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Communal Consciousness: Using Wittgenstein to Challenge Epistemic Privacy

By

Greg Misener

A Major Research Paper
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Philosophy
in Partial Fulfillments of the Requirements for
The Degree of Masters of Arts
at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2021

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Communal Consciousness: Using Wittgenstein to Challenge Epistemic Privacy

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ABSTRACT

In the *Philosophical Investigations,* Ludwig Wittgenstein argues against the possibility of a private language. This argument has semantic implications for how we come to understand the meaning behind our use of mental terms. Namely, that use determines meaning prior to signification. However, an interesting part about Wittgenstein's private language argument is what it tells us about epistemic privacy. This paper seeks to establish Wittgenstein's private language argument in a framework which deals primarily with how we come to understand the use behind our mental terms. Once we come to understand the use behind our mental terms, we can come to understand how we come to have knowledge of mental states. The implications for epistemic privacy are twofold. The first, is that other minds are necessary when it comes to self-knowledge of mental occurrences. The second, is that mental occurrences are an integral part of conscious experience. Together, these two implications provide an epistemic framework which depicts the mind as something which depends at least in part on other people. Since knowledge of mental occurrences is both dependent on the existence of mental occurrences themselves and the existence of others, minds are not epistemically private.

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INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I build on Wittgenstein's private language argument in order to present a view of the mind which is not wholly epistemically private. In order to do so, I begin with a summary of referential theories of meaning and how those theories result in an acceptance of metaphysical dualism when it comes to establishing meaning behind mental language. I further argue that metaphysical dualism combined with referential theories of language create two fundamental philosophical problems when it comes to theory of mind. The first, is the possibility of a private language and the second, is the problem of explaining the existence of other minds. In the second section of this paper, I use Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following to challenge the possibility of a private language and in doing so, challenge the assumption that mental states are private phenomena. This sets the stage for the third section, which seeks to provide a semantic solution to how we come to understand the meaning of our mental language without private language. The fourth section builds on the semantic solution in order to provide an epistemic solution to the problem of other minds. It concludes that other minds are a necessary component to establishing self-knowledge of mental states. Further, I also establish that phenomenal mental occurrences are necessary when it comes to self-knowledge of mental states. Together, these two points demonstrate that the mind is not wholly epistemically private. Finally, the final section deals with two perceived objections to this conclusion.

1. REFERENTIAL THEORY AND METAPHYSICAL DUALISM

At the start of the *Investigations* Wittgenstein presents a referential theory of meaning which he quotes from Augustine of Hippo. He writes,

> When grown-ups named some object and at the same time turned towards it, I perceived *this*, and I grasped that the thing was signified by the sound they uttered, since they meant to point it out. This, however, I gathered from their gestures, the natural language of all peoples, the language that by means of facial expression and the play of eyes, of the movements of the limbs and the tone of voice, indicates the affections of the soul when it desires, or clings to, or rejects, or recoils from, something. In this way, little by little, I learnt to understand what things the words, which I heard uttered in their respective places in various sentences, signified. And once I got my tongue around these signs, I used them to express my wishes. (qtd. In *Investigations* §1)

For Augustine, when it comes to how we learn the meaning behind our use of language, what matters is the connection between a word and the object which the word signifies. 'Signification', in this sense, means referring or denoting. A word signifies an object when it is referring to an object. The word refers to an object since it stands in as a sign for that object. Under a referential theory of meaning then, a word's meaning is determined by the thing which it refers to or signifies.

Although Wittgenstein quotes a referential theory of meaning from Augustine in the *Philosophical Investigations,* he himself holds the same view in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.* In the *Tractatus,* Wittgenstein argues for a picture theory of meaning which involves logical relations between atomic facts and sentences. For Wittgenstein, sentences express thoughts, which in turn represent facts about the world. He writes, "We make to ourselves pictures of facts" (Wittgenstein, *Tractatus* 2.1), and continues, "The picture is a model of reality" (2.12). A picture for Wittgenstein, is the representation of a fact which is expressed through language. The sentence 'the tree is green' for instance, presents a picture of a green tree. 'The tree is green' works as a depiction of reality since it corresponds to a fact about reality.

Crucially, this is the case since, "The picture has the logical form of representation in common with what it pictures" (2.2). Since the sentence, 'the tree is green' shares the same logical structure as the fact which it refers to (a green tree), the sentence 'the tree is green' has its meaning determined by referring to the fact.

This depiction of Wittgenstein's picture theory is brief and far from complete. However, what matters for our present purposes, is that Augustine and Wittgenstein's referential theory of meaning relies on signification. Signification dictates that the meaning of a word (or a sign) is determined by what that word signifies. What that word signifies, is what that word refers to. As Wittgenstein describes in the *Investigations,* "In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands" (*Investigations* §1). When it comes to determining meaning under a referential theory, what matters is the connection between a language term and that which the language term refers to. This may be an object, under a traditionally atomistic view such as that which is attributed to Saint Augustine. Or it may be an atomic fact, which is seen in Wittgenstein's picture theory. Either way, the referential theory of meaning presents a picture of language which relies heavily on the notion of signification in order to determine meaning.

When it comes to how we learn how language terms signify objects under a referential theory of meaning, the primary method is ostension. Ostension, or the act of showing, involves the act of referring to something. In the case of Augustine's depiction of how we come to learn language, we learn the use of a language term by pointing to the referent object. Once one is shown the referent which a language term signifies, one understands the meaning behind the term. Indeed, Wittgenstein writes, "An important part of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a

word… this ostensive teaching of words can be said to establish an associative connection between word and thing" (§6). Through the act of ostension, one is shown what a language term signifies. Since we come to understand how the word is associated with what it signifies, we come to understand the meaning associated with the term.

We might illustrate this idea with a plain paper cup. Let us assume that I have never encountered a paper cup before and so, I am quite surprised when one of my good friends shows up with a strange object in his hand. Confused, I *point* to the object and enquire as to what it is. My friend, following my lead, also points to the object and explains exactly what it is. 'It's a paper cup' he says. Through the act of ostension or pointing to the object which I had not encountered, I have come to understand that the words 'paper cup' signify the papery cone which lies in my friend's hand. Since I now understand that the words 'paper cup' signify papery cones, I understand the meaning behind the utterance of 'paper cup'. Under an Augustinian view of learning then, we come to understand the meaning behind words by coming to know what our language terms signify. We come to understand signification, primarily through the act of ostension, or showing.

