Wilfrid Laurier University who I met during my post-secondary education both professionally and personally. It’s been a great eight years.

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DEFINITIONS

Effects (of Olympic Boycotts)

A result or consequence of the actions taken by participating countries and individuals for their partaking in Olympic Boycotts.

Effectiveness (of Olympic Boycotts)

The extent to which the goals of the participating countries are met in relation to the desired impact of the boycotts, set out by participating individuals.

Boycott

The termination of a contract or relationships between two distinct groups – on the grounds of political differences (Daoudi & Dajani, 1983).

“Full” Boycott

An Olympic Boycott in which participating countries have pulled their athletes from competing, as well as had no political officials attend the events.

“Diplomatic” Boycott

An Olympic Boycott in which participating countries did not send political officials to the Games, but athletes from the country were still allowed to compete.

Political Bereavement

Sense of dissatisfaction one feels surrounding political issues and happenings around the world that the individual does not agree with.

ABBREVIATIONS

AOC	American Olympic Committee
CEBL	Canadian Elite Basketball League
COJO	Comité d'Organisation des Jeux Olympiques
FSFI	Fédération Sportive Féminine Internationale
GANEF0	Games of the New Emerging Forces
IAAF	International Amateur Athletic Federation
IOC	International Olympic Committee
ISF	International Sporting Federation
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBA	National Basketball Association
NFL	National Football League
NOC	National Olympic Committee
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROC	Republic of China
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USOC	United States Olympic Committee
WNBA	Women's National Basketball Association

Background

Introduction

Despite claims by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that there was a lack of political meaning behind the regeneration of the Olympic Games, the international event has been utilized by numerous countries as a propaganda tool to display their political ideals. Showcasing the dissatisfaction one has with political bereavements is one of the most significant reasons countries have for boycotting the Olympic Games. This thesis will not only discuss the effectiveness of the Olympic boycotts in the past but will assist the reader by offering a conclusion as to whether or not boycotts have any effects on the initial reasons for boycotting. The thesis will also suggest next steps that may be taken in order to change the magnitude, predictability, and regularity of Olympic Boycotts.

The idea of sports and politics being tied so tightly together is one that has existed for a significant period of time, and yet, to this day many refuse to acknowledge the relationship between these two factors. Although sport has often been seen as a way to pass time and for socialization, the decision in the 19th century to split recreational sport into those for professionals (those who get paid to play), and amateurs (those who do work elsewhere) was one of the first major steps in tying politics with sport (Rickey, 1955). At the time, those who were considered “professional” were of the working class and were unable to compete against those who were of a higher economic standing (Pope, 1996). With the introduction of an amateur code, it can be argued that politics have been involved in sport ever since. If we move forward in time, one such tie-in for sport was the Summit Series that took place in 1972 between the Canadian and Soviet Hockey Teams. Taking place in the midst of the Cold War, the Summit Series, a

tournament between the Red Army Russian Team and Top All-Star Canadian hockey players commenced and is said to have changed hockey in Canada (Government of Canada, 2016). However, the political landscape at the time created an intense, must-win, atmosphere for Canadians and ended up being more about national identity and diplomacy, masked by the game of hockey (Farish and Monteyne, 2015). Yet, despite the evident tie between politics and sport in the aforementioned example, individuals continue to reject the idea that there is a connection between the two factors. For example, in 2018, news anchor Laura Ingram said on live television that LeBron James should “shut up and drip” instead of getting involved in politics (Guardian News and Media, 2018). This was during the time of the Black Lives Matter movement that had been ongoing for several years, but eventually took 2020 by storm after the targeting and murder of many people of colour by police, specifically in the United States. LeBron James, along with many other athletes used their platforms to speak up about the issues at hand, but the idea that any professional athlete could have a valid opinion on political issues was turned into a point of debate amongst the media.

Despite the willingness of some to acknowledge the connections between the two, society is seeing the effect that sport and politics have on each other. Tied into the idea of the Black Lives Matter movement, professional leagues such as the Women’s National Basketball Association (WNBA), National Basketball Association (NBA), National Football League (NFL) and Canadian Elite Basketball League (CEBL), all made it a part of their seasons to speak out and support the causes that are close to them and their athletes. Within the WNBA, for example, speaking out on matters that are important to the athletes has been happening for years. The athletes protested in ways such as taking a

knee for the Black Lives Matter movement, bringing awareness to the causes they support through their warmup gear or partaking in full media blackouts (Ayala, 2020).

The connection often seen between politics and sport is when countries use their athletes as “pawns” to make a statement on political issues. This is mostly seen in high level, international competition, such as that unfolding at the Olympic Games, and this is the basis for this research project. Throughout the past, countries have pulled their teams from competing in the Olympics to protest the political issues and ideals of the host countries. These issues over time have spanned many different topics, including women’s rights, racial injustices, and differences in political ideals (Council on Foreign Relations, n.d.). The question that many individuals have asked is, do these boycotts actually have an effect on any political policy, or do they make any difference at all?

Since the first modern Olympic Games were staged in 1896, a number of major and minor boycotts have taken place, resulting in hundreds of athletes being unable to compete due to the stance that the countries they are competing for have when it comes to the host country. This research looks at the seven major, full boycotts that have occurred during the modern Olympic era. A brief overview analyzes the first three (1928, 1956, 1964), while a deep dive into the later four major Olympic boycotts (1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988) that have taken place occurs and is the main source of data used to evaluate if there were any effects that have come from them, as well as the level of effectiveness in which they have reached.

Boycotts emerge when there is a common matter in which a group of individuals do not agree in the way it is being handled (Community Tool Box, n.d.). Boycotts may not be expected by the boycotting party to make a change but instead, simply voice their

concern and express their disapproval (Community Tool Box, n.d.). When individuals or groups feel passionate about a stance, it is felt that a boycott may help illuminate the point the group is trying to make to the general public, as well as to the party they are trying to influence.

Need For the Study

Leading up to the 2022 Olympic Winter Games in Beijing, China, ten countries declared a diplomatic boycott on China, and sent only athletes and their entourage to participate in the Games, but no political officials attended (BBC, 2022). These countries, which included the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, all disagreed with human rights abuses that have impacted the Uyghur population who live in Xinjiang (BBC, 2022). In the months that followed the boycott of the Games, there had been no indication that there was any improvement to the situation (BBC, 2022). There was also no attempt by the countries who had participated in the boycott to take any further action to address those tragedies that were a concern for them earlier in the year. This begs the question, did the diplomatic boycott imposed by these ten countries have an effect on the Olympic Games at all? Did it have an effect on the host country? Was there any change in policy due to the protests? Did the absence of these diplomatic officials exert any pressure on China's government, making them question what was being done in their own country? One can also extend this thinking to other boycotts that have taken place and ask if the lack of athletes from the countries that boycott had an effect on the issue underpinning the boycott.

There has been little research conducted on this topic to date and any research that has been done on the boycotts of the Olympic Games have looked at a single set of Games as opposed to analyzing the idea of boycotts in the Olympic Movement as a tool

to effect change. The set of Olympic Games that have been looked at the most within research has been the 1980 Olympics. The Games in Moscow were the first major Olympic boycott that the United States had taken part in, and spearheaded, which also happened to be in a highly political time period; in the midst of the Cold War (Mather, 2021). Predictably, as many of the English-speaking Olympic researchers are situated in the United States, the majority of the research has focused on the events that took place surrounding the 1980 Olympic Games. However, each of the seven major boycotts are extremely important to understand in order to formulate an overall idea of the effectiveness of boycotts in international sporting events and in order to accurately weigh the positive and negative effects that they may have on the individual parties involved. This gap in the published research showcases the need for this information in this form. The analysis undertaken in this study will provide an overall idea of the importance of understanding protests in this context and the results of actions made that have an effect on individuals outside of those making the decision.

It has been suggested that the individuals that have seemingly been affected the most by all of the boycotts that are being analyzed have been the athletes. Generally speaking, it must be acknowledged that these individuals have worked tirelessly to achieve their goals, accomplishing them in terms of being able to qualify for their appropriate events. Boycotts ‘ripped away’ everything that has been achieved by these athletes due to their government’s decision to terminate a relationship due to political differences. Given the information gathered from this research, there is hope that the data collected will bolster the existing literature as to the effectiveness of boycotts. This will in turn help determine if placing athletes in the political abyss during each Olympic

festival is necessary or productive. If not, removing the athletes from being a part of the discussion in terms of boycotting and using them as “pawns” in a politically motivated protest will continue and potentially be considered fair and obligatory by respective governments.

Scope of the Study

This study aims to zero in on “true” Olympic boycotts that have happened, resulting in individual countries not allowing their athletes to participate in the Olympic Games to any extent. Since 1896, when the Games were revived by Pierre de Coubertin, this has happened on seven separate occasions. These are:

1. Games of the IX Olympiad in Amsterdam, Netherlands (1928)
2. Games of the XVI Olympiad in Melbourne, Australia (1956)
3. Games of the XVIII Olympiad in Tokyo, Japan (1964)
4. Games of the XXI Olympiad in Montreal, Canada (1976)
5. Games of the XXII Olympiad in Moscow, Russia (1980)
6. Games of the XXIII Olympiad in Los Angeles, United States of America (1984)
7. Games of XXIV Olympiad in Seoul, South Korea (1988)

However, it is argued that post 1968, with the emergence of major television deals, increased media attention, and eventual allowance of professional athletes at the Olympic Games, the events had begun to move into what we now consider the “modern era” of the Olympic Games. This research will focus on the four full boycotts that happened in this era (Olympiads XXI, XXII, XXIII and XXIV). The preceding Olympic Games will still be analyzed, in order to give context to an overarching understanding, but a deep dive into the four aforementioned festivals will create the bulk of the research,

as well as be the focus while providing conclusions when it comes to answering the research questions.

In conducting this research, a number of factors have been determined ahead of time, and also considered while deep diving into each of the four Olympic boycotts. To begin, an appropriate definition of effectiveness to help establish a baseline for boycott effectiveness has been provided. From there, the author has analyzed why each boycott happened, the context of each boycott, reactions at the time, and a follow up of the reasons (to note if there was any conclusion based upon the Olympic boycotts). These findings have been informed by using a number of different sources including, but not limited to, past research papers, archival sources, newspaper articles at the time, and any other information that was found addressing these events.

Although the main focus of the paper is to investigate the effectiveness of boycotts impacting the Olympics, it is hoped that these findings can also be extrapolated and applied to other major international events. With 206 National Olympic Committees (NOCs), the Olympics is an event that spans the globe and have a high focus in the majority of places worldwide, being extremely important in expanding sport opportunities for athletes in many countries (Kidd, 2022). Although not the primary focus of this thesis, for background information on boycotts at the international level, looking into other international events that have experienced boycotts have also been utilized to note if there are any differences in the way parties go about boycotting the Olympics versus other events. The acknowledged relationship between sport and politics, especially at the international level, highlights the importance of this study and therefore, hopefully,

will result in a more meaningful conclusion concerning the effect and effectiveness of Olympic Boycotts.

One note to make is that there has been discourse concerning the Seoul Olympic Games of 1988 and if it should be considered a full boycott. Based on the definition utilized for this project, it is argued that, a full boycott did occur during the 1988 Games and therefore the Games should be included within the scope of this study. As well, it rounds out the list of four major boycotts that occurred in back-to-back Olympiads, which makes it important to consider and include.

Purpose of the Study

The purpose of the study is to investigate and create an understanding of the lengths in which boycotts directed at the Olympics are effective in targeting and assisting with the issue or issues being protested. By analyzing each individual “full” boycott that has occurred since the resurgence of the Olympic Games in 1896, one should be able to conclude whether or not boycotting the Olympics is a valuable option when determining how to protest political beliefs.

A secondary goal of this study is to suggest, to both governmental and non-governmental agencies who are making decisions on whether to boycott events, or not, if it is an effective strategy that can be used to get their ideology across. To those they wish to impact. With the most recent boycotts in Beijing in 2022, it seemingly appears to have been an idea someone put forward to be on the “right side of history” and others followed suit, without acting against what the events that were the root of the boycott. There has yet to be a study investigating all major boycotts of the Olympics and offering conclusions on their effectiveness based on the available evidence. By undertaking such an investigation, it has been argued that the resulting conclusions will assist future

governments in analyzing the situation while considering the impact they have on the issue at hand. If the findings in this research show that there is an effect on the reasons for boycotting, international governments are then able to have the desired effect on the host country's government. If it is not seen as effective, governments can refocus their efforts and begin brainstorming new ways to take a stand and have a genuine effect on the issue.

An underlying hope is that this study will help to protect the athletes who remain at risk of being used as pawns by governments while protecting their right and ability to participate in the Olympic Games. Training to and becoming an Olympic level athlete is a lifelong commitment that individuals work tirelessly to achieve. To then be put in a position where one qualifies for the Olympics, just to have that taken away by your home nation is one that many athletes have had to deal with in the past and is one that seems unjust (Futerman, 2020; Maese, 2020), especially if the desired impact is not achieved. There have been athletes who have spoken out about being used by their country as a pawn in their political pursuit of right and wrong. One such example includes many of the 466 American athletes who were supposed to compete in the 1980 Moscow Olympics, which were boycott by the government of the United States and following the United States Olympic Committee's decision to respect the government's resolution, did not send their athletes (Maese, 2020).

When discussing the 1980 Moscow boycott and his inability to participate in the Olympics, Ron Galimore, the first African American athlete to make the U.S. gymnastics team had stated that "The level of depression that hit was pretty hard, because it just derailed a lot of plans that I had post-competing in the Olympics" (Maese, 2020). This

sentiment, as well as the idea that the athletes were upset with their government for the decision made, were echoed by a number of American athletes including Rowdy Gaines, Carol Blazejowski and Gene Mills (Maese, 2020). Not allowing individuals to compete due to a political stance one is trying to make deeply affects the lives of those who put in the work to reach their goals. In conducting this research, the hope is that it will place the athletes lives and their wellbeing at the forefront of the parties who make the decisions on boycotts. If a boycott is seemingly justified, the desire is to ensure that athletes understand the reasons and do not get caught in the crossfire.

Research Questions

The primary research question for this research is “Are Olympic boycotts effective in creating political and societal change in relation to the issue being boycotted?” However, hand-in-hand with this, there are a number of secondary research questions that can be answered through the research. These questions are:

1. What is considered being effective when it comes to creating societal and political change on the international level?
2. Are there any lasting effects of these boycotts? If so, what are they?
3. Have boycotts of the Olympic Games directly caused a resolution to occur in relation to the issues being protested?

It is hoped that the answers to these questions will not only allow the researcher to answer the primary research question, but assist those in power when making decisions to boycott the quadrennial festival, or any other major international events in the future. The knowledge gained will allow governments to make informed decisions of how they want to create change and how to go about making a difference in the political climate and landscape that they determine to be problematic.

Outline of Thesis

This thesis starts with background information pertaining to the idea of politics in sport and the link between the two that the Olympics have tried to sever since their reimagination in the late 1800s. Having this knowledge will assist not only the researcher, but the readers in highlighting the hypocritical nature of the IOC and their ideals towards the politics in their event and sport as a whole. This provides the foundation of the paper to determine the importance of boycotts, especially in a sport-based environment, where the idea is that sport at a high level should be non-political.

From there, the literature review assists in providing the necessary context of boycotts as a whole, as well as within sport. It provides an analysis of the existing research that has established the foundation of knowledge for politics in sport. But most importantly, it helps to determine the parameters of what will be used as the definition of effectiveness throughout this research. Having the definition supported by past research provides a factor of legitimacy to the paper and supports any conclusions that are drawn. By establishing an industry standard of “effectiveness” within sport research, or within political scholarship, the level of validity the research will take on is extended and thus result in more meaningful conclusions.

When undertaking the research for this project, each boycott has been reviewed individually in sequential order. Olympiads IX, XVI and XVIII have all been looked at from the lens of highlighting the most important ideas behind these actions. Research has been conducted on these boycotts before, so utilizing these studies has assisted the researcher in getting the main reasons behind of the events that took place, without needing to deep dive. Starting with the 1976 Olympic boycotts in Montreal to the 1988 Olympics in South Korea, each individual section looks at the who, what, when and why

of each boycott. The reasons behind the boycott as well as situational information of each Olympic Games has been researched. Concluding each section is the effects of the boycotts on the Olympic Games in question and the greater change that may have taken place due to the protesting. If no immediate change occurred, the researcher has taken a snapshot approximately ten years into the future after the boycotts occurred to see if any change happened. This provides insight into if the boycotts were effective at creating change.

The ten-year interval was established to ensure there is enough time directly after the Olympics to consider and to note the logistics of making changes and implementing them into society. It is argued that although a period less than ten years may allow for change to happen, it would be on a small scale. Anything more than ten years may be a consequence of change enacted for external reasons as opposed to change solely being a result of the Olympic boycotts. The process of enacting social change is something that can take a considerable amount of time given the situations of each individual case. The ten-year timeline allows for a decade's worth of work to be done and completed if the Olympics were the turning point for situations and society to make changes based off of the reasons for boycotting.

In the analysis section of the thesis, codes have been utilized to help find trends within each individual boycott being researched. These codes assist in wading through large amounts of research and highlighting important factors that aid in finding conclusions to the proposed research questions.

To conclude the thesis, an answer to all the aforementioned research questions have been provided based on the research conducted, and a final conclusion as to if

Olympic boycotts are effective or not will be determined. The information and insight that is provided based on the findings of the research look to assist government officials in determining if boycotting the Olympics will have the desired effect on society. It may also allow for athletes, who have been training their entire lives, to be removed from the forefront of issues that do not necessarily pertain to them.

