A comparative study of Chinese foreign policy restructuring.

Lizhu. Zhang
University of Windsor

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A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY RESTRUCTURING

By
Lizhu Zhang

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
1993

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ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY RESTRUCTURING

Lizhu Zhang

This thesis focuses on foreign policy changes over the forty-five year history of the People's Republic of China, attempts to explain these changes, and explores a model that analyzes China's foreign policy and predicts tendencies for further transition.

The analytic framework incorporates Kal J. Holsti's foreign policy restructuring model, focusing on a particular type of foreign policy change - restructuring. This is the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation's pattern of external relations. Holsti believes that the impetus for foreign policy restructuring is often a response to a threat - but not always a military threat. The threats of the modern era contain cultural, informational and economic components.

China has experienced such foreign policy restructuring four times. The patterns of its external relations have changed from the 1950s' pro-Soviet dependence to the 1960s' isolation, and then from the 1970s' Sino-U.S. anti-Soviet strategic partnership to the 1980s' non-alignment diversification. Conforming to Holsti's hypothesis, China's foreign policy restructuring has taken place when the decision-makers perceived domestic or external threats to national security, independence and development - the basic goals that have always been considered the most important to Chinese policy-makers.

However, where China's foreign policy restructuring goes beyond
the Holsti model is that threat is not the only explanation for such restructuring. Advantageous opportunity is also an impetus for policy restructuring.

The findings of this thesis also suggest that China's foreign policy restructurings are closely related to its internal affairs. Domestic political crises, economic vulnerability and the state's development strategy have had an important influence on foreign policy restructuring. Aside from the domestic determinants, peripheral threats and boundary issues have been more likely to become the catalyst of foreign policy reorientations. The changing character of the international system and the Sino-Soviet-American triangle during the Cold War era have been key guiding determinants of foreign policy reorientation.

In contrast, personality has been, in general, not a decisive factor. This was so because the external and domestic constraints usually did not give the leadership much leeway to put personal stamp on foreign policy reorientations. Furthermore, post-Mao era has seen an emphasis on economic determinants in foreign policy, idiosyncratic factors being even less influential.

Ideology has also not been a predominant determinant in decision-making. Instead, it has been changeable in accordance with the need of policy-makers and adaptive to circumstances. Even in strongly ideological periods, ideological concerns never ignored national interests. Furthermore, the influence of orthodox Communist ideology has gradually decreased with the changes within China and in the outside world in the 1980s.
To all my friends in the Chinese Foreign Service.

Your unwavering efforts have contributed to the opening of China to the outside world.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to the Department of Political Science in the University of Windsor for enriching my knowledge of political science as a challenging academic discipline. In writing this thesis, I undoubtedly benefited tremendously from the dedicated and constructive tutorials as well as the outstanding academic sagacity of the professors from whom the author took the courses.

I am particularly grateful to Professor Bruce Burton. As my thesis supervisor as well as the instructor of three courses I took, he has all along been very patient, helpful and supportive in helping me to overcome initial language difficulties and to adapt to a very different educational system.

A special thank you goes to my second reader, Professor Akira Kubota, who has provided me with important additional insights and suggestions.

I am also indebted to Professor Lam for the helpful and constructive comments he has given to me. His knowledge and direct experience of China was particularly useful in this study. Furthermore, it goes without saying that I owe a debt of gratitude to all those cited in the footnotes as well as in the bibliography.

On a personal note, I wish to thank the graduate class for their friendship and encouragement – in particular, Taylor, Gurbeen and James. A warm thank you must also go to my parents, whose support is always appreciated.
Finally, as an appraisal of one and a half years' study in the University of Windsor, I present this graduate thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science. Any errors of fact or interpretation in this thesis are exclusively my own.
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ROMANIZATION OF CHINESE NAMES

The romanized spelling of Chinese names has not been completely standardized. This thesis uses the most common system. In order to avoid the confusion of various spellings of the names of key figures, the alternative spelling is shown below together with the spelling used in the thesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In this thesis</th>
<th>Alternate spelling</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mao Tse-tung</td>
<td>Mao Zedong</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhou En-lai</td>
<td>Chou Enlai</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liu Shao-qi</td>
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<td>Peng Teh-Huai</td>
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<td>Lin Piao</td>
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<td>Deng Xiao-ping</td>
<td>Teng Hsiao-ping</td>
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</table>
Preface

