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The evaluation of emotional arguments: a test run

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ABSTRACT: In a recent paper (ISSA 2010), Groarke proposes a view of emotional arguments that seems too narrow. While his notion of pathos and emotional arguments may aid in the development of normative analysis, it is not sufficient in addressing all emotional arguments and is guilty of strictly adhering to the tradition’s conception of emotion’s place in argumentation. I suggest an alternative evaluation of emotional arguments - relying on Walton’s dialogue types and goals as its foundation.

KEYWORDS: conflict resolution, conflict management style, cognitive account, emotional argument, emotionalizing, normative, rhetoric, temperament

1. INTRODUCTION

This paper is part of an ongoing dialogue on emotional argumentation. In his recent paper, “Emotional arguments: Ancient and contemporary views,” Groarke demonstrates two principles that characterize the relationship between arguments and emotion: the principle that emotion influences argument and the principle that argument influences emotion (forthcoming). Groarke writes, “I want to show that the emphasis that Gilbert and Carozza have placed on emotional argument has a precedent in ancient times,” (Ibid., Part 1). Groarke adds value to the subject area in two main ways. He demonstrates that the issues important to those of us who work on emotional arguments are not new ones, that they have a long history, though there may be gaps along the way from ancient perspectives to the more contemporary ones. What I am more interested in though are the questions that Groarke raises, namely those that urge us to develop a normative system that applies to emotional arguments. I agree with Micheli when he writes that argumentation studies, “is undergoing rapid change” and that, “this growing interest for emotion crosses the boundary between normative and descriptive approaches to argumentation” (2010). In my own work I have (purposely) resisted the development of a normative approach, mainly because of the fluidity and inconsistency with which emotional arguments occur. Groarke’s response prompts more reflection and decisions to be made about normative concerns, not just descriptive ones, if the emotional mode of argument is going to be of more value in the field.

In what follows I briefly review what gets included in the concept of emotional argument. I respond to some of Groarke’s concerns under his principle that stipulates emotion influences argument. Specifically, I address the limitations of the rhetorical view for emotional argumentation. Referring to his second principle, that argument influences emotion, I explain the applicability of such a stance in conflict resolution settings. In the end, I am afraid to share, while I am less resistant to a normative interpretation of emo-
tional arguments, I am not convinced that the tools already developed will suffice. I demonstrate why by responding to Groarke’s ideas, with Walton’s dialogue types and the different types of emotional arguments in mind. I conclude with tools that span outside of the field but provide the missing ingredient to normative development: temperament theory and conflict management styles.

2. EMOTIONAL ARGUMENTS

An argument is an interaction where there is disagreement between parties. What is key for this definition is the plurality of interlocutors and that dissent is present. An emotional argument occurs when the dissent between interlocutors is of an emotional nature. I subscribe to an idea of emotional argument that amalgamates others’ pioneering work in the field. Gilbert argues that emotions can be used in two main ways: as reasons in argument and as a means of communicating arguments (1997). Ben-Ze’ev’s psychologically-informed perspective of emotional arguments corroborates and expands the notion of emotion used as a reason in the context of argumentation (1995). Plantin discusses emotion as the claim of an argument (1999), and his work is further developed by Micheli who demonstrates how emotions can be the objects of argumentative constructions (2010). Walton shows how the ad baculum and the ad misericordiam, typically considered fallacious as they evoke emotion in an arguer’s listeners in order to gain acceptance of a main claim, should be considered in context, and thus they may not always boil down to erroneous reasoning (1992). Above summarizes at least five different ways that arguments are emotional.¹ I do not take this list to be exhaustive. As the study of arguments transpires, observations and research could add to the ways that arguments are emotional. For instance, I include the ad baculum and ad misericordiam because they are discussed at length by Walton in the context of emotion, but I see them as types of emotional arguments that fall under a sub-type: eliciting the audience’s (many and different) emotions.

Because this paper addresses normative concerns of emotional arguments that Groarke prompts, I emphasize here that the mode of emotional argument is not uniform. There are different ways that arguments are primarily emotional. One of my concerns, among others, is that a normative framework implies a “one-size fits all” philosophy. I discuss concerns with emotional arguments construed normatively in more detail below. Suffice it to say that the framework that gets developed may have to be as nuanced as the emotional mode.