Literature Review

Effectiveness

Although studying the effectiveness of an event may be seen as being on the more subjective side of research, if the existing published studies are utilized, one is able to create a definition that is in line with the industry standard and therefore conclusions become more difficult to dispute. Effectiveness, as a whole, is defined as the match between the goal and achievement, or simply put the extent to which objectives are met (Fraser, 1994; Erlendsson, 2002).

Different research branches have different opinions on what should be used to define effectiveness. For the purposes of this study, definitions from political science research as well as those from sport management have been utilized. These two disciplines are the most relevant to this study and, when combined, provide the greatest insight into the industry standard as well as up to date definitions and themes in relation to the topic at hand – in this case, effectiveness.

In the sport management field, effectiveness is often defined as the extent to which the sporting organization is capable of reaching its goals (Byers et al., 2012). The majority of research within sport management dealing with effectiveness is geared towards the effectiveness of a specific organization, thus resulting in many ideas and definitions geared towards the multitude of factors that go into creating a focussed and

effective sports team (Byers et al., 2012). A three-tiered approach is commonly used by combining past models of effectiveness into one. The multiple-constituency approach, originally proposed by Connolly et al. (1980), is the idea that one can determine what factors exist in a specific setting. The assessments and consequences of these factors has been combined with the System Resource Model, Process Model and Goal Models to create an overarching understanding of all elements of an organization. Figure 1, found below, showcases what this model looks like when combined and was first assembled by Chelladurai (2009). In combination with this idea of organizational effectiveness, the idea of a primary beneficiary was proposed by Blau & Scott (1962), meaning that there is one sole group that benefits the most from the effectiveness that is measured, and it is this group that the discussion of effectiveness revolves around (Chelladurai, 2013).




Figure 1: Combined System Resource Model, Process Model & Goal Models

In political science literature, a specific focus on the objectiveness, or lack thereof, of a definition of effectiveness is utilized. Effectiveness is not a neutral term and is subject to debate (Sammons, 1996) which strengthens the need of adopting a

standardized definition in an effort to respond to debates that may arise. Stemming from this standard definition is the concept that an economic outcome may be a result of the level of effectiveness (West, 1999). This concept is important within the context of this study due to the link between economic and political sanctions during events on the world stage.

The efficacy of political change and impact is determined by a number of factors that rely heavily on the situation. The idea that political efficacy is both external and internal to the individual is conceptually adept (Lane, 1959). The external (responsiveness of the system) efficacy, combined with internal (personal ability) efficacy have validated that the effectiveness of change within a situation is not only determined by the individuals who want to enforce change, but the situation in which they are trying to change the behaviour (Craig, Niemi, & Silver, 1990; Verba, Schlozman, & Brady, 1995; Almond & Verba, 1963). The combination of these factors makes it difficult to enact change in a situation where the environment does not allow for change to occur. In order to be effective, the perfect storm of internal and external desire must work in unison to create the change needed in a set amount of time. If the internal desire to create change is present, but there is no ability for a response from the system, there is no successful way to create change within the political system. The same can be said in the other way. If the system is ready and able to be responsive to change, but there is no one at the core of the issue willing to take on the problem, again, change will be improbable. Having the timing of these two factors lining up is the only way in which effective change can be created in the political landscape.

Boycotts

Boycotts and general protesting have been a reoccurring activity within the world for a substantial period of time. The idea of standing up for an individuals' beliefs has been utilized by some as a way to make one's thoughts and opinions known. Boycotts are the termination of a contract or relationships between two distinct groups – on the grounds of political differences (Daoudi & Dajani, 1983). These boycotts affect not only the physical territories involved but the organization within the territories as well (Cossio-Silva et al., 2019). The differences that these boycotts stem from are a result of variance in morals and ethical practices due to various ideals in thinking (also known as the Personal Moral Philosophy; Forsyth, 1980).

Past research has noted that more idealistic individuals believe any act that results in a negative consequence to anyone should be avoided at all costs, where non-idealistic individuals believe that negative consequences may be mandatory to reach a positive outcome overall (Ferrell & Gresham, 1985; Forsyth, 1992; Hunt & Vitell, 1986; Mayo & Marks, 1990; Reidenbach & Robin, 1988). This difference in opinions results in boycotts for issues that have been created. If there is no short-term solution to the variance in morals and ethical practices behind the boycott, the boycotts can be ongoing and continue indefinitely (MacLean, 2014).

Boycotts are usually a highly emotional response to political issues and the intention behind a boycott is one of the major factors that lead to the boycott (Palacios-Florencio et al., 2021). If animosity is high between the different parties, it is argued that one will participate in a boycott regardless of any pressure against the idea (Palacios-Florencio et al., 2021). Due to the emotional tie boycotts often have, the response to being on the receiving end is rarely positive and as a result, a conclusion is very rarely

decided in a timely manner (Palacios-Florencio et al., 2019). Boycotts are often tied to political pursuits and ideals that may differ as a result of where one is raised and the political party that is in charge of the country at the time (MacLean, 2014).

Sports Boycotts

Sporting boycotts have been a pattern within the industry for decades but rely on being a monopoly of sorts in order to remain effective in creating change through their use (MacLean, 2014). Similar with economic boycotts, consideration must be given to the availability of a similar-enough product that is offered elsewhere when determining if a boycott will be effective or if the boycotted party will be able to continue on in a market similar to which they already exist (Barber & Spicer, 1979). Researchers such as Murray (2003), Scott (2015) and Nixon (1992) have investigated the effectiveness of one of the most successful sport boycotts, opposing the qualifying guidelines to be a part of the South African rugby team during apartheid. Within a year, South Africa was excluded from the Olympics, suspended from the International Amateur Athletics Federation, the Davis Cup and the proposed South African cricket tour of Australia were cancelled (Murray, 2003), as well as many other events. This occurrence was the only time where a country was effectively banned from every sporting event to boycott the ongoing social-political issues that were being faced due to apartheid. Nixon (1992) notes that the connection of factors such as sport, nationalism and race was one of the contributing reasons as to why the boycott was taken seriously by so many. It resonated with individuals of many backgrounds and was noted internationally as a direct comparison to “the colonial legacy of racist nationalism” (Nixon, 1992).

Although throughout a review of the available research the international boycott of South African sport has been identified as one of the most effective, there are some

other examples of boycotts that have been effective. Unfortunately, however, a lack of academic support is available to establish a sufficient background knowledge on the topic. Boycotts have been utilised within the sporting industry in a multitude of ways throughout history. The purpose and the different types of boycotts that have been used has been identified as a gap in the existing research. A review of the existing literature shows that boycotts within a sport context is a section of academia that has been overlooked, and therefore creates a gap in knowledge. Based on pop culture and the surge in media over the past five decades, the general public is aware of many of the different boycotts that have taken place, and the state in which they took place. However, in the academic world, there is a lack in knowledge as to the set types of boycotts that exist in the sports world, and if certain types of boycotts are more effective than others. Future research on boycotts should be considered to establish a solid framework, to assist both with research in sport management as well as political science.

Olympic Boycotts

The Olympic Games are one of the most common sporting events to have been the target of protests throughout history. This was primarily due to the principles that underpin the Olympic Movement and being one of the largest international sporting events now representing some 206 NOCs. Many governmental and non-governmental entities have utilized the fact that they are on a “world stage” in an attempt to let their opinions be known (Preuss & Alfs, 2011). In more modern times, the media component included with each Olympiad is a motivating factor as well, especially when it comes to making a statement within the sporting world (Latham, 2009; Lee, 2019; Luo, 2012). Mega-events, where the media has been encouraged to attend in order to report on such happenings has ensured that there is a set ideal and light in which the media portrays

about international events. This idea, named the “media-sports-cultural complex” proposed by Rowe (2013), links dominant sporting events with the consideration of their corporate partners. This focus leaves very little media attention for those who are opposed to the events (Wilson & VanLujik, 2019). That said, one of the major ways utilized to get the attention of the media is by claiming to “boycott” the event as a whole and following through with the claim. This decision, although major and repetitive throughout history, is extremely controversial due to the link it often has with politics that sport has historically tried to deny or gloss over (Berg et al., 2012; Rosner & Low, 2009; Torres, 2011).

Despite the suggestion that the Olympic Movement is an apolitical collection of individuals and entities, it has been utilized on numerous occasions for a number of political pursuits. For example, the effort to further a specific political agenda by the host country has been one of the main ideas considered and recognized throughout history (Hoberman, 2011; Berg et al., 2012). This effort has been encouraged by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) who have actively selected host cities that have been embroiled in political issues or who may feel that they have something to prove (i.e., Beijing, 2008), which in turn adds to the possibility that boycotts will take place (Luo, 2012). Today, with host cities being chosen seven years in advanced, blame cannot always be placed on the IOC, as future political issues involving host countries may be difficult to predict. However, in the case of the 1980 Games in Moscow and the 1984 Games in Los Angeles, both countries were in the midst of a highly political Cold War for years before these host cities were selected (Kobiercki, 2015). In retrospect, the selection of these host cities, and the countries in which they reside, could have been

avoided, thus adhering to the claims of political neutrality that the IOC has tried to push since the resurgence of the Olympic Games in 1896.

Much of the research surrounding Olympic boycotts has focussed more so on the ‘what’ of the event, as opposed to the ‘why’ and the results. Therefore, it is the researcher’s contention that the effectiveness of an Olympic boycott is a topic that needs to be investigated more than it already has, both individually and overall. Deep dives into the available scholarly literature have shown that there is a lack of research examining the effectiveness of these boycotts. This identifiable gap in the literature highlights the importance of this research endeavour.

Sport and Politics

The relationship between sport and politics has been a topic of discussion and debate since the birth of modern sports. While sport has often been used to entertain, a long withstanding tie to politics has changed the purpose of sport, helping push sport forward, beyond the sole purpose of entertainment. Berg et al. (2012) argue that sport alone is used more as a facilitating mechanism throughout history in terms of advancing political ideals and issues, as it is very rarely sufficient enough to create full divisions between countries. Sport, along with those individuals and entities involved, is used as the medium in which the political pursuits of a country are therefore showcased.

Originally, sport in the Olympic context was a means to an end, bringing individuals from across the world together. In the 1933 version of the Olympic Charter (the first to be published in English), it states that the IOC and its modern Olympic Games were established:

to take all proper steps to conduct modern athletics in the right way, by fostering the spirit of chivalry, love of 'fair play', reverence for true amateurism and getting the help of the official authorities (International Olympic Committee, n.d.).

These ideals were utilized to bring individuals together “to make the different classes in a country as well as the units in different civilizations well acquainted with each other and to promote better understanding” (International Olympic Committee, n.d.). The possibility of dissolving any political differences through the Olympic Games was advanced by many IOC Presidents beyond Pierre de Coubertin, the most vocal of which was Avery Brundage. As the United States considered if boycotting the 1936 Berlin Games was appropriate, Brundage, President of the American Olympic Committee (AOC) at the time, argued that there was no place for politics in sport and it should be avoided at all costs at the Olympic level (Wenn, 1996). However, even despite the continuous call to keep sport and politics separate, the relationship the IOC and sport have with politics to stage and fund Olympic festivals showcases the ease and capacity involved in this relationship. Former IOC President Jacques Rogge, for example, noted that despite the continuous push for the separation of politics and sport, there was a link and ultimately “politics invited itself in[to] sport” (Hounshell, 2008). Despite this claim, it was Rogge himself, as well as all other IOC Presidents that have worked with government officials in creating political calls surrounding sport and the Olympic Games themselves. This follows the blueprint that Pierre de Coubertin set out with his ideals of sport being utilized for peace as opposed to becoming “an instrument of political interests and did not want politics to intrude into the Olympic Movement directly” (Krieger, 2022).

For many years the principle of not linking sport with politics was enunciated, yet those in the fields of political science and international relations have ignored sport as being a factor involved in conflict (Budd & Levermore, 2004). Until recently, there was very little on the importance of linking both major ideas to one another or even acknowledging that this connection existed. There is a large segment of academia that argues that sport can be used as a tool to resolve political issues, being more in line with the original thought process between this relationship, as opposed to sport being used as means to an end in showcasing differing issues between parties. Most significant is the work of Nygard and Gates (2013) who argue that sport has been used to build trust and increase the dialogue revolving around opposing political opinions. However, as a society we have seen that this is not always the case. As research begins to acknowledge the connection between sport and politics, more comes into view. Grix and Houlihan (2014) found that many developing countries utilize not only the Olympics, but all major international sporting events as a way to push their “soft power” abilities. These events are utilized as a way to showcase the host’s political abilities and thoughts in a way that assists them in gaining leverage on the world stage.

The connection between sport and politics does not only exist within the realm of major events but also within professional and domestic leagues. Scholars have explored sport being utilized for politics in a number of countries such as in Israel and Palestine (Belcastro, 2020), Kosovo (the former province of Yugoslavia) (Giulianotti et al., 2016), Scandinavian countries (Bergsgard & Norberg, 2010), and many more. The fact that there are individual studies highlighting the link between politics and sport in individual countries, showcases the apparent connection between these two factors and that we are

no longer accepting the argument that there is no place for politics within the sporting world.

A final component of sport and politics that needs to be explored more by those within the scholarly community is that of professional sports. There is an evident link as showcased throughout the 2020 season of many professional leagues within North America, however there is little to no evidence within the published scholarly literature that assists in explaining why the connection is evident, as well as the effect that the professional athletes have on the general public when speaking out on political matters.

Methodology

Research Design

The method for this thesis is a multiple case study approach that will include an analysis of each boycott as an individual event. The multiple case study approach was chosen for this project as it is well-suited for information-rich cases (Yin, 2009). The topic for this project looks to analyze an in-depth description of the events that took place at each of the Olympiads that were boycott, which makes a multiple case study approach the one most fit for this project. For this project, a multiple case study approach is the stronger route to take opposed to a comparative case study approach. With a multiple case study approach, each individual event is treated as its own event and through the analysis, commonalities can be analyzed without being a direct comparison of the multiple events. A comparative multiple case study approach would look and analyze the events in a way that conducts systematic comparisons and “allows researchers to draw causal inferences based on configurational data” (Kröger, 2021). In this process, the individual cases would be analyzed against each other to format a basis of what components were effective or not effective for certain boycotts, and not others. This, however, is not the purpose of this research, and instead the focus is global in nature identifying if anything has occurred throughout all of the Olympic boycotts that have made them effective through the definitions put forward for this project.

The analysis then continues in a way that combines similar ideas from each individual event to create a combined picture used to answer the primary research question addressing boycotts and their effectiveness in enacting social change. Approaching the topic this way not only allows for the collection of as much information as possible, but it also ensures that a fair analysis is given to each individual event. In

doing so, it is argued that an accurate conclusion has been determined, that is supported by evidence, in relation to the topic at hand. With this case study approach adopted, the hope is that it has shed light on the complex issues being investigated in their real-life context (Gratton & Jones, 2010), which is the goal of this document.

Data Collection

Data collection has been undertaken using a combination of both primary and secondary scholarly sources. Utilizing sources such as the published literature has assisted in developing a better understanding of the events and their effectiveness in enacting social change. However, primary sources are crucial in determining the importance of the boycotts on a societal level, as well as reactions to political issues, and the news of boycotts at the time of the events taking place. Having the combination of both primary and secondary sources allows the story of each individual Olympic Games to be uncovered thereby providing a deeper understanding of the events that will be available not only to the researcher but also the audience through the reporting of that information. Select newspapers from the time surrounding the Olympic Games have been utilized in order to create a deeper understanding of the reactions and events of the time to acknowledge and learn what the media was saying at the time the events took place.

For the primary sources, three major Western newspapers were utilized, and their archives were accessed in order to obtain information regarding these Olympic boycotts. The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times and The Times (London) were the chosen newspapers. These newspapers give a variety of opinions based on their geographic area, and all have a global reach. The Globe and Mail was originally considered in this list to have a Canadian perspective. This would have been insightful as the first major boycott took place in Montreal. However, due to the availability and accessibility of their

archives, as well as the geographic closeness of New York City, home of The New York Times, to Canada, it was decided to remove this newspaper as an option. When collecting data itself from the newspapers, key terms such as “Olympics” and “Olympic boycotts” were utilized to focus the search between dates that ranged from four years before the Olympiad to four years after. An initial search of the three newspaper archives for titles that related to these terms was utilized, pulling any articles that may work. From there, each document was read and separated into sections based on the boycott they were discussing, as well as focussed categories that were: selection of city/background, reasons for boycott/political issues, countries that boycott, perceptions of the boycotts (further separated into officials, athletes, media) and conclusion. These then formed the basis of the research.

For secondary sources used, the past research on the Olympic boycotts and political issues were utilized as a way to fill in any gaps and supplement the research for more descriptive explanations of what was occurring at the time. This expansion assisted in giving an overarching idea and assisted in explaining the events at the time with information that we know now about said events.

