Jun 3rd, 9:00 AM - Jun 6th, 5:00 PM

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ABSTRACT: This paper attempts to trace a series of theoretical and political challenges between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s that advocates of Canadian informal logic movement had to overcome for making informal logic as a legitimate philosophical inquiry. Based on a historical narrative that reveals a trajectory of the development of informal logic using oral history interviews and archival research, this paper offers proposals for a research agenda for history of argumentation/informal logic.

KEYWORDS: applied logic, critical thinking, history of argumentation, informal logic, oral history

1. INTRODUCTION

Rhetoric, communication studies, philosophy, linguistics, economics, and natural science. These disciplines or fields of inquiry have their own history and theories. Since diachronic and synchronic dimensions of scholarship interact with each other, there may well be a history of argumentation, given that scholarly specialization of argumentation studies started in late seventies. In communication studies in the United States, scholars affiliated with the American Forensic Association and National Communication Association began holding a conference on argumentation at Alta, Utah, in 1978. In the Netherlands, the current Mecca of argumentation, Argumentation and Rhetoric Sections of the Conference of the Dutch-Belgian Speech Communication Association was held for the first time in 1978. In Windsor, a hometown of informal logic and argumentation in Canada, the first International Symposium on Informal Logic was held in 1978. It has been one generation since the scholarly specialization of argumentation began. To steal the exact phrase that Blair and Johnson (1980, p. vii) used in *Informal logic: the first international symposium*, the basic premise of this paper is simple: “the time was ripe” for starting serious historical projects on argumentation. In order to ensure that scholars and the general public understand argumentation as a legitimate field of scholarly inquiry, argumentation scholars should create a history of argumentation as its second component for scholarship along with argumentation theory, as other disciplines and fields of inquiries have done. While scholars in the first generation of informal logic and argumentation focused on theoretical projects for establishing argumentation as a serious theoretical endeavour, scholars in the second generation should start to inquire into historical as well as theoretical projects.

Attempts to historicize argumentation have not been unprecedented. For example,

Konishi, T. (2009). Toward a History of Argumentation: Canadian informal logic. In: J. Ritola (Ed.), *Argument Cultures: Proceedings of OSSA 09,* CD-ROM (pp. 1-26), Windsor, ON: OSSA.

Zarefsky (1996) offered an excellent synoptic account of historical trajectories of argumentation in communication studies from the 19th century. Hansen and Pinto (1995) traces historical development and contemporary key ideas on fallacies. Walton and Brinton (1997) edited a volume that traces key foundational figures for informal logic, starting with pre-Socratic sophists. Eemeren and others (1996) offered an account of key theories of argumentation, in which authors refer to historical roots of different approaches to argumentation. However, when we turn our attention to historical account regarding how argumentation as a field of inquiry emerged in the second half of the 20th century, the accounts given by leading scholars of the field in the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, their accounts strangely appear similar. At the third Alta Conference, Brockriede (1983, p. 17) used the phrase "the contemporary renaissance in the study of argument" and traced the origin of the Renaissance to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Toulmin. When Johnson and Blair (1980, pp. 3-7) hosted the First International Symposium of Informal Logic in 1978, they offered a historical narrative about how the teaching and the research of logic took an argumentative turn in the seventies. It starts with Aristotle, followed by 'the dark age' until the Renaissance by Stephen Toulmin, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Charles Hamblin started theoretical endeavor to formulate argumentation as a serious field of inquiry. When Eemeren and others (1987) offered a historical narrative on argumentation, they also refer to Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. In short, key persons in argumentation regard Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca as the crucial figures of modern argumentation studies.

While I agree that Toulmin, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, and Hamblin contributed a great deal to the theoretical foundations of informal logic and argumentation, the history of argumentation needs more detailed narratives that chronicle the development in the second half of the 20th century. This paper is a preliminary attempt to reply to David Hitchcock (2003) and Robert Binkley's (2003) calls, made in a round-table discussion at the Informal Logic @ 25 Conference, for the history of informal logic. More specifically, this paper attempts to uncover, through oral history and archival research, challenges that informal logicians had to overcome in promoting their cause to establish informal logic as a legitimate field of inquiry within philosophy in general, logic in particular. Focusing on the period between the late 60s and the mid-80s, this paper offers historical narratives on the following questions: How did key philosophers of informal logic/argumentation start to deal with informal logic? What obstacles did Blair and Johnson face and overcome in publishing *Logical Self-Defense*? What were the major achievements of the first two International Symposiums on Informal Logic held in 1978 and 1983? These questions are significant for historical scholarship on argumentation. Inquiring into how and why key players were interested in informal logic before it was known as informal logic, different roots of informal logic will be uncovered. Knowing what challenges Blair and Johnson faced in publishing one of the most influential textbook written by informal logicians will make apparent philosophers' biases toward a newly emerging scholarly and pedagogical projects. Knowing more in detail about two symposiums will help track the scholarly specialization of informal logic. In short, answers to these questions will reveal what the initial phase of the informal logic movement looked like, and how key players in the movement rhetorically manoeuvred themselves in the process. In the next section of the paper, the author justifies the combined use of archival research and oral history as methods for a historical project on argumentation studies. After justifying the method, this paper will provide a chronicle between 1968 and 1984 based on three categories: beginnings of informal logic to different players, publication of *Logical Self-Defense*, and two international symposiums.

2. ARCHIVAL RESEARCH AND ORAL HISTORY

In conducting this project, the author of the paper relied on two methods for historical research. One is the traditional historical method to use archival material. In retiring from the full-time faculty position, Johnson and Blair donated to Leddy Library at University of Windsor a substantial amount of documents regarding the three international symposiums on informal logic, manuscripts for *Logical Self-Defense* and *Reasoning*, correspondence with publishers and colleagues. The library also stores all the issues of *Informal logic newsletter* and *Informal logic*. The archival research has helped the author to understand what actually happened during the initial years of the informal logic movement, which strengthens and questions what Johnson and Blair (1980, 1994, 1996, 1997) have offered as historical accounts of informal logic.

A second method for historical research is oral history. Yow (2005, p. 3) defines it as "the recording of personal testimony delivered in oral form," which can recover/disclose undocumented aspects of history. Although argumentation scholars may understand how hard it has been for informal logicians to convince other philosophers of the philosophical significance of informal logic, no detailed account has been given on the actual hardship that informal logicians faced. Narratives that Johnson and Blair provide in several oral history interviews would help elaborate key obstacles they had to overcome. Besides Johnson and Blair, the author of the paper interviewed key figures in the initial period of informal logic. Michael Scriven, John Woods, and Douglas Walton came to the First International Symposium as presenters. Trudy Govier and David Hitchcock attended the Symposium and later became the key contributors to the field. Robert Pinto was not an active player in promoting the pedagogical project of informal logic, but he got interested in the theoretical aspect and became a key figure in linking informal logic and epistemology. Interviewing people who participated in the informal logic movement with different philosophical backgrounds will reveal how they experienced the initial phase of the informal logic movement.

The combined use of archival research and oral history uniquely makes it possible to give a more detailed account of the initial phrase of the informal logic movement, for it helps uncover the stories that have not been told and also achieves certain degree of accuracy on what happened. Archival research alone does not help to uncover historical narratives that have never been told. For example, the archive at Leddy Library does not hold records about who were the reviewers of the manuscripts of *Logical Self-Defense*. By using oral history interviews with Blair, Johnson, and Govier, the author could understand the process how Govier was approached as a reviewer. On the other hand, oral history alone does not help to achieve accuracy that archival research would likely guarantee. Although Johnson and Blair vividly remember the gist of the initial review of the manuscript of *Logical Self-Defense*, we need to closely scrutinize their reply to the publisher to see how they used extended arguments to persuade the publisher to have another round of review by more open-minded philosophers. In short, the combined use of archival research and oral history will better help to chart the history of informal logic.