For our purposes however, we are interested in how Augustine's picture of language dictates our use behind language terms which deal with mental occurrences. Mental terms, are those terms in language which depict mental states. Following the work of David Chalmers in *The Conscious Mind*, mental states are often depicted as being one of two different concepts. The first, is mental states as psychological concepts. Chalmers writes, "This is the concept of mind as the causal or explanatory basis for behaviour. A state is mental in this sense if it plays the right sort of causal role in the production of behaviour" (Chalmers 11). A mental state is psychological if it plays a causal role in explaining behaviour. For example, learning is often

seen as wholly explained through a psychological concept of mind, since we can explain learning solely through causal changes in behaviour. One can be said to learn while playing chess for instance, since one changes how they move the pieces as they play more games. Someone who is learning how to play chess well, changes their play behaviour to avoid making the same mistakes they made before. We can say they are learning then, solely through how they behave with the pieces over time.

The second concept typically used to describe mental states deals with a phenomenological aspect. Phenomenological, since this type of concept puts emphasis on the subjective experience associated with a mental occurrence. As C.S. Peirce writes, "The initial great department of philosophy is phenomenology whose task it is to make out what are the elements of appearance that presents itself to us every hour and every minute whether we are pursuing earnest investigations, or are undergoing the strangest vicissitudes of experience" (Peirce, "Phenomenology" 147). Phenomenological consciousness, in the Peircean sense, is reality filtered through experience. As conscious beings, we cannot help but view the world through an experiential frame of reference. Thus, our mental language, such as the term 'pain', is necessarily tied to how we represent the world through the senses. Phenomenological mental terms then, depict sensations.

My use of the word 'sensations' here, is being used in a broad sense which attempts to portray phenomena that involve a quality of feeling. A quality of feeling is important since it captures what makes us conscious of mental states. Chalmers writes, "a mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in that mental state. To put it another way, we can say that a mental state is conscious if it has a *qualitative feel* – an associated quality of experience" (Chalmers 4). Mental states under the phenomenological concept of mind

necessarily are associated with experiential sensations, or quality of feeling. To be in a particular mental state under the phenomenal concept, is to feel a certain way while one is experiencing that state. When we look at a colour like yellow for instance, we experience a visual sensation that we associate with viewing that colour. For the purposes of this paper, we will be primarily concerned with the phenomenological concept of mental states, and thus, with how our mental terms are associated with sensations.

Under an Augustinian view of meaning, mental terms gain their meaning by referring to mental states. The term 'pain' for instance, gains its meaning by referring to a sensation of pain. Additionally, we learn how our mental terms refer to mental occurrences through ostension. G.E. Moore, through his discussion of yellow, gives us a picture of ostension when it comes to visual sensations. For Moore, yellow is a simple natural property. Thus, we cannot define yellow through any form of complex explanation. He writes, "We may try to define it, by describing its physical equivalent; we may state what kind of light-vibrations must stimulate the normal eye, in order that we may perceive it. But a moment's reflection is sufficient to shew that those light-vibrations are not themselves what we mean by yellow" (Moore, *Principia* §10). Moore's example shows that color sensations are not the type of property which can be explained without attributing a quality of feeling to it. The only way to define yellow, is to know what it is to experience the perceptual sensation of the colour. This is a quality of feeling. It feels like something to experience yellow. Thus, 'yellow' can be expressed as a mental term. Thus, under a referential theory of meaning, we can only come to understand the term 'yellow' when we come to associate it with the sensation of viewing yellow.

What the Augustinian referential theory of meaning leads to then, is that mental terms refer to mental happenings or states, and subsequently substance. For Augustine, certain behaviours

demonstrate the existence of phenomenological mental states. When one expresses pain behaviour, such as crying, this behaviour is influenced by an inner sensation of pain. In Augustine's words, behaviours point to "the affectations of the soul" (qtd. In *Investigations* §1). This relation between behaviour and mental occurrence sets up a distinct ontology between the publicly observable body and the privately experienced mind. As Gilbert Ryle writes in *The Concept of Mind,* "The official doctrine, which hails chiefly from Descartes, is something like this. With the doubtful exceptions of idiots and infants in arms every human being has both a body and a mind. Some would prefer to say that every human being is both a body and a mind" (Ryle 1). 'The official doctrine' or substance dualism, is the belief that every person is composed of a publicly observable, physical body and a private non-physical mind. The mind influences the body which in turn displays behaviour. Since it is assumed that the mind acts on the body, these public behaviours demonstrate the existence of an inner mind.

Substance dualism is supported with a great deal of common sense. It seems that when I feel and think, these occurrences are private phenomena. Only I can truly know what I am thinking and feeling. On the other hand, I am aware that my behaviour is constantly available to the scrutiny of others. My bodily actions are on public display. We might appeal once again to G.E. Moore, who in his discussion of common-sense writes, "We all, I think, commonly assume, in this way, that our acts of consciousness take place, at any moment, *in the place* in which our bodies are at the moment" (Moore, *Problems* 7). Here Moore highlights another essential feature involved in being a metaphysical dualist. Namely, that the mind is located in the same place as the physical body. I cannot, as Moore highlights, get on a train and leave my mind behind. (7) Additionally, the mind is essential when it comes to the life of the body. The difference between myself and chairs for instance, is that I am in possession of conscious experience and chairs are

not. (8) Together the mind and body work to form a single person.

Given metaphysical dualism and the referential theory of meaning, we come to establish the reality of a private language when it comes to mental terms. A private language in this sense, is a language which can only be understood by its inventor. This is the case since anyone only has direct access to their own thoughts and sensations. Since the use of mental terms have their meaning determined by referring to those thoughts and sensations, only I can know what I mean when I utter mental language, such as 'pain'. Thus, my use of mental language is a private phenomenon. Further, although I seem to be certain of the existence of other minds, I cannot, by our epistemological standards come to know their mental states. We then reach two essential problems which come about through the referential theory of meaning joined with metaphysical dualism. The first, is the seeming existence of a private language. The second, is explaining how we come to know other minds.

A typical metaphysical dualist response to these problems is presented by Augustine. Since behaviours gain their meaning from mental states they point to mental occurrences. Further, since others exhibit behaviours that are analogous to our own, we can be confident in coming to know both that mental occurrences exist in others, and that those behaviours come with the same meaning. Thus, by appealing to analogous modes of behaviour, the metaphysical dualist looks to dodge both the reality of private language and the problem of explaining other minds.

However, as Gilbert Ryle notes in his work, this analogical argument falls short. He writes, "one person has no direct access of any sort to the events of the inner life of another. He cannot do better than make problematic inferences from the observed behaviour of the other person's body to the states of mind which, by analogy from his own conduct, he supposes to be signalized by that behaviour" (Ryle 4). The analogical solution dodges the problem with fallacious

reasoning. If the happenings of my inner mind are epistemically private, the only thing I can be justified in knowing is my own private language. Since mental terms point to occult mental realms, all I can describe for certain when I utter a sentence such as ‘the banana is yellow’ is a private meaning determined by the experience of my own mental state. Thus, the utterance has no empirically observable meaning which can be justified. Finally, since all one has access to is my publicly observable behaviour, all one can say for certain, is that I exhibit a certain type of behaviour. There is no way to explain that my behaviour is evidence of conscious experience. In order to remedy these problems, we must show that language is not a private phenomenon.

