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## *Locating Justice Pal: TWAIL, International Criminal Tribunals, and Judicial Powers*

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### **Abstract**

This paper brings forward Justice Pal's dissenting opinion at the Tokyo Tribunal to add to the TWAIL literature on international criminal law and examine the rules of evidence and procedure. It is part of a TWAIL effort to scrutinize the everyday practices of international prosecutions through procedural and evidentiary rules. By locating and situating Justice Pal's reason within the broader academic literature on dissents in international criminal law, it is possible to illustrate how and why Justice Pal's views were obscured as a relevant dissent. From this vantage point, this paper pursues Justice Pal's legacy as it relates to the rules of evidence and procedure in the ICTY and ICTR. It traces the evolution of the judicial power to draft and amend the rules and examines the impact of these decisions on the everyday functions of the tribunals and how truth is determined.

As the Indian judge on the Tokyo Tribunal,<sup>1</sup> Justice Radhabinod Pal was one of the first jurists from the Global South to be appointed to an international criminal tribunal. Justice Pal's dissent is a "largely forgotten" critique of international criminal law. The importance given to Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Tribunal) further reinforces the obfuscation of Justice Pal's dissent.<sup>2</sup> In fact, Justice Pal is "an outsider to international criminal law, and his visceral critique of the institutionalization of this system reveals the deep roots of third-world resistance."<sup>3</sup> Justice Pal's approximately 1200 paged dissent is significant, especially

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<sup>1</sup> Commonly known as the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). I use the Tokyo Tribunal in the remainder of this paper.

<sup>2</sup> Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, "Introduction" in Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, eds., *Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), xxxiii at xxxiii [Boister and Cryer, "Introduction"]; for recent attempts to examine the history and implications of Tokyo Tribunal, see generally Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK, and Gerry SIMPSON, "Editors Preface" in Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK, and Gerry SIMPSON, eds., *Beyond Victor's Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited* (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), xxvii at xxvii–xxx; Kirsten Sellars, "Imperfect Justice at Nuremberg and Tokyo" (2010) 21:4 *European Journal of International Law* 1085; for a Japanese perspective on Justice Pal, see Nakajima TAKESHI, "Justice Pal (India)" in Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK, and Gerry SIMPSON, eds., *Beyond Victor's Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited* (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 127 at 127; Sumedha CHOUDHURY, "Contextualising Radhabinod Pal's Dissenting Opinion in Contemporary International Criminal Law" (2021) *Asian Journal of International Law* 1-9 [Choudhury, "Contextualising Pal"].

<sup>3</sup> Rohini SEN and Rashmi RAMAN, "Retelling Radha Binod Pal: The Outsider and The Native" in Frédéric MÉGRET and Immi TALLGREN, eds., *The Dawn of a Discipline: International Criminal Justice and Its Early Exponents* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020) 230 at 233.

as international criminal law continues to encounter staunch criticisms of its own Eurocentricity<sup>4</sup> and reproduction of Western legal normativity.<sup>5</sup>

Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) offers a central challenge to international law's Eurocentricity. Broadly, TWAIL argues that international law is the handmaiden of colonialism and imperialism, which is built on racial hierarchies and double standards.<sup>6</sup> TWAIL scholars maintain that these architectures of exclusion nonetheless persist in various locations, including settler colonial milieus.<sup>7</sup> While TWAIL critiques of international criminal law may have started in 2003,<sup>8</sup> there is a concerted effort to expose this dynamic field's "idealization of Western liberal criminal law fused with a transcendently utopian ethos ..."<sup>9</sup> Asad Kiyani and other scholars have pushed to expose the double standards prevalent in the selection of international criminal cases<sup>10</sup> and various "operational selectivity" mechanisms of the International Criminal Court (ICC).<sup>11</sup> Other TWAIL scholars have challenged the ways in which post-colonial states have deployed the ICC as a means to "redefine" their internal armed conflict.<sup>12</sup> As astutely pointed out by Vasuki Nesiah, local voices are used by international criminal institutions to justify their pursuits of international justice.<sup>13</sup> In this expanding body of scholarly engagement,<sup>14</sup> the focus is on the more recent international criminal institutions and on broad conceptual concerns that examine the application of the doctrines of international criminal law,<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Asad KIYANI, John REYNOLDS, and Sujith XAVIER, "Foreword" (2016) 14:4 *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 915–20; John REYNOLDS and Sujith XAVIER, "'The Dark Corners of the World': TWAIL and International Criminal Justice" (2016) 14:4 *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 959; Obiora Chinedu OKAFOR and Uchechukwu NGWABA, "The International Criminal Court as a 'Transitional Justice' Mechanism in Africa: Some Critical Reflections" (2015) 9:1 *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 90; Choudhury, "Contextualising Pal" *supra* note 2.

<sup>5</sup> See for example, Sujith XAVIER, "Theorising Global Governance Inside Out: A Response to Professor Lateur" (2012) 3:3 *Transnational Legal Theory* 268 [Xavier, "Theorising Global Governance Inside Out"].

<sup>6</sup> Makau MUTUA, "What is TWAIL" (2000) 94 *American Society of International Law Proceedings* 31 [Mutua, "What is TWAIL"].

<sup>7</sup> Antony ANGHIE, "Foreword: Welcoming the TWAIL Review" (2020) 1 *Third World Approaches to International Law Review* 1 at 2; Sujith XAVIER and Jeffery G HEWITT, "Introduction: Decolonizing Law in the Global North and South: Expanding the Circle" in Sujith XAVIER, Beverley JACOBS et al, eds., *Decolonizing Law: Indigenous, Third World and Settler Perspectives* (Milton, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2021), 1.

<sup>8</sup> Antony ANGHIE and B. S. CHIMNI, "Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts" (2003) 2:1 *Chinese Journal of International Law* 77.

<sup>9</sup> Asad G. KIYANI, "Third World Approaches to International Criminal Law" (2015) 109 *American Journal of International Law* 255 at 255.

<sup>10</sup> Asad G. KIYANI, "Group-Based Differentiation and Local Repression: The Custom and Curse of Selectivity" (2016) 14:4 *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 939 [Kiyani, "Group-Based Differentiation"].

<sup>11</sup> Reynolds and Xavier, *supra* note 4.

<sup>12</sup> Parvathi MENON, "Self-Referring to the International Criminal Court: A Continuation of War by Other Means" (2015) 109 *American Journal of International Law* 260.

<sup>13</sup> Vasuki NESIAH, "Local Ownership of Global Governance" (2016) 14:4 *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 985 [Nesiah, "Local Ownership"].

<sup>14</sup> Victor KATTAN, "Palestinian Scholarship and the International Criminal Court's Blind Spot" (20 February 2020), online: *TWAILR* <<https://twailr.com/palestinian-scholarship-and-the-international-criminal-courts-blind-spot/>>. Noura ERAKAT and John REYNOLDS, "We Charge Apartheid? Palestine and the International Criminal Court" *TWAILR* (20 April 2021), online: *TWAILR* <<https://twailr.com/we-charge-apartheid-palestine-and-the-international-criminal-court/>>.

<sup>15</sup> Asad G. KIYANI, "Al-Bashir & the ICC: The Problem of Head of State Immunity" (2013) 12:3 *Chinese Journal of International Law* 467; Christopher GEVERS, "Prosecuting the Crime Against Humanity of Apartheid: Never,

the histories of international criminal law,<sup>16</sup> and institutional practices.<sup>17</sup> Precursors of TWAIL's animating ethos however can be found much earlier in the dissenting views of Justice Pal. To this point, James Gathii characterised Justice Pal's dissent "as forming part of the resistance towards projections of both metropolitan power and authority over third world peoples."<sup>18</sup> TWAIL scholars writing about international criminal law have also taken note of the "TWAIL sensibility" of Justice Pal's dissent.<sup>19</sup>

In this paper, I seek to contribute to this field by bringing forward the continued relevance of Justice Pal's dissenting reasons in the prosecution of the Japanese war criminals by the Tokyo Tribunal in 1948.<sup>20</sup> This paper moves beyond the conceptual and institutional TWAIL critiques of international criminal law. In particular, the central purpose is to bring forward Justice Pal's largely ignored views on the Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal Rules) and the Tokyo Tribunal's evidentiary rules as set out in article 13 of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East Charter (Tokyo Tribunal Charter).<sup>21</sup> It is part of a TWAIL based effort to scrutinize the everyday practices of international prosecutions through the various rules of evidence and procedure.<sup>22</sup> In this vein, I examine the recently completed work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and their respective rules of evidence and procedure to illustrate the continued -importance of Justice Pal's dissent.

In the first section of this paper, Justice Pal's reasoning is located and situated within the broader academic literature on dissents in international law, and in particular international criminal law. This is to illustrate how and why Justice Pal's reasons were obscured both as a useful dissent and as a site of scholarly engagement. I then locate Justice Pal within the earlier precursor to TWAIL,

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Again" (2019) African Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, online: <[https://www.academia.edu/39736593/Prosecuting\\_the\\_Crime\\_Against\\_Humanity\\_of\\_Apartheid\\_Never\\_Again](https://www.academia.edu/39736593/Prosecuting_the_Crime_Against_Humanity_of_Apartheid_Never_Again)>.

<sup>16</sup> Vasuki NESIAH, "The Law of Humanity Has a Canon: Translating Racialized World Order into 'Colorblind' Law" *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* (15 November 2020), online: *PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review* <<https://polarjournal.org/2020/11/15/the-law-of-humanity-has-a-canon-translating-racialized-world-order-into-colorblind-law/>>.

<sup>17</sup> Nesiiah, "Local Ownership", *supra* note 13.

<sup>18</sup> James T. GATHII, "TWAIL: A Brief History of Its Origins, Its Decentralized Network, and a Tentative Bibliography" (2011) 3:1 *Trade Law and Development* 26 at 35.; Elizabeth Koppleman recognized Justice Pal as a "[p]recursor to Third World Perspectives on International Law" in 1990, see Elizabeth S KOPELMAN, "Ideology and International Law: The Dissent of the Indian Justice at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial" (1990) 23:2 *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics* 373 at 428.

<sup>19</sup> Kiyani, Reynolds, and Xavier, *supra* note 4 at 918.

<sup>20</sup> While there are different available versions of Justice Pal's dissent, for ease of reference, I have relied on the Boister and Cryer's compilation of the documents of the Tokyo Tribunal; "Judgment of The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pal, Member from India" in *Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 809 [Boister and Cryer, "Judgment of Justice Pal"]; for a recent intervention arguing for the continued relevance of Justice Pal for international criminal law, see Choudhury, "Contextualising Pal" *supra* note 2.

<sup>21</sup> "Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (25 April 1946)" in Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, eds., *Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 12 [Boister and Cryer, "Tokyo Tribunal Rules"]; "Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (as amended-26 April 1946)" in Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, eds., *Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 7 [Boister and Cryer, "Tokyo Tribunal Charter"].

