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**Isolated Identities:
The Impact of Government Policies and Socialization Agents on the
Root Causes of the Current Conflict in South Sudan**

By

Adam Malou A. Dhal

A Major Research Paper
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts
at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

2021

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The Impact of Government Policies and Socialization Agents on the
Root Causes of the Current Conflict in South Sudan**

by

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May 14, 2021

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Abstract

In his book *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*, Timothy Sisk has argued that “What is most important is not whether ethnic group identity is innate and fixed or contrived and manipulable; it is that members of an ethnic group perceive the ethnic group to be real. Perceptions are critical in understanding the extent to which intergroup relations can be peaceful or violent” (Timothy Sisk, 1996, p. 13).

In South Sudan, "Identity Groups" are not only perceived to be real, *they are real*, and as such serve as the basis ethnic differentiation. Before the separation and independence of South Sudan in 2011, Sudan was inhabited by over five hundred distinct ethnic groups; South Sudan seceded with sixty-four of these ethnic groups. Importantly, each of these groups had unique cultures, traditions and religious beliefs that shaped their identities. This multi-ethnic and multi-communal setting created an environment conducive to social conflict, in that it set the stage for the absence of a unified Sudanese identity. The result was "protracted civil conflict" (Azar, 1990), resulting in decades of political instability and civil wars. First, there were two post (1956) independence civil wars with the North, and second, following its independence in 2011, a civil war broke out within South Sudan. The net result is that since independence in 1956, these civil wars totalled thirty-nine years of conflict that killed over three million and three hundred thousand people on both sides, mostly from South Sudan – totals not to be envied.

This paper initially seeks to trace the origins of identity groups in Sudanese/South Sudanese history, both before and after the Turko-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian condominium eras beginning in 1821 and lasting until 1956. Further, it will trace the continuing impact of colonial and independent Sudanese government policies on creating "isolated identities" as the "root causes" of the protracted social conflict seen in Sudan following independence in 1956. Finally, through the author's first-hand experience growing up in South Sudan, the paper explores how these identity groups have been perpetuated into the present through an examination of the socialization process. In conclusion, the paper will document how a lack of a common shared identity created dysfunction in South Sudan's Transition Government, resulting in instability, insecurity and widespread human suffering.

Dedication

To my late Father and Mother, I dedicate this work to you AND To my children for putting up with me during the time of my research and to my wife for your prayers & moral support.

Acknowledgements

Above everything, to God be the glory for his great grace and mercy upon me and for seeing me through my studies. I want to express my thanks and gratitude to all of the Political Science faculty members. My special thanks and appreciation and gratitude goes to my supervisor, Distinguished Professor Emeritus Dr. W.C. Soderlund, for his above exemplary support, insightful suggestions, comments during the course of this study and throughout the research process. This research would not have seen the light without his continuing support. My thanks and special gratefulness goes to the one whose support and encouragement motivated me to complete this research, Dr. Tom Najem, my second reader. Your insightfulness and resourcefulness have left a special mark on me, and I am sure it will touch many more after me.

Finally, my sincere thanks go to my family, friends and especially my dear Uncle Alfred Mayen Maciek for the life-long support until writing this research – God the Almighty will bless you all.



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Introduction

Once the largest country in Africa, inhabited by 40,661,000 people before the session of South Sudan in 2011 (World Bank, 2014), Sudan has been engaged in civil wars almost continuously since its independence in 1956. The question addressed in this major research paper is whether Sudan's civil wars, described by many historians and political scientists as intractable conflicts that have been ongoing since the Turko-Egyptian and Anglo Egyptian colonial eras began in 1821, can be explained by using Edward Azar's theory of "Protracted Social Conflict" (PSC). It is argued that Sudan's bi-polar character (a northern region under Egyptian-Arab influence and southern region under African influence, combined with a multi-communal reality in both regions, which was exacerbated by the colonial legacy of "Divide and Rule" policies, produced a unique political culture in the country that failed to embrace anywhere near what may be seen as a unified national identity. Unfortunately, with the coming of independence in 1956, the Republic of Sudan followed the same pattern of governance characteristic of the prior colonial regime, and attempted to manipulate group identities to promote its policies of "Arabization" and "Islamization," which favoured the north. Specifically, the paper argues that the current crisis in South Sudan can be seen as the continuation of the communal political conflict that was inherited from Sudan, and was exacerbated by the absence of a unified political identity necessary to address South Sudanese issues collectively and peacefully as one nation.

Sudan's thirty-nine years of civil war have drawn particular attention to the need to study and understand why this culturally rich country was engulfed in such devastating wars, both before and after South Sudan's separation and independence. Further, why did South

Sudan's separation and independence in 2011, a strategy widely seen to be a solution to so-called "intractable conflicts," fail so badly in bringing peace and stability to the newly minted country?

In so doing, Chapter One establishes the relevance of Azar's *Protracted Social Conflict* theory, which cites the fundamental importance of communal identities to countries such as Sudan and South Sudan and their problems in achieving peaceful governance. It argues that Sudan is, without doubt, a textbook example (perhaps the textbook example) of Azar's theory of protracted social conflict at work.

In Chapter Two, the paper will first discuss the pre-colonial composition of ethnic groups in South Sudan and how these groups interacted historically. Secondly, it will review the way in which the unique colonial system established under the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium, exacerbated Sudan's tribal divisions by favouring some over others, thus initiating a set of lasting grievances.

Chapter Three explores the unique circumstances of the British withdrawal from Sudan, leading to independence in 1956; the new state's role following independence, documenting the impact of the first of Sudan's civil wars (which actually began prior to independence); as well as explaining the Addis Ababa Agreement, which in 1973, ended that war. It argues that the state continued to operate under the colonial model, further entrenching tribalism and regional inequality through the way in which services and resources were distributed to the indigenous African Sudanese and other ethnic groups of Arab origin. In addition to the preconditions for conflict identified by Azar, regional disparities between North and South were not addressed and was an influential factors in creating conditions leading to continued inter-communal violence.

Chapter Four deals with abrogation of the Addis Ababa peace agreement following ten years of relative peace, plus the attempted imposition of Islamic hegemony on the South – all of

which culminated in a second civil war, even more devastating than the first. The chapter ends with a discussion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which in 2005 ended the second civil war. That Agreement called for a six-year period, following which there would be a referendum in the South, whereby voters would decide whether to remain a part of a United Sudan or separate and form an independent state of their own. The results of that referendum were that 99 percent of South Sudanese voted in favour of independence, which was achieved in 2011. Within two years, South Sudan was again at war, this time within itself.

In Chapter 5, the paper will explore the role of various “socialization agents” in maintaining “isolated identity groups.” This will be done through an examination of the personal experiences of the author, who grew up and lived in South Sudan from 1959 to 1984. While the chapter focuses mainly on one tribal socialization experience (among sixty-four different ethnicities in South Sudan), it will be used to demonstrate how socialization acted to shape individual ethnic identities in ways that did not promote a “national identity.”

In the conclusion, the paper will review the question of how an independent South Sudan, widely promoted as a solution to Sudan’s continuing civil wars, became caught up in the same set of circumstances that have bedeviled the nation from the time of independence. The paper will end with an assessment of whether, given the lack of a cohesive national identity, “state failure” and “protracted social conflict” are permanent conditions for South Sudan.

Chapter One

“Identity Groups and Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict”

Unfortunately, since the beginning of creation, political differences, communal conflicts, and civil wars have been common phenomena among human beings. When an armed conflict (whether interstate or intrastate) begins, it is most often the case that there will be an end to that conflict—either a negotiated solution is reached, or one side emerges victorious. However, in Sudan, the thirty-nine years of civil wars since independence in 1956 is an exception – the country has experienced an almost unparalleled prolonged catastrophe that has claimed millions of lives (Sidahmed & Soderlund, 2008, p. 84), widened national identity differences and still shows few signs of ending. Despite the gravity of the conflict, the world’s press and the academic community were mostly silent about Sudan.¹ This was the case until the latter half of the 1990s, when many asylum seekers and groups of refugees from both Sudan and South Sudan started migrating to neighbouring countries, with some going to new homes across the oceans. At that point, the global community, including some academics, became aware of the civil war in Sudan and started critical searches for answers to explain the on-going carnage.

Among the explanations that emerged for Sudan’s conflicts, we argue that Edward Azar has offered a theory of “Protracted Social Conflict” (1990) that appears well-suited to understanding the prolonged civil wars in Sudan. Although the theory was not rooted in the Sudanese experience, the independent variables offered by Azar as conditions leading to communal conflicts are without a doubt critical to understanding the lengthy and seemingly intractable civil wars in Sudan. These four variables, *communal identities, the role of the state, basic human needs, and international linkages*, explain to a remarkable degree, not only the

factors underlying the prolonged civil war in Sudan, but why, after apparently finding a solution to the North/South Sudan conflict in the form of separation and independence in 2011, another civil war broke out, this time in the newly-independent Republic of South Sudan. This chapter will objectively examine the contribution of each of these factors to the Sudan/South Sudan case to establish the relevance of Azar's theory in explaining the causes of Sudan's persistent and violent communal conflicts.

The Importance of "Communal Identities"

In his theory, Azar points to "communal identity" as perhaps the most significant factor triggering protracted social conflict. He defined a community as a "politicized group whose members share ethnic, religious, linguistic or other cultural identity characteristics" (Azar, 1990, p. 5). In this context, it is essential to point out that Sudan has over five hundred different ethnic groups and that each of these ethnicities has formed its unique identity-- beyond geography, there was little that unified them.

Azar argued that "multi-communal societies, whether formed as a result of divide-and-rule policies of former colonial powers or through historical rivalries, often produced political systems characterized by the dominance of one group over the others, which he described as leading to the "disarticulation between the state and society as a whole" (1990, p. 5). We found that the first of these variables, identity group formation (as a precondition for the protracted social conflict in Sudan and South Sudan), began in the centuries before colonization (see Johnson, 2003, pp. 3-4; Deng, 1995, p. 35; Dhurgon, 1995). That process of basic ethnic group formation set the stage for what was to follow.

Azar then identified two factors that could lead to the rise of politically active identity groups in multi-communal societies. Among these are the historical rivalries which developed in

the context of Sudan's prolonged conflict between the North and South Sudan. For example, the Nuba and Fur in Western Sudan identified themselves as "African" instead of the predominant "Arab" North. Another factor are the divide-and-rule policies enacted by former colonial powers, such as Britain's declaration of the "Closed Border Ordinance" that restricted northern access to South Sudan (see Johnson, 2003, p. 11).

Tracing the process by which colonial policies strengthened pre-colonial ethnic identities (as well as "national policies" of successor state governments following the Independence of Sudan), we rely heavily on Douglas H. Johnson's *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (2003). The primary motivation behind British policies to establish different administrations and separate development strategies for the northern and southern Sudan is unclear. Some see it as cultural protection for the South, arguing that the British intention was to safeguard and protect the naïve South from the policies of "Arabization" and "Islamization" thrust upon it by the North, while, at the same time, empowering Christian missionaries to promote the Christian faith and provide education. However, some scholars saw the Closed Borders colonial policy's intention as the early recognition that Southern Sudan's future might ultimately lie with the countries of British East Africa, rather than with the Middle East (Johnson, 2003, p.11). For example, Abdel Rahim argues that "the basic considerations that dictated the Southern policy were the colonial interests of the British Empire in Sudan and East Africa" (Rahim, 1966, p. 227). Further, the British colonial policy has been described as a diabolical system that strengthened colonial control by increasing friction among what might have been "one country's people" (Johnson, 2003; Koul & Logan, 2019).

Regardless of the motivation (we believe both were involved), Johnson convincingly argues that the British policies of "divide and rule" as practiced in Sudan are unique in colonial

administration annals. First, they set up essentially different governance systems for the two parts of Sudan; thus, from the start, more or less guaranteeing that it would be unlikely that Sudan would develop into a single political entity. The South's administration was constructed along 'African.' rather than 'Arab' lines, discouraging (and later actually prohibiting) northern cultural and economic intrusion into the South. Simultaneously, the British implemented a loosely administered system of "native administration" in the South, built heavily around ethnic culture and customary laws, thus enhancing and strengthening local identities at the expense of a southern-wide identity. Thus, whether intended or not, British colonial policy worked against the development of *both* pan-Sudanese and pan-South Sudanese identities. The importance of this for future developments cannot be overstated.

State Institutions (and Power) Captured by One Group

Azar explains that in countries facing and experiencing protracted social conflict, political power becomes dominated by one identity group; that group then uses its power to allocate resources unequally in favour of its ethnicity. Furthermore, they use their power to ensure that they remain in control of the state. Any attempts made by the disadvantaged communal group(s) to participate in governance are brutally repudiated (such as evidenced in the current conflict in South Sudan Conflict), resulting in a prolonged social conflict (Azar, 1990, p. 7).

The competition for power and influence among rival identity groups happened in Sudan under colonial rule and, importantly, continued after Independence in 1956, when political power became concentrated in the North, at the South's expense. A political system rooted in power imbalances between identity groups carried over as well into the new state of South Sudan following its Independence in 2011. In both situations, the state became dominated by a single communal group (or a coalition of a few ethnic groups) which monopolized benefits for their

own, while marginalizing the majority of smaller ethnic groups. Following independence in 1956, subsequent northern-dominated governments downgraded and ignored other groups' interests and needs, not only in the South but also in Eastern Sudan, Western Sudan, and some Northern Sudan areas (see Deng, 1995). Azar points out that efforts to resolve such power disparities by enforcing assimilation and integration policies (such as attempted by the northern-dominated Sudanese Government in Eastern Sudan (the Bejja), Darfur and the Nuba in the West and the Blue Nile) impede the nation-building process (Azar 1990, p. 7). Such policies damaged the social fabric and contributed to protracted social conflict in South Sudan.

Countries suffering from Protracted Social Conflict will often see minority groups' attempts to participate in governance met with resistance and force by the dominant group. Azar concludes that "such crises exacerbate the already existing conflictive situations, diminish the states' ability to meet basic needs, and lead to further developmental crises" (Azar, 1990, p. 7). For example, as we shall see in the following chapter, a 'promise' by northern politicians to consider a federal government system (a primary demand of the South at the time of Independence) was subsequently ignored by a succession of northern-dominated governments. This refusal to even consider a federal system led directly to two civil wars (1955 – 1972 and 1983 – 2005), and indirectly to the current conflict in South Sudan.

Deprivation of Human Needs

The meeting of basic human needs (such as food, shelter, and security) is crucial for individual and communal survival. In today's world of scarcity, especially in post-colonial countries, these basic needs are seldom met satisfactorily, much less equally. All too often, privileged groups benefit in abundance in the allocation these basic needs, while other groups are discriminated against, thus initiating grievances. Grievances resulting from needs deprivation are usually

expressed collectively, and the failure to rectify these grievances on the part of state authorities leads to protracted social conflict (Azar 1990, p. 7). Azar also pointed out that basic needs do not necessarily have to be thought of as primarily survival needs; they can also be psychological, cultural, and infrastructural/developmental needs. He argued that such unmet basic needs do not necessarily lead directly to conflict. However, what is critical is the degree to which, over time, minority groups can gain access to political institutions to ensure the recognition of their communal existence (Azar 1990, p. 9). Unequal distribution of benefits by the state deprives non-favoured groups from receiving equal services and benefits in employment. For example, in Sudan's first post-colonial government, South Sudanese were given only *four* out of *eight hundred* civil service positions (Deng, 1995, p. 25).