Data Analysis

Given the significant volume of information available, the analysis of data for this study was one of the biggest tasks to complete. Analyzing the data and combining the findings from each event in a succinct way to find patterns provided a challenge. However, identifying similarities to code the information that align with the reasons, timeline, results, etc., ensured the analysis of all of the data collected. Each event, as previously mentioned, was analyzed individually to determine if there was an indication of effectiveness independently before answering the research questions as a whole after

combining the four major boycotts studied. The codes used during analysis were as follows:

1. Reason for boycott
 - a. Political disagreement
 - b. Societal norms
2. Reasoning for countries to boycott
 - a. Directly effected
 - b. Societal pressure
 - c. Ally pressure
3. Effects of the boycott
 - a. Media awareness
 - b. Governmental/political change
 - c. Major change in Olympics
 - d. Difference in how the Games are run
4. Timeline of response
 - a. Immediate response (0 – 6 months)
 - b. Delayed response (over 6 months)
5. Resolutions to boycott
 - a. No resolution
 - b. Semi-resolved
 - c. Resolved completely

These codes were selected in a deductive coding method, meaning that they were chosen before the research occurred. The background knowledge on Olympic history and sport

history as a whole was utilized to create these codes. However, the coding for this project was also open to inductive coding if there was anything found during the research that was not thought of ahead of time to be an option. This allowed for as many codes, and as accurate of a coding method to be utilized and therefore, an accurate analysis to take place. Dividing the information collected into separate codes not only assisted when combining the quantity of data retrieved, it illuminated patterns that have withstood time across the various boycotts being studied. Any differences may assist in showcasing variations in the effectiveness of each event, individually and collectively.

Limitations

The first main limitation while conducting this project was the volume of information available and required to analyze for this study. As there were seven separate events being researched, there were seven different stories that needed the details uncovered and analyzed. As research has been done on a number of these boycotts before, this helped to guide the research, but it is also important to note that it did not hinder the extent into which each event was investigated. When trying to determine the effectiveness of each situation, it is important to be able to bring attention to the entire story and get an accurate representation of the events as they unfolded. However, the large volume of information can be extremely intimidating and at times, resulted in getting wrapped up completely in elements of the story that are not pertinent to the study. With that being said, in order to combat this, a focus on the key elements of the politics involved in the Games was required. Separating the information into background information, politics, and other allowed for a focus to be put on what is needed to answer the research questions, as well as what information is good to know as background. As

hoped, these notes assisted in keeping the writing portion of the thesis as focused and accurate as possible in order to come to a complete conclusion.

Another main limitation was creating accurate definitions for each case study. As the case study approach is more of a qualitative research approach than quantitative, the definitions initially proposed were not “set in stone”. This is pertinent, for example, to the definition of effectiveness and the delimitation of 10 years I have placed on progress after the games to describe if there is an effect on the politics underpinning the boycott, in terms of the idea of long-term effects. Short-term effects were also looked at in relation to any change from the boycotts within the initial year after the Olympic Games in question have taken place. As these things can be easily argued, it was pertinent to find examples of what others have adopted as a working definition of effectiveness in the past and ensure that the definition adopted for this study aligns with industry standards, both within sport, but also political science. As such, it is suggested that any arguments for or against this adopted definition should be able to withstand challenge.

A final limitation of this study is the different viewpoints that could have been utilized. As boycotts within the Olympic Games expand into numerous realms of study (sport, politics, international relations, etc.), there were a number of different angles in which the events can be analyzed. There were also seven different cases being studied that differ in both the amount of research provided, as well as availability for the information to be discovered. Given the nature of each boycott, it should also be noted that it was easier to find more information about the more recent boycotts than the first few boycotts due to the increased interest in the Olympic Games, as well as heightened political tensions that were more recent and memorable to the current researchers within

the field. Relatedly, the time available to complete this study was a limitation, and thus, only one viewpoint could be researched and analyzed for this topic. Given the volume of information available emanating from a multitude of sources, it must be acknowledged that this was an intensive project to undertake.

Delimitations

The delimitations to this proposed study allowed for a narrower focus to take place, as the idea, overall, is quite large. The first delimitation restricted the investigation to a deep dive into the four most recent full boycotts. By analyzing these select Games, it was expected that a greater amount of information would be available and easier to locate in primary sources. Although noting that the first three are incredibly important, a preliminary review found that it would be difficult to locate and analyze documents from as early as the 1920s.

A second delimitation is that this research has been conducted through a Western view. The Olympics being one of the biggest international events means that there are many articles written about activities associated with the quadrennial festival. And, as many media outlets have been found to lean towards certain political beliefs, reports on events may be contradictory to one another. With this being said, this investigation has utilized three major Western newspapers and their archives in order to conduct research.

These are:

1. The New York Times
2. The LA Times
3. The Times (London)

This variation has provided me with an overarching understanding of the Western World's view of events that took place throughout the span of and surrounding the Olympic boycotts.

Another delimitation utilized throughout this research was the 10-year cut-off for any progress on political events to be considered effective. By limiting the amount of time after the Olympic Games, it not only allowed for a greater focus on direct impacts but created a limit for the researcher to abide by, as opposed to diving into what could have been decades of documentation regarding the political events that were boycott in the first place. Anything longer than 10 years can be argued that there were external sources that may have had a greater impact on the result of the political happenings than the Olympic boycotts did.

Finally, the decision to base this project on Olympic Boycotts allows research to be expanded in an area in which very little academic literature exists. There is limited research on this topic, and where there is, the focus is on the 'what' as opposed to the 'why' and the effects. With the analysis this project has provided, the literature in this topic will expand and it is hoped that a more holistic approach to the reasons for boycotts will result. This information will be readily useable and available for future research. Having the scope of the study span over the entirety of the modern Olympic Games' history has allowed for trends and changes to be noted, if identifiable, and to view the Games from an approach that is more extensive than simply studying a single event in time. The extensive data set utilized has allowed for a more comprehensive understanding of Olympic Boycotts as a whole and it is hoped that this can then be

applied to other international events in the future. However, for this project, the researcher seeks to keep the scope clear and focused on the Olympics.

Findings

Pre-Modern Era Boycotts

Boycott of the IX Olympiad in Amsterdam, Netherlands (1928)

The first full boycott identified took place during the Games of the IX Olympiad in Amsterdam, 1928, where the British Women's Track and Field team decided not to compete in the Olympics as a stance for gender equality within the event itself. In 1917, the Fédération des Sociétés Féminines Sportives de France was created, becoming the first national women's sport federation, who elected Alice Milliat as the treasurer (Leigh & Bonin, 1977). Milliat and the Fédération des Sociétés Féminines Sportives de France pleaded with the IOC to incorporate women's track and field events into the Olympic programming for Olympiads VII (1920) and VIII (1924) as women were only to compete in tennis, swimming and ice-skating at this time (Messerli, 1952). Both the IOC and International Amateur Athletic Federation rejected this idea which caused a change in Alice Milliat and solidified her unflinching determination towards this cause.

On October 31, 1921, the Fédération Sportive Féminine Internationale (FSFI) was founded by Alice Milliat. The FSFI was an international organizing committee for women's sport to provide a "forum for competition as well as a regulatory body for their control" (Leigh & Bonin, 1977). The FSFI got to work right away with the establishment of the Women's Olympic Games, that were to be held every four years, starting in 1922. During the first Games held in Paris on August 20, 1922, over 20 000 people were in

attendance to witness women from Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, and the United States compete (Tuttle, 2001) in eleven different events (Tuttle, 2001; Leigh & Bonin, 1977).

The success of this event, although a win for female athletes, was seen as a threat to many male sport administrators, including Pierre de Coubertin and the IOC. In 1923, the IOC discussed the rise of the feminist empowerment within sport, and the potential abuse that it gave rise to (Mayer, 1960). It was believed that they had to assume control over the women athletes and transfer the governance of women's sport to the international federations to govern the regulations the athletes must follow in order to compete in future events (Leigh & Bonin, 1977). The International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) drew up rules and by 1924 had permitted changes to include women as members and govern women's track and field events. "The FSFI agreed to abide by the general rules of the IAAF but retained power to modify rules regarding specific athletic events" (Leigh & Bonin, 1977) which led to the FSFI still being able to hold their international games, but it could no longer use the "Olympic" name.

With the change in name, the FSFI approached the IOC again about including a full program of events for the 1928 Olympics in Amsterdam for women in track and field. Although the "full" program was rejected, the IOC and IAAF agreed to five events that would be added as an "experiment" (Leigh & Bonin, 1977). These included the 100-metre sprint, 800-metres, 4 x 100 relay, high jump, and discus (Olympics, 2021). Alice Milliat was not happy with this decision, and neither were the British female track and field athletes, which is where the boycott started. There were still women who competed in these events, as well as in other sports, making up 10% of the total number of athletes

who competed in the events (Olympics, 2023). However, adding fuel to the fire of those arguing that they should not be allowed to compete in strenuous events, there were a number of reported health concerns for those who did compete in the 800-meter race. These reports of women dropping out of the race or collapsing, turned out to be false (Olympics, 2019), but the IOC held on to these claims and ended up dropping the 800-metre as a female track event. The result would see the longest distance female athletes could participate in was the 200-metres until 1960 (CBC Sports, 2012).

The FSFI continued demanding a full program for the 1936 Olympics despite the showing of those who participated in 1928. When pushback continued from the IOC and IAAF, the FSFI suggested instead that they would rather have no female events at all in the Olympics, and thus be able to govern their own events instead (Leigh & Bonin, 1977). This, however, did not go in favour of the FSFI and instead resulted in the IAAF completely taking over the governance of women's track and field, resulting in the FSFI eventually disappearing completely from the athletic scene. Shortly after, Milliat would step down from her post as president of the FSFI (Terret, 2010).

The boycott of the 1928 Olympics itself by the British women's track and field team all-in-all had little to no effect on the issue at hand. Despite the leadership of Alice Milliat, a full program for female track and field athletes did not occur in the proceeding Olympiads post 1928. In terms of complete equality in number of events between the female and male track and field programs, since 2008 men have competed in 24 events within athletics and women have competed in 23 (Summer Olympic Games official report Beijing 2008, 2009). However, only 21 of these events are the exact same in length, with only men competing in the 50 km speed walk, women compete in a

heptathlon instead of a decathlon, and men run 110 metre hurdles, where women only run 100 metre hurdles (*Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics – athletes, medals & results*, 2008).

As we are nearing 96 years since the 1928 boycott took place, it is evident through the lack of true equality today when reviewing the type of events, that there was little effect on the issue due to the boycott itself. With that being said, it is difficult to say where society would be without the impact of Alice Milliat and the FSFI on female sport participation. The IOC itself did not change any of their standards or practices during the 1928 boycotts, or directly thereafter which, for the purposes of this study, shows a lack of effectiveness from the point of view of the boycotting party.

Boycott of the XVI Olympiad in Melbourne, Australia (1956)

The boycotts of the XVI Olympiad in Melbourne in 1956 vary significantly from the boycott in 1928 and were due to highly politically charged issues that faced society at the time. Egypt, Iraq, Cambodia, and Lebanon all boycott due to the Suez Canal Crisis (CBC Sports, 2009), the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland boycott due to the Soviet Union's presence in the Hungarian Revolution (CBC Sports, 2009), and the People's Republic of China boycott due to the IOC allowing the Republic of China (Taiwan) to compete in the Games (CBC Sports, 2009).

Suez Canal Crisis

In 1956 the announcement of the nationalization of the Suez Canal set off a number of issues which resulted in the United Kingdom, France and Israel signing the Protocol of Sevres and planning to invade Egypt, in which they did less than a week later (Shlaim, 1997). Ten days after Israel initially invaded and the United Kingdom (UK) and France started bombing, the United Nations (UN) declared a ceasefire that was enacted (McCauley, 1981). Two weeks later, the UK finally began its military withdraw from

Egypt after additional pressure, and it was not until a full month after this that British and French troops withdrew completely from Egypt (U.S. Department of State, n.d.). The Melbourne Olympics started on November 22nd, the day before the UK began military withdrawal, and therefore Egypt did not send a team to compete. Standing with their allies, Iraq, Cambodia, and Lebanon also did not participate as a means to protest the invasion, and the subsequent participation of all at fault countries in the Olympics (CBC Sports, 2009). A full timeline is available as Figure 2 below (*Suez Crisis of 1956*, 2015).




Figure 2: Timeline of Suez Canal Crisis

Hungarian Revolution

From 1945 to 1955, Hungary, and all of Eastern Europe, were occupied by the Soviet Union after the conclusion of World War II (McCauley, 1981). At the start of 1956, tensions between the Soviets and Hungary continued to grow as the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, forced Mátyás Rákosi, the Hungarian leader, to resign (*The Hungarian Uprising 1956*, n.d.). Things looked bleak for Hungarians and that following autumn, after a less than ideal harvest, fuel shortages and the political instability of their country, a number of protests in Budapest took place (*The Hungarian*

Revolution begins – archive, October 1956, 2021). Things were starting to look up as Soviet forces pulled out of Budapest the next day, a new Prime Minister was chosen, and many critics of the Soviet Union were released from prison. This, however, did not last long as eleven days later, Soviet tanks invaded Budapest, killing thousands of Hungarians, with over 200 000 fleeing and seeking refuge (Trueman, 2015). Despite Hungary still sending a team of athletes to compete, Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland all boycott the 1956 summer games as a way to stand up for Hungary and against the Soviets invasion and rule over Hungary (CBC Sports, 2009). A full timeline is available as Figure 3 below (*Timeline of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, 2016*).

1945-1955	February 1956	October 23 rd , 1956	October 24 th , 1956	October 31 st , 1956	November 4 th , 1956	November 14 th , 1956
Following World War II, Hungary and Eastern Europe were occupied by the Soviet Union. Hungarians suffered greatly under the regime, largely due to the continuous presence of thousands of Soviet troops and hundreds of Soviet tanks. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, put Matyas Rakosi in power in Hungary. Despite Hungarian hope for freedom, Soviet rule continued following Stalin's death in 1953.	The new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, forced Rakosi to resign due to Soviet policy changes.	Political instability mixed with a bad harvest, fuel shortages, and a tempestuous winter culminated in the start of student protests on the streets of Budapest.	In order to calm protestors, Soviet forces pulled out of Budapest and Khrushchev allowed the moderate Imre Nagy to become the new Hungarian Prime Minister. Under Nagy's more liberal rule, different political parties were once again allowed to organize and many critics of the Soviet Union were released from prison.	Nagy announced that Hungary would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact, angering the Soviet Union.	Hundreds of Soviet tanks invaded Budapest, using immense brutality against Hungarian civilians. Thousands of people were killed and approximately 200,000 Hungarians fled to other countries as refugees from Soviet violence.	Former Hungarian Foreign Minister Janos Kadar was put into power and Soviet rule was re-established in Hungary.

Figure 3: *Timeline of the Hungarian Revolution*

China-Taiwan Conflict

The last political issue that was going on at the time that caused certain nations to boycott the Games of the XVI Olympiad in Melbourne was between the People's Republic of China (China) and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Taiwan had separated from mainland China in 1949 (BBC, 2024), which resulted in an atmosphere of mistrust from both the government and people of China. It was because of the decisions taken by the IOC and Melbourne's organizing committee that had allowed Taiwan to compete individually, that China would not compete in the Games, and would not make their return until the Winter Olympic Games in 1980 (Chan, 1985).

Conclusions

Despite eight countries not competing in Melbourne in 1956, there was effectively no change to how the Olympic Games were staged. The Suez Canal Crisis ended officially in March 1957 with Israeli forces finally retreating after the UN evacuated French and British troops (Ikeda, 2022). The Soviets rule of Hungary, as previously mentioned, did not end until 1989 (33 years after the revolution occurred) when the Republic of Hungary was proclaimed, and Soviet forces were completely withdrawn by 1991 officially (Bowers, 1991). Based on the evidence available, the countries that had boycotted the 1956 Olympic Games, although showing support for their allies, had little to no impact on any of the aforementioned reasons behind the boycott. Instead, it is suggested that only resulted in the removal of each nation's athletes' chance to compete on the world stage.

Boycott of the XVIII Olympiad in Tokyo, Japan (1964)

In 1964, China continued its pattern of boycotting the Olympic Games by boycotting the Games of the XVIII Olympiad in Tokyo, Japan, and they were joined by both North Korea and Indonesia. The reason for this boycott was due to the IOC banning athletes who were involved in the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFo), which were set up to counter the Olympics (Field, 2014). GANEFo made it clear that politics and sport were intertwined with their event, a point of contention for the IOC. Interestingly, however, politics were absent completely in documents issued by the GANEFo Preparatory Conference (Connolly, 2012).

GANEFo's aim was to "constitute all countries opposing imperialism and colonialism and struggling for justice and prosperity" (*Imperialist Intrigues in Olympic*

Games, 1963; Schuman, 2013). It was the governments that the GANEFO executives were targeting to get involved as opposed to sport committees which ended up with 51 participating nations for the first official Games (GANEFO I) that took place in 1963 in Jakarta, Indonesia (Schuman, 2013). The direct hit at the IOC for creating an event run similarly to the Olympic Games, including the format, goals and the idea of friendly, equal competition to be held every four years (Schuman, 2013) was a result of Indonesian President Sukarno stating that the IOC was not following Olympic ideals (Schuman, 2013), but the idea of the Olympics that Pierre de Coubertin imagined and laid out were in line with what he and GANEFO were trying to accomplish (Schuman, 2013). GANEFO II, the first Asian GANEFO was held in 1965 and 17 nations participated with over two thousand athletes (Lutan & Hong, 2005).

After GANEFO I and the presence of nations competing internationally that were not recognized by international organizing committees, the IOC decided to ban athletes who competed at GANEFO. Indonesia and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) demanded that their athletes be allowed, but when the IOC refused, the two nations decided to boycott the Tokyo Games (Trumbull, 1964). However, the IOC had previously suspended Indonesia from competing due to the discrimination of Taiwan and Israel in the IV Asiad in 1962 (Connolly, 2012), so there was little utility in their boycott as they were already not allowed to compete. China also had no organizing committee present in the IOC, so the claims of China boycotting 1964 were also moot.