<sup>22</sup> Sujith XAVIER, "Learning from Below: Theorising Global Governance Through Ethnographies and Critical Reflections from the Global South" (2017) 33:3 *Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice* 229.

or what is now characterised as TWAIL I scholarship to contextualize his views. The second and final section of this paper pursues Justice Pal’s legacy as it relates to the rules of evidence and procedure in subsequent international criminal tribunals. This section first traces the evolution of the judicial power to draft and amend the rules of evidence and procedure from Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and then examines the impact of these judicial power on the everyday functions of the ICTY and ICTR and how they determined truth. The ICTY and ICTR two are instances where the ICC does not have jurisdiction and the international community is seeking a different means of arriving at “justice.”<sup>23</sup>

Throughout this project, I have remained hopeful that the victims of mass violence can seek redress and overcome the impunity of the perpetrators through some form of international criminal justice in situations like Syria, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.<sup>24</sup> When and if the international community does create an ad hoc tribunal (or something similar), greater attention must be had to the construction and amendment of the various evidentiary and procedural rules. While remaining hopeful and revisiting the work of Justice Pal, I cannot ignore the recent challenges to Western notions of justice, punishment, and the carceral state, wrought on by social movements like “Movements for Black Lives” and “Idle No More.”<sup>25</sup>

## I. LOCATING JUSTICE PAL’S RADICAL DISSENT: CONTEXT AND RECEPTION

A special proclamation by General Douglas MacArthur created the Tokyo Tribunal based on the Allies’ declarations and the instrument of Japanese surrender.<sup>26</sup> The Tokyo Tribunal Charter and the Tokyo Tribunal Rules were “approved and issued” by General MacArthur. These rules were modelled on Nuremberg and they set out the jurisdiction, the applicable crimes, and other necessary components of Western based adjudicatory processes.<sup>27</sup> General MacArthur more or

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<sup>23</sup> See for example Sujith XAVIER, “Looking for ‘Justice’ in all the Wrong Places: Creating an International or Hybrid Criminal Tribunal for Sri Lanka?” in Amarnath AMARASINGAM and Daniel BASS eds., *Sri Lanka : The Struggle for Peace in the Aftermath of War* (Oxford University Press/London: Hurst Publication, 2017), 53 [Xavier, “Looking for ‘Justice’”]; Stephanie NEBEHAY, “Step Up Trials of Alleged Syrian War criminals, U.N. Rights Chief Says” *Reuters* (11 March 2021), online: Reuters <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-security-anniversary-un-idUSKBN2B31D2>>.

<sup>24</sup> For an excellent critique of the hopefulness in TWAIL, see Asad G. KIYANI, “Afghanistan & the Surrender of International Criminal Justice” *TWAILR* (16 September 2019), online: TWAILR <<https://twailr.com/afghanistan-the-surrender-of-international-criminal-justice/>> [Kiyani, “Afghanistan”]. See also Karin MICKELSON, “Hope in a TWAIL Register” (2020) 1 *Third World Approaches to International Law Review* 14, online (pdf): TWAIL Review <<https://twailr.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Mickelson-Hope-in-a-TWAIL-Register.pdf>>.

<sup>25</sup> On western notions of justice, see Sylvia MCADAM, *Nationhood Interrupted: Revitalizing Nêhiyaw Legal Systems* (Saskatoon, SK, Canada: Purich Publishing Limited, 2015); on justice, punishment and carceral state, see Ruth Wilson GILMORE, *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing California* (California: University of California Press, 2007); Rinaldo WALCOTT, *On Property: Policing, Prisons, and the Call for Abolition* (Windsor, Ontario: Biblioasis, 2021).

<sup>26</sup> For an in-depth discussion of the Allies reasons for prosecution, including the various legal instruments, see Boister and Cryer, “Introduction” *supra* note 2 at xxxv; Johannes FUCHS and Flavia LATTANZI, “International Military Tribunals” in *Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law* (NY: Oxford University Press, 2007), 27 at para 13.

<sup>27</sup> See generally Yuma TOTANI, *The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008) at 24–32; the Charter was based on a policy document drafted by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and presented to the Allied governments in mid-October 1945; Fuchs and Lattanzi, *supra* note 26 at para 21.

less “rubber stamped” the appointment of 11 judges from the allied nations, including three judges from Global South “Asiatic” countries.<sup>28</sup> The indictment against the 28 accused major war criminals was deposited with the Tribunal on 29 April 1946 and the trial quickly commenced on 3 May 1946.<sup>29</sup> As a condition of surrender, the Japanese Emperor was not prosecuted.<sup>30</sup> The 28 defendants were indicted on charges related to crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as set out in the Tokyo Tribunal Charter, comprising of “fifty-five counts grouped into three categories.”<sup>31</sup>

Two and half years later, having heard 419 witness testimonies and reviewed 4335 exhibits and 779 witness affidavits, the Tribunal rendered the majority decision on 4 November 1948.<sup>32</sup> It was not a unanimous decision, as previously hoped. It included Justice Bernard (from France) and Justice Pal’s dissents, Justice Roling of Netherlands’ partial dissent, a separate opinion by the President of the Tribunal, Justice Webb of Australia, and a concurring opinion by Justice Jaranilla of the newly independent Commonwealth of the Philippines.<sup>33</sup> Justice Jaranilla was in a unique position as he was a victim of the Japanese violence and viewed the prosecution and punishment of Japanese from a drastically different perspective than Justice Pal.<sup>34</sup> Justice Cramer of the United States took control of the “seven member majority drafting committee” and Justice Webb’s influence on the majority decision remains uncertain.<sup>35</sup> There was intrigue and drama in drafting of the majority decision, where Justice Webb objected to the role of the military assistants of Justice Cramer and did not approve of the use of capital punishment.<sup>36</sup> In the end, General MacArthur confirmed the Tribunal’s decision to sentence seven of the accused to death<sup>37</sup> and the remaining were given varying prison sentences.<sup>38</sup> The defence counsel nonetheless sought to

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<sup>28</sup> Nine judges hailed from the signatory states to the Japanese Surrender from Australia, Canada, China, France, New Zealand, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union and two remaining judges were from former colonies of India and Philippines.

<sup>29</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”, *supra* note 2 at lix.

<sup>30</sup> It was believed that the emperor would ultimately face the will of his people; Yoriko OTOMO, “The Decision Not to Prosecute the Emperor” in Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK and Gerry SIMPSON, eds., *Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited* (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 63. See also Totani, *supra* note 27 at 43–62. Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, *The Tokyo International Military Tribunal: A Reappraisal* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 21 [Boister and Cryer, *Tokyo International Military Tribunal*].

<sup>31</sup> Indictments were filed against 28 accused but two died during the proceedings and Shumei Okawa was discharged for mental health reasons; Boister and Cryer, “Judgment of Justice Pal”, *supra* note 20 at 811 para 2. Another accused was admitted to a psychiatric facility; Robert CRYER, *Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 42.

<sup>32</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”, *supra* note 2 at lix.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, at lix–lxx.

<sup>34</sup> “Concurring Opinion by the Honourable Mr. Justice Delfin Jaranilla, Member from the Republic of the Philippines” in Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, eds., *Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 642. See also Kopelman, *supra* note 18 at 391.

<sup>35</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”, *supra* note 2 at lxviii.

<sup>36</sup> Justice Webb is noted as remarking “[i]t may prove revolting to hang or shoot such old men”; *Ibid.*, at lxxv; see also recent dramatization of *The Tokyo Trial*, 2016, Netflix app, (Tokyo: NHK; Amsterdam: FATT Productions; Toronto: Don Cormandy Television, 2016), online (video): <<https://www.netflix.com/ca/title/80091880>>.

<sup>37</sup> Fujita HAIKAZU, “The Tokyo Trial: Humanity’s Justice v Victors’ Justice” in Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK, and Gerry SIMPSON, eds., *Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited* (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 3 at 8.

<sup>38</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”, *supra* note 2 at lxxxii.

appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court however declined to grant leave on the grounds that it lacked jurisdiction. Notably, there was an important dissent by Justice Douglas.<sup>39</sup>

Of the three full and partial dissenting opinions of the Tokyo Tribunal, Justice Pal's reasons outlined the problem with Western universalism embedded within the majority decision.<sup>40</sup> This led Justice Pal to conclude that the "accused must be found not guilty of each and every one of the charges in the indictment and should be acquitted of all those charges."<sup>41</sup> He viewed the prosecution of the Japanese accused as an act of "vindictive retaliation" and an exercise in victors' justice.<sup>42</sup> For Justice Pal, the American exemption from prosecution for the atomic bombing of Japan, general colonial aggression and territorial annexation by the Allies rendered any attempts to punish the Japanese as vindictive retaliation. More importantly, he was highly critical of the decision to mandate the Tribunal to prosecute undefined and retroactive crimes.<sup>43</sup> When it was time to render the judgment, Justice Pal's request to read out his dissent was denied.<sup>44</sup> Yet the "US censors [attempts] to suppress the dissenting judgment" were not successful and the "existence of the split was revealed" to the Japanese people.<sup>45</sup> The dissent however was not published along with the judgment,<sup>46</sup> resurfacing a few years later.

In section, I will first contextualize Justice Pal's view within the burgeoning literature on dissents in international law. I offer this discussion to demonstrate how the rediscovery of the Tokyo Tribunal and Justice Pal's dissent is unusual, even within international criminal law. Said another way, even though there is a recognized practice of engaging with dissenting views of international judges, the field of international criminal law has obscured the relevance of Justice Pal's dissent. To reinforce this point, I will explore the curious characterization of Justice Pal's dissent by both academic and non-academic commentary within international criminal law after the rediscovery of the Tokyo Tribunal some 45 years later. I will then juxtapose how scholars with a Third World sensibility have sought to recover Justice Pal's dissent, notwithstanding the exclusion by international criminal law scholars. While it is important to recover Justice Pal, it is also worthwhile to point out some of the challenges embedded within his reasons. In this vein, I locate Justice Pal as part of the "first generation of post-colonial international lawyers" and I demonstrate the importance of Justice Pal for TWAIL in the context of international criminal law, albeit while taking note of the controversies in his dissent.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> For a discussion on *Hirota*, Stephen I VLADECK, "Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III" (2007) 95:5 *Georgetown Law Journal* 1497; *Hirota v MacArthur* 338 U.S. 197 (1948).

<sup>40</sup> Kopelman, *supra* note 18 at 403.

<sup>41</sup> Boister and Cryer, "Judgment of Justice Pal", *supra* note 20 at 1422 para 1226.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, at 829-30, para 1233.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, at 829, para 42; Justice Pal states: "To say that the victor can define a crime at his will and then punish for that crime would be to revert back to those days when he was allowed to devastate the occupied country with fire and sword, appropriate all public and private property therein, and kill the inhabitants or take them away into captivity. When international law will have to allow a victor nation thus to define a crime at his will, it will [...] find itself back on the same spot whence it started on its apparently onward journey several centuries ago."

<sup>44</sup> Boister and Cryer, "Introduction", *supra* note 2 at lxix.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>46</sup> Gerry SIMPSON, "Writing the Tokyo Trial" in Yuki TANAKA, Tim MCCORMACK, and Gerry SIMPSON, eds., *Beyond Victor's Justice? The Tokyo War Crimes Trial Revisited* (Leiden, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011), 23 at 27.

<sup>47</sup> Anghie and Chimni, *supra* note 8 at 79.

### A. *Locating Justice Pal's Decision Among Dissents in International Law and International Criminal Law*

Dissents play a crucial role in charting the future of legal normativity within specific fields of law in national jurisdictions.<sup>48</sup> There is no universal practice of including dissenting views in international courts and tribunals<sup>49</sup> and subsequently there is no consensus on their usefulness.<sup>50</sup> Some international and regional courts allow for dissents while others do not. For instance, the European Court of Justice does not disclose the voting records, while the International Court of Justice and other courts have a significant history of dissents.<sup>51</sup> There is a fascinating history of the politics of dissents reaching as far back as to the debates on creating the Permanent International Court of Justice.<sup>52</sup> This prompted R.P Anand to reflect on the necessity of allowing international judges to dissent, given the complex, “imprecise, fragmentary, uncertain and controversial” nature of international law.<sup>53</sup> Importantly, he suggested:

There is no use suppressing these differences. When judges do not agree, it is a sign that they are dealing with subjects on which society itself is divided. It is the democratic way to express dissident views. The right to speak is the “fortress of the personality of the free judge” and that is the reason judges attach greatest importance to this sacred right. Judges should be honoured rather than criticised for following that tradition and proclaiming their differences so that all may read.<sup>54</sup>

Within international criminal law, dissents can be deployed for a variety of purposes. Sometimes described as the “paradox of dissent”, the politics of dissents of international criminal courts and tribunals oscillate between maintaining the legitimacy of an institution to promoting judicial dialogue.<sup>55</sup> Dissents can be straightforward disagreements with the majority’s view on a specific doctrine. In exceptional circumstances, dissents can take on a fundamental character.<sup>56</sup> Building on these typologies, some dissents within the international criminal law jurisprudence are “radical” in nature.<sup>57</sup> A radical dissent “is one that critiques the authorized version of the historical, political and cultural portrait set up by the trial and creates a civic space for counter-

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<sup>48</sup> See for example, Ruth Bader GINSBURG, “Remarks on Writing Separately” (1990) 65:1 *Washington Law Review* 133.