3. DIFFERENT BEGINNINGS OF INFORMAL LOGIC FOR DIFFERENT PLAYERS

Although Johnson and Blair note that informal logic is a pedagogy-led philosophical inquiry in their writing, different key players of informal logic refer to different “irritations of doubt” in starting their scholarly inquiries on informal logic in their oral history interviews. The interviews have called our attention to three different beginnings of informal logic, which I label the pedagogy-led, the theoretical-logic-led and the applied-epistemology-led. The first group of scholars started their investigation with the teaching of introductory philosophy courses, and took theoretical turn through the teaching and writing textbooks. The second group of scholars started their investigation on informal logic for handling challenges on theories of logic. The third group of scholars was led by their concerns on the nature of non-deductive justification. The first group, the pedagogy-led scholars, consists of Ralph Johnson, Tony Blair, Trudy Govier, and David Hitchcock. The second group, the theoretical-logic-led people, consists of John Woods and Douglas Walton. The third group, the applied-epistemology-led people, is represented by Robert Pinto. Although all the people interviewed by the author have written both on theoretical and pedagogical issues on informal logic later in their scholarly careers, different reasons for starting inquiries into the field have influenced what these scholars study as well as how they study it.

The voice of the first group, the pedagogy-led people, has been heard most often among the three, for Johnson and Blair (1980, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2006) have written on the state of affairs on informal logic in different occasions. Ralph Johnson, as a junior faculty member of philosophy department at University of Windsor, started teaching introductory logic course in 1968. He taught the course using a symbolic logic textbook. As time went on, he gradually sensed the approach based on symbolic logic was not working well with many students. While students with mathematical background performed well in the course, those without that background struggled in the course. Since he was not happy with the students’ struggles, he proposed to start a new course on Applied Logic. His colleagues in the philosophy department agreed on the proposal, and he started teaching the course in 1971, using Howard Kahane’s textbook, *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric*[1]. The course was well accepted by the students, and the enrolment was doubled in the following year. As a result, the department decided to open another section of the course. For the instructor of the second section, Johnson (2007a) approached Tony Blair, because he noticed that Blair used logical phrases such as ‘begging the question’ in the right way at faculty meetings. Johnson thought Blair would be a great teacher to teach the course. Blair (2003) agreed to teach the course, and they started teaching different sections on Applied Logic, sharing the teaching material. They were happy with the students’ acceptance of the course content, but they grew unsatisfied with Kahane’s textbook for three reasons. First,

[1] Logic and Symbolic Logic must be two courses before he started teaching Applied Logic in 1971. *The general calendar of University of Windsor*, 1971-1972 (1971, p. D-167) states the following general objective of Applied Logic: “The aim of this course is to teach the student how to discriminate between good arguments and bad ones. Among the topics to be considered are: the basic principles of deductive inference; the different kinds of fallacy, the nature of inductive inference; the difference between proof and persuasion. Examples will be taken not only from philosophical writings, but also from political speeches, advertising, newspapers and periodicals. (3 hours a week)” It should be noted that the course includes deductive logic and inductive logic as its components.

Kahane's text just lists the gist of the arguments without analyzing the original texts closely. Second, Kahane's textbook did not offer clear conceptions of fallacies, so it was hard to tell whether a particular fallacy was bad. Third, Kahane's textbook used American socio-political issues as examples of arguments. Since Johnson was an American and Blair received his graduate education in the US, they could explain the background of the examples to the students. However, they thought it was time-consuming to do so, and they thought it would be easier to teach with Canadian examples[2]. Due to these dissatisfactions, they started to supplement Kahane's textbook with clearer conceptions of different fallacy labels and Canadian examples. The date of their initial supplement was 1973. They kept on refining the supplement for several years, which later became *Logical Self-Defense*.

A third person to be mentioned in this group was Trudy Govier (2007). She reviewed the manuscript of *Logical Self-Defense* and supported its publication after the first round reviewers unanimously denied it. In teaching the introductory course on Practical Reasoning, she used Giere's *Understanding Scientific Reasoning*, Huff's *How to Lie with Statistics*, as well as *Logical Self-Defense*. Although she did not present a paper at the First International Symposium on Informal Logic, she came to the Symposium and became a major figure, publishing a textbook of her own, *Practical Study of Argument* as well as a scholarly monograph, *Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation*.

David Hitchcock (2007) is a fourth person in this group. Before the Symposium, he had not published in the field of informal logic. As a junior faculty member, he taught an introductory course on Moral Issues. While teaching the course, he discovered that students had difficulty in adequately extracting the message of the assigned reading, and he introduced another course called Reasoning to deal with this problem. In the Reasoning course, he used Scriven's *Reasoning*, and later published his own textbook, *Critical Thinking*. Like Govier, he did not present a paper at the First Symposium. However, he became a key contributor in the field after Johnson and Blair started *Informal Logic Newsletter* in 1978. As we have observed so far, the pedagogy-led scholars developed their interest in argumentation out of their teaching service courses. They developed their interest in informal logic through the teaching and published their own textbooks, then started publishing scholarly articles and monographs. In this sense 'the pedagogy-led' is an adequate label for these scholars.

While the pedagogy-led scholars' narratives jointly strengthen the story already told by Johnson and Blair, the narratives by Woods (2007) and Walton (2007) reveal that the theoretical irritation of doubt was the key engine in pushing their inquiries into the field. Due to their theoretical orientation, this group can adequately be called 'the theory-led.' Walton taught a course in logic at University of Winnipeg, using Copi's text. Like Johnson, Walton realized that student at Winnipeg did not need so much mathematical logic as practical skills for treating informal fallacies. However, unlike Johnson, Walton did not pursue the pedagogy-led route to develop informal Logic. He (2007, p.2) remembers how he decided to work on informal logic:

> […] when I started teaching logic I realized that the students at the University of Winnipeg didn't

[2] Oral history interviews with Johnson and Blair reveal that they are not on the same page about who voiced dissatisfaction with American socio-political examples. While Johnson perceives that it came from students, Blair perceives it was more from him than students. The author believes that it came more from Blair and students than from Johnson, partly due to their Canadian nationality.

> need so much mathematical logic, which was how I was trained—that they needed a more practical, uh, approach or more practical skills, and so, in particular, part of the curriculum of the standard logic course was teaching informal fallacies. And, uh, so I thought that was important for the students to learn that, because it seemed more practical. The problem was there was very little written about that. It's always in the logic textbooks, but aside from Hamblin's book—Charles Hamblin had written a book in 1970 on fallacies. You probably know it. And, uh, that was really the only scholarly book in the field that was written on fallacies, and so, I resolved at that time to try to make a contribution by developing that field in a way that my students could get more benefit out of it.

He suggested to Woods, his former advisor at University of Toronto, informal fallacies as a research topic. Although Walton's motivation to start investigating into informal logic partly came from his experience of teaching logic courses, he started to study it because of a lack of systematic studies on fallacies.

Woods also found an exciting challenge in Hamblin. When he ran out of material in the course on mathematical logic for the first-year student at University of Victoria in 1971, he (2007, p.2) assigned Hamblin's *Fallacies* and liked it very much: "I found it a wonderful book and I was moved by Hamblin's challenge to logicians to revive the fallacies program and to get serious about it." It should be noted that Woods did not teach a course on informal logic or applied logic although he treated some fallacies in upper-level courses. Rather than focus on teaching students practical skills, he was more interested in complex aspects of fallacies and wanted to elaborate a good logical account for them.

After agreeing to working on clarifying the nature of different types of fallacies together, Woods and Walton co-authored several articles on fallacies in scholarly journals. Later their collected papers were published in 1989. Eemeren and others (1995, pp. 236-238) devote a section to explaining the Woods-Walton approach to fallacies. It summarizes that their approach uses various logical systems, such as dialog logic, in clarifying the nature of different fallacies, and that this approaches believes that resort to some type of formality is meaningful in clarifying the nature of fallacies. When Johnson and Blair had the First Symposium on Informal Logic, both Woods and Walton were invited to speak. Woods' talk was on what informal logic is, and Walton's was on *petitio principii*. After attending the symposium, they published their own textbook, *Argument: The logic of fallacies,* in 1982. Later Walton took a pragmatic, dialectical turn in studying informal logic, working with Eric Krabbe and published *Commitment in Dialogue*. Also, he published several journal articles and books with a computer scientist Chris Reed on the nature of argumentation schemes. Woods investigates philosophical logic and informal logic, and studies the relationship between formality and informality in logic and argumentation. Their scholarly path on informal logic and argumentation started with theoretical concern rather than pedagogical one, and their interest in writing a textbook followed later. Although practical aspect influenced Walton's interest in informal logic, 'the theory-led' is an adequate descriptor because both Woods and Walton were interested in systematizing fallacies.