Furthermore, continuing during Sudanese government rule, remaining high on the list of regions not well served by the Sudanese government was the South. Economically, provinces in South Sudan did not receive benefits equal to Northern provinces. Such inequality alienated South Sudanese and pushed them to rebel against the state. Annual transfers from the central government in Khartoum to the South accounted for approximately 20% of Sudan's total budget, even though 95% of the South's total tax revenues were transferred to the North. For example, in 1982, as reported by the Regional Ministry of Finance in South Sudan, the revenue collection from different sectors was estimated to be 13 million Sudanese pounds. The annual budget allocated for the three Southern provinces of Bahar Elgazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile in the same year was estimated at 4 million Sudanese pounds. Moreover, in addition to receiving less than other provinces, South Sudan's payments tended to be paid behind schedule, meaning that government employees in the South received their monthly salaries late.²

Another area of deprivation can be seen in physical infrastructure and developmental projects, which the central government in Khartoum controlled. It was not until 1960 (when General Ibrahim Abboud took power through a coup d'état), that through his "Arabization" and "Islamization" policies, most government buildings in the three provinces of South Sudan were built. In each province, Abboud built three primary schools, two intermediate and one secondary school. The building of these schools and other government facilities was not to carry out a national infrastructural plan for the whole country. Rather, he intended to reinforce his government's policy of Arabization and Islamization in the South by controlling education from the primary level to secondary schools. It is worth mentioning here that only missionary schools were allowed to operate freely in the South during British rule. Teaching was based on the East African Curriculum, comprised of courses in the English language, Christian religion and mathematics. The few schools built by the central government admitted only muslim pupils.

International Linkages

On the fourth variable, Azar outlined two international linkage models described as preconditions for social conflict. These models were "economic dependency" and "patron-client relationships." With the advent of globalization and competition in international trade, disadvantaged and poor states were often forced to depend on global assistance (economically and developmentally) to maintain and provide their citizens' services. Such assistance was derived from global economic and financial systems giants such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These institutions imposed their influence on underdeveloped countries by controlling their "economic development policies" and (partly or wholly) by dictating their financial policies. There are many questions about who benefits from these

policies, and Azar stressed that dependence on foreign economic systems often exacerbates denial of communal groups' access to basic needs (Azar, 2005, p. 11).

Patron-client relationships refer to arrangements whereby a wealthier state guarantees a weak state's security in return for loyalty and various concessions. In that client states' loyalty involves obedience to the more robust states' desires, this relationship may significantly and negatively impact the extent of a state's ability to provide services to its citizens. Azar argued that such dependency often exacerbates denial of communal groups' access to basic needs, distorting domestic political and economic systems by imposing numerous conditions involving international capital, domestic capital, and the state (Azar, 1990, p. 11). In some cases, these "conditionalities" may require the weaker state to give up vital sovereignty elements such as autonomy, self-reliance, and possibly even independence. A state that gives up these domestic rights and obligations may be forced to adopt foreign policies which run counter to its citizens' needs. Moreover, giving up these liberty factors will impede economic development and likely create resentment among citizens, which will ultimately breed grievances and eventually cause social conflict.

Evidence of the impact of such patron-client relationships can be found in the civil wars between the North and South: Saudi Arabia (under King Fahad) and Egypt (under Hosni Mubarak) supported the North, while Libya (under Muammar Gaddafi) and Ethiopia (under Mengistu Hailemariam) aided Southern fighters. For example, during the SPLA/M's fight with the North, Khartoum declared that the civil war being fought in the South was a "holy war," its objective was to protect Islam (and the South Sudanese Muslim) from being dominated by the SPLA/M, which was mainly Christian and ideologically western-oriented. This declaration prompted many Muslim and Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to intervene to

preserve the Islamic religion and culture and protect Arab identity in Sudan. Egypt sent military advisors and air force units to fight against the rebels in South Sudan. Egypt did this under the defence agreement Jaafar Numayri had signed with Hosni Mubarak under the pretext of safeguarding and protecting the Nile watershed. On the other side, Libya aided the South (SPLA/M) materially through military hardware and finances to earn African countries' trust and support in Gaddafi's vision of creating the United States of Africa and reinforcing Pan Africanism. In both cases, external interference worked to solidify already well-established North/South identity differences.

This primary point of the chapter is to establish that all the four variables underpinning Azar's protracted social conflict theory, leading to Sudan's protracted Civil Wars, can be found in Sudan's history, both before and during colonialism. Furthermore, we argue that these same variables carried over into Sudan (both North and South), following independence in 1956 and into South Sudan following its separation and independence in 2011. In the following chapter, we will present the detailed evidence needed for understanding Sudan's seemingly endless conflict through the lens of Azar's PCS theory.

Notes

1. Among ten severe humanitarian crises in the 1990s, Sudan has ranked 3rd in terms of severity (measured by numbers killed and numbers of refugees), 10th (last) in terms of media interest and 10th (again last) in terms of the strength of an international response (Sidahmed and Soderlund (2008, pp. 84-88).
2. The author's father worked for the Sudanese government, so I can attest first hand to the lateness of salary payments.

Chapter Two

Sudan: Complex Historical Legacies

Contemporary Sudan is mired in multiple conflicts whose origins can be traced to the distant, pre-colonial past, which the highly atypical Anglo-Egyptian colonial experience (following after an Turko-Egyptian occupation) built upon. Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala, in their book *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, argued that Sudan's pre-colonial past includes an imperial heritage linking it to the pharaonic civilization of the Nile valley, to the Christian kingdoms of ancient Nubia and Merowe, and to the Islamic Nilotic Sultanates that emerged in the region's central riverain areas (located along the River Nile) and Western Savannah lands (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 27). They further pointed out that the historical relations between the rapacious central riverain sultanates and the South's territories bestowed a legacy of political marginalization and socioeconomic inequalities contributing to the interlocking regional conflicts that characterize today's Sudan. Generally, they argued that the conflicts that continue to rage in the country are all manifestations of the continuing quest on the part of Sudan's multiethnic inhabitants for a more equitable membership in Sudanese polity that recognizes the worth of each and all within in it (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 27).

The Pre-Colonial Setting

Centuries before the colonial era began with the invasion of Egyptians and the Turks in 1821, Sudan existed as a group of scattered kingdoms. Spanning from Eastern to central Sudan was the Funj kingdom; the Fur and the Nuba were located in Western Sudan (leading two separate empires, concurrently in North and South Darfur and in North and South Kordofan); and the Shilluk and Zande, also two autonomous kingdoms, were located in Southern Sudan. Other

Negroid Nilotic tribes existed along the Nile, such as the Dinka the Nuer and the Shilluk, who lived inland, far to the South, and had very little to no mention in Sudan's ancient history.

Overall, the most prominent kingdom was that of the Kush (located adjacent to Egypt), during the Pharaohronic period. History recalls that some of the Kushite kings had invaded and ruled parts of Egypt. Sudanese historian Mekki Shibeika, in his book *Sudan over Centuries*, argued that between the 5th and 6th centuries, marriages among Arab immigrants and the indigenous Sudanese are considered the beginning of the Arab identity in ancient Sudan (Shibeika, 1956, p. 17).

According to Douglas H. Johnson, the ethnic groups located in current South Sudan did not play a significant role in Sudan's ancient history, except for the "Shilluk" in Upper Nile Province, who, according to LaVerle Berry, had attempted to advance north along the Nile. They reached Aljazeera on the White Nile in the 17th century, but were repulsed by the Funj (Barry, 2015, p. 14; Johnson, 2003). The "Zandi" (located in Western Bahar Elgazal) were connected to the Azande Kingdom situated in Central Africa. Other societies and groups existed in South Sudan, such as the "Bantus," which consisted of the greater "Bari" Acholi, Avakian, Moru, along with many other "hunter-gatherer" tribes located in what is now Equatoria Province. These communities lived in isolated, well-organized and ethnically-governed settings. They shared no common tribal/ethnic identity and were not united. It is argued that the absence of a sense of nationhood and a non-existent unified government had facilitated and eased the outsiders' invasion and conquest. Eventually, as a result, the country was subject to Turko-Egyptian rule from 1821 to 1885.

Johnson has argued that Sudan's problems have been wrongfully explained and attributed entirely to colonial policies. Moreover, the predominant interpretation of its continuous conflict has focused too much attention on a bi-polar explanation -- an "Arab" north

versus "African" South. Consequently, scholars and other writers have seldom elaborated on the multi-communal and the diverse identities of the 500+ ethnic groups in Sudan, which can be argued to be the main factor underlying the country's protracted civil conflict. Johnson argues that Sudan's historical and contemporary dysfunctional politics is based on *identity issues* that can be traced beyond the well-recognized Arab vs. African split. Moreover, the roots of these identity issues were established long before the advent of colonialism. However, as stated earlier by Frances Deng and Riak Dhurgon, the arrival of the "invaders" failed to create a common identity among the Sudanese tribes living in the South. Nevertheless, the conquest and occupation did contribute immensely to changing the cultures, religious beliefs, and patterns of daily living of the exposed indigenous peoples by forcing them to adapt and conform to their new rulers' rules and other forms of exploitation.

Colonial Conquest and Occupation

Mekki Sheibeka, in his book *Sudan Over Centuries* emphasized extensively on the routes the 'Arab' communities took in the 5th and 6th centuries to enter Sudan and North Africa. He argued that the collapse of the "Maarab" dam in Saudi Arabia necessitated the Arab exodus (along with their livestock) looking for fresh drinking water and grazing land for their animals. Sheibeka explained the two routes the Arabs took to enter Sudan – in the North East, over the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia, in the North and northwest Africa, through the desert in a caravan from Egypt (Shibeika, 1956, p. 17). Their settlement in the 'Land of the Sud' could be thought of as an invasion, although it was not coercive (Shibeika, 1956, p. 20). The migrating Arabs, through intermarriage with the locals, were able to establish many communities and expanded Arabic culture and Islamic religion in the region.

Turko-Egyptian Rule: The "Turkiyya" (1821-1885)

Riak Machar Dhurgon, in his article "South Sudan: A History of Political Domination," examined the early relationship between Sudan and South Sudan and explained how that relationship impacted the formation of both northern and southern identities. He agreed with other scholars that before the Turko-Egyptian invasion in 1821, Sudan consisted of various Kingdoms and tribal communities without modern forms of government similar to today's type (Dhurgon, 1995).

The Turko-Egyptian occupation beginning in 1821 was prompted by the Ottoman empire's expansionist ambitions and cravings for wealth and markets. The primary commodities of interest in Sudan, especially in South Sudan, were slaves, elephant tusks, gold, and timber. South Sudan and her people became the principal source of these commodities. Dr. Dhurgon further argued that the Turko-Egyptians and North Sudanese, united as they were by ideology and Islamic religion, collaborated in their raids against South Sudan for slaves, resulting in millions of South Sudanese people being taken into slavery and shipped to various Arab and other locations in the world (Dhurgon, 1995). Although Turko-Egyptian rule lasted for sixty years, it is significant that South Sudan was never fully brought under the invading foreign power's control and administration; moreover, when the invading forces left, they did not leave behind any established system of governance. Similarly, the brief Mahdist administration in the North (1883-1898) (see below) failed to impose its authority over the whole of the region (Deng, 1995; Dhurgon, 1995; Koul & Logan, 2019). The invaders' failure to fully control the South was attributed to the hardship of travelling to the region at that early time.¹ However, those who did manage to enter the South were rewarded by the lucrative business of the slave trade. Therefore, it is worthy of mention that the relationship between Sudan's North and South was *not* built on

brotherhood and a spirit of a shared common identity. Instead, Northerners looked at Southerners as nothing but a commodity to be sold as slaves and referred to them as "Abid" – i.e., "slave" (Sharky, 2003, p. 19).

In his analysis of the division between North and South, in the context of Islam and Christianity Douglas H. Johnson claimed that "Sudan has been undergoing Arabization and Islamization since the invasion of Sudan by the Arab tribes from Upper Egypt, and across the Red Sea during the Middle Ages" (Johnson, 2003, p. 1). He argued that the Arab invasion of Sudan has been accepted as a historical fact by both those who think Arabization is a natural and inevitable process, interrupted in its final stages by British intervention; and by those who see it as an external threat that required the rallying of indigenous African opposition to stop (Johnson, 2003, p. 1). Frances Mading Deng, in his book *War of Vision: Conflict of Identities in Sudan*, has affirmed that the relationship between Egypt and Sudan predated the Turko-Egyptian invasion of 1821. According to Deng, Egypt was the primary contact point for the interaction between Sudan and the Middle East (Johnson, 2003, p. 6).

Douglas H. Johnson, in *The Root Causes of Sudan Civil Wars*, argued that the conflict between the North and the South is complicated and often misunderstood (Johnson, 2003, p. 1). The historical relationship between Sudan's North and South is deeply rooted in trades of all kinds, but led by the trafficking of humans (i.e., slavery) and other natural resources and materials. The Northerners saw the South as an open market where they could buy needed commodities at a low price (most of the time, these commodities were acquired at no cost). Johnson offered two explanations for the continuing discord between the North and South. He argued that the leading reason is that the North and South division is based on periods of exploitation and slave-raiding carried out by the Arab-North against the African-South. In turn,

that unequal relationship gave the North an upper hand in the governance of a territory that was divided, not only geographically (North and South), but socially (superior and inferior) and spiritually (Christian and Muslim) (Johnson, 2003, pp. 5). Dr. Riak M. Dhurgon also elaborated on the multi-tribal setting in Sudan, arguing that it is generally accepted that racial, religious, cultural, linguistic and historical diversity existed. However, these diversities have not been used to enrich and consolidate the country's multi-communal group identity. Instead, they were used by the ruling Arab elites in the North to oppress, subjugate, and exploit South Sudan's people, resulting in prolonged political instability and protracted social conflict (Dhurgon, 1995).

Colonialism under the Turkiyya unquestionably established Northern "supremacy" over the South. Beyond the horrendous exploitation of Southerners as slaves, colonial rule served to widen the physical separation and limited interaction between the North (which existed within Egyptian cultural customs and traditions), and the South (which existed in an African cultural sphere). The new colonial system also gradually created "identity differences" between ethnic groups in the South by imposing Islamic ideology and Arabism on some and not others. These early divisions were a significant factor that shaped and influenced the creation of distinct "Arab" and "African" Sudanese communities -- the bitter fruits of which the Sudanese are harvesting in the modern-day political arena.

The "Mahadiyya" (1885–1898)

The Turko-Egyptian regime in Sudan collapsed between 1881–1885 due to a religiously-inspired uprising carried out in Sudan. In her book *Living with Colonialism, Nationalism and the Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, Heather Sharky affirmed that in 1885 the supporters of a Sufi Scholar named Muhammad Ahamed Al-Mahdi, who claimed himself to be the voice of true Islam, seized the Turko-Egyptian capital Khartoum. Casualties in the war were estimated to be in

the thousands, including the British Commander, General Charles Gordon. The Mahdists (Al-Ansar) established a state based on Islamic principles and named the city of Omdurman (currently one of the Tri-Cities of Khartoum) to be their capital (Sharky, 2003, p. 5). In the early stages of the Mahdiyya, there had been some intention to bring the Southern Sudanese into the Muslim fold. However, the Mahdiyya did not last long, and it lost control of the South at a very early stage of its rule (Johnson, 2003, p. 6). Slave-raiding and Slave trading declined during the Mahdiyya. Johnson argued this was a result of the contraction of state power during that period. Incursions into the South tended to be almost exclusively for plunder (and for food during the great famine of 1888-1892), and for more slaves to add to the dwindling supply of domestic labour as well as soldiers needed for military operations (Johnson, 2003, p. 6).

The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1898-1956)

The Mahdist victory at Khartoum was a massive blow to British prestige, just as other European powers were beginning to partition the African continent in a rush to expand their imperial territories. Sharky concluded that Britain, responding to the pressures of the "European Scramble for Africa," launched a campaign against the Mahdist State in 1896, and did so by invoking Egypt's earlier territorial claims to Sudan (Sharky, 2003, p. 5; Rahim, 1966). The invasion, which was successful in 1898, was extraordinarily violent. The Anglo-Egyptians used guns and bullets with greater precision, at a more extended range, and using more devastating shrapnel than anything previously seen in the region. The death tolls revealed the technological disparities that enabled the Anglo-Egyptian forces to win over the Mahdists. In the final battle of "Karari" (Omdurman), Mahadist casualties were estimated at 11,000 dead and 16,000 wounded, compared to 49 killed and 382 wounded on the Anglo-Egyptian side (Sharky, 2003, p. 5). After the battle at Karari and the defeat of the "Ansar," Britain's connection to Egypt proved beneficial.