The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China\(^1\) (PRC) throughout its history is characterized by dramatic changes. In the past four decades, China has gone through four foreign policy transitions as its patterns of external relations has been completely changed. As a student of international relations in China (1981 - 1985) and a civil servant in the Chinese foreign service (1985 - 1989), the author was fortunate to witness and experience the state's foreign policy transition throughout the 1980s. Fascinated by this intriguing process, the author has chosen as the subject of the thesis inquiry China's foreign policy transitions.

This thesis focuses on the dramatic foreign policy changes in the history of the People's Republic of China, attempts to explain these changes and explore a model that analyzes China's foreign policy and predicts tendencies for further transition. The analytic framework employed in this thesis is Kal J. Holsti's foreign policy restructuring model, because it focuses on the dramatic, wholesale change of a nation's foreign policy, which suits the Chinese case.

Chapter One introduces the framework of this thesis. It explains why Holsti's model is chosen as the thesis framework,

\(^1\)The People's Republic of China, established in 1949, hereinafter will be called "China", referring only to Communist China.
lays out the theoretical hypotheses of Holsti's model and his
analytic framework, appraises this model, and shows how it would be
applied in the Chinese case study.

Chapter Two examines China's first foreign policy restructuring
(Restructuring I). This restructuring paralleled the establishment
of the PRC in 1949, ending in 1950, when Chinese military
involvement in Korean War finally confirmed its pro-Soviet, anti-
American orientation.

Chapter Three focuses on Restructuring II which started in 1958
when the Sino-Soviet dispute emerged. This period was completed by
1962 when the Sino-Indian war signalled that China had entered an
era of isolation.

Chapter Four describes Restructuring III. It started in 1969,
when the Sino-Soviet border war broke out, and China sent messages
to the United States. By 1972, China had improved its relationship
with the United States and both countries had built up a strategic
partnership in their anti-Soviet front.

Chapter Five gives an evaluation of China's most recent foreign
policy restructuring (Restructuring IV). The fourth restructuring
started in 1978 when the open-door policy was first unveiled. This
restructuring was completed in 1982, and was marked by China's
withdrawal from the America-led anti-Soviet front.

Chapter Six, as a conclusion, suggests a number of supplements
to the Holsti model and states several implications for Chinese
foreign policy restructuring in the future.
In preparing this work, the primary source has been the author's experiences in studying and executing Chinese foreign policy. From 1985 to 1989, the author had the opportunity to attend the seminars and meetings at which reports were given by senior Chinese diplomats and high-level officials. These reports include analyses of international situations given by Wu Xue-qian (Foreign Minister, 1983-1988), foreign policy explanation by Li Zhao-xin (Foreign Ministry spokesman, 1985-1990), Chinese diplomacy reviews by Zhang Wen-jing (Deputy Foreign Minister, 1977-1982) and Sino-American relations by Chai Ze-ming (Ambassador to the United States, 1984-1988).

This paper also draws upon information from Chinese official sources. The Beijing Review, a semi-official Chinese publication in English, carries many of the views expressed by Chinese officials and analysts. The People's Daily, is an official English newspaper of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). However, limitations exist with this information since it relies on highly partisan Chinese official documents and media. Therefore, the author also pays a great attention to collecting information from non-Chinese sources, carefully comparing information from Chinese sources with non-Chinese ones, and taking pains to check the accuracy and objectivity of all information. Extensive reading of related works by Western specialists has served to broaden the author's perspectives, and has been helpful in the formation of the themes and ideas herein.
Chapter 1

Framework Introduction

The analytic framework employed in this thesis is Kal J. Holsti's foreign policy restructuring model. This model focuses on the dramatic, wholesale change of a nation's foreign policy which Holsti calls "restructuring". Chinese foreign policy is a typical case for Holsti's model. In the past four decades, the People's Republic of China has gone through four foreign policy restructurings, its external relations corresponding to four different patterns: 1) pro-Soviet dependence; 2) isolation; 3) Sino-American strategic partnership; and, 4) diversification.

