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When Establishment and Social Movements Fail: Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries

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When Establishment and Social Movements Fail
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries

By

Nancy Duffy

A Major Research Paper
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Political Science
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2019

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By

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June 4, 2019
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ABSTRACT

This paper takes a second look at the 2016 American Presidential Primaries from the perspective of asking what the American people were really after when they chose to ultimately support populism. Media reports and editorial discussions all pointed to a base that was somehow backing misogyny and racism. My research points to an alternative. Populism and social movement theory suggest that the success of anti-establishment candidacies is not credited to populists alone; in the case of 2016, it had support in the credibility and political opportunity left by social movements past. And so to investigate this historic battle between the establishment and anti-establishment candidacies, we can look to what populism and social movements have in common, and how they merge during the framing process. Within this context, this research seeks to answer how the anti-establishment candidates of the 2016 American Primaries framed a battle against 'the establishment' – within an establishment arena and won.

By seeing populism as more of a logic as opposed to an ideology, we can eliminate a partisan lens in the study of what happened in 2016. By seeing populism as a strategy when added to a collective action frame of a social movement, we can analyze how it was used to mobilize voters to action. By using populism and social movement theory, we can add further context to what voters were experiencing in 2016. This study uses a populist master frame analysis of the 2016 U.S. Presidential Primary debates, which ultimately illustrates the efficacy of populist messaging while exposing the weaknesses of the establishment rhetorical response. Findings suggest that populist candidates unearthed deep insecurities in 2016, specifically in areas concerning the economy, foreign policy, and within the identities affected by loss, discrimination and threats to human rights.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

The American presidential primaries of 2016 offered a milieu of electorate angst, anti-establishment candidacies, and populist showmanship with social movement characteristics, all culminating into one of the most exciting and politically contentious climates in modern U.S. history. Was it the clash of ideologies that stirred us so, or the strategies politicians chose to utilize during their campaigns? Or is it still the current state that our global politics finds us in?

David Frum (Munk Debates, 2018) has referred to this period as a *new* populism. And although it had not yet been in the arena of such an aggressive globalism pitted so snugly against a requiem for the past, populism is not new. It has not changed – except that in 2016 America, populism has entered and won in the establishment arena. In an environment that first relished his outlier status and his verbose command of attention, Trump handily employed his unique brand of populism – as did the senator from Vermont, Bernie Sanders.

At the time of this writing, populist-style contenders continue to enter the political arena. Andrew Wang promises a universal basic income. He frames it as a “freedom dividend” to help ward off the impending effects of artificial intelligence and automation (Bloom, 2018, p. 1). Bernie Sanders tags the word “Movement” at the end of his campaign videos in his 2020 bid to office, employing the same inequality messages of the past. Meanwhile Alexandria Ocasio Cortez, the youngest person to win a congressional seat in U.S. political history, handily won the 14th Congressional District in New York using some of the same Sanders’ rhetoric (Wallis-Wells, 2018). The popularity of all these candidacies
rests on their clearly stated intentions to buck old establishment ways. Their plans are called impractical – radical even.

These are explosive, exciting times; not because of the ill-repute populism might leave in its wake, but because of the increasing saliency of politics and in watching how different populists wield its power. Populism by nature is disruptive, signifying the uncomfortable revelations of the greater problems that its mere presence has come to signify (Judis, 2016). As Judis writes, “Voters have suddenly become responsive to politicians or movements that raise issues that major parties have either downplayed or ignored” (Judis, 2016, p. 20). Neither populism nor social movements happen in a vacuum.

This paper explores what happens when old contentions remain, as grievances and blame still stemming from the Great Recession, pour into the establishment arena under the powerful steering of populist candidacies. This newly-lit populism in the United States has divisively ignited the imaginations and activism of the American psyche in its media, and constituency of all ages. I explore this period through the lens of a populist master frame comparing findings to a similar frame analysis done on the populist social movements of the Great Recession. At its core, this particular case study investigates how the primary anti-establishment candidates framed a battle against ‘the establishment’ – within an establishment arena, for the right to lead the country on behalf of ‘the people.’

A caution for anyone interested in improving the practice of politics, the findings herein illustrates how the complacency of establishment and ineffectiveness of social movements make ripe the opportunity for intervention of an alternate kind. More than anything, this paper unveils just how precarious the democratic system is to populism against the backdrop of changing superstructures. A growing economic insecurity and
inequality fused with a diminishing feeling of national security readied the conditions of the primary electoral arena in 2016; they were more cunning; they were wittier at the podium, and more than anything the populists of 2016 were more consistent in ‘establishing’ what they wanted to set as the framing agenda. The anti-establishment candidacies of 2016 were bold and unapologetic; willing to name names while riding on the legitimacy of grievances set in social movements past.

**Organizational Overview**

I open this journey with a literature review that first dives into the context of the social movements of the Great Recession and the grievances it left behind. The electoral angst during the 2016 primary season, was illustrative of the continuation of grievances and increasing contention Americans were facing at the time. Once context has been established, I discuss the nexus between populism and social movement theory and how, at least in the case of the 2016 primaries, political opportunity and agency showed up in the form of populism when both establishment and social movements failed. And of course if we are to research how populists operated in 2016, we must also discuss what I mean by establishment versus anti-establishment candidacies, and the ‘establishment arena’ they play in. All of these are important factors that will be reconsidered within the discussion portion of the empirical findings in Chapter V.

The empirical portion of this paper includes a populist master frame analysis of the 2016 American presidential primary season [herein referred to as ‘primaries’], beginning from August 2015 to April 2016 followed by a further comparative analysis against a similar case study of the social movements of the Great Recession (see Methodology). This process will help illustrate how anti-establishment candidates used the populist master
frame in relation to the simple rhetoric of establishment candidacies. This analysis also works to reveal that those blamed for the grievances of the social movements of 2011 were the same in 2016. Herein I uncover how Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump drew on the experiential knowledge, fears and insecurities of a voter base – that in some ways served as either a new protest cycle of the 2011 Occupy movement.
CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW

2008-2011: An Overview of a Contentions Past

The slide into one of the greatest recessions on record began with a policy decision that failed to protect the people, a point of contention often brought up by Bernie Sanders during the 2016 primaries. The Glass-Steagall Act, a separation between commercial and investment banking, “had been repealed in 1999, and by 2007 income inequality in the United States had reached pre-1929 levels” (Kitromilides, 2012, p. 8). In 2008, the bottom fell out of America - as well as other parts of the world, jarring confidence everywhere. In the United States, it was a time when the repossession of homes, and personal economic insecurities were at an all-time high. To stress the magnitude of this crisis, I use the words of a scholar half a world away:

A crisis that began in a small segment of the U.S. housing market evolved into a global credit crisis of systemic proportions. The impact of the crisis began to engulf households and business around the world. The most advanced economies (the U.S., the EU and Japan) were simultaneously in recession (Krinickiene, 2009, p. 124).

These were the conditions that spawned the global social movements of the Great Recession, beginning in 2011 with the 15-M Anti-austerity Movement and the Los Indignados of Spain and Greece, followed by the Occupy Movement in the United States which extended to various cities throughout the world. In Spain the movement was a protest against the 41 percent youth unemployment rate, austerity measures, and “the predicted dominance of the main Spanish political parties in upcoming regional and municipal elections on 19 May” (Krinickiene, 2009, p. 4). Though he underestimated its impact, Spanish journalist Miguel-Anxo Murado captured the sentiment of the event when he wrote, “For all its far-reaching rhetoric, [the movement] … ultimately represents the
frustration of those who see that it doesn't matter which way you vote, the economic policies are dictated by the markets; hence the critique of the system” (quoted in Charnock et al., 2012, p. 5).

Months later, on September 17th, 2011, fueled by similar sentiments to the 15-M, and the tactic of occupying public squares, the Occupy Movement began. Taking over Zuccotti Park, purposely in the Wall Street financial district of New York City, occupiers protested uncertainty, corruption, and inequality. Utilizing a populist master frame (discussed later in this paper), the leaderless movement strongly positioned itself in stark opposition to an elite antagonist. Some argued that the movement was a success as “evidenced by the diffuse reference in cultural and political discourse to the movement's framing of the 99% united against the corrupting influence of the 1% of elites who control the majority of global wealth” (Lubin, 2012, p. 185). These were the conditions under which the Occupy Movement was born:

On the brink of collapse in 2008 and 2009, Wall Street firms were bailed out by the federal government while millions of Americans lost their jobs and homes. With a shrinking middle class, poverty reached an all-time high, and a record 50 million Americans went without health insurance… Adding to the frustration was the realization that the long-held American work ethic – work hard and get ahead – was no longer tenable (Lubin, 2012, p. 185).

As Zuccotti Park cleared, however, the 1% was still intact, leaving the 99% somewhat unchanged while some fell even more behind. These were the conditions under which the 2016 American election season was born.

A Discussion of Populism and Social Movement Theory

What does populism even mean? In 2018, The Munk Debates questioned populism’s future as part of their deliberations, attracting both media and protesters to
Toronto's Roy Thompson Hall. Ex-Breitbart News executive and advisor to Trump, Steve Bannon, dubbed as “one of the world's most well-known populist thinkers and campaigners,” (Munk Debates, 2018) defined Trump's populism as an “economic nationalism” when he said to a somewhat mocking crowd:

Trump's economic nationalism doesn't care about your race, your ethnicity or your colour… It cares if you're a citizen. We're at the beginning of a new political revolution and that is populism… is it going to be populist nationalism that believes in capitalism and deconstructing the administrative state and giving the little guy a piece of the action, and break up this crony capitalism of big corporations and big government? Or is it going to be Jeremy Corbin and Bernie Sanders type of populist socialism? (Munk Debates, November 2, 2018).

Atlantic journalist, and former speechwriter to President George W. Bush, David Frum, offered this in response:

[Populism] claims to speak for the people, but it always begins by subdividing the people and by saying some among the people, because of their skin or the way they pray, or their gender, whom they love or how they conduct themselves - or for some other reason. Populism begins by dividing the country between those people and us people and saying those people do not matter and our people do … this new populism, it's a scam, it's a lie, it's a fake (Munk Debates, November 2, 2018).

In the greater public sphere, the defining moment for contemporary populism blurs further still. In October 2018, Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, tried to co-opt the 'right type of populism,' aligning himself with Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau: “I think Justin Trudeau and I are also populists. We are,” he says, “of [a] populism which is delivering for the people” (CBC News, October 25, 2018). This tendency of politicians to want to appear as an ally of ‘the people’ seems par for the course. In the loose proliferation of the term, Oliver and Rahn (2016) write that this is “why the populist label gets so widely applied” (p. 191). The difference, however, is not in the adoption of the term, but the
centrality of its practice. “[P]opulists do more than simply paint themselves on the side of the majority; they make populist rhetoric the center of their campaigns” (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p. 191).

To Judis (2016) populism is seen as more of a logic with utility throughout the political spectrum, as opposed to its typical attribution as a right-wing-only ideology (p. 14). Populism belongs to no one specific party, but rather employs a particular sensibility between leftwing and rightwing actors. According to Judis, leftwing populists work vertically, pitting the interests of ordinary masses in stark contrast to those in power. Rightwing populists will usually add a third party to the mix fighting those from above and below. This type of rightwing populist “champions the people against an elite that they accuse of coddling a third group, which can consist, for instance of immigrants, Islamists, or African American militants” (Judis, 2016, p. 14). Judas (2016) draws a further distinction on the right, however, between rightwing populism and “a conservativism that primarily identifies with the business classes against their critics and antagonists below” (p. 14). Regardless of ideological affiliation, “with the aid of the medium of mass mobilization” (Türk, 2018, p. 153), populism assumes at the very least, the existence of two rival groups; the disadvantaged (us) against the advantaged (them) elite.

Aslanidis (2018) concurs. Populism belongs to no one ideology, but above mere logic, he sees it as a form of anti-establishment discourse in the name of the people – that when added to a collective action frame, becomes more of a strategic tool. In this sense, and within the context of social movement framing theory, Aslanidis views “populism as a mobilizing frame” (p. 444). His work identifies how populist framing was made manifest
During the social movements of the Great Recession, which I refer to later in the empirical portion of this paper.

So the different schools of thought on populism are those that believe populism as belonging to a particular extreme version of ideology; as more of a benign cooptation of other politicians, as a form of economic nationalism; as a divisive scam, versus those that see it as logic or a strategic tool of mobilization. For the purposes of this research, I adopt the definition of populism similar to that of John Judis (2016) and Paris Aslanidis (2018), defining populism as both a logic as well as a strategic tool for the purpose of mass mobilization.

**Where Social Movements and Populism Converge**

The social movements of the Great Recession were effective in using populism as a mobilizing force by framing the 99% of a collective humanity against the 1% of a corrupt, billionaire class (Aslanidis, 2018). It built a consensus which manifested in colourful protests and the occupation of public spaces; an overt exercise of power. In terms of real change, however, the social movement fell short. The movement had no real access to the establishment process and lacked the enduring motivating power and leadership to change it.

This case study relies heavily on the 2018 work of Paris Aslanidis for two reasons. First, the empirical methodology of this study was inspired by his 2018 analysis on the social movements of the Great Recession and their use of “populism as a collective action master frame” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 443). And second, for how he draws attention to the connection between mobilization, social movement theory and populism. He is one of the first scholars to argue that the “Great Recession mobilizations can be meaningfully
understood as a wave of *populist social movements*, instigated via the politicization of citizen identity” (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 301/302). And although some prefer *not* to use the terms “populist movements” and “populist social movements” interchangeably, Aslanidis (2016) points to the work of contemporary scholars who “conceptualize the American populists as both a social and a political movement… contending that ‘authentically populist social movements and parties have played important roles at critical times’ in American history” (p. 302). This then provides an opportunity to borrow the literature of social movements to help explain the populist attributes of the 2016 primaries. To Aslanidis (2016), there is a clear “relation between social movements and electoral politics [that] should serve an opportunity to bring social movements and populism theorists together” (p. 303).

Although Aslanidis boldly marks an association between these two schools, he builds on the work of those before him who have drawn *loose* parallels between the social movements of the Great Recession, and populism. Judis (2016) writes that populist “campaigns and parties have converged in their concerns, and in the wake of the Great Recession, they have surged” (p. 13). Until recently, “there was no concerted effort toward building a comprehensive framework for the study of populist mobilization, despite its growing significance in the past decades” (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 301). I suspect that the current election cycle (2020) and the results of the last one (2016) may change that. Here, through the help of a scholar’s attempt to publicly explain populism, I will build an illustration of what populism and social movements have in common; how they merge during the framing process and how the greatest difference between them lies in the direct rhetorical leadership of the populist.
In September of 2016, scholar and writer, Niall Ferguson told an audience for Zeitgeist Minds that there are five ingredients needed for populism to emerge: an increase in immigration, increased inequality, a major financial crisis, the perception of corruption, and finally a demagogue (Ferguson, 2016, Time 2:31-5:40). Four of these five precursors also make up part of social movement theory. The bridge between populist-style social movements and populism lies in the strategies they have in common and the grievances people face.