3. FROM EMOTION TO ARGUMENT

Groarke calls attention to the “cognitive account” to capture a prominent notion in the field of argumentation: rationality and emotionality are opposing states. This view typically endorses an objective, or a dispassionate, analysis of arguments (forthcoming, Section 2). Gilbert has referred to this stance as the “critical-logical” view (1997), and I have talked about it as the “traditional” view (2009). The main tenets for these labels is the same though, and the one I point out as most relevant is that normative theories in the cognitive account do not adequately capture emotional arguments. Though the cognitive

¹ For a discussion of all the types see Carozza (2009).
view is a dominant one, Groarke points out that ancient views of sophism and rhetoric do not view emotions and reason as irreconcilable entities, instead, “they view the implied connections between emotion and argument as an opportunity that should be explored, cultivated and properly seized upon” (forthcoming, Section 4).

Groarke refers to Aristotelian rhetoric to demonstrate the legitimacy of emotional parts of arguments (Ibid.). He reminds us that, “the ideal argument is an argument that satisfies the criteria for good argument proposed by the cognitive account of argument and successfully invokes emotion in a way that speaks to one’s audience” (Ibid.). An immediate reaction to this reminder is that emotion is still conceived of as a part of informal arguments, as if without informal arguments there would be no conception of an emotional argument. Emotional arguments are not just derivatives of the dominant view of argument. I would be more willing to argue that informal arguments may be predicated on emotions, though this is an entirely different topic saved for another paper. While this reaction of mine has been consistent throughout the ongoing dialogues on emotional argumentation, I am sympathetic to Groarke’s perspective on addressing emotional arguments in a manner that moves the field forward.

One of Groarke’s intentions is to show the legitimacy of emotions (Ibid.), and I think there is no question that he demonstrates the importance of emotional arguments throughout his paper - in reference to ancient theories and in application with his examples of forums where emotional arguments are apt to occur. Groarke concludes the section on the principle stipulating that emotions influence arguments with questions, one of which reads, “Can all the emotional aspects of argument be reduced to aspects of the pathos of audience?” (Ibid.). I take this question in the context of developing a normative framework for emotional arguments. Thus, if the cognitive view does not measure up, then maybe the rhetorical tradition can aid in the assessment of emotional arguments? The answer is still “not quite.” In the way that the cognitive view falls short of evaluating emotional arguments, the rhetorical view referenced by Groarke can as well. Its focus is on the audience, which adds more to the tools of evaluation at our disposal, but it does not fix the overarching problem, which is relying on methods that did not grow out of a concern for the normative appraisal of emotional arguments. If we reworked the principles of acceptability and relevancy (logos) - as held by Johnson & Blair (2006), Govier (2005), and Groarke & Tindale (2008) - and added criteria that relates to audience emotion (pathos), we would still be unable to address all types of emotional argument listed above. For instance, developing the acceptability condition or the relevancy condition in the context of emotional arguments might make sense if the emotional argument is one where the reason that is being utilized is an emotion, so it is apropos to an emotional argument as conceived by Ben-Ze’ev (1995) and Gilbert (1997). These evaluative tools may even aid in instances where the main conclusion is an emotion that is being defended, as discussed by Plantin (1999) and more recently Micheli (2010). However, these conditions are misplaced in other contexts. Groarke’s point may well be that rhetoric can recuperate what gets ignored in the cognitive tools. In cases where the arguer is evoking an emotional response from his/her audience, this may be possible.

This still leaves arguments where emotional expression is the strength of the argument as unaddressable. If we rely on the adapted tools above, these become non-arguments or irrelevant information in the context of arguments. Gilbert (1998) offers the foundation of “emotionalizing” in a paper that expands the pragma-dialectical account
(see van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992) to include emotional arguments. Two key criteria that emotionalizing considers are consistency (are an arguer’s emotional cues consistent with his/her verbal expression?) and commitment (to what degree is the arguer committed to his/her standpoint?). This is a helpful tool that is likely the most applicable, thus far, for someone who practices in a forum where emotional arguments run rampant.