This thesis applies Holsti's foreign policy restructuring model to the study of the dramatic foreign policy changes in the history of the People's Republic of China, attempts to explain these changes, and explores a model that analyzes China's foreign policy and predicts tendencies for further transition.

A. EMPIRICAL CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY STUDY AND HOLSTI'S MODEL

The foreign policy of the People's Republic of China is one of the most complex cases in Third World foreign policy studies. The PRC's foreign policy throughout its forty-year history has been characterized by sudden dramatic changes and completely different styles. Moreover, the state's particular historical and national
features and its secretive foreign policy decision-making process offer additional challenges to the student of international relations. Indeed, although there have been numerous studies of communist Chinese foreign policy, in general they are marked by considerable oversimplification in their analysis of China's foreign policy determinants. Generally speaking, conventional approaches to Chinese foreign policy study fall into the following categories based on their focuses of study.

(1) Expansionist/revolutionary approach. This is one of the earliest approaches used to study post-1949 Chinese foreign policy. It was embedded in the Cold War. This approach asserts that expansionism is inherent in the nature of a communist country like China and as the motive behind communist China's foreign policy—the hope of spreading communism beyond its borders and finally replacing capitalism. Therefore, "any assessment of Chinese military capabilities and foreign policy strategy, present or future, must take into account the facts that the Communist Party of China is imbued with a martial spirit and driven by international revolutionary ambitions."²

(2) Leadership approach. This approach holds that the a communist system like that of China is a totalitarian one dominated at any one time by a single leader, and that in foreign affairs, policy decision-making is largely thought to be determined by such a leader's personality. Therefore, communist China's foreign

policy study needs to focus on idiosyncratic factors, such as a leader's personality, ideology, and view of the world. For example, the study of Mao Tse-tung has been considered critical to the study of Chinese foreign policy from 1949 to 1976. As Samuel S. Kim notes, the leadership approach believes that "the Maoist image of world order can be said to be an integrated systemization of both substantive values and norms and operational code." And operationally, "it [Maoist image of world order] performs cognitive, evaluative, and prescriptive functions for decision makers, helping them to define the state of the world, to evaluate the meaning of the world so defined, and to prescribe a correct line of action." As Mao's personality cult reached its peak in China during the 1960s and the 1970s, some Chinese study scholars such as Harold Hinton asserted that "the most important single feature of Chinese policy making, domestic and foreign, continues to be the overwhelming importance of Mao Tse-tung, considered not only as a symbol but as an actual political force."

(3) Ideology approach. This approach considers that, in China, ideology is an overarching determinant which shapes Chinese

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decision-makers' perception of the world and their corresponding policy to this world. The ideology approach to Chinese foreign policy study includes not only orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology, but also ideas and doctrines created or endorsed by the Chinese leadership. The ideology is significant in this approach because "not only do the theoretical formulations put forward by the party leadership constitute the most general, and in many ways the most suggestive expression of the line at any given time; once enunciated, they have a life of their own, shaping the political climate and thereby influencing subsequent political developments."

Maoist doctrine draws greater attention among various ideological ideas. J.D. Simmonds admits that "as this is a study of China's foreign policy during the twenty years of Mao's rule, I have relied quite often largely on Mao's own writings."  

(4) The Traditional/historical legacy approach. This approach explains and predicts China's foreign policy by studying its traditional and cultural characteristics and historical legacy because "few will deny that without knowledge of imperial China one cannot hope to understand China today". Because, "any society,

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even a revolutionary one, is the product of its historical
development...in order to comprehend China's basic economic and
military capabilities more fully, it is important to consider the
tradition and consciousness of Chinese society...".  