<sup>49</sup> Donald R. SONGER, John SZMER, and Susan W. JOHNSON, “Explaining Dissent on the Supreme Court of Canada” (2011) 44:2 *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 389.

<sup>50</sup> R. P. ANAND, “The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in International Adjudication” (1965) 14:3 *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 788; Neha JAIN, “Radical Dissents in International Criminal Trials” (2017) 28:4 *European Journal of International Law* 1163; Jeffrey L DUNOFF and Mark A POLLACK, “International Judicial Practices: Opening the Black Box of International Courts” (2018) 40:1 *Michigan Journal of International Law* 47.

<sup>51</sup> Dunoff and Pollack, *supra* note 50 at 81–6, 89–101.

<sup>52</sup> Anand, *supra* note 50 at 804–5.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, at 805.

<sup>55</sup> Hemi MISTRY, “The Paradox of Dissent: Judicial Dissent and the Projects of International Criminal Justice” (2015) 13:3 *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 449; Dunoff and Pollack, *supra* note 50 at 89–101.

<sup>56</sup> For a greater exposition of the distinction between the different types of dissents, see Jain, *supra* note 50 at 1169–72.

<sup>57</sup> Kopelman, *supra* note 18 at 373; Jain, *supra* note 50.



narratives to emerge and challenge the idiom in which the majority judgment speaks and which it takes as a given.”<sup>58</sup>

Justice Pal’s “radical” dissent is significant because it examined the retroactive application of the prohibition of war crimes, the double standards in prosecuting the Japanese and the legacies of colonialism and imperialism in the guise of universal prosecution of various crimes by the Japanese.<sup>59</sup> In this manner, the dissent challenged the authorized version of the “historical, political, and cultural” image that the Americans sought to generate with the prosecution of the Japanese war criminals.<sup>60</sup> More importantly, when placed within the literature, it is not at all surprising that Justice Pal’s dissent (or the Tokyo Tribunal’s decision for that matter) was not studied with the same eagerness as that of the decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal, especially when the international community was grappling with the genocides in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.<sup>61</sup> The dissent’s challenge to Western universalism of international criminal law forces open questions about the field’s very core. This challenge, coupled with Justice Pal’s Global South otherness then makes it easy for Western scholars writing about international accountability in “dark corners” of world to dismiss this dissent and relegate it to annals of history.<sup>62</sup>

### B. Scholarly Reception of Justice Pal’s Dissent

Justice Pal’s critique of international criminal law was academically scrutinized only recently.<sup>63</sup> There was a return to the Tokyo Tribunal by international criminal law scholars, political scientists, and historians in the 1990s.<sup>64</sup> Some attention focused on the dissenting views of the judges of the Tokyo Tribunal, especially by scholars with close ties to the Global South.<sup>65</sup> While the return to the Tribunal’s judgment can be viewed as an attempt to recover significant insights from the past, there has yet to be a complete reckoning with the arguments set out in Justice Pal’s dissent by international criminal law scholars and practitioners.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Jain, *supra* note 50 at 1170.

<sup>59</sup> Kopelman, *supra* note 18 at 376.

<sup>60</sup> Jain, *supra* note 50 at 1170.

<sup>61</sup> For an exception, see Kopelman, *supra* note 18.

<sup>62</sup> Reynolds and Xavier, *supra* note 4.

<sup>63</sup> Takeshi, *supra* note 2 at 127–44. Simpson, *supra* note 46 at 27–29; for an extensive engagement with Justice Pal’s dissent, see Boister and Cryer, *Tokyo International Military Tribunal*, *supra* note 31.

<sup>64</sup> Richard H. MINEAR, *Victors’ Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); Kopelman, *supra* note 18; Guido SAMARANI, Article Review of “Tokyo Judgement and the Rape of Nanking” by Timothy BROOK, (2002) 20 *Revue Bibliographique de Sinologie* 174; Madoka FUTAMURA, *War Crimes Tribunals and Transitional Justice: The Tokyo Trial and the Nuremberg Legacy* (London, United Kingdom: Taylor & Francis Group, 2007); Totani, *supra* note 27 at 224–45; Tanaka, McCormack and Simpson, *supra* note 2; Boister and Cryer, *Tokyo International Military Tribunal*, *supra* note 30.

<sup>65</sup> Ashis NANDY, “The Other within: The Strange Case of Radhabinod Pal’s Judgment on Culpability” (1992) 23:1 *New Literary History* 45; Melinda BANERJEE, “Does International Criminal Justice Require a Sovereign? Historicising Radhabinod Pal’s Tokyo Judgment in Light of his “Indian” Legal Philosophy” in Wui Ling CHEAH, Tianying SONG, and Ping YI, eds., *Historical Origins of International Criminal Law* (Brussels: Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher, 2014), 64; Latha VARADARAJAN, “The Trials of Imperialism: Radhabinod Pal’s Dissent at the Tokyo Tribunal” (2015) 21:4 *European Journal of International Relations* 793; Sen and Raman, *supra* note 3.

<sup>66</sup> Boister and Cryer, *Tokyo International Military Tribunal*, *supra* note 30 at 176–204.

Rather, the dissent has sparked varying levels of academic and non-academic dismissal.<sup>67</sup> For example, Justice Pal's scathing assessment of the Tribunal, in excess of 1200 pages, was characterised as "almost schizophrenic."<sup>68</sup> Surprisingly, he was described as the "world's first mystic positivist" by a leading Western international criminal law scholar.<sup>69</sup> It is true that there are problematic moments within Justice Pal's dissent and, in this vein, some commentary has focused on Justice Pal's unfortunate use of quotes from "the slaver Jefferson Davis" in his conclusion.<sup>70</sup> Others have rightly picked up Justice Pal's "unforgiveable" and "irresponsible" dismissal of the severity of the "reports of the Rape of Nanking (Nanjing)"<sup>71</sup> and the more general dismissal of Japanese violence and its effects on innocent civilians.

The sanist<sup>72</sup> ("almost schizophrenic") and racially charged<sup>73</sup> ("mystic") references are part of the larger trend prevalent within international criminal law and other fields of public law.<sup>74</sup> TWAIL scholars have pointed to this larger trend endemic within the field of international criminal law, especially in the context of race<sup>75</sup> and voice.<sup>76</sup> From a different point of view, Obi Okafor identified similar trends in the construction of knowledge in the context of UN human rights commissions, where expertise travels in a single direction from the North to South, causing a "one way traffic paradigm."<sup>77</sup> Okafor's reflection is particularly salient and helps to rationalize why Justice Pal's dissent was not studied, while Justice Röling's was.<sup>78</sup> These features of international law broadly prompted Makau Mutua to reflect on the construction of the "savage" worthy of being saved in 2001.<sup>79</sup> These are not unique features to international law, rather it is part of a larger form of "false

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<sup>67</sup> Totani, *supra* note 27 at 224–239; Mark A. DRUMBL, "Memorializing Dissent: Justice Pal in Tokyo" (2020) 114 *American Journal of International Law Unbound* 111; Mark A. DRUMBL "Judge Pal with Jefferson Davis in Tokyo", (23 March 2019), online: *Opinio Juris* <<http://opiniojuris.org/2019/03/23/judge-pal-with-jefferson-davis-in-tokyo/>> [Drumbl, "Judge Pal"].

<sup>68</sup> Kopelman, *supra* note 18 at 378.

<sup>69</sup> Simpson, *supra* note 46 at 27.

<sup>70</sup> Drumbl, "Judge Pal", *supra* note 67.

<sup>71</sup> Banerjee, *supra* note 62 at 37.

<sup>72</sup> Sonia MEERAI, Idil ABDILLAHI, and Jennifer POOLE, "An Introduction to Anti-Black Sanism" (2016) 5:3 *Intersectionalities: A Global Journal of Social Work Analysis, Research, Polity, and Practice* 18.

<sup>73</sup> Daniel SOLÓRZANO, "Critical Race Theory, Racial Microaggressions, and Campus Racial Climate: The Experiences of African American College Students" (2000) 69:1 *Journal of Negro Education* 60.

<sup>74</sup> Richard DELGADO, "The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want Minority Critiques of the Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1987) 22:2 *Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review* 301.

<sup>75</sup> Souheir EDELBI, "Making Race Speakable in International Criminal Law: Review of Lingaas' The Concept of Race in International Criminal Law" *TWAILR* (14 April 2020), online: *TWAILR* <<https://twailr.com/making-race-speakable-in-international-criminal-law-review-of-lingaas-the-concept-of-race-in-international-criminal-law-%e2%80%a8/>>.

<sup>76</sup> Kattan, *supra* note 14.

<sup>77</sup> Obiora OKAFOR, "International Human Rights Fact-Finding Praxis: A TWAIL Perspective" in Philip ALSTON and Sarah KNUCKEY eds., *The Transformation of Human Rights Fact-Finding* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 49 at 54.

<sup>78</sup> Robert CRYER, "Röling in Tokyo : A Dignified Dissenter" (2010) 8:4 *Journal of International Criminal Justice* 1109. Antonio CASSESE and Bert ROLLING, *The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemaker* (London: Polity, 1994).

<sup>79</sup> Makau MUTUA, "Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights" 42:1 *Harvard International Law Journal* 201.

western universalism”<sup>80</sup> that perpetuate what Antony Anghie has characterized as the “dynamics of difference.”<sup>81</sup>

The construction of Justice Pal as mentally ill or someone of the occult, coupled with his own promotion of prominent white supremacists like Jefferson Davies and the negation of the lived experiences of the victims of the Japanese, then worked to assiduously dispossess his radical claims set out in the dissent.<sup>82</sup> Justice Pal’s pro-Japanese sympathies and his overt support of these movements during the post-War period did not help either.<sup>83</sup> By “disinheriting” Justice Pal, his dissent was not able to gain any traction to become part of the larger critique of the universalism of international criminal law.<sup>84</sup>

A handful of scholars, with a Third World sensibility, view the dissent as a “fly in the ointment of the post-Second World War efforts at institutionalizing international justice.”<sup>85</sup> More recently, some have characterised Justice Pal’s dissent as “deeply suspicious of this utopian state of order ...”<sup>86</sup> The most interesting examinations of his dissent have focused on his Third World perspective and animosity towards Western universalism. For example, Adil Hasan Khan has characterized Justice Pal as deeply suspicious of universal creeds and truths: “Pal demonstrated a ‘tragic ethos’ in his persistent suspicion of assertions of a ‘universal’ ‘international community’ in whose name a ‘new’ truly ‘universal’ international law was sought to be authorized.”<sup>87</sup> Yet, what is missing from these types of critical engagement is a robust discussion of where to place Justice Pal’s views within TWAIL. To locate his views, it is important to examine the history of TWAIL.

Antony Anghie and Bhupinder Chimni suggested that TWAIL transformed over time, and they chronicled this evolution through two stages.<sup>88</sup> While recognizing the challenges of anachronism and the progress narrative built into this type of periodization<sup>89</sup>, the first generation of international lawyers and scholars grappling with the realities of new newly independent former colonies were gathered under the moniker of TWAIL I. The second generation of TWAIL scholars have sought

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<sup>80</sup> Sujith XAVIER, “False Universalism of Global Governance Theories: Global Constitutionalism, Global Administrative Law, International Criminal Institutions and the Global South” Osgoode Hall Law School, PhD Thesis, 2015 at 353.