2.– DISPROVING THE POSSIBIITY OF A PRIVATE LANGUAGE

Wittgenstein, in his critique of the possibility of a private language, begins by targeting various methods for establishing meaning found in traditional referential theories of meaning. The first method, although not explicitly highlighted by Wittgenstein, can be found in Plato's *Euthyphro.* In a discussion between Socrates and Euthyphro on the nature of piety, Socrates bids Euthyphro to tell him the meaning of 'piety'. Socrates remarks, "Bear in mind then that I did not bid you to tell me one or two of the pious actions but that form itself which makes all pious actions pious, for you agreed that all impious actions are impious and all pious actions pious through one form" (Plato 6d8-10) and continues, "Tell me then what this form itself is, so that I may look upon it and, using it as a model, say that any action of yours or another's that is of that kind is pious, and if it is not that it is not" (6e3-5). To understand what 'piety' means, Socrates requires Euthyphro to present him with knowledge of the form, or essence of piety itself. Once knowledge of the form is obtained, the form is used as a model to dictate all future applications of the term 'piety'. If an action is pious then it will display the essential characteristics of all pious actions. On the contrary, if an action is not pious, it will lack the essential characteristics of pious actions. The form in this case, is an objective idea which terms will refer to in order to establish correct future use, and thus, meaning.

Wittgenstein is skeptical that relying on an objective idea as a referent will suffice for establishing meaning. When it comes to essences, Plato's method of division involves taking various examples of a thing and pointing to essential characteristics. We may look at an oak leaf, maple leaf and elm leaf for instance, and come to an agreement on a shared characteristic common to all types of tree leaves. Yet Wittgenstein challenges, "what does the picture of a leaf look like when it does not show us any particular shape, but rather 'what is common to all shapes

of leaf?'" (Wittgenstein, *Investigations* §73). His remark challenges the notion that there is a specific form which we can point to in order to define what a leaf is shaped like. The shapes of leaves differ so radically, it is impossible to find a common characteristic which is shared by all leaves. If we come up empty when asked what the common form of a set of things is, such as the form of a tree leaf, it is not the case that members of that set are determined by that form. If meaning is determined by an objective idea which we can point to, we ought to be able to point to it.

Taking another approach, John Locke in *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* suggests that general meaning derives from subjective ideas. Although Locke is also not highlighted by Wittgenstein specifically, his theory is helpful to establish a referential theory which uses subjective experience as a referent for establishing meaning. Locke writes of experiencing objects, "Such precise, naked appearances in the mind . . . the understanding lays up (with names commonly annexed to them) as standards to rank real existences into sorts, as they agree with these patterns, and to denominate them accordingly" (Locke, *Essay*, II, XI, 9). Under this view, the meaning of general terms such as 'dog', 'triangle' and 'yellow' correspond to abstracted ideas. These abstracted ideas are gained through the subjective experience of objects. When we view yellow objects such as a bananas, cars, or flowers for instance, we abstract the idea of yellow from the common experience of yellow. The idea is then used as a standard to dictate all future cases of applying the word 'yellow'. We know the correct application of 'yellow' if it matches up with the idea of yellow. Notice, that Locke's theory of meaning is not unlike that of Moore's reliance on ostension when it comes to knowing simple natural properties. In order to know 'yellow' we refer to the phenomenal perception or idea of yellow.

However, Wittgenstein is also skeptical that subjective ideas can serve as a referent for establishing meaning. In order to challenge referential theories such as Locke's, he asks us to imagine a picture of a triangular prism before our minds. Under Locke's theory of meaning, if I hear someone utter the word 'cube', I know the meaning of the word since it brings about the idea of a cube. So, if I hear the word 'cube' yet have the picture of a triangular prism before my mind, I can easily say that 'cube' is used incorrectly by pointing to the idea of the prism. 'Cube' in this case, does not match up to the idea. Yet, Wittgenstein asks, "In what way can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word 'cube'? – Perhaps you say… I point to a triangular prism… say it is a cube… then this use of the word doesn't fit the picture. – But doesn't it fit?" (Wittgenstein, *Investigations* §139). Imagine that upon hearing the word 'cube' you conjure up a picture of a cube in your mind. This picture most likely corresponds with Fig. 1. Now imagine that you are looking at the imagine of Fig. 1 tilted like Fig. 2. Already, our grasp of whether the image is a cube may change. In Fig. 3, which is a top-down view of Fig. 2, we are hard pressed to admit that the image presented is a cube. Instead, it could be interpreted as a triangular prism. This is Wittgenstein's point. There is nothing about the image itself which determines the correct use for all future applications of the word 'cube'. Subjective ideas, without an understanding of their proper application are ambiguous.



Fig. 1



Fig. 2



Fig. 3

What these theories have in common is that they rely on a standard, or a norm for

determining the correct, or incorrect usage of a term. In the case of Plato, the norm presents itself as an objective idea. In the case of Locke, the norm presents itself as a subjective idea. Indeed, referential theories of meaning rely on establishing a norm, or rule for determining meaning. Wittgenstein articulates this prior to the *Investigations* in his Cambridge lectures between 1932 and 1935. He suggests, "The meaning of a word is to be defined by the rules for its use, not by the feeling that attaches to the words. … Two words have the same meaning if they have the same rules for their use. … The meaning changes when one of its rules changes" (*Lectures* §2). Under this view, the correct use of a word involves following a rule. Once we know the rule for a word's use, we can determine all future uses of that word by following the rule.

Wittgenstein also summarizes this stance in the *Investigations.* He writes, "Here I'd like to say first of all: your idea was that this *meaning the order* had in its own way already taken all those steps: that in meaning it, your mind, as it were, flew ahead and took all the steps before you physically arrived at this or that one… it seemed as if they were in some *unique* way predetermined" (*Investigations* §188) and continues, "How the formula is meant determines which steps are to be taken" (§190). The meaning of a word is pre-determined by the correct or incorrect usage of that term in all future cases. In this sense, meaning relies on coming to know a rule required for the proper use of a word. Once we know the rule, we can act in accordance with that rule to use language meaningfully.