By declaring Egypt to be a “co-dominus” (or partner) in ruling Sudan, Britain established the fiction of an Anglo-Egyptian partnership, and referred to the Sudanese regime from 1898–1956 as a "Condominium." Further, it placed the territory under the British Foreign Office (rather than Colonial Office) for supervision. Not only was Sudan technically not a "colony," it was treated as differently than other colonies.

The Genesis of the Anglo-Egyptian "Condominium" in Sudan

The British conquest of Egypt in 1882 marked the end of the Ottoman Empire's government in Egypt and the beginning of Britain's imperial presence in North Africa (Collins & Deng, 1984, p. 7; Lesch, 1998, p. 29). The British, however, did not wholly remove the Ottoman presence from Egypt. For example, they kept the Khedive to run the administration, except for decisions that concerned national and international security (Collins & Deng, 1984, p.11). Andrew S. Natsios, in his book *Sudan, South Sudan & Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know*, argued that the British reconquest of Sudan was motivated by their belief that Sudan was part of Egypt. Egypt's reliance on the Nile waters was central to its survival and legitimized British efforts to secure the Nile sources (Natsios, 2012, p. 27). Another reason that prompted the reconquest was that the British feared a Mahdist resurgence under the leadership of the notorious Abdullah Taishi. Furthermore, they (the British) wanted to secure their East African colonies (See Natsios, 2012, p. 27-29; Sharky, 2008, p. 4; & Dhurgon, 1995). Ann Lesch, in her book, *Sudan: Contested National Identities*, argued that Britain sought control over Sudan for imperial strategic reasons that were primarily related to preventing other European powers from seizing the sources of the Nile and gaining footholds along the Red Sea from which they could threaten their sea route to India (Lesch, 1998, p. 29). Added to all of the above, Britain had been the de-facto ruler of Egypt since 1882, and the official justification was the restoration of Turko-Egyptian sovereignty on

Sudan, which they believed to be an Egyptian colony. Therefore, when they defeated Mahdiyya in 1898, Britain established a joint colonial regime known as the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium.

The British Colonial Administration's Distinctive "Southern Policy."

South Sudan's administrative area was comprised of three provinces -- Equatoria, Bahar Elgazel and Upper Nile Province. That land was inhabited by more than sixty-four ethnic groups, divided between three more prominent groups: Bantus, Nilotic, and Lou. Following the British reconquest of Sudan, they capitalized on the disparity between the Northern and Southern Sudanese peoples. They intensified existing differences in identity and religion by establishing different governance systems -- one for the North and one for the South. The government system in the North was designed to dissuade Northerners from following the Mahdist and Ansar Group. As the sub-title, "Patterns of Conquest and Occupation, North & South" of Johnson's book indicates, these decisions were based on a strategic understanding of the significant problems facing British colonial rule. Specifically, Johnson asserted that when the Anglo-Egyptians reconquered Sudan, they chose to implement distinctively different governance forms than the former colonial (Turko-Egyptian) rulers had established.

In the North, the goal was to suppress any resurgence of Mahdism. Egyptians (now partners in the condominium), utilized their friendship with the large section of the disgruntled Muslim Sudanese population in different cities and towns of North who detested the Ansar regime. The Egyptians also used their followers in religion (the Mirghani Family and the Khatmiyya Section founders), who supported them against the Mahdists and their Khalifa Abdallah and convinced them to join the new government (Johnson, 2003, p. 9). Furthermore, they reinstated tribal leaders whom the Mahdist has purged and replaced them with their agents. See (Collins & Deng, 1984; Deng, 1995; and Koul & Logan, 2019).

Before World War I, the condominium regime underwent a quick transition from military occupation to civil administration, when civilian British Officials replaced all military governors in the Northern Provinces. Further, the police took over responsibility for rural security from the army. Northern Sudanese began to be recruited into the police force and some army units, replacing the Egyptian and Sudanese former slave soldiers (Johnson, 2003, p .9). The strategy of setting up a different system of governance in the North was a tactical move by the new Anglo-Egyptian Condominium government to secure itself from any threat of resurgent Mahdism, and in this it succeeded.

In the South, according to Johnson, the political situation was different. Except for a few garrisons at Fashuda, Bor and Rajaf, the Mahdist state did not exercise significant control over the region during its reign; therefore, there was no need to wean people away from Mahdism by offering them rewards to renew their loyalty to the government as they did in the North (Dhurgon, 1995; Johnson, 2003). The South was looked at by both Turko-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian colonial regimes through the same lens of rejection and repudiation. The intruders did not offer services and help Southerners, but rather took them into slavery and a life of servitude. Whatever government there was, was not set up to meet their needs, and the new colonial elite used force and coercive action to ensure the peoples' loyalty (Johnson, 2003, p. 10). Another piece of misinformation, fed to many scholars and politicians who wrote about the unique British government system in South Sudan, was that the British wanted to “protect” South Sudan from the central government in Khartoum. Instead, their real goal was to annex South Sudan to their East Africa colonies. It is argued that South Sudan, at that stage of history, was not influential politically, but economically it was seen as an area to capture slaves and other natural resources such as ivory (elephant tusks) and gold. It is worth mentioning that building a nation with a

unified South Sudanese identity was not a part of the colonial mindset; what was important was the bigger picture involving which European countries would control East Africa.

Before the application of the Southern Policy, there were already different organizational/development patterns in North and South, and Johnson argued that the Southern Policy put into words what was already common administrative practice. This practice had been labelled "Indirect Rule" in other parts of British Africa, but in Sudan, it was more commonly called 'Devolution' or 'Native Administration.' In essence, this policy set out that colonial peoples' local administration should be conducted through indigenous structures of authority, employing indigenous laws and customs, as long as these were consistent with British ideas of good government and practice (Johnson, 2003, p. 11).

To ensure this consistency, despite their avowed support for indigenous traditions, as part of "Indirect Rule," the British could appoint and dismiss chiefs and establish courts that applied British, rather than indigenous codes of procedure, and these frequently deviated from customary laws and punishments. Within the indirect rule system, the British could also raid cattle camps to collect taxes, continue the "corvee system" (forcing people to work without pay to construct roads), resumed the state monopoly on the sale of ivory which was first introduced in the period of the Turkiyya. According to Robert O. Collins, Frances M. Deng and Ann Lesch, "There was an inherent contradiction between British intervention to promote Native Administration and its erosion of tribal custom and authority." (Lesch, 1998, p. 31; Collins & Deng, 1984, p. 9). Whatever its intention might have been, Indirect Rule did not treat the people who lived in the South as a "coherent entity." Thus, it reinforced previous practices, and we argue that it intensified separation from the North as well as promoting "isolated identities" in the South.

The "Closed District Ordinance."

With its diverse ethnic composition, South Sudan proved to be complex and challenging to control, not only for the former two colonial systems (the Turkiyya and the Mahdiyya) but for the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium as well. This situation prompted the British to pursue a "pacification program" (that continued for well over twenty years), with more determination than seen previously under the Turkiyya or the Mahdiyya governments.

As part of this policy, the British attempted to seal off the South from the North in order (as they claimed) to "protect" the South from Muslim influence. Thus, in the 1920s, they introduced the "Closed Border Ordinance." That order was intended to stop the Arab tribes from capturing slaves, seizing cattle, forcefully confiscating grain from the South Sudanese. It also sought to end the alleged pressure to convert the South to Islam and halt Northern pressure on the South's control of the Nuba Mountains. The British also shared the previous conquerors' perception that South Sudan's people were primitive and pagan and concluded that they required moral guidance of the type that the Christian missionaries from Europe could provide (Lesch, 1998, p. 31). Generally speaking, the British officials were hostile toward Islam and sought to keep Arab and Islamic influences out of East Africa entirely.

As initially articulated, the "Closed District Order" of 1922 applied to Kordofan, Darfur, part of Kassala and the White Nile Province, as well as South Sudan (Lesch, 1998, p. 32). It mandated that Sudanese who lived outside those areas could travel to or live there only if they obtained a special permit. The "Permits to Trade Ordinance" of 1925 allowed colonial authorities to exclude Northern traders, who had previously dominated commerce in the southern countryside (Collins & Deng, 1984; Dhurgon, 1995; Deng, 1995 & Johnson, 2003). The British separation of South Sudan and other marginalized areas from the North was deeply resented by

the Northern Sudanese, who felt that British action was aimed against Islam and Arab identity in Sudan (Lesch, 1998, p. 33).

In conclusion, the closed district ordinance, whether it was for the protection of Southern and other marginalized people of Sudan or to stop the expansion of Islam in Africa, was without precedent. History and the current level of violence in Sudan will be judge of its impact.

An Independent Sudan (1956-2011)

On January 1, 1956, The Republic of Sudan was the first country under British colonialization in Africa to earn its independence. Many reasons have been identified as the main factors leading the British to relinquish control of Sudan. Among these is what Andrew S. Natsios articulated in his book *Sudan, South Sudan & Darfur* -- that the chaos produced by World War II had inspired many African and Arab nationalists to seek independence. The professional indigenous elites in French, British and Dutch colonial empires had witnessed the German conquest of continental Europe and siege of Britain and the former invincibility of their colonial masters disappeared. Following the end of the war, this perception of imperial vulnerability helped accelerate independence movements, most noticeably in the African continent, including Sudan (Natsios, 2012, p. 35). Another factor was what Natsios termed the "Professional Class of the Nile River," a political organization originating in Egypt, with the goal of unifying Egypt and Sudan into one country. That move posed a threat to British interests in the region and potentially jeopardized their control over the Suez Canal (Natsios, 2012, p. 35 & Dhurgon, 1995).

Three issues were generally involved in the Sudanese independence movement; the first was the relationship between Egypt and Sudan. On this, the Umma party (led by the Mahadi's descendants) called for a completely independent Sudan, while the Khatmiyya (the supporters of Egypt for more than a century) advocated for union with Egypt. The second was the status of the

South. Most Southerners were unprepared for rapid independence and the few who were politically active demanded a say in the South's position in an independent Sudan. It is worth mentioning that the main Northern parties tried to minimize Southern influences in the independence movement or exclude them entirely from the process because Southerners were neither Muslims nor Arabs (Johnson, 2003; Koul & Logan, 201). In this, they were largely successful. The third issue, according to Natsios, was the relationship between the state and religion. There were Muslims in the South and communists, socialists and secularists in the North who supported a secular Sudan. However, the main parties of the North insisted on the formation of an explicitly Islamic State (Natsios, 2012, p. 37). Only with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, combined with the referendum in South Sudan in 2011, has the third issue been addressed. Nonetheless, the status of the Islamic religion within the Sudanese state remains a source of antagonism within Northern Sudanese politics. Others articulated different reasons for the British granting Sudan its independence. For example, Johnson and Deng argued that the British feared that Egypt would somehow control the North -- (an unacceptable outcome (and a well-founded suspicion, as independence did not stop Egyptian meddling in Sudan's internal affairs) (Deng, 1995; Natsios, 2012; Koul & Logan, 2019).

The South had been critical to British attempts to ensure that another colonial power did not encroach on its East African holdings. The French had secured Somalia and Djibouti in the East, and they had troops stationed at "Fashoda," the Shilluk Reith capital in the Upper Nile Province. Belgium was involved in a similar move; they had seized Rejaf, a town in Equatoria Province adjacent to the Congo. In negotiations surrounding independence, the British agreed with those South Sudanese who demanded a federal system. However, they decided that this demand had to be "postponed" until after independence. Unfortunately, that demand did not

receive any serious attention from either the British or Northerners. By the time independence was achieved in 1956, a North/South civil war had been in existence for a year, and the so-called "Problem of the South" was to dominate the history of an independent Sudan.

We believe that Sudan's prolonged conflict fits well into Azar's theory of Protracted Social Conflict. There are "Multi Communal Groups," combined with the absence of a unified identity, and a grossly unequal distribution of power. Francis Deng offered three alternative approaches to the resulting crisis. First, he argues that by bringing to the surface the realities of the African elements of identity in the North-- thereby revealing characteristics shared by all Sudanese-- a new basis for creating a shared identity could be established that fosters equitable participation and distribution. This model became John Garang's position in the six-year transitions period agreed to in 2005. Second, if the issues that divided Sudanese proved insurmountable, Deng argued for a "diversified coexistence" framework within a loose federal or confederal arrangement. Third, he concluded that partitioning the country (along justified borders) might be the only option to end the devastating conflict. Indeed, it was Deng's final proposal that was implemented in 2011; the results of the referendum were 98% favouring separation. Despite the overwhelming support for independence, this third solution did not work --the "New Republic of South Sudan" fell into renewed civil war shortly after its birth.

Chapter Three

“Sudanese Independence, a Civil War and Ten Years of Peace”

Many scholars and political scientists (for example, Douglas H. Johnson, Frances M. Deng, Abdel Salam Sidahmed), as well as other academicians, have written extensively about Sudan’s prolonged civil wars and their consequences in terms of humanitarian hardships and lack of infrastructural development. This chapter will first focus on the British role in the conflict, specifically how their precipitous action in granting independence (and abandoning the South in the process), contributed to the conflict between North and South Sudan. Further, it will discuss the genesis of the “Anyanya” conflict, which actually started in the year before the Republic of Sudan attained its Independence from the British in 1956. It will continue with an assessment of the impact of the Torit Mutiny (and the ensuing massacre of Northern Sudanese) on the downward trajectory of North/South relations culminating in a Civil War. It ends with a discussion of the Addis Ababa Agreement that terminated the war and started Sudan’s most prolonged period of peace.

The British Withdrawal

Several talks, meetings, and conferences were conducted between the British, North and South Sudanese before what was to become the Anyanya rebellion erupted in August 1955. Among the most important of these conferences and meetings was the “Juba Conference” of 1947. Ann Mosley Lesch, in her book *Sudan – Contested National Identities*, wrote disparagingly about the conference, arguing that the British arranged it only to avoid criticism for not having done so (Lesch, 1998, p. 34). She argued that the conference agenda did not include the key issue of “unity” vs. “separation” of the two parts of Sudan. Instead, it discussed how South Sudan should be represented in the legislature and what special safeguards were needed for the South (Lesch,

1998, p. 34). Furthermore, to the great disappointment of Southern Sudanese politicians, the British intentionally selected only seventeen Southern Sudanese as trusted delegates to the conference; and those nominated and selected individuals were all on their payroll as tribal chiefs, junior officials, and police officers (see Dhurgon, 1995; Deng, 1995; Johnson, 2003; Koul & Logan, 2019). Lesch concluded that the British policy would have made sense if it had led to the South's separation from the North, either turning it into an independent state or attaching it to a neighboring African country. Although few and far between, British officials suggested these solutions, they were never seriously considered (Lesch 1998, p. 35).

In October 1954, Southern Sudanese leaders organized a second Juba Conference, with no authorities or delegates present from the North to direct the results (Natsios, 2012, p.40). The meeting voted for independence from Egypt (affirming a National Assembly vote against union with the North), but leaving open the condition that the South be given autonomy within a federal system. If this was not possible, the Southerners insisted on self-determination, including the possibility of independence from the North. Thus, at the second Juba Conference, Andrew Natsios claimed the emerging Southern leadership proposed two of the options that were to become central features of Comprehensive Peace Agreement's (CPA), that some 50 years later was finally negotiated in 2005 (Natsios, 2012, p. 40) - an autonomous South within a united Sudan or self-determination, leading to possible separation of the South (Rahim, 1966). The process leading to the independence of Sudan clearly ignored the South and has to be seen as an obvious opportunity missed to put Sudan on a viable path toward independence.