<sup>81</sup> Antony ANGHIE, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>82</sup> I remain ambivalent about Justice Pal and his dissent, particularly because of what seems like a disavowal of the lived experiences of the victims of the Japanese in dissent and the promotion of white supremacist like Jefferson Davies. Even though new understandings of the analogous nature of caste and anti-Black racism is available, I am unable to reconcile how Justice Pal could advocate for racial equality all the while electing to conclude his dissent with the words of a known white supremacist. These incongruous positions require further study of the dissent and Justice Pal’s perspectives. George Galindo’s discussion on anachronism is useful in this instance. See George R. B. GALDINO, “Splitting TWAIL?” (2016) 33:3 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 37 at 44–8.

<sup>83</sup> Totani, *supra* note 27 at 224-239; see also Takeshi, *supra* note 2.

<sup>84</sup> Prabhakar Singh, “Reading RP Anand in the Post-Colony: Between Resistance and Appropriation” in Jochen von BERNSTORFF and Philipp DANN, eds., *The Battle for International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 297 at 305.

<sup>85</sup> Varadarajan, *supra* note 65 at 794.

<sup>86</sup> Sen and Raman, *supra* note 3 at 232.

<sup>87</sup> Adil Hasan KHAN, “Inheriting a Tragic Ethos: Learning from Radhabinod Pal” (2016) 110 American Journal of International Law Unbound 25 at 26 [Khan, “Inheriting a Tragic Ethos”].

<sup>88</sup> Anghie and Chimni, *supra* note 8 at 79–80.

<sup>89</sup> Galdino, *supra* note 88.

to follow in footsteps TWAIL I, all the while building new ground. More recently, Karin Mickelson has pointed to the emergence of a third wave of TWAIL scholars and beyond.<sup>90</sup>

International law scholars like Georges Abi-Saab, F. Garcia-Amador, R.P. Anand, Mohammed Bedjaoui, and Taslim O. Elias were important figures in TWAIL I, where the impetus was to deploy international law as an emancipatory tool for the betterment of Third World peoples.<sup>91</sup> Under the rubric of TWAIL I, even though 19<sup>th</sup> century international law was used to exclude non-Europeans, there was a firm belief that international law was part of the fabric of Third World societies. It was believed that international law's power could be harnessed for good. Importantly, there was an emphasis on sovereign equality of nations, underscored by the firm belief in international law. TWAIL II scholars, while travelling on the same path, elected to break new ground by developing "powerful critiques of the Third World nation-state, of the processes of its formation and its resort to violence and authoritarianism".<sup>92</sup> By looking at the theory and doctrines of international law, scholars writing in this vein sought to clearly demarcate the racial hierarchy's endemic within international law, placing an emphasis on the lived experiences of the peoples of the Global South.<sup>93</sup> More importantly, by using history, they sought to connect international law to its civilizing mission and its colonial past.<sup>94</sup> The next generation of TWAIL scholars are pushing further ground and are making "sweeping indictment(s) of international law"<sup>95</sup>, all the while building bridges between marginalized communities through "praxis of place" for example.<sup>96</sup>

Justice Pal's dissent then can be situated within the first group of international law jurists. In coming to his conclusion of not guilty, there are two central themes that scaffold Justice Pal's dissenting view. The first is the double standards of the decision to prosecute, indict, and ultimately find culpable Japanese officials.<sup>97</sup> The second is the pure politics of victors' justice.<sup>98</sup> The former theme manifests throughout his reasons with repeated references to colonial endeavours of the

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<sup>90</sup> Mickelson, *supra* note 24; for a similar earlier framing, see Madhav KHOSLA, "The TWAIL Discourse: The Emergence of a New Phase" (2007) 9:3 International Community Law Review 291.

<sup>91</sup> Anghie and Chimni, *supra* note 8 at 79; see footnote 5.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, at 83.

<sup>93</sup> Galdino, *supra* note 88 at 42–3.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>95</sup> Mickelson, *supra* note 24.

<sup>96</sup> Sujith XAVIER, Amar BHATIA, Usha NATARAJAN, and John REYNOLDS, "Placing TWAIL Scholarship and Praxis: Introduction to the Special Issue of the Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice" (2016) 33:3 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice v at vii. See also Xavier and Hewitt, *supra* note 7.

<sup>97</sup> See for example Justice Pal's discussion of "[w]hether the war of the alleged character became criminal in international law"; Boister and Cryer, "Judgment of Justice Pal", *supra* note 20 at 840 para 69. In this discussion, Justice Pal notes, "[a]s to the 'Widening sense of humanity' prevailing in international life, all that I can say is that at least before the Second World War the powerful nations did not show any such sign. I would only refer to what happened at the meeting of the Committee drafting resolutions for the establishment of the League of Nations when Baron Makino of Japan moved a resolution for the declaration of the equality of nations as a basic principle of the League. Lord Robert Cecil of the Great Britain declared this to be a matter of highly controversial character and opposed the resolution on the ground that it 'raised extremely serious problems within the British Empire'. The resolution was declared lost: President Wilson ruled that in view of the serious objections on the part of some it was not carried." Boister and Cryer, "Judgment of Justice Pal", *supra* note 20 at 867 para 137; see also Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, "International Military Tribunal for the Far East, *United States et al. v. Araki Sadao et al.*,"— "Majority Judgment" in Neil BOISTER and Robert CRYER, eds., *Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 71-639 paras 48414-49858.

<sup>98</sup> Boister and Cryer, "Judgment of Justice Pal", *supra* note 20 at 835 para 57, 838 para 64, 913 para 246, 916 paras 251a–b.

Allies, and how they in fact engaged in aggressive war in various parts of the world, before and during World War II. These forms of violence were clearly overlooked, while the Japanese were prosecuted. The second interrelated theme of victors' justice is littered throughout Justice Pal's dissent with references to the atrocities arising out of the use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These themes work to assiduously expose the double standards of the charges laid against the Japanese. They are scaffolded throughout the analysis in setting out the problems with the competency of the established Tribunal and the meaning and scope of the law that the judges sought to apply. In pursuing the legality of Japan's conduct, Justice Pal deploys various opinions of legal experts ranging from Manley Hudson, Hans Kelsen, Hersch Lauterpacht, Aron Trainin, and others to parse through the veracity of the prosecution's case against the accused. Throughout his analysis, there are robust discussions on for instance individual criminal responsibility<sup>99</sup> and customary international law<sup>100</sup> all the while gesturing to the possibility of a future in which international law can be emancipatory.

Justice Pal's dissent is predicated on the sovereign equality of Japan and its conduct within the then existing framework of international law that he sought to apply. The dissent falls squarely within the first generation of TWAIL scholars. By locating the dissent in this context, some of the fault lines within Justice Pal's thinking become easier to trace, and place as well. More importantly, doing so allows for a fuller nuancing of the Justice Pal's decision where we can identify some of the commonalities, all the while troubling the erasures of for example the lived experiences of the victims and the problematic, questionable and racist citational practices.<sup>101</sup>

In the next section, I take up Justice Pal's unique perspective on institutional powers granted to the judges of the Tokyo Tribunal to amend the rules of evidence and procedure. By focusing on the relevant sections on proceduralism and evidence in his reasons, I will exemplify the dangers of othering his radical dissent, further cementing my argument Justice Pal remains a relevant figure in international criminal law.

## II. ENDURING LEGACIES OF JUSTICE PAL'S CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES: JUDGES QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWERS, PROCEDURAL IRREGULARITIES & TRUTH

Justice Pal's dissent is a complex multifaceted intervention that confronts central fault lines in the creation of the Tokyo Tribunal. Importantly, the dissent challenges the reasoning in the majority decision to render culpable Japanese public officials. A unique aspect of Justice Pal's dissent is the focus on the everyday practices of the Tribunal and the examination of the rules of evidence and procedure. Justice Pal took issue with the flexibility of the rules and its impact on the daily operation of the Tribunal. He presented the issue by chronicling the effects of the judges' powers to draft and amend the rules as means to expedite the daily proceedings, the various procedural irregularities, and the determination of truth via witness testimony. These three conceptual challenges then work to reinforce the broader Third Worldist critique central to his dissent: double standards and victors' justice.

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<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, at 874–85 paras 154–79; see also Choudhury, “Contextualising Pal” *supra* note 2 .

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, at 885–904 paras 179–225.

<sup>101</sup> I borrow George Galindo's suggestion on how to present TWAIL's history, see Galindo, *supra* note 88 at 56.

TWAIL scholars have devoted much effort to exposing the embedded racial hierarchies and the double standards in international law generally, and international criminal law in particular.<sup>102</sup> The themes of double standards and victors' justice that scaffold Justice Pal's dissent are prominently featured in TWAIL scholarship on international criminal law's theory, doctrine, and institutional design. In 2003, Anghie and Chimni signalled to their serious concerns with the creation of the two international criminal tribunals by the UN Security Council using its Chapter VII powers, as opposed to creating these tribunals through bilateral treaties.<sup>103</sup> More broadly, Anghie and Chimni worried that these two tribunals would retroactively apply law.<sup>104</sup> They argued that the Tribunals' singular focus on individual criminal responsibility shifts the blame away from state actors and international institutions. State actors and international institutions for example had contributed to the fermenting of ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.<sup>105</sup>

More recently other TWAIL scholars have pursued similar broad critiques of the doctrine, theory, and the institutional DNA of the ICC, as I alluded to at the outset of this paper. For example, some scholars have explored the selectivity of prosecution in international criminal law<sup>106</sup> and the "operational selectivity" of cases by the ICC.<sup>107</sup> These scholars worried about the focus on the African war criminal to the exclusion of the Israeli and Sri Lankan Sinhala war criminals.<sup>108</sup> While these interventions take apart the prominent doctrines, theory, and institutional design, there is more work to be done on the specific applicable rules of evidence and procedure in international criminal proceedings from a TWAIL perspective.<sup>109</sup> Such a gap is not unique to TWAIL. There is more room for mainstream international criminal law scholars to examine the specific application of the rules of evidence and procedure.<sup>110</sup> Even within the mainstream scholarship, there are only a handful of interventions that have taken a noticeably critical approach to the application of the rules of evidence and procedure.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>102</sup> Mutua, "What is TWAIL", *supra* note 6; James Thuo GATHII, "The Agenda of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL)" *SSRN* (2018), online: *SSRN* <<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3304767>>.

<sup>103</sup> Anghie and Chimni, *supra* note 8 at 88.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, at 93–5.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, at 89–91.

<sup>106</sup> Kiyani, "Group-Based Differentiation", *supra* note 10.

<sup>107</sup> Reynolds and Xavier, *supra* note 4.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> Xavier, "Looking for 'Justice'", *supra* note 23; Sujith XAVIER, "Theorizing International Criminal Procedure Review Essay: Christoph Safferling's International Criminal Procedure" (2015) 2 *Transnational Human Rights Review* 135.

<sup>110</sup> Jessica PEAKE, "A Spectrum of International Criminal Procedure: Shifting Patterns of Power Distribution in International Criminal Courts and Tribunals" (2014) 26:2 *Pace international law review* 182; Christoph Johannes Maria SAFFERLING, *International Criminal Procedure* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); Megan A. FAIRLIE, "Rulemaking from the Bench: A Place for Minimalism at the ICTY" (2004) 39:2 *Texas International Law Journal* 257; Daniel TILLEY, "The Non-Rules of Evidence in the ad hoc Tribunals" (2011) 45:2 *The International Lawyer* 695.

<sup>111</sup> Nancy A. COMBS, *Fact-Finding Without Facts: The Uncertain Evidentiary Foundations of International Criminal Convictions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Alexander ZAHAR "The Problem of False Testimony at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda" in André Klip and Göran Sluiter, eds., *Annotated Leading Cases Of International Criminal Tribunals*, 25 *International Criminal Tribunal For Rwanda, 2006-2007*, (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2010) at 515.