Although Wittgenstein has already established some skepticism in his critique of objective and subjective ideas, in order to disprove the possibility of a private language, he must show that meaning cannot rely on pre-determining norms. A good way to test a theory which relies on rules, is to use it to explain how we apply mathematical formula to certain mathematical problems. A mathematical formula functions as a rule which dictates how we ought to apply our

mathematical language terms. Following the work of Saul A. Kripke, and an example given to us by Wittgenstein, we can hypothesize that I understand the meaning behind addition since I know the rule required to use it. Kripke writes, "By means of my external symbolic representation and my internal mental representation, I 'grasp' the rule for addition. One point is crucial to my 'grasp' of this rule. Although I myself have computed only finitely many sums in the past, the rule determines my answer for indefinitely many new sums that I have never previously encountered" (Kripke 7). If we think of a mathematical sentence such as '2+2 = 4', we might assume that the meaning behind this sentence comes in the form of a rule which determines the process of my mental calculation. We can express this rule as the formula n+2. Since I have completed this kind of mathematical sentence before and understand how to properly apply the formula n+2 to such a sentence, I grasp the meaning behind addition. Indeed, upon meeting a slightly different sentence with much the same symbols, the correct application of n+2 snaps into my mind. '3+2 = 5' for instance, is determined to be a correct application of the rule, while '3+2 = 4' is determined to be incorrect.

The nagging question, however, is determining how I know the correct application of the rule itself. If my understanding comes in knowing a rule for proper use, what gives me knowledge of that rule in the first place? Wittgenstein summarizes, "how does an explanation help me to understand, if, after all, it is not the final one? In that case the explanation is never completed; so I still don't understand what he means, and never shall!' – As though an explanation, as it were hung in the air unless supported by another one" (Wittgenstein, *Investigations* §87). In order to understand addition, I require knowledge of the rule for addition. Yet in order to understand that rule, I require a meta-rule to explain it and so on. Like words, rules require knowledge of how to properly apply them. If words and rules both require the same competence when it comes to

their proper application, it does not make sense to explain that ability by evoking the other. Indeed, if we try to explain the use of words by pointing to rules, we verge on infinite regress.

However, we may buckle down and insist that regardless of how we have come to know the rule, we do apply n+2 to various mathematical sentences in order to understand their correct or incorrect use. Wittgenstein once again challenges our assumption by offering up a thought experiment involving a student performing addition. He writes, "we get the pupil to continue one series (say '+2') beyond 1000 – and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to him, 'Look what you are doing!' – He doesn't understand. We say, 'you should have added *two*: look how you began the series!' – He answers, 'Yes, isn't this right? I thought that was how I *had* to do it'" (§185). In the thought experiment, Wittgenstein's student correctly uses the rule 'n+2' as he reaches 1000. He writes, 996, 998, 1000. Yet, as he proceeds past 1000 he begins to write 1004, 1008, and 1012. When confronted on this, the student simply replies that he was following the correct directions. The student has interpreted the rule, 'n+2 until you reach 1000 then begin n+4'. Any number of correct instances before the student's deviation is thus consistent with more than one rule. Yet, there is nothing which dictates which rule the student is following.

Kripke presents the problem as a skeptical argument against the assumption that we reference a particular rule which determines all future steps when we perform addition. He writes, "The sceptic claims (or feigns to claim) that I am now misinterpreting my own previous usage. By 'plus', he says, I *always meant* quus" (Kripke 9). When performing addition, we assume we are following plus, yet there is nothing dictating that I am following that rule. Instead, I might be following a deviation from plus. I may instead be following quus. What Kripke and Wittgenstein highlight, is the notion of a bent-rule, or a rule which deviates from its initial meaning. Since a rule must determine meaning in all future cases, we expect it to be the case

that Wittgenstein's student would continue the infinite chain of addition with the formula 'n+2'. We assume in this instance, the student is following the rule 'plus'. Yet, the skeptics reply is that there is nothing dictating that the student is following the rule 'n+2'. Instead, He could be following a bent rule, such as 'n+2 until 1000, then n+4', or following Kripke's lead, a variation of plus, such as quus. Wittgenstein and Kripke's skeptical point is that there is no fact about the student which determines he is following one rule rather than another..

We then hit a paradox if we assume that meaning is determined by a rule. Wittgenstein writes, "this was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with a rule" (Wittgenstein, *Investigations* §201). Notice here, that the problem of rule-following is no different than attempting to establish meaning based on Locke's notion of ideas. There is nothing about an idea which determines the proper application of a term like 'cube' in all future cases, since 'cube' might be made to accord with the idea of a triangular prism. There is thus nothing about the idea which determines the proper use of 'cube'. The same applies with rules. There is nothing intrinsic about a rule which determines its proper use over an infinite number of cases, since future cases might be made to accord with a bent-rule.

When it comes to theory of mind, Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox creates substantial problems for metaphysical dualism. Remember, metaphysical dualism assumes that the meaning of mental terms relies on the signification of mental states. My sensation of pain for instance, determines my use of the term 'pain' for all future cases. Yet Wittgenstein writes, "Let's imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign 'S' and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation (§258). Much like the mathematical pupil attempts to follow 'n+2' by making a chain

of calculations, the diarist seeks to demonstrate the meaning behind 'S' by signifying the sensation S. He does this by writing 'S' in his diary whenever he has the occurrence of S. Yet, Wittgenstein's diarist hits the same paradox as his pupil. What tells the diarist he is actually recording the sensation S? Perhaps, a skeptic might push, the sensation you are actually experiencing when you write 'S' is Q.

Hence, there is nothing about the sensation S, which determines all the possible applications of 'S' in future cases. As Kripke suggests, "The important problem for Wittgenstein is that my present mental state does not appear to determine what I *ought* to do in the future. Although I may *feel* (now) that something is in my head corresponding to the word 'plus' mandates a determinate response to any new pair of arguments, in fact nothing in my head does so" (Kripke 56). If a mental state determines the meaning of our mental terms, then pointing to that mental state will determine the incorrect or correct application of the term in future cases. Yet, nothing about a present mental state determines the correct application of the mental term. If the mental state itself does not determine proper use, then it cannot be the case that mental terms gain their meanings by referring to mental states.

The takeaway from Wittgenstein's semantic skepticism then, is that meaning behind the use of mental terms, if we accept a referential theory of meaning, is ambiguous without a prior understanding of how to properly apply mental language. Wittgenstein writes, "When one says 'he gave a name to his sensation', one forgets that much must be prepared in the language for mere naming to make sense" (Wittgenstein, *Investigations* §257), to highlight this point. The Augustinian assumption that our mental terms refer to mental occurrences comes under fire since Wittgenstein has shown that signification is not a reliable source of meaning. His rule-following paradox demonstrates that mental terms must gain their meaning prior to signification.

Additionally, Wittgenstein's diarist example challenges the idea that we can have private understanding of our mental states.