Conclusions

From the information gathered and summarized above, it is evident that there was little, if any, long-term effects on global politics due to the boycotts that took place in the pre-modern era. Although some leeway was made in the IX Olympiad when it came to

female participation in the Olympics, it was not until 80 years later that equality (for the most part) was achieved, and in that time, there were a number of large political movements that aimed directly at gender equality, which is more likely to have made a greater political impact than the boycott did. Some of the large-scale issues that were a reason for the major boycotts (e.g., Suez Canal Crisis) had concluded before the boycott of the Olympics had started, and therefore the lack of involvement from the countries had no political pull when it came to helping resolve the issue at hand.

Boycott of the XXI Olympiad in Montreal, Canada (1976)

Selection of City

In order for Montreal to win the rights to host the Games in 1976, the city had to compete against Los Angeles, United States and Moscow, Russia. Hours before the decision was made by the IOC, the potential cities were asked to bring forward their financial plans for the Games (Fresco, 2016). This was a relatively easy task for both the American and Russian bid committees to obtain financial guarantees from their governments, however, Montreal had just hosted the Montreal Exposition in 1967 and many Canadians did not want their tax dollars going to another major event (McKenna & Purcell, 1980). Without the backing of the Canadian Government, the municipal council of the City of Montreal and Jean Drapeau, the Mayor of Montréal, knew that a different technique had to be used in order to secure the Games (McKenna & Purcell, 1980).

As opposed to providing the IOC with their financials, Drapeau put Montreal's reputation on the line, stating that in order to keep the amateur nature of the Games, the costs would be kept down and would avoid extravagant costs, while being funded by foreign investments, and a self-funding model, raising money through private fundraising (Fresco, 2016). With the confidence of the in the City of Montréal and its past history of

challenges met, it was in the second round of voting that Montreal was chosen to host the 1976 Summer Olympic Games.

Reason for Boycott/Political Issues

By the time that the Montreal Olympics were taking place, apartheid in South Africa had been officially going on for almost 30 years, and by the late 1960s was the only Western nation that approved the segregation of individuals based on race, specifically within sport (Booth, 2003). As the International Sporting Federations (ISF) took note of the racist policies that were put forth by the South African government they started to ban South Africa from partaking in sport competitions. By the early 70s, the nation and all of their athletes were banned from almost all sport competitions. However, one sport in which there were no restrictions on South Africa's participation was rugby (Booth, 2003).

One of the largest rugby nations is New Zealand, whose team, the All Blacks, famously travelled to and toured numerous nations throughout their history. They first toured South Africa in 1961, where the South African government noted they were only available to participate in their country if only white players participated (Booth, 2003; Lock, 1976). This angered the New Zealand Rugby Union and they refused to tour South Africa again until their Māori and Samoan players were allowed to compete, which did not happen until 1970 (Booth, 2003; Rankin, 2007; Burns, 1976). Despite South Africa allowing New Zealand's "non-white" players permission to compete, the absence of diversity within their own national team (the Springboks) was still lacking (Rankin, 2007). New Zealand's next tour in South Africa after this allowance was in 1976, which caused a significant backlash within the general public. At the time, the United Nations had called for a complete prohibition of international sport for South Africa due to the

apartheid regime they were in (Rankin, 2007). New Zealand ignored this call and continued on with their tour of the country, which led to a political uproar and many protests took place as a way for countries to express their anger and disapproval towards the situation. The largest international protest was the boycott of the XXI Olympiad in Montreal that took place throughout July in 1976 [Wenn, Schaus & Mason, 2007; LA84, (n.d.)].

Despite the calls for a boycott by (mostly) African nations if New Zealand were able to compete in the Montreal Olympic Games, the IOC and New Zealand's IOC representative, Lance Cross, felt as if their hands were tied (Cady, 1976d). Although they are one of the largest international sporting events that exist, the IOC felt as if they had no say or pull in the situation due to the fact that Rugby (at the time) was not an Olympic sport (Wenn, Schaus & Mason, 2007; Cady, 1976c). In addition, the Olympic charter states that "any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement" (International Olympic Committee, 2011). As apartheid was a government policy in South Africa, there was very little that the IOC could do in order to get involved without going against the regulations they set out within their own Olympic Charter. The IOC had already banned South Africa from being invited to participate due to the restrictions put on sport participation by the individual international sport federations, and this included the pre-Olympic competitions held in Montreal in 1975 (*South Africa not wanted at pre-Games event*, 1975). Thus, there was no way for the IOC to govern what New Zealand could participate in outside of those events recognized by the

IOC, which resulted in nations following through and deciding to go ahead with the boycott of the XXI Olympiad (Wenn, Schaus & Mason, 2007).

Despite New Zealand being the central figure and thus the reason for the Montreal boycotts, it should be noted that 25 other countries had competed in South Africa or in events where South African athletes were allowed to participate (Cady, 1976d). Leaders of African nations who took part in the boycotts had noted that the main reason for the backlash against New Zealand specifically was that the Government of New Zealand helped directly by subsidizing the sports tours (Cady, 1976d). It was also believed that there were two objectives for the boycott: “(1) to embarrass South Africa at the biggest forum there is and (2) to punish the segregationist society by ending the New Zealand rugby tours that play a role in the sports fantasies of South Africans,” (Times Wire Service, 1976). Regardless of the social implications there may have been, the decision to protest was based on a political stance that many nations took, as well as a goal to change political issues and decisions. Therefore, this would classify the Montreal 1976 boycott as a political boycott opposed to a social boycott.

Countries that Boycott

Due to the presence of New Zealand in South Africa for a sporting event, while the rest of the world collectively decided to shun them from competition, 28 countries decided to boycott the Summer Olympic Games in Montreal in 1976. They were:

Algeria, Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Upper Volta, and Zambia (Cady, 1976e; Allen, 1976a; *Effect of Africa's boycott of Montreal*, 1977).

“It’s unfortunate this decision had to be made at the 11th hour. But we cannot sacrifice principle for the sake of getting gold,” noted the chairman of Kenya’s national sports

council, Isaac Lugonzo (Cady, 1976b). Zambia's delegation leader, Musa Keni Kasonka, noted that the team was making reservations to leave soon after the Games started noting that they were "on the front line of the whole apartheid thing. Any nation that condones that, we just can't take part with them." (Cady, 1976b).

Of these countries, Cameroon, Egypt, and Morocco had initially started competing in the events at the Olympic Games but pulled out after a couple of days (Cady, 1976e). When asked about their decision to leave the Games after they had already started, Jean-Claude Ganga from the Congo Republic stated that "...we're sorry for Canada. We must leave. What can we win more than our dignity?" (Cady, 1976c).

In addition to these countries, eight other countries boycott the XXI Olympiad as well in order to stand up and support their allies. These countries were:

Afghanistan, Albania, Burma, El Salvador, Iraq, Guyana, Sri Lanka, and Syria [Cady, 1976c; LA84, (n.d.)].

"To merely pay lip service to your opposition to apartheid is not sufficient. It does not give the impetus or carry the true significance," Sir Lionel Luckhoo, the delegation chief of Guyana noted (Cady, 1976c).

Perceptions of the Boycott

Many individuals had ranging emotions when it came to the decision for so many countries to be boycotting one of the biggest international sporting events. These emotions seemed to change based on the role the individual had in relation to the event and the boycott as a whole.

Perceptions from Officials. Sporting and government officials were the main targets of media outlets when it came to looking for reactions to the boycotts. These perceptions were different depending on which side the individuals supported. For

example, IOC officials and others who were involved in international sport were not enthralled with the idea of so many nations not participating.

“Count Jean de Beaumont of France, a long-time IOC member, called the boycott ‘foolish’ and added that some of the protesting nations were ‘not as distinguished now’ as they were before. ‘They’re doing politics,’ the Count said today. ‘But that’s their business.’” (Cady, 1976c).

Dr. Kurt Waldheim, the United Nations Secretary-General, today urged the African nations boycotting the Olympics to return to the Games in a spirit of ‘brotherhood and understanding.’ ‘I recognize the deep and genuine concerns felt by African states,’ he said in New York. ‘At the same time I wish to point out that the Olympic Games have become an occasion of special significance in mankind’s search for brotherhood and understanding.’ (Allen, 1976a).

Even individuals who supported the idea behind the boycott were not supportive of the way in which the boycott commenced and what it meant for their country.

Mr. (Lamine) Diak (a former high jumper and president of the African Athletics Association), for all his firm opposition to apartheid in sports, believes that African participation in the Olympics is vital because it is ‘a peaceful meeting place for the use of the world.’ He claims that Senegal, the Ivory Coast and North African countries knew nothing of a move to boycott the games until they arrived here and that the subject was not brought up when the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa met in Nairobi on May 25. He resents the last-minute pressure brought to bear by the Organization of African Unity upon the various African Governments to withdraw their teams and is critical of the behind the scenes work of Abraham Ordia and Jean-Claude Ganga (Allen, 1976b).

There were also officials who were proud of the nations for taking a stand and were supportive of their decision to boycott.

“The sacrifices made by these countries and their sportsmen is a noble act, which I hope will persuade governments and sports bodies in New Zealand, as well other countries concerned, that verbal condemnation of apartheid is meaningless so long as there is collusion and fraternization with the practitioners of that crime,” stated Leslie O. Harriman, the chairman of the United Nations committee against South Africa’s policy of apartheid or racial segregation (*U.N. Official Calls Boycott 'Noble Act'*, 1976).

Keith Shervington, an official from the Jamaican delegation had noted that they had no word from anybody about their nation joining in the boycott. “We came here to compete and there is nothing to indicate the situation will change” (Cady, 1976d).

New Zealand’s officials had their own opinions about the boycott, sticking to their guns saying that they did not support apartheid and were being targeted when other countries were still also competing against South Africa. Graham Davy, president of New Zealand’s Amateur Athletic Association had said:

In our country sports is autonomous from the government and each sports union is autonomous from any other. The point being that while the government is not in favor of apartheid, there was nothing it could do to demand or influence the rugby union to recall its team (Newhan, 1977).

Isaac Lugonzo, chairman of Kenya’s national sports council, noted that New Zealand in fact did not break any rules as the rugby union did not call for the ostracism of South Africa within rugby and that the boycotting countries were “partly to blame for the erosion of the Montreal Olympics” (Cady, 1976b). “We should have made a positive position much earlier,” Lugonzo noted in response to the number of nations that pulled out after teams had already travelled to Montreal (Cady, 1976b).

Perceptions from Athletes. Arguably, the individuals who were most affected by the boycotts during the XXI Olympiad in Montreal were the athletes. Both those from nations who were boycotting who were no longer allowed to participate, as well as those who were still able to compete but now had a decreased level of competition, were not

pleased about the decision. Willi Daume, the IOC vice president from West Germany at the time, noted that the athletes were not free in their decisions to not compete. “Many athletes would like to stay. This brings no sympathy for the African cause” (Cady, 1976c).

As more and more nations pulled their athletes after they had either already competed or had travelled to Montreal and were waiting for their events, spirits were low, with many athletes realizing that what they have worked so hard for would not be feasible. It was noted that “members of the teams who ha[d] been forced to withdraw from the Games on orders from their governments... wait[ed] tearfully in the Olympic village for aircraft to take them home,” (Allen, 1976a).

“We’ve had athletes crying like babies in this clinic when they learn their countries are pulling out,” said Maj. Jacques Cherlebois, chief administrator for the medical facility at the Olympic Village. “It’s kind of sad. The athletes from the black African countries come in here for treatment and they’re demoralized. Some of them have been training and getting ready for this for eight years” (Times Wire Services, 1976).

Nations who did not choose to boycott had athletes who held their ground when it came to being asked if they would join the boycott. ““This is our first Olympics and we have no intention of participating in any boycott,’ said Frederick Sowerby, the captain of Antigua’s track and field team” (Cady, 1976d).

Perceptions from the Media. From the point of view of the general public and the media, the Olympic Games undergoing a major boycott such as the one during Montreal 1976 was unheard of and some suggested it could potentially be the end of the international sporting event. An article published on July 20, 1976, in *The New York Times* noted that the concept of the Olympic Games, being a global sporting competition was being “debased before the world’s eyes” (*Destroying the Olympics*, 1976). The

article continues that the boycotts are affecting the athletes and the political expression of the governments “is not what should be asked or expected of athletes striving to excel in their chosen challenge,” (*Destroying the Olympics*, 1976).

There was, however, a sense of understanding from some media outlets as to why the boycott happened and that the nations involved understood the reason for taking such actions. Nevertheless, there was still concern about the wider implications towards international competition.

Since rugby has such intensely political implications in South Africa and New Zealand, it is difficult to fault black Africans for boycotting the Olympics to make their gesture of protest. But can international sport survive in the long run, if such political actions – however well-motivated – become commonplace? (Lock, 1976).

Conclusion of Boycott

Economic sanctions eventually ended apartheid officially in 1994 due, in part, to the formation of a democratic government in the country (Bookwalter et al., 2020). However, there were a number of events that happened in the aftermath of the African boycott of the Montreal Olympiad.

Even before the 1976 Olympic Games ended, the New Zealand rugby team still made their way to South Africa to compete in the tour that was initially scheduled. The idea and threat of over 30 countries pulling out of one of the largest international sporting events in protest of the tour did nothing to prevent the New Zealand All-Blacks from competing in the apartheid regime of South Africa (Burns, 1976). Both countries still continued to compete despite the pushback from others under the guise that the IOC had little to no control over the happenings in the rugby world as it wasn't an Olympic sport.

Unrelated to the boycott itself, the events surrounding the 1976 Montreal Olympic Games caused the IOC to create a rule on the spot that they were able to expel nations

that break Olympic rules as an attempt to stop future governmental influence over the Games (*New Rule by I.O.C. Has 'Teeth'*, 1976). Although created in good faith, in the present it is known that these rules held little veracity as two major boycotts occurred in the Olympiads directly after these rules were put in place. These rules were ultimately used to try to scare other countries and prevent them from participating in future boycotts, which, when the time came, the IOC took a hands-off approach to, and did very little about.

With fewer athletes than reporters attending the XXI Olympiad, there was a surplus of tickets available that Montréal was scrambling to sell (Times Wire Services, 1976). There were so many available that Kean-Pierre Belzile, the head of ticket distribution for Montréal had to make a statement asking the public to forgo purchasing from scalpers due to the price of the original tickets. The Montréal Organizing Committee (COJO: Comité d'Organisation des Jeux Olympiques) also had to take out large newspaper ads to try to sell some of the stock that they had left over for events (Times Wire Services, 1976). Unfortunately, the lack of ticket sales added to the staggering debt that COJO was already in due to the size of the Montréal Olympics, and poor decisions made by the organizing committee. This conclusion of the boycott showed that although the boycott had some effect on the Olympic Games, it more so revolved around the turnout and ticket sales, and not creating societal change.

During the IOC session in Prague the following year, rules were adopted to strengthen those rules already in place that noted that “any future politically motivated withdrawals will be punished” (*Shadow of South Africa hangs over IOC meeting*, 1977). Interestingly, however, during the same meeting, it was determined that there should be

no sporting contact with South Africa as long as their apartheid policies were continued. It should be noted that the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Robert Muldoon, also signed this declaration (*Shadow of South Africa hangs over IOC meeting*, 1977).

There was also a call for the exclusion from other competitions against South African athletes during this time. Most widely known was that a number of American gymnasts were to travel to South Africa to participate in a competition at the end of their Olympic showing (Lock, 1976; Times Wire Services, 1976). Although New Zealand was the country targeted for the major boycott, other nations such as Britain, France, Australia, and the United States were actively allowing competition with South African athletes (Lapchick, 2009). New Zealand took much of the blame even though many countries were still actively sending athletes to compete against South African athletes after the many calls for banishment from participation. There was a lack of reciprocation and calls for boycotts against other nations were non-existent.

Eventually the focus of the boycotts returned to fighting for the removal of South African athletes from international sporting events and those from New Zealand were rarely the focus of boycotts going forward. By the time the 1976 Olympic Games had ended, it was determined by The Supreme Council for Sport in Africa that it would end the boycott of New Zealand and allow their athletes to compete both in the upcoming World and Commonwealth Games (Newhan, 1977).

The council said it was taking this step because it had received a letter from New Zealand prime minister Robert Muldoon spelling out his country's distaste for apartheid and because some of the black African nations, such as Kenya, felt their athletes were being handicapped by not being able to compete against such New Zealand stars as John Walker, Rod Dixon, and Dick Quax (Newhan, 1977).

Boycotts of international sporting events continued due to the lack of change in sporting links and governmental policies. The Commonwealth Games, held in Edmonton, Alberta in 1978 were also subjected to the threat of boycotts from African countries due to New Zealand's continued ties to the apartheid regime in South Africa (*Warning of another boycott by Africans*, 1976; *Committee not daunted by boycott threat*, 1976). The declaration that New Zealand eventually signed at the IOC meeting in Prague in 1977 was highlighted as not being 'enough' to satisfy the South-African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SANROC), arguing that action must be taken instead (*Shadow of South Africa hangs over IOC meeting*, 1977; *Warning of another boycott by Africans*, 1976). With the possibility of another boycott taking place, the Canadian government finally took a firmer stance against apartheid in the time between the XXI Olympiad in Montreal and the 1978 Commonwealth Games (Macintosh et al., 2014). After two long years, the Commonwealth's leaders established the Gleneagles Declaration: a document following in the steps of the Declaration of Commonwealth Principles recognizing the "diverse racial nature of the Commonwealth. It noted that sporting contact with countries practicing apartheid served to 'condone this abhorrent policy' (Macintosh et al., 2014; Payne, 1991). This, paired with a final push from Nigeria to get other countries to boycott the Games, resulted in only three African Commonwealth countries deciding to not compete in 1978 including Nigeria, Uganda and Botswana (Macintosh et al., 2014).