In adopting a “Nuremberg legal sensibility”,<sup>112</sup> the two ad hoc tribunals replicated the double standards that Justice Pal contested in his dissent of the Tokyo Tribunal. The double standards that Justice Pal was concerned with was the prosecution of the Japanese, all the while ignoring the colonial violence of the Allies. He was particularly vexed by the lack of prosecution of those responsible for the atomic bombs. These double standards then worked to fuel a form of victors’ justice (notwithstanding the support of China and other newly independent Global South states).<sup>113</sup> Fast forwarding to the ICTY and ICTR, there are instances of double standards built into the prosecutorial process and beyond. For example, the then ICTY prosecutor, Carla del Ponte’s decision not to prosecute NATO leaders in the commission of international crimes was described as an “amateur whitewash” by one commentator.<sup>114</sup> The leaders of the Rwandan Patriotic Front were not prosecuted either.<sup>115</sup> In this paper, I pick up on the double standards embedded within the rules of evidence and procedure. On the one hand, the statutes are clear in enshrining the rights of the accused and ensuring a fair and transparent adjudicatory process. On the other, when we peer into the anatomy the rules, there is something wholly different. The double standards then work to reinforce the existing racial hierarchies (especially in the case of the ICTR) and further entrench the North South divide. Accordingly, my analysis focuses on the rules and their impact, rather than exploring the specificities of the rights of the accused.<sup>116</sup>

The rules of evidence and procedure within a criminal proceeding are of the utmost importance, especially given the impact such a decision may have on the accused. While the evidentiary thresholds are much lower in for example non-criminal proceedings<sup>117</sup>, the presumption of innocence is an essential part of international criminal prosecution. The Chief Prosecutor of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Robert Jackson is noted to have said “[t]he ultimate principle is that you must put no man on trial under the forms of judicial proceedings if you are not willing to see him freed if not proven guilty.”<sup>118</sup>

In this vein, I explore the enduring legacy of Justice Pal’s dissent with a particular focus on the ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTY Rules) and the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence (ICTR Rules) from a TWAIL perspective. In the following sections, I trace the evolution of the powers of the judges to draft and amend their respective rules of evidence and procedure. I locate the origins of these powers to Robert Jackson, the Nuremberg Tribunal and a “Nuremberg legal sensibility.”<sup>119</sup> In the following three sections, I expose the effects of these powers and how they generate double standards through the available procedures of international criminal

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<sup>112</sup> Reynolds and Xavier, *supra* note 4 at 962.

<sup>113</sup> For an excellent discussion of informal empire, see Ali HAMMOUDI, “The International Law of Informal Empire and the ‘Question of Oman’” (2020) 1 Third World Approaches to International Law Review 121, online (pdf): TWAIL Review <https://twailr.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Hammoudi-The-International-Law-of-Informal-Empire.pdf>; Prabhakar SINGH, “Of International Law, Semi-colonial Thailand, and Imperial Ghosts” (2019) 9:1 Asian Journal of International Law 46.

<sup>114</sup> Michael MANDEL, “Politics and Human Rights in International Criminal Law: Our Case Against NATO and the Lessons to be Learned from it” (2001) 25:1 Fordham International Law Journal 95 at 96.

<sup>115</sup> Mahmood MAMDANI, *When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002).

<sup>116</sup> Yvonne MCDERMOTT, *Fairness in International Criminal Trials*, Oxford Monographs in International Humanitarian and Criminal Law (Oxford: University Press, 2016).

<sup>117</sup> See for example in the administrative law context, Sujith XAVIER, “Biased Impartiality: A Survey of Post-RDS Caselaw on Bias, Race and Indigeneity” SSRN (2021), online: SSRN <<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3762594>>.

<sup>118</sup> Safferling, *supra* note 110 at 403.

<sup>119</sup> Reynolds and Xavier, *supra* note 4 at 962.

prosecution. In this vein, I first chronicle the problems of making changes to the rules on an everyday basis and then I turn to examine the impact of hearsay evidence.

### A. Critique of the Institutional Powers of the Judges

Several problems plagued the Tokyo Tribunal, starting with General MacArthur's heavy-handed role in its creation.<sup>120</sup> The Tokyo Tribunal's Charter provisions ensured that the Japanese accused were prosecuted quickly and efficiently, with fairly relaxed evidentiary rules.<sup>121</sup> The nine rules of procedure accompanying the Charter were rather superficial as well, especially for an international criminal trial that would eventually convict and deploy capital punishment on those deemed culpable. The powers allocated to the judges to amend the rules of evidence and procedure moreover caused day-to-day operational problems.<sup>122</sup> Approximately 45 years later, identical problems were evident in the day-to-day operations of the two ad hoc international criminal tribunals, created by the United Nations Security Council.

The United Nations Security Council established the ad hoc tribunals on the heels of the findings of the commissions of experts tasked with investigating the violent conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively.<sup>123</sup> Similar to the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR statutes delineate the applicable international crimes,<sup>124</sup> the organisational structure of the respective tribunal, and tribunal composition.<sup>125</sup> Importantly, they follow the Nuremberg Tribunal's approach to the rules of evidence and procedure. The ICTY and ICTR statutes allowed judges to draft the rules of evidence and procedure,<sup>126</sup> and the judges then

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<sup>120</sup> See Hisakazu's discussion of the treatment of war criminals after the restoration of independence, Hisakazu, *supra* note 37 at 15–6.

<sup>121</sup> See article 13 of the Tokyo Tribunal Charter, Boister and Cryer, "Tokyo Tribunal Charter" *supra* note 21 at 10; Richard MAY and Marieke WIERDA, "Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha Essays on the Laws of War and War Crimes Tribunals in Honor of Telford Taylor" (1998) 37:3 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 725 at 730–1.

<sup>122</sup> There were other controversies. Judicial impartiality to judicial interpretation of retroactive application of law (whether aggression as a concept existed in law at the time the IMTFE Charter was drafted) were problems that the Tribunal could not overcome. On impartiality and on retroactivity, Kirsten SELLARS, "*Crimes against Peace*" and *International Law* (New York, United States: Cambridge University Press, 2013) at 234–6; Boister and Cryer, "Introduction", *supra* note 3 at ixix.

<sup>123</sup> *UNSC Resolution 780*, UNSCOR, 3119<sup>th</sup> mtg, S/RES/780, (6 October 1992) 1; adopted unanimously and 0 No/Abstentions, non-permanent members: Austria, Belgium, Cape Verde, Ecuador, Hungary, India, Japan, Morocco, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.

<sup>124</sup> *Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192, Articles 2–5 [ICTY Statute]; *Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda*, November 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598, Articles 2–4 [ICTR Statute].

<sup>125</sup> ICTR Statute, *supra* note 124 at Articles 11–12; ICTY Statute, *supra* note 124 at Articles 10–11.

<sup>126</sup> "The Statute, in turn, empowered the judges of the ICTY to create the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. In doing so, the Security Council also requested the Secretary-General 'to submit to the judges of the International Tribunal, upon their election, any suggestions received from States for the rules of procedure and evidence called for in Article 15 of the Statute of the International Tribunal'. The Secretary-General, for his part, agreed that 'the judges of the International Tribunal as a whole should draft and adopt the rules of procedure and evidence', and set about gathering suggestions from UN member states"; Gideon BOAS, James L. BISCHOFF, Natalie L. REID, and B. Don TAYLOR III, eds., "Creation and Amendment of Rules of International Criminal Procedure" in *International Criminal Law Practitioner Library: International Criminal Procedure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 21 at 23; see also Safferling, *supra* note 110 at 25.



designed the amendment process through their respective rules.<sup>127</sup> It is important to note that the ICC Statute did not, however, follow this model.<sup>128</sup> The enabling statute of the ICC, *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, was drafted differently. Article 51 of the Rome Statute explicitly guarantees that amendments to the rules of evidence and procedure are only possible with a two-thirds majority of the Assembly of States Parties.<sup>129</sup>

In this section, I trace the origins of the “quasi legislative” powers of the judges to draft and amend the rules of evidence and procedure to Robert Jackson and the Nuremberg Tribunal.<sup>130</sup> By modelling the ICTY Rules and ICTR Rules on the Nuremberg Tribunal and granting quasi-legislative powers to the judges, Justice Pal’s concerns about the double standards and unfairness would continue. What I argue below is that providing judges with liberal procedural powers does not lead to expeditious trials. Inversely, the judges attempt to be expeditious in fact caused further trial delays. By chronicling the origins and effects of these quasi-legislative powers, Justice Pal’s dissenting view that a liberal approach to the rules did not lead to happy results becomes all the more relevant. In fact, these are the same exact concerns that TWAIL scholars set out vis-a-vis the double standards in the “selection of cases” and “operational selectivity”, albeit in the doctrinal and institutional context.<sup>131</sup> Importantly, this discussion on the powers to amend then forms the backdrop to more insidious forms of double standards that I chronicle in the following discussions on procedural irregularities and the determination of truth.

### 1. *Judicial Power to Draft and Amend the Rules: Inheriting “Utmost Liberality”*

Evidentiary and procedural rules are the backbone of an international criminal tribunal and are essential in setting out how the institution performs its basic function: the determination of truth and culpability. To that effect, article 7 of the Tokyo Tribunal Charter was modelled on the Nuremberg rules of evidence and procedure.<sup>132</sup> This provision allowed the judges to draft and amend their rules, provided it was consistent with the Charter. The Tokyo Tribunal Charter moreover offered further guidance to the judges on how to conduct the trial (article 12) and receive evidence (article 13 & article 15 (d)). In dealing with the admissibility of evidence, article 13 (a) enabled the Tribunal to move beyond technical rules of evidence and proclaimed: “It shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value ...”<sup>133</sup> Expeditiousness, as part of the Allies

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<sup>127</sup> *Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia*, UN Doc IT/32Rev.50 (10 July 2015) at Rule 6 [ICTY Rules]; and *Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda*, UN Doc ITR/3/Rev.23 (29 June 1995) at Rule 6 [ICTR Rules].

<sup>128</sup> For recent issues with ICC judicial interpretation of procedural rules, see Giovanni CHIARINI interview of Cuno Jakob TARFUSSER, “Can We Return to the Law, Please? Rethinking the Judicial interpretation of Procedural Rules in the ICC – A Conversation with Judge Tarfusser after the Gbagbo-Blé Goude Appeal Judgment” *Opinio Juris* (13 April 2021), online: <http://opiniojuris.org/2021/04/13/can-we-return-to-the-law-please-rethinking-the-judicial-interpretation-of-procedural-rules-in-the-icc-a-conversation-with-judge-tarfusser-after-the-gbagbo-ble-goude-appeal-judgment/>.

<sup>129</sup> Safferling, *supra* note 110 at 51; *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*, A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998, Article 119 [Rome Statute]; opened for signature 17 July 1998.

<sup>130</sup> Fairlie, *supra* note 110 at 263.

<sup>131</sup> Kiyani, “Group-Based Differentiation”, *supra* note 10; Reynolds and Xavier, *supra* note 4.

<sup>132</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Tokyo Tribunal Charter”, *supra* note 21 at 7–11.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, at 10.

efforts to deliver victors' justice quickly, was thus built into the Charter. Judges were granted these "quasi-legislative" powers to ensure that the proceedings were expedited.<sup>134</sup>

Importantly, the idea of expeditious trials can be traced back to the drafting of the Nuremberg Charter. The discussions recorded by Robert Jackson through his meticulous notes on the International Conference on Military Trials (June to August 1945) illustrate the importance of expeditious proceedings. To this effect, Jackson made the following statement: "We do not want technical rules of evidence designed for jury trials to be used in this case to cut down what is really and fairly of probative value, and so we propose to lay down as a part of the statute that *utmost liberality* shall be used".<sup>135</sup> The Russian General Nikltchenko responded in agreement in the following manner: "We think it is perhaps very advisable to remind the judges that there may be a possibility of attempts by the Fascists to use the courts as a sounding board for accusing the Allies of imperial designs."<sup>136</sup> This approach to the rules of evidence and procedure at Nuremberg then travelled to the Tokyo Tribunal via Robert Jackson and General MacArthur. It is certain what emerges from the Tokyo majority decision, the dissenting reasons, and the ensuing academic commentary that the desire for expeditious processes was spurred on by victors' justice. This would eventually make its way, many years later to the two ad hoc tribunals.