**Just Immigration or Population Changes?**

A new Immigration and Nationality Act in 1965 saw “a flood of new immigrants, including unskilled labor from Latin America and Asia” (Judis, 2016, p. 44). With the influx of a plentiful, low-cost labor force, this new immigration policy had inadvertently aided in lowering wages while also impugning union powers (Judis, 2016). In addition to the consequences of conventional immigration laws, international conflicts exert further pressure on an already feeble system, like that of the Syrian refugee crisis. These pressures only further exasperate the growing disparity between parties; where Democrats want to open up borders, Republicans prefer a more selective, cautious approach. The reasons for caution have ties to national security in fears of terrorism, but also to that of a feeling of a potential loss in national identity. By 2050, North America “is projected to be a majority minority… replacing the self-confidence of white majorities with an existential insecurity channeled by the lightning rod of immigration” (Kaufman, 2019, p. 2). Ferguson’s necessary ingredient of immigration for populism, therefore, is valid but also highly limiting as it relates solely to a right-winged perspective of the term. And since we have by
now discovered that populism is non-partisan, I would, therefore, expand Ferguson’s confined ingredient of immigration to one of population change in general.

Populations move not only internationally, but within nations as well; from rural areas to cities; from state to state; from cities to suburbia. People are always moving. They move from belonging to one demographic category to another as they age; their differences in political perspectives also change; and new cohorts are formed. Within these changes the opportunities to support these populations as they morph, also changes, and sometimes the opportunities fall short. Jack Goldstone's (2002) perspective on social movement theory supports the idea that changes of population can act as source of contention. There is not enough time and space to go through all of the possible factors affecting population changes, but as an example, let us expand on one demographic in the form of American youth. Goldstone (2002), for instance, posits that “[p]roblems arise when there is a persistent mismatch between employment prospects and the size and nature of the labor force” (p. 10). This may include reasons of immigration but does not have to.

In the United States, a factor of political discontent for youthful Sanders' supporters, for instance, might be “over-education relative to the caliber of available jobs” (Goldstone, 2002, p. 10), a grievance compounded by growing student loans. Experiences within demographic groups, like Mannheim’s political generation concept, are also a factor. Mannheim theorizes that “political generations emerge when particular birth cohorts are exposed to highly distinctive life experiences during adolescence or young adulthood” counting the “protest cycle among these distinctive life experiences” (Goldstone & McAdam, p. 195). The baby boomer generation, for instance, during their youth, for the first time through the American education system and their involvement in the protests of
the 1960s, drew the attention of media, movements, and businesses. It was a generation that enjoyed the luxury of economic advantage; one who was readily available for protest. As suggested by the Manheim theory, this 1960s youth cohort had “a strong sense of generational identity and ‘history-making’ potency… the capacity to act as a conscious political group” (Goldstone & McAdam, p. 211).

Fast forward to 2016, you have a cohort of youth that remembers the Occupy Movement; a youth living in a world where some of the top American organizations are run by people close to their own age (Mark Zuckerberg is merely 34). They have the memory of a protest cycle, the advantage of organization through the education system, and a strong millennial identity. To add to the political generation concept, however, is the addition of the real grievance of the lack of economic advantage and security that past generations once had. This may only further fuel the ‘strong sense of generational identity and history making potency’ that Mannheim’s political generation concept describes.

With respect to population changes and affects between rural and urban areas, some suggest that the 2008 recession may have affected rural and urban populations differently. This might help explain the rural/urban divide among supporters between primary candidacies. One study analyzing institutional confidence levels after the Great Recession found “that individuals who live in the counties that experienced the greatest economic shocks have larger declines in confidence in the federal government and organized labor than those living in other counties” (Danziger, 2013, p. 23). This variance in population experience between rural and urban areas can help explain the Republican / Democrat rivalry – where rural populations tend to support the Republican base and urban populations, the Democrats.
Growing Inequality, Corruption, and a Major Financial Crisis

Just as is the case with social movements, Niall Ferguson gets it right when he points out how increased inequality, a major financial crisis, and the perception of corruption, work as ingredients for populism. Social movement theorists refer to these issues, generally, as grievances, which come in many forms and affect collective groups differently.

The genesis of this research began with wanting to further explore the impact of lost work and identities stemming from the wake of the Great Recession of 2008 and what it meant for the politics of America. Though economic inequality started decades before, 2008 and beyond was described as “the most severe recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s” (Danziger, 2013, p. 6). Real wages have since stagnated or actually decreased, greatly impacting the lower to middle class worker, making way for a renewed form of contentious politics in America. Bad trade deals, corruption and lobby influences were seen as part of the problem with an understandable “public skepticism… [in] opposition to American firms moving plants overseas” (Judis, 2016, p. 45).

Social movement theory supports, at the very least, a conversation about the effects of structural changes and modernization on society, as a source of growing inequalities and potential crisis. In challenging the notion of whether or not modernization was a cause of contentious politics, Charles Tilly (1973) had cast aspersions on Samuel Huntington’s findings on the matter. Tilly cited Huntington’s lack of evidentiary support for “the effects of changes in the rate of social and economic modernization within the same country” (p. 432) as a reason to disagree with his position. Huntington (1968) had accredited the contentious conflict between the years of 1958 and 1965, to “rapid social change and the
rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions” (p. 4). He goes on to explain that as innovations and modernization begins to take hold within a conventional society, some “sources of identity and association… may be undermined and destroyed… Others, however, may achieve a new consciousness and become the basis for new organization because they are capable” (p. 38).

Arthur Brooks, a social scientist and scholar, has been championing awareness of what he refers to as the dignity gap since 2014. By ‘dignity gap’ he means that parts of America have been suffering with the phenomenon of no longer being needed. The disappearance of jobs from the North American market, has changed the very nature and pay of work. He argues that past policies “got the U.S. government into the business of treating people left behind by economic change as liabilities to manage rather than as human assets to develop” (Brooks, 2017, p. 3). And while identities in some parts of the U.S. are being lost, others are being voiced in the form of Black Lives Matter, women’s rights, equal work for equal pay, etcetera. So there is not only a disparity in income equality; and equality of rights, but also a growing identity gap. Nevertheless, these gaps coincide with Huntington’s (1968) earlier idea of the lost and found identities in the wake of modernization processes.

Indeed the issue of growing inequality has inspired new research into modernization and structural influence on greater society. One of the reasons the Great Recession was felt so widely around the world was due to the global market ties between industry and countries. This globalization made possible what is referred to as financialization whereby “during a period of hegemonic transition... capitalist elites
respond to increased international competition by shifting their investments from production to finance” (Van der Zwan, 2014, p. 104). In her study on the internationalization of global markets, Van der Zwan (2014) points to the disproportionate compensation between executives and employees, as executives are now more so rewarded on the basis of stock value as opposed to actual production output (p. 107).

Not only are financial rewards disproportionately favouring managers and executives, but the research consensus is that these rewards are given at the expense of employees. It is as Van der Zwan (2014) writes, “a dramatic picture, in which the pursuit of shareholder value is directly linked to declining working conditions and rising social inequality for large segments of the population” (p. 109). Much in the same way that anti-establishment candidacies accuse establishment of being influenced by lobbyists and superPAC funding, the new ‘financialization of global markets’ may be affecting corporate behaviours, as executives seek out ‘market performance’ enhancers as a path to higher compensation (p. 110). Van der Zwan (2014) cites “internationalization of global markets [as a] major impetus for firms to withdraw from productive activities” (p. 104), while also incentivizing offshore production.

Under the guise of neo-globalization, other structural influences are also underfoot which will serve to challenge economic equality now and in the future. Automation and artificial intelligence are expected to fundamentally change entire industries. And while new jobs and opportunities will be created in its wake, “technological advancement has stagnated or even shrunk earnings for much of the population across nations” (Islam, 2018, p. 933). Still, to date, there is little evidence that establishment politics is preparing for the
impending repercussions. In this case, Huntington’s view of the modernization process and a slow-to-move establishment as cause of contention, becomes more and more relevant.

Social movement theorist, Ted Gurr (1968) refers to fissures in equality as the culprits behind what he terms as ‘relative deprivation’ – a driver of contention. He describes this as “a state of mind that can he defined as a discrepancy between people’s expectations about the goods and conditions of life to which they are justifiably entitled, on the one hand, and on the other their value capabilities – what they perceive to be their chances for getting and keeping those goods and conditions” (Gurr, 1968, p. 51). Skocpol (1979) describes this as a condition that occurs when “a gap between the valued things and opportunities they feel entitled to and opportunities they actually get” (p. 9). The American dream used to be achievable – the loss of good-paying jobs, a growing inequality and shrinking middle class now have citizens believing otherwise. As stated by Lubin earlier regarding the Great Recession – “the long-held American work ethic – work hard and get ahead, was no longer tenable” (Lubin, 2012, p. 185).

A Demagogue or Something Else?

The fifth ingredient that Ferguson deems necessary for populism is the presence of a demagogue. But a demagogue and populist are not the same thing. It is no surprise, that like populism, demagoguery lacks consensus in definition. A term originally coined by the Greeks, the meaning of demagogue ranges from something as banal as being “a leader of the people” (Hogan & Williams, 2004, p. 152) to someone who makes “dangerous popular appeals” (Ceaser, 2007, p. 258). For others still, a demagogue is merely “a label used to discredit those who offend our rhetorical or ideological sensibilities” (Hogan & Williams, 2004, p. 153).
Most of these definitional variations, however, might be fine for a Donald Trump, but would omit cases like Bernie Sanders. His rhetoric is not consistent with the pejorative connotation of a demagogue, yet his framing of speech and leadership style is indeed populist. Here is where Niall Ferguson and I disagree. And to help clarify my point, I refer to the work of Michael Federici. In *The Challenge of Populism*, Federici (1991) contrasts the ‘populist demagogue’ and their style of oratory to that of ‘the statesman.’ Quoting John Hallowell, he writes, “The statesman is concerned with inspiring right action, and the test of his statesmanship is his ability to lead public opinion rather than slavishly to follow it” (p. 120). He further clarifies his position by describing a true statesman as one who in their attempt to lead, “tries to persuade [the people] by means of argument” (p. 120). Whereas the demagogue, on the other hand, is more inclined to “publicly berate their opponents, using hyperbole to characterize their positions” (p. 120). In Sanders and Trump we can see the respective statesman and demagogue, but that does not preclude either from their use of populism. Rather than the presence of a demagogue, therefore, the fifth component of populism, could be seen as the actual populist – or agent who uses populism as a means to mobilize people to action.

Ferguson is right in that grievances alone do not lead to populism (otherwise his list of five would be one), just as grievances alone are not enough to lead to the collective action within a social movement. Goldstone (2002) writes that “it is a profound and repeated finding that the mere facts of poverty and inequality or even increases in these conditions, do not lead to political or ethnic violence” (p. 8). Rather, in addition to grievances, “there must be some elite leadership to mobilize popular groups and to create linkages between them” (p. 8). Supporting Goldstone's point, McCarthy and Zald (1977)
add “issue entrepreneurs and organizations” to the list of acceptable elite leadership (p. 1215) – a brief discussion on the agency of populist leadership is then warranted.

Barr (2009) looks at the advent of populism by analyzing the “nature of political appeals, the individual's location vis-à-vis the party system and the linkages emphasized,” (p. 44). Through this lens, populism can be precisely defined as “a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages” (Barr, 2009, p. 38). Note that these appeals do not have to be partisan; nor do they have to be denigrating in nature.

Generally, linkages have to do with “the means by which political actors and constituents exchange support and influence” (Barr, 2009, p. 34). Plebiscitarian linkages (meaning direct vote) are associated with populism because there is an implication that in populism, a direct relationship exists between the populist and ‘the people.’ This direct relationship, however, is highly symbolic, that “although citizens feel like direct participants… they are expected to delegate power to a politician who claims to be the embodiment of their redemption” (Barr, 2009, p. 36).

This anti-establishment, plebiscitarian, ‘go it alone’ maverick behavior of a populist – aligns with the sentiment that “establishment is not willing, or perhaps incapable of moving fast enough toward a solution to the perceived crisis” (Judis, 2016, p. 16) – and so something else is needed. The populist then becomes the leadership component and agency that social movements sometimes lack. But there is more to how and why populism showed up effectively in 2016. This is where I look to social movement theory to fill in what Ferguson has left out.
What Populist Assumptions Leave Out, Social Movement Theory Will Provide

So far we have discussed all the conditions that Niall Ferguson says are needed in order for populism to exist. In the case of the 2016 American Primary season, and the surprising success that populism showed in the general election, there are a few additional considerations that come to mind. A further look into other theoretical positions of social movements could help explain how populism might not only exist but actually succeed.

Political Opportunity, Even After the Movement Dies

The failure of the social movements of the Great Recession does not mean that the grievances were not real nor that they still are not real. In this section I argue that if grievances are not dealt with by the establishment, in essence, if establishment fails, and even if ensuing social movements thereafter fail, that contentious politics will continue and create opportunity for something else to step in. In the case of 2016, that something else was populism. It is as Goldstone and Tilly (2001) write that “the repeated empirical finding [is] that in many situations, even after controlling for other factors, increased repression leads to increased protest mobilization and action” (p. 181).

Political opportunity involves changes in the dynamics of a situation that somehow transform the expectations of what can be done (Tarrow, 2011, p. 163). When conditions change, new possibilities emerge; new material, new resources, new supports can be thought of; new discussions can be had about how people might do things differently. This means that although a social movement fizzes out, its work was not done in vein. The death of a movement and persistence of grievances can arguably create new political opportunity for the populist to come in and take up the work started in the movement before. In this sense a dead social movement, followed by a successful populist challenge
(in that the populist successfully activates people toward consensus and action – or even election!) can be seen as simply a new cycle of protest. It is as Tarrow (2011) writes:

As conflict collapses and militants retire to lick their wounds, many of their advances are reversed, but they often leave behind incremental expansions in participation, changes in popular culture, and residual movement networks. Cycles of contention are a season for sowing, but reaping is often done during the periods of demobilization that follow, by late-comers to the cause, by elites, and by authorities (Tarrow, 2011, p. 266).

Outside of the election process, establishment can still be challenged, but it leaves little room for ‘maverick’ antics, and opportunity then becomes on the side of establishment to appease grievances by other means. “If the state is in a position to negotiate and appease the social sectors where from these demands originate, then populist mobilization will not ensue” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 447). But in this case the state, or establishment had not reconciled in any real way with the movement concerns and because the movement came to a natural decline, they did not have to. An election cycle, however, presents new political opportunity for populists in that the establishment arena becomes officially open for business, and positions are formally up for challenge. Social movements do not have direct access to the electoral arena though some might try to affect its course anyway.

With all the political opportunity left behind from the social movements of 2011, coupled with standing grievances and an open electoral arena to establishment, the 2016 American elections made for a most opportune time for a populist agenda. Had the Occupy Movement succeeded, the reasoning to pursue a populist agenda would be mute. But in this case, by taking up the same unaddressed grievances, the populist borrows the credibility of the prior movement’s claims, already validated by its followers in the 99%:

The majoritarian view of democracy implicitly provided legitimacy for the movement and its claims; at the same time, divisions among the 99 percent
were underplayed, since the vagueness of the collective identity allowed everybody to feel part of the in-group. The Statement of Autonomy proclaimed Occupy a people's movement (Aslandis, 2016, p. 311).