Threats also continued for African nations to boycott future Olympiads if New Zealand remained able to participate in the Games. Tanzania put out a statement noting that African countries would reconsider their participation in the Olympic Games if countries with "sporting links with South Africa were not barred" (*African Olympics ban*

'may be renewed', 1976). The statement also noted that the "IOC has ranged itself with the forces encouraging the violation of its own principles," (*African Olympics ban 'may be renewed'*, 1976).

In 1977, a coalition of 15 groups, representing the political, religious, sports and civil rights sectors was created in order to help "hammer away" at apartheid (Amdur, 1977). The main idea of the American Coordinating Committee for Equality in Sport and Society (ACCESS) was that the large number of groups would support one another, and a policy was approved to end all team competitions between the United States and South Africa (Amdur, 1977). ACCESS's work resulted in boycotts in the sports that had still not barred South Africa from their competitions, being mostly tennis, rugby, golf and boxing (Morgan, 2017). ACCESS and their work in fighting apartheid from the perspective of sporting events remained intact until the end of apartheid (Morgan, 2017).

Despite apartheid continuing into the 1990s in South Africa, there is very little noted about events that happened in the 1980s when it came to the link between sport and apartheid. International federations continued to exclude South Africa from being a part of their groups, but there were no major events that took place within the sporting world in the 1980's regarding apartheid as other major political occurrences were taking place. Tensions did rise in the late 1980s in South Africa which lead to uprisings in cities and school boycotts, and lead to a lack of sport focus at this time (Keech & Houlihan, 1999). This combined with the economic sanctions and infighting within the country eventually lead to the degradation of their government and a change to a democratic government by 1994 (Bookwalter et al., 2020; Keech & Houlihan, 1999).

The “Two Chinas” Boycott in 1976

Another boycott that was ongoing was what has been coined the “two Chinas” issue. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) had initially requested that the Canadian government bar the Republic of China (Taiwan; ROC) from the Olympic Games (Chan, 1985). In an attempt to compromise with the PRC, the Canadian government and organizing committee would require Taiwanese athletes to compete without any reference to “China” (Chan, 1985). The IOC had to intervene and noted that this would be against Olympic principles, eventually concluding that Taiwan could compete under Taiwan-ROC (Chan, 1985).

The PRC, at this time, were still withdrawn from the Olympics but were not content with Canada in allowing the ROC to be recognized as their own independent nation and allowed to participate as such (Chan, 1985; Trumbull, 1976). Taiwan withdrew from the Games as well hours before the Olympic Flame was carried into the city due to the IOC’s insistence that the official name they competed under was ‘Taiwan’ as opposed to the ROC (Cady, 1976a).

After the 1976 Olympics, the IOC took it upon themselves to be proactive and find a solution to this issue, as the PRC wanted to re-enter the Olympics. In 1979, it was decided that the PRC would be recognized as the Chinese Olympic Committee and the ROC would be recognized as the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (Chan, 1985; Amdur, 1979). The ROC was not happy about this decision and tried to file two lawsuits against the IOC, both of which were unsuccessful, and a formal agreement was signed in 1981 (Chan, 1985; *IOC Solves China Dispute*, 1981). When it came to Taiwan, “Lord Killanin, President of the IOC called the Taiwanese decision ‘regrettable’ but beyond the

control of his group now” (Cady, 1976a). The political issues surrounding both China and Taiwan are very complicated, and still continue to this day.

Boycott of the XXII Olympiad in Moscow, Soviet Union (1980)

Selection of City

The selection of the city for the 1980 Olympiad outwardly seemed to be a straightforward affair, but there was more under the surface to the selection. Throughout the 1970s, when the IOC held their meetings to select the host cities for the 1976, 1980, and 1984 Summer Games, there were only three cities that put their hats in the ring; Montreal, Canada (who hosted 1976), Moscow, Soviet Union and Los Angeles, United States (Sarantakes, 2009). This made the IOC’s job quite easy, and it was decided each of the three would get to host one of the upcoming Summer Olympics. There was pushback from the American public, which caused Denver, the selected host city for the 1976 Winter Olympics to pull out, thus diminishing the standing of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) in the eyes of the IOC (Sarantakes, 2009).

When the IOC assembled in Vienna to choose the host cities for 1980, Lake Placid, United States was the only city still with a viable bid to host the Winter Olympic Games (Sarantakes, 2009). When it came to Los Angeles and Moscow presenting their bids, it was evident based on the questions the IOC asked the Soviet delegation that there was a lot that had to be considered given the political climate at the time and it was a decision that the IOC would not take lightly (Sarantakes, 2009; Pound, 2004). With the United States already set to host one set of Olympic Games in 1980 and the previous Summer Olympic Games taking place in North America, the selection and “the vote in favour of Moscow was almost unanimous,” (Killanin, 1983).

Reason for Boycott/Political Issues

The boycott of the XXII Olympiad, unlike that of the XXI Olympiad, had been pondered and thought out for years before the resulting boycott eventually took place. It was first in the mid-1970s that the thought to boycott the 1980 Olympic Games was brought forward, citing Soviet violations of human rights during this time as being the leading justification for the proposed boycott (Tulli, 2016). Many individuals, as soon as the 1980 host city was announced, felt it was not appropriate to hold the Games in Moscow given “the repressive nature of Soviet power” and that “the Soviets had lost the right to host the Games” (Tulli, 2016).

Despite many attempts, there was nothing set in stone when it came to boycotting the 1980 Olympic Games. This changed in late 1979 after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and the Soviet-Afghan War began (Jahn, 2019; Guttman, 2002; Pound, 2004). What became the longest and most expensive military operation in Soviet history (Hoodbhoy, 2005), was the point that pushed a large number of nations, led by the United States, to boycott the Olympics that were set to take place in Moscow the following summer. It did not take long for many to condemn the action and demand the Soviet Union’s withdraw from Afghanistan. For example, in January 1980, Soviet nuclear physicist and human rights activist, Andrei Sakharov, officially called for a boycott of the XXII Olympiad due to the extreme human rights violations that the Soviets were inflicting on the people of Afghanistan (Gordin, 2022; Rhéaume, 2008). Sakharov was soon exiled from the Soviet Union for his criticism of the regime (Rhéaume, 2008); however, his actions had given nations a point to ‘piggyback’ on to, in order to showcase their contempt with what the Soviet Union was doing.

The invasion of Afghanistan was what Joseph M. A. H. Luns, the secretary general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), called a “flagrant violation of international law and a threat to peace” (Vinocur, 1980). “The situation was the ‘the first time that the Soviet Union had used its military power directly and massively in a country not belonging to the Soviet bloc.’ Mr. Luns said the situation required ‘solidarity and unity of purpose and decision among the allies’” (Vinocur, 1980).

On January 14th, 1980, these countries opposed to the Soviet invasion voted during a United Nations General Assembly, to join Sakharov’s appeal and condemned the Soviet Union’s invasion. The resolution was passed in a vote of 104 condemning the invasion and demanding their withdrawal, to 18 against, with 18 absentees (Amstutz, 1986; Eaton, 2016). With a push from the United States, the Soviets biggest political opponent at the time, to boycott the Olympics was becoming stronger and stronger. The Carter Administration continuously adopted anti-Soviet policies that Congress continued to support (Tulli, 2016), and boycotting the Olympic Games was going to be another way Carter showcased his contempt of the Soviets. The decision to boycott the Olympics was made without discussing the move with the USOC. It was explained to President Carter by Lloyd Cutler, Presidential Counsel, that he did not have the legal authority to prevent U.S. athletes from competing in the Olympic Games and that he had no ability to take the Olympic Games from Moscow (Hedgpeth, 2019). The reason for this was due to the fact that the invitation to attend the Olympics is sent to the NOC and not the government. The only option Cutler had noted would allow Carter to request that the USOC not send their qualified athletes to Moscow unless they removed their forces from Afghanistan (Sarantakes, 2011). Carter, however, discovered that the government indirectly could

restrict the athletes from participating by not issuing visas and blocking flights during this time (Harrigan, 1980). Initially the idea of the boycott was to deter the Soviets from continuing their invasion as “the idea of deterrence is not to win war, but to prevent war by creating a believable resistance to the adversary’s attempts to use force,” (Lewis, 1980).

On January 20th, 1980, the President of the United States announced his definitive decision. If the Soviet Union did not pull their troops from Afghanistan within a month (by February 20th, 1980), the United States would boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games (Tulli, 2016).

...neither the American people nor I would support the sending of an American team to Moscow with Soviet invasion troops in Afghanistan. I have sent a message today to the USOC spelling out my own position, that unless the Soviets withdraw their troops within a month from Afghanistan that the Olympic games be moved from Moscow to an alternative site, or multiple sites, or postponed or cancelled (Carter, 1980).

There were a number of other nations, including Canada, Britain and Italy who joined forces with the Americans almost immediately when it came to calling for a boycott of the XXII Olympiad in Moscow (Jefferys, 2012; Tulli, 2016), where in other nations, mainly in Europe, there was more consideration to the boycott issue and what that meant for their nations.

The Soviets were well aware of the threat of the impending boycott if they continued their invasion of Afghanistan. However, the Soviet Communist Party believed that the IOC would remain uninvolved in the political side of the issue similar to how they did in both 1956 with the Hungarian Revolution and 1968 with the invasion of Czechoslovakia, so there was no attempt to remove themselves from Afghanistan [Secretariat: Planning response to “hostile” campaign against participation in the

Summer 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow. 29 JANUARY 1980 (ST 195/3), 2019].* By the time the American-set deadline had passed, there had still been no attempt made by the Soviet Union to remove its troops.

From the point of view of the Carter Administration, this meant that there would be no athletes from the United States competing in the Moscow Olympics in 1980. The USOC was still not on board with the boycott, and the President of the USOC, Robert Kane, told the IOC that they were still willing to send a team to Moscow if there was a change in the political climate and the Soviets chose to remove themselves (American Embassy Memorandum to Secretary of State, 2013a). Discussions began within governments to contemplate whether or not the 1980 Olympic Games could be held in an alternative location. Montreal, the site of the previous Summer Olympic Games, was debated for a brief period (*U.S. Expects Backing By 50 to 60 Countries For Olympics Boycott*, 1980). Noting the logistical problems with relocating the Games in such a short time frame, Kane had expressed, ‘I really don’t believe it’s feasible to have the Games in any other site in 1980,’ (Tolchin, 1980). Warren M. Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State, quickly disagreed noting “I think it is possible to find an alternate site, if the will were there to do it” (Tolchin, 1980). There was also a push to keep one permanent home for each set of Games. Greece, where the Olympics began, for the Summer Games (Sulzberger, 1980; Browning, 1980), and a “neutral country such as Switzerland or Austria” (Sulzberger, 1980) for the Winter Games.

The International Olympic Committee did not want another major boycott during an Olympiad, especially given that experienced at the Montreal 1976 Olympic Games. At the same time that Kane had told the IOC that the USOC was still open to participating,

IOC President, Lord Killanin, had met with U.S. President Jimmy Carter to note that the Olympics would not be postponed or held in an alternative location (American Embassy Memorandum to Secretary of State, 2013b). In this meeting, held eight days before the May 24th deadline to respond to the Moscow Olympics invitation, Carter noted that the U.S. was going to continue the promotion of the boycott and urge other nations to boycott the Olympic Games as well (American Embassy Memorandum to Secretary of State, 2013b).

The Carter Administration recognized they had to do more in order to prevent the USOC from sending athletes. Kane and the USOC continuously tried to find ways to allow the athletes to still have the opportunity to participate in the Olympic Games. This effort was echoed by other nations, as it was the governments making the decisions to agree to the impending boycott without consultation of their respective NOC (Rice, 2021). Athletes were also doing what they could to publicize they were not in support of the boycott. Many athletes, and civilians, filed lawsuits against the United States government prohibiting border control to stop athletes at the border if a boycott were to happen (Shinnick, 1982). The sole travel agency for the Moscow Olympics in New York “went to Federal Court to prevent nearly 11,000 Americans from losing money they had paid for air fares and accommodations,” (Hunter, 1980).

After a significant battle, through financial coercion and blackmail, policy changes and being pushed to a place where the destruction of the USOC may have been imminent (Hedgpeth, 2019), the USOC eventually had to secede their attempts to allow their athletes to compete in Moscow for the 1980 Olympic Games. This, in turn, led to

many other countries preventing their athletes from participating in the 1980 Olympic Games as well.

Countries that Boycott

The 1980 Moscow Olympic Games were the smallest Olympic Games since 1956 (Statista Research Department, 2022; See Figure 4 below) with only 80 nations participating. In protest of the Afghanistan invasion by the Soviet regime, there were 67 invited nations that decided to not participate in the Olympics (Moscow 1980, n.d.).

These nations were:

Albania, Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Bolivia, Canada, Caymen Islands, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Chinese Taipei, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Haiti, Honduras, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Malawi, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mauritius, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands Antilles, Niger, North Yemen, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Qatar*, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, South Korea, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United States, Uruguay, Virgin Islands, West Germany and Zaire. (Freudenheim & Slavin, 1980; McFadden, 1980; Whitney, 1980; Sulzberger, 1980; Reich, 1980b).

Qatar's recognition within the IOC came too late to be invited, but they also did not participate in the 1980 Olympic Games.

There were a number of nations who still participated in the XXII Olympiad but protested what the Soviet regime was doing in other ways. There were seven nations who decided to not participate in the opening ceremony but still compete in the games:

Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, San Marino, and Switzerland

There were five nations where the athletes participated under the Olympic flag (Guttman, 2002):

Australia, Andorra, Denmark, Ireland, and Puerto Rico.

There were three nations who competed under the flag of their NOC as opposed to their nations flag:

Spain, Portugal, and New Zealand.

Finally, both Great Britain and Ireland's governments allowed each individual national sporting federation to decide if their athletes would participate in the 1980 Moscow Olympics, as opposed to making one call for the entire nation (Young, 1980).

An unresolved issue that continued from 1976 was the issue of two Chinas. Both Taiwan and the Democratic Republic of China did not participate in the 1980 Summer Olympic Games (Matthews, 1980).




Figure 4: Number of Participating Countries in the Summer Olympic Games from 1896 to 2021

Perceptions of the Boycott

Perceptions from Officials. The perception of the boycott from the official's side is fairly split depending on what type of official they were at the time. From a political standpoint, the vast majority of officials (in Western countries) were in favour of boycotting. The minute President Carter made his opinion known; the majority of his

office was there supporting his idea to boycott. Secretary of State, Cyrus R. Vance was straight forward in stating that the “United States should not participate in the Moscow Olympics if Soviet troops remain in Afghanistan” (Klose, 1980). Officials knew the impact an Olympic Games had on a country, especially the Soviet Union and were determined to ensure that enough countries boycott in order to make it effective enough to make a difference. “They will sorely miss their Olympics and they will wonder what happened” noted Representative Don Ritter of Pennsylvania, who spent time in Moscow in 1967-1968 as a scientific exchange fellow (Hunter, 1980). Members of the United States government started flying across the world to espouse their views and attempt to garner support from other governments. “White House Counsel Lloyd N. Culter, flew to London... to try to persuade Follows and other British Olympic authorities at least to hold off their decision.” (Reich, 1980b).

Support continued to grow quickly. Canadian support was quickly garnered with Mark MacGuigan, External Affairs Minister telling the Canadian House of Commons that “withdrawal from the Olympics is the clearest and most effective way available to make plain to the leaders of the Soviet Union that the world condemns the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its defiance of international demands for its withdrawal” (Giniger, 1980). However, unlike the United States, it was determined that “the Government would not use coercion to prevent athletes from going to Moscow,” but instead there would be no financial support provided to athletes who decided to attend (Giniger, 1980).

President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya was in line with these ideas as well noting that “it would be most inappropriate for any nonaligned nation to attend the Moscow

Olympics while Soviet troops are in Afghanistan,” (*Kenyan Urges Olympic Boycott*, 1980).

The United States were extremely let down by certain countries who did not decide to boycott, specifically Italy and Britain (Weisman, 1980). The next idea was to target the athletes and sports federations themselves. “The Carter Administration... plans to seek greater support from individual sports federations in those countries whose Olympic committees are planning to participate in the Games” (Weisman, 1980). This was a cause that the government grasped on to, and in the midst of the Cold War, felt it was a “one up” on the competition to be successful in this attempt.

One of the officials who was turned to the most, and a vocal critic of the Olympic boycott was President of the USOC, Robert Kane. When he first heard of the idea of a boycott from President Carter, his response was:

I’m a little bit shocked by his statements. I wonder if he understood all of the implications... Certainly, if the Persian Gulf becomes an endangered area, and lives would be placed in jeopardy by going to Moscow, no one in the Olympic of staging the Games. But I hate to see the games used as a ploy, and I don’t favour the concept of an Olympic boycott (Amdur, 1980).