The "liberality" approach to the rules caused significant concern for the Tokyo Tribunal defence lawyers. They worried about the judicial determination of probative value afforded to their evidence.<sup>137</sup> Defence lawyers were concerned that their evidence would not have the same weight as that of the Prosecutor (as discussed in the next section 2.b). Put differently, given the criminal nature of these proceedings, Tokyo Tribunal judges had a duty to ensure that the most relevant evidence with probative value was accepted. In this vein and in referring to the powers granted to the judges, Justice Pal arrived at an important conclusion in his dissent: "[T]hough the Charter sought to make us independent of all artificial rules of procedure, we could not disregard these rules altogether. The practical conditions of the trials necessitated certain restrictions. This however might not have yielded happy results."<sup>138</sup> These unhappy results centred on the Tribunal's understanding and determination of probative value of evidence. In fact, Justice Pal worried about the meaning and scope of probative value of evidence that was used to determine the criminal culpability of the accused. To this effect, Justice Pal powerfully remarked that with "these provisions of the Charter we admitted much material which normally would have been discarded as hearsay evidence."<sup>139</sup> The ability of the judges to amend the rules, at times mid-way through the process then reinforces the two animating themes of Justice Pal's dissent. On the one hand, the double standards allow the judges to direct the rules to benefit the prosecution (as I reveal in section 2.b) and on the other, the malleability of the rules reinforce the idea of victors' justice, where the outcome is certain.

As part of their "inheritance" from the Nuremberg Tribunal, similar problems arising from the malleability of the rules of evidence and procedure can also be found within the ICTY Rules and

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<sup>134</sup> Fairlie, *supra* note 110 at 263.

<sup>135</sup> International Conference on Military Trials, London, 1945. *Report of Robert H. Jackson, United States Representative*. US Department of State Publication 3080. (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1949) at 83 [Report of Robert H. Jackson] (emphasis added).

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> Boister and Cryer, *Tokyo International Military Tribunal*, *supra* note 30 at 112.

<sup>138</sup> Boister and Cryer, "Judgment of Justice Pal", *supra* note 20 at 942 para 304.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, at 933 para 282.

ICTR Rules.<sup>140</sup> Notwithstanding the need for expedite the proceedings, the real-life results were the exact opposite that resulted in the double standards that Justice Pal was worried about.

## 2. *Inheriting the Legacies of the Past: Utmost Liberality at ICTY and ICTR*

Article 15 of the ICTY Statute enabled the judges to “adopt rules of procedure and evidence for the conduct of the [...] trials and appeals, the admission of evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters.”<sup>141</sup> The ICTR statute borrowed the ICTY statute’s language on the rules of evidence and procedure.<sup>142</sup> Drafted by the judges, the ICTY Rules consist of 127 provisions, while the ICTR Rules include 126 provisions. Slight variations aside, the respective rules specify the required pre-trial, trial, and appeal procedures. They cover every aspect of the tribunals’ work, from investigations to appeals. ICTY and ICTR Rule 6 allowed judges to amend the provisions<sup>143</sup> and unlike the rules of the Tokyo Tribunal, it established a clear amendment process.<sup>144</sup> The rules thus form the normative architecture that enables the tribunals to function effectively.

For example, judges of the ICTY would gather to elect the President of the Tribunal, discuss policy and administrative issues, and amend the rules when required through the plenary sessions.<sup>145</sup> These sessions were confidential, and there are no public records of the discussions and decisions. As the tribunals started their proceedings, an Intersessional Working Group for the Amendment of the Rules, with a panel of five judges, was established to deal with any issues. This working group later morphed into the Rules Committee that took on the role of “a permanent working group for the plenary of judges in respect of changes to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”<sup>146</sup> The Rules Committee included three judges from the Trial Chambers, the Vice-President, and the President of the ICTY.<sup>147</sup>

Notwithstanding the cosmopolitan nature and history of the rules,<sup>148</sup> several important criticisms emerged as the tribunals carried on the work of international prosecutions. Certain criticisms were concerned with the cost of justice,<sup>149</sup> and while others focused on length of the

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<sup>140</sup> I borrow this idea of inheritance from Adil Khan, see Khan, “Inheriting a Tragic Ethos”, *supra* note 87.

<sup>141</sup> ICTY Statute, *supra* note 124 at Article 15.

<sup>142</sup> ICTR Statute, *supra* note 124 at Article 14.

<sup>143</sup> Boas, Bischoff, Reid, and Taylor III, *supra* note 126 at 26–27; ICTR Rules, *supra* note 127 at Rule 6; ICTY Rules, *supra* note 127 at Rule 6; it is important to note that the ICTR Rule 6 is slightly different.

<sup>144</sup> Boas, Bischoff, Reid, and Taylor III, *supra* note 126 at 26–27.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>146</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>147</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>148</sup> Safferling, *supra* note 110 at 14; Gideon BOAS, “Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law: The ICTY and the Principle of Flexibility” (2001) 12:1 Criminal Law Forum 41 at 50; Richard MAY and Marieke WIERDA, “Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha Essays on the Laws of War and War Crimes Tribunals in Honor of Teleford Taylor” (1998) 37:3 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 725.

<sup>149</sup> While some may perceive ascribing monetary value to international justice as “vulgar”, the reality is that international institutions are governed by how much they spend. By 2011, it was forecasted that the cost of international criminal justice would reach close to \$6.5 billion by 2015; Stuart FORD, “How Leadership in International Criminal Law is Shifting from the United States to Europe and Asia: An Analysis of Spending on and Contributions to International Criminal Courts” (2010) 55:3 Saint Louis University Law Journal 953 at 956; David WIPPMAN, “The Costs of International Justice Notes and Comments” (2006) 100:4 American Journal of

proceedings.<sup>150</sup> As a result, in April 1999 the United Nations General Assembly requested the UN Secretary General to create an “Expert Group” to evaluate the operation of both tribunals, given the delays in prosecution and the drain on the financial resources needed to continue the international prosecutions.<sup>151</sup> The Expert Group however, made a number of recommendations to improve the daily operations of the trials.<sup>152</sup> The main crux of the Expert Group’s report was on the role of the judges and the adversarial system.<sup>153</sup> Subsequently, the Expert Group’s recommendations focused on shifting the judicial role within the Tribunals.

In response to the report, the ICTY and ICTR judges sought to tackle delays and other inefficiencies within the adjudicatory process by turning to ‘managerial’ judging.<sup>154</sup> They adopted a managerial role and amended the rules of evidence and procedure in the hopes it would bring about cost cutting and efficient processes. These reforms to the rules were precipitated by the urgency of the UN Security Council’s completion strategy that sought to limit the length of trials and reduce the costs of international justice.<sup>155</sup> As illustrated earlier, the desire for expeditious prosecutions is part of the history of international criminal prosecutions and can be traced back to the Nuremberg Tribunal and Robert Jackson’s “utmost liberality” approach to the rules of evidence and procedure.<sup>156</sup> The Expert Group’s report and the UN Security Council’s completion strategy then worked to reinforce the application of the “utmost liberality” approach within the ICTY and ICTR.

To prevent delays, judges introduced reforms that allowed increased judicial access to case information by amending their respective rules. Simultaneously, the reforms to the rules provided the judges with new powers to set deadlines and work plans, thereby for example, limiting the number of witnesses. These changes, it was argued, “would reduce the length of both pre[-]trial[s] and trial[s].”<sup>157</sup> In this context, the ICTY judges, for example, amended their respective rules on 48 different occasions.<sup>158</sup> In contrast, the ICTR Rules were amended 23 times during the life of the Tribunal.<sup>159</sup>

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International Law 861 at 862; Mark DRUMBL, “International Criminal Law: Taking Stock of a Busy Decade Feature: Reflections on a Decade of International Law” (2009) 10:1 *Melbourne Journal of International Law* 38.

<sup>150</sup> See Sarah WILLIAMS, “ICTY and ICTR (Completion Strategy)” cited in Antonio CASSESE ed, *Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 362–3; Robert CRYER, *An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure*, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 133–6, 141–2 [Cryer, *An Introduction*].

<sup>151</sup> *Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda*, UN Doc. A/54/634 (1999) at paras 36–101, online: UN Docs <<https://undocs.org/A/54/634>> [Report of the Expert Group].

<sup>152</sup> Maximo LANGER and Joseph W DOHERTY, “Managerial Judging Goes International, but Its Promise Remains Unfulfilled: An Empirical Assessment of the ICTY Reforms” (2011) 36:2 *Yale Journal of International Law* 241 at 247.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*; *Report of the Expert Group*, *supra* note 150.

<sup>154</sup> Langer and Doherty, *supra* note 152 at 247.

<sup>155</sup> Cassese, *supra* note 150 at 362–3; Cryer, *An Introduction*, *supra* note 150 at 133–6, 141–2.

<sup>156</sup> Report of Robert H. Jackson, *supra* note 121 at 83.

<sup>157</sup> Langer and Doherty, *supra* note 152 at 247.

<sup>158</sup> Safferling, *supra* note 110 at 25.

<sup>159</sup> Boas, Bischoff, Reid, And Taylor III, *supra* note 126 at 25; *Ibid.*, at 26–9. For a complete list of the dates that the ICTR Rules were amended, see ICTR Rules, *supra* note 127 at 1; the most recent update to the ICTR Rules as of the date of publication is 13 May 2015.

The move to managerial judging did not however lead to more efficient or expeditious trials. On the contrary, the changes with the added new steps built into the rules and the adjudicatory process, prolonged the trials' duration. The judges lacked specific information about their cases. The prosecution and defence counsel resented and resisted their diminished roles. All of this led some commentators to conclude that the “managerial judging reforms did not deliver any of their promised outcomes.”<sup>160</sup> As I illustrate in the following sections, these quasi-legislative powers allowed judges to overrule previous decisions of the ICTY Appeals Chamber. These everyday changes then generate two important issues that strike to the heart of the operationalization of the double standards. First, judges acting on their own volition changed the rules of evidence and procedure at various stages in the proceedings in determining the criminal culpability of an accused.<sup>161</sup> While it is true that the central goal of these tribunals was to prosecute the perpetrators and render justice,<sup>162</sup> the judicial power to amend the rules leave open questions about the scope of the legitimate authority of judges. There are inconsistencies throughout the processes of the ad hoc tribunals where the accused were subject to varying degrees of procedural standards. Second, even within the most liberal account of the rule of law (whether in the domestic or international context), an accused has the right to know the type of evidence and the process that will be used to determine individual criminal responsibility.<sup>163</sup> Importantly, the accused has the right to know how the adduced evidence will be used to determine their individual criminal culpability. The death sentences meted out by the Tokyo Tribunal illustrate the importance of safeguarding procedural standards.

This drive for expeditious adjudicatory process formed the backdrop to Justice Pal's dissent. He worried about the flexibility of the rules of evidence, how the procedural rules were used to diminish the protections afforded to the accused, the impact of the Tribunal's decision on the accused's individual's life and liberty and the legitimacy of the Tokyo Tribunal.<sup>164</sup> In a similar manner, the move to managerial judging in the ICTY and ICTR set out in this section did not yield quick or cheap international justice. Rather, these changes exacerbated the situation within these two tribunals that adversely affected the rights of the accused, prolonged the proceedings, and challenged the legitimacy of the process. In the following section, I chronicle the real daily effects of the malleability of the rules and the impact of allowing hearsay evidence before the Tokyo Tribunal and the two ad hoc tribunals.

#### B. *Procedural irregularities at the Tokyo Tribunal, ICTY and ICTR: The Everyday Changes to the Rules*

The flexibility of the rules described above precipitated daily procedural irregularities at the Tokyo Tribunal and the two ad hoc tribunals. These procedural irregularities moreover can be traced back to the notion of “utmost liberality” formulated by Robert Jackson and they would eventually travel to the ICTY and ICTR. I set out the procedural irregularities within the Tokyo Tribunal and then turn to the two ad hoc tribunals, focusing procedural discrepancies.