The final group is called 'the applied-epistemology-led.' Robert Pinto, Mark Weinstein, and Harvey Siegel can be included in this group. Given publication records of these scholars, the applied-epistemology-led approach is a latecomer to the informal logic movement. Pinto observed the process of development of informal logic as a colleague of Johnson and Blair. However, he did not become involved in what they were doing until he realized that informal logic could throw light on questions in epistemology he was already interested in. As an epistemologist of analytic philosophy tradition, he (2007, pp. 7-8) was interested in the nature of inference. In drawing a conclusion, people can use arguments/reasoning. To draw a conclusion Q, a person can offer reason P, in the form of 'P therefore Q.' If this process uses deductive reasoning, Q necessarily follows from P. However, if the reasoning is a non-deductive type, Q does not necessarily follow from P, and an interlocutor can counter this inference, saying "Well, Q does not follow from P, because of X, Y, and Z." Since there are many instances of inferences that are not deductive, Pinto was wondering how he could elaborate theories on the nature of non-deductive inference. By attending the First International Symposium, interacting with scholars there, and by reading scholarly works by them, Pinto realized informal logicians did a fine job in investigating into the nature of non-deductive inference. In short, he was persuaded by informal logicians, and started studying it. Although he did not start writing in the field until the Second Symposium on Informal Logic in 1983, his name is worth mentioning because of his contribution to the development of the acceptability standard that Johnson and Blair (1977a, p. 23) employed in *Logical Self-Defense*, and as a key player who brought a new perspective into informal logic. Like other key scholars, he later started teaching an introductory course on Reasoning and published a textbook, *Reasoning: A Practical Guide for Canadian Students*, with Blair and Parr in 1993.

Although the narrative told by Johnson and Blair emphasizes the primacy of the pedagogy as the starting and end point of informal logic, oral history interviews of other key informal logicians reveal that that's not the whole story about the beginning of informal logic. The narratives by Woods and Walton disclose their motivation to theorize fallacies to answer the challenge raised by Hamblin, and Pinto's narrative reveals his motivation to develop a better account of non-deductive justifications as an epistemologist. Since all the key scholars I interviewed ended up writing one or two introductory textbooks on informal logic, reasoning, critical thinking or argument, Johnson and Blair can defend their thesis about the focal point of informal logic. However, the initial motivations to start the scholarly inquiries are varied according to their different scholarly interests. We are still observing the different development of informal logic about forty years after these scholars started pedagogical or theoretical revolutions in philosophy. The next section of this paper narrows down the focus and tracks how Johnson and Blair grew dissatisfied with Kahane's textbook and published their own, overcoming strong biases against their approach from other philosophers.

4. PUBLICATION OF *LOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE*

For the pedagogy-led informal logicians, textbook writing was a serious scholarly endeavour, particularly in the beginning period of informal logic, for there used to be fewer publication outlets than now. There was no *Informal Logic* or *Argumentation*, and informal logicians had not yet made serious attempt to publish in the *Journal of American Forensics Association*. The textbook was thus a place to develop scholarly ideas. Publication of *Logical Self-Defense* was undeniably a key moment in the history of informal logic, given its consequence to later textbooks and scholarship. Govier's *Practical Study of Argument*, Groarke and Tindale's *Good Reasoning Matters!*, Romain's *Thinking Things Through*, and the author of this paper's *Logical Competence* and *Let the Debate Begin!*, just to name a few, have employed the triad criteria of relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability in evaluating argument in natural language. Scholars also have worked on refining each of the three criteria in scholarly forums. It is a big *IF*, but if *Logical Self-Defense* had not been published, would we be observing what we are observing right now in 2009? Would there been so many monographs or textbooks in the field of informal logic and argumentation? Would philosophers keep hosting conferences on argumentation? Would York, Toronto, or McMaster produce Ph.D. students whose specialty is informal logic and argumentation? The answers are arguably 'yes,' but we probably see substantially different theories of informal logic and argumentation if there had not been for *Logical Self-Defense*. This is not a meaningless *IF* to ask because Johnson and Blair actually had to overcome serious challenges from other philosophers and resort to arguments to discharge their dialectical obligations to their audience.

When Johnson started teaching a new logic course in 1971, after he grew dissatisfied with symbolic logic, he titled the course Applied Logic, not Informal Logic. He used Kahane's *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric* and focused on the fallacy-led approach in evaluating arguments in natural language. After Blair started another section of the course in 1972, they started to supplement the textbook to refine it in three areas: analysis of arguments, clearer conceptions of each fallacy, and use of Canadian examples. First, Kahane merely listed the gist of the arguments, but did not closely analyze the structure of the argument. Relying on Scriven's *Reasoning*, they analyzed the arguments using a tree-diagramming technique (Blair 2007b, pp.5-6). Second, they thought that Kahane was somewhat loose in offering conceptions of fallacies. Due to this looseness, "They were often hard to tell whether a particular fallacy was good or not. So we began to list the conditions on which a given fallacy was committed […]" (Blair 2007b, p. 3). Third, the examples in Kahane's examples were exclusively American cases. Johnson (2007b, p. 3) remembers complaints from his students:

> Why should we in Canada be using a text that examples are all American examples? Aren't there any Canadian examples? Don't Canadian politicians, you know, engage in […]" and so that's when we began to think, "Oh, we should do our own […] we should take this approach, but, but, you know, Canadianize, that would be one way of putting it, and tighten that up." So that was essentially the beginning of the idea for *Logical Self-Defense*.

As a Canadian, Blair strongly wanted to use a Canadian textbook for the course and wrote to Canadian publishers before he started to teach, asking if there was a book "to use as a text for a course in informal logic *which has a Canadian slant and which uses Canadian material for its illustrations*" (1972, emphasis in original). Due to these sources of dissatisfaction, it did not take them much time before they started to supplement Kahane's textbook.

The archived materials at Leddy Library confirm their stories about the refinement of their ideas. There are different versions of manuscripts, the oldest one written in 1973. This manuscript, titled *Applied Logic: The Art of Evaluating Argument*, does not offer the triad criteria of relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability as the three main categories for evaluating arguments, although Johnson and Blair include accounts of irrelevant reason or hasty conclusion. Instead of using the triad criteria, they still endorse the classification of deductive and inductive arguments, as the following passage clearly states:

> Every argument has two dimensions: a horizontal one reaching out the world; and a vertical one that lies through the premises and the conclusion. It is the vertical dimension that is the subject of logic:

> or, to be accurate, formal logic. The central question dealt with in formal logic is: What conditions must be fulfilled in order for the passage from the premises of an argument to its conclusion to be justified? What sort of linkages are strong, and which are weak? Formal logic itself is subdivided, according to the customary distinction of arguments into two kinds: *deductive* and *inductive*.
>
> A deductive argument is one in which the conclusion of the argument is *necessitated* by the truth of its premises. An inductive argument is one in which the conclusion of the argument is rendered *probable* by the truth of its premises. (1973a, emphasis in original, p. 51)

In another manuscript dated 1973, they divide logic into two main categories: formal and applied. The former is further divided into deductive and inductive, which respectively concern validity and strength. In contrast, applied logic concerns fallacy (1973b, p. 58). This version still does not offer the triad criteria, but different fallacies are listed under irrelevant reason: *ad hominem*, guilt by association, false dilemma and two wrongs. This looks closer to the published version of *Logical Self-Defense*. In the untitled UPTEENTH REVISION dated on 7 February 1975, they finally offered the two main categories of fallacies: irrelevant reason and inadequate evidence. These different versions of the manuscripts reveal they started with endorsing a deductive-inductive dichotomy of argument, then introduced fallacies as a distinctive category along with deduction and induction, and ended in offering applied logic as a distinctive category to evaluate fallacies. The latest manuscript dated September 1976 has a 'TO THE TEACHER' section:

> We wish we could have written a text that is definitive. Once into the project, we began to realize how vast the area is, how intriguing, and how little practically oriented work has been done. We attribute that chiefly to the mesmerizing grip that formal deductive logic has had both on logic and philosophy in the 20th century. One of consequence has been to relegate informal (or applied) logic--the study of fallacies--to a position of minor importance….What we have tried to do is to make the study of *ordinary arguments* interesting and lively. Our main focus is the idea of *fallacy*, and we have tried to put some order and regularity into that. (p. v)

While preparing the supplement, that Johnson and Blair seemed to search for a publisher for it. They (1974a) wrote to Gordon Van Tighem, Humanities Editor of McGraw-Hill Ryerson, on February 18, 1974, regarding the possibility of publishing a textbook. Including the first chapter as a sample, they emphasize the significance of using Canadian examples and state that they want to publish it so that they could make the textbook more readily available to students rather than turn a profit. In May 1974, they (1974b) agreed with McGraw-Hill Ryerson about publication and promised to finish their manuscript by June 15, 1975. In a memorandum titled 'Notes of organizational meeting for Applied Logic text, October 1, 1974,' they were developing lines of thinking to endorse the eventual title of their textbook, *Logical Self-Defense*.

> Our angle will be that we are treating that part of critical thinking that might be called 'defensive thinking.' This angle provides a (rough) principle of unity: everything in the text can (more or less) go under the rubric of 'something you need to know to be able to think well defensively' (p. 1).

Although the issue of boundaries between informal logic and critical thinking became crucial in establishing Association of Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT), this memo does not clearly distinguish critical thinking from applied/informal logic.

Taking more time than they promised to the publisher, Johnson and Blair turned in the manuscript in August 1975. After being reviewed, it was advised unanimously against publication in November 1975. One review is three pages long and harsh on the substance of the manuscript. It begins with a strong criticism: "Despite some virtues (an agreeable style, a lively selection of examples), its *logical* defects are so serious as to make it a worthless introduction to the subject which it [this book] professes to treat" (re: *APPLIED LOGIC*, emphasis in original, p. 1). Then it goes on to treat the fallacy of Irrelevant Reason to show "how much the authors manage to get wrong in the span of a few pages" (p. 1). In my reading, two strong lines of criticisms[3] are that: (1) the textbook does not tell different versions of committing the fallacy of Irrelevant Reason–one arising from presupposing a false major premise and minor premise; and (2) it does not examine relevance of the premise with the method of counterexample. Instead, it asks the readers to provide different, non-irrelevant premises that support the same conclusion of the original argument[4]. With regard to this second point, the review states that:

> (t)his is logically *horrible* advice. For it amounts to saying the proper way of displaying fallacy in an argument A in some specified respect, which is non fallacious!! How can this procedure convince? The original proponent, if tough-minded, will reply: "alright, 4) [a different, good argument] is OK, but how does this show that 2) [the original argument]–which is different–is not?" (emphasis in original, pp. 2-3)

The other review was concerned more about the marketability of the book than its substance. It pointed out that Bentham's *Handbook of Political Fallacies*, Ward and Holter's *Fallacy, the Counterfeit of Argument*, and Michalos' *Improving Your Reasoning* dealt with the same topic with shorter space, so Johnson and Blair's book would be more expensive and thus less competitive. Also, due to the narrow scope of the textbook, it would not be used in ordinary logic courses. It concludes that the manuscript be published as a workbook but not as a textbook.

Receiving these two negative reviews, a representative of McGraw-Hill Ryerson became less enthusiastic about the project. Blair (1975, p.1) recollects from his phone conversation with her that:

> She is afraid her judgment isn't authoritative: "I'm not a philosopher […]" So she takes reviews like G's and X's as authoritative. She said she sees it now as two in favour (us) and two against (G and X). That's why she wants another reviewer.

In this critical situation, Johnson and Blair resorted to what they should be good at: argumentation. They wrote a twelve-page document that pointed out how the original reviewers "were not fully acquainted with the goals and scope of the text" (1975b, p. 12). They followed the original structure of the two reviews in their replies, for it "will help if you go over those reviews once more, and have them, and the Manuscript, at hand while reading what follows" (p. 1). As regards the longer and harsher review by Long, which criticized the substance of the text, they sounded polemical at the outset:

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[3] The other, less crucial criticisms are that Johnson and Blair's reconstruction of the original argument about the nutritional value of corn flake commits the fallacy of straw person, and that they are not consistent in their use of letters (A, B, and C, or P1, P2, and P3) in standardizing arguments (pp.1-2).

[4] In their reply to the publisher, Johnson and Blair regard the use of different, non-irrelevant premises and counterexamples as two separate points and respond to each. In my analysis I group these two points and present how Johnson and Blair respond to them, because these two points jointly seem to advance a point that their treatment of irrelevant reason is not adequate.

> […] as we show the below, point by point, Long's objections are in the main straight mistakes, misreadings of the text, or unsupported controversial opinions taking issue with the considered judgement of the authors. This is *not* a matter of one opinion against another. We show that Long is, time and again, wrong. It is infuriating to have to take the time to defend the text against the sloppy, churlish, and even stupid comments Long makes. We think you were seriously ill-served by this review. (1975b, emphasis in original p. 2)

After setting a tone of their reply, they address each of the points raised by Long. On the failure to distinguish two modes of irrelevant reason, they do not believe that the distinction will help students to make good assessment of arguments:

> The question we've had to ask throughout is: What distinctions will help students develop the practical skills that this book is explicitly designed to teach? It is a serious misconception of the text to see it as intending to provide a complete presentation of the subject called "applied" or "informal" logic. The goal is not to get across a body of information, but to instill a skill. That is and should be a major selling point of the book. We've chosen not to introduce the distinction Long thinks is important. Our reason for doing so is that to teach this distinction would require a digression that stands to confuse and lose some of the practically-oriented students the text is designed for. Our disagreement with Long on this point is in no way a logical defect in the book. (1975b, p. 3)

In this passage Johnson and Blair contrast 'skill' or 'practically-oriented' with 'a body of information' or 'digression,' and attempts to establish a point that the failure pointed out by Long is not significant given the nature of the book. Using the hierarchy between practical use to the students and a body of information or a digression to confuse them, they appeal to the publisher that the charge, if it were true, does not make any sense in light of the goal of the text.

On the Long's second major point, Johnson and Blair refer to the manuscript and defend their position that asks the readers to offer a different argument.

> […] what we actually say on p. 84 [of the manuscript] is this:
>
> > "On the basis of this discussion of irrelevance, you can se that to prove condition (2) of *Irrelevant Reason* satisfied it is necessary to show with specific reference to the argument in question how the truth of the conclusion is independent of the truth of the premise. This is what we did when we charged Lalonde with *Irrelevant Reason*. We argued that whether milk has nutritional value makes no difference to whether corn flakes have nutritional value, since they are two different substances and their nutritional properties are independent of one another."
>
> What we actually say bears no resemblance to what Long makes us out to have said. (1975b, p. 6)

In addition to showing that Long has misunderstood the manuscript, they defend that their method of teaching has been successful with their students, so this part of manuscript can not be misleading to the potential readers. They conclude that "the evidence is mounting--and there's more--that Long did not read the text with much attentiveness" (p.6). By charging the sloppy reading of Long, they attempt to re-establish their own credibility.

On the use of counterexamples, they refer to Kahane (1971), Capiladi (1973), and Fearnside and Holther (1959) and point out that the notion is not widely used in these books. On this basis, they conclude that: "(i)t's absurd to say that our not explicitly introducing the notion of counterexamples demonstrates the worthlessness of the text" (p.6). In addition, they argue that including the use of counterexamples will force them to deal with the method of logical attack, which the manuscript was not written for.