(5) Domestic politics approach. This approach looks for the
impetus for Chinese foreign policy in domestic politics. During
the 1960s, when China was plagued with political struggles,
scholars believed that communist China's domestic politics were
characterized by its inherent political struggle and instability,
which greatly decided its foreign policy. For example, China's
"anti-American propaganda reflects the endeavour to incite the
Chinese people to the emotional state desired by their rulers".  
And the introduction of an external enemy is "designated to enable
the party to extend its control."  
Most recently, scholars of
this approach have not only emphasized the influence of domestic
politics, but have also paid attention to domestic economic
factors. David Bachman believes that "domestic sources have had a
greater impact than international factors in shaping Chinese
foreign policy; this has been particularly true since the early
1980s, especially for economic as opposed to security issues."  

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9 Robert C. North, *The Foreign Relations of China* (Third

10 G.F. Hudson, "Russian and China: The Dilemmas of Power",


12 David Bachman, "Domestic Sources of Chinese Foreign Policy",
(6) Systemic approach. This approach examines the effect of the international system upon China's foreign policy behaviour. "The systemic approach is a theory of environmental and structural determinism". Because "the system itself defines the role, position, status ranking, and norms of its interacting units (states), the reactions of member states to systemic variables are similar and thus predictable." Chinese foreign policy behaviour in the past four decades has proven that, "constrained by bipolar international structures, Chinese foreign policy falls within a narrow range of possibilities." Therefore, this approach suggests that "Chinese foreign policy behaviour can best be understood in terms of the constraints imposed upon it by the structure of the international system."

The expansionist/revolutionary approach is a rigid and arbitrary model. With the improvement of relations between China and Western countries and the end of Cold War, this approach has long become obsolete. The leadership and ideology approaches tend to overemphasize the influence of a leader or ideology and neglect the constraints of the domestic and external environments. The traditional/historical approach is helpful in understanding China's

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13 Samuel S. Kim, China and the World, 17.

14 Ibid., 17.


16 Ibid., 101.
foreign policy. However, Chinese traditional and historical legacy itself has been interpreted in multiple and sometimes conflicting ways. Therefore, this approach is not able to explain Chinese foreign policy. Lastly, both the domestic politics and economics and systemic approaches cannot avoid lopsided views by emphasizing some factors meanwhile neglecting others.

In reality, the policy-making process in communist China has many features in common with processes prevailing in other states in the world. It is as diverse and complex, though not as pluralistic, as that of Western countries. In China, as in most other countries, domestic policy and foreign policy are often interacting. Therefore, international circumstances, domestic factors, traditional/historical legacy, in addition to ideology and personality, all to some degree influence Chinese foreign policy. Consequently, the study of Chinese foreign policy requires a comprehensive approach rather than single factor analysis.

Having said this, Chinese foreign policy behaviour also has distinct characteristics. Its foreign policy often changes in a dramatic, radical way, with a sudden shift in external relations from one pattern to another sharply antagonistic pattern. Therefore, an analytic model of Chinese foreign policy needs to focus on such dramatic change and to distinguish it from slow and incremental normal foreign policy change.

Holding this viewpoint, this paper has chosen Kal J. Holsti’s model as the framework of this thesis. Firstly, the Holsti model is a relatively comprehensive model, allowing the analysis of
foreign policy from a wider and more complete range by emphasizing the determinants of the external, domestic and historical/traditional/cultural factors. Holsti emphasizes interactions between political and economic factors, between domestic determinants and the external environment, and between traditional values and current events. Furthermore, Holsti also takes into account decision-making variables such as leadership personality, perceptions, and elite attitudes.

Secondly, Holsti's model focuses on sudden, radical changes of foreign policy that exactly suit the study of Chinese foreign policy, which often changes in a dramatic manner. By this way, Holsti's model presents a different perspective to the study of Chinese foreign policy, which is not offered by other empirical approaches.