4. FROM ARGUMENT TO EMOTION

In the discussion of this second principle, Groarke looks at argument as a conduit for emotion, whether it produces them, changes them, or eliminates them altogether. He writes, “In ancient rhetoric, this second principle is evident in the attempt to use argument, to instill, not only beliefs within audience, but specific emotions that strengthen, secure and embolden these beliefs” (forthcoming, Section 5). This section highlights the important ways that we use arguments to influence emotion. Emotional arguments in practice, those rarely found in a Critical Reasoning text book, resonate with the examples of Phaedo and Epictetus. My interest in emotional argumentation is connected to the Restorative Justice work I conduct. When I facilitate dialogue between an “offender” and a “victim,” or when I lead a youth peace-building circle that has various stakeholders who are affected by an incident that prompted the conflict resolution circle, the cognitive approach is limited in its applicability. It helps me synthesize information, it helps ask relevant questions, it helps to reformulate a participant’s ideas and arguments, so someone else can better understand. Where emotional arguments are concerned though, and this is a forum that is rife with emotional argumentation, there is a lack of tools that help a practitioner who confronts the emotional mode. Most of the time, as Groarke indicates, “the end of the argument is not a simple assent to the truth of some proposition, but an emotional disposition that instills the emotional perspective essential to a good life” (Ibid.). While this idea originates in ancient moral philosophy (i.e. living a happy life entails a good life for Epictetus), it has similarities with Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) methods. ADR is a process that steps away from judges, and resolutions typically result from collaboration and mutual agreement between affected parties. Important, relevant, criteria in these forums are: 1) conflict and emotions breed each other, and untangling the two as distinct processes from each other is often difficult, and 2) there is no normative measure for resolutions - creative and unconventional agreements are acceptable and encouraged. As a conflict resolution facilitator, often what some of us do is validate emotions, translate their meaning to other parties, find common points between different argument modes (i.e. emotional, visceral, logical, kisceral). In a forum where parties often evoke emotions, transcend certain emotions, realize the impact of their emotions, and so on, tools that speak specifically to these types of arguments is necessary.

In summary, the above discussion, stemming from Groarke’s two principles, leaves us with the following emotional modes and their possible normative tools:

(A) Emotions used as reasons - cognitive tools can be adapted (logos)
(B) Emotions as a conclusion - cognitive tools can be adapted (logos)
(C) Ad misericordiam - rhetorical tools can be adapted (pathos)
(D) Ad baculum - rhetorical tools can be adapted (pathos)
(E) Emotional Expression - emotionalizing (ethos)
My hesitation in moving forward in this manner is that all of these methods are connected to an idea of argument that either ignores emotion or sees it as an addition to the core argument. In Good Reasoning Matters!: A Constrictive Approach to Critical Thinking Groarke and Tindale supplement the diagramming of arguments by recommending an address of the arguer, the audience, and the opposing views (2008). Investigating these parts of argumentation might get us closer to a normative framework for emotional arguments. Of the five types of emotional arguments listed above, only (A) and (B) incorporate emotion into the argument structure, the others involve emotion from the audience or on the part of the arguer. If supplementing an argument could be developed to address more than possible illegitimate bias, then there might be more merit in developing a normative framework that concentrates on the interlocutors (arguers and audience), as well as a broader audience (opposing views). This is just a brief example of an alternative, one that tries to step away from cognitive constraints and concentrates on the human element in arguments.

5. A TEST RUN

In Carozza (2009) I outlined the different ways that emotional arguments may occur in dialogues discussed by Walton (1998). For instance, given the dialogues’ goals and the importance of “truth,” among other criteria, an argument where the emotion is a claim is more likely in an eristic dialogue, rather than an inquiry or negotiation. Eliciting empathy is likely in a persuasive dialogue. The chart below depicts six dialogues with the five types of emotional argument; where the dialogue and emotional mode connect, the evaluative tool that best fits the context and emotional argument is proposed. This chart is meant to synthesize some observations that come from connecting concepts thus far discussed or referenced. Some cells do not have a corresponding tool of analysis because there is little chance of an emotional argument occurring, or there is no obvious tool of evaluation that can be adapted.

A “cognitive/character” tool assesses whether we can accept the reason in the argument and whether the reason is relevant to its conclusion - where the premise or conclusion is an emotion. Because we cannot separate emotions from humans, the criterion of “character” also needs to be incorporated into the cognitive-adapted analysis. So, is the emotional argument in question acceptable and relevant based on the circumstances of the arguer? Is the emotional argument in keeping with the circumstances of its audience? Or, is it misplaced, irrelevant, disconnected?