> To discuss it [the method of counterexamples] would get us into territory we've deliberately avoided: strategies of logical offense. We've designed the whole text around what might be called "defensive logic"—how to avoid being taken in by others' bad logic. It would call for an entirely new section—and in fact a different orientation; a different book—to catalogue and teach the methods of logical attack. (p. 6)

After attempting to demonstrate that Long has not supported his case in his review, Johnson and Blair direct attention of the publisher to significant parts of the manuscripts on which Long has not said anything. Those significant parts include their treatment of media and advertisement, extended arguments, standardization of arguments, classification of fallacies, appeal to authority or two wrongs:

> The list could go on and on. When we think of the variety of questions that even a sympathetic critic could address himself to, and compare the trivial quibbles Long manufactures, we wonder about the time and care he devoted to assessing the text, and indeed about his experience with this philosophical material.
>
> Long's review was written with such a lack of good faith, and of care, as to be useless to us and to you. It was a waste of your time and money. It's a waste of our time to have to reply to it. (p. 8)

Having concluded that Long's review was off the point and useless, Johnson and Blair then start dealing with Short's review, which focused more on the issue of marketability of the text given that other books treat the same topic with shorter space. At the outset, their tone toward Short is less polemical than that toward Long. "Although critical, they [Short's comments] were written with good will. Still, we cannot agree that Short's observations, even when well-taken, imply that the book is not salable" (p. 9). Although they acknowledge the Short's point that their text has fewer lists of fallacies, they argue that it is rather "a virtue" of the text, for they deal with "*the most frequently occurring* ways to spoil an argument" (emphasis in original, p. 9). After this sentence they reiterate the goal to which the text was written. It is not for the

> traditional introduction to logic that briefly surveys 'informal logic,' not is it for the informational course that tells the students what the traditional fallacies are. Instead, it's a handbook teaching a skill—a skill that is useful, and immediately applicable in a practical way" (p. 9).

Again, they use a contrast between logic for skill and logic for knowledge/information and imply that Short's comments may not be meaningful to the book written for logical skills.

In addition, Johnson and Blair justify the length of the manuscript, by addressing two audience members that Short do not explicitly consider. They consciously speak to the publisher, who must be reading their reply with the manuscript at hand, contrast their text and other textbooks on the market and argue for the superiority of their own. They point out that those other textbooks do not explain how different fallacies occur, why they are fallacious, why people commit them, and so on. Their manuscript simplifies the taxonomy of fallacies so as not to confuse "people who need a fairly simple working map of the area" (p. 9). Neither do these other textbooks use actual, everyday arguments; they instead use artificial ones. These points would be selling points for their textbook. Also, the criticism on the length does not consider another group of the audience of the textbook: a university student without much philosophical background:

> Note that what would be worrisome would be non-philosophers finding the text long-winded. It can be tedious for a philosopher to work through material treated in detail when he already knows it backward, but not so for a student meeting the ideas for the first time. (p. 10).

By constructing the main readership of the textbook as someone who do not have much philosophical background but someone who need skills in argumentation, they attempt to persuade the publisher how Short's review is not on the point. Given who the readers of the textbook are, they need to offer a detailed account in the text. Besides characterizing the audience and justifying the textbook written for them, they draw the publisher's attention to different markets for the textbook than the traditional introduction of logic, such as humanities courses, communications arts courses, community colleges and high schools. Given these points, they conclude that Short's objections are not critical once the text is shortened.

With the long rejoinder, Johnson and Blair persuaded McGraw-Hill Ryerson to have another round of review. While the notes of the conversation between Blair and McGraw-Hill Ryerson's representative (1975) indicate that the publisher wanted Johnson and Blair to provide a list of people or departments for potential reviewers, Johnson and Blair do not remember who they were, other than the fact that Trudy Govier was one of the actual reviewers who supported the publication of the text. According to her oral history interview, she was not among the original reviewers, but Terence Penelhum[5], her former teacher who was in Calgary, asked her to review the textbook since he did not have time to do so (p. 2). Both reviews in the second round supported the publication on condition that the manuscript could be shortened. They both liked the use of Canadian examples in the textbook. One review classifies two types of informal logic textbooks on the market. One is the Copi sort, which deals with made-up examples; the other is the Kahane sort, which uses modern examples from newspapers or television. Comparing Johnson and Blair's manuscript with the Kahane sort, it goes on to say as follows:

> Since most instructors today want to use the newer texts they choose Kahane or something like it. The difficulty is that the student actually needs to know a bit of U.S. history, current events, and governmental structure in order to properly understand the fallacies. This, of course, poses a problem. The publication of AL [Applied Logic] would solve this problem. Indeed, with the availability of AL an instructor would have a hard time, justifying the use of Kahane. (Which means that distribution of examination copies in Canada should be liberal.) (Report on *Applied Logic* for McGraw Hill-Ryerson p. 5)

After the two-rounds of reviews and efforts to shorten the manuscripts, *Logical Self-Defense* was published in 1977. As we have observed over the last three decades, it has three Canadian editions and a US edition, and is currently available from International Debate Education Association. The historical sketch of the publication of *Logical Self-Defense* provides for us significant issues that deserve serious attention by philosophers in general, argumentation scholars in particular: how is informal logic different from formal logic?; how is informal logic similar to or different from applied logic and critical thinking?; how do informal logicians use the extended argument for discharging their dialectical obligation?; what roles do the audience play in the extended

[5] In the follow-up interview conducted in February 2009, Johnson and Blair do not remember whether they recommended Penellhum, but Johnson told the author of this paper that they could have recommended Penellhum, for he was a fair-minded philosopher.

argument?; how do different goals of persuasive or eristic dialogue intersect in the process of argumentation?; what role does the background knowledge about socio-political issues play in evaluating the argument?; how can the skill education be philosophical? Later, informal logicians and argumentation scholars discuss these issues in such scholarly forums as *Informal Logic Newsletter*, *Informal logic*, or *Argumentation*. However, this section has revealed that precursory discussion was going on in the process of publishing *Logical Self-Defense*, with or without explicit consciousness of the parties involved in the process. Suffice it to say that the historical sketch of the process indicates the need for doing historical research more for grounding theoretical projects in a historical framework. The next section will examine two catalytic events for converting informal logic into a serious scholarly endeavor: two international symposiums.

5. TWO INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUMS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES

> The basic premise behind calling of the Symposium was simple: the time was ripe. (Blair and Johnson 1980, p. vii)

Through the teaching and the research conducted fairly independently, informal logic developed over the first ten years. While preparing the manuscript of *Logical Self-Defense*, Johnson and Blair started to recognize other works on applied logic by philosophers: textbooks and journal articles. Regarding the textbooks, more and more textbooks did not focus on formal deductive logic as the central focus. Other than Kahane (1971), Thomas (1973) and Scriven (1976), Blair (2007c) and Johnson (2007c) remember textbooks published in the 1970s: Michalos (1970), Fogelin (1978), Weddle[6] (1978), Munsen (1976), and Engel (1976). They both mention Douglas Walton and John Woods' scholarly articles on different fallacies[7]. These two factors contributed to their judgments that the time was ripe for them to hold a conference.

To the question which of the two, Johnson or Blair, took initiatives in holding a conference, they do not remember. However, both were clear that they jointly worked from the very early period. To them, who articulated something first does not seem important. Remembering the experience of blind-refereeing of the same paper and writing quite similar comments, Johnson (2007c) says:

> I mean in a certain sense we can operate with one mind when it comes to this kind of thing. We have our differences all around this territory…coming to this kind of thing, I think, it's in a real sense one minded individuated in two brains…And that mind would've been the mind that said 'there need to be a conference.' So who articulated the view of that mind? I don't remember. I doubt if he does either. (p. 9)

Although neither of them remembers who initiated the conference, Johnson (2007d, pp. 2-3) refers to a potential obstacle to invite people to a conference at University of Windsor. Because the University of Windsor was affiliated with the Catholic Church until

[6] Fogelin's textbook and Weddle's textbook were published in the same year when the First International Symposium on Informal Logic was held. Therefore, Blair seems to be confused about what textbooks were around when they held the symposium.