Douglas H. Johnson, in his book *The Root Causes of Sudan Civil War*, provided a compelling narrative of the conflict between North and South Sudan, and how in a rush, the British left Sudan, abandoning all the promises of protection they had made to the Southern

Sudanese. Johnson reasoned that the mutiny leading to the Anyanya rebellion (which actually marked the beginning of the first civil war), served to hasten, rather than delay Sudanese Independence, as “it brought home forcibly to the British Government the paradox of its continued vague responsibility in Sudan without any longer having the power to control or shape events in the country” (Johnson, 2003, p. 29). Furthermore, the British action of granting the Sudanese their Independence before the Sudanese had agreed on a permanent constitution indicated an avoidance of the legal procedure for self-determination that already had been decided upon between the British and Egyptian Governments. It is worth mentioning here that Southern Sudanese politicians were persuaded to accept the country’s independence after receiving an assurance from the British Government that they would exercise restraint in restoring order in the South and that the Sudanese Government would adhere to their request that a federal constitution be given serious consideration. Consequently, the date of Independence was brought forward, and the country became a fully independent nation on January 1st 1956, with numerous issues of its nationhood still unresolved, as well as being at war with itself (Johnson, 2003, p. 29).

The First Civil War (Anyanya)- (1955 to 1972)

While Sudan’s civil wars have been identified as Africa’s most prolonged civil conflict, they do not stand alone among the continent’s costly wars. The end of the World War II marked the beginning of African colonies’ quest for emancipation and independence. While in the decades following the war many achieved their independence, the reality of communal ethnic formation, ethnic hegemony and sectarianism remained and have resulted in economic hardship, greed, and competition for power – all leading to conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). In their article “Insurgency and Civil Wars,” James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin asserted that African nations

were leading globally in the incidence of civil wars (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Taisier M. Ali and Robert Matthews, in the Introduction of their book *Civil Wars in Africa, Roots, and Resolutions*, argued that civil wars had destroyed the African continent, causing indescribable misery in the lives of African people, destroying their economies, weakening their political institutions, and undermining the social fabric of their societies (Taisier & Matthews, 1995, p. 1). They described the conflicts and civil wars in Africa as a pandemic that had persisted for many years, and that every country in Africa had unique factors that caused them. This chapter aims to highlight the causes of the civil wars in Sudan and explain why Sudan and South Sudan (together the largest country in Africa) have been involved in civil wars since the country became independent in 1956.

Many scholars and political scientists have written extensively about Sudan's prolonged civil wars and their consequences in terms of humanitarian hardships and lack of infrastructural development. We have examined the British role in the conflict, specifically how their precipitous action in granting independence (abandoning the South in the process), contributed to the conflict between North and South Sudan. We will now discuss the genesis of the "Anyanya" conflict, and how the Torit Mutiny (and the ensuing massacre of Northern Sudanese), contributed to the downward trajectory of North-South relations leading to the First Civil War.

A leading cause of the first Anyanya conflict was that Northern government officials, merchants and military officers streamed South to occupy the posts previously held by the departing British (Deng, 1995; Dhurgon, 1995; Johnson, 2003; and Collins & Deng, 1984). It was documented that eight hundred such posts were given to Northerners, while only eight positions went to Southerners (Natsios, 2012, p. 41). Needless to say, this caused alienation and anger among Southerners. In July 1955, spontaneous riots broke out in Yambio, the former

capital of Western Equatoria; police intervened by firing into the crowd killing eight people (Natsios, 2012, p. 41). One month later, a mutiny took place in Torit, the base of the old colonial Equatorial Corps (Natsios, 2012, p. 41) and the First Civil War was underway.

The Torit Mutiny, August 1955

Torit is a small city in Western Equatoria Province, close to the border with DRC (Congo). The British established it as a military garrison and had stationed the Equatorial Corps – (Southern Sudan Division) there. In a televised interview aired in November 2019, Joseph Lago (leader of the rebel army during the First Civil War), recalled two events that were of significant importance in the history of South Sudan. The first was the British departure from Sudan, an event that was received with jubilation in Northern Sudan, but was met with bitter disappointment and uncertainty in the South. The second event was the Torit Mutiny, which many Southern Sudanese politicians and scholars see as the turning point in Sudan's contemporary history, especially in its history of relations with the North.

It is argued in this paper that 'Torit' was the birthplace of the idea of "South Sudanese Unification," although, as we will explore it in depth in the following chapter, it failed to create a unified "South Sudanese Identity." According to Joseph Lago, the disappointment and mistrust Southerners experienced at the hands of the Egyptian, Turkish and the British colonial systems, had become a common theme at the time when Northern Sudanese started arriving in a significant numbers in the South following the British departure. Southerners perceived Northerners as a "fourth colonial power" coming to replace the British and they welcomed these migrants with conflicting perceptions and embedded fear (Lago, 2019).

To protect newly-appointed government officials, civilian traders, teachers, and others, the Northern Government decided to transfer Southern Sudanese military officers in

commanding positions and personnel from the South to Northern Sudan and replace them with officers and troops from the North. This action resulted in heightened tension among the military and police service members who were from the South.

Government officials, scholars, news media and oral sources alike have testified that multiple factors contributed to the ignition of the mutiny in Torit. However, the most immediate factor that caused mutiny in Torit was the killing of a South Sudanese soldier by an Arab officer in August 1955. When Southern troops witnessed that killing, they rushed to the weapons depot, seized rifles, and started shooting -- murdering Northern officials as well as merchants, including their families. The riot spread like wildfire to Wau, and Malakal, although there is no evidence indicating that any of these outbreaks were planned or organized (Natsios, 2012, p. 41). Over all, more than three hundred people were killed in the violence, most of them from the North. Arabs blamed Christian missionaries for inciting the violence, an allegation that was later proved unfounded by the investigation committee comprised of Arab and British members.

The uprising in the South convinced the British Government to accelerate its departure from Sudan, since British officials no longer felt they had the power to control or shape events. Thus, Britain was anxious to grant formal Independence, even before the Sudanese parliament had agreed on a permanent constitution and initiated a circumvention of the legal procedures for self-determination settled upon by Egypt and Britain (Johnson, 2003, p. 29). On January 1st 1956, the British hastily departed, and the Sudanese state was born with an unstable and unprepared government in charge (Lesch, 1998, p. 41; Johnson, 2003, p. 29; and Lago, 2019).

Impact of the First Civil War

It is argued in this paper that the First Civil War had brought the South Sudanese together to face a common enemy, but had failed to build a unified identity among the sixty four different

ethnicities that inhabited the land. By modern standards, as revealed by Johnson, in its first years, the civil war was fought almost entirely in the South and was conducted at a relatively low level of intensity. The Southern guerrillas were joined together very loosely and had no external military support. They armed themselves mainly by stealing from the police outposts, an occasional ambush of army patrols or through the defection of Southern police and soldiers (Johnson, 2003, p.31).

Mekki Shibeika, in his book *Sudan Over the Centuries*, argued that in spite of the bravery of their bearers, spears, sticks, and light rifles did not fare well against the modern machine gun (Shibeika, 1956, p.27). The Northern Army came to engage the Southerners equipped with weapons manufactured in Britain, while ten men from the rebels lined up behind one man carrying a rifle. They would wait until the first carrier of the gun was killed, then the next in line would seize the gun and continue the battle (Lago, 2019). Hostilities were largely confined to the South. While not as bloody as the Second Civil War, by its end in 1972 half a million people had been killed and hundreds of thousands more fled into exile as refugees.

Problems of Disorganization and Disunity among Southerners

As mentioned, the catalyst for the military uprising in Torit was not an organized and planned event. It occurred due to real grievances and negative sentiments held by Southerners against Northerners (mainly Arabs). Many South Sudanese fled the country to neighbouring Uganda, and in the early 1960s they formed what was termed the “Leadership of the Exile Movement,” later known as “Anyanya,” which is “Snake Venom” in the Lotuko dialect (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 25). Johnson described the Anyanya leadership as predominantly Equatorian. Both Fr. Saturnino and Joseph Oduho were from Torit (and of the Lotuko ethnic group); Aggrey Jaden was from Juba (of the Bari Ethnic group); while William Deng Nhial was the first influential

Dinka leader, and he was from Tonj, in Bahar al-Gazal (Johnson, 2003, p. 32). Because of its disorganized nature, the rebellion failed in its early stages to attract significant members from the three larger ethnic groups (Dinka, Nuer and Shilluk) until after 1965, ten years after the start of the war. This finally occurred when Joseph Lago, a South Sudanese and an Officer in the Sudan Arm Forces (SAF), defected from the Sudanese army and joined the rebels (Lago, 2019). The movement's leadership in Uganda continued to attract most of the Southerners Sudanese refugees, the majority of which came from Equatoria, which had more access to East Africa than Southerners from either Bahar al-Gazal, or Upper Nile Province.

Infrastructural Destruction

The British policy of development in Sudan had very little to do with either human or infrastructural development. Instead, as argued by Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt in their book *Short Cut to Decay: The Case of Sudan*, their main concern was the exploitation of Sudan's resources such as a free workforce, Ivory and other natural resources. It was British policy to use local Sudanese in achieving their objectives. Only in the North and Central Sudan did they develop various agriculture and transport systems, because these areas produced cotton, dates and other products which Britain needed (Harir & Tvedt, 1994, p. 34; Kalian, 2007, p. 520). The British developed these areas to pursue their policy of becoming self-sufficient in the area of agriculture products. However, Southern Sudan was not geographically and economically prepared for agricultural projects, except in the Upper Nile province, which produced products (grain and sasami), which were less important to Great Britain.

There was some physical infrastructural development in the South during the Ibrahim Abboud regime (1958-1964), such as schools, hospitals, and government administration offices.

These infrastructures survived the Ananya war (1955-1972) because most of the Anyanya fighting with the government took place outside the cities.

The Addis Ababa Accord

The Addis Ababa Accord brought an end to the First Civil War. The discussions between the South Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) (under the leadership of Joseph Lago), and the Head of the Sudanese Government (Jaafar Numayri), leading to the Accord took place in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. According to Douglas H. Johnson, that Agreement not only brought peace to Sudan, but as a unique resolution to the civil war, brought great international acclaim to the African nation and its leaders (Johnson, 2003, p. 39). Andrew Natsios agreed, but added that while leaders of other African states may have been sympathetic to the Southern cause, they were concerned about how the Southern Sudanese rebellion might impact separatist tendencies in their own countries, as many were dealing with the same problems as faced by Sudan (Natsios, 2012, p. 51). Among these, Nigeria had been torn apart by the Biafra civil war. Ethiopia faced a decade of independence movements in Eritrea (as well as the war with Somalia over the status of the ethnic Somali population), while Zaire was threatened by separatists in Katanga Province (Dhurgon, 1995; Lago, 2019). Natsios argued that support from African nations for Southern Sudanese independence would create a dangerous precedent (Natsios, 2012, p. 51).

Since the 1960s, the U.S State department policy had opposed any separatist movement in Africa.¹ However, many Southern Sudanese wished for independence, a dream that finally was to come true in 2011 (Sidahmed, 1996; Sulton, 1980). Although the Addis Ababa Agreement brought ten years of relative calm (1972 – 1983), we argue in this chapter that the Agreement was bound to fail, sooner or later, and at least in part, that this failure was because it had not been adequately explained and sold to the public. Also, the guarantor and the facilitator

of the Agreement, although they were internationally recognized entities, lacked popular support on the ground.

It must be mentioned that Numayri had first attempted to end the Civil War militarily. In that he had received military hardware and support from Russia and Egypt, Numayri believed that he could destroy the Anyanya and its supporters. Little did he know that the South Sudanese rebels also had received equipment and training from Israel. With external support of their own, the Southern Sudanese rebels were able to fight the Sudanese Army effectively and scored repeated victories in 1970 and 1971 (Natsios, 2012; Lago, 2019). With the North incapable of defeating Southern forces in the countryside (a pattern that repeated itself in the Second Civil War (SPLA/M)), by 1971 it became increasingly apparent that military solution to the “Southern Problem” was unlikely (Koul & Logan, 2019). Jaafar Numayri changed course. He eliminated his former communist comrades, who had attempted a coup against him. He hanged his Minister of Southern Affairs, Joseph Garang (not related to the John Garang, see below), and replaced him with another Southerner, Abel Alier, a skilled lawyer, negotiator and ideological moderate. Alier accepted the position on the condition that he could quietly begin talks with Southern political leaders about a peace settlement.

Provisions of the Agreement

The Addis Ababa negotiations commenced with the important provision of a “United Sudan” as a precondition. Johnson, in his book, revealed that many exiled South Sudanese, including some on the negotiating team, were unhappy about abandoning the goal of independence; as well, there was a clear difference of understanding between the government and the SSLM delegation regarding the nature of “regional autonomy,” which was proposed during the negotiations.

Among the Addis Ababa Agreement's provisions was the creation of a Federal Sudanese State, in which South Sudan would be granted an autonomous government within a "United Sudan." It would be governed by a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers (Sidahmed & Sidahmed, 2005, p. 41). The Southern Government would be run by Southerners appointed by Numayri, with the advice and consent of the High Executive Council.² English was to be the Official Language of the South and the language of instruction in schools. The status of the Islamic religion was not discussed, thus it was not a stumbling block; nevertheless, it emerged as one of the leading causes of the Second Civil War (1983 – 2005).

Looking at the Addis Ababa Accord from a different perspective, it appears as if both sides, the government and the rebels alike, placed almost exclusive emphasis on ending the war, meaning that the main reasons that led to the rebellion in the first place had not been suitably addressed. Fundamental issues that were missed (or that were intentionally left out) during negotiations were the location of external and internal borders; the country's national identity (Arab vs. African or both); and, importantly, the means by which to promote the concept of a "national identity" for Sudan. Although the Agreement was negotiated under the new constitution, which had separated religion from the state, as Mathew LeRiche and Mathew Arnold pointed out, it was never implemented (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p.28). As we shall see in the following chapter, these issues (and others) became the central reasons behind the igniting of the Second Civil War in Sudan (1983 – 2005).

Southern Autonomy within a United Sudan

In the years immediately following the Addis Ababa Agreement there was widespread peace and relative prosperity in the South. Moreover, contrary to expectations, following the first Southern Regional Government's (SRG) term in 1977, its members could take pride in that they had

indeed been able to govern effectively (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p.28; Lago, 2019; Collins, 2004). The government had created the basic bureaucratic and judicial structures of governance, assisted a million Southerners returning from exile and presided over a successful election for the regional assembly in 1973 (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 28). However, following these initial successes, Southern Sudanese political space became increasingly fractionalized between those who supported Abel Alier and those who supported Joseph Lago for leadership positions on the High Executive Council's (Harir & Tvedt, 1994; Lago, 2019).

This chapter argues that these political differences exposed the weakness of the SRG and rendered it open to Northern manipulation. President Numayri proved to be a master at such manipulation, especially in his role in constituting the HEC. As Douglas Johnson has argued, despite widespread Southern perceptions that the Addis Ababa Agreement had disadvantaged the South institutionally, Khartoum's interference was mainly undertaken with Southern leaders' acquiescence or active participation (Johnson, 2003, p. 40). The reality was that Southern politicians could not effectively work together to counter Northern influence and manipulation, as major political parties and dominant individuals engaged in debilitating competition and confrontation. LeRiche and Arnold concluded that Southern solidarity was further complicated by rising ethnic divisions, notably between Equatorians and Dinka, as well as other Nilotic, cattle-raising ethnic groups such as the Nuer. Because of these divisions within Southern Sudan's political space, the SRG failed to challenge Khartoum with respect to important issues such as sharing resources fairly, promoting economic development, moderating educational policy, or pushing for judgements regarding the placement of contested internal, regional, and international borders (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013).

Furthermore, the Agreement stipulated that Anyanya insurgents must be absorbed into the National Army. This proved highly problematic and became a crucial factor in the collapse of the Agreement (Fearon & Laitin, 2003, p. 81; Dhurgon, 1995; Sulton, 1980, p. 148). It is worth elaborating further here on the Agreement's weaknesses, especially that its provisions for Southern Security (an issue that had been especially contentious during the negotiations) were inadequate. Despite the initial demands for a separate army, the SSLM eventually accepted Emperor Haile Selassie's argument for a compromise, which turned out to be a weak point in the Agreement. Selassie pressed for integrating the Anyanya into the National Army, but maintaining a Southern Command, half of which was to be formed from former insurgents. Lago (and few top officers) were guaranteed high-level posts in the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), police or other civil government positions (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 29).