However, although this model is applicable to the study of China's foreign policy restructuring, Kal Holsti himself has not applied his model to the Chinese case study. While Thomas W. Robinson borrows the concept of foreign policy restructuring and Holsti's analytic framework in his Chinese case study, he does not, however, examine all China's restructurings since 1949. He does not count the restructuring of 1949 to 1950, neither does he include the restructuring of 1978 to 1982. Furthermore, he pays more attention to developing his own framework than to applying Holsti's one in analyzing Chinese foreign policy restructuring.\(^{17}\)

Therefore, in using Holsti’s analytic framework, and applying it to China’s four foreign policy restructurings from the 1940s to the 1980s, Chinese foreign policy will be looked at from a new perspective. Furthermore, through the study of China’s previous foreign policy restructurings, this thesis also attempts to explore several implications of these foreign policy determinants in order to analyze and predict tendencies for China’s future foreign policy restructuring. Finally, the Chinese case study serves as a good test of applying Holsti’s theory to reality, and at the same time, may also suggest some additions to his framework.

B. THE HOLSTI MODEL

Kal J. Holsti tends to explain foreign policy behaviour by examining a state’s foreign strategic changes, which he calls foreign policy restructuring.

**(1) Focus on Foreign Policy Restructuring**

Holsti claims that his study focuses on

a particular type of foreign policy change - the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation’s pattern of external relations...foreign policy restructuring.\(^{18}\)

Such restructuring is distinguished from normal foreign policy change, which is usually slow and incremental. Instead it

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"usually takes place more quickly, expresses an intent for fundamental change, is non-incremental..."\(^{19}\)

The purpose of this type of restructuring is to seek to change, usually simultaneously, the total pattern of their external relations. The changes usually occur both in the pattern of partnerships... and in the type of activity... [that seek] to create essentially different or new patterns of relations in both sectors.\(^{20}\)

The history of the People's Republic of China had been full of such foreign policy restructurings as defined by Kal Holsti. The pattern of China's external relations has been changed so dramatically that its foreign policy has swung from one extreme to another, such as the 1950s' pro-Soviet, anti-American policy vis-a-vis the pro-American, anti-Soviet policy in the 1970s; and the isolation in the 1960s vis-a-vis diversification of the 1980s.

(2) Patterns of Restructuring

According to Holsti, types of a state's external relations include 1) dependence; 2) isolation; 3) self-reliance; and, 4) non-alignment-diversification. Patterns of foreign policy restructuring usually fall into one of these four categories. Consequently, foreign policy restructuring usually just changes from one of these types to another. Holsti explains the distinguishing characteristics of each of them.

\(^{19}\)Ibid., 2.

\(^{20}\)Ibid., 2.
a) Dependence: Externally directed actions and transactions are at a fairly high level, and are characterized by high concentration toward another state or group of similar states.\textsuperscript{21}

China's foreign relations in the 1950s and the 1970s fell into this pattern of dependence. In most of the 1950s, China was dependent on Soviet financial, technological and military aid. It had to take the same stance as the Soviet Union did on international issues. In the 1970s, China to some extent depended on the Sino-American strategic partnership to protect its security from the Soviet threat.

b) Isolation is characterized by extremely low level of external involvement, combined with comprehensive exclusionist policies. All military or diplomatic commitments are avoided.\textsuperscript{22}

China's external relations in the 1960s was a typical pattern of isolation. During this time, China had no diplomatic relations with the United States and most other Western countries. Its relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries were also hostile.

c) Self-reliance is a type in which trade, diplomatic and cultural contacts are diversified, but levels of transactions are generally low.\textsuperscript{23}

In *Why Nations Realign*, Kal Holsti divides China's foreign policy

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{22}Ibid., 4.

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., 4.
in the 1960s into two different types: self-reliance (1959-1966) and isolation (1966-1969).\textsuperscript{24} Therefore, he considers that China had two foreign policy restructurings within the 1960s. In the author's view, China's foreign policy restructuring (Restructuring II) had already transferred China's foreign policy into isolation. Marked by the split with the Soviet Union (1959), the deterioration of relations with the United States (1958) and the war with India (1962), China entered an era of isolation. Since both the West and the East imposed economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation against China, China's external involvement was at a very low level. The Cultural Revolution which started in 1966 intensified China's isolationism with its ultra-leftist external and domestic policies. Therefore, there was not another foreign policy restructuring during the 1966-1969 period, because the pattern of China's external relations did not change. Its pattern of isolation, formed by Restructuring II, simply intensified into extreme isolation after 1966 and was maintained until Restructuring III started in 1969.

d) Non-alignment-diversification is characterized by extensive externally directed actions and transactions, but they are well scattered among many states and groups of states.\textsuperscript{25}

China's Restructuring IV changed its foreign policy strategy into non-alignment-diversification. Along with its domestic economic reforms started in 1978, China opened its door to the outside

\textsuperscript{24}See Realign, 4.