The “rhetoric/character” tool evaluates whether an appeal to the audience’s emotions is in a manner that helps the dialogue move forward to a plausible, not necessarily reasonable, outcome. The rhetorical device could also be adapted to necessarily include the criteria of arguer and audience. Is the arguer in a position that is fair or manipulative? Is his/her emotion realistic given his/her situation? Is the audience a relevant one for the issue at hand? Spanning even broader, is the arguer’s emotional views and/or the audience’s emotional reaction of the issue understandable to others (analysts, judges, friends, etc.)?

“Emotionalization” as a tool of analysis looks at whether the arguer is sincere in his emotionally expressed argument. Does he/she seem genuinely committed to the argument, or is the emotion just a theatrical aid? Is the emotion indicative of a possible enthymeme (i.e. does the emotion mask an interest, a commitment of some kind, or another
<table>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emotion as a reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>Likely, could indicate dark-side commitments Cognitive/ Character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inquiry</td>
<td>Less likely to be made in an inquiry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Likely, and could indicate interlocutor’s interests Cognitive/ character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information-Seeking</td>
<td>Interviewee may use this line of reasoning, but not often Rhetoric/ Character</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deliberation</td>
<td>Emotions as reasons could help form an action plan Rhetoric/ Character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eristic</td>
<td>Highly likely; they could be indicators of dark-side commitments Cognitive/ Character</td>
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Fig. 1. Dialogue Types and Types of Emotional Arguments
emotion perhaps)? It is even possible that a lack of emotion can be masking emotional reasons in arguments, which none of the tools of evaluation adequately addresses.

There are more concerns, than satisfaction, that I have with this preliminary method of evaluating emotional arguments. Something is just missing from the adaptation of the tools of logos, pathos, and ethos. If we try to assimilate the tools we are already using in different argument contexts and types, we tend to have a smorgasbord of normative tools, which is problematic for two reasons. It makes the analysis of emotional arguments extra difficult because there would be different tools used depending on the emotional mode. Overall though, there is a disconnect between the tools and the emotional parts. They function well in a cognitive view of argument, but emotional arguments are not manipulations of “reasonable” arguments, they are a different set of arguments. While I hesitate to agree that Groarke’s recent suggestions help derive a firm normative framework, he has convinced me that it is a necessary next step. I take the onus to propose an alternative to adapting the field’s current tools.

I contend that the missing ingredient lies in the fact that when we study emotional arguments we are not just studying arguments, we are studying people, as emotions cannot be separated from them as easily as the field can separate arguments from their arguers. Tools that can be adapted to assist emotional argument practitioners include those of personality temperament and conflict management styles.

In the midst of emotional argument territory, parties are typically trying to be understood by others (or vice versa), aiming to make decisions, build action plans, and so on. These practical matters get missed if we ignore the importance of where the emotion is coming from. Temperament theory argues that we each have core needs that tend to remain consistent within our life span, and when those needs are unmet, we remain dissatisfied. Depending on one’s temperament, different attitudes and behaviours develop. Knowledge of temperament tendencies can help interlocutors and practitioners work through and elucidate emotional arguments. This is necessary because unlike cognitive arguments, where there tends to be a universal notion of verbalized reason that complies with some of the tools addressed above, emotions are not felt, described, or used universally. They are different depending on the arguer, audience, and surrounding context. An understanding of temperament can help clarify arguments and judge their legitimacy in that specific context.

Sometimes temperament is lacking in its ability to help solve or work through emotional argumentation. One of the reasons for this is because arguers have different styles of handling conflict, and for someone who orients in a different manner during conflict, confusion is apt to set in for arguers and their receivers. There are different conflict management styles that can further aid in the understanding and thus evaluation of arguments. Conflict management styles typically stipulate five types: competitive, avoidant, compromising, collaborative, and accommodating. An understanding of these styles of communicating conflict can help understand why an emotional argument takes the path that it does, and how we can evaluate its efficacy.