3. –WITTGENSTEIN'S SEMANTIC SOLUTION

Wittgenstein's semantic solution to the rule-following paradox builds into a positive epistemic theory which gives us a different perspective on how to approach both the possibility of private language, and the problem of other minds. His solution consists in two main moves. The first, is to establish that our use of language is determined through training. The second, is to establish that our use then determines meaning. Once one is trained on the proper use of terms, they largely understand the meaning behind those terms. Notice that this is the opposite of signification. Signification refers to something which determines the proper use of a term. Under signification, the meaning of a term determines the correct or incorrect use, while under Wittgenstein's view, use determines meaning.

To begin, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a signpost in the place of a word. He writes, "What has the expression of a rule—say a signpost—got to do with my actions? What sort of connection obtains here? - Well, this one for example: I have been trained to react in a particular way to this sign, and now I do so react to it" (§198). We can imagine coming upon a signpost which points us in a certain direction when we come to a fork in a road. What about this signpost determines my next actions? Well, under a theory of meaning which relies on signification, one looks to the signpost and the signpost determines what I ought to do. Yet, how do I know how to interpret the signpost? Wittgenstein's paradox calls into question that I have an understanding how to act by only the signpost itself. Perhaps for instance, I mistake the tail of the signpost as being the correct way to turn when I come to the fork and misinterpret its meaning. Thus, I need to know how to apply the signpost prior to understanding how to properly use it. Wittgenstein's answer is training.

Wittgenstein's mathematical pupil is accompanied by a mathematical tutor. When the pupil

adds '+2' in the correct manner, the teacher praises the pupil's work. Yet, when the pupil hits 1000 and reveals he is following a bent-rule, the teacher balks at his incorrect use of '+2'. Thus, the pupil comes to understand the correct use of the formula '+2' when he changes his action and begins to apply it correctly again. Wittgenstein suggests that we come to understand how to properly apply the signpost, and thus, how to properly apply words in the same way. We come to understand the proper use of language through training.

The immediate objection presented by an interlocutor is the following. Wittgenstein writes, "But with this you have only pointed out a causal connection; only explained how it has come about that we now go by the signpost; not what following the sign really consists in" (§198). If my action is merely dictated with how I am trained when I approach the signpost, then the meaning of the sign has no actual connection with how I respond. Thus, I may be acting in accord with what the sign says, but I may not be following what it says. If this is the case, then training does not qualify as an explanation of understanding the meaning of the sign itself. I may instead be acting as an automaton, without any kind of understanding.

Wittgenstein's reply suggests that a trained- response to the signpost only follows when there is an established custom, or regularity behind doing what the sign says. He replies, "Not so; I have further indicated that a person goes by the signpost only in so far as there is an established usage, a custom." (§198). Wittgenstein's point here emphasises the need for a regularity when it comes to understanding proper usage. When his mathematical pupil is corrected by the teacher, the pupil begins to once again, properly apply '+2' to a series of examples over 1000. He writes, 1002, 1004, 1006, and so on. We might ask here, what criterion is needed to state that the pupil understands the proper use of '+2'? The interlocutor, wary of the possibility of writing out the correct chain of '+2' without actually coming to understand the proper use of '+2', points out

that training only explains how the pupil came to causally write out a series of examples. Wittgenstein's response sets a criterion for demonstrating proper use by adding a further caveat to the process of training. The pupil understands the correct use of '+2' only when he demonstrates that he follows how '+2' is customarily used in a language game. The language game being in this instance, mathematics.

Wittgenstein's emphasis on regularity transitions into the second move of his theory. Namely, that use determines meaning. He writes, "What is the criterion for how the formula is meant? It is, for example, the kind of way we always use it, were taught to use it." (§190) In establishing regular use, one establishes the meaning behind our terms. We understand how to respond to the signpost for instance, because when one regularly uses a signpost, they know the pointed end points in the correct direction. We know the pointed end points in the correct direction, since we have been trained on the regular use of the signpost. Thus, the regular way in which we use our terms determines the meaning behind those terms. This makes the interlocutors worry irrelevant when it comes to understanding since regular use establishes a criterion. If one uses language how it is customarily used, they demonstrate that they largely understand the meaning behind their use of the terms.

It is important to consider how Wittgenstein's theory of meaning changes how we come to understand meaning from previous theories which rely on signification prior to use. Kripke writes, "Wittgenstein proposes a picture of language based, not on *truth conditions*, but on *assertability conditions* or *justification conditions*. Under what circumstances are we allowed to make a given assertion?" (Kripke 74). Unlike, theories which rely on referring to something which determines the truth-value behind our use of language, Wittgenstein asks what conditions need be present in order to determine meaning. For Wittgenstein, these conditions present

themselves in customary practices. Thus, there is no determined truth-value for the application of language in an infinite number of cases. Instead, the meaning behind our terms ebb and flow within the customary usage of our language.

When it comes to mental terms then, Wittgenstein looks to how we ordinarily use them to determine meaning. What is discovered, is that the mental state itself has little relevance when we use it in everyday discourse if we assume meaning comes from a referential theory of meaning. In order to demonstrate this, Wittgenstein asks us to imagine a thought experiment involving boxes and beetles. He writes, "Suppose that everyone had a box with something in it which we call a 'beetle'. No one can ever look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at *his* beetle" (Wittgenstein, *Investigation*s §293). Let us follow Wittgenstein's advice and imagine a conversation which stems from such a scenario. I stand holding an unopened box, an interlocutor approaches and inquires as to what is inside. The conversation might go something like the following:

Me: "I have a beetle in my box"
Interlocutor: "What is a beetle?"
Me: "The thing in my box."
Interlocutor: "Well, what is the thing in your box?"
Me: "A beetle"

If the word 'beetle', derives its meaning from the thing in its box, we reach our semantic paradox created through private language. The interlocutor cannot know what I mean by the word 'beetle' since the interlocutor has no access to the thing in the box. Thus, Wittgenstein writes, "if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and name', the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant" (§293). The same problem appears, as we have already discussed, with mental terms. Imagine the following conversation where we replace 'box' with 'head' and 'beetle' with 'pain'. It goes like this:

Me: “I have a pain in my head”
Interlocutor: “What is a pain”?
Me: “The thing in my head”
Interlocutor: “Well, what is the thing in your head”?
Me: “A pain”

Once again, if we assume meaning comes from signification, pain drops out of the picture as being relevant. Yet this cannot be how we come to understand mental terms for two main reasons. The first, is that being in a mental state, such as pain, seems undeniably relevant to what we mean behind our utterance of pain. The second, is that others do seem to understand what we mean by pain perfectly well.