However, the complicated arrangements embedded in the Agreement, were too convoluted for the Anyanya ranks and file to accept, a situation that prompted Abel Alier, the First President of the HEC, to comment:

[T]he Anyanya was fighting for political Independence against the "Arabs" until the Agreement came and took them by surprise. It was not the type of arrangements the ordinary Anyanya had expected, be in one Army with their long-standing enemy (Alier, 1992).

In short, the Agreement needed to be explained and sold to what was at best a skeptical Southern population.

In conclusion, Douglas H. Johnson argued that the semi-autonomous government had achieved at best qualified legislative authority, poorly defined economic powers, and an unclear understanding of the composition of its security forces (Johnson, 2003, p. 40). Most Southerners assumed that integration of the two armed forces would take place within five years, and that the proportion of Northern and Southern soldiers in the Southern Command would remain equal, and

that southern troops would remain garrisoned in the South. But Numayri had different ideas. The first was to protect his government from possible coup attempts mounted against him by Northern political opponents. Thus he wanted to keep a good number of southern soldiers close to him to assure his protection. Secondly, the transferring of Southern Sudanese soldiers to the North would eliminate the threat of their rebelling again, or building new loyalty to their Northern officers, who then might pose a threat to him. For its part, the Southern Army insisted that the agreed to process be completed within five years (Deng, 1995; Alier, 1992; Johnson, 2003). However, what the Southern Sudanese Army didn't know was that there were no explicit provisions in the Agreement for the Army's status after the five year period (Johnson, 2003, p. 41).

The Addis Ababa Agreement was ratified and embodied in the Regional Self-Government Act in March 1972, and it was incorporated in the Permanent Constitution in 1973. The constitution recognized a strong executive presidency for the nation and suggested safeguarding the Agreement by requiring a referendum to be held in the South before any amendments to it could be made (Koul & Logan, 2019; Deng, 1995; Lago, 2019; Johnson, 2003, p. 41). This provision set up a fundamental contradiction between the central and regional governments within the national constitutional structure (Dhurgon, 1995; Collins, 2004).

The powers reserved for the president were a matter of concern for many Northern Sudanese. However, at that time, Southern Sudanese leaders tended to regard Numayri as their personal protector against Northern opposition to the Addis Ababa Agreement. Therefore, in general, they were not only willing to let Numayri have the powers he claimed, but were glad that he had them (Johnson, 2003, p. 41).

Ten Years of Peace (1972-1983)

The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement had silenced the guns fired by North and South Sudanese against each other for the past seventeen years. During that time of war, life in the South had come to a standstill and South Sudan became a deserted land. The war had killed half a million people and displaced hundreds of thousands more; school buildings were turned into military barracks and hospitals mainly treated wounded soldiers. After sundown, in the South no one was allowed to be on the streets except for uniformed men and women. However, with the signing of peace in Addis Ababa in 1972, life started returning to normal. Ann Mosely Lesch argued in her book *Sudan: Contested National Identities*, that the Agreement established a regional Self-Government Act for the three Southern Provinces, and an autonomous government was indeed put in place. The three southern provinces became one region, whose provincial assembly would elect a High Executive Council (HEC). The regional government was responsible for internal security and local administration in social, cultural and economic areas. The government had an independent budget, with its revenue coming from local taxes and fees, plus special funds from the central government to narrow the infrastructural and human development gap with the North (Lesch, 1998, p. 46).

As noted, the Addis Ababa Agreement and the Regional Self-Government Act were incorporated into Sudan's permanent Constitution of 1973. A strong article was affixed that if an amendment would be necessitated, it would require a three-quarters vote in the national assembly and a two-thirds vote of the southern electorate in a referendum. Lesch argued that this double protection would prevent the Northern majority from making arbitrary changes to the Agreement (Lesch, 1998, p.47). Another applicable provision of the permanent constitution (if it had been implemented honestly), was the provision respecting Sudan's dual Arab and African identity; respect for Islam, Christianity and "Noble Spiritual Beliefs;" equality of all persons

before the law and the prohibition of any form of discrimination based on religion, race, language or gender. The Addis Ababa Agreement as well as the Constitution articulated an “ethnic, pluralistic model” for Sudan (Lesch, 1998, p. 47; Lual, 2013, p. 16).

Peace Dividends, Human Development and Infrastructural Rebuilding

Under the terms of the Addis Ababa Agreement which lasted from 1972 – 1983, an ordinary person could live in the South in relative peace and tranquillity. Also during those years many developments took place that were encouraging, such as rebuilding of ruined schools, building of hospitals and road construction ; as well, land was divided and registered. Everything appeared calm and safe, but the unfortunately the calm was of the type that appears before the storm.

Part of the problem was that the SRG’s full authority did not extend to provisions for local government and law enforcement. As well, most of its ability to raise revenue from local taxation derived from the central government. On security matters, the Agreement granted amnesty to rebel soldiers and provided for their absorption into the Southern Defence Corps (comprised of 6,000 soldiers each from Northern and Southern personnel), to form a unified national force (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 85). It is significant here, that Southern troops’ participation in the SAF applied only to the Army division. Other military units such as the Air Force, Navy, and other technical divisions were not included in the absorption formula. Thus, Anyanya soldiers were not allowed to join these units, even by the criteria of merit and/or experience (Lual, 2013, p.101).

When the First Civil War ended, the new government was faced with many hurdles and obstacles; most significantly, the Southern Sudan economy was in shambles. Agriculture projects that had been established during the colonial era had been abandoned and infrastructure was destroyed. Plus a million people had fled the country, some into the bush and others became

refugees in the neighbouring countries and around the world. As well, both Lesch and Johnson argued that the regional government was “starved” for funds to undertake reconstruction and rehabilitation; however, it failed to receive allotments for developmental funds from the central government (Lesch, 1998, p. 47; Johnson, 2003, p. 40). Southerners were also intensely disappointed because the North-South socioeconomic gap continued to widen. Therefore, the controversy over Junglei Canal³ and disputes over natural resources created grievances over inadequate development financing and economic discrimination.

In addition to all of the above, oil exploration became a contentious issue. In 1979 Chevron (an American company), discovered oil in two areas close to the North-South border region -- ‘Muglad’ in South Kordufan and ‘Bentiu’ in Upper Nile, South Sudan. Southerners’ fears that the North would steal their oil were crystalized in November 1980, when Attorney General Hassan al-Turabi submitted a new map to the Peoples Assembly that shifted the northern part of Bentiu into the Kordufan region. Lesch attested that although Numayri diffused the tension by withdrawing the proposed boundary change, he later replaced Southern troops with Northerners at Bentiu; in addition, he pocketed the proceeds from the Chevron licence (Lesch, 1998, p. 48). Lesch argued that such an action violated Addis Ababa Agreement which stated such revenue should go to the regional government. Numayri also decided to shift the location of the site of a proposed oil refinery from Bentiu to Kosti, a strategic rail and river city in the North. Many Southerners contested that decision because having the refinery in Bentiu would improve infrastructure, promote economic development and provide jobs to Southern workers.

The controversy over the oil in Bentiu was not the only problem faced by the SRG. The Addis Ababa Agreement provided for the reversion to the South of areas that belonged to South Sudan prior to Independence in 1956. That meant the district of Hufirat al-Nahas and Kafia Kingi

would be returned to Bahar al-Gazal Province. But Hufirat al-Nahas contained copper, and Kafia Kingi had deposits of uranium and Numayri's attempt to transfer Hufirat al-Nahas back to Darfur in 1978 met widespread opposition and was blocked by members of the National Assembly. The Agreement also stated that residents of border areas (who had ethnic ties to the South) could decide by referendum whether to merge with the South. (Lesch, 1998, p. 48). Therefore, the Abyei district in South Kordofan, Kurmuk and Chali el-Fil districts in the Blue Nile became eligible to hold the referenda, but the central government never implemented the provision in the five years as agreed on in the Addis Ababa Agreement. Southern politicians such as Samuel Aru Bol, a former Interior Minister, Samuel Abu John, Frances Deng and many others later argued that the contest over oil and the other natural resources, in addition to the border disputes, commutatively was the main reason for Numayri's abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1983 (Lesch, 1998 ; also see Deng, 1995; Dhurgon, 1995; Johnson, 2003). Lesch specifically argued that Numayri would never accept that revenue from natural resources would accrue to the regional government. Therefore, if the central government was to retain control of the newly found wealth in the South, he (Numayri) must swiftly end what was left of Southern Autonomy once and for all (Lesch, 1998, p.48).

Security Arrangements and Absorption of the Anyanya

The Addis Ababa Agreement specified that half of the troops garrisoned in the South would be from the Anyanya. Other local forces, such as the police, prison guards as well as any additional security and peace maintenance personnel would be recruited entirely from South Sudanese (Lesch, 1998, p. 49), with recruitment into the National Army proportional to the population. The hidden agenda behind the "proportional" clause emerged later on. Joseph Lago in his 2019 TV interview claimed that it was to gradually reduce the number of Southerners in the National

Army to under 12 percent (Lago, 2019). It is worth mentioning here that the Anyanya forces were incorporated initially as separate units within the armed forces (SAF). The plan was to integrate the troops fully by 1977. The absorption and integration process proved to be a tedious and complex task that taxed both the national and regional governments (Johnson, 2003, p. 41). Regarding security arrangements, Johnson explained that many guerrillas in the bush were unwilling to comply with the new security provisions. Additionally, some of those who complied, resented integration and opted to remain in their insurgent units. Among those who complied (as Lago recounted in his interview), many were not satisfied with the low ranks they were given. The integration of the Anyanya into the Army was accomplished within the proscribed five years. But many in the region were still dissatisfied. Johnson explained that while the full quota of 6000 Anyanya soldiers was absorbed into the Army, the number of the Northern troops in the South was not reduced to an equal number -- 6000 (Johnson, 2003, p. 42).

Many senior ex-Anyanya officers were forced to retire early or otherwise eliminated from the Army, with some transferred to garrisons outside of the South. According to Johnson, in the early 1980s, such transfers were especially resisted and became one of the factors contributing to the Bor mutiny in May 1983, which immediately preceded the presidential abolition of the Southern Regional Government (Johnson, 2003, p. 42). Additionally, Lesch argued that violent incidents within the army erupted in Juba 1974, Akobo 1975 and Wau 1976 because Southern troops feared they would be attacked by Northern soldiers or be transferred to the North (Lesch, 1998, p. 49). The Sudanese government ordered that the battalion at Aweil be transferred to Darfur in December 1982, and replaced Southern troops stationed at Bentiu with Northern soldiers to ensure Khartoum had control over the oil fields.

The turning point came in January 1983 when Dinka soldiers in the Bor and Pibor garrisons in Junglei (Upper Nile province), refused orders to move to the North. In response, on May 16th, 1983, Northern troops attacked them. Hundreds of southern commanders and soldiers evacuated Bor and Pibor (mainly Battalions 104 and 105) and regrouped them in Ethiopia as rebel forces (Lesch, 1998; Dhurgon, 1995; Lago, 2019). Soon they were joined by thousands of soldiers, some supporting the reconstituted Anyanya II, but most joining what was to become the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), which was formed and led by Colonel John Garang De Mabior, an officer from the absorbed forces who had deserted to join the rebels Lesch. 1998).

The Dissolution of the Addis Ababa Agreement

Many factors prompted Numayri's dissolution of the Addis Ababa Agreement. When asked why he was abrogating what he had built, his answer was that the "Agreement was neither a Bible nor Qur'an. The Agreement was made by me, a man, and the same man can destroy it for the nations' common good" (Numayri, TV interview Sept 1979).

Iyob and Khadiagala argue in their book *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, that managing the quasi-autonomous governmental institutions in Juba posed more constraints than opportunities for Southern political elites, particularly given the context of administrative inexperience, weak economic resources, and interethnic strife (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 86). Furthermore, although the Addis Ababa arrangements allowed Southerners to govern themselves for the first time, unfortunately the High Executive Council (HEC) brought to the forefront the rivalries that had characterized Southern politics over the years. As the initial semblance of unity dissipated, the Southern political elite embarked on the path of political mobilization along ethnic, sectional, and regional lines (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 86). In his interview on South Sudan TV, Joseph Lago recalled that Numayri took advantage of the South Sudanese politicians'

weaknesses and transformed the HEC into a sub-system of his presidency. He was able to dismiss sitting leaders and appoint new ones at will (Lago, 2019).

From 1972 to 1983, Southern politics revolved around the personalities and ethnic identities of Joseph Lago, an Equatorian and Abel Alier, a Dinka from the Bor section. This factionalism and disunity among the Southerners gave the Northern Sudanese officers the ability to gradually increase control over the southern troops. More provocative still were the orders for the redeployment of Southern units to the North, which increased significantly in the early 1980s. LeRiche and Arnold said these orders began provoking mutinies in the Southern Command, culminating in the May 1983 second mutiny (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p.30).

Aggravating these tensions, during the late 1970s Numayri used his presidential powers to undermine the Agreement's core principles and he effectively abrogated it in June 1983 (Wakoson, 1990) through a re-division of the South. In so doing, he broke Southern Sudan into three smaller regions, each having its capital, thereby undermining a distinct Southern entity (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 30). However, many Southern Sudanese, particularly in the Equatorian area, supported the re-division policy as a method to acquire greater control in the face of growing Dinka dominance and their moving into Juba and other Equatorian areas (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 30).

The failure of the Addis Ababa Agreement was extraordinarily disillusioning, leading to severe ramifications and unfavourable consequences. Although initially, as LeRiche and Arnold argued, the Agreement had been widely supported in the South, over time it failed to significantly improve Southerners' quality of life, which deepened resentments over security and political struggles. This resulted in public dissatisfaction, suspicion and a gradual rejection of the political situation the Agreement had created; southerners were left with a profound contempt for

what was seen as ‘false unity.’ Most would later come to doubt that such unity, however it might be reformed, would be more acceptable than complete independence (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 30). Southerners viewed the relatively quick acceptance of the Agreement, without explicit guarantees of a Southern army and robust international monitoring, as a grave mistake (Koul & Logan, 2019).

Public outrage began to build, and resentments were especially pronounced among Anyanya veterans who in the late 1970s started returning to their prior bush war, hoping to secure South Sudan’s absolute separation from the North. Hence, they formed an armed group and called themselves Anyany II, with the aim of resurrecting the Southern struggle for independence, and a second Sudanese civil war was underway (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013, p. 31).

Chapter Four

“The Path to Southern Independence and a Second Civil War”

The Second Civil War (SPLA/M) 1983 to 2005

The combination of ethnic complexities and negative colonial policies had impacted the growth of a unified Sudanese Nation-state and positioned it to exist in a continuous condition of intrastate conflict. In addition, Sharif Harir and Terje Tvedt wrote in *Short-Cut to Decay*, that in southern Sudan, where ethnic groups as social categories (tribes) were more important than social class, one of the main problems in building a “unified identity” had been ethnic arithmetic; the difficulties in implementing universalistic principles of public policy in the context of persistent ethnic rivalry and conflict (Harir & Tvedt, 1994, p. 47).

This chapter examines the causes of Sudan’s second civil war, and the way in which it was fought (both contenders manipulating it to amplify the friction between ethnicities) causing more conflicts. It will conclude by delving into the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), shedding light on its provisions and how it led to Southern self-determination and ultimately to South Sudan’s secession and independence. In so doing, it also assesses the prospects of Sudanese unity envisioned under the banner of a “New Sudan” offered by Dr. John Garang.¹

Events Leading to the Second Civil War (SPLA/M)

Since its independence in 1956, the Republic of Sudan has been in a state of civil war more often than not. These civil wars had drained economic resources as well as impeding and stopping infrastructural and human development. Many factors have been identified as the leading causes of these recurring civil wars. The chapter will argue that the second civil war (which the

SPLA/M initiated in 1983), resulted from what Azar termed Protracted Social Conflict -- a *built-in conflict mechanism* that would keep the country in a loop of social conflict and constant civil wars. As reviewed in Chapter 1, Azar argued that disputes associated with communal identity and fear of marginalization or loss of collective integrity produce an enduring antagonistic set of perceptions and behaviours (Azar, 1990, p. 15). Apart from the strategies and organizational capabilities of state and communal actors, he concluded that the history of experiences in the conflicts and other interactions among hostile contestants are also responsible for shaping the behavioural characteristics of protracted conflict (Azar, 1990, p. 15).