I end with a recent example of an emotional argument in a peacebuilding circle with a youth who has three charges: threatening bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and possession of a dangerous weapon. In a third circle meeting between the youth and three circle keepers, the youth is asked how he/she can demonstrate to the courts that he/she is taking responsibility, or being held accountable, for the above-mentioned charges. There
is a long pause and then the youth shares that he/she is beginning to forgive him/herself for what was done and is starting to realize that blame is not all his/hers. He/she is starting to think about including the “victim” in a future peacebuilding circle. The response given at the end of the third circle was a significant step forward, as it is something that would be typical at the end of the first peacebuilding circle, or the beginning of a second peacebuilding circle, at least.

This emotional argument (mainly because of the reasons, though there was subtly choked emotional expression) showing accountability could easily be considered irrelevant (failing the cognitive/character test). What does forgiving oneself and stopping self-blame have to do with taking responsibility for such serious crimes? Given this context ... the youth had thus far remained detached from the events, claiming to have moved on; the youth declared that he/she would never think about meeting with the “victim” (which is one of the main goals of a circle, to bring an “offender” and “victim” together in dialogue to determine resolutions); the youth admitted that he/she was fully responsible for his/her actions and just wanted to move on and never have to share this isolated and embarrassing moment in his/her life again ... this was a heartfelt argument that made sense to the three circle keepers in that room (emotionalization test passed). It was sincere and it was necessary to move forward to the subsequent circles—where they begin to address the “victim” and the repercussions crimes have on society. As someone devoted to emotional arguments, who sees them as a means of transcendence in some circumstances, I cannot deem such an argument a weak one. Knowing the context, that the arguer has an adventurous temperament that gets triggered/upset when his/her sense of freedom is stifled (which is how he/she perceived the “victim’s” actions which instigated this event), and that his/her conflict style is typically competitive, and so his/her detached attitude up until this point was unusual, this was a strong emotional argument for beginning to take accountability for his/her wrongdoing. The irony of developing a normative theory for the evaluation of emotional arguments is that we may have to relinquish our judgment of certain emotions, or the interlocutors who have them, to develop judgments of the strength of emotional arguments.

6. CONCLUSION

If there is an understanding of the relevant argument dialogue, the emotional type of argument at play, and some knowledge of personality as it connects to core needs and conflict management style, we could have a more functional mechanism to understand and evaluate emotional arguments. As Groarke shows, not only does argument influence our emotions, but emotions influence arguments. Having tools that aid our understanding and evaluation of emotional arguments should be predicated on studies of emotion in practice. This missing ingredient is needed because of the fluidity and inconsistency with which we all feel, express, understand, and label emotions in the context of argumentation.

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Commentary on “THE EVALUATION OF EMOTIONAL ARGUMENTS: A TEST RUN” by Linda Carozza

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1. INTRODUCTION

In a famous movie, Trouble in Paradise, set in Venice, M. Filiba, an Englishman, tried to describe the way he was robbed by a fake doctor to a chorus of excitable Italian policemen. Filiba could not speak Italian, so the hotel manager translated his words. But his translation was not simply limited to words. On the contrary, every statement, uttered by the Englishman in a calm tone, was reported in Italian with an extremely excited voice, accompanied by waving and facial expressions, communicating that something uniquely terrible had happened. Even the subject matter of the talk between the fake doctor and Filiba (the tonsils) became a shocking revelation in the translation.

This funny scene points out a crucial issue raised by Carozza: people’s emotions do not simply externally affect or influence the reasonableness of the dialogue. On the contrary, they constitute an essential part of argumentation. If the translation had simply reported the words without adapting them to the characters of his interlocutors, they would have probably failed to lead the policemen to action. The policemen had a conversational (or social) style completely different from Filiba’s controlled temperament. This extreme example also illustrates the reasons of the fundamental questions that Carozza’s paper addresses: How do temperaments and conversational styles affects argumentation? Are emotional moves equally allowed or reasonable in all types and contexts of dialogue? Is it possible to develop a normative model of emotions in dialogue, or shall they be confined to psychological or post-modernistic considerations?