Kane and Don Miller, the executive director of the USOC had sent a telegram to President Carter expressing their opposition to the boycott, which ultimately was never answered or acknowledged by the President or any of his staff (Amdur, 1980).

Other sport officials, including Ed Williams, the chairman of the Athletes Advisory Council, felt similarly. “You can’t ignore the Soviet aggression... I would hope we would go on record as supporting the President, but I also hope that the boycott is not one of the sanctions he would use.” (Amdur, 1980).

American sports and business executive, and chairman of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, Peter Ueberroth, later wrote in his book “why Carter thought the Soviets would alter their foreign policy because we threatened to ruin their track meet was beyond me” (Ueberroth, 1985).

Perceptions from Athletes. From an athlete perspective, the boycott elicited the most outcry as they tried to voice their opinions and be heard. Many of the athletes had sided with the USOC and wanted to compete. They had trained their entire lives for this moment and believed that the political side should be left more to the governments to determine new policies rather than use them as pawns.

Eamonn Coghlan, an Irish miler, offered his opinion on the matter by stating that “no athletes are going to boycott an Olympics. It’s the governments who will boycott and governments have no power,” (*Athletes Give Some Opinions on Matter of an Olympic Boycott*, 1980). Dr. Lawrence Klecatsky, one of the United States’ top rowers echoed this thought process as he said “I don’t think we should boycott... The Olympics are supposed to be above all that. It’s man against man, not country against country” (Daly, 1980).

In this same idea, there were groups of athletes that put out statements highlighting their disagreements concerning participating in a boycott. At an indoor track and field championship that took place at Madison Square Garden in 1980, a group of 40 athletes “voted unanimously to oppose a boycott by their country of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow.” (*US athletes to defy Carter Olympic boycott*, 1980). Jimmy Carnes, the president of the Athletic Congress and an Olympic coach stood by these athletes and

said that he would “like to help support the athletes in every opportunity to help them participate in the Olympics” (*US athletes to defy Carter Olympic boycott*, 1980).

Another statement, drafted by cyclists, handball players, marksmen, weightlifters, and women’s volleyball players in the United States that “the use of an Olympic boycott is not in the best interest of world peace” (Reich, 1980a).

A group of ten British Olympic medalists also put forward a statement against the boycott and noted that “boycotting Moscow would be to make an essentially political statement in a way that will destroy the entire basis of sport enshrined in our society and culture” (*Medallists oppose boycott of Olympics*, 1980).

A few athletes were able to predict exactly what the outcome would be if they were to participate in a boycott, while set to host the Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles four years later. “I fail to see what a boycott would accomplish. If we boycott, what would be the effect on the ’84 games in Los Angeles?” questioned Al Oerter, a four-time Olympic champion in discus throw (Amdur, 1980). Mark Spitz, an American gold medalist swimmer “came out against the boycott, saying he feared it would boomerang into a boycott of the Los Angeles games in 1984 and that, in any case, it would not have the desired impact on the Soviet Union” (Reich, 1980b).

Despite what seemed to be an overwhelming number of athletes who wanted to participate and were completely against the boycott, there were athletes from western countries who supported the idea of boycotting in order to decrease the supposed influence that it would have on appearing to support what the Soviet Union was doing. Terry Bellinger, a member of the United States men’s Olympic soccer team noted that his view was “that the Olympics is a great thing for a lot of athletes, but at the same time I

don't think it's right to go to Moscow and give the Russians all the business and exposure" (*Athletes Give Some Opinions on Matter of an Olympic Boycott*, 1980). Similarly, Craig Masback, an Olympic hopeful in track and field noted that his "gripes are not against the Soviet athletes. It's against their Government and [his] presence in Moscow would lend legitimacy to that Government" (Daly, 1980).

Regardless of what side the athletes fell on, whether to boycott or not, there was one aspect that appeared to be understood by all. That is that politics are tied to sport and the Olympic Games, and it is almost inevitable that they, as athletes, will be used as pawns to further the objectives of their countries' governments.

"It seems to me that politics has always entered into athletics, and I don't think that's fair, but in a big event like the Olympics, it's inevitably going to be involved and athletes are going to be used as levers," said Tracy Caulkins, an American swimmer who was 17 years old at the time (*Athletes Give Some Opinions on Matter of an Olympic Boycott*, 1980). "I don't like using the Olympic Games as a foreign-policy tool. I'd like to think there were other ways to show our displeasure and to put pressure on the Soviets," stated world class fencer, John Nonna (Daly, 1980). This was again echoed by New Jersey weightlifter, Bob Giordano, who noted that "the very foundations of the Olympic Games began as an instrument to fostering peace. That fundamental ideal will be destroyed by the institution of an Olympic boycott" (*US athletes to defy Carter Olympic boycott*, 1980).

It was clear that many believed the Olympics were used as a way to showcase political ideals, despite what the IOC argued was correct based on the Olympic charter. Australian gold medal swimmer, Dawn Fraser, put this thought out when she noted that:

People forget that it is Moscow that has been nominated as the host city, and not Russia as the host nation. And if you ask will they use the Olympic Games as a propaganda exercise, my answer is that we did exactly that when Australia hosted the 1956 Olympic Games in Melbourne. Every country does it (*Olympic gold swimmer tries to sink boycott*, 1980).

Again, this sentiment was emulated by Valery Borzov, a former Soviet Olympic sprinter who said:

The leaders of the American Administration are threatening a boycott. You get the impression that they have got things mixed up: it is not Carter and his officials who are invited to Moscow, it is the athletes of the United States of America. And those who support the Olympic movement have reminded its ill-wishers of this in no uncertain terms (*Soviet Acknowledges Olympics Boycott Bid Is Under Way in West* 1980).

All of this can be summarized by Masback, who said “throughout the history of the Olympics, politics and sports have always been intertwined, and anyone who denies that is simply molding history for their own convenience” (Daly, 1980).

Perceptions from the Media. Unlike the past two subsections, the media at the time seemed to be overwhelming against boycotts, while others voiced their disapproval of the way the American government went about the development of the boycott. Many pointed out that there is no legal way the government could stop athletes from competing and believed that the government should not have a say at all as to whether the boycott stops athletes from participating.

Michael Harrigan of The New York Times wrote:

As a practical matter, our Government has virtually no power to enforce a boycott of the Olympics – unless the Government canceled all American visas to travel to the Soviet Union. The United States Olympic Committee has been a private corporation since its inception; since 1950 it has held a Federal Charter. Moreover, consider the suits against the Government from prospective Olympic champions who plan to use their Olympic gold medals to cash in on commercial contracts. If every country applied its own political principles to political goals unrelated to the Olympics, international sport would be destroyed. The Olympics are, at least, one

way in which countries may be nationalistic, political and aggressive without danger to each other (Harrigan, 1980).

Harry Edwards, who attempted to organize a boycott during the 1968 Summer Olympics in Mexico City of black athletes also commented that:

The President's most fundamental error in the boycott situation perhaps occurred at the outset when he failed to seek the counsel of people with proven analytical expertise in the realm of international sport-politics – especially those who have had substantial experience in organizing Olympic boycotts and protests. Despite the President's good intentions, this error could very well turn out to be “bush-league” sport-politics in every possible sense of the characterization (Edwards, 1980).

Edwards is recognizing that the strength of the boycott would have been much greater if those in sport administration roles (such as Robert Kane) would have been asked for insight ahead of time. The support of the athletic world and athletic officials would have ensured the primary message of the boycott to be more effective if it were to work at all. Edwards continued that he felt the boycott would not “free Afghanistan of one Red Army soldier, nor will such a boycott induce the Kremlin to abandon its military occupation of that country” (Edwards 1980).

Another reporter, David Lamb, noted that the Carter Administration's attempt to get any African nations on board with the boycott by having boxer Muhammad Ali tour the continent was a sad attempt to get them to agree.

If the White House had thought Ali's presence would sway any countries toward a boycott, it should have known better. Black Africa will make its decision in its own good time and will go to great lengths to show it is not susceptible to pressure from any American, black or white (Lamb, 1980).

The only real media release that supported the boycott that was found through the referenced resources, was that of the Levi Strauss company, a sponsor of the USOC. “We plan to support U.S. foreign policy. Obviously, if the team does not go to Moscow, we will not go to Moscow” Mary Anne Easley of Levi Strauss noted before commenting that

the company had “planned to outfit American athletes with 700 to 800 sets of clothing” (The Associated Press, 1980).

Conclusion of Boycott

In the eyes of the IOC, and most specifically Lord Killanin, it was believed that the boycott of the XXII Olympiad was unsuccessful.

Little did we realize the Olympic movement and Olympic competitors were to be sacrificed by the ill-advised, unprepared action of the President of the United States of America, who endeavored to sabotage the Olympic Games in Moscow - the Olympic Games, the property of us all here and not that of the Soviet Union. I am glad to say this failed (*Boycott still Rankles, 1981*).

The Soviet Union felt the same way, that the American-lead boycott was unsuccessful and “both privately and publicly Soviet officials are delighted that many more major sporting countries will be competing than they feared” a few weeks before the deadline to accept the Olympic invitation (Binyon, 1980).

There were very few outcomes that came from the boycott of the XXII Olympiad in Moscow, Soviet Union. The main outcome was that of retaliation from the Soviet Union towards the United States for staging the boycott in the first place. The Olympic Games that followed the XXII Olympiad took place in Los Angeles, United States. As the United States were the lead nation in conducting the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, the Soviet Union took advantage of this fact and decided to boycott their Olympic Games (Kobierecki, 2015; Gutmann, 2002). The specifics of this boycott will be discussed in depth in the following section.

The main reason for the boycott – the Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan – was not ‘concluded’ until 1989. On February 15, 1989, the Soviet Union announced that the last of their troops were moving out of Afghanistan (Myers, 2017). Many of the crimes that had occurred during the Soviets time in Afghanistan were covered up by the Soviet media

and caused a lack of knowledge within their nation, as well as misinformation being spread until later on in the war (Myers, 2017). Despite numbers not being exact, it is estimated that over a million Afghanistan casualties were a result, and millions more were displaced from their homes (Myers, 2017). Additionally, throughout the Soviet invasion, different areas within Afghanistan started infighting. Despite the departure of Soviet troops, a civil war continued to rage on throughout Afghanistan, which has resulted in many ongoing issues that are still relevant and present today (Jalali, 2023).

Boycott of the XXIII Olympiad in Los Angeles, United States (1984)

Selection of City

As the decision to award the XXIII Olympiad loomed, there were fewer and fewer countries willing and able to host the Olympic Games. The last three Olympiads all had major issues that held countries back from wanting to invest the large sums of money necessary only to have potential issues emerge and affect the outcome of their Olympic Games (e.g., the 1972 terrorist attacks, 1976 boycott and 1980 boycott). There were initially two bids that had been submitted for the 1984 Summer Olympics: Los Angeles, United States and Teheran, Iran (Kobierecki, 2015).

By the time the IOC held their selection meeting in 1978, Teheran had pulled their bid, and the IOC was only left with the bid from Los Angeles. Having submitted bids and failed on being awarded the Games for the two past summer Olympics, it was felt that they should be given a chance to host the Summer Games (Hill, 1996). As the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan had not happened yet, and there were no set plans to boycott 1980, the IOC believed the selection of Los Angeles was a safe bet. However, despite its intent, the IOC's policy for selecting host cities around seven years in advance of the event allows for major changes in politics to occur (Onyestyák, 2010). Although

there were tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time of the host city selection, the resulting boycotts were difficult for anyone to predict.

Reason for Boycott/Political Issues

Despite what appears to have been a boycott in retaliation of the United States boycotting their Olympiad, the Soviet Union's decision to boycott was not guaranteed and appeared to come fairly last minute. It was first thought that a boycott of the XXIII Olympiad would take place the moment President Carter announced his intentions to pull the United States Olympic team from participating in the XXII Olympiad at the beginning of 1980 (Kobierecki, 2015; Guttmann 2002). Yet these claims were never focused on as the Soviet Union had Olympic Games that they were responsible for hosting and a desire to showcase that they were still strong despite the countries who chose to boycott.

A few weeks after the closing ceremony of the XXII Olympiad, a meeting was held within the Soviet Union that noted their success and suggested that the "best way of showing up the Americans was to show up in Los Angeles and win" (Edelman, 2015). This sentiment was echoed for the years leading up to the 1984 Olympic Games as the Soviets had signed documents and made it seem as if they had every intention to participate in the XXIII Olympiad. Yuri Andropov, the party leader at the time had fully supported Soviet participation (Edelman, 2015). Juan Antonio Samaranch, the new IOC President remained confident, stating that he had received "unofficial word" from the Soviet Union that they would participate in the Games no matter what (Miller, 1996). "I know the Soviet Union, and I know sports in this country, and I know the word boycott does not exist in this country" (*No Soviet Boycott Seen by Samaranch*, 1983). The Soviet NOC made a trip to Los Angeles in December 1983 and signed a protocol noting the

participation of the Soviets in the upcoming Olympic Games (Kobierecki, 2015; Hill, 1996). Marat Gramov, president of the Soviet Sports Committee and Olympic Committee said specifically at the beginning of December that the Soviet Union would compete fully in the 1984 Games (*Soviet Affirms Stand*, 1983).

It was Samaranch's goal to ensure that there was no Olympic Boycott during this Olympiad. He visited the United Nations in 1982 to propose an international convention against boycotting the Olympics (Reich, 1982). This proposal included the idea that NOCs would be independent from control of their government (Reich, 1982).

Uncovered in 2016, in the midst of the Russian Doping Scandal, evidence suggested there was a doping plan in place for the 1984 Olympic Games as well to completely show up the American athletes, officials and general public (Ruiz, 2016). A letter from November 1983 explained exactly how much of each drug the athletes should be taking and how long the drugs will linger in their systems, ensuring that the drug tests athletes were to take would come back clean (Ruiz, 2016). This document showcases that right up until the year of the Games there was every intention of the Soviet Union to send their athletes to the United States to participate in the 1984 Olympic Games.

Unfortunately for the USOC and the IOC, there were a number of events that cause the USSR to lose faith in the organizing committee. One component that led to the boycott of 1984's Summer Olympic Games from the Soviet Union was a resolution passed by the authorities in California to "ban the USSR from participating" (Kobierecki, 2015) after a Soviet Sukhoi Su-15 interceptor aircraft shot down South Korean Airlines Flight 007, which resulted in the deaths of 272 people (Cheney, 2012). Another component that led to the boycott was that Andropov died in early 1984 and was replaced

by Konstantin Chernenko, an Olympic skeptic (Edelman, 2015; Reich, 1984b) which, according to Ueberroth, was when communication and the hope of the Soviets' presence in Los Angeles that summer started to deteriorate (Reich, 1984b). These reasons combined with the creation of anti-Soviet groups within the United States trying to ban Soviet athletes (Kobierecki, 2015; Dolan, 1984), all began to culminate and create doubts within the Soviet government, and thus sparking the idea of boycotting.

It was the idea that Soviet athletes were unsafe that the Soviet Union eventually noted to be their main reason for boycotting the Los Angeles Olympic Games. At the beginning of April 1984, the Soviets began to discuss a boycott based on the anti-Soviet rhetoric and the push for Soviets to not participate in the Games emanating from the United States (Pasko, 2020). At the same time, in a statement they demanded that the IOC ensure the Americans followed the Olympic Charter and provided protection for all participants and guests (Pasko, 2020; Petrakovschi, 2016). "The chief issues are procedures for the entry of the Soviet Olympic delegation, security against anti-Soviet demonstrators and what the Russians perceive as exorbitant costs being demanded for Olympic-related service" (*Boycott by Soviet Appears Unlikely*, 1984). This is the argument that was used to add fuel to the fire and create the reasoning for the Soviet boycott of the XXIII Olympiad in Los Angeles.

The official announcement of the Soviet's decision to boycott came at the beginning of May 1984, after discussions for about a month regarding potential threats and violence towards the Soviet athletes (Kobierecki, 2015). The Russian NOC's statement was:

Chauvinistic sentiments and an anti-Soviet hysteria are being whipped up in the United States. Extremist organizations and groupings of all sorts,

openly aiming to create “unbearable conditions” for the stay of the Soviet delegation and performance by Soviet athletes, have sharply stepped up their activities... Washington has made assurance of late of the readiness to observe the rules of the Olympic charter. The practical deeds by the American side, however, show that it does not intend to ensure the security of all athletes, respect their rights and human dignity, and create normal conditions for holding the games... In these conditions, the National Olympic Committee of the USSR is compelled to declare that participation of Soviet sportsmen in the Games is impossible. (Guttman, 2002; *Text of Soviet Statement on Olympic Games*, 1984).

This statement came after a meeting in Washington that happened at the end of April where the Soviet’s said their concerns about athletes’ safety were considered to be “false accusations” by the U. S. State Department (Schemann, 1984). It was thought, from the perspective of the Soviet National Committee, that this was not a boycott, and instead was them deciding to not attend the Games (*No Boycott but Russians May Still Stay Away*, 1984). “We never use the word boycott and we will never use it. We have no intention of boycotting. We make a difference between boycott and not attending,” exclaimed Gramov (*Moscow’s Statement Shuns Term ‘Boycott’*, 1984).