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<sup>160</sup> Langer and Doherty, *supra* note 152 at 244.

<sup>161</sup> For other examples of this type of rulemaking, see Boas, Bischoff, Reid, And Taylor III, *supra* note 126 at 35–7.

<sup>162</sup> For an explicit discussion of the goals of international criminal law, see Cryer, *An Introduction*, *supra* note 150 at 28–45.

<sup>163</sup> Safferling, *supra* note 110 at 403.

<sup>164</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Judgment of Justice Pal”, *supra* note 20 at 936 para 290.

## 1. *Procedural Irregularities at the Tokyo Tribunal*

Justice Webb commented about the controversial nature of the everyday changes to the rules by the Tokyo Bench. In fact, he was very much alive to the effects of these procedural irregularities, as evidenced by his comments from the bench. His reflection is worth quoting in its entirety as it illustrates the challenges brought on by a flexible approach to the rules of procedure:

I am not here to offer any apology on behalf of the Tribunal, but as you know the Charter says *we are not bound by any technical rules of evidence*. [...] All we can do on each piece of evidence as it is presented is to say whether or not it has probative value, and the decision on that question may depend on the constitution of the court. Sometimes we have eleven members; sometimes we have had as low as seven. And you cannot say, I cannot say, that on the question of whether any particular piece of evidence has probative value you always get the same decision from the seven judges as you would from eleven. I know that you would not... You cannot be sure of what decision the court is going to come to on any particular piece of evidence not absolutely sure- because the constitution of the court would vary from day to day and I would be deceiving you if I said decisions did not turn on how the court was constituted from time to time. They do. *On the other day in court on an important point I know the decision would have been different if a Judge who was not here was present*. How are we to over-come that. We cannot lay down technical rules. We might spend months in trying to agree upon them and then fail to reach an agreement. The Charter does not allow us to adopt them in any event. It is contrary to the spirit of the Charter. The decision of the Court will vary with its constitution from day to day. There is no way of overcoming it.<sup>165</sup>

The inheritance of Robert Jackson's approach of "utmost liberality" to the rules of evidence and procedure from the Nuremberg Tribunal then had a significant impact on the day-to-day operations of the Tokyo Tribunal.<sup>166</sup> Justice Webb's acknowledgment of the daily realities of the Tribunal compounded an already difficult situation brought on by the flexibility built into the rules, all of which fuelled Justice Pal's scathing dissent. In his analysis of the Tokyo Tribunal's rules, Justice Pal was concerned with the ways in which these procedural irregularities had a significant impact on the accused and the proceedings, depending on which judge was present on the bench on a particular day.

For example, on 26 June 1946, defence counsel sought to cross-examine a prosecution witness on a document that was yet to be introduced into evidence.<sup>167</sup> The judges accepted the prosecution's objection. This decision was in accordance with the Tokyo Tribunal Rules.<sup>168</sup> Three days later, the Tribunal made a similar decision. In this instance, when cross-examining a Prosecution witness, defence counsel asked questions based on another yet to be introduced document. The prosecution objected as the document needed to be served 24 hours in advance. The judges again accepted this objection. Notwithstanding these rulings, when the prosecution attempted to rely on yet-to-be introduced documents in cross-examination, the Tribunal departed from its two earlier decisions in June. In fact, the Tribunal noted that "the rule as to processing and serving a copy of the document in advance did not apply."<sup>169</sup>

These procedural inconsistencies animated Justice Pal's dissent and his specific focus on the construction of the rules, the application of the procedure and ultimately, their negative impact on

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<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, at para 348 (emphasis added).

<sup>166</sup> Report of Robert H. Jackson, *supra* note 135 at 83.

<sup>167</sup> Boister and Cryer, "Judgment of Justice Pal", *supra* note 20 at 962 para 347.

<sup>168</sup> See rule 2 of the Tokyo Tribunal Rules; Boister and Cryer "Tokyo Tribunal Rules", *supra* note 21 at 12.

<sup>169</sup> Boister and Cryer, "Judgment of Justice Pal", *supra* note 20 at 962 para 347.

the proceedings. In fact, these types of irregularities where the judges of the Tribunal elect to change the rules daily, based on what would amount to an alleged pro-prosecution bias then assiduously reinforces the two themes that forms the bedrock of his dissent.<sup>170</sup> The double standards remove the due process rights of the accused and ensures that a form of victors' justice is meted out.

## 2. *Procedural Irregularities at the ICTY and ICTR*

Turning to the ICTY, similar examples of these types of everyday procedural irregularities are evident. For example, during the deposition of two witnesses in *Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic*, the presiding judge informed the Chambers that one of the members of the Bench had fallen ill and was “unlikely to be able to attend the hearings during the remainder of the week.”<sup>171</sup> The ICTY Statute requires three judges to serve in a Trial Chamber. Given the circumstances, the presiding judge encouraged the parties to proceed, relying on Rule 71. This rule allows for the appointment of a ‘Presiding Officer’ to depose a witness “in exceptional circumstances and in the interests of justice.”<sup>172</sup> To the objection of the defence counsel, the prosecutor made an application to this effect. Defence counsel objected because the witnesses would testify on specific facts relating to the charges against the accused.<sup>173</sup> The third judge of the Trial Chamber needed to be present to decide if the witnesses’ testimonies were credible and to determine probative value, which goes to the heart of the determination of guilt in the commission of an international crime. Based on the prosecutor’s application, the two judges of the Trial Chamber decided to receive the witness testimonies without their third colleague.<sup>174</sup>

The defence appealed the decision to include the deposed testimony. The ICTY Appeals Chamber agreed with the accused. Relying on the ordinary meaning of the Statute, the Appeals Chamber noted the following:

Rule 71 provides that a Trial Chamber may order that a deposition be taken, whilst Article 12 of the Statute stipulates that a Trial Chamber shall be composed of three Judges. Given the plain and ordinary meaning of the latter provision, a Trial Chamber is only competent to act as a Trial Chamber *per se* if it comprises three Judges. Consequently, the requirement in Rule 71 that an order for depositions to be taken may only be rendered by a Trial Chamber, has not been met. That a written decision confirming the ruling was issued by the Trial Chamber the following day could not *ipso facto* cure this illegality. Where the Statute or the Rules prescribe that a matter is to be decided by a *Trial Chamber*, two sitting Judges may not do so on the part of the Trial Chamber, save in the case where the Trial Chamber has received prior authorisation by the President. Such authorisation may, however, only be given in respect of routine matters pursuant to Sub-rule 15(E). In the present case, no such authorisation had been given by the President, and, in any event, the making of a decision to proceed by way of deposition with regard to the examination of witnesses giving evidence on facts relating

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<sup>170</sup> Combs, *supra* note 100 at 224–74.

<sup>171</sup> *Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic*, No. IT-95-16-AR73.3, Decision on Appeal By Dragan Papic Against Ruling To Proceed By Deposition (15 July 1999) at para 4 (ICTY, Appeals Chamber).

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, at para 12.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, at para 5.

<sup>174</sup> “We rule that in spite of the opposition of the Defence counsel and the accused, Rule 71 is fully applicable because according to this Rule the request of one party is sufficient, and we feel that we are confronted with exceptional circumstances and that the interests of justice command that a fair and expeditious trial be held” cited in *Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Dragan Papic and Vladimir Santic*, *supra* note 171 at para 6.

to the specific charges made against an accused, thereby having a direct bearing on the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, does not, in the view of the Appeals Chamber, constitute "routine matters" within the meaning of Sub-rule 15(E).[...] The Appeals Chamber, therefore, finds that the ruling was null and void since it was rendered without jurisdiction with regard to defence witnesses Pero Papic and Goran Males,  
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...

In November 1999, the judges sitting in plenary amended Rule 15 and added Rule 15 *bis* (Absence of a judge). This new rule overturned the ICTY Appeals Chamber's five-member panel decision in *Kupreskic*. In fact, Rule 15 *bis* was much more expansive in scope. If one of the judges is ill or unable to attend, the new rule allowed the remaining two judges of a Trial Chamber to "continue in the absence of that judge" (for no more than five days), if they are satisfied that doing so would be in the "interest of justice."<sup>176</sup> The decision to amend the rules in this manner then worked to overturn the *Kupreskic* Appeals Chamber decision to rely on the ordinary and plain meaning of the Statute.

There are other examples in which the judges have sought to overturn their previous decisions.<sup>177</sup> Gideon Boas suggests that judges have overturned the chambers' decisions in "core areas of the law, including the procedure for the delivery of discrete sentences for each finding of guilt by a trial chamber; amending the provisions on the right of appeal ..."<sup>178</sup> *Kupreskic* and other similar cases illustrate the broader implications of judicial inconsistency in applying the rules of evidence and procedure in admitting evidence. These inconsistencies adversely affect, for example, tribunal practice, tribunal jurisprudence, and importantly, the rights of the accused.

Decisions like *Kupreskic* highlight the problems brought about by allowing the judges to amend the rules of evidence and procedure. Justice Pal first articulated these issues as a result of the changes to the rules mid-way through the Tokyo proceedings as set out earlier.<sup>179</sup> Justice Pal was concerned with the way procedural rules were changed to allow for expeditious prosecution. During the Tokyo Trial, the procedural guarantees were not seen as important (as I have illustrated in the earlier section on the critique of the institutional powers of the judges). These examples then enliven Justice Pal's central concerns articulated 45 years before the judges of the ICTY and ICTR started to draft and amend their respective rules.

In both instances, judges were able to change the process that sought to determine the credibility of the witness and the veracity of their testimony midway during the proceedings. Moreover, these changes illustrate the double standards that were built into the international criminal justice system, that Justice Pal and many more recent TWAAIL interventions have sought to challenge. In the next section, I take up the probative value assigned to witness testimony that forms the factual basis of the determination of truth by these three tribunals.

### C. Critique of Truth: Probative Value of Witness Testimony

Beyond the everyday changes to the rules adopted by the Tribunal, Justice Pal articulated several other important shortcomings with the Tokyo Tribunal's determination of truth in prosecuting the Japanese war criminals. In particular, he was deeply critical of how the Tribunal determined

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<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, at para 14.

<sup>176</sup> ICTY Rules, *supra* note 127 at Rule 15*bis*.

<sup>177</sup> Boas, Bischoff, Reid, And Taylor III, *supra* note 126 at 35–7.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, at 35.

<sup>179</sup> Boister and Cryer, "Judgment of Justice Pal", *supra* note 20 at 932–62 paras 280–348.



probative value of the 419-witness testimony and 779 witness affidavits.<sup>180</sup> By allowing hearsay evidence, the Tokyo Tribunal may have potentially compromised the importance of truth, especially in the prosecution of war crimes. By adopting the practices of the Nuremberg Tribunal as a model for the ICTY and ICTR, the “utmost liberality” approach detailed earlier is once again visible and the cause of significant problems in meting out justice for the genocide in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, respectively. In the following section, I set out Justice Pal’s concerns with hearsay evidence and trace the effects of allowing hearsay at the ICTR.