[7] Johnson (2007c) mentions the name of Wayne Brockriede and says that the scholarship in communication studies pointed in the same direction.

the mid-20th century, many people were still predisposed to think that the philosophy program at Windsor focused on Thomas Aquinas[8]. He thought that the site of the First International Symposium on Informal Logic might not be appealing to many philosophers due to this perception. It is hard to judge that this predisposition actually existed at the time, but it must be a real obstacle for Johnson and Blair. When they (1975b, p.12) replied to the publisher after the first-round review of *Logical Self-Defense*, they wrote:

> We would also strongly urge that the text be sent out anonymously. There exists a certain degree of snobbishness among Ontario universities, with York and Toronto often thought of, and thinking of themselves, as at the top, with places like Windsor seen as pretty provincial ("Didn't that used to be Assumption, the Catholic college").

Partly because of this feeling, Johnson and Blair approached people to come and talk at the Symposium, instead of publicly announcing the call for papers. The archived records (Johnson and Blair 1977b; 1977c; 1977d; 1977f; 1977g) show that they approached Howard Kahane, John Woods, Douglas Walton, and Alex Michalos, and Peter Minkus in June 1976 with potential topics for presentation. They (1977e) contacted Michael Scriven by phone in September 1977. In contacting potential speakers, they had to consider the number of foreign speakers because they thought about applying for the funding to the Canada Council (currently the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada), who would support scholarship by Canadians more than that by foreigners. For them, Scriven was "an obvious move; he was a big gun in philosophy. We were *astounded* that he came. We didn't expect him to come" (Blair 2007c, p. 4). Kahane was invited because his textbook, *Logic and Contemporary Rhetoric,* was pivotal in the development of informal logic. Due to their commitment to Scriven and Kahane, they did not commit to the idea of inviting Charles Hamblin. In the series of correspondence with Walton, Blair (1977) asked if Walton knew any other Canadians who might contribute to the symposium. Along with Rob Binkley, Jonathan Bennett, Hans Herzberger, and Bas van Fraassen, Walton (1977) suggested Hamblin, stating as follows:

> By the way, have you thought of inviting Charles Hamblin of the University of New South Wales in Sydney? It doesn't seem like a conference on this subject could be internationally fully representative of the best work without him because his book really contributes so much. To be sure, Australia is a long way away, air fare is prohibitively expensive, and it is possibly too late to spring such a request on the Council. If funds can be found though, possibly it is still worth considering. It is possible, for all I know, that Hamblin might be somewhere closer during the time of the conference is planned, and could therefore be brought to Canada at less expense.

To this letter, Johnson (1977) replied and expressed his gratitude and told Walton that they had contacted Binkley, who agreed to come[9]. However, although both Blair and he agreed

[8] Although the history of universities in Canada is beyond the scope of this paper, we need some socio-political background knowledge for understanding Johnson's point. Some universities in Canada started as private universities, but when the population of high school graduates grew and higher education institutions needed larger capacities, the government asked them to accept more funding from the government upon condition that they would be provincial universities. As a result, almost all universities became government-supported universities. University of Windsor used to be Catholic-affiliated Assumption College, but when it cut the tie with Catholic denomination, it became University of Windsor.

[9] They contacted van Fraassen of University of Toronto in September 1977, but he (1977) declined the invitation for other commitments.

to what Walton said about Hamblin, they had abandoned the idea of inviting him because of the cost and their commitment to Scriven and Kahane. The financial restrictions prohibited informal logicians from interacting with Hamblin at the First Symposium, but it would be an intriguing what-if question to ask. How would informal logic have developed if Hamblin had come and talked at the Symposium? Would it have developed as more theoretical endeavour, given that Hamblin was more theory-laden than Kahane was? Would it have focused more on dialogic aspects of logic, as his *Fallacies* endorses? Although Hamblin's ideas kept inspiring informal logicians in the 80s and 90s, a direct encounter with him in 1978 could have affected the development of informal logic in one way or another.

Other than whom to invite, another important aspect of the Symposium was the naming. Why is it The First International Symposium on *Informal Logic*, but not applied logic, practical logic, or any other logic? Although *Logical Self-Defense* kept changing its title and Johnson and Blair were fuzzy about the relationship between applied logic and informal logic when they were preparing the manuscript, and although they kept the course title 'Applied Logic' at University of Windsor until they renamed it Informal Logic for the academic year 1996-1997, how and why did they arrive at Informal Logic[10]? On this question, Blair (2007c) and Johnson (2007c) offered similar answers. They did not like the connotation of applied logic because it could be interpreted as applying formal logic to everyday argument, which they did not do. They also did not like practical logic because the word 'practical' in philosophy is understood in contrast to theory, which goes back to Kant's and Aristotle's distinction between theory and practice. Interpreted this way, practical/practice is related to what to do, but they taught other than that in their course. This way they rejected alternative names to informal logic. Johnson (2007c, pp. 10-11) also referred to natural logic, but he does not recall how they rejected this name.

While they fairly agree how they rejected alternative wording, they do not agree why they arrived at the phrase 'informal logic.' Johnson does not provide a story why they arrived at informal logic; Blair believes that they picked up from Fogelin's book. However, since Fogelin's book was published in 1978, this story does not seem right. At this point, the best guess to be made is that they had several choices, among which were informal logic and applied logic (Johnson and Blair, 1977a, p. xii). Although they did not clearly differentiate informal logic and applied logic, they preferred the former because of the lack of negative connotation of applied logic. They do not believe that they were applying formal logic, but they attempted to create some noise in the philosophical community partly based on informal fallacies. This is how they decided to use the name Informal Logic.

The term informal logic, in my view, was a strategic naming for creating identity of the scholarship to be developed in the following years. It helped informal logicians to justify what they did was not just teaching the skill course. With the word 'logic,' they could argue what they did was a sub-field of one of the legitimate areas of philosophy, but not rhetoric or communication studies, just to name a few cognate areas. In addition, the word 'informal' seemed to challenge the empire of formal deductive logic and provided a

[10] Even in the initial invitation letter, they (1977e) did not completely differentiate applied logic and informal logic: "The past several years have witnessed an increasing interesting in that area of logic known as 'applied' or 'informal' logic. We believe the time is ripe to bring together some of the philosophers who have an interest in this area. Hence we are drawing up plans to sponsor a conference on informal logic."

scholarly battlefield whether logic ought to be exclusively formal. Although Govier (2003, p. 1), Hitchcock (2003, p. 2), or Walton (2003, pp. 1-2) are not fully happy with the name informal logic, and they seem to prefer Argumentation Theory or the Philosophy of Argument to informal logic, I must say they judge so retrospectively based on the contemporary development of argumentation after informal logicians started to interact with American communication scholars and Dutch scholars. Given that intellectual space and identity had to be constructed within philosophy for those who were working fairly independently without so much support from the colleague in the late 70s, the name informal logic was a wise strategic choice.

While determining the title of the conference and the speakers, Johnson and Blair handled regular business items for holding the conference. They made efforts to get funding from the University of Windsor and the Canada Council. After the Department of Philosophy endorsed the idea to have a conference on informal logic in March 3, 1977, they (1977h) wrote to Dr. J. F. Leddy, the president of the University at the time, in late June, and he agreed to finance it on July 5. They also contacted the Canada Council in early June, and the Council decided to finance it in January 1978. With the Symposium approaching, they mailed the flyer of the conference to universities in Ontario and neighboring states of the US. *Informal Logic Newsletter* (1978, pp. 6-9) lists those sixty-four registrants. One key person they could successfully called in to the Symposium thanks to their efforts was Robert Ennis. He got the information the Symposium through his colleague at Southern Illinois University (Ennis 1977). He eventually attended and co-authored a paper in the proceedings with Thomas N. Tomko.