2. FROM EMOTIONS IN ARGUMENTS TO EMOTIONS IN ARGUMENTATION

Carozza’s paper wants to be a reply to Groarke’s analysis of the ancient accounts concerning the uses of emotion in argument, in which he tried to provide the foundations of a possible normative reconstruction of emotions in arguments. On this perspective, emotions and reasons are closely related to each other: emotions influence arguments, and arguments can be used to alter or influence emotions (Groarke 2010). On the one hand, in the ancient Rhetoric pathos was seen as an extremely powerful tool to alter the interlocutor’s acceptability of the premises, modifying his acceptance of the conclusion. On the other hand, in ancient moral philosophy argumentation was regarded as an instrument to lead to ataraxia, or tranquillity. By contrasting a disturbing belief with an opposite point of view, the judgment producing the emotion is suspended and the emotional equilibrium is restored.
On Carozza’s view, this approach to emotions in argumentation is too narrow, as it accounts for emotion as a possible dimension of arguments, and not as an essential feature of argumentation. On her perspective, emotions can affect arguments in different fashions, not simply limited to their cognitive dimension; moreover, she maintains that emotions need to be analyzed in a framework broader than simple reasoning, claiming that their role can be fully perceived only by considering how they work in argumentative dialogues, involving dissent between two persons (Carozza 2007: 203). She lists five types of “emotional modes”:

(A) Emotions used as reasons - cognitive tools can be adapted (logos).
(B) Emotions as a conclusion - cognitive tools can be adapted (logos).
(C) Ad misericordiam - rhetorical tools can be adapted (pathos).
(D) Ad baculum - rhetorical tools can be adapted (pathos).
(E) Emotional Expression - emotionalizing (ethos).

Emotions can be used to show the speaker’s commitment to a viewpoint, indicating how strongly he believes and therefore how much he is willing to defend his idea. They can be also aroused in the interlocutor to modify his role in the discussion, and enhance the speaker’s authority or undercutting the hearer’s. This tactic often amounts to character arguments. The speaker can also choose to arouse pity and fear in the hearer, using appeals to pity or to threat to lead the interlocutor to accept more eagerly a conclusion. Finally, the speaker can express his emotions, often attacking the listener and provoking emotive reactions that can alter his role or position towards the conclusion.

Building on these different types of emotional arguments, Carozza tries to advance a normative model of emotions in dialogue, grounded on Walton’s types of dialogue. Dialogues are conceived by Walton as conventionalized, purposive joint activities between two speech partners (Walton 1998: 29), and according to the global dialogical purpose and the joint and individual interlocutors’ goals six types of dialogue can be distinguished (Walton, 1998: 30). On Walton’s view, in a dialogue the interlocutors can have different kinds of goals, which influence the nature of the interaction and are sub-ordered to the collective goal, or purpose of the communicative interaction. Walton maintains that a type of dialogue is a normative framework in which there is an exchange of arguments between two speech partners reasoning together in turn-taking sequences aimed at a collective goal (Walton 1998: 30). However, even though applied to interactions between computers or multi-agent systems, in the theory of dialogue types the interlocutors are not regarded as mere agents, but as people having their own background knowledge, social roles and expectations (Macagno 2008; Macagno & Walton 2007). Dialogue types can be applied to real social interactions including basic contextual information. For instance, a negotiation between friends has characteristics different from a negotiation between bank managers or politicians. Depending on the type of dialogue, and, more specifically, on the nature of the background assumptions constituting the context of dialogue, some moves are excluded whereas others admitted. For instance, certain forms of threat appeals are reasonable in some types of negotiations, such as in business or in some diplomatic discussions, but in public political debates they are usually considered as forms of violence.

Carozza applies the idea of analysing discourse moves according to the types of context of dialogue, and examines how the different emotional arguments fit their pur-
poses and rules. For instance, she notices how emotions can be used as reasons that indicate the strength of the commitment to certain propositions (“He does not care about political views; he does not even reply if you challenge what he says”). However, the purpose of these admissible moves may vary according to the discourse and participants’ goals. In persuasion dialogue they can reveal dark-side commitments (the speaker is interested or strongly committed to a certain viewpoint or assumption); in negotiations they can provide the hearer with fundamental information about the interlocutor’s real interests (“He looks so afraid of losing this auction; therefore he is really interested in it!”); in deliberation they can show the speaker’s desires and therefore can be considered as an integral element of the decision-making process (“I understand that you are really dying for shopping at that Mall, and I know that any word I can spend to persuade you of the beauty of the museum will be totally useless.”). In other types of dialogue, such as inquiry or information-seeking, emotions are less likely to be used as reasons, while in quarrels they are an essential part of the dialogue, as they show the darks-side commitments or reasons that led to the verbal fight.