### 1. *Hearsay Evidence at the Tokyo Tribunal*

In exposing some of the fundamental flaws of the determination of probative value, Justice Pal focused on the use of the diary of Koichi Kido and the Saionji-Harada memoir by the Tokyo Tribunal’s prosecutors. Kido held several important ministerial positions within the government of Japan. He served as the adviser to the Emperor, the Lord Keeper of the Privacy Seal.<sup>181</sup> During the proceedings, Kido’s diary, which covered 1930 to 1945, was introduced as evidence. The prosecution relied on the diary because of Kido’s role within the government and his dealings with other Japanese officials at that time.<sup>182</sup> The diary was used to substantiate conversations that Kido had with Japanese officials facing similar charges.<sup>183</sup> Justice Pal was however worried about the trustworthiness of the diary. He thus noted: “[w]hen, however, the author proceeds the whole course either of a life or any event, there may come an unconscious influence of his creation which may greatly affect the record detracting from its initial trustworthiness.”<sup>184</sup>

Similarly, Justice Pal was concerned about the prosecution’s use of Saionji-Harada’s memoir to construct their respective case against the accused.<sup>185</sup> The memoir was introduced into evidence by the prosecution as part of its rebuttal evidence. The memoir reported various conversations with different Japanese officials during the war, as experienced and chronicled by the secretary to Prince Kimmochi Saionji, Baron Harada.<sup>186</sup> These accounts were transcribed by Baron Harada’s stenographer. Harada dictated the text from 1930 to 1940, based on his interactions with various government personnel.<sup>187</sup> These notes were then reviewed by Harada and later corrected by Prince Saionji.<sup>188</sup>

For Justice Pal, the hearsay evidence in the memoir had an insidious effect that made the entries completely “worthless.”<sup>189</sup> At times, Harada was not present when these statements were made. More importantly, the accounts of the author were edited by Prince Saionji,<sup>190</sup> even though he was not part of these conversations. Subsequently, this portion of the dissent focused on the nature of the evidence, prompting the following crucial reflection by Justice Pal: “I for myself find great

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<sup>180</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Introduction”, *supra* note 3 at lix.

<sup>181</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Judgment of Justice Pal”, *supra* note 20 at 933–5 paras 283–9.

<sup>182</sup> Boister and Cryer, *Tokyo International Military Tribunal*, *supra* note 30 at 52.

<sup>183</sup> *Ibid.*, at 68.

<sup>184</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Judgment of Justice Pal”, *supra* note 20 at 934–5 paras 286–7.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, at 935 para 288.

<sup>186</sup> *Ibid.*, at 935–940 paras 288–99.

<sup>187</sup> *Ibid.*, at 936 para 290.

<sup>188</sup> *Ibid.*; Boister and Cryer, *Tokyo International Military Tribunal*, *supra* note 30 at 113.

<sup>189</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Judgment of Justice Pal”, *supra* note 20 at 940 para 299.

<sup>190</sup> *Ibid.*, at 936 para 290.

difficulty in accepting and acting upon evidence of this character in a trial in which the life and liberty of the individuals are concerned.”<sup>191</sup>

## 2. Hearsay Evidence at the ICTY and ICTR

Similarly, hearsay evidence was allowed through the ICTY Rules and ICTR Rules. Rule 89 of the ICTY and ICTR sets out the framework to adduce evidence.<sup>192</sup> In particular, this provision adopts a ‘free proof approach’ where the trial chamber admitted any evidence with probative value.<sup>193</sup> There was no clear, consistent, and discernible practice on admitting evidence though.<sup>194</sup> Both the ICTY and ICTR admitted hearsay evidence since their inception,<sup>195</sup> albeit with some caution.<sup>196</sup> The tribunals’ jurisprudence suggest that each chamber had to be satisfied with evidence’s reliability, “given the content and character of the evidence for it to be admitted.”<sup>197</sup> The tribunals recognized the limited probative value of hearsay evidence. For example, in *Bagosora*, the ICTR Trial Chamber noted that “there are limited avenues for testing the reliability of this [hearsay] particular evidence.”<sup>198</sup>

Various scholars have examined witness testimony before the two ad hoc tribunals.<sup>199</sup> Like Justice Pal, these scholars were particularly worried about false witness accounts and possibilities of perjury.<sup>200</sup> For example, Alexander Zahar chronicled perjury in the 2006 ICTR Trial Chamber decision in *Rwamakuba*. The ICTR may have opted for a relaxed approach to witness testimony, recognizing the context in which witnesses testified.<sup>201</sup> The passage of time and witness trauma may have contributed to witnesses’ fading memories. Due to the horrific nature of the Rwandan genocide, these were practical realities with which the Tribunal had to grapple with.

In an analogous manner, Nancy Combs pinpointed significant dangers in using hearsay evidence in 2010 by examining the trial transcripts from the ICTR.<sup>202</sup> In this ground-breaking

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<sup>191</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>192</sup> ICTR Rules, *supra* note 127 at Rule 89; ICTY Rules, *supra* note 127 at Rule 89.

<sup>193</sup> Yvonne McDermott, “The ICTR’s Fact-Finding Legacy: Lessons for the Future of Proof in International Criminal Trials” (2015) 26:3 Criminal Law Forum 351 at 360 [McDermott, “The ICTR’s Fact-Finding Legacy”].

<sup>194</sup> *Ibid.*, at 359–360, citing Goran Sluiter, Hakan FRIMAN, Suzannah LINTON, Salvatore ZAPPALA, Sergey VASILIEV, eds., *International Criminal Procedure: Rules and Principles* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013)

<sup>195</sup> See *Prosecutor v. Tadic*, IT-94-1-T, Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay (5 August 1996) (ICTY, Trial Chamber); *Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu*, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (2 September 1998) at para 136 (ICTR, Chamber I).

<sup>196</sup> McDermott, “The ICTR’s Fact-Finding Legacy”, *supra* note 193 at 362. For an account of a cautious approach, see *Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic*, IT-98-29-AR73.2, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Concerning Rule 92bis(C) (2 August 2002) at paras 26–71 (ICTY, Appeals Chamber). In this interlocutory appeals decision, the Appeals Chamber had to weigh reliability of statements of deceased witness and whether to these statements were admissible as per Rule 92bis.

<sup>197</sup> John F. Archbold, Karim KHAN, and Rodney Dixon, *Archbold: International Criminal Courts: Practice, Procedure and Evidence*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (Sweet & Maxwell, 2014) at 751.

<sup>198</sup> *The Prosecutor v. Thoneste Bagosora*, ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on the Admissibility of Evidence of Witness DP (18 November 2003) at para 8 (ICTR, Trial Chamber I).

<sup>199</sup> Combs, *supra* note 111 at 222; Zahar, *supra* note 111 at 515.

<sup>200</sup> Zahar, *supra* note 111 at 515.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>202</sup> Combs, *supra* note 111.

study, Combs points out several problems that the ICTR faced. For example, how to contend with a Rwandan eyewitness with different socio-cultural practices? As a result, “[i]n sum, Trial Chambers often seem content to base convictions on highly problematic witness testimony.”<sup>203</sup> This was because the witnesses were unable to provide detailed accounts of the dates, times, and specific locations of the events they were attesting to.<sup>204</sup> More importantly, based on Combs’ careful review of trial transcripts, the ICTR witnesses could not place the accused accurately at the scene.<sup>205</sup> This is a necessary and essential requirement for individual criminal responsibility.

Throughout the life of the ICTY and ICTR, hearsay witness testimony was used to indict, prosecute, and then determine the guilt of accused perpetrators of international crimes.<sup>206</sup> Within the ICTR, the judges accepted problematic witness testimonies for a whole host of reasons. We know from the history of the conflict that the Hutu perpetrators were responsible for the Rwandan genocide. Even in instances where there are significant problems with the testimonies, Combs suggests that the “Trial Chambers explain these [inconsistencies] away as products of the passage of time, the frailty of memory and errors introduced by investigators and interpreters.”<sup>207</sup>

Spanning half a century, all three tribunals encountered difficulties by admitting hearsay evidence. By exploring parallel examples from Justice Pal’s dissent and the practices of the ICTY and ICTR, I illustrated the continuing legacy of the flexible approach to hearsay evidence. In highlighting the dangers of adduced hearsay evidence, it is prudent then to return to Justice Pal’s words referenced earlier: “I for myself find great difficulty in accepting and acting upon an evidence of this character in a trial in which the life and liberty of individuals are concerned.”<sup>208</sup>

### III. CONCLUSION: PAL’S CONTINUED RELEVANCE TO TWAIL AND CRITIQUE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Framed as an excavation of a significant intervention in aftermath of World War II, I have argued that Justice Pal’s dissent remains relevant, especially for scholars interested in a Third World sensibility of international criminal law. By moving beyond TWAIL’s conceptual and institutional challenges of international criminal law, this paper located and situated Justice Pal’s views within the broader literature on dissent in international law and the specific academic engagement by international law and international criminal law scholars. Importantly, while acknowledging some of the problems within Justice Pal’s dissent, I sought to locate his views within the TWAIL tradition. Then I examined the problematic use of the rules in the everyday practices of the Tokyo Tribunal and the more recent international criminal tribunals set up to prosecute the most egregious perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia. Deploying an under studied facet of Justice Pal’s dissent on the rules of evidence and procedure, I chronicled how his scathing perspective remains relevant today, especially in light of the practices of the ICTY and ICTR. I

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<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.*, at 224.

<sup>204</sup> *Ibid.*, at 277–9; Xavier, “Looking for ‘Justice’”, *supra* note 23 at 62.

<sup>205</sup> For more detailed discussion see, Xavier, “Looking for ‘Justice’”, *supra* note 23 at 62; Xavier, “Theorising Global Governance Inside Out”, *supra* note 5 at 277.

<sup>206</sup> See for example, *Prosecutor v. Milan Lukić and Sredoje Lukić*, IT-98-32/1-A, Judgement (20 July 2009) at paras 21–37 (ICTY, Trial Chamber III); *Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al. (Butare)*, ICTR-98-42-A, Judgement (14 December 2015) at paras 1610–17 (ICTR, Appeals Chamber).

<sup>207</sup> Combs, *supra* note 111 at 221.

<sup>208</sup> Boister and Cryer, “Judgment of Justice Pal”, *supra* note 20 at 936 para 290.

did so by tracing the effects of allowing judges of these tribunals to draft and amend their respective rules, the everyday impacts of these changes and allowing hearsay evidence.

Broadly, this paper followed in the footsteps of other TWAIL interventions on international criminal law, challenging the various forms of western universalism and double standards. These themes were scaffolded throughout Justice Pal's dissent. As I have illustrated, the same themes were part and parcel of the everyday practices of the ICTY and ICTR through the changes to their respective rules of procedure and evidence. By examining these practices, I have sought to uncover the embedded double standards, which are pervasive within these international criminal institutions. There is a robust tradition within TWAIL that reconstructs and reimagines the existing structures within international law,<sup>209</sup> while in this paper my concern focused on uncovering as opposed to reconstructing. Although the importance of creating 'new legal edifices' for the betterment of the lives of those affected by international law and international institutions must be acknowledged,<sup>210</sup> one cannot ignore the calls for abolition and its continued relevance, especially in the delivery of international justice.<sup>211</sup>

My intervention is situated within TWAIL and it is offered as means to explore how the practices of international criminal institutions remain exclusionary and are unable to move beyond the persistent legacies of double standards. This perspective though should not be mistaken as an insistence on, and continued faith in, international criminal law's ability to deliver justice. It is impossible to displace law's western universalism and its enduring legacies of the past. I would be remiss not to mention that there may be no other alternative but to engage in disavowal,<sup>212</sup> given the very nature of law and international law in particular. The more recent calls for racial justice have precipitated a reckoning with the law's role in the continued subjugation of Black people, Indigenous Peoples, and racialized peoples.<sup>213</sup> In the same way, there is a real and urgent need to rethink international criminal institutions and how to deliver justice to the victims of mass violence.

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<sup>209</sup> Balakrishnan RAJAGOPAL, "Counter-hegemonic International Law: rethinking human rights and development as a Third World strategy" (2006) 27:5 *Third World Quarterly* 767; James Thuo GATHII, *Promise of International Law: A Third World View (Including a TWAIL Bibliography 1996–2019 as an Appendix)* (Washington, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2020); see also Mickelson, *supra* note 24.

<sup>210</sup> Mutua, "What is TWAIL", *supra* note 6.

<sup>211</sup> Gilmore, *supra* note 25; Walcott, *supra* note 25.

<sup>212</sup> Ryan Cecil JOBSON, "The Case for Letting Anthropology Burn: Sociocultural Anthropology in 2019" (2020) 122:2 *American Anthropologist* 259.

<sup>213</sup> Walcott, *supra* note 25.