Other political opportunity considerations include outside interferences at the macro level that may work to further induce mobilization (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 628). In 2011, the macro-level events in Greece, Spain, and the United States exposed commonalities between movements which created more impetus for others to join the cause. The social movements of the Great Recession uncovered a collective clash between neo-globalization efforts and the needs of people and their communities; an unearthing which served as fodder for new populist activity in America as well as Europe.

Another element that perhaps made ripe the ascent of candidates like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders is the normalization and possibly even a preference for a less formal, grassroots form of content creation. “These new forms of interactive digital media also shift the focus away from a transmission model of traditional news framing effects to a more interactive, social constructivist, and ‘bottom-up’ model of framing” (Nisbet, 2010, p. 75). In some ways, the informal, direct discourse made possible by social media has perhaps made clearer, the path for populism, and its practitioners, to take hold in times of contentious politics.

**Name it, Blame it, Change it. Framing in Populism and Social Movements**

We now know that political opportunity in the form of a new collective awareness and credibility of grievances, an openness to establishment through the electoral arena, and the greater normalization for populist-like discourse through social media, all helped the American populists of 2016. But what else? While all of these catalytic conditions were critical to the populist fates of the 2016 primaries, the season had one further special sense
of agency behind it. In addition to those mentioned above, political opportunity can also be affected by a mobilization of resources through the framing process itself. This occurs when “the framing of entire episodes of contention” can be seen as a “mechanism … in the immediate environment that triggers mobilization” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 163) by bringing bystanders and even converts into the process. This is exactly what the populist master frame was made for!

I mentioned credibility earlier because its role is significant in the framing process that carried the populists of the day. The aftermath of the Occupy Movement gave the American populists of 2016 the credibility to name the corruption and grievances that remained unaddressed by establishment, despite the social upheavals of 2011. Establishment had not changed all that much and inequality had only since grown. One study done the same year as the primaries had shown that the middle class was in decline, nationwide, across American cities – “the share of adults living in middle-income households fell in 203 out of 229 U.S. metropolitan areas examined from 2000 to 2014” (Fry & Kochhar, 2016, p. 3). A falling middle class automatically widens the gap between the one percent elites and the rest of society (the 99 percent) that Sanders so frequently cites within his political rhetoric. When the middle falls out, only the ends remain. So the grievances of the 2011 social movements were not wrong. The populists knew it and were, therefore, easily able to tap into people’s ‘experiential knowledge’ (Goffman, 1974), adding more credibility to the populist frame. Therefore, this void that remained from the dust of the social movements of the Great Recession granted the opportunity for populism to move in.
I begin this next section by first providing a general definition and purpose of framing, followed by the meaning of a collective action frame and all of its working components. I then explore what it means to use populism as a collective action frame and how the collective action frame can extend to what is known as a master frame.

The framing process is both a meaning-making and mobilization machine and yet, useless without a driver. A frame sets the structure for the needed identity work that aids a movement practitioner or populist in telling motivational stories about issues; how the issue came about and what needs to be done. A frame is defined as “a central organizing idea for making sense of relevant events and suggesting what is at issue” (Kuypers, 2010, p. 300, also Gamson, 1989, p. 157). The process of framing is deliberative in defining and promoting certain information and ideas over others. Entman (1993) refers to this as a process of “selection and salience” (p. 52). Although not always perceived as intended, the salience of a well-constructed frame has the power of making some issues “more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to audiences” over others by simply including some facts at the exclusion of others (p. 52-53). In the context of describing how media uses framing, Entman defines framing as “the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to promote a particular interpretation” (Entman, 2010, p. 336). In keeping with his definition of populism as strategy, Aslanidis (2018) defines frames as “discursive structures aiming to supply and make available versions of reality that cater to their producers’ strategic needs in the wider struggle for social meaning making” (p. 445).

Benford and Snow (2000) have done an extensive amount of research on collective action frames, master frames and framing tasks. They describe framing as a means “to help
render events or occurrences meaningful and thereby function to organize experience and
guide action” (p. 614). This stems from Erving Goffman’s (1974) fixation on frames as
“the organization of experience” (p. 11). But a framework, he writes “allows its user to
locate, perceive, identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences
defined in its terms” (p. 21) even if subconsciously. And so the negotiation for meaning
making begins with the framing process and the agency of the one who uses it.

Collective action frames work as a structural tool to help movement practitioners
(or populists) build consensus about an issue by first defining the problem at hand. Once
defined, the framework then sets out to “make attributions regarding who or what is to
blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in concert to
affect change” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 615). Components of the collective action frame,
as suggested by Gamson (1995) include “injustice, agency and identity” (p. 90). The
injustice piece implies that the problem being identified is not merely a ‘wrong’ but a
“moral indignation… laden with emotion” (p. 90). Emotions play a significant role in
populist movement making, which I discuss later. The agency component suggests that
desired changes are achievable if effected “through collective action” (p. 90). Lastly, the
element of identity “refers to the process of defining this ‘we,’ typically in opposition to
some ‘they’ who have different interests or values” (p. 90). But when added with the edge
of populism, the identity component is most affected.

The literature suggests that when used as a collective action frame, populism has
the ability to cover all three components of ‘injustice, agency and identity.’ “As a collective
action frame, populism is based on an anti-elite discourse in the name of the sovereign
people, invoking the value of popular sovereignty to seek redress for injustices perpetrated
by unaccountable elites that have usurped political authority” (Aslandis, 2018, p. 447). The 2018 Aslanidis study proposes that the social movements of 2011, including the Occupy Movement, used this form of collective action frame, where populism was used to mobilize ‘the people’ to action (p. 443). This particular frame’s openness to other groups is what brings us to the concept of a master frame.

Master frames are like collective action frames which broaden the framing process to include more than one issue or use devices to simplify blame. This opens the movement up in a way that can be as inclusive as possible to others. If successfully executed, the master frame “invites other groups to recognize its utility and potentially exploit it in mobilizing their own constituencies, profiting from the opening of a fresh discursive opportunity” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 445). “In this sense,” Aslanidis (2018) writes, “master frames differ from movement-specific collective action frames by informing a wide array of protest events, providing movement entrepreneurs with a generic rubric for blame attribution, amenable to customization and adaptation to particular needs and objectives” (p. 445). The rights framing of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s was a great example of a master frame that opened up for other movement entrepreneurs, like the women’s rights movement, LGBT and “gay rights, animal rights, abortion rights, fetal rights, and student rights” (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 4). The populist messaging executed in the Occupy master framing process, however, was one easily understood, and resonated around the world. “As the best slogans do, it concentrated the most basic issues into a phrase. That Wall Street represented the ‘1%’ was of course an implication, but the frame also brought a more general inequality into focus” (Calhoun, 2013, p. 33).
Framing Tasks and Devices

The framing tasks as assigned by Benford and Snow (2000) help to organize the negotiation process toward the goal of mobilization by either moving people toward action or toward some sort of consensus on an issue. There are three framing tasks designed to achieve these initiatives: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing. The diagnostic framing process is where grievances or the issue in need of change is defined while also ascribing blame. What to do about the grievance or issue is handled during the prognostic framing process. Lastly, inciting supporters to action becomes the job of the motivational frame. This is where “the elaboration of a call to arms or rationale for action that goes beyond the diagnosis and prognosis” (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 202) and where reasoning and framing devices come into effect.

Framing devices are simplified messages, mottos, slogans, or metaphors used to quickly amplify meaning within a frame. If well done, devices increase the memorability of a message, while also inviting buy-in and even participation in its repetition. “We are the 99%” for instance was a catchphrase termed by David Graeber an American anarchist activist (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 311). Hashtag ‘#OccupyWallStreet’ was first coined by Kalle Lasn, founder of Adbusters, through a blog and twitter post that actually brought people out to Zuccotti Park on September 17th, 2011. Per Lasn, “The whole idea behind Occupy Wall Street was that we, the people, would go to the iconic center of global capitalism, which is Wall Street, and we would take it over. It's a hell of a sexy idea, right?” (Middlewood, 2012, p. 32). The point was to motivate people to some action. Framing devices, the phraseology of motivating words and slogans is a tactic often used in advertising, their meaning and intent are direct. Reasoning devices on the other hand, are
more of an implication. They are much less obvious and work to “form a route of causal reasoning which may be evoked when an issue is associated with a particular frame” (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 91). In this case as the receiver is interpreting the framed message, the hope is that they will make a “causal inference … in line with the [intent of] the reasoning devices” (p. 91).

These devices are particularly useful in motivating consensus or action, especially through the use of emotional triggers like fear or moral arguments. Within this context, the use of fear for instance, might come in the form of iterating the threat of something happening if something else is not done. Goldstone and Tilly (2001) consider threat as part of creating political opportunity. Here the idea is that despite being repressed and feeling the pressures of a system working against you, that the threat of something worse will be enough to mobilize people to action (p. 183).

**Are Framing Tasks Populist by Design?**

Populism, when taken apart, can be seen as employing the same framing logic as social movements. Populists may differ slightly in tactics, perhaps more so in actual rhetorical style between rightwing and leftwing populists. But generally in populism, there is a “vertical politics of the bottom and middle arrayed against the top” (Judis, 2016, p. 15). Earlier we read how David Frum talked of populism, calling it “a scam… that claims to speak for the people, but it always begins by subdividing the people” (Munk Debates, November 2, 2018). And yet if we look to the collective action framing in social movement theory, the mechanics of ‘identity juxtaposition’ are the same. By defining the grievance and the blame during the diagnostic phase of framing one “defines the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a movement’s structure of conflict and alliances” (Tarrow, 2011, p. 31).
Because frames are socially constructed, they require agency in the construction of meaning making (Benford & Snow, 2000). In the same way that “movement actors are viewed as signifying agents engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 613), populists are also signifying agents. In the populist master frame deployed in 2016, the populist is the one naming the grievance, the one who calls the blame, and for the prognostic framing task, serves themselves up as being the direct-to-people-solution. The populist becomes the agency in the “meaning making struggle” (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 444).

More specifically, the motivational framing task, as seen through the populist’s lens, is rhetorically designed as a means to move people to action. This task in social movements is referred to as “the agency component of collective action frames” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 617). Here the populist puts to task their own social capital, their own language and style, which in turn gains further political opportunity through resource mobilization. One’s charismatic character, hyperbolic rhetoric and positioning in part determines a frame’s efficiency and effectiveness “to garner bystander support and to demobilize antagonists” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614).

Aslanidis (2018) argues “that the inclusive identity of 'the people' and its contentious juxtaposition against sociopolitical and economic 'elites' allowed activists to mobilize diffuse sentiments in favor of the value of popular sovereignty and unite disparate grievances in society toward joint action” (p. 444). In doing so, he brings the worlds of populist rhetoric and the collective action frames of social movements together. If Aslanidis can use populist theory to help explain the social movements of the Great Recession, then
certainly, we can use the framing tasks of social movement theory to help explain the populism of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries.

All definitions imply some sort of construction in terms of selection or the actual creation of a reality that works in favor of the framer’s interest. The idea behind frame analysis then is that if something is socially constructed, it should then be able to be deconstructed, studied and even counted. The purpose then of a frame analysis “is to reconstruct the underlying, culturally embedded frames in a text” (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 93).

The term frame analysis was first coined by Erving Goffman in his 1974 writing of the same title. Goffman saw frames as a means of people making sense of and defining certain phenomenon – usually through exposure of specific events, and the subsequent conscious or subconscious organization of information. To him, “frame analysis is a slogan to refer to the examination … of the organization of experience” (Goffman, 1974, p. 11).

Thanks to the work of Benford and Snow, this approach has since been pushed from “cognition … toward collective and organization processes appropriate to mobilization” (Johnston, 1995, p. 217). In other words the purpose of frames was to no longer merely organize experiences in order to make sense of something, but to move people toward action based on a frame’s resonance. If Goffman was the first one to consider frame analysis in the work of meaning making, then Benford and Snow were the 2.0 version of the same.

**Counter Frames**

It is important to note that those on the recipient end of blame, or those who disagree with a frame’s intent or context, do not simply remain docile in the process. Indeed there are those who reject and seek to challenge the frame, and in the process may come up with
their own. This oppositional response is known as counter-framing where there is a concerted effort to “rebut, undermine, or neutralize a person's or group's myths, versions of reality, or interpretive framework” (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 626). Oppositional responses within the same movement or party are referred to as “framing disputes” or “framing contests” (p. 625-626). The very process then of framing itself, is therefore argumentative, which may only add to further complicate the already contentious politics it purports to fix (p. 614).

I should note that while challengers or counter-frame actors can include anyone who disagrees with a frame, for the purposes of this research, due to the limited scope of this research design, the only possible counter frames that become part of the analysis, are those produced by the establishment candidacies within the 2016 primary debates.

**In Keeping with the Cycle of Protest**

Aslanidis cautions that in the interest of empirical integrity, when doing a master frame analysis, the context should be in keeping with the cycle of protest (Aslanidis, 2018, p. 446). If a cycle of protest is defined as “a phase of heightened conflict across the social system, with rapid diffusion of collective action … and sequences of intensified information flow and interaction between challengers and authorities” (Aslanidis, p. 446), then 2016 could perhaps qualify as a new cycle of protest of an old movement.

This claim, however, would not be without its challengers. In 2013 for instance, Calhoun writes: “But for the most part there is relatively little reason to expect continuity in [Occupy Wall Street] as such… It will not be just ‘Occupy Again’ but something new, sparked by its own exciting innovations, giving voice to new participants and new visions” (Calhoun, 2013, p. 27). But branding something by a different name does not make it new.
Calhoun is right in that the 2016 cycle was not called Occupy, but its grievances remained; and its framing, at least by one populist, certainly maintained the use of the same Occupy slogans (see empirical portion).

The Establishment Arena

The establishment arena within the context and purposes of this research, represents the traditional political ‘primary’ process of choosing presidential candidates. It is referred to as the establishment, or more precisely, the electoral arena because there are traditional ways a politician comes to be a candidate in the primaries – including shared ways of campaign funding, the binary profession of Republican or Democrat ideology, and the declared support of their respective issues. Theodore Windt describes the ‘establishment arena’ well, defining it as “the arena of political reality within which political thought and action take place… [that] in the United States … presidents set the initial terms for argument about issues and politics. Their messages create the arenas in which others will do rhetorical and political battle” (Windt, 1990, p. 3).

Participating within the electoral or establishment arena may have special rhetorical framing considerations as well. As suggested by McCarthy et al. (1996) an effective frame requires the rhetorical talents of the framer, especially when it pertains to breaking past the ‘gatekeepers’ of the electoral arena – those charged with trying to protect against the entry of outsiders. Within this context, McCarthy informs us that “the discourse in different arenas may well require more elaborated plans and programs if they are to be convincing to gatekeepers… the rhetorical quality of frames is crucial to their success” (McCarthy, Smith, Zald, 1996, p. 311).
Establishment v. Anti-Establishment Candidacies

The next concept that requires definition comes in two parts, the establishment versus the anti-establishment and their respective candidates. The 2016 American primary elections brought notoriety to the contrast in terms, where headlines gave credence to the notion that a counter-establishment movement was on the rise. Here are just a few headline examples:

This campaign is a mortal threat to their grip on the establishment... We need to teach the Republican establishment a lesson... The Republican establishment is... determined to stop us... The Establishment Tries to Exert What Influence It Has Against Gingrich... (Serazio, 2016, p. 181).