Carozza notices how this approach can be efficient in providing general tendencies in the use of emotional arguments and describing the possible purposes of such uses. On her view, however, a normative model based on generic institutionalized contexts, built on social roles and stereotypic background information, risks proving useless in coping with real life argumentation, where not only do social roles and institutions come into play, but also real people with their own characters and tempers. Carozza simply points out how an abstract normative approach fails being specific enough to describe, predict and tackle people’s behaviour in different contexts. However, the normative and the relativistic and descriptive approaches can combine considering dialogues from another perspective, as a succession of moves that need to be interpreted before being assessed. In this fashion, the analysis of dialogue theory can be extended to people with their own core desires and styles of communicating conflict or disagreement.

3. INTERPRETING DIALOGUE MOVES

Carozza pointed out how, in order to understand the mechanism of dialogues, it is necessary to analyze arguers’ temperament, that is, where their emotions and dialogical or conflict-management styles come from. This paper successfully explains how emotions are integral part of argumentation, and how a theory aimed at describing and predicting dialogues between real people needs to develop. An extremely interesting direction that this proposal opens up is the reason why real argumentation is so deeply rooted in emotions. Why do people with different temperament often run into deep dialogical misunderstanding when they argue? Why do “facts” sometimes conflict with “feelings” (Carozza 2007: 208)? Why do reasons sometimes fail not only to persuade, but even to be considered by the other party? Why are emotions sometimes hindrances to communication?

The funny dialogue between M. Filiba, the hotel manager and the Italian policemen highlights one form of misunderstanding that has often been overlooked in communication sciences. The hotel manager needed to translate the facts into emotions in order to prevent the policemen from ignoring or underestimating the case. He needed to translate an “analytical style” into an “expressive” one (Carozza 2007: 207) to avoid a type of misunderstanding that is not rooted in semantics or pragmatics, but it is rather
communicative in kind. On the one hand, Filiba’s objective descriptions hided his real problems to the policemen’s eyes. On the other hand, the policemen’s excited communicative behaviour would sound too exaggerate for Filiba’s controlled temper. Carozza noticed how in conflict management dialogues (such as Alternative Dispute Resolution) the mediator acts actually as a translator of the viewpoints communicated through facts or emotions. However, she pointed out also how emotions, and, therefore, dialogical attitudes, are deeply connected with an interpretation of the subject matter. For instance, in her examples she shows a strict relationship between the interpretation of an event (committing a crime) and the emotive reaction (acting as a victim). Depending on how the facts are analyzed and interpreted by the speaker, his emotions and his openness to consider the other’s viewpoint change. On this view, a theory of interpretation lies beneath emotive attitudes, while on the other hand emotions can explain dialogical attitudes and reveal crucial progresses in the speaker’s interpretation of facts and events. This approach to emotions and dialogue from an interpretational perspective, applied to the discovery of intentions and attitudes, overlaps with some studies in psychiatry, where the cognitive roots of emotions and dysfunctional are investigated and traced back to interpretative schemes or core beliefs (Ellis 1994; Young, Klosko & Weishaar 2003).

Carozza’s approach to emotions in argumentation suggests a new development of the theory of dialogue types, aimed at taking people, and not abstract or social agents, into consideration. This proposal can be built up providing a model of dialogical context that includes the interlocutor’s goals, their roles but also their interpretative tendency or attitude, which can be more or less stereotyped in cultural background interpretative behaviours. In this fashion, the emotive reaction and the relationship between emotions and deep background knowledge can be accounted for. This notion of context of dialogue affects the normative goal of the theory of dialogue types. Some emotive arguments are allowed in some types of dialogue, while in others are considered as abusive. However, if contexts and not types of dialogue are considered, it is necessary to investigate the possible interlocutors’ interpretative tendencies, cultures and attitudes. An account of the admissibility of emotive arguments considering stereotyped contexts can be combined with a description of the acceptable or abusive strategies that can be used for specific dialogical purposes before specific types of interlocutors. For instance, a more vehement expression of emotions in support of a claim can prevent objections from being advanced. However, a normative theory providing that such moves shall not be admitted this normative approach does not help in real conversations. Recognizing an abusive move can be used to open a different context of dialogue, where different rules apply. In this kind of framework understating the reasons behind the real or pretended emotions that have been voiced can be an instrument to develop strategies to undercut possible reactions or communicating reasons in another fashion.
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