Politically, the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) was seen as a ground-breaking solution to the North/South conflict, to the extent that Iyob and Khadiagala argued that the agreement was winning acclaim for Numayri as Sudan's Abraham Lincoln. However, in reality, as pointed out in Chapter 3, the AAA had many flaws and loopholes that continued to reflect the profound national power imbalances inherent in the Sudanese state (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 84).

Many factors have been identified by scholars such as Douglas H. Johnson, Andrew S. Natsios, Mathew LeRiche and Mathew Arnold as causes leading to the second civil war. The termination of Abel Alier's government in 1981 indicated the extent of Numayri's manipulation and control of the HEC, and was a prelude to his revoking of the entire Addis Ababa Agreement. The decree Numayri issued dissolving South Sudan's autonomous government allowed him to take complete control of the political affairs and governance in the South. He created three new Southern regions with separate governments and administrations (Equatoria, Bahar al-Gazal and Upper Nile). In doing so, he had isolated the position of the already weakened South Sudan political elites; got rid of those who oppose him; and quickly redrew the South Sudan's map, and in so doing, moved a significant portion of the oil resources to the North. Numayri's intent was

to deprive the Southern government of taking control of their natural resources and controlling their economy. Indicative of the extent of Southern disunity the Vice President of Sudan and former leader of the South Sudan Liberation Movement, as well as other politicians from Equatoria and parts of Bahar al-Gaszal province, who desired more decentralization, supported Numayri's decree, which proclaimed the annulment of the autonomous status of South Sudan Government (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 88). In his book *Sudan, South Sudan and Darfur*, Natsios attributed the proceeding factor to unresolved border demarcation controversies that threatened peace following the Addis Ababa Agreement (Natsios, 2012, p. 59). The order to deploy Battalion 105 stationed in Bor to the North was a clear indication by Numayri that he intended to undermine that key provision of the AAA. That order was rejected by the Commander of the garrison Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, who instead moved the Battalion to Ethiopia, where it joined with others to form the SPLA/M on May 16th, 1983.

Numayri's 1983 abrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement added more fuel to what was an already tense situation. Prior to the abrogation, he had eliminated his "Revolutionary Partners" and replaced them with Muslim fundamentalists. And now, with the support of his new political allies (the Islamic Front of Hassan Alturabi), he declared Sudan to be an Arab-Islamic State (Natsios, 2012, p. 69). Southern Sudanese and other marginalized citizens rejected this declaration and considered it reason enough to pick up guns and rebel against it (Lesch, 1998, p. 21). It is worth mentioning that Anyanya-2 did not score or achieve any victories in their skirmishes against Sudan's two governments. They were not recognized or welcomed by the Ethiopian Government (which was a close ally of Southern Sudan), because Anyanya-2's objective was total separation of the South from Sudan. In any case, the movement did not prevail over an extended period. It was overtaken by SPLA/M, which had more assertive leaders,

with more vigorous objectives that gained them support nationally, regionally and internationally (See Dhurgon, 1995; Johnson, 2003; and Lago, 2019). Although they did not achieve their objectives, history will record Anyanya-2 as a group that kept the revolutionary fire blazing in South Sudan , to be carried on by SPLA/M.

Sought After Objectives of the Civil War

Numayri's declaration of Sudan as an Arab-Islamic state laid bare the acute tension between the proponents of the Arab-Islamic paradigm that had dominated political life in the North since independence and the advocates of "territorial nationalism," who sought to restructure the political system to respect minority rights and create a common political identity. In her book *Sudan: Contested National Identity*, Lesch acknowledged that the Arab communities in Sudan see themselves as first-class citizens; and that anybody else who does not fit or succumb to this principle is viewed as second class citizens (Lesch, 1998; see also Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Lago, 2019 & Dhurgon, 1995). To further inflame the situation, the ruling ethnic nationalists maintained that the majority religion (Islam) and the widespread language (Arabic) should define the country's identity and be expressed in its legal and political system – in short, the country would become Muslim and Arab in identity (Lesch, 1998, p. 21).

Anyanya-2 and Southern Soldiers 1980 – 1983

Although Addis Ababa Agreement had silenced the guns in Sudan and South Sudan, it did not completely solve contentious political problems, nor did it fulfill South Sudanese aspirations and expectations (LeRiche & Arnold, 2013). Instead, it created a new insurgency group composed of opponents to the Addis Ababa Agreement and disgruntled Anyanya-1 soldiers who were not happy with the positions or ranks they were given during the absorption process. They were

joined by other politicians who had remained outside the country because of their low opinion of the Agreement; leaders like Gordon Mortata and Beshir Bandi.

In one of his speeches, Dr. John Garang had pointed out that the absence of an agreed upon collective philosophy and unity among the Anyanya-1 revolutionaries might pose a problem in the future (SPLA, 1985). The split among Anyanya-1 combatants was strong, with some even willing to fight their former comrades in the arms, who refused to endorse the agreement. In spite of this, the AAA was signed, and the SRG was formed. But years later, when Numayri changed gears from being accommodating to assimilating, his guarantee of the Addis Ababa Agreement began to die out. This caused his supporters from the Anyanya-1 guerrilla group to lose the motivation to fight on the government side; and those who had always been skeptical of the agreement confirmed their skepticism (Johnson, 2003, p. 60). Anyanya-2 was established based on that principle “*What is not cooked correctly must go back to fire*”. (Johnson, 2003, p. 60).

Both South Sudan’s autonomous government and the central government in the North considered Anyanya-2 guerrilla fighters to bandits and outlaws. In 1980 and 1981, Johnson confirmed that local people were confused by the guerrillas’ behaviour and were apprehensive about their future. However, that confusion began to change as confrontations between the regional and central government became more frequent and critical (Johnson, 2003, p. 60). Problems in the relationship between the governments in the North and South -- (particularly disputes over the placement of the border), -- worked to the benefit of the guerrillas. In 1980 it allowed some guerrillas to move into the Bentiu district, announcing they had come to protect the oil fields from the Northern government intrusion.

During this time, the Northern government became concerned over guerrilla activities in the South and the positive response they were getting from South Sudanese citizens (Johnson, 2003, p. 61). To prepare for the eventuality of another mutiny or rebellion by Southern troops, the central government increased the number of Northern soldiers sent to the South. The Northern soldiers started committing atrocities against the civilians, killing anyone who was accused of collaborating with guerrillas, raping girls and women, and on many occasions looting the civilian properties, actions not endearing them to the local population.

From 1981 to 1982, the guerrillas initiated direct talks with the police and some military, explaining that their quarrel was not with them but with the North. By 1982 (as Johnson noted in his book), more positive contacts were made with Army officers by one of the most influential guerrilla leaders operating from Ethiopia, Akuot Atem. Atem, a 'Dinka' from Bor district, maintained personal contact with three former Anyanya-1 officers, namely Colonel John Garang, retired Major General William Abdallah Choul and Samuel Gai Tut. Another serving ex-Anyanya-1 officer Major Kerubino Kuanyin Bol, who has been actively fighting Anyanya-2 in Jonglei Province, was in direct contact with Akuot Atem and the other three officers. Johnson concluded that throughout April and May 1983, more and more police and soldiers deserted their units and headed for the bush to join the guerrillas. It needed only the Khartoum government's actions to push all of these groups together into an active anti-Northern alliance (Johnson, 2003, p. 61). Therefore, this paper argues that, even if Anyany-2 did not independently lead the way to Southern Sudan's independence, it did in an important way, pave the road for SPLA/M to takeover leadership in the Second Civil War.

Mutinies of 1983 and the Foundation of SPLA

As stated by Ruth Iyob and Gilbert M. Khadiagala in their book *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, the SPLA/M arose from a convergence of many events, key of which was the inadequate implementation of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Particularly, the slow absorption of the former Anyanya-1 soldiers into the national army, combined with frustration among the absorbed units over non- payment of salaries and lack of facilities and proper training, created resentment among the southern military companies that occasionally erupted in mutinies (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 88). When soldiers of Army Battalion 105 refused the order to move North in January of 1983, Johnson argued that the soldiers did so partly on the basis of their interpretation of the Addis Ababa Agreement --- that they were to only serve in South Sudan (Johnson, 2003; Lago, 2019 and Harir & Tvedt, 1994).

Several South Sudanese politicians attempted to intervene and quiet the situation, people like Dhol Acuil, the former Vice President of HEC, but he was arrested in Khartoum for opposing the division of South Sudan. Also, as noted by Johnson, Dr. John Garang when he was then Head of the Staff College in Omdurman, went to Bor, apparently to mediate. However, as noted by Joseph Lago in his TV interview, Garang was already party to the conspiracy among a number of officers in the Southern Command who had been planning the defection of Battalion 105 to the guerillas (Johnson, 2003, p. 61). Garang took advantage of the government's offensive against Battalion 105 to lead the mutineers into Ethiopia to join the Anyanya-2 rebels, marking what many see as the beginning of Sudan's Second Civil War (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 88).

In July 1983, the SPLM announced in their first manifesto, indicating that their sought after objective was the establishment a "*New Sudan*" based on social, economic and political equality. Importantly, in so doing they renounced the separatist agenda promoted by some of the

Anyanya-2 forces. Johnson, Iyob and Khadiagala and other scholars were of the view that the SPLM under Garang highlighted the importance of a “national context” wherein all Sudanese would be free to develop and express their cultures (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 89).

Furthermore, the SPLM pointed out that the South did not stand alone. It shared common grievances with the West and East of Sudan, and that successive Northern governments had dismissed these grievances by seeking to construct a Sudanese Identity based on the Arabic culture and Islamic religion (Iyob and Khadiagala, 2006, p.89).

The North employed “tribal militias” to aid in its fight with the South

Iyob and Khadiagala described “the wars in the South and currently the West ... [as] ... racial, ethnonational, and religious” (2006, p.65). Looking at the identity of the numerous groups confronting one another in these wars reveals that Sudanese, like other people, forge their alliances not exclusively on prehistoric ties of kinship and religion, but also on coherent calculations of economic wellbeing and maximal utilization of available resources (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 65). Likewise, in South Sudan, it is important to note that despite the conventional belief that all Southerners are united against the Arab-Islamic government in Khartoum, that statement does not reveal the whole truth. Some desperate Southern communities were aligned with the Northern government in opposition to the freedom fighters of SPLA/M, who claimed to represent not only people of the South, but also all the people of Sudan marginalized by the oppressive Khartoum Government (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 65).

Much of the fighting in Sudan’s Second Civil War has been described by external spectators in tribal terms; as Johnson stated, the SPLA was labelled a Dinka army. This meant the tribal opposition was not only against the SPLA, but against Dinka ethnic groups more broadly (Johnson, 2003, p. 67). It is worth mentioning here that anti-Dinka politics had

motivated many people in the Equatoria leadership; Johnson recalled that both Lago and Tumbura were among them. Both leaders had supported the central government in its 1983 attack on Bor; they were very comfortable with the action and commended it as a means of “Downsizing the Dinka Population.” This negative sentiment against the Dinka and Nuer ethnic groups had encouraged the central government in Khartoum (and the regional government in Juba) to manipulate ethnic conflicts in their fight with SPLA.

After the attacks on Bor, Taposa, and Murle, virtually all Dinka Bor men had left to join the rebel movement and the only ones left behind were women, children and cattle. Johnson reported that the government organized a long-range raid and attacked Junglei, killing women, children, elderly and looting Dinka cattle and other live stock. The Dinka had arranged for their defence (supported by the few remaining in the Junglei province police) and repulsed the attack. The bodies of uniformed Toposa police officers were found among the dead, leading to suspicions that the raids against the Dinka Bor civilians had a political motive and was supported by the Equatorian Region government (Johnson, 2003, p. 69). It is argued that the Mundari, who are the closest neighbours to Dinka Bor, were armed by the Regional government under the pretext of defending themselves from SPLA. The national government in Khartoum was also directly involved in supplying arms to the Murle around Pibor for raids against the Dinka and Nuer, from whom the SPLA drew their support.

Furthermore, Johnson stressed that the government strategy of arming tribal militia in the South began under Numayri and was continued under all successive Khartoum governments. Its aims were two-fold -- as propaganda, arguing that the South Sudan war was a product of internal southern tribalism, and therefore unrelated to national policies, and as a way of waging war through surrogates. It enabled successive Khartoum regimes, and even some of their

international allies, to deny the reality of a civil war in Sudan (Johnson, 2003, p. 69). To conclude his argument, Johnson elaborated on the use of the tribal militia and how the practice became a significant factor in the war in the years after Jaafar Numayri.² The Misiriyya and Rizaiqat Baqqara, Murahalin (Militia) of Kordufan and Darfur especially received such support and large well-armed raiding parties of 500 to 1000 men began chasing Dinka Ngok of Abyei into Northern Bahar al-Gazal, where the Abiem Malual and Twic Dinka also came under attack (Johnson, 2003, p. 82). Needless to say, such manipulation of ethnicity added real life experience to elements of distrust that had been imbedded in centuries of tribal interaction and unfortunately carried over to post-independence political interactions.

Consequences of the Second Civil War

Since its independence in 1956, the Republic of Sudan had been involved in civil wars longer than it had been in peace. The Addis Ababa Agreement, ground-breaking as it was in ending the first civil war, ultimately failed in its implementation, leading to yet another. And the second civil war was even more devastating than the first. Bluntly speaking, however, there has never been a winner in civil wars. Losses in human and physical infrastructure are always massive, and it takes years to rebuild and restore what has been destroyed. Sudan's second civil war (as was the case in the first), was fought primarily in the South, and there were tremendous losses in civilian life, estimated at 1.3 million (cited in Sidahmed and Soderlund, 2008, p. 84) and physical infrastructure.

According to Andrew S. Natsios, human losses could be attributed not only to direct death due to combat, but due to famine and war-linked causes such as disease; natural causes such as droughts also contributed to the death toll. Regarding the pattern of fatalities in the second civil war, Natsios argued that the great famine of 1988-1989 was the most visible

humanitarian crisis of that civil War; but it was not the only one. Another regional famine caused by the war took place between 1998 and 1999 -- that famine had killed between 50,000 and 100,000 people (Natsios, 2012, p.77). Natsios further added that the brutal implementation of the four pillars of Sadiq's strategy led to most of these deaths. Sadiq's, and later Omar Beshir's, government used displacement, disease and starvation as weapons of war to kill off the Southern population because they provided the support base for Garang's Army. In the 1990s, when the rebellion spread to the Nuba Mountains in Southern Kordufan, Khartoum's tactics led to the death of between 60,000 to 70,000 people, according to author Julie Flint's estimates (see Natsios, 2012, p. 77). Natsios further cited the American demographer J. Millard Burr, who reported that 1.3 Million Southerners died in the second civil war, most of them civilians (Natsios, 2012, p.78). According to a subsequent study, more than a million people perished between 1993 and 2003. With respect to physical infrastructure, aside from the schools and hospitals that General Ibrahim Abboud built in the early 1960s, there was little to begin with, there was significant destruction. It is worth mentioning that early on most of the clashes between SPLA and SAF were carried in the bush or the countryside. It was not until the late 1990s that Garang changed his tactics and began capturing towns where SAF forces located.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on January 9th 2005, between the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People Liberation Movement, was a historical event for the Republic of Sudan and the people of South Sudan. The agreement was signed in six protocols: The Machakos Protocol, the Power Sharing Protocol, the Wealth Sharing Protocol, the Resolution of Abyei Conflict Protocol, the Resolution of the Conflict in the Two States of Southern Kordufan and the Blue Nile Protocol and the Security Arrangement Protocol. The two sides in the

agreement had faced relentless pressure from the international community to come to an agreement-- in some instances carrot-language was used and in others stick language was resorted to. But finally, the documents were signed, and a peace agreement was declared on January 9th 2005. Unlike the previous AAA, the CPA was facilitated by many countries and organizations. Negotiations were held in Machakos, Kenya, under the supervision of the International Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU and was guaranteed implementation by the United States, Norway, the UK, and the international community. In their comments about the CPA, Andrew S. Natsios hailed the agreement and affirmed that peace would prevail if the Agreement was implemented in letter and spirit (Natsios, 2012).