Based upon these efforts to invite speakers and participants and secure the funding, the First International Symposium of Informal Logic, held on June 26-28. There were only nine presentations and no concurrent sessions. Both Blair and Johnson remember to how *Informal Logic Newsletter* was born at a wind-up session after all the presentations Blair (2007c, p. 6) remembers the atmosphere of the wind-up session:

> When we said to us, “Let’s get together and talk about where we are now. What’s happening now? What’s gonna become of this group?” The fascinating thing to me about that meeting was that you had people showing up and say, “I’ve been introducing this new course in sort of applied logic or this non-formal approach to arguments because my students seem to really need it and appreciate it. I found that when I tried to teach formal logic and applied argument didn’t […] People were saying that coming out of the woodwork and saying that. These fifty people had been operating more or less independently, doing very similar things. So it was quite exciting felt like there was a spirit, Hegelian *Geist*, Hegelian spirit of the time manifesting itself at this conference because we had no idea there would be this spontaneous manifestation of similar phenomenon across this area we thought this is probably typical of this continent—not just bits of Canada, bits of the States, but probably true of both countries, not Mexico, but Canada and the United States. So we said, “what do we do?” Somebody said—I don’t know who that was—we should have some sort of way to keep in touch with one another. And so, it was suggested that I think I suggested we start a newsletter. Scriven at that point jumped up and said, “This is a wonderful idea, and here is five dollars. Here is my five dollars.” In other words, “I’m prepared to put my money where my mouth is in support of this.” So we took […] Ralph and I took to create and circulate a newsletter, letting people know about conferences, and spreading around teaching ideas. And that was the beginning of *Informal Logic Newsletter.*

Michael Scriven’s presence at and support for the Symposium is worth mentioning. At the time of Symposium, he had established himself as a well-known philosopher, so the publication of *Reasoning* in 1976 and his participation in the symposium as a speaker must have helped to call people's attention to informal logic. His presentation at the Symposium, Philosophical and Pragmatic Significance of Informal Logic [11], was inspirational to participants. Blair (2007c, p. 7) says:

> (t)hat this wasn't simply little pedagogical turn, a new way of teaching logic, or a new way of teaching argument, but there was theoretical shift going on here. And this might be because he himself believed in this theoretical shift, and brought his views. But I think there *was* a theoretical shift going on, and he identified it.

Govier (2003, p. 1) also remembers Scriven's speech: "That speech gave me a research agenda for the next ten years and created in me a powerful Inner Logician–of the informal variety of course." While Johnson and Blair sensed that there was something different going on in what they were doing. In replying to the reviewers of *Logical Self-Defense*, they emphasized practically-oriented logical skills but did not push how philosophical or theoretical their endeavours were. Considering that Johnson and Blair were in their thirties, teaching at a philosophy program that did not offer Ph.D., and starting something that challenged the dominance of formal logic, the support from a well-known philosopher like Scriven must have meant a lot to informal logic in general, Johnson and Blair in particular. When Johnson and Blair later published the proceedings of the Third International Symposium of Informal Logic in 1994, they dedicated it to "Michael Scriven, a founder of informal logic, for his inspiration, his guidance, and his generosity" (p. vi).

In addition to providing a forum for informal logicians to interact with each other and starting *Informal Logic Newsletter*, publication of the proceedings of was another major achievement of the First Symposium. While Johnson and Blair hoped they could publish the proceedings with *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* and contacted the journal even before the Symposium, its Editorial Board was unanimously against publishing it in November 1979. When they had no other publishers, Scriven offered to publish the proceedings from his own publishing house, Edgepress (anonymous 1979). On March 6, 1980, Johnson (1980) agreed that they should publish the proceedings with Scriven, and *Informal Logic: The First International Symposium* was published later that year. Blair (2003, p. 2) acknowledges the role that Scriven played in starting *Informal Logic Newsletter* and publishing the proceedings and states the role of these two achievements:

> The papers in that book [the proceedings], along with the fledgling *Informal Logic Newsletter*, arguably contributed, along with the work of John Woods and Douglas Walton, to the beginning of informal logic as a field of scholarship as well as pedagogy.

The proceedings helped informal logic to reach the wider scholarly community. One positive consequence is that Jürgen Habermas (1984) quoted the proceedings in his *Theory of Communicative Action*. In 1981, when Johnson went to a conference of American Philosophical Association, he bumped into Thomas McCarthy, a philosopher and translator

[11] As an anecdote, Scriven (1977) suggested that he talk on Logic of Grading, but Blair (1978) and Johnson kept the originally suggested title, believing that a strong case needed to be made on informal logic. If he had talked about logic of grading, what would have happened? How would have it influenced the development of informal logic? This may be the proper topic for history of evaluation studies, but this may be an interesting historical project.

of Habermas' work. Since they received graduate education together at Notre Dame University in the 1960s, they talked about what they were doing, and Johnson told him that he was involved in informal logic. McCarthy said: "Oh, that's interesting! You should send me that because I think Habermas would be interested in that" (Ralph Johnson 2007e, p. 3). Johnson sent a copy to McCarthy, who let Habermas know about the book. This way, the term 'informal logic' got disseminated in the wider scholarly community by a major figure in contemporary philosophical thought.

While the proceedings of the First Symposium were more scholarly than pedagogical, the *Informal Logic Newsletter* was pedagogical, at least at the beginning. The first volume of the *Newsletter* includes an annotated bibliography of relevant literature, book reviews, conference notices, course syllabi, teaching ideas and materials. Weddle's (1979) article, "Inductive, Deductive" in the second volume, was the first scholarly article published in the *Newsletter*. He had already received tenure, so he was willing to publish in the Newsletter although it was not a refereed journal (Johnson 2007c, p. 4). It sparked some scholarly discussion on the topic, and the *Newsletter* gradually became a resource for scholarly controversies as well as teaching ideas. Other than induction-deduction dichotomy, informal logicians discussed the principle of charity, red herring, conductive argument, critical thinking, and two wrongs. Johnson and Blair seemed to start thinking about turning the Newsletter into a journal as early as 1980. One of them talked with Walton on the phone and talked about finances or an editorial board (Anonymous 1980). In the meantime they kept publishing scholarly articles in the *Newsletter* without the peer-review process, and it was paving a way for the journal *Informal Logic*.

One network that the First Symposium created for Johnson and Blair was the one with the critical thinking movement. After getting to know Ennis' work, they started to participate in the conference on critical thinking in Sonoma. They met Richard Paul, who later published in the *Newsletter* and presented a paper at the Second Symposium (Paul 1982). They also met Nicholas Rescher at Sonoma, and he (1982) asked them to write an article for *American Philosophical Quarterly*. They revised their paper for the Second Symposium and published it in *American Philosophical Quarterly* in 1985.

Based upon the development of the scholarship and the network, the Second International Symposium on Informal Logic was held on June 20-23, 1983. From the records on the Second Symposium, some signs of growth of the field are observed: The Second Symposium was four days long while the First one was three days long; not only did Johnson and Blair invite speakers, but they posted call for papers; there were fifteen papers presented in the Second Symposium while eight in the First; there were eighty four registrants for the Second Symposium while sixty four for the First; the network with critical thinking was strengthened with Ennis, McPeck, Paul presenting papers; Govier, Hitchcock, and Pinto were participants in the First Symposium, but they all presented their papers at the Second Symposium (Blair and Johnson 1983, pp. 18-19). Although there were no proceedings coming out of the Second Symposium, two major achievements on the infrastructure of scholarship are worth comments: a peer review journal *Informal Logic*, and Association of Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT).

As we have already observed, people already started exchanging scholarly ideas in the *Informal Logic Newsletter*. Dissatisfaction with the editorial policy grew larger as years went on. In the final issue of the *Newsletter*, Blair and Johnson explain why they decided to convert the *Newsletter* into a journal.