Despite the efforts of Samaranch, he was unable to change the minds of the Soviet NOC and government before the invitation deadline (Burns, 1984). Instead, the IOC and USOC took to trying to ensure that as many nations still attended the XXIII Olympiad as possible, despite the Soviet’s influence on many communist countries at the time (Pasko, 2020). They noted that they “would give the Los Angeles Games the same support against efforts to extend the boycott to other countries as they gave the U.S.-led boycott in 1980” (Reich, 1984a). It was quickly after the announcement that many countries within the Eastern Bloc “fell in line” and also declared their decision to boycott the Summer Olympic Games alongside the Soviet Union (Hill, 1996; Onyestyák, 2010). This

happening despite Garamov noting that he “guaranteed that the Soviet Olympic committee was not putting pressure on other countries to withdraw” (Miller, 1984a).

“We were planning to go to Los Angeles. If not, we would not have transferred millions of dollars to American television companies and to the American organizers. We would not have sent hundreds of athletes to pre-Olympic meets,” (Schmemann, 1984b) said Gramov. Their idea was seemingly always to participate in the Games until ‘push came to shove’ in the eyes of the Soviets.

Countries that Boycott

Regardless of their attempts, the Soviet Union’s boycott was significantly smaller than that of the United States and their boycott in 1980. However, there were still a number of countries who participated in the boycott including:

Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Ethiopia, Hungary, Iran, Laos, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, South Yemen, Soviet Union, and Vietnam. (Kifner, 1984; *Olympic Boycott is Called Firm*, 1984; *North Korea Joins the Olympic Boycott*, 1984; *Southern Yemen Joins the Olympic Boycott*, 1984; Markham, 1984; *Deadline Passes; 132 in Olympics*, 1984).

There were also four other countries who boycotted the 1984 Summer Olympic Games; however, their boycotts were not related to the Soviet-led one, but instead other issues they had related to the United States. These countries were:

Albania, Iran, Libya, and Upper Volta/Burkina Faso

In the end, there was 132 nations that announced plans to attend the 1984 Olympic Games, a record at the time (*Deadline Passes; 132 in Olympics*, 1984).

Perceptions of the Boycott

Perceptions from Officials. In line with past boycotts, the perception of the boycott in 1984 was divided pretty evenly between governmental officials and athletic officials. Before the decision of the Soviets, President Samaranch was certain that the

USSR would not boycott noting that “they will follow what has always been their policy, they will not mix politics with sport” (*No Soviet Boycott Seen by Samaranch*, 1983). Samaranch’s opinion quickly switched when the decision was made to not participate and he became accusatory towards the Americans saying:

The extremists in California have done enormous harm to the Olympic movement and, of course, to the country that is organizing the Olympic Games. It was their intention – and in this they seem to have succeeded – to insure the nonparticipation of some of the most important nations in the sporting world. It is hardly a matter for congratulation that they have achieved their goal (Burns, 1984).

With the decision to boycott came the feeling of responsibility from other nations in the Eastern Bloc to join the Soviets and boycott the Olympics themselves.

Poland – one of the countries in the Eastern Bloc – had made the decision to follow the Soviets lead. “After voting to follow the Soviet lead, the 45-member Polish Olympic committee said it was ‘fully aware’ its decision was unpleasant for its athletes and ‘for the millions of sports fans in Poland’” (Kifner, 1984). This would be the first time there was no Polish athletes participating in the Olympics since 1924 (Kifner, 1984). Southern Yemen also followed and decided to boycott the XXIII Olympiad citing the “Olympic violations by the American side and the wild hostility campaign against Soviet athletes and those of socialist states and some developing nations” (*Southern Yemen Joins the Olympic Boycott*, 1984). East Germany – a third country partnering with the USSR had made it known that they were not pleased to be joining the boycott. In a statement, they had noted that their “sportswomen and sportsmen have for years intently and ambitiously prepared themselves for the XXIII Olympiad in Los Angeles in the 1984 in order to worthily represent their homeland in the Olympic spirit” (Markham, 1984). “Soviet officials have tried to give the impression that allied countries joining the boycott

are doing so of their own volition” (Schmemmann, 1984b). This, however, was not the case from the point of view of the countries noting that they felt it was mandatory for them, but they were not happy about the decision. “Eastern European diplomats have said that there was strong resentment in their capitals at the demands made by Moscow for a common front” (Burns, 1984).

Soviet officials had made it clear that there was very little the Americans would be able to do to get their participation for the Games ahead of their official decision but made it pretty clear when their intentions switched. Georgi A. Arbatrov, a member of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee said, “I don’t know whether how your Government can do anything,” when he was asked what would have to be done for the Soviets to be willing to participate (*Olympic Boycott is Called Firm*, 1984).

There were many, mostly American, officials who believed that the last-minute call from the Soviets to not attend was intentional. “Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth W. Dam said that the decision by the Soviet Union not to attend the Games was deliberate and that the Soviet Union normally stuck by such decisions” (*Olympics Boycott is Called Firm*, 1984). This sentiment was echoed by many, but as noted based on the available evidence, it appears that the Soviets did actually have every intention to attend the Games before extenuating circumstances changed the leaders’ minds.

When it comes to athletic officials, the majority of them all agreed that the politics that had been making their way into the sporting world was overwhelming and becoming too much. Secretary of the Greek Olympic Committee, Nikos Filaretos, shared that “politics shouldn’t meddle in sport. It’s disastrous when that happens” (Dionne, 1984). William E. Simon, president of the U.S. Olympic Committee added that “The

Olympics are a terribly tempting target for self-serving politicians and the boycott (by the Soviets) was a political decision which reflects the deterioration of relations between our two countries” (Reich, 1984a). “It is the athletes who suffer the most,” said Julian K. Roosevelt, an American member of the IOC executive board (*New Olympic Sanctions*, 1984). This sentiment was one of the most repeated statements amongst sport officials, not only through this boycott, but others as well. “History has proven that the use and abuse of athletes for political purposes only hurts young individuals rather than achieving any political gain. Sports organization and events should not be involved in disputes between governments,” noted Peter Ueberroth (Davis, 1983).

Perceptions from Athletes. Not much attention was given to athletes’ opinions this time around as there were significantly more still able to compete in the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games as opposed to the Olympiad before. Regardless of this, the same idea was repeated over and over by many Western athletes. “Boycotts don’t work. They hurt athletes and don’t help anyone,” stated Canadian high jumper Debbie Brill (Harvey, 1986). Many athletes were also “saddened but not surprised” about the Soviet decision to not compete, including Sebastian Coe, one of Britain’s top athletes and gold medal winners (Butcher, 1984).

Athletes whose countries were partaking in the boycott also showcase their disappointment in the decision. “I had great hopes that things would turn out differently,” said Janusz Piecal, who won a gold medal in the pentathlon at Montreal in 1976 for Poland (Kifner, 1984). “I deeply deplore the fact that political power plays are carried out in the sports arena. For each athlete who starts in Los Angeles, there will remain a pale

aftertaste that someone was missing in his competition,” stated Michael Gross, a West German swimmer, and world-record holder (Dionne, 1984)

Perceptions from the Media. During the lead up to the Olympics, the idea of having a static site for the Olympics has been brought up again with President Karamanlis of Greece renewing his offer for the Olympics to take place in Greece permanently. “The decision had placed in serious jeopardy the future of ‘a unique and age-old institution” (*Karamanlis Renews Games Offer*, 1984). “The best solution would be a single, permanent site: in Greece, where the original Games were held” (*How to Rescue the Olympics*, 1984).

The media and general public’s opinions about the boycott were mostly the same as that of the athletes and athletic officials. “Sport is prestige. Sport has no other goal but to repress the fear the leaders have that they are not recognized as a full-fledged state. They regard gold medals as an assertion of their state sovereignty,” said Johannes Lawrenz, a journalist who emigrated from East Germany (Markham, 1984).

On both sides, reports from the general public were more in favour of participating in the Games than not, despite the intention behind wanting the Soviets to attend. “One middle-aged [Soviet] woman said, ‘I don’t see why we have to endanger our young people, though I guess it would have been nice to compete’” (Schmemann, 1984a). “‘This is not too surprising but a little disappointing because we had a lot of things planned to welcome them here,’ David Balsiger [co-founder of the *Ban the Soviets Coalition*] said” (Dolan, 1984).

Regardless of these opinions, the media could see what government officials could not. “If the decision had belonged to U.S. sports officials in 1980, there would have

been no boycott of the Moscow Olympics. The same is true of Soviet sports officials in regard to the Los Angeles Olympics four years later” (Harvey, 1986).

Conclusion of Boycott

There were a few outcomes that resulted from the boycott, however, none of them lasted too long. The first was the “Friendship Games” that the Soviets hosted to promote “friendship” which made its way into the events motto “Sport, Friendship, Peace” (Malchrowicz-Moško et al., 2017). This event saw 2300 athletes compete from 50 nations (Malchrowicz-Moško et al., 2017), many of which also competed in the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles (*Soviet Bloc Set for Its Games*, 1984). The Soviets wanted to ensure that the events would be open to non-Soviet bloc athletes and was not an alternative to the Olympics (*Alternative for USSR and Other Nations*, 1984). However, this was a one-time event and did not take place again as a competitor to future Olympics. That is until 2023 when it was announced that Russia will hold the second iteration of the Games in 2024, 40 years after the first Games (Burke, 2023).

When it came to the side of the IOC and how they would go about addressing the political landscape that had overtaken the Olympic Games. Many ideas were brainstormed on how to decrease the number of Olympic Games that were being boycott. One such idea was to ban countries from participating in the Olympic Games that immediately followed the ones the boycott. However, this proposal was rejected as the IOC noted that it would affect the athletes more than the nations (*Olympics Will Bar Officials in Boycotts*, 1984). However, the IOC did vote that “if any member did not send a team, beginning with the Calgary or Seoul Games in 1988, sports officials including judges, from that nation would be banned from attending, and the quota of journalists would be cut.” (*New Olympic Sanctions*, 1984).

When it comes to the reasons for the boycott, the anti-Soviet groups seemingly were not mentioned as an issue again. Tensions remained high between both the United States and Russia through the end of the Cold War, and still are not the friendliest, but the boycott itself did very little to ease tensions and instead may have escalated them further. In fact – the Los Angeles Games were seen as a success in the eyes of the Americans as it was the biggest Olympic Games at the time (Statista Research Department, 2022). Furthermore, the United States saw much success on the podium, and they were the first Olympics to turn a profit since 1932 (Augustyn, 2010).

Boycott of the XXIV Olympiad in Seoul, South Korea (1988)

Selection of City

Seoul was one of only two cities who had bid to host the 1988 Summer Olympics, the other being Nagoya, Japan. The decision for Seoul to host came as a surprise to many and was highly contested. North Korea almost immediately began noting that the Korean peninsula was “unsuitable to host the Games” (Mousset et al., 2023).

Reason for Boycott/Political Issues

Tensions between North and South Korea were already high prior to Seoul being awarded the 1988 Summer Games following a vote held on September 30, 1981, at the 84th IOC Session in Baden-Baden, West Germany (Mousset et al., 2023). However, when North Korea demanded to co-host the Games, despite not initially bidding to host the XXIV Olympiad, South Korea and the IOC had to find how to go about dealing with the situation (Mousset et al., 2023). North Korea’s opinion was that due to the presence of the United States in South Korea they planned to “use the Games” to “convey a certain form of American imperialism” (Mousset et al., 2023).

With the past three Summer Olympic Games being boycotted, the IOC was taking any issues that may lead to another extremely seriously. There were predictions of boycotts occurring in 1988 soon after the 1984 Olympiad had concluded (*Boycott call by N Korea*, 1984), again resulting in calls to switch the location of the XXIV Olympiad to a more “neutral” location (*How to Rescue the Olympics*, 1984; *Alternatives to Seoul*, 1984). This was quickly dismissed by Samaranch (*Samaranch Digs in Over Seoul*, 1984). The possibility also made many in the media question if the Olympic Games would be able to survive another boycott, with the idea that the politics that had infiltrated the Games had become too overbearing (*The Next Olympics – If Any*, 1984).

Discussions between the IOC, North and South Korea started to become more regular in late 1984, where the IOC started with offering a joint North and South Korean team, as well as North Korean staging “two or three” individual events (Miller, 1984b). Despite the initial dialogue, North Korea did not want to change from their initial proposal of a 50/50 split. In October 1985, the IOC began discussions with both Korean NOCs to try to come to a compromise (Mousset et al., 2023). The IOC’s goal was to ensure North Korea did not boycott while South Korea was the core host of the Games. This, however, did not happen as North Korea remained set on their demand to evenly split hosting duties (Mousset et al., 2023). The South Korean minister of sports had made it known during meetings that he favored a unified Korean team for the 1988 Olympic Summer Games, despite the many challenges that may come up (*New Olympic Sanctions*, 1984). This, however, never came to fruition.

To ensure some sort of progress was seen, South Korea started to agree on specific preliminary rounds of events taking place in North Korea. This, however, did not

satisfy the North Korean NOC who was still set on the 50/50 split (Mousset et al., 2023). Time and time again, there were attempts to create a plan that would satisfy the North Koreans, until eventually, Samaranch believed that hosting the 1988 Olympics with the participation of them would be impossible (Mousset et al., 2023).

Negotiations continued for years and by 1986 the North Koreans started to take part in compromising and changed their opinions on the number of events they wanted to host in their entirety. The IOC eventually ended up offering four sports from qualifiers to finals to North Korea, which the country agreed to “in principle” but ultimately wanted more (*'88 Boycott Not Feared*, 1987; *In Olympics, Opportunity for Mischief*, 1987). Despite this, there was no set agreement that the two nations with the assistance of the IOC could come to, so the North Koreans decided to officially boycott the Games. Despite the relationship between North Korea and the Soviets, the Soviet Union knew that there would be penalizations against their athletes if they were to boycott another Olympic Games (Radchenko, 2012; *Koreans reopen talks about dividing Games*, 1985). It was also decided in early 1987 amongst the East German government that they would not boycott the XXIV Olympiad if North Korea, one of their allies at the time, were going to boycott (*East Germany Won't Boycott*, 1987).

The IOC tried one more time to get the North Korean delegations on board with participating in an attempt to have one Olympiad during the 1980s without a boycott. Their final proposal was to have both Korean delegations carry its own flag during opening and closing ceremonies, with an Olympic flag carried in front (*North Koreans Reject Proposal*, 1988). This was rejected as it aligned with the idea of “two Koreas”, an

idea that the North was trying to get rid altogether (*North Koreans Reject Proposal*, 1988).

Countries that Boycott

A number of countries did not respond to the invitation or could not compete for financial reasons, but it was only North Korea and its ally Cuba that officially boycotted the 1988 Olympics. Cuban leader Fidel Castro had made it known from early on that Cuba was going to boycott alongside North Korea if the event was not co-hosted (*Cuba Warns of Boycott*, 1986). Ethiopia, Albania, and the Seychelles also did not attend, as they did not respond to the official invitation but were not associated with the North Korean lead boycott (Janofsky, 1988).

Perceptions of the Boycott

From the resources used for this project, consisting of three major Western newspapers, there were very few reactions to the boycott after the fact. As mentioned above, there were predictions that a boycott would happen and it can be said that from the moment Seoul was chosen, there was a good chance that there would be another boycott during the XXIV Olympiad.

The lack of perceptions gathered and published about the boycott could be a result of North American countries not being involved in the boycott in anyway, whether through participation or through hosting a boycotted set of Games.

The one perception of the boycott received and noted through the media the most was that of IOC President Samaranch, who said in a statement that he “sympathized with athletes who would be ‘manipulated, exploited and often sacrificed with little chance of making their voice heard’” (Janofsky, 1988). The issue of forced-athlete non-

participation was one that was mentioned by the media throughout all of the boycotts but was the only main talking point for the media through this boycott.

Conclusion of Boycott

In regard to the boycott itself, there were no major conclusions that result from the action. The Games had the greatest number of nations participate with 159 competing (Statista Research Department, 2022). Both North and South Korea are still at “war” due to no peace treaty being signed after the Korean War ended, and relationships between the two countries are strained to this day (Darussalam, 2020). Their relationship is rocky and very reliant on the political relationship between South Korea and the United States at any given moment (Darussalam, 2020).

From an Olympic perspective, the two nations have competed separately and never joined to co-host an event or create one single Olympic team. For the 2018 Olympics in PyeongChang, North Korea sent 22 athletes to compete in South Korea which, according to reports, helped ease some tension between the two countries (Sanghun, 2021).

Analysis

Coding

As conductive coding is the method utilized for this research, the codes used were as follows:

1. Reason for boycott
 - a. Political disagreement
 - b. Societal norms
2. Reasoning for countries to boycott
 - a. Directly effected
 - b. Societal pressure
 - c. Ally pressure
3. Effects of the boycott
 - a. Media awareness
 - b. Governmental/political change
 - c. Major change in Olympics
 - d. Difference in how the Games are run
4. Timeline of response
 - a. No response
 - b. Immediate response (0-6 months)
 - c. Delayed response (over 6 months)
5. Resolutions to boycott
 - a. No resolution
 - b. Semi-resolved
 - c. Resolved completely

Reason for boycott. All four boycotts studied were caused by political disagreements by two or more countries. Although some were more political charged than others, it all came down to the separate political ideals of the countries involved. For example, the leading reason for the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Games was the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet troops. This was a highly political decision by the Soviet Union and was one that the United States, who lead the boycott, did not agree with. In contrast, the 1984 Olympics boycott in Los Angeles had a leading cause of Soviet officials feeling that there was a safety risk for their athletes. Due to the political climate between the Soviet Union and the United States at the time, the undertones were

significantly political but there was not a singular political event that caused this feeling of unrest. Instead, it was select groups of American citizens coming forward who threaten the Soviet Union, and therefore causing them to boycott.