There is a consensus among the literature as to what constitutes an establishment candidate and/or party. But there is variance on what constitutes the anti-establishment. In first defining establishment party I defer to a study by Amir Abedi, who “measures establishment by the governing potential of a party and its actual governmental relevance” (Abedi, 2004, p. 11). For the purpose of this research, establishment (and/or establishment candidate) is defined as “first, all those parties that have participated in government or alternatively those parties that the governing parties regard as suitable partners for government formation, and second, parties that are willing to cooperate with the main governing parties by joining them in a coalition government” (Abedi, 2004, p. 11).

To help define anti-establishment parties and persons, Abedi comes up with a three-part criterion, whereby all parts must be true. An anti-establishment party, and for the purposes of this study, an anti-establishment candidate, is:

[a] party that challenges the status quo in terms of major policy issues and political system issues; [a] party that perceives itself as a challenger to the parties that make up the political establishment; [and finally, a] party that asserts that there exists a fundamental divide between the political
estabishment and the people. It thereby implies that all establishment parties be they in government or in opposition are essentially the same (Abedi, 2004, p. 11).

Robert Barr (2009) talks of the expression of anti-establishment sentiments as those which “claim that the power elite are unable or unwilling to represent ordinary citizens” (p. 31). In this sense, Anti-establishment candidates do not simply wish to replace the political elite, but to affect change in the entire system. In doing so they utilize “a specific rhetorical appeal...where political actors attempt to gain support through an ‘us versus them’ discourse” (Barr, 2009, p. 31). In this description, we can once again see the system of framing at work.

In a viewpoint that differs from other scholars, Schedler (1996) writes, that “[a]nti-political-establishment actors declare war on the political class” (p. 293). To him, anti-establishment is less about outsiders going against establishment government, but more so about those aggressively opposing those who appear in control of the overall system in a way that controls and prevents the success of others. “Its main thrust has been anti-capitalist, anti-oligarchic, or anti-imperialist. In sum, where anti-political-establishment actors carry populist banners, they do so in a qualified way; they engage in anti-political populism” (p. 293). For all the things that have generally been suggested of the anti-establishment candidate, Schedler, nearly alone in his judgement, is right to caution us that “unless we always choose to take sides for the status quo, we must first assess the underlying empirical realities before we judge anti-political diagnoses of irrationality to be irrational themselves” (p. 297).

In a more partisan view, Serazio (2016) makes the argument that it is primarily anti-establishment actors that “strategically harness resentment against the unfair conditions of
contemporary privilege and power” (p. 188). To Serazio, where the left properly names their establishment foes, in the case of the Occupy Movement, “the villainous one percent,” the right, he points out, names no one really; that the enemy, rather, is somewhat imagined - the “boogeyman or party to that secret cabal… naturally [stopping] shy of such an outright confrontation” (p. 188).

**Why it All Matters**

Why should we care about populism? Because it appears to only show up when everything else has gone wrong. If establishment failed to listen when thousands upon thousands of people lined the streets and occupied public spaces in 2011 in cities around the world, what will they listen to? Maybe if the movements would have been more clear perhaps, but how much clearer can you get than a four-word slogan? The framing by the populists during 2016 not only served as a movement-maker, it actually served as a president-maker. But a frame is only as powerful as its audience is vulnerable to fear and hope. And so when the frame is working, it can only mean that times are that dire. People’s experiential knowledge deserves recognition. And they should not have to wait for some populist to put what they are feeling into words on their behalf. When establishment and social movements fail, people had better hope that the next best solution is on their side.
CHAPTER III. ANALYSIS

Scope of Analysis

This research design entails the execution of a populist master frame analysis of the 2016 American presidential debates, beginning from August 2015 to April 2016 (see Appendices B and C). This process illustrates how the populist master frame was used by anti-establishment candidates in relation to the simple rhetoric of establishment candidacies. Grievances of the social movements of the Great Recession (Appendix K) as well as results from a 2016 Pew Research report (Appendix I) are also considered.

The Candidates

For this study, the following will represent the anti-establishment candidates whose 2016 debate rhetoric will undergo a frame analysis: Bernie Sanders, Donald Trump, and Ted Cruz. Those designated as ‘establishment candidates’ within this research, for reasons of their families’ longevity within the establishment arena, as well as their own political record, are Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush. The latter two need no further explanation as to why they should represent ‘establishment’ candidacies. An explanation for the inclusion of Sanders, Trump, and Cruz is outlined below.

Trump proves his position as an anti-establishment candidate for a number of reasons. His first bout in politics came on the tails of Ross Perot's run for the presidency in the mid-1990s, when he fought to lead the new Reform Party. Insecure about the party's future, and after dropping out of the race, Trump implies his anti-establishment status when saying, “he regretted not being able to run a race against Mr. Bush and Mr. Gore, two establishment politicians” (quoted in Judis, 2016, p. 72). When asked by a reporter from Bloomberg Businessweek about the future of the Republican party, Trump responded,
“Five, ten years from now - different party. You're going to have a worker's party. A party of people that haven't had a real wage increase in eighteen years, that are angry” (p. 77). These were not the thoughts of someone embedded in establishment ideals, even if he is solidly embedded as a member of the economic elite.

Like Trump, Bernie Sanders' debut in politics lay outside the establishment. “Sanders ran for Senate twice and governor twice in the '70s on the ticket of the Liberty Union, a left-wing third party in Vermont” (Judis, 2016, p. 78). Having failed miserably in his bid for higher office, Sanders finally found success in municipal politics (Judis, 2016, p. 79). Municipal wins garnered Sanders the experience and name recognition that would later help propel him to the House of Representatives and eventually, the Senate – all the while remaining an independent candidate. Though he first self-identified as a “radical and socialist,” (Clendinen, 1982, p. L24), Sanders now describes himself as a democratic-socialist (Weigel & Fahrenthold, 2015, p. 2).

And lastly, because John Dickerson (2013) called him “a populist egghead” (p. 1), I include Ted Cruz on my list of anti-establishment candidates. Having had roots (still present) in the populist Tea Party, Dickerson described Cruz’ entry to Washington as “an anti-establishment bolt from the blue, having defeated the GOP’s preferred nominee in his first Senate race” (p. 1). A lot has happened with Ted Cruz since 2013, namely, he fell short of winning the candidacy in 2016 perhaps because he was not anti-establishment enough; or perhaps his rhetorical skill could not stand in comparison to that of his challenger’s. For the purposes of this study, I maintain the use of Cruz as an anti-establishment candidate, precisely because his brand of populism failed: “despite his highly praised and far superior ground organization, Cruz was outperformed by Trump” (Mast, 2017, p. 467).
The following is a summary of the candidates whose rhetoric, during the 2016 Primary debates, will be reviewed as part of this populist master frame analysis (see Figure 1):

### Anti-Establishment Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donald Trump</td>
<td>Though non-establishment, Donald Trump comes from within the establishment and garners enough support to become the leader of the Republican Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ted Cruz (Quasi)</td>
<td>With informal ties to and originating from the Tea Party, Cruz remains an outsider within establishment politics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernie Sanders</td>
<td>An anti-establishment candidate working within the establishment as a sitting senator. Though unsuccessful in his attempt to lead the Democratic Party, Sanders was able to garner widespread support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Establishment Candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeb Bush</td>
<td>During this campaign Jeb Bush represented ‘old establishment’ – including his chosen style of debate in stark contrast to Trump’s charismatic character.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hillary Clinton</td>
<td>Represents globalization’s push for more open markets, and ‘more good jobs.’ Insists that America is already great – while fringe voters ask, “Great for who?”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1. Anti-Establishment & Establishment Candidates**

### Data Collection

This design was inspired by the methodology in Paris Aslanidis’ (2018) master frame analysis of the 2011 social movements. Within his study, Aslanidis looked at the manifestos of the social movements of the Great Recession. Since my work is a case study of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries as a continuation of the politics of the Great Recession, I will be looking at the framing rhetoric of anti-establishment/establishment candidates during the primaries (as identified above) but in keeping with the same methodology as the Aslanidis’ 2018 study.

Official transcripts of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries were sourced from the *New York Times, Time Magazine,* and *The Washington Post.* Video links of the full debates were also sourced through formal channels on YouTube to help provide context.
and/or clarification pertaining to the transcripts when necessary. To be clear, video links were for clarification only, the actual analysis is indeed limited to the transcripts.

I chose transcripts for this analysis to witness how candidates frame their stance among opposition candidates so as to exclude, as much as possible, the framing influence of the media. As Gamson (1992) writes, “[f]rames that are present in social movement discourse but are invisible in mass media commentary rarely find their way into conversations. Systemic omissions make certain ways of framing issues extremely unlikely” (p. 6). By looking directly at words and phrases uninterrupted by media discourse, I can better analyze context, intent and frame applicability.

Each transcript was printed to a PDF from its original news source, then downloaded and converted into a word document, where line numbers were added to properly conduct the frame analysis. Data sources for all the material used in this study have been curated and documented, inclusive of links, debate dates, locations, participant and moderator names (See Appendices A and B).

One of the challenges that Aslanidis (2018) came across in his study was with the issue of agency during the empirical prognostic framing process (p. 452). The challenge was that the social movements of the Great Recession prided themselves on their non-hierarchical style of leadership. There is no such concern for this case study of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries, as the candidates were their own agency in continuing their cycles of protest, not yet chosen by the people as representatives of “the movement.”

The challenge that this research does present, however, is simply in its size. Because Aslanidis (2018) limited his scope to the manifestos of the movement subjects, the amount of lines identified as grievances were limited in findings (p. 450, see also Appendix K).
Since the data I am considering is a bit larger, with back and forth dialogue between candidates, as well as opening and closing statements over a period of 20 debates, the transcript material extrapolates into a far greater number of documented ‘lines’ in the analysis. I will do my best to illustrate the findings in a way that can be easily viewed, despite the size of transcriptions.

**Methodology**

This research design has three parts. The first is the master frame analysis of the 2016 American Primary debates, including the necessary inductive and deductive phases. In the second part of the design, the findings of part one will be compared to the 2016 Pew Research report findings, which polled the top issues that concerned voters during the 2016 election (Appendix I). And lastly, the findings of the master frame analysis are then compared to a similar and prior study on the social movements of the Great Recession (Appendix K).

The research design of the master frame analysis follows the major framing tasks of social movements as suggested by Benford and Snow (2000) combined with Goffman’s (1974) influence in looking at the meaning making work of cognition. In this process I first conduct an inductive framing analysis on all of the subjects’ speaking parts within the official transcripts of the 2016 debates. For this phase I follow the practical instructions of Baldwin Van Gorp (2010) who suggests that “the intention of an inductive framing analysis is to reconstruct the frames that are useful to define a certain topic” (p. 92). From here I am able to assess the totality of the content for themes according to Benford and Snow’s (2000) framing tasks.
This means I am looking at how the candidacies positioned what they were saying according to the major framing tasks of the diagnostic frame (identifying a grievance and who or what the candidate is ascribing blame to for the grievance); the prognostic frame (a declaration of the necessary solutions), and the motivational frame (devices motivating bystanders and voters to action) (Benford & Snow, 2000). The framing and reasoning devices used by each candidate are identified to help indicate “the presence of the frame in a subsequent deductive phase, thus limiting, or even eliminating, subjectivity from the framing analysis” (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 92).

Grievances, perpetrators and subsequent solutions as well as framing devices are then identified and coded into a frame matrix. Once the matrix of the inductive phase is complete, I move to the deductive phase. This phase “is based on principles of doing quantitative content analysis which deal with measuring the extent to which inductively reconstructed frame packages are actually applied in a representative sample of texts” (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 99). In this phase I look for “clusters in the coded devices,” (p. 100) where framing findings within the inductive phase can be grouped into larger themes. For example, specifically named businesses who are being blamed for a grievance (i.e. AIG Corp) can be deducted into being part of a perpetrator group called ‘corporations.’

Once the inductive and deductive phases are complete, I am ready to prepare the master analysis where I compare grievances, blame, prognosis and devices across all debates and all selected candidates, again deducting findings into larger themes where deemed appropriate.

There will then be a comparison of the 2016 master frame analysis and the Pew Research findings that polled American voters on what they thought the top issues were for
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2016. Here I will discuss how these issues relate back to those framed by the candidacies of the same time. My hypothesis here is that the top grievances found in my master frame analysis will closely resemble those identified in the Pew Research poll.

And lastly, the research findings of the master frame analysis of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries and the anti-establishment candidacies are then compared to the findings of the 2018 Aslanidis master frame analysis of the social movements of the Great Recession (Appendix K). My hypothesis is that many of the grievances identified during the 2011 social movements, will be the same as those identified by the populists of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries.

Debate Sources and Other Considerations

Please note that when I refer to ‘points’ within the results and discussion portion of this paper, I am referring to percentage points. Since grievances and perpetrators within the frame were looked at first, qualitatively to code the frame, and then quantitatively to surmise issue categories, the points refer to the percentage of the named issue in relation to other candidates.

Debates and line numbers referred to herein are coded first according to party and then line number. For example: (R01, 237) refers to the first Republican debate, line number 237. Another example: (D09, 1290) refers to the ninth Democratic debate, line number 1290. A separate bibliography for debate transcript citations are listed according to debate number after the main bibliography under the heading “Cited Transcripts.”
CHAPTER IV. RESULTS

The populist master frame deployed during this period allowed for a wide array of grievances as well as their blame attribution. The primary populist candidates of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders came in top for nearly every grievance, meaning, nearly every grievance identified within the frame analysis had either Sanders or Trump as its main champion. The rhetoric opened new opportunities for defense and opposing opinions, but also drove the agenda of the debates, sometimes with the assistance of moderators. Undeniably framing contests took place between candidates within the debates. A further breakdown follows.

Grievances

The overall results of the diagnostic frame shows that the top grievances in the 2016 American Presidential Primaries were first, the economy (or economic system), followed closely by national and international security concerns, then by corruption, rights and discrimination and so on (see Figure 2 below and Appendix I for more details). The overall data is interesting in itself, which I will discuss later. But when further unpacking the findings, we can see how certain grievances presented themselves in comparison between establishment and anti-establishment candidacies.

Figure 2. Top Grievances Named by Candidates, 2016 American Primaries
The top grievances bifurcated between anti-establishment and establishment candidacies (see Appendices C and D, Figures 3, 7) where the top three concerns for anti-establishment candidates were Economy (including economic system), National and International Security (herein referred to as ‘security’) and Corruption. If we look at the candidates individually, Trump and Cruz championed security as their top grievance which included the issue of a diminishing military, followed by economy and then corruption. Sanders on the other hand had economy as his highest grievance followed by corruption and then rights and discrimination.