In order to solve the problem of private language when it comes to theory of mind, we ought to apply Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning to mental terms. The first step is to look at our first uses. Wittgenstein writes, “Words are connected with the primitive, natural, expressions of sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behavior” (§244). Here, Wittgenstein suggests primitive behaviours function as an expression of mental states. A child, when in pain begins to cry. However, as the child develops an adult begins to train them to use different exclamations. The child, for instance, may be taught to change a painful wail to an ‘ouch’. Here we establish Wittgenstein’s first requirement for meaning. Namely, training determines proper use.

An important thing to notice in Wittgenstein’s account is the relevancy of mental states when it comes to establishing meaning. Mental states are expressed with primitive behaviour which is then trained into regular uses. This is not to say that behaviour signifies a particular mental state. Instead, behaviour is a primitive form of regularity. When a child is in pain, a child regularly expresses that pain through crying. Thus, the mental state does not determine meaning, but it

certainly is relevant to establishing use. Since the mental state is relevant to determining use, it is relevant to establishing meaning. If this is the case, it is not use alone which determines meaning. The experience of the mental state itself contributes to establishing meaning by being that which can be expressed.

Indeed, as we express ourselves through language, customary uses are trained and those uses then establish the meaning behind our terms. The child, who has learned the word 'ouch' to correctly express pain, successfully tells his parents that he is hurt. His parents, having taught the child to say 'ouch' as a regular expression of pain, understands that the child is in pain. Crying after all, might serve as an expression of many different mental states, such as fatigue or frustration. In this sense, the term 'ouch' serves to refine exactly what the child means. Use then, establishes the meaning behind the term.

Thus, Wittgenstein explains how we come to understand the meaning behind the use of our mental terms without relying on signification. Since he does not rely on signification, he dodges the problem of private language which is assumed in theories of mind such as substance dualism. We come to understand the meaning behind mental terms by coming to know their regular uses. These regular uses are a result of training various primitive expressions. Under this view, we do not require direct access to the mental states of others in order to successfully communicate the meaning behind our mental language.

4. - WITTGENSTEIN'S EPISTEMIC SOLUTION

Wittgenstein's theory of meaning also builds into a solution to the problem of explaining knowledge of other minds. There are two aspects to the epistemological question of how we come to have knowledge of minds. Following the work of Paul M. Churchland, "the first problem is called the *problem of other minds*: How does one determine whether something other than oneself… is really a thinking, feeling, conscious being… the second problem is called the *problem of self-consciousness*: How is it that any conscious being has immediate and privileged knowledge of its own sensations?" (Churchland 111). Using Wittgenstein's theory of meaning, we can come to potential solutions for both problems.

In order to solve the first problem we must first tackle the second. Namely, how is it that we have privileged knowledge of our own sensations? Wittgenstein writes, "Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensation *only* from my behaviour – for I cannot be said to learn of them. I *have* them. This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself" (Wittgenstein, *Investigations* 246). When we experience pain, we cannot doubt that we are in pain. When I stub my toe, only I experience the sensation which goes along with that action. Indeed, someone else may doubt that I am in pain at all after my toe-stubbing incident. Thus, only I have privileged access to the quality of feeling which comes about after stubbing my toe.

Yet, it is important to pause here and consider what it means to have self-knowledge of that particular sensation. Namely, the feeling of pain I get after stubbing my toe. The interpretation of the word 'know' is a point which Wittgenstein continuously highlights throughout the *Investigations*. In particular, he is concerned with two main interpretations of the word when it comes to mental sensations. He writes, "The grammar of the word 'know' is evidently closely

related to the grammar of the words 'can', 'is able to'. But also closely related to that of the word 'understand', (To have mastered a technique)" (§150). Wittgenstein's distinction here, points to two different aspects of self-consciousness. The first, is the privileged access to mental sensations. When I stub my toe, pain shoots throughout my body. Under this interpretation, *I am able to* experience a quality of feeling. I cannot doubt that this occurs, while others can. The other aspect is how I come to *understand* what this pain means.

The importance of this distinction when it comes to self-consciousness is that simply having the occurrence of a sensation is not sufficient for having self-knowledge of that sensation. Wittgenstein writes:

> In what sense are my sensations *private*? – Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. – In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word 'know' as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I'm in pain. – Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself! – It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I *know* I'm in pain. What is it supposed to mean – except perhaps that I *am* in pain. (§246)

Wittgenstein's point here is that all privileged access to qualities of sensation tells us, is that we experience a particular sensation. When one states, 'only I can know whether I am really in pain', according to Wittgenstein, is that a particular sensation of pain is occurring in that moment. In this sense, 'know' is being used under the first interpretation. That one *is able to* experience pain. Yet, as Wittgenstein urges us to ask over and over again, what needs to be established in language in order to name that sensation in the first place?

The crux of the problem is Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox. Under the rule-following paradox, we cannot come to understand a sensation by experience alone. We might bring up Moore's example of yellow to illustrate this problem. Yellow, for Moore, is a natural, simple quality which can only be known when ostensibly brought to our attention. We only come to know the experience of yellow by associating it as a simple property which is commonly seen in

objects. The color of a banana for instance, is what we mean by 'yellow'. Yet, how only using the sensation of yellow, does one come to understand that the sensation one is experiencing means 'yellow'? Could the sensation one is experiencing, under a skeptical inquiry, turn out to be the color *Qellow*? Like the pupil who follows the wrong rule in his mathematical calculations, or the diarist who follows the wrong sensation in his attempt to record 'S', the yellow observer cannot understand the sensation of yellow simply by having that sensation. There is nothing about the sensation which tells him how to apply the term 'yellow' to that sensation in all future cases.

We thus come to see the importance of others in establishing self-knowledge. We cannot be certain of our experiences without having an established criterion for justifying what those particular sensations mean. All we have the privilege to say without a framework of meaning when it comes to mental sensations, is that we are *having* sensations. In order to understand those sensations, as Wittgenstein writes in *On Certainty*, "It needs to be *shewn* that no mistake was possible. Giving the assurance 'I know' doesn't suffice. For it is after all only an assurance that I can't be making a mistake, and it needs to be *objectively* established that I am not making a mistake about *that*" (*Certainty* §15). To simply have mental sensations occur is not sufficient to know those sensations. In order to know a particular sensation is occurring, one must understand what that sensation means. Under Wittgenstein's theory of meaning, meaning comes from regular use which in turn, comes from training. Thus, it is necessary that others are involved when it comes to understanding mental sensations.