Dividends of the CPA

Orphaned by the death of Dr. John Garang, the CPA beavered its way slowly but surely through many obstacles and hurdles. After the passing of Garang, the champion of a “New Sudan,” supporters of separation abandoned his objectives and vision of the “New Secular Sudan.” Instead, they worked hard to promote their agenda of partitioning the country, denying the noble call for unification which Garang fought for, and died believing in. The most implemented protocol was the one on power-sharing, which provided South Sudan six years of Transitional Government that would operate with the support of Khartoum Central Government and the international community. The Transitional Government was to maintain security, make the unity of Sudan attractive, and improve South Sudan’s living standard by rebuilding the infrastructure and providing basic needs (see Fadel). Most important of its dividends, the CPA granted South Sudanese the “*Right for Self-determination*” to be decided in a referendum which was to be held in 2010. The results of that referendum were that South Sudanese voted 98% for the session of South Sudan from the North and the establishment of an Impendent Republic of South Sudan.

Notes

1. John Garang sought to unify all Sudanese in a united secular Sudan, which would have created a Sudan that believed in unity, equality, democracy, and one identity. But that dream was short-lived -- ended by Garang's death in 2005.

John Young, in his book *The Fate of Sudan* noted that when Dr. Garang returned from the USA in 1981, fearing his presence in the South, Numayri posted him to the Army General Headquarters in Khartoum with the rank of Colonel, which turned out to be costly mistake. The posting proved an ideal location for plotting, and Garang became head of the Anyanya-1 group, which was absorbed into Sudan's Armed Forces (SAF) (Young, 2012).

2. The use of tribal militias to Khartoum's wars was not limited to the South. Note the use of the notorious "janajweed militias" in the Darfur conflict (Sidahmed, et al., 2008).

Chapter Five

“Life Experiences in Creating and Maintaining Isolated Identities.”

This chapter will discuss the roles of various “Socialization Agents” in creating and maintaining what I have termed “Isolated Identity Groups” in South Sudan -- a prime factor underlying an unparalleled record of civil strife. The discussion is based mainly on the author’s personal experiences growing up and living in South Sudan from 1959 to 1984 – twenty-five formative years that saw conflict, peace and a return to civil war.

Socialization is found in all communal interactions, such as in families, schools, political parties and social groupings – collectively, these are referred to as socialization agents. While socialization begins within the family unit, Frances M. Deng has pointed out that society in Southern Sudan is fragmented, composed of many tribes -- 64 in number (Deng, 1995, p. 185), and we argue that these tribes are central to the region’s socialization process. Each tribal group observes different cultural norms, religious beliefs, and traditions. Moreover, historically, no one identity group (North or South) has been able to unify South Sudanese society to establish a “national identity.” In fact, except for geographical proximity, it was “others” who identified peoples in the region as “South Sudanese.” Thus, even to address a people as “South Sudanese” created a false sense of identity because imbedded in that generalization were many isolated and different ethnic groups, each with its own ethnic identity.

In South Sudan, it has been pointed out that it does not take just one family to raise a child -- instead, it takes a whole community. And that community, without a doubt, is composed mainly of people of the same ethnicity (tribe). Hence both family and tribe play complementary roles in imparting cultural norms to a given individual as he or she grows up and walks proudly with the identity given to him or her.

The Family

The family plays an integral role in an individual's upbringing by teaching values, traditions, customs and culture. Growing as a young 'Monyjang' (male child), I learned 85 to 90 percent of my social skills from my father when going with him to the farm, hunting or fishing. The rest of the 10 to 15 percent can be attributed to the tribe's behaviour, and "agemates" (peer group friends)- experiences learned outside the home. My father and his younger brother (my uncle), when going hunting, always asked me to carry their spears. The number of the spears usually ran between five to ten, depending on what animal we wanted to bring home -- an antelope, a gazelle, or a deer. I found holding the spears to be something amazing and unique, especially when walking in the bush. It helped build my confidence to become a breadwinner (bringing meat home at the end of the day) or to be a family protector in case of an attack from enemies. My father and uncle taught me how to walk like a warrior, act like a warrior and be a great hunter. The time I enjoyed most was after the supper meal, when all the family members, including my grandfather and grandmother, would sit around the fire. My grandmother would tell us stories about the 'Dinka' tribe and how great warriors they were. Then my grandfather would dispute her, saying, "We are not 'Dinka' - that is not the name God gave us. The Turks are the ones who named us 'Dinka,' but the real name God gave us was "Monyjang" (Mony = Husband or a Man – Jang" = People" - (including the non-Dinka).

Many of my contemporaries did not make it to school. I was fortunate because my father worked for the ministry of Civil Infrastructural Engineering under the central government in Khartoum. He was transferred to Malakal, where I started my elementary and secondary school education. At age six and a half, I was able to see Arab merchants and Arabs kids for the first time. Because we lived at the same compound, they became my friends. Even though we played

together, I always received a lecture from my parents and my uncle when I get back home about how I must not forget I am “Monyjang.” I have to be careful when I am playing with Arabs kids because they abduct our kids and sell them into slavery. My friendship with these Arab kids did not go particularly well. There were language differences; I only spoke Dinka, and they only knew the Arabic Language. So we played together, but with few words, inferior communications sometimes led to misunderstandings and anger.

Tribal Culture

Sixty-four ethnics groups inhabit South Sudan. Each group has their unique cultural norms and traditional process to bring up their children. Nuer and Shilluk, for example, raise their children similarly to the Dinka and other Nilotic tribes who are cattle keepers. There are minor differences that emerge when the children of this Nilo group reach adolescence and early manhood. The difference is how they mark their children's forehead with the unique markings that make each ethnic group identifiable. These marks vary in shape and size. The Nuer and Dinka Agar, for example, cut rounded lines on their forehead, the Dinka cut eight of these lines, and the Nuer cut six lines, depending on their subsection of the Nuer ethnic group. The marks of the Shilluk are cut in a dotted shape. Cut along the forehead, sometimes reaching twelve dots or more, depending on the subsection of the Shilluk ethnic group. The Nilotic and some Bantus of South Sudan are easily noticeable by their marks on the forehead, or the number of teeth intentionally pulled out.

The tribal fragmentation characteristic of South Sudan is based on natural land features and economic activities that have influenced patterns of traditional settlement and social organization pre-dating colonization. Some of these tribes had been given names, reflecting a broader sense of identity than characteristic of peoples who were loosely connected in cultural terms but otherwise not organized as different groups. Deng argued that Southern Sudanese culture's most striking

feature is the extent to which the cattle economy dominated the lives of Nilotic people, who are numerically the most dominant groups in the region. As Deng pointed out, the day-to-day lives of the Dinka and Nuer peoples are intensely connected to the “cow economy” -- the animal being a veritable god. In addition, both the Dinka and Nuer peoples are incredibly conservative and very proud of their civilizations.

Personally, growing up as a Dinka “city boy,” one had to balance one’s lifestyle between the city (where the immediate family members lived) and the cattle camp (where the culture, values and traditions of a Dinka young person were meticulously taught). This voyage to the cattle camp is a compulsory part of growing up, and it happens once schools are closed for the summer leave or during the dry season when the cattle are brought closer to permanent dwelling areas. In the cattle camps, the government played a limited role because within the ethnic group, disputes were rare, and if they happened, they were resolved by elders. Chiefs and veterinary officials were the most visible government representatives known to the group at the cattle camp. Cattle camp groups were divided based on their age and gender, and children developed a sense of belonging that remained intact through their lifetimes. Even when one moved to the city (or elsewhere, nationally or internationally), he or she would still remember and be remembered by the name given to their group during the process of attaining “manhood or womanhood.”

Unlike a child brought up in South Sudan, children raised in communities in the North (those specifically in Arab and Islamic areas) were brought up based on Arabic and Islamic values. The central government in the North participated directly in teaching these values through the schools, national media (radio and television) by airing Islamic programs and reading verses of the Qur’an at prayer times. The Mosques in northern Sudan also played an influential role in the community that impacted the upbringing of Northern children. In general, it takes a family and an

ethnic community to raise a child in South Sudan. However, in the North, it takes a family, a Muslim community, and the government to teach cultures and educate children,

The Central Government and the Resolution of Tribal Conflicts

Government intervention in simple intra-ethnic conflicts is not needed. As John Wuol Makac mentioned in his book *The Customary Law of the Dinka People of Sudan*, the tribes of South Sudan (the Nilotic tribes in particular) do not rely on the government to solve their internal problems (Makac, 1988, p. 17). Each tribe has their chiefs or kings. The Azande tribes of Western Bahar al-Gazal had a king (whose position now is symbolic), but he presides over tribal courts; his position is maintained by the Ministry of Local Government and Law Enforcement of Western Bahar al-Gazal State. The same prevails with Shilluk King or the “Reith” These individuals represent the higher authority within the ethnic group. Johnson noted that the judicial power of these chiefs and kings in South Sudan was confined to certain aspects of customary laws and that the British District Commissioner supervised their administrative work (Johnson, 2003, p. 12). Should there be a conflict between what the District Commissioner ordered and what the tribe believed was the correct policy, there was a question as to which order would be obeyed.

I had the privilege of witnessing the “*Gadiang Conflict Resolution Conference*” in 1980 between the Dinka Bor, Anyuak and the Mourle Ethnic groups (all in Jonglei State) on the one hand, and the Tapossa of Eastern Equatoria, on the other hand.¹ Several issues were on the table, from child abduction, cattle raiding to border and marriage issues. The order for this conference was issued by the “High Court” in Juba, South Sudan and facilitated by the Regional Government of South Sudan (SRG). Government officials were told that their presence was not needed. Dinka Bor Chief Kual Anyieth stated that government “Judgements” were always biased and influenced by its relationship to tribes with more people working for the Government. In addition, chiefs from

other provinces (Equatoria and Bahar al-Gazal) had been invited to help solve the conflict between the tribes in Upper Nile.

It was my conclusion that the government was often not trusted by the tribes. Orders and instructions from the government had to be channelled through chiefs or other tribal authorities, which the Turkiyya and Anglo-Egyptian Condominium did during their Administration of South Sudan. They set up tribal courts composed of local leaders and gave them full authority to judge the issues relevant to the ethnic group and fine and jail criminals, including the power to adjudicate murder cases. John Makac mentioned in his book that most of the murder or killing occurred during intra-ethnic conflicts. The only time the government became involved in local criminal issues was when a person was sentenced to jail; because the government was the sole authority controlling the prisons.

Schools (Christian Missionaries)

Education, in general, was not a priority during the Turko-Egyptian rule in Sudan. As stated earlier, the Ottoman Empire's interest in Sudan focused on slaves, animal products and other natural resources. Although the British were keen about educating Sudanese, as Heather J. Skarky stated in her book *Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, as they did elsewhere, the British relied on Christian Missionary Schools to train young men for employment. But in the case of Sudan, to avoid offending the Muslim elite, they placed the colonial government in the North in charge of the type of education they needed to staff their public services -- clerks, accountants, teachers and engineers. Like institutions elsewhere in Africa—including Sadigi College in Tunisia, Makerere College in Uganda, Ecole William Ponty in Senegal, and Fourah Bay College in Sierra Leone -- the British authorities established Gordon College

(currently the University of Khartoum) in 1902 for that purpose. Gordon College served not only as a training ground for the bureaucracy but as a cradle of nationalism (Sharky, 2003, p. 7).

As far as South Sudan was concerned, the British believed southern society needed to be protected from the Muslim North, whose traders had preyed upon the South in the nineteenth-century slave trade. As outlined in Chapter 3, the British applied isolationist policies (the Closed Border Ordinance). While they entrusted the colonial government in Khartoum with educational development in the North, this was not the case in the South, where they gave underfunded Christian Missionary groups full authority over education. Whether the British education policy in the South was meant to educate southerners (or keep them entirely in the dark) remains a subject of discussion among academic scholars.

Johnson and Sharky, in their assessments of the issue of inequality in education, stated that during the colonial era, in both the North and the South, those to be educated were male. Females had no place at Gordon College, nor was education providing basic literacy easily accessible to girls throughout the colonial period (Sharky, 2008, p. 8). Nevertheless, as Johnson pointed out, educational needs were much more limited in the South. Before WWI, the colonial government in Khartoum declared that it needed only a few educated blacks to fill minor clerical positions in the South. The first of these groups came from the sons of soldiers rather than from the local population. The colonial government invested very little in education in the South, leaving it entirely in the hands of religious bodies. The result was Khalwas (kindergartens), serving Muslim urban communities and Christian Missions which operated irregularly in the rural areas and far off settlements (Johnson, 2003, p. 15). Moreover, as Johnson pointed out, the policy of the Native Administration adopted in 1920 tended to discourage rather than encourage education in some areas of Southern Sudan, predominantly rural areas.

My personal experience as an urban city boy who reached the age of enrolment to primary school (typically six years old) was complicated. There was no missionary school in Malakal, the town where I lived; however, a Catholic School accepted younger student and taught them how to read and write the English Language (no Mathematics was introduced). The other obstacle was that the school was located in a small village of “Tonja” 21 miles away from Malakal. It was not a boarding school, and there was no bus.

My father was once again transferred from Malakal to Renk. However, Renk belonged to the “Padang” section of the Dinka tribe. They were very close to the North, and that created a mixed culture of Arabic/Dinka, with the Arabic dominant culture. In Renk, there were several Islamic mosques, but no Christian churches. My father decided to send my uncle, my Mom and I back to Malakal where I was forced to enter Islamic pre-school for one and half years before I was admitted into first-year of primary school. Thus, I was enrolled in Islamic school and started from ‘Khalwa,’ where I had to memorize two introductory books to the Quraan [Juzu Aama and Juzu Tubarak]. Each book took six months to finish. By the time we were done, final exams were composed of reciting the two books from memory; then, there was dictation in the Arabic language. These two hurdles had to be passed before one was allowed to enter regular first-year primary school.

Grading involved a most exciting process. A raffle system was devised whereby a small piece of paper was rolled up according to the number of the students in the class. That pieces of paper were then put in a jar. On these papers, they wrote “Pass” or “Fail.” It is worth mentioning here that there were only two primary schools in Malakal, and there were five Khalwas. Each Khalwa could bring only fifteen students forward to the first year. We had fifty-three students in

our Khalwa. It took me two years to move up from the Khalwa because I kept picking “Fail” paper from the raffle jar.

My father was once again transferred from Malakal to Renk. I would have never been able to go to school, but luckily, my cousin got married, and her husband had graduated from the “Tonj” technical school and was transferred to Malakal to work as a clerk in the city council. He took me to the assistant commissioner of education and demanded that I be enrolled in the government public school. The number of students whose parents transferred to Malakal in that year 1968 was thirty-five. After a serious discussion between the Education Commissioner (who happened to be from the North and the District Commissioner who was also from the North), they decided to open a “second shift” set of classes for us, starting school after ‘Arabs’ pupils finished at 2:00 pm.

In 1969, I was supposed to be promoted to the second year, but the May revolution led by General Numayri took place, and as a gift from him to South Sudanese, he opened additional primary and junior secondary schools in all three provinces of Juba, Malakal and Wau. However, he attached the condition that these schools must follow the Arabic pattern, meaning all the subjects must be taught in Arabic, and that Islamic prayer times must be observed. All students enrolled in those schools were required to pray irrespective of their religious beliefs. Many parents who were not Muslim removed their kids from school. I, however, remained in the school and was promoted to junior secondary school. In 1973 my parents moved from Malakal to Tonj in Bahar al-Gazal province. I finished my senior secondary school at the Renk Senior Secondary there. I was denied entrance to Khartoum University in 1978 and instead recruited as a tax collector in 1979.