Establishment candidates were nearly tied between security and economy. Economy and rights and discrimination were nearly equal as the top grievance identified by Clinton, followed by security. Bush’s grievances were primarily focused on security followed loosely by economy. If we look at candidates according to party, however, we see that both Sanders and Clinton agree that economy is a top grievance but differ greatly on the issue of corruption. It is barely present as an issue with Clinton (Appendix D, Figure 9). On the Republican side while all three candidates agree that security and economy are top issues, only Trump and Cruz (Figures 6, 7) indicate corruption as a grievance. Like Clinton, it falls as almost a non-issue for Bush (Appendix D, Figure 10). This data clearly supports the notion that establishment candidates rarely point to corruption as a grievance, a stark contrast to those working outside establishment norms. I break down the results by category below.

**Economy**

Beginning with the economy, this was a category that was expanded to include other grievances through the deductive process. The big issues of trade and its impact on
jobs, unemployment and low, stagnating wages were included under the overall economic category as all of these issues relate to the people’s experiential knowledge of what is perceived to affect their immediate economy. Poor trade policy brought up as a grievance (and later as a perpetrator as well) affecting American jobs is very much an economic issue. The economy not being able to employ people or low wages, which affect how people spend money all ultimately fall under the ‘master’ grievance of the economy. Even so, data was gathered within each of these categories; granting further revelation (see Figure 10, Economic Grievances, Combined, and Appendix E. Economic Grievances: Breakdown).

The biggest champion of pushing the economy in general as a top grievance was Bernie Sanders, followed by Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, Ted Cruz and finally, Jeb Bush (in that order). For trade, as it relates to jobs and the economy, the main champion of this grievance fell to Donald Trump who led the issue by 15 points ahead of Bernie Sanders. Talk of trade and the related jobs as a grievance then drops significantly with Ted Cruz leading ahead of Hillary Clinton followed by Jeb Bush. Hereafter I will refer to the candidates by last name only.

The terms ‘Unemployment and Underemployment’ made up part of Sanders’ framing devices and so it is no surprise that he led the task of raising the issue as a grievance by more than 27 points ahead of the nearest challenger, Cruz. This does not mean that the other candidates did not think unemployment was an issue, but that they chose to frame the issue another way – as covered under jobs related to trade for example. The same thing happened with naming the issue of ‘lower, stagnant wages’ as a grievance, where once again Bernie Sanders acted as the main champion with a stark difference between himself
and the remaining candidates leading by 70 points. The economy overall, however faired as the most significant grievance framed during the 2016 American primary debates.

**National / International Security**

The grievances under this category include national and international security in general (incorporating a perceived military in decline), foreign relations, and terrorism. On this issue, there is definitely a division of support along the lines of ideology as opposed to merely establishment versus anti-establishment lines (see Appendix F).

Foreign policy was framed most often as an issue of grievance by Sanders and Trump within just 3 points of each other while establishment candidates, Clinton and Bush lagged a full 11 and 19 points respectively, behind Sanders. When we look more specifically at the grievances of the condition of the military, and more generally at national and international security, Trump is the greatest identifier, followed by Cruz 19 points behind, then Bush and Clinton. No mention of this particular grievance was made by Sanders. Here we clearly see a demarcation in the naming of grievances according to ideology mixed in with an anti-establishment sentiment that I shall discuss later. The final grievance falling under the category of foreign policy is terrorism with grievance-naming-support across the board by all candidates, however the establishment candidacies fell behind the populists in naming it as a grievance.

**Corruption**

Corruption, as expected, shows the greatest amount of disparity between establishment and anti-establishment candidates (see Appendix G, Figure 12). Bernie Sanders led the charge of corruption as a grievance at 45 points, nearly doubling Donald Trump next in line, followed by Ted Cruz. As expected, the establishment candidacies of Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush, had little mention of corruption. The overall grievance of
corruption was identified primarily by anti-establishment candidates throughout the debates under the subcategories of an ‘unjust or corrupt democratic process,’ as a charge against ‘establishment politics,’ the ‘establishment’ or as ‘waste, fraud and abuse of resources.’ Framing devices were heavily employed, specifically by Sanders on this issue. He used it as a means of arguing nearly every other grievance with the reasoning that, “very little is going to be done to transform our economy and to create the kind of middle class we need unless we end a corrupt campaign finance system which is undermining American democracy” (D04, 1454-1456) (New York Times, 2016, January 18, p. 43).

**Rights and Discrimination**

Continuing in order of saliency among candidates, rights and discrimination falls into fourth place among the top grievances (see Appendix G, Figure 13). Because discrimination and inequality (excluding any discussion of general economic inequality, which was reserved under ‘economy’) is so closely tied to rights, these two issues were deduced into one and included the subcategories of: discrimination (racism, sexism, gender inequality, etc.) and rights (constitutional, women’s, paid family leave, pro-choice, pro-life, property, religious liberty, veterans and work/union). Although I grouped these two together, I will break down the results here so as to reveal right and left leanings as well as differentials in establishment versus non-establishment candidacies which I will take up in Chapter V. Beginning with Rights, there is concern about rights across all candidates led by Sanders at 30 points followed by Clinton, 9 points behind.

With respect to Discrimination and Inequality, we see much more of an ideological disparity as opposed to one of establishment versus anti-establishment. Hillary Clinton leads in this category at 48 points followed closely by Sanders at 42. The Republican side
of the debates, however, showed almost no concern for this particular grievance (see Figure 13, Appendix G).

**Healthcare as An Issue of Access v. An Economic Hinderance**

Healthcare was a top issue for both sides of the aisle, equally important for anti-establishment and establishment candidacies but for different reasons. On the Democrat side Sanders led the issue by nearly 10 points over Clinton. The contention between these candidates was in Sanders championing the need for a new single payer system, where Clinton wanted to build on the existing system.

On the side of the Republicans, Trump led the issue, but all Republican candidates were in favour of repealing Obamacare. Bush wanted the responsibility of healthcare to solely be designated back to the states and Trump wanted something entirely new with the promise that he would take care of those who could not take care of themselves. All Republican candidates saw the existing system as a strain on the economy (see Figure 14).

**Immigration**

Immigration was a much hotter grievance for Donald Trump leading 12 points ahead of Clinton on the issue, although both candidates are in support of immigration reform. This is another instance where ideology makes a clear demarcation (see Figure 15). On the Democrat side of the debate Clinton and Sanders want immigration reform with a path toward citizenship for persons currently without status in the United States. Clinton’s support of immigration as a grievance is slightly higher than Sanders which fits in well with the backing of rights and discrimination as her prominent campaign issue.

Donald Trump on the other hand uses a controversial populist frame to make his case to build a wall, and to move toward the deportation of ‘illegal immigrants.’ He frames
the issue as one of security with a call for a nostalgic ideal: “So, we have a country of laws, they're going to go out, and they'll come back if they deserve to come back. If they've had a bad record, if they've been arrested, if they've been in jail, they're never coming back. We're going to have a country again” (R01, 1078-1081) (Washington Post, 2015, August 5, p. 33). Trump also often pairs his stance on immigration as an issue of state sovereignty through this reasoning device: “I have a very hardline position; we have a country or we don't have a country” (R05, 1552-1553) (Washington Post, 2015, December 15, p. 45) (the sentiments of which are also mentioned in R02, 1071, 1078; R03, 1367; and R04, 387, 397-398).

And of course the top prognostic frame offered by Trump as a solution to the issue of ‘illegal’ immigration is to “Build a Wall” (R01, 394) (Washington Post, 2015, August 5, p. 14) which is mentioned repeatedly throughout the debates. Several mentions were also made of fitting the bill of the wall’s construction to Mexico (also in R02, 1065; R03, 139, 145; R04, 388; R05, 177, 1555; R08, 1685-1686; R09, 913; R10, 411-432, 2328; R11, 634, 635).

Division and Rhetoric

This was an interesting grievance that had made it into the debates with support at various levels across the board but meaning different things to establishment versus anti-establishment candidates (see Figure 16). For Trump and Cruz, rhetoric was brought up as a grievance in the form of political correctness. To them, the ability to operate loose rhetoric gave them the freedom for a more colourful dialogue; de-sanitizing the political correctness of the establishment. For Trump, it was about not having time to be politically correct, while for Cruz rhetoric was a way to accuse the other side of not being brave enough to
call things as he thought they were: “I want to speak to all the moms and dads whose sons and daughters are fighting for this country, and the incredible sense of betrayal when you have a commander-in-chief who will not even speak the name of our enemy, radical Islamic terrorism” (R06, 1965-1973) (Washington Post, 2016, January 14, p. 60).

Jeb Bush and Hillary Clinton indicated rhetoric as a grievance of division in stark contrast to political correctness, with Jeb often referring to Trump as ‘Divider-in-Chief’ during opening and closing statements of the debates: “The Armed Forces Radio is here listening to this today. I hope they know that if I'm president, I'll be a commander-in-chief, not an agitator-in-chief or a divider-in-chief” (R05, 1335-1337) (Washington Post, 2015, December 15, p. 39). The implication is a passive-aggressive attempt at insult with little effect.

Before the very first debate had begun, Jeb Bush had made a public comment about Donald Trump’s divisive tone that had made the news. The question of rhetoric entered the electoral arena during the debate at the behest of moderator, Megyn Kelly. A question was first posed to Bush and then again to Trump. Trump’s response was framed in such a way that tone was nothing in comparison to the urgent grievance of terrorism:

The one thing he did say about me, however, was my tone. And I also understand that. But when you have people that are cutting Christians' heads off, when you have a world that the border and at so many places, that it is medieval times, we've never – it almost has to be as bad as it ever was in terms of the violence and the horror, we don't have time for tone. We have to go out and get the job done (R01, 1321-1326) (Washington Post, 2015, August 6, p. 40).

Trump’s rhetoric from news reports and rallies often made their way into the electoral arena in the form of moderator questions during the debates. For example, Jake Tapper posed this question to Trump and then later asked the same question of Marco
Rubio: “Last night, you told CNN quote, “Islam hates us?” Did you mean all 1.6 billion Muslims?” (R12, 736-738) (New York Times, 2016, March 11, p. 20). Correcting himself to the term of ‘radical Islamic terrorism’ Trump used framing to blame ‘political correctness’ for getting in the way of dealing with what he had earlier termed as hate: “Now you can say what you want, and you can be politically correct if you want. I don’t want to be so politically correct. I like to solve problems. We have a serious, serious problem of hate” (R12, 776-778) (New York Times, 2016, March 11, p. 21). The charge of political correctness “frequently got [Trump] out of tight spots during interviews and demonstrates how far he managed to stretch the ‘Overton Window’ of acceptable public discourse” (Kaufman, 2019, p. 118).

Trump’s rhetoric was such a topic during the overall primary season that during the fifth Republican debate a frustrated Trump questioned moderators about why their questions were always about what he says and how he says it:

> I think it's very sad that CNN leads Jeb Bush, Governor Bush, down a road by starting off virtually all the questions, “Mr. Trump this, Mister” -- I think it's very sad. And, frankly, I watched -- I think it's very sad. And, frankly, I watched the first debate, and the first long number of questions were, “Mr. Trump said this, Mr. Trump said that. Mr. Trump”– these poor guys … I thought it was very unfair that virtually the entire early portion of the debate was Trump this, Trump that, in order to get ratings, I guess (R05, 1340-1349) (Washington Post, 2015, December 15, p. 39).

For Sanders, Trump’s rhetoric was simply something of an irritation when brought up by other candidates or moderators; getting back to his primary framing device was key: “All of us have denounced Trump’s attempts to divide this country: the anti-Latino rhetoric, the racist rhetoric, the anti-Muslim rhetoric. But where I disagree with you, Governor
O’Malley, is I do believe we have to deal with the fundamental issues of a handful of billionaires…” (D04, 629-633) (New York Times, 2016, January 18, p. 19).

**Infrastructure**

“Crumbling infrastructure” (a framing device used by Sanders throughout the 2016 debates) became a euphemism for ‘build it and get the economic boost and jobs that come with it.’ Addressing the infrastructure issue was a means of creating new jobs while also fixing something that had clearly been ignored over the years (see Figure 17) (D01, line 1041; D02, line 968; D03, line 825; D04, 93, 579, 843, D05, 188-189, 1390, D06, 106-109, 228, D07, 70, 154, 217, and D08, line 915). This was an issue especially highlighted during the debate hosted in Flint, Michigan, where the spotlight was heavily placed on the Flint Water Crisis by both candidates and debate moderators. During the debate in Flint, the grievance of infrastructure, however, was quickly linked to one of discrimination and inequality – an underlying systemic racism that made cutting corners on something as important as water even possible:

One wonders if this were a white suburban community what kind of response there would have been… Flint, Michigan, is a poor community. It is disproportionately African-American and minority. And what has happened there is absolutely unacceptable (D05, 1264-1266) (New York Times, 2016, February 5, p, 35).

**Education, Both A Grievance and Solution**

The ideological battle over education is a battle of Democrats wanting the quality of education to be controlled at the federal level in order to improve it at the local level, and the Republicans wanting to turn that responsibility and ‘say so’ back to the state level. The Republicans have a consensus on the issue. The Democrats do not (see Figure 18).
The establishment versus anti-establishment battle about education exists on the Democrat side only, and as a nuanced argument on behalf of Sanders that today’s educational requirements at the college level, are what was expected years ago at the basic high school level, and therefore should be free for everyone. To pay for it, he suggests that a speculation tax, which was mentioned multiple times throughout each of the debates: “…we are going to have a tax on Wall Street speculation, which will bring in more than enough money to provide free tuition at public colleges and universities and lower the outrageous level of student debt” (D09, 1289-1291, p. 37).

The support for education changes from a grievance (too expensive, should be free) to a solution for discrimination and criminal justice reform. What started out in the first debate as this: “It seems to me that instead of building more jails and providing more incarceration, maybe – just maybe – we should be putting money into education and jobs for our kids” (D01, 125-127) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, p. 4) turns into the slogan of “Jobs and education, not jails and incarceration” (D04, 253-254) (New York Times, 2016, January 18, p. 8).

**Climate Change**

Climate change was a completely one-sided grievance on the part of the Democrats, but within that camp, how climate change was framed varied greatly. To Sanders climate change was elevated to global security status and was an issue that should be fought in the same way that a country prepares to go to war:

You know, if we, God forbid, were attacked tomorrow the whole country would rise up and say we got an enemy out there and we got to do something about it. That was what 9/11 was about. We have an enemy out there, and that enemy is going to cause drought and floods and extreme weather

Clinton on the other hand, frames climate change as an opportunity for green jobs; and although she supports fracking, she waits until the final debate to clarify her support of fracking as only a bridge: “I don’t think I’ve changed my view on what we need to do to go from where we are, where the world is heavily dependent on coal and oil, but principally coal, to where we need to be, which is clean renewable energy, and one of the bridge fuels is natural gas” (D09, 866-869) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 25). On the Republican side, in opposition to any movement on climate change, establishment candidate Jeb Bush says that the United States needs to “embrace the energy revolution in our country” (R01, 991) (Washington Post, 2015, August 6, p. 30); the energy revolution meaning natural gas and the XL pipelines.