> In the past two years, more and more space has been devoted to articles which, in our opinion, are good enough to have been published in full-fledged journals. The change in our name, then will reflect more accurately the character of the publication.
>
> A second motivation for the change is related to the first. We believe that people who might other wise inclined to send materials to the Informal Logic Newsletter have been deterred from so doing by the fact that it was not a referred journal and hence they cannot gain credit on their c.v.'s for material published in ILN.
>
> These along with other considerations were given a thorough airing during the Second International Symposium on Informal Logic this past June, and your editors were persuaded that the time had come for change. (1983a p.1)

Johnson and Blair approached people to ask them to serve as members of the editorial board, and started the journal in January 1984. In their recollections, only Chaim Perelman turned down the invitation, because informal logic was a pedagogical movement (Blair 2003, p.2). *Informal Logic* created a significant environment for informal logicians because they could get credit on their resumes, and they could discuss scholarly ideas with colleagues interested in the topic. Informal Logic must have helped some philosophers to acquire tenure and keep the scholarship on informal logic going. Despite these positive consequences, there have been drawbacks of converting the *Newsletter* to the journal. First, Informal Logic must have created the divide between theory and teaching practice. While teaching ideas or teaching supplements were regular features of the *Newsletter*, the teaching supplement did not become a regular feature of *Informal Logic* till 2000. As a result, some pedagogy-led informal logicians might have stopped importing theoretical developments. Second, while *Informal Logic* has provided reliable intellectual space for informal logicians, it could have prevented informal logic from making noise in the mainstream philosophical journals. Not every scholar in the field is as prolific as Douglas Walton, and we must make a decision about what journal we send our work to. If there is an article to send for publication, and if *Informal Logic* is more likely to accept it than *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Philosophical Review*, *Journal of Philosophy*, or *Synthese* is, most informal logicians and argumentation scholars send it to *Informal Logic*. In an academic culture that endorses 'to publish or perish,' it is a wise move. However, from a long-term point of view, this must have solidified the divide between informal logic and formal logic, with the former still struggling for respect in a wider philosophical community.

The Association of Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT) was the other major achievement of the Second Symposium. This organization has worked as an interest group for informal logicians to present papers at the regional meetings of American Philosophical Association. According to the regular procedures, scholars can present a paper in two ways. One is to send a completed paper and have it accepted for presentation, and the other is to form an organization that sponsors a panel. Since not all philosophers were open to the scholarship on informal logic, as is clearly evidenced in the publication process of *Logical Self-Defense*, it was not easy for informal logicians to send a completed paper and to have it accepted by philosophers who may not be doing informal logic. AILACT was established to manoeuvre through the situation. It became a body to sponsor panels in which informal logicians can present their papers, and it still sponsors panels at APA regional meetings. When participants of the Second Symposium talked about the idea of creating a sponsoring organization, the issue of naming came up. Both Johnson (2007f, p.

8; 2007g, p. 1) and Blair (2007c, p. 15) remember there was a disagreement how to name the organization, and they agreed to put both informal logic and critical thinking in the name of the organization. Other than sponsoring panels, it now holds an essay prize and promote scholarship on informal logic and critical thinking. AILACT probably create the same problem of the division between informal logic (and critical thinking) and formal logic, but the Second Symposium further expanded the infrastructure for informal logic.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper is a preliminary study on history of argumentation studies in Canada, developed under the term "Informal Logic" from 1968 to 1984. Based on oral history interviews with key persons as well as the archival research at Leddy Library of University of Windsor, this paper has revealed the divergent motivations that started informal logic. Although it is partly true that informal logic started as a way to improve the teaching of the introductory philosophy courses, other scholars approached the field to offer a good account of fallacies or elaborate the nature of non-deductive justification. It has also suggested that the extended argument played a pivotal role for Blair and Johnson to successfully publish *Logical Self-Defense*. A survey of two International Symposiums has revealed that they helped to establish the infrastructures of scholarship (newsletter, journal, proceedings, and organization) as well as identity to situate informal logic within philosophy along with formal logic.

To follow Johnson and Blair's (1980) attempt to create a research agenda for theoretical projects, I conclude this paper with an unclassified and partial list of research topics for historical projects of informal logic and argumentation.

1. *Inclusion of later period*: This paper takes for granted the significance of Canadian informal logic movement led by Blair and Johnson and covered events through to 1984. Given that informal logic and argumentation in Canada further developed through the interaction with American and Dutch scholars, future research should cover development of international conferences in Amsterdam first held in 1986, the Third International Symposium on Informal Logic in 1989, and several OSSA Conferences since 1995.

2. *More in-depth account of key events*: Although it is hard to tell how much is enough for historical projects, more in-depth analysis of key events in the history of the informal logic movement will make us realize rhetorical, argumentative, or semiotic nature of historical process. As Zarefsky (2003, p. 30) states, history can be approached from a rhetorical perspective and historical projects can focus on creation and use of messages to influence and relate to one another. The review process of *Logical Self-Defense* and use of the term "informal logic" can be approached from a rhetorical or semiotic perspective. In addition, the author must acknowledge that more detailed account must be given on the Second International Symposium. This is partly possible by interviewing parties hostile to the informal logic movement as well as interviewing more people within, or in support of the movement[12].

3. *Other countries and communities*: Although the specialization of argumentation studies

[12] I credit this point of view to Jean Goodwin.

started about the same time in Canada, US, and the Netherlands, detailed historical accounts of US and the Netherlands, to the best of my knowledge, do not exist. How and why did communication scholars affiliated with National Communication Association and American Forensic Association take a scholarly turn after they hosted a seminar in Minneapolis and a summer conference in Utah, 1978? How did American philosophers develop informal logic in the United States, as suggested by Scriven's (2007) oral history interview? How did Pragma-Dialecticians at University of Amsterdam develop their program over years through the interaction with other scholars? How did these three camps start to interact with each other? How did historical precursors of argumentation studies, as written in Perelman (1979) influence the development of these three contemporary argumentation studies?

4. *Socio-political dimensions*: This paper has attempted to follow history of informal logic on the development of infrastructures of pedagogy and scholarship (courses, textbooks, conferences, newsletter, journals, or books). Johnson and Blair (1997 pp. 158-159) cite the influence of the culture of the 60s, such as student activism and the anti-Vietnam war movement, and suggest that historical projects merit study by sociologists of knowledge. Given that the culture of the 60s was widely shared by many countries other than Canada, US, and the Netherlands, why and how did these three countries take the leading role in developing informal logic and argumentation studies? How about France, UK, or Japan, to name a few? If informal logic and argumentation were the answer to the culture of the 60s, what were the answers to it in other countries? Studying socio-political conditions may lead us to examine the demise of philosophy in these countries and rise of (post-)structuralism and cultural studies.

5. *Intellectual history*: Given that several narrators of oral history interviews refer to Wittgenstein's importance for the emergence of informal logic, how can we relate the emergence of informal logic within intellectual history (Blair 2007b, p. 6; Johnson 2007d, p. 2;Scriven 2007, p. 1)? Other intellectual figures to be connected to informal logic would be: John Wisdom, Paul Grice, Carl Wellman, Nicholas Rescher, and C. S. Peirce's and John Dewey's versions of pragmatism, semiotics and logic.

6. *Relationship between history and theory of informal logic and argumentation*: How does history and theory influence each other? Although theory construction has been dominant among informal logicians since the late 1970s, how do historical projects influence or be influenced by theoretical projects? An extreme position on the relationship between the two, as taken by Janik and Toulmin (1973), would be any theoretical construct is a reflection of historical conditions, and it is indispensable to use the historical perspective to understand the theory. Even if this is too extreme, the introduction of a historical perspective would allow us to understand argumentation theories in a new light. On the other hand, theoretical constructs of argumentation studies may well help us to interpret raw materials on historical events. For example, Walton's new dialectic would help us understand how argumentative dialogues among relevant parties determine the outcome of historical events. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's dissociative scheme of argument help us understand how informal logicians and argumentation scholars employ conceptual differentiation in offering new ideas at historical junctures.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: I would like to thank the following people and organizations: Dr. Ron Zboray and Mary Zboray for the course in Oral History at University of Pittsburgh in 2007; University of Pittsburgh and CRARR for the grant and help for oral history interviews and archival research; Bill Keith for commenting on the earlier version of the paper at the NCA convention in 2008; Carly Woods for reading and commenting the draft of this paper; and all the narrators who took time for the interview.

Link to commentary

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