We might look at it this way. A newborn has sensations which cause it to exhibit certain primitive behaviours. It may, for instance, experience hunger and cry out. Yet the newborn does not understand that it is hungry, nor does it understand that crying is an act of communicating

hunger. Indeed, the parents also have a hard time understanding what the newborns behaviour means. The newborn could be experiencing any number of things, such as hunger, pain, heat or light sensitivity. Only through regular interaction, in which the parents both feed and speak to the child does it come to associate the sensation of hunger with the proper meaning. On the same token, the parents learn to differentiate a certain expression with a certain meaning. Eventually, as the child grows, it learns to associate the word 'hungry' with the desire to eat.

It is clear then, that self-consciousness is deeply intertwined with, and necessarily reliant on other minds. How we come to know other minds is necessarily dependent on how we come to understand our regular use of expressions. How we come to understand our regular use of expressions necessarily involves other minds. We might put it as Wittgenstein does in the *Investigations*. He writes, "In so far as it makes *sense* to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain" (*Investigations* §253). Since self-knowledge necessarily relies on a test of understanding when it comes to objective criterion, pain is not solely an individual experience. It is true that upon stubbing a toe, one feels a private quality. Yet, the sensation as a whole is forged both with a quality of feeling, and an understanding of what it means. Thus, the experience of pain when stubbing a toe is not wholly epistemically private. We know that others experience pain since we come to have self-knowledge of pain through others.

If this is the case, Wittgenstein paints a picture of the mind which functions differently from the Augustinian view. The first thing to note, is that privileged access to one's own mental states and thoughts does not reign supreme. Since self-consciousness is dependent on others, the problem of other minds seems to dissipate. Indeed, the question flips. It no longer asks, how can we explain the existence of other minds? But instead asks, how can the existence of other minds

explain our own? The mind shifts from its status as a wholly individual phenomenon to that which is shaped and structured through communal relations. C.S. Peirce, in his discussion of personhood, presents a picture which describes this relation. He states, "The man's circle of society (however widely or narrowly this phrase may be understood) is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism" (Peirce, "Pragmatism" 338). The problem of other minds through this framework seems to be a nonsensical problem. If our individual minds are shaped through the relations involved with other minds, it is necessary that other minds exist.

5. - POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

Before we accept this solution to the problem of other minds however, two significant objections must be addressed. The first is addressing the problem of secrets or lying. In other words, the ability to hide meaning from others. Although this seems like a problem for our epistemological theory, it merely depicts another form of meaning which requires the existence of a regularity. The objection goes something like this. I can privately withhold meaning, or present false meaning to others through keeping secrets or telling a lie. If this is the case, only I have privileged and direct access to the truth behind what I mean. Since meaning can be private in these cases, it shows that minds are wholly individually private.

In order to tackle this objection, we ought to make another distinction between weak and strong privacy. Weak privacy, involves the technical trick of withholding, or presenting false meaning. In this case, only you have direct access to what you mean behind that particular use of language. Yet, this does not in principle prevent anyone from understanding what you mean. If one can in principle understand what you mean when you withhold or present false information, you are not expressing anything which is private in the strong sense. Only the strong sense of privacy is sufficient for establishing a private language. Gilbert Ryle, in *The Concept of Mind* describes this distinction. He writes, "The technical trick of conducting our thinking in auditory word-images, instead of in spoken words, does indeed secure secrecy for our thinking, since the auditory imaginings of one person are not seen or heard by another… But this secrecy is not the secrecy ascribed to the postulated episodes of the ghostly shadow world" (Ryle 23). Here, Ryle presents a picture of secrecy which involves the technical trick of hiding meaning from others. For instance, one thinks a sentence instead of expressing it. In not expressing a sentence, one hides what they mean.

However, this kind of technical trick is not unlike using a pair of shutters to block one from seeing inside a room. Ryle further presents the metaphor, "In the case of all the specifically head-senses, either we are endowed with a natural set of shutters or we can easily provide an artificial set" (Ryle 26). Imagine you are having a conversation with someone in a room. As you speak, you walk through a door into another room and close it behind you. The other person can no longer hear what you are saying, yet this does not make it so they can in principle not understand you. Now, view the door of the room as your own lips. Instead of telling the other person what you mean, you simply close your mouth and keep that information a secret. Only you know what you were going to express, yet this does not mean that the person cannot in principle, have known it as well. Secrets then, merely hide meaning from others. They do not create private meaning in the strong sense.

The act of lying, much like the act of holding a secret, involves the technical trick of presenting false meaning. Yet, in order to understand how to perform a lie, one must understand what it means to lie in the first place. Wittgenstein writes, "Are we perhaps over-hasty in our assumption that the smile of a baby is not a pretence? – And on what experience is our assumption based? (Lying is a language-game that needs to be learned like any other one)" (Wittgenstein, *Investigations* §249). We might once again ask, what needs to be in place in language in order to determine that something is a lie? The answer is explained through Wittgenstein's theory of meaning. To lie to someone in your speech community you must use words in the way you both understand them. It is what you say with those shared meanings that is intentionally misleading.

Yet, it is important to pause here and discuss our use of the word 'intention' when it comes to telling a lie. We might once again bring up Wittgenstein's pupil. What is the difference between

the pupil making a mistake in the series as he provides his answers to '+2' and the pupil lying about his calculations in the series? Well, the first involves an unintentional act which is corrected by the teacher. This is part of the training of coming to understand how to apply '+2'. The second involves an intentional act in which the student already must be trained in the proper use behind '+2'. The student then purposely goes against the regular use as a technical trick. The important point, however, is that the student is not demonstrating anything which cannot in principle be understood by the teacher. The teacher, upon inspecting the further work of the pupil, may actually determine that the pupil is lying based on his performance. What this shows, is that in order to lie at all one must already be versed in proper use, and thus, understand meaning.

The first objection to our epistemological solution then, ironically works to support the notion that other minds are necessary to determining self-consciousness. This is precisely because weak privacy depends upon the inability to have strong privacy. What makes a secret a secret, or a lie a lie, depends on a regularity of what it means to keep a secret or tell a lie. Thus, although secrets and lies do demonstrate that one can have a weak sense of privacy when it comes to meaning, they are not sufficient to prove the notion of strong privacy.

The second objection comes in the form of functionalist accounts of mind. Functionalism defines mental states not by the composition of the states themselves, but by the function that they perform. Churchland writes, "According to *functionalism*, the essential defining feature of any type of mental state is the set of causal relations it bears to (1) environmental effects on the body, (2) other types of mental states, and (3) bodily behaviour" (Churchland 63). A popular theory of mind, functionalism captures important features of Wittgenstein's epistemological and semantic theories. Functionalism considers the importance of third-party influence, expressive

behaviours and relations between mental states. However, functionalism poses a threat precisely since the importance of the mental-states themselves falls out of the picture. Churchland writes, "What is important for mentality, argues the functionalist, is the not the matter of which the creature is made, but the causal structure of the internal activities which that matter sustains" (64), to illustrate this point. If all that matters is the causal structure behind mental states, the composition of mental states themselves fall out of relevancy.