The framing analysis (see Figure 21) points to climate change as both a grievance, but also as a perpetrator. There are a few instances within this study that make this similar transition and it depends on how the issue is framed. Though the issue of education, for example, was identified as a grievance by some, it was also presented as a solution to another grievance by others. In the case of climate change, on the one hand for Sanders it is a grave threat to humanity, although, not big enough that it sits as his top grievance. Again, his strategic logic is that if you do not fix a corrupt system, you will not be able to fix anything. Still within the diagnostic frame, Sanders also sees climate change as a source of blame as well as a grievance. When questioned by Dickerson if he still believed that “the greatest threat to national security was climate change,” Sanders responded:

Absolutely. In fact, climate change is directly related to the growth of terrorism. And if we do not get our act together and listen to what the
scientists say, you're going to see countries all over the world – this is what the CIA says – they're going to be struggling over limited amounts of water, limited amounts of land to grow their crops ask you're going to see all kinds of international conflict (D02, 117-121) (Washington Post, 2015, p. 4).

**Timing and Other Issues**

The issues of social security and democratic participation fell more to party lines than to disparities between establishment and anti-establishment framing (Figures 21, 24). Democratic participation was brought up the least and was mostly one-sided with its biggest champion being Bernie Sanders. Supreme Court Choice reached salience as an issue at the passing of Justice Scalia in February 2016. Candidates debated if President Barack Obama should or could have someone appointed before the next election. Debate discussions then became about the sort of litmus tests that potential appointees would have to pass in order to earn their respective appointments. For Ted Cruz, the litmus test was about constitutional integrity, specifically about religious rights. For the Democrat camp, the litmus test had to do with the willingness to overturn Citizens United.

Certain grievances, like the supreme court choice, terrorism or foreign policy, spiked according to events of the new cycle. The news cycle therefore had an influence on the grievances and perpetrators of the day as they were brought up and discussed during the debates by moderators, but also in opening and closing remarks by candidates. While on the top of the news cycle, the media itself was brought up by the populists – this before becoming Trump’s ‘enemy of the people.’ They were served up as more of a perpetrator, though not in any significant way. The data, however, shows that all three populist candidates took issue with the media, usually in the context of not reporting on the real news (see Figure 35).
Perpetrators

The top four perpetrators blamed for the grievances of 2016 were big business, poor foreign policy, corruption, government and a ‘rigged’ economic system. Big business included the subcategories of corporations, the top 1 percent, and any who were identified as business persons throughout the debate (see Appendix H., Figures 25-29). There is a spike in business persons by Ted Cruz, as much of his debates were targeted toward Trump as a businessman who was trying to corrupt the political process through his donations. Notice in Figure 25, the only one not blaming business persons is Donald Trump. In the remaining subcategories of big business, we can see the fruits of Sanders’ framing work of the one percent: “we tell the billionaire class, they cannot have it all. For a start, they’re going to start to pay their fair share of taxes” (D03, 820-821) (Washington Post, 2015, December 19, p. 22).

Foreign policy received a large spike of interest throughout the debates, again, relating to the events of the news cycle. In January 2016, for example, the news and image of U.S. Navy sailors in the kneeling position under arrest by Iranian officials had a profound effect on Ted Cruz throughout the debate. Security issues, issues of foreign policy, and terrorism became highly salient:

Today, many of us picked up our newspapers, and we were horrified to see the sight of 10 American sailors on their knees, with their hands on their heads. In that State of the Union, President Obama didn’t so much as mention the 10 sailors that had been captured by Iran (R06, 26-29) (Washington Post, 2016, January 14, p. 1).

The same thing happened during the news cycle of the Paris bombing in November 2015, and the San Bernadino attack in December 2015. These events especially heightened nationalist and emotional appeals on the right, where issues of national security, a military
in decline were brought up as grievances. The main perpetrator of poor foreign policy
decisions primarily related back to the decision to go to war in Iraq, a blame that had
consensus among all populist candidates, but mostly Trump and Sanders (see Appendix H,
Figure 27).

Corruption was often tied to other grievances – a “corrupt criminal justice system”
for instance as framed by Bernie Sanders. But general corruption as a perpetrator was
almost never pointed out or named by establishment candidates (Appendix D, Figure 39).
The perpetrators that had more of a consensus among candidates, but still higher with anti-
establishment candidates were the healthcare industry and drug companies, as well as the
economy in general (see Appendix H., Figures 28 and 29).
CHAPTER V. DISCUSSION

*Name it, blame it, and then propose to change it*, is a system that the populist candidates of 2016-America did very well. It is not as though these anti-establishment candidacies were necessarily consciously choosing to employ the populist frame while performing their rhetoric, but almost as though Judis’ (2016) version of populism used as a type of logic, became innate.

Both grievances and perpetrators were plentiful and again well documented and almost universally accepted by the public in the framing work already done by the social movements of the Great Recession. When both Sanders and Trump named a grievance, in almost every case there was a specifically attributed blame. Their frames, with the use of persistent reasoning and framing devices remain consistent throughout the primary debates. The populist candidates did indeed “make populist rhetoric the center of their campaigns” (Oliver & Rahn, 2016, p. 191).

**Establishment Counters the Frame: Diffusion, Deflection, Defense or Denial**

When confronted with the rampant depravity of Wall Street and its influence on establishment politicians, Clinton’s response to Sanders’ framing work was one of three things: She diffused or deflected the accusation, she defended the actions or character of existing establishment, or she denied altogether that she was even part of the establishment. In reaction to accusations, Clinton consistently steered her rhetorical performance away from the precise naming of grievances, instead opting to go straight to a solution. Rather than specifically naming blame, Clinton’s attributions (with the exceptions of AIG and Lehman Brothers), were more abstract in nature:

> We’ve talked a lot tonight about what we’re against — we’re against income inequality. We’re against the abuses of powerful interests. We’re
against a lot of things. I’m for a lot of things. I don’t want to just stop bad things from happening. I want to start good things... (D05, 1341-1346) (New York Times, 2015, February 5, p. 38).

Clinton’s use of ambiguity in labeling what people are against before pivoting to something new is an attempt at diffusion. Gamson (1995) describes this process whereby “vague and abstract sources of unfairness diffuse indignation and make it seem foolish” (p. 91). Sanders is trying desperately in his framing to point to an injustice, accusing politicians and SuperPACs for the creation of a corrupt democratic process. Clinton in return tries to diffuse the accusation (as one who had received SuperPAC funding) by lumping concerns under the generic titles of ‘inequality’ and ‘abuses of powerful interests’ without specificity of a defined culprit. And rather than answer to it, her aim was to redirect the conversation. If the perpetrator is diffused to a larger than life, immaterial construct, assigning blame in order to seek some sort of correction or retribution serves to discredit the accuser by making them appear irrational in their appeal. Gamson (1995) describes this as trying to blame the rain for ruining the parade and expecting others to do something about it. “When impersonal and abstract forces are responsible for our suffering, we are taught to accept what cannot be changed and make the best of it” (p. 91).

Another tactic that was used by establishment candidates came in the form of deflection; accepting blame but then also pointing to another to soften any impending setback. Gamson (1998) writes that “[i]f reification does not prevent the development of an injustice frame... accepting human agency while diverting the focus toward external targets or internal opponents” (p. 91) becomes a strategy.

Instead of addressing job loss and low, stagnating wages credited by Sanders’ to the charge of “disastrous trade deals” throughout the 2016 Democratic debates, Clinton rarely
mentions unemployment and low wages. Instead she presses on the issue of creating “more good jobs” (e.g. D01, 144) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, p. 4).

An example where both diffusion and deflection are used in a single response to Sanders’ harp on Wall Street happens during the sixth Democratic debate, where Clinton says:

We agree that we’ve got to get unaccountable money out of politics. We agree that Wall Street should never be allowed to wreck Main Street again. But here’s the point I want to make tonight. I am not a single-issue candidate... I think that a lot of what we have to overcome to break down the barriers that are holding people back… (D06, 1241-1253) (New York Times, 2016, p. 32).

Here she concedes that there is a problem with corruption in politics but does not accept responsibility for it as she frames it as a nearly unsolvable abstraction under the guise of “unaccountable money.” But then she immediately attempts to change the conversation from the grievance of Wall Street corruption to one of rights and barriers.

In response to being questioned about being part of a ‘dynastic’ establishment politics, Bush responded, “I've got a record in Florida. I'm proud of my dad, and I'm certainly proud of my brother. In Florida, they called me Jeb, because I earned it … I am my own man” (D01, 160-161) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, p. 5-6). Concerning accusations of the influence of SuperPACs, Clinton pointed to how President Barack Obama had raised the most amount of money in history and yet also put into law the toughest regulations to date on Wall Street in the form of the Dodd-Frank legislation. For instance during the 7th debate, Clinton countered Sanders’ frame about the corrupt campaign system with this:

But, the real issue, I think, that the Senator is injecting into this is that if you had a Super PAC, like President Obama has… If you take donations from
Wall Street, you can’t be independent. I would just say, I debated then-Senator Obama numerous times on stages like this, and he was the recipient of the largest number of Wall Street donations of anybody running on the Democratic side ever. Now, when it mattered, he stood up and took on Wall Street (D07, 736-742) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 19).

On similar charges of campaign influence, Jeb Bush, simply replies: “I’m not going to be bought by anybody” after admitting that he took money from Donald Trump, but also stood against him on casino gambling in Florida (R02, 388-390; 398) (Washington Post, September 16, p. 12). These responses suggest that Super PACs and corporately funded campaign funds do not have to interfere with Washington. Clinton’s response uses establishment past as an illustrative example that despite all the SuperPAC campaign support held by Obama, when the 2008 recession hit and the housing bubble burst, he pushed through the Dodd-Frank regulation, touted as “the toughest regulations since the 1930’s” (D06, 743-744) (New York Times, 2016, February 12, p. 19).

Further defense of establishment came in the form of an implied accusation that Sanders was playing the gatekeeper role of progressive establishment:

But I’ve heard Senator Sanders comments, and it’s really caused me to wonder who’s left in the progressive wing of the Democratic Party. Under his definition, President Obama is not progressive because he took donations from Wall Street; Vice President Biden is not progressive because he supported Keystone… (D05, 154-159) (New York Times, 2016, February 5 p. 5).

It is fair to say, Senator, that in your definition, as you being the self-proclaimed gatekeeper for progressivism, I don’t know anyone else who fits that definition, but I know a lot of really hard fighting progressives in the Democratic party who have stood up time, and time again against special interests… (D05, 237-241) (New York Times, 2016, February 5, p. 7).
During the final debate Clinton equated an attack on her to an attack on President Obama again reminding the audience that despite taking SuperPAC support in 2008, he still came up with the Dodd-Frank legislation to reel in Wall Street. How dare she be accused of not being able to stand up to Wall Street when her predecessor had: “Well, make — make no mistake about it, this is not just an attack on me, it’s an attack on President Obama… [He] took tens of millions of dollars from contributors. And President Obama was not at all influenced when he made the decision to pass and sign Dodd-Frank…” (D09, 147-153) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 5).

On the occasions that corruption was conceded as a problem, in the case of Clinton, it was only done so as a grievance of the past, for example: “I went to Wall Street when I was a United States senator. I told them they were wrecking the economy. I asked for a moratorium on foreclosures” (D07, 475-476) (New York Times, March 7, p. 15). Such concessions, however, were followed up with but “now we have tools, laws that we didn’t have before” (D07, line 510) (New York Times, March 7, p. 16). Attacks against establishment were downplayed as being mere disagreements that opposition was masking as corruption: “it’s always a little bit, uh, challenging because, you know, if Senator Sanders doesn’t agree with how you are approaching something, then you are a member of the establishment” (D09, 1468-1470) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 42).

When confronted as being part of corrupt establishment by Bernie Sanders, Clinton denied that she was part of the establishment on at least two occasions – based on her gender status:

1) “Well, I can't think of anything more of an outsider than electing the first woman president, but I'm not just running because I would be the first
woman president” (D01, 1616-1618) (Washington Post, 2015, October 13, p. 47).

2) “Well, look, I’ve got to just jump in here because, honestly, Senator Sanders is the only person who I think would characterize me, a woman running to be the first woman president, as exemplifying the establishment” (D05, 317-319) (New York Times, February 5, p. 9).

3) “I am not a natural politician, in case you haven’t noticed, like my husband or President Obama. So I have a view that I just have to do the best I can” (D08, 608-609) (New York Times, March 10, p. 18).

Diagnosing a Growing Insecurity

In the 2019 documentary, “Knock the House Down,” when referring to the struggle against the establishment of New York, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC) says, “This is not just about Democrat versus Republican, in fact it’s so far away from that. It’s not left and right, it’s up and down” (Blotnick & Lears, 2019, Time 6:00 min). This, of course, is a populist statement, and a powerful us versus them framing in regular politics, but one that is even more potent when trying to get power from within the same party. In this 2018 congressional race, AOC is going against long-time establishment Democrat, Joseph Crowley. Within this context, a ‘left versus right’ frame within the same party, makes little sense, and becomes a lot less effective. The same framing logic was evident during the respective camps of Sanders versus Clinton and Trump versus everyone else running for Republican leadership.

But who is up and who is down varies according to perspective. The populist who can tap into the people’s experiential knowledge (Goffman, 1974) will be the one who drives the up and down frame toward increased political opportunity and ultimate voter support. Simply put, insecurity and perceived corruption is fodder for populists to use in identity meaning-making work within the collective action frame – to reach those who have
been ex-communicated and excluded in a changing economic or societal system. This means that a Sanders’ and an AOC’s *up and down* perspective can vary greatly for instance from that of a Donald Trump (of which I will provide an example shortly).

Referring back to the credibility borrowed by populists from the 2011 social movements, if people did not feel the experiences that populists described in 2016, populist candidates would have no legitimacy, no footing and no opportunity to move forward. Most of the grievances that were made in stark contrast to establishment, involved larger global structural changes. And so if we look further to the underlying foundations of these grievances, the populists do, to an extent, have *some* scholarly support. Academics began calling attention to structural contention even before the 2011 social movements began – calling it an “unprecedented phenomenon of exclusion” (Sánchez, 2010, p. 71). “The transformation of world productive structures” were credited for the creation of this exclusion by “[modifying] productive processes in a severe way” (Sánchez, 2010, p. 71). Sanchez (2010) suggests that “[t]he worst inequalities today make up a difference between people not only in terms of ‘up’ and ‘down’ but also in terms of who are ‘in’ – protected – and ones who are ‘out’ – those who are rejected” (Sánchez, 2010, p. 71, also Wieviorka, 2007).

This *up and down*, and *in an out* determination by structures, suits the *’us versus them’* language of populism, thus justifying it in a sense as a natural strategic partner for anti-establishment candidacies. Recall how Judis (2016) described populism as a type of vertical logic in Chapter II. The frictions caused by structural changes helps explain the real insecurities that were tapped into by the populists of 2016 (see Appendix J).
What is interesting here is that while evolving structures determine who is in and who is out (a non-technical, diminishing middle class would be out for instance), the framing work of populism through its vertical logic, seeks to expand membership by gaining those ousted by structures to gain momentum over establishment:

Identity in PSMs is much broader than the average movement, stretching to cover nearly all available audiences. The in-group is not a small social minority (e.g., sexual minorities, immigrants) or even a somewhat larger swath of society (e.g., women, workers, the poor, pensioners, students, etc.); rather, it is the people as a whole, save the vastly outnumbered elites (Aslanidis, 2016, p. 306).