Churches

Sudan's three religious beliefs are African traditional, Christianity and the dominant religion Islam, representing 70 percent of the total population. In South Sudan, before secession, Christianity represented 25 percent of the population. In comparison, African traditional and animist beliefs, according to Sikianga, Robert O. Collins, Din, & Alshahi, 2021, in their article “*Sudan*,” a small percentage (about 5 percent) of the Sudan population follow traditional and animist religion, mostly in the Nuba Mountains. It worth mentioning here that the church in South Sudan has a long history connected to the Ancient Nubia. The latter, according to John Makac, was the first to bring Coptic Christianity to South Sudan. During the colonial period, the Anglican church and Catholic missionaries assigned to the Diocese in Sudan had been granted the right to build cathedrals in all the three provinces of South Sudan (Makac, 1988, p. 35).

This chapter argues that although Sudan was ruled under the British colonial system, the British did not attempt to alter or inhibit the popular religion of the masses in the North, which was Islam. It is to be noted that when the British came to Sudan, they had Egypt as their partners, and Egypt has one of the largest mosques in the Islamic World, built by Omar Ibn al Aze during the period of Islamic expansion era after the death of Prophet Muhammed. Peace be upon him. However, Britain concentrated its efforts to Christianize Southern Sudanese who were not Muslim but instead followed traditional African religious practices.

Although the “animists” in South Sudan share some common elements of religious beliefs, at the same time, each ethnic group has its indigenous religion. Virtually all of South Sudan’s traditional African religions share the concept of a high spirit or divinity, usually a creator God. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, the “Earthly” and the “Heavenly” (visible and invisible) exist as two concepts of the universe. The astral world is seen as being populated by spiritual beings whose function is to serve as intermediaries or messengers of God. In the case of the Nilotic

peoples, these spirits are identified with their ancestors. The supreme deity is the object of rituals using music and dance (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2020).

Peer Groups and Sports Teams

Geography and the nature of South Sudan have effectively impacted the physiological appearance and body construction of Southern Sudanese, which are considered one determinant of athletic excellence. The Nilotic (Dinka, Nuer, Shilluk and Lowu) are famous for the high jump, basketball, volleyball and spear throwing. Bentos and other equatorial ethnics groups are well-known as sprinters, body-builders, football players (i.e., soccer), boxing, and other martial arts. Most if not all these skills and athletic abilities are acquired through school and private athletic clubs.

There are many well known football teams in Sudan and South Sudan. The most popular ones are the Marieke (Planet Mars) and the Hilal (Moon Crescent). These two teams do not have ethnic borders. Soccer is the only sport that brings all the Sudanese together, irrespective of where they hailed from or what religion they believed. However, even in football, sometimes politics was indirectly evoked during football matches, especially between the North and South. Most South Sudanese cheer for the “Mariekh football team,” a majority of their players are from the East, West and South Sudan and are mainly “Africans.” The majority of Hilal Football Team players are from the Central and North Sudan; very few blacks are Muslim.

Southerners dominate in basketball, which is not as popular as football. However, the national team is controlled by the Ministry of Youth and Sports of both Governments and is consistently underfunded -- it is appreciated but not loved. Most of my colleagues and school mates played basketball, but my favourite sports were boxing and weightlifting, and I was able to represent my school in two tournaments where I brought home “Bronze” in one match in 1977 and “Gold” in weight-lifting in 1978, the year of my graduation from Senior Secondary School.

Political Parties (The SPLM)

The Sudan People Liberation Movement is the only civilian-military party that has adopted the establishment of a unified secular Sudan as its goal, a strategy that its founders claimed would address all the matters of nationalism and develop Sudan's multicultural identity. As Joseph Lago articulated in his interview, this strategy had gained SPLM sympathy and support from many Sudanese citizens. However, and most importantly, it could have unified most of the sixty-four ethnic groups of South Sudan after a long time in disagreements and self-centredness.

Iyob and Khadiagala, in their book *Sudan: The Elusive Quest for Peace*, argued that there was a series of political fractures that characterized radical southern Sudanese political movements before SPLM/A achieved success in its military campaign. In July 1967, Aggrey Jaden founded the Southern Sudan Provincial Government (SSPG). A rival group, the Nile Provisional Government (NPG), was formed in 1969 to oppose Jaden (SSPG) (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 82). Yet another faction formed, the Anyidi Revolutionary Government in July of 1969, presumably to provide more military muscle and organization to the rebellion. In addition, there was dissatisfaction within the leadership of the Anyanya (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 821). Within Bahar al-Gazal and Upper Nile, there were the Southern Sudanese Political Association (SSPA), the Sudan African Congress (SAC, and Sudan African National Union (SANU). There was a fourth party in Upper Nile, the Sudanese People Federal Party (SPFP), and all the above and other parties were dissatisfied with the leadership of the Anyanya (Iyob & Khadiagala, 2006, p. 821). To strengthen his position and exercise more control. Joseph Lago formed a breakaway faction, The Anyanya National Organization (ANO). It should be noted that Iyob and Khadiagala argued that in-fighting among the Southern rebel movements predicted the split within SPLA/M that was witnessed in the late 1980s and 1990s. In short, the conflict that developed among South

Sudan's political elite post-2011 should not have come as a surprise – there was ample warning that South Sudanese politics was fractious.

However, after the Addis Ababa Agreement and the formation of SRG, most of the political parties in Sudan and South Sudan became redundant. Numayri's establishment of the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU) had eclipsed all the political parties, forcing other leaders to flee the country. Currently, there are over 27 political parties in South Sudan. Out of this number, only 15 parties are registered, but some are categorized as defunct. Salva Kiir leads the SPLM mainstream; SPLM/IO, SPLM/DC, SPLM/FM are the main parties in the new revitalized Government of National Unity in South Sudan.

Mass Media

South Sudan's Mass Media is underdeveloped. The issues of technical know-how, poor transportation, corruption, and mismanagement are all factors that impede the progress of mass media in the country. Although the government has an impressive set of media outlets, ranging from radio, television, newspapers to news agencies and the internet, they are still lagging in service delivery.

A few years ago, South Sudan was able to acquire a channel on the "Arabsat" satellite. With satellite technology being available and accessible, the country could air daily news and other programs such as children's shows, religious and arts programs that could promote the idea of "unity as one nation and one people." Recently, the Khartoum government, after mediating the South-South conflict, offered to lend the South Sudan Broadcasting Commission (SSBC) technical assistance to improve its service delivery.

It is worth mentioning here that the availability of the satellite has helped tremendously in the development of networks and telephone services. It has also attracted many telephone

companies such as Zein, Sudatel and others to invest in South Sudan telephone services. With the development of these modern communications and technological services, South Sudan will not forever remain an isolated island in an ocean of ignorance and neglect. It is no longer a myth that the world has become a small village and that the vehicle to that simplicity was the development of social media, such as the internet, facebook and youTube. In South Sudan today, a pastoralist who has never seen a mobile phone aside from a motorola satellite phone can sell one of his or her cows, purchase a 3G Samsung or iPhone handset and communicate with relatives on the other side the world. As is widely known, communication is power, and with the power of mass media in hand, it is easy to circulate any new information at a minute's notice. Events like political unrest, tribal conflicts and other crimes against helpless nations worldwide can no longer be hidden. These events now could effortlessly and publicly be announced, which would alert the international community to quickly intervene and abate catastrophes such as famine, flood, or genocide.

Entertainment (Popular Music)

Sudan was once Africa's largest country and was inhabited by over 500 different ethnic groups. Within these ethnic groups were embedded a mosaic of Arabic and African cultures, which makes it challenging to tell where one culture ends and the other one begins. When Sudan and South Sudan were still one country, many areas such as music, cultural dance, and even some lyrics and poetry caused many controversies and disagreements because of the Islamic orientation of the state. Government laws and restrictions complicated the relationship between the government and the entertainment industries.

Still, music festivals were being held, attended by many spectators and music lovers. Many well-known musicians, such as Muhammed Wardi, Salah Ibn Albadia, Alkably and Abu Araki Albakhiet, gained fame -- the list is very long (Editorial, World Music Network, 2014). It is worth

mentioning that some of these patriotic performers, songs writers and singers paid the ultimate price with their lives, some were jailed, and others fled the country. But the spirit of music was never defeated. Nor was the Government able to eliminate popular culture because people are culture, and culture is life.

Before the secession of the South, as stated earlier, one could not draw a line between music influenced by Afrobeats or Arabic Sudanic style. Many locally made musical instruments were popular in both North and South Sudan, for example, “Tamhour,” which is a type of ‘Lyre.’ Also, the “Lude” is very popular in Northern Sudan, played by Northern Ethnic groups, as well as the Bagarra in Western Sudan. Other instruments such as the violin, various horns and the accordion were adopted after World War II. The electric guitar arrived in Sudan in the sixties, as well as musical influences from Jimmy Hendrix and the jazz legend Santana. The electric keyboard came in the 1980s (Editorial, World Music Network, 2014), and Sudanese musicians mixed traditional styles with modern music composing.

In the South, the story was different. At the same time as the war with the SPLA intensified, the Khartoum government destroyed all the recorded valuable and important Southern cultural artifacts-- that included wiping out all the tapes of famous musicians of South Sudan -- singers like James Fataki, Steven Deng Deng, the Dinka Aweil group and many others. Following independence, South Sudan had to start from scratch to build what the war had destroyed in terms of arts, music and culture.

The new South Sudanese music generation began the process by introducing all kinds of music, from classical to pop and highlife music, to reggie and hip hop. “Grandfather” music bands like Jeel Jaz Band, Rejaff Band, Fashuda Jaz Band, and many others are being revitalized. New music and new songs are being introduced. The flamboyant mosaic of Arabic and African culture

is heard on Radio and Television in South Sudan, addressing many social issues, the most important of which is teaching the lost nation of South Sudan a new meaning of nationhood and the values of a unified people. Their message is loud and clear “We stood together to liberate our country, let us stand together again to create a unified identity.” Magok is a young South Sudanese poet from the “Dinka Agar” ethnic group -- here is one of his songs:

“Cinko bai Ku Dutko Ruot” [“Let us live in the country and unite ourselves”]

Ee pan cuk thor wa kuhk,

Ee pan cuk lweil ni rimkua

Achie pan cathor ni akuhk

En e beir cuar piny hu waj ni achouk

Palku tong Ku rerku, ecin nuer, ju cin shiluk

Translation of Lyrics:

It is the country; with our arms, we fought for it

We paid our blood as a ransom for our freedom

Is this not the land you fought for and get it

Now you throw it down, and with your feet, you kick it

Let us castoff fighting and stay together, with no Nuer, No Shilluk

But one South Sudan, tied down by love

Conclusion

“Post-Independence Conflict in South Sudan: A “Lost Vision” and Lack of a Unified Southern Political Identity”

Since its Independence in 1956, the Republic of Sudan has been involved in constant civil wars that have killed at over a million people, and displaced 4 to 5 million more, crippled the country economically and developmentally and led to the breakaway of South Sudan. The causes of these civil wars have been attributed to many factors, which we argue in this paper can be summed up into “grievance” and “identity” conflicts. As the analysis of Dr. Edward Azar pointed out, grievances as a result of depriving others of receiving equal government services and wealth sharing or shared authority, often leads to communal dissatisfaction resulting in civil conflict -- and this is clearly the case with respect to Sudan. The political elites and subsequent governments in the North of the country abandoned their moral responsibility towards South Sudan and other marginalized areas. They carried on with their selfish, egocentric idea of “Islamization” and “Arabization” that generated conflict and eventually led to the separation of South Sudan in 2011.

In addition, due to factors such as geography, isolation and demographics, plus colonial government (and post-independence Sudanese government) policies which worked to foster separation and isolation, the South (as a whole), never developed a unified “National Identity” of its own. Beyond the basic recognition that the South was fundamentally different from and was treated both unequally and unfairly by the North, a common bond strong enough to bring together a significant variety of ethnic groups as a “nation” did not develop.

It is important to note that the separation of South Sudan was not the sole idea of people living in the South; some Northerners as well were not happy with the idea of partitioning the

country and worked for unification along with those in the South led by John Garang. However, after the death of Dr. Garang in 2005, opponents of a united secular Sudan worked hard to make the envisioned “Attractive Unity” that Garang envisioned “Unattractive” (see Fadel 2012). In addition, differences within the South, based on region, tribe and religion, continued to hinder the development of a unified Southern identity strong enough to sustain a “national” government. Added to the aforementioned government policies (under both colonial and independent governments) reviewed in Chapters 3 and 4, socialization agents (primarily family and tribe) as discussed in Chapter 5, perpetuated differences *both* between the South and North *and* between tribal groups in the South. Thus neither the “Unity of Sudan,” nor the unity of the new nation of South Sudan had a bed-rock of attitudinal support in the South.

On the issue of a possible “United Sudan,” in spite of great respect for Dr. John Garang, as reviewed in Chapter 3, given that that the union of Sudan resulted from a brutal conquest, at least from the time of the problem-filled Sudanese independence from Britain in 1956, combined with the arrogation of the Addis Ababa Agreement (which might have saved the idea of unity of one nation), that outcome has to be seen as a “lost vision” – one that was highly unlikely to be achieved. But the question remains: Why, after all that had been achieved in the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, did the new country of South Sudan born in 2011, fail to emerge from Protracted Social Conflict?

We have argued repeatedly in this paper that it was in the interests of both colonial regimes and post-independence governments to maintain a fragmented and isolated society in the South. These policies were successful and had consequences. Indeed, as reported in Chapter 4, the second civil war was as much a civil war between tribes in the South as it was a war between the armed forces of the South and North. The manipulation of tribal differences (and Southern

political leaders) to create intra-South hostilities was very much a part of Northern strategy in the war – *and it worked*. South Sudan, as born in 2011, was a textbook example of what *New York Times*' Columnist Thomas Friedman has described as a “Tribes with Flags” type of country (Friedman, 2011, Mar. 23).

As the central theme of this research paper, we have argued that the multi-ethnicity that characterized Sudan and the inequality that some groups faced in the distribution of power and resources were the primary factors leading to the conflict between North and South Sudan. But let us examine more closely the situation in the South.

Truth be known, as is the case with many other countries in the underdeveloped world that relied heavily on ethnicity to survive, conflicts between tribes in South Sudan are a fact of life. In South Sudan's case, the starting point of the conflict between Dinka and Nuer can be found in competition for grazing areas and cattle raiding. These conflicts are well-documented in the historical record. After the separation of the South, the Northern government continued to manipulate these conflicts and politicized them for their benefit.

Also as argued earlier, single ethnic group hegemony (in this case Dinka), created much resentment among the tribes who felt disadvantaged, resulting in each group arming itself, with some declaring war against the government. By doing this, they felt that if a settlement or agreement was reached (or if a pardon was given to them), they could gain a position of power within the government. As well, lack of knowledge as to how the newly independent country would be ruled, exacerbated the situation and caused more chaos. As was the case with the Southern Regional Government in the 1970s following the Addis Ababa Agreement, disunity and conflict did not take long to resurface. In what was to turn out to be a dysfunctional national government, the ruling political elite in the South never really gained control of the situation. An

election was conducted in the hope that a parliamentary government would resolve a host of problems. However, following the election, the elected President did not resign his military rank; that in itself was a recipe for trouble.

Yet another factor that led the young country to plunge into renewed conflict in 2013 was interference from the North – including the significant military support tribal militia groups received from the Northern government. Following past practice, the Northern government had succeeded in destabilizing South Sudan’s government and blocked progress, not only by supporting rebel groups, but also by infiltrating the Southern government through the (NCP) party members who were given sensitive positions within the government of South Sudan.

Where do things stand at present? The Republic of South Sudan is now 10 years old. There are signs of political reform in the North and the old political elite in the South will be passing into history. Could it be that a new political leadership can emerge in the South that will take seriously Magok’s advice: “Let us cast off fighting and stay together, with no Nuer, No Shilluk. But one South Sudan, tied down by love.” We can but hope for this outcome.

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