Take the following zombie scenario posed by David Chalmers. He writes, "consider the logical possibility of a *zombie*: someone or something physically identical to me (or any other conscious being), but lacking conscious experience all together. At the global level, we can consider the logical possibility of a *zombie world*: a world physically identical to ours, but in which there are no conscious experiences at all" (Chalmers 94). We can imagine a world that is physically identical to our own in every way. In this physically identical world, we all behave in exactly the same way. However, we can imagine that in our imaginary world, there is no such thing as conscious experience. All the actions of those in that world, are merely causal implications of physical laws. Under the functionalist account of mind, which primarily is concerned with causal relations, there is no significant difference between these two worlds when it comes to how minds function. If there is no difference, functionalism fails to explain away the problem of other minds, since it does not explain the existence of other forms of consciousness. It only explains the causal relations prevalent in how minds function.

Thus, functionalism poses a problem for Wittgenstein's epistemological solution as we have set it up in this paper. If we can explain minds only using causal relations, there is no need to assume that mental states actually occur. If there is no need to assume that mental states actually occur, there is no reason to conclude the existence of other minds. Perhaps, a skeptic might

challenge, the world is full of zombies who simply act in causally identical ways. Thus, in order to arrive at our epistemological solution, we must demonstrate that mental states are better described as a phenomenological concept.

In his article, "What is it like to be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel provides a thought experiment which challenges that reductionist accounts of minds can adequately explain mental phenomenon. We know for instance, how a bat behaves. In order to hunt and maneuver through the air, a bat uses high pitched shrieks to navigate. Equipped with intricate webbing, a bat knows how to fly in complete darkness. Further, as dawn approaches, the bat hangs upside down in order to sleep. Nagel asks us to imagine what it is like to be that bat. However, he writes, "In so far as I can Imagine this (which is not very far), it tells me only what it would be like for *me* to behave as a bat behaves. But that is not the question. I want to know what it is like for a *bat* to be a bat" (Nagel 439). Under a functionalist theory of mind, we may be able to explain certain mental states which accompany the behaviour of a bat. Upon nearing an owl for instance, a bat may shriek in panic and fly the opposite way. Causally, we can postulate the bat experiences a form of fear. Yet this does not tell us what it is like for a bat to feel fear. The quality of feeling of fear is important to what it means to be a conscious bat. This is not to deny that mental states do not have functional characterisations. It only denies that functional characterisations capture all that a mental a state is. The subjective character of experience, or what it is like to be conscious, is an integral part of how minds work.

Further, Frank Jackson in his article, "What Mary Didn't Know", presents another thought experiment which captures subjective experience from a human perspective. We can imagine an individual named Mary, who is educated solely in a black and white room. Mary reads black and white books, and watches black and white lectures. In this way, Mary learns everything she

can know about the physical world. Yet, Jackson writes, "It seems, however, that Mary does not know all there is to know. For when she is let out of the black-and-white room or given a color television, she will learn what it is like to see something red" (Jackson 291). Confined to the black-and white room, Mary can learn all the causally relevant facts about the colour red. She may for instance, learn that red is a certain frequency of light-waves, which holds a certain location on a colour spectrum. She may learn that red is the colour of red things, such as a red house, or a red rose. However, what she is missing in her education of causal relations, is the subjective experience associated with seeing red. Like Moore's idea of yellow, the subjective experience of the color red is a simple natural quality, which cannot be reduced to causal explanations such as light-wave frequency.

What these thought experiments show is that reductionist theories of mind such as functionalism miss an integral part of mind. Ignoring or denying the relevance of subjective experience dismisses an important aspect of conscious experience. When it comes to understanding self-consciousness then, not only are other minds necessary, but the occurrence of subjective experience is an unavoidable aspect of consciousness. In this sense, both interpretations of the use of 'know' are an integral part of Wittgenstein's epistemological solution. One must have the occurrence of a mental sensation in order to understand what occurs. On the other hand, one must understand what occurs in order to have knowledge of a mental occurrence. Thus, one cannot simply eliminate or ignore the relevancy of subjective experience.

One of the biggest misconceptions of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mind is to categorize him as a functionalist or behaviourist. Yet, this reduces his epistemological views to his semantic views. He writes,

> "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour with pain and pain behaviour without pain." – Admit it? What greater difference could there be? – "And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a Nothing." - Not at all. It's not a Something, but not a Nothing either! The conclusion was only that a Nothing would render the same service as a Something about which nothing could be said. We've only rejected the grammar which tends to force itself on us here. (Wittgenstein, *Investigations* §304)

Wittgenstein does not deny the relevance or the existence of mental states. Indeed, he expresses that there is a huge difference between pain behaviour without the occurrence of pain and pain behaviour with the occurrence. He instead wishes to claim that under a theory of meaning which relies on signification, a nothing serves just as well as a something when it comes to explaining the meaning behind our mental terms. As we have seen, Wittgenstein's shift in semantic theory brings back the relevancy of mental states by linking use to primitive expressions.

If this is the case, the functionalist objection to the epistemological solution is not sufficient. Since the subjective occurrence of mental states is necessary to understanding those occurrences, we can conclude that those who operate in the proper regularities established in our forms of life also have subjective experience. As Wittgenstein writes, "You learned the *concept* 'pain' in learning language" (§384). We feel pain. As we feel pain we express certain primitive behaviours. Through training, we learn to associate these behaviours with regular use. Regular use determines the meaning of those behaviours which forms our concept of pain. Subjective experience within an objective framework work together to create our mental concepts. This is a strong claim, yet the paradox of other minds falls away once we come to establish that knowing mental occurrences relies both on having them, and on coming to understand them.

CONCLUSION

Wittgenstein's theory of mind then, is heavily reliant on his semantic conclusion of the inability to have a private language. Once he demonstrates that our use of mental terms establishes meaning prior to signification, he can call into question that minds are epistemically private phenomenon. This comes from an interpretation of what it means to have knowledge of both other minds and self-consciousness. We cannot, as he demonstrates with the private language argument, come to have self-knowledge of our own mental occurrences without an understanding of what those mental occurrences mean. An understanding of what those mental occurrences mean necessarily relies on the existence of other minds. On the other hand, the quality of feeling which comes from the mental occurrences themselves is also an integral part to what it means to have conscious experience. Thus, knowledge of mental states relies heavily both on the existence of other minds and the occurrence of mental phenomenon. What is arrived at, is a picture of mind which is not epistemically private. Instead, as Peirce demonstrates in his notion of personhood, the mind may be better viewed as that which is not wholly individual, but that which is shaped by communal relations.

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