In 2016, to Sanders, a disadvantaged 99% was down and a corrupt, self-serving one percent was up (see Appendix G). To Trump, a forgotten class of workers were down, the nation’s border security and the means to defend it was down, and the elite leadership charged with producing the perceived losing ethos was up (see Appendix E, Trade and Related Job Loss, Appendix F, Appendix G, Figures 15 and 12 respectively). Their frames sought to include those who identified as “the vulnerable,” those who were losing or who had always struggled for access to the structural arenas that ran the world. This relates back to Huntington’s (1968) theory on modernization, where establishment policies fail to keep up with changing cultures and structures discussed in Chapter II.

_Fear and Hope in Changing Structures and Lost Identities_

We now know how structures that work for some at the exclusion of others in part serves to create opportunity for populists to transform a vulnerable ‘people’ into a voter base. To mobilize this transition, however, requires a significant amount emotional framework. Aminzade and McAdam’s (2001) exploration on emotions used within collective action frames point to the coupling work of distress and hope. An emotional framework
seeks first to heighten a distressed emotion followed by a constructed hope for something more: “It is only when anger gets joined with hope that the forms of action we normally associate with social movements and revolutions are apt to take place” (p. 32). The distressed emotion can range from anger, to fear including “threats to meaning and membership” (p. 37). Loss of something once had – a status, security, maybe even certain rights can also serve as the distressed emotion. To identify emotions is one thing. To effectively execute their use as part of the motivational task in framing, is another. Though seemingly innate, the aptitude to identify and tap into these emotions requires a leader with the “ability to deploy emotional knowledge and define or manipulate emotion rules” (p. 35). Here we can see the potential for either a statesmen or demagogue (Federici, 1991) to emerge, but still, a populist. Both the Trump and Sanders’ camps relied heavily on the emotional aspect of framing – but as research would find it, so did Cruz and Clinton.

During the 2016 debate in Milwaukee, Clinton warned America that supporting Sanders’ and his one-track issue of corruption, would do little to lift their barriers; her attempt at countering the attack on establishment:

Yes, does Wall Street and big financial interests, along with drug companies, insurance companies, big oil, all of it, have too much influence? You’re right. But if we were to stop that tomorrow, we would still have the indifference, the negligence that we saw in Flint. We would still have racism holding people back. We would still have sexism preventing women from getting equal pay. We would still have LGBT people who get married on Saturday and get fired on Monday (D06, 1256-1261) (New York Times, 2016, February 12, p. 32).

On the right-wing, Cruz used fear to try and garner more support when he said, “We are one liberal justice away from a five-justice radical leftist majority that would undermine our religious liberty…” (R10, 805-808) (New York Times, 2016, February 26, p. 25).
Trump’s reasoning device of “We don’t win anymore” (R01, 196) (Washington Post, 2015, August 6, p. 7) was a line meant to trigger feelings of American, nationalist pride – but also shame, followed by the hopeful anecdote of “Make America Great Again” used ad nauseam in and out of debates. On the issue of terrorism, he used fear when he told Americans that there was a problem of “tremendous hate” toward the U.S. (R12, 788) (New York times, 2016, March 11, p. 21). On the issue of healthcare, his emotional trigger attempt was toward that of anger when he said that “insurance companies are getting rich on Obamacare” (R08, 752-753) (New York Times, 2016, February 7, p. 22).

For Sanders, fear was reserved mostly for issues of foreign policy and climate change. He accused both the Democrats and Republicans of poor foreign policy decisions which destabilized the Middle East in their support for regime change when he said, “[b]ut the point about foreign policy is not just to know that you can overthrow a terrible dictator, it’s to understand what happens the day after” (D06, 886-887) (New York Times, 2016, February 12, p. 23). It is important to note that a very similar frame of reference was also used by Trump (R09, 254-255) (New York Times, 2016, February 14). With respect to climate change, Sanders warned that “we have got to realize that this is a global environmental crisis of unprecedented urgency... We have an enemy out there, and that enemy is going to cause drought and floods and extreme weather disturbances. There’s going to be international conflict” (D09, 791-792; 797-798) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 23). On the issue of corruption, the emotional requirement Sanders was asking for from supporters was one of anger against the systems in place – so much so that it was his hope that they would be part of the march to ‘stand up and change it, something he said, more than once, at nearly every debate: “And we can do that when millions of people stand
up, fight back, and create a government that works for all of us, not just the 1 percent” (D09, 1706-1707) (New York Times, 2016, April 15, p. 49). The frame analysis performed for this study, therefore, supports the theory of heavy emotional framework. Reasoning and framing devices were used throughout the debates as a means of triggering emotions and mobilizing voters toward consensus and action.

**Addiction and the Opioid Crisis**

Back on the discussion of the use of emotion in framework, there exists a potential for further nuance. During the debates, there is talk about the opioid crisis. One of the host states, New Hampshire was dealing with this issue at an unprecedented level at the time of the debates and so of course, it was brought up by both candidates and moderators. There was also talk about pockets of unemployed, white neighborhoods, that had fallen victim to changes in industry, energy trends and trade deals. This paper focuses on the period of 2015-2016, where we see addiction and opioids being raised as a concern at the national level for the first time in a while within the establishment/electoral arena. At the time of this writing (early 2019) addiction grievances in New Hampshire has increased – “An astonishing 53 percent of adults said in a Granite State poll last year that drugs were the biggest problem facing the state — the first time in the poll’s history that a majority named a single issue as the most important. (Jobs and the economy lagged a distant second)” (Seelye, 2018, p. 3). The *New York Times* cited several possible factors of the state’s decline into drug chaos, as discussed by researchers. Proximity to illegal drug distribution points, cuts in drug treatment programs, the over-prescription of opioids by doctors and then subsequent crackdowns that led more people searching for street-alternatives were all suspect. But researchers also pointed to “pockets of ‘economic
degradation,’ especially in rural areas where jobs are few, and that may contribute to the problem” (p. 3). To suggest that job loss is feeding the opioid crisis is conjecture at best; more studies in this area are needed. But the loss of identity; loss of individual productivity and feeling of worthiness, especially amidst the sweeping changes in structures of employment, can point toward a future of further contention.

For a demographic where no jobs, lost identities, and a futureless feeling are commonplace, is it any wonder then that when someone with a little bit of hope comes along and practices a rhetoric that feels as though they are being directly spoken to, responds? Subsequently, there has been a long-suffering portion of the American public who has felt these same grievances since before the time of slavery. It is why Clinton, the primary establishment candidate in 2016, purports to champion for those who are being discriminated against, and those facing “barriers” – barriers she promised to break down. Keep in mind that this is on the heels of other social movements and contentious American politics that has been happening all the while in the background – Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, etcetera. And so perhaps at the crux of all this contention, at the behest of changing superstructures, we can look back to Huntington’s (1968) suggestion that “sources of identity and association… may be undermined and destroyed... Others, however, may achieve a new consciousness and become the basis for new organization because they are capable” (Huntington, 1968, p. 38). As one part of the American population seeks to solidify their voice, rightfully pushing for more – more inclusion, more access and equality; all the while celebrating their collective identities, a newly vulnerable, other part of the population is losing theirs.
2016 Pew Research Poll Comparison

Here I compare the grievances made salient during the framing process of the debates as identified through the research of this paper to those identified by a Pew Research poll taken during the 2016 primaries. The Pew Research Poll asked voters what their top issues were for 2016. The economy was the top concern for voters (see Appendix I), and the findings of this frame analysis agree. The economy heavily resonated with both Republican and Democrat camps; a clear 80% of Clinton supporters conceded to it being the most important issue, while 90% of Trump supporters agreed (Pew Research Center, 2016, p. 51).

Both the findings of this paper’s frame analysis and the 2016 Pew Research poll tell an even larger story which resonates with the growing insecurity of our time. In 2016, despite publicized reports of an increasing threat of climate change, for instance, climate change during this time ranked lower on the list of voter issues. “Only about half of all voters (52%) view the environment as very important” (Pew Research Center, 2016, p. 51). In this study, it ranked lower as well. As noted earlier much of this ties in with ideological underpinnings, as there was no discussion of climate change whatsoever during the Republican debates. Of this phenomenon, one might wonder why the moderators – Dickerson, Kelly, anyone – never asked about the issue in the first place? Nevertheless, the Pew Research findings as well as those from this study points to a hierarchy of grievances based on issue saliency during the primary season and highly susceptible to populist framing, among other things.

Security studies reveal that populations find different ways to self-medicate during difficult times. In times of insecurity “individuals seek one stable identity (regardless of its
actual existence) to achieve biographical continuity in the context of the uncertain and dislocating flux of globalization” (Botterill et al., 2016, p. 126). This coincides with Aslanidis’ (2018) notion on how populist collective action frames are used to “construct a resonant collective identity of ‘the People’ and to challenge elites” (p. 301).

Framing tactics aside, the saliency of an issue is also based on its resonance and priority level for the voter. For example, without mitigating the importance of the environment, Scruggs and Benegal (2012) in a study done shortly after the Great Recession, found that public opinion on issues underwent significant changes while in crises. During the Great Recession, for instance, there was a considerable decline in climate change convictions “around 10-20% over a short period of a year or two,” suggesting “that the decline in belief about climate change is most likely driven by the economic insecurity caused by the Great Recession” (Scruggs & Benegal, 2012, p. 505-6). This change in conviction does not diminish the significance of any one issue in the Pew Research findings (2016), rather, it points to a voter vulnerability toward issue saliency based on the insecurities and grievances at hand.

The populists, whether warranted or not, and whether intentional or not, in 2015-16, were making an appeal to the insecurities of the US electorate. The 2008 recession, and how it was made manifest, not only in the United States, but Canada and Europe made an international audience painfully aware of the frailties of a global, neo-liberalist society. Growing insecurities point to the presence of contention, a political opportunity for intervention – and a constituency vulnerable to a populist master frame.
2011 Social Movements of the Great Recession Comparison

The top four grievances personified during the 2016 American primary debates were grievances that were also identified in Aslandis’ (2018) frame analysis (Appendix K). In his study there was some variance between the movements of Spain, Greece and the USA, but within America, corruption, rights and equality were commensurate with my findings of economy, security, corruption and rights (see Appendices C and K). The Aslanidis (2018) frame analysis involved the manifestos of the social movements of the Great Recession. The line numbers within his findings were fewer because of his limited scope (manifestos only). His categories, on the other hand, were more varied than those of this study, as clusters of grievances in this study were further deduced into single categories.

When it comes to perpetrators, however, our studies seem to have a consensus. Both the social movements of the Great Recession and the populists of the 2016 primary debates identified politicians, corporations, the economic system, and government (or what I refer to as establishment) as the main perpetrators (See Appendices H and K).

A Prescribed Nostalgic Ideal

In the 1600s, nostalgia was a diagnosis; a medical illness relating to symptoms of homesickness, typically suffered by those away at war (Goldman, 2016). To progressives, the idea of basing decisions on a sentimentality of the past made little sense as the whole notion of being ‘progressive’ was to make progress toward something newer and better than before. To refer to nostalgia as a progressive, therefore, was akin to backward thinking or “an obstacle to the reorganization of society along rational lines” (p. 211). But the use
of nostalgia no longer falls according to party lines, and in 2016, its use within the electoral arena had plenty of support.

Neil Irwin (2016) writes, “The economics of nostalgia may capture the hearts of a certain portion of voters. But it is disconnected from the decades-long direction of the United States economy and the interests of the businesses that are historically a crucial part of the Republican coalition” (p. 1). Still, in maverick-style, populists ruled the debates in trying to make it so: “Trump made mincemeat of his Republican opponents by repeating Reagan’s promise to make America great again… [while] Sanders …[advocated] the policies of the Truman Administration in an accent reminiscent of Woody Allen’s period films…” (Goldman, 2016, p. 212).

What became apparent in this analysis was that all candidates, to varying degrees, establishment and anti-establishment alike, regardless of ideological footings, used an appeal toward nostalgia throughout the 2016 debates. By targeting the precarious, insecure circumstances that electors found themselves in, the populist frame and the use of emotional, opened up the construction of nostalgic appeals to connect directly to voters. Like collective action frames, nostalgia also assists in identity work, acting as “a powerful coping mechanism, helping to maintain identity continuity during times of social upheaval” (Murphy, 2009, p. 128). Users of nostalgia work to incorporate sentiments which “[signal] general predispositions such as glorification of the past, drawing boundaries with other national groups, political contention based on national identity, and transcendence or coming to terms with class divisions” (Oliver & Johnston, 2000, p. 18).

For Trump, nostalgia meant expanding the master frame to include calls to a greater sense of what America could be, based on what it once was. In using characteristics of the
nationalist frame, many of his opening and closing remarks touted several framing devices that implied a patriotic sentiment – “we’re don’t anymore” (R01, 196) (Washington Post, 2015, August 6, p. 7). The implication is of course that ‘we’ used to!

Sanders used moral reasoning mixed in with nostalgia to motivate voter support. He often refers to a disappearing middle class, one that was prosperous 40 years ago. While in Flint, Michigan, Sanders tells the audience what their city once was: “Do you know that in 1960-Detroit, Michigan was one of the wealthiest cities in America? Flint, Michigan, was a prosperous city” (D07, 527-528) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 16). To go with his often-used framing device about working longer hours for lower wages, Sanders reverts to better days of the past when he said, “new jobs in manufacturing, in some cases today, pay 50 percent less than they did 20 years ago” (D07, 534-536) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 17). And on the issue of healthcare, Sanders offers up history as part of his moral reasoning; another appeal to a nostalgic ideal: “Now, the truth is, that Frank Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, do you know what they believed in? They believed that health care should be available to all of our people” (D04, 426-428, 464-467) (New York Times, 2016, January 18, p. 13).

Ted Cruz’s nostalgic framing consistently went back to the policies of Ronald Reagan: “Every time we’ve pursued all three of those (tax, regulatory reform; sound money — whether in the 1920s with Calvin Coolidge or the 1960s with JFK or the 1980s with Ronald Reagan — the result has been incredible economic growth” (R04, 207-209) (Alter, 2015, p. 6).

Hillary Clinton’s nostalgic ideal shows up in the campaign as a nod to her husband’s past accomplishments, a time when citizens enjoyed “lowered unemployment
and increased manufacturing jobs” (D07, 544-546) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p.17). In response to charges about establishment politics and the deregulation of Wall Street, Clinton boasts:

But if we are going to talk about the ’90s, let’s talk about 23 million new jobs, incomes went up for everybody. The median African American income went up 33 percent at the end of the ’90s, and we lifted more people out of poverty than at any other time in recent history. So we were on the right path. More jobs, rising incomes (D07, 1063-1072) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 33).

Clinton may word it differently, but she too wanted to make America great again, “I don’t think we need to make America great again. America didn’t stop being great; we have to make it whole again” (D07, 1424-1426) (New York Times, 2016, March 7, p. 43). What was once preserved as a diagnosis, nostalgia, at least in modern times, appears to have turned into a non-partisan prognosis – that Americans can do better, because once upon a time past, at least for some, they have. Like the work of collective action frames, nostalgia also assists in identity work – as “a powerful coping mechanism hoping to maintain identity continuity during times of social upheaval” (Murphy, 2009, 128). Having all candidates, establishment and otherwise, however, refer to the past for ‘better examples’ of what could be, might be more of a sign of the times.
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSIONS

Niall Ferguson says that populism does not work (Fergusson, 2016). The unfolding of American politics in 2016, however, teaches us that it can at least win. David Frum said that “this new populism is a lie… a fake.” But the words that populists spoke in 2016 resonated from the same grievances that were just as true in 2011 as they are today. Much like with the use of stereotypes, a populist pulls at the small thread of some truth somewhere. Like a social movement, it is not something that happens in a vacuum.