\textsuperscript{25}Ibid., 4.
world. It has kept an equidistant policy toward the two superpowers and established friendly relations with as many countries as possible. Its economic and cultural exchanges with foreign countries have greatly increased. China has become more and more active in the international area, while trying to avoid military alignment and commitment with any other countries or groups of countries.

(3) Impetus for Restructuring

Holsti believes that

Foreign policy restructuring is often a response to a threat - but not always a military threat. The threats of the modern era contain cultural informational and economic components.

In order to explain a state's response to such threats, one must examine a state's perception of threats. External threats may come from international conflicts, inter-state competitions, and dependence. The internal threats may come from economic vulnerability and domestic factions. The analysis of a state's main foreign policy determinants from the international system level to the state level, must examine political and economic phenomena, and historical and cultural factors.

Holsti then asserts that threat of dependence, or what he calls 'interdependence', is an important impetus for foreign policy restructuring.

\(^{26}\)Ibid., ix.
Many of them [threats] derive from the processes associated with 'growing interdependence'. Foreign policy restructuring, in short, is basically an attempt to assert autonomy, to control transnational processes, to destroy the residues of colonialism, to escape from the embrace of a hegemon.*

When a state's dependence, either political or economic, on another state reaches the extent that such dependence forms a threat to the state's political independence, economic fortunes or cultural integrity, it is usually the time that foreign policy restructuring occurs to reverse such dependence. 28 This hypothesis is born out in Chinese foreign policy behaviour vis-a-vis the two superpowers. For example, the breaking-off of the Sino-Soviet relationship in the late 1950s happened when China realized that its dependence on the Soviet Union had led to its vulnerability to Soviet intervention in its internal affairs. Alignments to the superpowers were mainly from the motivation of seeking greater autonomy from them. Therefore, in analyzing China's Foreign policy behaviour, the so-called Sino-Soviet American triangle must be added as an important determinant.

(4) Analytical Framework

Holsti's analytic framework is composed of three parts:

1) independent variables, which include external factors, domestic factors and background historical and cultural factors;

27 Ibid., x.

28 see Realign, 9.
2) intervening variables or decision-making variables,\textsuperscript{29} which include the policy-makers' personalities and perceptions, elite attitudes, and the policy-making process.

3) dependent variables. Holsti does not give a clear definition of dependent variables. However, he expounds on the elements of a foreign policy restructuring under this term which includes: (a) reorientation, it refers to "the intentions of policy-makers to restructure their nation's relationships with other countries."\textsuperscript{30} (b) disengagement from previous pattern of external relations. (c) restructuring, "[following the reorientation], restructuring is the alteration of the total pattern of external actions and transactions."\textsuperscript{31} (d) actions toward external penetration. However, in the view of this thesis, disengagement and restructuring are actions of foreign policy restructuring, therefore, the last point - actions towards external penetration - is overlapping to disengagement and restructuring.

\textsuperscript{29} Holsti uses the term "intervening variables" in his Chapter One (Introduction). Then in Chapter Eight (Conclusion) he uses the term "decision-making variables". He does not explain why he changes the terms. However, he refers to the same category of variables which may intervene in the decision-making process of a foreign policy restructuring. Therefore, in this thesis, the author prefers to keep a consistent term in the thesis and use the term "decision-making variables". See Holsti, Realign, 14, 207.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 2.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 2.
Following is an outline of Holsti's analytic framework.²²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Decision-making variables</th>
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<tr>
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<td>political</td>
<td>(2) Policy-making process</td>
<td>Disengagement</td>
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<td>factionalization</td>
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<td>2. External factors</td>
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<td>military threat</td>
<td>(3) Personality</td>
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<td>non-military threat</td>
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<td>structure of</td>
<td>(4) Elite attitudes</td>
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<td>previous relationship</td>
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<td>3. Background historical and cultural factors</td>
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<td>attitude toward</td>
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In this framework, independent variables are the main determinants of the foreign policy restructuring. Decision-making variables affect the decision-making process through reviewing and calculating information from independent variables. Outcomes of this process includes the policy reorientation and actions of restructuring.