Both 1976 and 1988 were political charged as well. With 1976 being a stand against New Zealand participating with South Africa in sporting events that were meant to be avoided. In 1988 the tension between North and South Korea, after the Korean War, in which the power struggle between being unified and separate came in to play. Both of these events were related to a variety of political and social issues that had very little to do with the events of the Olympic Games themselves, but utilized the respective Olympiads as ways to showcase to the world what their opinions were regarding the events going on at the time, and their political ideals.

Overall, the reason for the boycotts that happened was mainly a political pursuit by the countries who were leading the boycotts. There were no instances, when investigating the boycotts identified, that were found to have utilized an Olympic boycott as it was a “societal norm”. Furthermore, when considering the reasons for boycotts, there are no external factors outside of those used for coding that seem to be present.

Reasoning for countries to boycott. As many countries were involved in the boycotts over the four separate Olympiads investigated, there is a wide variety of reasons that individual countries may have felt the need to participate. As the researcher did not have access to meeting notes of all of these countries, the available knowledge of politics and allegiances at the time to fit the countries into a specific variable for this coding section.

For 1976, the majority of countries who participated in the boycott were African nations. They were the ones leading the boycott and felt it deeply important that New Zealand be expelled from the Olympics. When this did not occur, the organization of the 1976 boycott commenced. These nations were all directly affected by the reason for the boycott as it was important for them to have South African politics change. Taking a stance against countries who let apartheid continue while ignoring international calls to not become involved with South Africa was intended to impact these countries directly. There were 28 nations who participated in the boycott, in which they were directly affected. There was a second group of eight countries who chose to participate in the boycott as support to their allies who were already not attending the Games.

In 1980, the leading cause of the boycott was the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. The boycott was led by the United States who tried their best to garner support from their allies to boycott the Soviet Games. They managed to do so in a way effective enough that more than 60 countries participated in the boycott of the XXII Olympiad due to ally pressure. It is interesting to note that Afghanistan still sent 11 athletes to compete in these Games, even though the United States used the wellbeing of those in Afghanistan as part of their reasoning to boycott the 1980 Olympiad.

The presumed safety risk to the Soviet's that caused the boycott to occur in the XXIII Olympiad only directly affected the Soviet Union. Some of their allies that are a part of the Eastern Bloc could have also been at risk due to association, however, there were no direct threats to anyone other than the Soviet athletes. With 20 nations participating in total, that means that 1 (the Soviet Union) was directly affected by the

reason for the boycott, and the other 19 were all either allies who were nudged into joining or felt societal pressure to join the boycott as well.

1988 was officially boycotted by only two nations, North Korea, and Cuba. North Korea was directly affected by the reasoning for the boycott (not being able to compromise when it came to how to share the XXIV Olympiad with South Korea) and Cuba made it well known from early on that they would stand with their allies, in this instance, North Korea if they decided to boycott the Olympic Games.

As is the case with many political feats, it is evident that there was a strong tie between what a country's allies were doing and their stance on the boycotts that occurred. Those countries who were affected by the reasoning for the boycott took part, but it was the allies that resulted in the majority of countries partaking in the boycotting actions. They decided to stand with those they had an allegiance to in order to show strength in numbers when it came to their ideas, and in hopes that it would have some effect on the issue they were against.

Effects of the boycott. Within the four Olympiads that were analyzed, the media awareness of the issue at hand was increased. Each of the reasons for the boycotts were large political issues to begin with, however due to the fact that these boycotts were directed at the Olympic Games, politics were brought into more of the sporting news media throughout these years. This was the case, despite the idea that politics and sport had no sense being thought of as ideas that go hand-in-hand. Change in the Olympics occurred in 1976 where the IOC put in place rules to punish those who participate in political boycotts in the future (which ultimately ended up having very little effect, or were not seen at all in subsequent Olympic boycotts) as well as pushing to avoid South

Africa in sporting competition until apartheid was abolished (which also did not happen as many nations still travelled to and competed against South Africa for sporting competitions). As well, in 1984, the Olympics made a change that for any nation that boycotted, the number of sport officials and journalists allowed from that country would be decreased.

Although there were large numbers of individuals who were unable to participate in the Olympics due to the major boycotts that occurred, the overall effects of these boycotts were quite minute. Media awareness did increase with each of the boycotts, especially regarding the idea that the boycotts would effectively “take down” the Olympics as a whole, however, there was no major governmental or political change that occurred as a direct effect of the boycotts. As well, the IOC did very little to change their procedures both internally, as well as how the Olympic Games as a whole run, minus minor rule changes regarding judges and journalists from countries that boycott the games.

Timeline of response. Except for 1988, the time between the reason for the boycott and the call to boycott was immediate. The event occurred and within a number of months for each of the events, there was a call to boycott. For example, in 1976, the New Zealand tour of South Africa started just over a month before the Olympics, and the call came to boycott almost immediately. For the 1980 Olympic Games, the Soviet invasion happened in December 1979, and the boycott from the United States was announced by the beginning of February 1980. For the 1984 boycotts, the safety concerns started and within a month it was decided the Soviet Union would not participate in the XXIII Olympiad.

For 1988, there were discussions between the IOC, North Korea and South Korea happening as early as 1984 to decide if it was possible to share the hosting responsibilities between both nations. It was not until a few months before the Games occurred that North Korea decided they would not participate in the Games.

Except for 1988, the calls for boycotts happened in less than 6 months after the issue occurred. As such, it could be argued that the calls to boycott the Olympic Games were decisions made prematurely and as a way to showcase one's political views on a major stage. The lack of time between the event and the decision to boycott could have been used in different ways, to try to find a resolution to the root of the issue itself, instead of deciding to not attend a sporting event.

Resolutions to boycott. In regard to the reason the boycotts occurred across the researched Olympic Games, there was no resolution as a result of the boycotts actually happening that could be identified. Countries continued to participate in sporting events against South Africa during apartheid, the Soviets did not retreat out of Afghanistan until 1989, and tensions remain high between both the United States and Russia as well as North Korea and South Korea to this day. The lack of resolution assists in leading the researcher to a conclusion regarding the effectiveness of these boycotts on making political and societal change within their times, and for their reasons.

Short-term Effectiveness vs Long-term Effectiveness

Within a year of each of the boycotts occurring, there was very little change that happened. In terms of effectiveness, a spotlight was cast on the political events of concern, which could be seen as a goal for having the boycotts in the first place. In this regard, the boycotts could be seen as effective due to the fact they brought more attention to the issues that were important to the boycotting nations. However, from a societal and

political impact perspective, there was nothing within a year of each of the boycotts that changed the trajectory of the highlighted issues. If the boycotts had not occurred, there theoretically would have been no major changes in the proceeding events regarding the reasons for the boycott. From an overall effectiveness standpoint, this measure is more in line with what should be looked at and analyzed. In each case, there was little to no effectiveness of the boycotts from a short-term perspective.

From the perspective of looking at the events that preceded the boycotts, in the current measures, there was essentially little to no effectiveness from a long-term standpoint. Within 10 years of each of the boycotts, there was little to no solution to the reasons for boycotting. In the case of 1980, the only time when the cause had concluded within the 10-year time frame established for this study, the boycott of the XXII Olympiad was so far removed and had no impact on the reasons for the Soviets to have withdrawn from Afghanistan. To that point, there were major unrelated issues that snowballed as a result of the Soviets being in Afghanistan that are still seen to this day. Overall, the Olympic boycotts were not effective in either a short-term or long-term sense.

Discussion

The present study looked at the major boycotts that have happened since the modernization of the Olympic Games to note if any political or societal change had occurred due to the boycotts from a Western media perspective. The objective of this thesis was to analyze primary and secondary recounts of the events leading to and after the boycotts occurred in order to identify if there are any beneficial effects of boycotting

the Olympics and if, historically, there has been a level of effectiveness with these boycotts.

As a result of the deductive coding undertaken and an analysis of that data, it is difficult to identify any indication of effectiveness throughout the four major boycotts investigated. Despite the minor events that happened as a result of the boycotts from the IOC's perspective (in regard to minor changes to attempt to stop boycotts from happening in the future), there were very few effects resulting from the boycotts themselves. Although the reasons for the boycotts resulted in increased media attention due to the association with the Olympics, but when considering if any change from a political standpoint due to the boycotts had occurred, none have been found or noted. There were some effects that had occurred secondary to the reasons the boycotts had occurred, such as the impact of athletes, as well as potentially advertisers and fans, however, within the constraints, definitions and purpose of this study, no effects were found in enacting social and political change on the reason for the boycotts.

The research conducted had made it easy to determine the answers to the proposed research questions set forward for this project:

Are Olympic boycotts effective in creating political and societal change in relation to the issue being boycotted? As there were no signs of political or societal change in relation to the issues being protested in each of the given boycotts, it can be concluded that the Olympic boycotts throughout history have not been effective. From both a short-term and long-term viewpoint, there was little that occurred as a result of the boycotts, but specifically on the reasons the boycotts occurred. In each of the four cases studied, there was no outcome that resulted in any political change as a result of the

boycotts occurring. All of the issues that were analyzed continued well past the Olympic Games and did not result in how events were looked at from a societal point of view at the time. This lack of difference showcases that although time and effort was put into these boycotts by the countries organizing them, not allowing their athletes to participate in their respective Olympic Games did little to further their cause. It can be argued that having the government make changes within who the country associates themselves with, as well as trying to tackle the issues head on, could have had a greater effect on the event that caused the boycott to happen than the boycotts themselves.

What is considered being effective when it comes to creating societal and political change on the international level? In order to be effective in creating societal or political change on an international level, there should be direct effects from the initiating event to the resolution of the issue. Being able to see a timeline of events that correlate and correspond with the change that has occurred as a result of the initiating event would be one way to measure if change has occurred effectively. In the case of the current study, with the initiating event being the boycott at each Olympic Games, there are no cases where the boycotts themselves caused a chain reaction of other events leading to the desired positive change, either politically or societally.

If we look at 1976 for example, the reason for the boycott was New Zealand continuing to travel to South Africa to compete against them in a rugby tournament, as they had been effectively “shunned” from sporting events until they abolished their apartheid practices. If this boycott was effective in creating societal and political change, the events proceeding the boycott would have resulted in South African legislation removing all apartheid practices due to the overwhelming response and pushback from

other countries. However, it took until the 1990s for South Africa to change their laws and abolish apartheid.

Are there any lasting effects of these boycotts? If so, what are they? One of the lasting effects of these boycotts is the idea that the Olympic Games can be the target of a boycott and thus used as a means of taking a political stance on an issue or issues. As the Olympic Games provide one of the largest international stages upon which to project competitive views, it is an easy target for those who might try to get a point across when political disagreements occur. Utilizing a major sporting event as a platform for a political reason is one that has occurred many times before and since the boycotts investigated. As such, it can be argued that they will continue to be utilized by others as it is becoming increasingly evident that there is a tie between politics and sport. From the initial major boycott in 1976, the tolerance for other boycotts had increased, and any political disagreement resulted in an Olympic boycott. Four Olympic boycotts in the span of four Olympiads was a series of events that many believed would be the end of the Modern Olympic Games. Since 1988, no other full boycott has taken place at the Olympic Games, but many continue to utilize the Olympics as a platform to showcase their political beliefs. However, Pound captures the utility of a boycott and this investigation's conclusions when stating:

After Moscow... the Soviet attempt to get revenge by boycotting the Los Angeles Games in 1984 was not successful, the minor boycott by Cuba and North Korea in 1988 even less so. By 1992, there was a sizeable stake through the heart of political boycotts of Olympic events (Pound, 2004).

Another lasting effect of these boycotts are those they had on the athletes who were not afforded the opportunity to participate due to their governments' actions. Throughout the research, there was overwhelming rhetoric about the impact of a boycott

on the athletes and how it was unfair to them when not given the ability to decide for themselves what to do in each scenario. Many athletes train for the majority of their lives to be able to get to the level of qualifying for an Olympic Games, and having that opportunity ripped away from them, in a choice that is not theirs is something that many can still recall. “Basically, he crushed my dreams. I felt like he had crushed my life,” (Maese, 2020) said Gene Mills, an American wrestler who qualified for the 1980 Olympics and was unable to participate. Using the athletes as pawns affected the trajectory of their lives and voided years of hard work. If the athletes had chosen to not participate due to what was occurring politically at the time would have been one thing, but not giving them the chance to decide what to do themselves is another story and one worthy of future investigation.

Have boycotts of the Olympic Games directly caused a resolution to occur in relation to the issues being protested? As a result of the research conducted on the four major boycotts that occurred between 1976 through to 1988, it can be concluded that the boycotts did not directly cause a resolution to occur. Many of the events which resulted in a boycott continued on for decades after and in some instances, it is possible to still see effects of the initial events that caused the boycotts to this day. For example, there is still tension in Afghanistan that is a direct result of the Soviets invasion in 1979, despite changes in governments seemingly calming tides for a period of time before aggravating the relationship again, and North and South Korea are still experiencing major political disagreements. There were no serious events that resulted in a boycott of the Olympic Games and saw a conclusion of the issues due to the boycott themselves. The boycotts may have assisted in shining more light on the issues due the volume of media coverage

that reported on the boycotts, however, there was no direct resolution of any of the issues because of an Olympic boycott.

Limitations and Future Extensions

Limitations

A major limitation to the research conducted was the vast amount of information that was available when it came to newspaper articles. Despite only using three, pre-chosen Western newspapers, there were unlimited numbers of searches that could yield results for this research project. The decision to limit my searches to be the same throughout each boycott (“Olympics” and “Olympic boycott”) and the same time span for each search (four years before and after each Olympic boycott year) assisted in managing the sheer volume of material, but it was still quite overwhelming. By the end of the research, over 20 years of newspaper articles, from three different sources were utilized to assist in the documentation and creation of this research project.

Another limitation that I had with this research was controlling the varied opinions while attempting to limit the depth of research in each political issue. Each reason for the boycotts were heavily ingrained in expansive and complicated political disagreements that expand over decades. For this research it was important to be able to provide enough background to grasp the foundations of each without going too in depth and turning the paper into one that was entirely about each political issue. Finding the limits of knowledge required to accurately depict the political landscape at each time of the boycotts was one I found to be challenging but absolutely necessary for this project.

Future Extensions

This research allows for a number of future extensions to be made in order to expand the existing knowledge on the topic of Olympic boycotts. When starting this

research there was very little available to utilize as a jumping off point. Many topics within the literature are still in their early stages and are starting to become popular but not yet expansive. Any research similar to this would assist in expanding the knowledge base thereby creating a more succinct and extensive library of material.

One idea for future research considerations would be to analyze the same boycotts from a different media lens. As this research was done using three major Western newspapers, seeing if the results vary based on media outlets from other regions and political orientations would be interesting to note. Another potential research extension could be analyzing effective boycotts across other disciplines and finding ways in which they can extend to sport in order to create an environment that fostered successful sporting boycotts. The third and final research extension would be to look at individual protests that have occurred during the Olympic Games (i.e., The Black Power Salute in Mexico City in 1968) and seeing if using a similar definition would compare in effectiveness to the full boycotts that were analyzed in this project. All three of these options would assist in increasing the understanding of Olympic boycotts and the politics associated with sport.

Conclusion

In *Inside the Olympics* by Richard Pound he states:

The bottom line on Olympic boycotts is that the politicians who call for them do nothing more than eviscerate their own citizens, to no useful purpose. My view is that such boycotts are political failures; that the governments who order them appear inept; that ineptness is the most terrible political sin; and that no politician wishes to appear inept. That is why political boycotts of the Olympics do not work. They are an ineffective tool in this context and the proponents are shown to be ineffective (Pound, 2004).

This research endeavor emphasizes a similar point of view and highlights the fact that there was no effect within the constraints of this research project that was strong enough to showcase that these boycotts had any effect on their specified issues. Despite the amount of effort nations used to boycott specific Olympics as a means to go against their political rivals, no political or societal change occurred as a direct effect of the Olympic boycotts.

The boycotted Olympiads, although many of the festivals were still successful, cause more harm to the athletes involved than to the nations who were the intended target. In a statement made by the Sarah Hirschland, President of the United States Olympic and Paralympic Committee in 2020, 40 years after President Carter refused to allow the American athletes to participate in the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, she notes that:

It's abundantly clear in hindsight that the decision to not send a team to Moscow had no impact on the global politics of the era and instead only harmed you – American athletes who had dedicated themselves to excellence and the chance to represent the United States (Hirschland, 2020).

The purpose of the Olympics Games is to unite nations and celebrate the athletes and their achievements. By denying the athletes their opportunity to participate after qualifying and instead utilizing them as pawns in diplomatic affairs, shows a clear lack of understanding on the governments' behalf of the purpose behind the Olympic Games themselves. The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by education youth through sport, practiced without discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play.

Throughout history, the link between sport and politics has not gone unnoticed. Despite many individuals and organizations (most specifically, the IOC) trying to ignore this, there will always be a connection. The power comes with understanding how to effectively utilize this connection to create the change one wants to see. Unfortunately for the governments involved in the political boycotts of the 1970s and 1980s, this was not understood. Seeing a similar event in 2022 with the diplomatic boycott that happened during the Beijing Olympics, with no conclusion to the reason for the boycott two years on, a similar outcome to those that happened decades ago can be found. All in all, from a Western perspective, Olympic boycotts have never been an effective tool to force change and will continue to remain that way unless governments can figure out a new approach that can create the change they want to see in the world.

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