By presenting themselves as anti-establishment candidates, Sanders and Trump rode in on the remnants of the social movements of the Great Recession, which, despite their size, had failed to deliver any real solutions; establishment remained stagnant. Unlike the social movements of the Great Recession, the opportunity of the 2016 primaries opened up the electoral arena and gave populists a chance to challenge establishment at its core. Because the mere presence of populism or a growing number of social movements for that matter, signal that something has clearly gone wrong, it is only prudent that everyone stop and dig deeper. Establishment somewhere has failed. And if greater society fails to help correct it, we in essence create the political opportunity for someone else to come along to frame their version of what needs to be done.

Summary of Objectives and Approach

This paper set out to explore what happens when both establishment and social movements fail and how the void to do something about overwhelming grievances creates new opportunities for populism to rise up. Specifically, I sought to understand how anti-establishment candidates used populism to garner support from within the establishment arena. By conducting a master frame analysis on the populist and establishment candidates
during the 2016 American Presidential Primaries, I was able to unpack the framework of all major candidates. This allowed the identification of the top grievances, perpetrators and solutions as aired by the primary candidates during the debates, permitting a comparison of framing positions between candidate types, but also between political parties.

In 2016, a hierarchy of grievances emerged, leaving clues to the many growing insecurities of the American public. These hierarchies of grievances showed similar themes to those of the social movements of the Great Recession (Aslanidis, 2018). Not only were some of the grievances the same, but the perpetrators were nearly identical. Matters of corruption, uncaring corporations, and growing inequality granted economic insecurity as a top grievance. Terrorism (Paris bombings, San Bernardino), a rogue Russia and a nuclear North Korea, combined with bad foreign policy brought matters of national/international insecurity to the top of the list of grievances. A growing insecurity among group identities brought rights and discrimination to the top of the list of grievances. The major theme, in all findings, therefore, is one of insecurity in general.

**Important Implications of Findings**

The significant discovery that stood out in this research most lies in seeing the power that exists in merely naming something. The debates and the frame analysis herein, expose the rhetorical weaknesses of establishment candidacies in comparison to the charismatic charges of anti-establishment opponents. In nearly every grievance, issue of blame, or solution, the anti-establishment candidates led the charge (Appendices E, F, G, H).

The use of emotion and nostalgia with the frequent use of reasoning and framing devices played well to the legitimate growing insecurities of an electoral base. Rhetorical
When Establishment and Social Movements Fail
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries

performances worked to further intrigue debate moderators which led to more questions concerning the grievances and blames named by anti-establishment candidates. Again, there is something to naming a grievance and repeating it like a slogan; blaming someone or something and then putting minds at ease or at least instilling hope that things can change in a very precise way. The solutions of populist candidates were specific, ranging from something as concrete as building a wall to a free education paid for by a speculation tax on Wall Street. The application of the diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing tasks was not only used but was repeated over and over again. Their content often set the agenda on what was to be debated – in this sense; it was the maverick that was driving the agenda from within the establishment electoral arena. As for establishment candidates, they had a plan – a “five-point plan” (D03, 1379) (Washington Post, 2015, December 19, p. 38), or a “three-point plan” (D04, 1066) (New York Times, 2016, January 18, p. 32); (D08, 1372) (New York Times, 2016, March 10, p. 41); blame was abstract and solutions were framed as the same. Establishment rhetoric had an un-coolness to it; theirs were conversations of right and left, which were no match for the greater urgency of up and down. And as the debates heated up, rather than meet the maverick challengers with something better, their grievance became about the rhetoric itself.

The other discovery was in being able to see the grievances and perpetrators of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries as a continuance of the same from the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 2011 social movements. The pattern supports the notion that if grievances are left unchecked, in combination with some other major change – more job loss, a new drug crisis, a new financial crisis, stark changes in demographics and/or
population for instance – that new political contentions and opportunities will present themselves; and new challengers to the system will show up!

Being able to see the grievances and perpetrators identified throughout the debates in comparison to those identified by Paris Aslanidis (2018) in the social movements of the Great Recession – as well as the issues named by voters in 2016 was noteworthy. At the close of the American Presidential Primaries (when Trump won the Republican leadership) and again at the 2016 national election, the people of the United States chose populism over the establishment. The framing worked. What is more, populism showed that winning in the United States – that being anti-establishment and working toward authority within the electoral arena is possible. The implication is bifurcated between the opening up of further political opportunity to populist challengers, or at best, the raising of consciousness to establishment powers that grievances must be addressed; that the electoral arena is vulnerable.

The reemergence and success of populism during the 2016 primaries serves as an important anecdote for future generations. “This story” Brooks (2016) writes, “is the lodestar for cultural renewal and better politics, no matter one’s place on the ideological spectrum” (p. 3). It is a story for establishment to ‘catch up’ with the modernizing structures that quake beneath the feat of their electorate. The more that we can understand about the meaning making and therefore motivational processes in politics, whether done subconsciously or consciously on the part of its originator, the more we can find ways of building a better consensus toward the resolution of world problems or even in the critiquing of bad ideas.
Research Limitations / Needed Future Work in the Field

While limiting the scope to the debates had its advantages, as discussed earlier in the methodology section, other considerations could have further enriched the findings of this study. Framing contests and important counter frames that took place apart from the debates may have influenced the 2016 populist movement but were out of the scope for this research design. This study, therefore, misses the opportunity of exploring framing contests within political parties – the back and forth between Mitt Romney and Donald Trump, for instance. The influence of media framing was also purposely not taken into consideration. Additionally, populist frames exercised during the rallies and press conferences of 2015/2016 that would have further enriched this study, were excluded.

Moderator influence was also problematic in this research in that they set the agenda in terms of what questions were asked and to whom. In this sense, grievances were addressed or brought up only if there was an opportunity to do so. In controlling these opportunities, issues may have been brought up as grievances, not necessarily because they were high on the framing agenda of candidacies, but because of moderator influence. Additionally, questions and themes that occurred in the debates were highly susceptible to current events such as the Paris bombing in November of 2015, and the passing of Justice Scalia in February 2016.

Taking on the daunting task of conducting a master frame analysis has been an eye-opening experience. One of the most significant limitations in this research lies in the inconsistencies of methodology and the issue of subjectivity within the field of framing analysis itself. There is no shortage of criticism of its manner of practice nor the results of its study. And yet an agreed-upon source with a precise methodology mapped out for those
who dare in its execution continues to be elusive. Plenty of examples exist that utilize specific topics – climate change, for instance, but not one that can translate into a simple how-to method across various subject matter. I concur with Nisbet (2010) in that “the process of frame analysis is extremely subjective with no one clear consensus on methodology” (Nisbet, 2010, p. 45). Nevertheless, the methodology, as outlined by Van Gorp (2010) proved useful for this study.

Will someone be able to reproduce this research according to the methodology set out in this design and come up with the same findings? Not necessarily. But they should come close – and the proximity of this research’s outcome to the 2016 Pew Research results tell me that I am on the right track. The subjectivity, therefore, built into the process of frame analysis makes it fickle at its worst, but its utility in excavating patterns and effectiveness, makes it hopeful at its best.
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CBC News. (2018, October 25). Trudeau and Rutte are the 'Right Sort' of Populists, says Dutch PM. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cfcbmHrCUBo


When Establishment and Social Movements Fail
Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries


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CITED TRANSCRIPTS

The Democratic National Convention, 2016


The Republican National Convention, 2016


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Exploring the Populist Candidacies of the 2016 American Presidential Primaries


APPENDICES
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<th>Moderators</th>
<th>Video Link to Full Debate</th>
<th>Original Transcript Link</th>
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<td>1-May-2016</td>
<td>San Francisco, California (canceled)</td>
<td>Fox News Channel</td>
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<td>CANCELED</td>
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## 2016 RNC Debates - Full 2016 Primaries Debate Schedule

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<th>Date</th>
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<th>Media Host</th>
<th>Moderators</th>
<th>Video Link to Full Debate</th>
<th>Original Transcript Link</th>
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### 2016 RNC Debates - Full 2016 Primaries Debate Schedule

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<th>Date</th>
<th>Location of Broadcast</th>
<th>Media Host</th>
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<th>Video Link to Full Debate</th>
<th>Original Transcript Link</th>
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<td>25-Feb-2016</td>
<td>University of Houston, Houston, TX</td>
<td>CNN/Salem, Radio/Telemundo</td>
<td>Wolf Blitzer, Maria Celesta Arrasas, Dana Bash, Hugh Hewitt</td>
<td><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAxRDIFielXg">link</a></td>
<td><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/26/us/policy/transcript-of-the-republican-presidential-debate-in-houston.html">link</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>3-Mar-2016</td>
<td>Fox Theatre, Detroit, MI</td>
<td>Fox News</td>
<td>Megyn Kelly, Bret Baier, Chris Wallace</td>
<td>Part 1: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAxRDIFielXg">link</a> Part 2: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAxRDIFielXg">link</a> Part 3: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAxRDIFielXg">link</a> Part 4: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAxRDIFielXg">link</a> Part 5: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAxRDIFielXg">link</a> Part 6: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAxRDIFielXg">link</a> Part 7: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GAxRDIFielXg">link</a></td>
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Appendix C. Top Grievances for 2016 Anti-Establishment Candidates

Figure 3. Top Grievances: Anti-Establishment, 2016 American Primaries

Figure 4. Top Grievances: Bernie Sanders, 2016

Figure 5. Top Grievances: Donald Trump, 2016

Figure 6. Top Grievances: Ted Cruz, 2016
Appendix D. Top Grievances: 2016 Establishment Candidates

Figure 7. Top Grievances: Establishment, 2016 American Primaries

Figure 8. Top Grievances: Hillary Clinton, 2016

Figure 9. Top Grievances: Jeb Bush, 2016

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Appendix E. Economic Grievances: Breakdown

Figure 10. Economic Grievances, Combined

Grievance: Economy, Economic System

Grievance: Unemployment / Under-Employment

Grievance: Trade and Related Job Loss

Grievance: Lower, Stagnant Wages
Appendix F. National / International Security Grievances: Breakdown

Figure 11. Security Grievances, Combined

Grievance: National/International Security / Military

Grievance: Foreign Policy

Grievance: Terrorism

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Appendix G. Remaining Grievances

Corruption and Establishment Politics

Figure 12. Corruption and Establishment Politics

Rights and Discrimination: Breakdown

Figure 13. Grievance: Rights and Discrimination, Combined

Grievance: Rights

Grievance: Discrimination and Equality
(excluding Economic Inequality)
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Remaining Grievances (Continued)

Figure 14. Grievance: Healthcare

Figure 15. Grievance: Immigration

Figure 16. Grievance: Division and Rhetorical Choice

Figure 17. Grievance: Infrastructure

Figure 18. Grievance: Education

Figure 19. Grievance: Gun Legislation

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Remaining Grievances (Continued)

Figure 20. Grievance: Climate Change

Figure 21. Grievance: Social Security

Figure 22. Grievance: Addiction / Opioid Crisis

Figure 23. Grievance: Supreme Court Choice / Decisions

Figure 24. Democratic Participation

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Appendix H. Perpetrators

Perpetrators
Identified During the 2016 American Primary Debates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Big Business / Corporations / The 1% / Business Persons</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poor Foreign Policy</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government / Establishment</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Rigged&quot; Economic System</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Banking</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthcare System - Drug Companies</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Media</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhetoric (Politically Correct v. Divisive)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Illegal Drug Trade; Overprescribing</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
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</table>

Figure 25. Perpetrators

(Note for sake of space, the names along the x-axis for the remaining charts of Appendix H are uniform and in this order: Sanders, Clinton, Bush, Trump, Cruz).

Businesses and Corporations Breakdown

Figure 26. Big Business and Corporations, Breakdown

Others to Blame

Figure 27. Poor Foreign Policy

Figure 28. Corruption

Figure 29. Corrupt Criminal Justice System

Corruption

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Perpetrators (Continued)

Figure 30. Government / Establishment

Figure 31. Rigged / Poor Economy

Figure 32. Immigration

Figure 33. Banks / Bankers

Figure 34. Healthcare Industry & Drug Companies

Figure 35. Media

Figure 36. Rhetoric

Figure 37. Discrimination & Racism
Appendix I. Grievances and Pew Research Poll Comparison

Source of Pew Research Data:
Appendix J.
A Congruence between ‘Up and Down’ Politics, Populism, and Structural Insecurity

A Congruence between ‘Up and Down’ Politics, Populism, and Structural Insecurity

Post-Industrial, Hyper-Global, Technological/ AI Superstructure

Growing Identities

Falling Identities

The 1%
Establishment Elites
Corporate Techno-Eldites
Financiers, Big Banks

Falling Middle Class, Minorities + Poor

Establishment Elites, Corporations

Upward Mobility of Middle Class

Minorities + Poor

Industrial Revolution

Time and Structure Change

Time and Structure Change

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Appendix K. Framing of the Great Recession Movements

(A reference to the 2018 Paris Aslanidis Study)

The following two tables are reprinted from: Populism as a Collective Action Master Frame for Transnational Mobilization. Sociological Forum, 33(2), 443-464, with the expressed written permission of its author, Paris Aslanidis.

Table I. Diagnostic Framing of Great Recession Movements

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Categories of grievances</th>
<th>15M-Indignados (Spain)</th>
<th>Aganaktismenoi (Greece)</th>
<th>Occupy Wall Street (USA)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>line 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Working rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Citizen rights</td>
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<td>Corruption</td>
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<td>Democratic accountability</td>
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<td>Inequality</td>
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<td>Environment</td>
<td>line 23</td>
<td>line 11</td>
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<td>Commodification</td>
<td>lines 28–30</td>
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<td>Sovereign debt</td>
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<td>Private debt</td>
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<td>Discrimination</td>
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<td>Torture</td>
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<td>Impunity of officials</td>
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<td>line 10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food/medicine safety</td>
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<td>lines 12, 25, 26</td>
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<td>Animal abuse</td>
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<td>Freedom of press/expression</td>
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<td>Capital punishment</td>
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<td>Militarization</td>
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<td>Perpetrators</td>
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Table II. Prognostic Framing of Great Recession Movements

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<td>Cooperation among people</td>
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<td>lines 3–4</td>
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<td>Better society</td>
<td>line 12</td>
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<td>“Ethical” revolution</td>
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Source:
## VITA AUCTORIS

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<tr>
<th>NAME:</th>
<th>Nancy Duffy</th>
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<td>PLACE OF BIRTH:</td>
<td>Leamington, ON</td>
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<td>YEAR OF BIRTH:</td>
<td>1972</td>
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<td>EDUCATION:</td>
<td>Leamington District Secondary School, Leamington, ON, 1992</td>
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<td>University of Windsor, B.A. Windsor, ON, 2017</td>
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