²²See Realign, 14.
C. APPLICATION OF HOLSTI’S MODEL

Applying Holsti's framework to the Chinese case study, this thesis will examine each of China's foreign policy restructuring from the following aspects.

(A) Independent variables

(1) Domestic Factors

Internal threats may result from political crisis or economic vulnerability, and therefore, in the thesis, this category includes: a) domestic politics, including political crises and political factionalization; b) economic phenomena, including domestic economic vulnerability and development strategy.

(2) External Factors

When studying the external factors, this thesis first examines the changing character of the international system. The structure of the international system has a great influence on a state's foreign policy. Therefore, examining the changes of this external environment is important in understanding the changes of a state's foreign policy. Furthermore, in the case of China, the Sino-Soviet-American triangular relationship must be considered as an important determinant among external factors. Second, besides the systemic factor, specific events during the period of each restructuring are other important determinants because they are
usually considered by the decision-makers as military or non-
military threats.

(3) Political Culture

The traditional cultural values and historical legacy which form a state's perception and attitude toward the outside world are other determinants of foreign policy restructuring. However, the content of a state's traditional cultural values and historical legacy is tremendous. Each specific period of history has its mainstream value. Therefore, this thesis concentrates on the particular traditional value or historical legacy that had an important effect upon a specific restructuring. For example, anti-
imperialism was every strong in 1949, which became an impetus for the new regime to abrogate all unequal treaties with Western powers. During the 1960s, historical territorial disputes between China and the Soviet Union greatly aggravated their relationship. Kall Holsti does not include in his framework ideological factors. However, for a communist country like China, ideological factors are not negligible. This thesis will add ideological factors to the analytic framework.

Therefore, besides the external and domestic factors, the third determinant of foreign policy restructuring in this thesis will be called political culture, which includes some particular traditional and cultural values, the historical legacy and ideology insofar as they affected a specific restructuring.
(B) Decision-making variables

In this thesis, decision-making variables will take account of the bureaucratic influence and of the personality and perceptions of key decision-makers. They are variables that have intervening effects upon the process of policy-making at which the input of independent variables is converted into an output such as policy restructuring. Therefore, in these thesis, intervening variables will be examined at the same time as independent variables. For instance, when analyzing the effect of the international system upon Chinese foreign policy, one also needs to analyze the Chinese decision-makers' view of this system. This is because the external environment, as a determinant, affects foreign policy not by the way it really is but by the way that the decision-makers perceive it. Therefore, it seems unnecessary to have two separate sections when analyzing the international system - one explaining the international system itself and another discussing the Chinese leaders' perceptions or attitudes towards this system.

Because non-party elites usually have no access to policy-making in China's one-party system, Holsti's sub-category of elite attitudes will not be included in this framework. Party leaders are the decision-makers in China and the differences in elite attitudes that matter take place within the party and are therefore discussed under the category of party factionalism, which is listed among the independent variables.
(C) Dependent variables

In this thesis, dependent variables will be called restructuring outcomes, which include policy reorientation, disengagement from the previous pattern and the restructuring of new pattern.

The analytic framework of this thesis is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Decision-making Variables</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
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<td>Intervening Variables</td>
<td>Dependent Variables</td>
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</table>

1. Domestic Factors

a) domestic political crisis political faction

b) economic phenomena vulnerability development

2. External factors

military or non-military threat

structure of previous relationship

(1) Leadership
definition and perceptions

reorientation

(2) Bureaucratic influence

restructuring

disengagement

3. Political culture

historical legacy

ideology

Each restructuring will be examined according to this framework and there will be a short summary at the end of the respective chapter to review the determinants of each restructuring and evaluate the restructuring outcomes.
Chapter 2

Restructuring I (1949-1950)

Leaning to the Soviet Side

On 1 October 1949, in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Chinese Communist Party, declared:

The People's Republic of China is established today; The Chinese people have stood up today; This ancient nation hence has stood up in front of the whole world.  

Although the new communist regime faced tremendous problems — a country split up by local, anti-communist bandits and minority nationalities, a collapsed economy riddled with war wounds — the new leadership sounded optimistic and confident to welcome a brand-new beginning. They wanted to establish a new society for its people as well as to build up a new image of China in front of the rest of the world.

Therefore, in order to work for a reconstructed domestic economy and unified country, in the external field, the new leadership needed to determine its basic foreign policy orientation, restructuring foreign policy, which could serve their internal goals and distinguish the new regime from the old one. Trying to pursue a policy of political and economic independence, the new foreign policy departed from the Nationalist government's

policy of depending on the United States and its pro-Western stance. However, serious domestic economic problems, the hostility of the Western powers, and the Korean War finally compelled the Chinese Communist Party to lean to the Soviet side and pursue a pro-Soviet, anti-American foreign policy. In doing so, it became highly dependent on the Soviet Union for political and economic support.

1. CHINA AFTER REVOLUTION: RE-BUILDING THE NATION-STATE

(1) National Integrity and Regime Consolidation

Since the mid nineteenth century, China had been a semi-feudal, semi-colonized country suffering from civil wars, foreign aggression, peasant rebellions and national disintegration. Although the last emperor of the Qing Dynasty\(^3\) was overthrown by the Chinese Nationalist Party (known as Koumingtang or KMT), China's situation did not change. Almost immediately after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, China was plunged into anarchic civil wars. A number of local warlords fought against each other and split China into small warlord possessions. The KMT, trying to integrate the country, engaged in war against these warlords.

\(^3\)The Qing Dynasty, China's last feudal dynasty, lasted from 1644 to 1911. Beijing Language Institute, A Chinese Dictionary, Beijing: New China Press, 1972, 554.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was established against this background in 1921 and immediately joined in the civil wars. In the early years, the CCP helped the KMT to eliminate local warlords. Then both sides began another prolonged war against each other vying for the right to rule China. During World War II, they cooperated again to resist the Japanese invasion. However, right after the Japanese surrender, they resumed their unfinished civil war until 1949, when the KMT government, headed by Chiang Kai-Shek, fled to Taiwan. The CCP claimed the liberation of China's mainland and the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

The new communist regime and its leader Mao Tse-tung faced a country with serious wounds of long-lasting wars. Their enormous and urgent task was re-building a nation-state with order and integrity, which included 1) regime consolidation; 2) national integrity; and, 3) economic recovery.

When the PRC was established, the civil war had not yet ended. Chiang Kai-Shek's army still controlled the southern coastal area and off-shore islands. Furthermore, there were over 400,000 KMT army remnants scattered over the central and southwestern

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The first KMT-CCP alliance was from 1923 to 1927. The goal of this alliance was to eliminate warlord separatism and realize national unification. See Maurice Meisner, Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic, New York: The Free Press, 1977, 21.

The second KMT-CCP alliance was from 1936 to 1945 aimed to resist the Japanese invasion. Ibid., 38.
regions. In those regions, Mao's People's Liberation Army (PLA) only had control over the major cities. Over a dozen provinces had anti-communist military resistance. In Tibet and some other non-Chinese areas, resistance also existed among minority nationalities against the communist army, with intentions to separate from China. All the resistance of the KMT remnants, landlords and the non-Chinese people threatened the survival of the newly established regime. In order to eliminate internal subversion, Mao ordered the PLA to pacify the resistance of the KMT remnants and other bandits, and to liberate Tibet and Taiwan.

In early 1950, the PLA engaged in a large-scale "bandit suppression campaign". Over one quarter of the PLA force, with the cooperation of the local militia, was involved in this action to mop up the KMT remnants. By mid-year, the PLA had moved southward and had liberated the Hainan island and several off-shore islands. In October 1950, the PLA entered Tibet and established a military administrative committee for the Tibet region. After this, the communist army controlled the whole mainland.

While the PLA was engaged in wiping out resistant forces, the new regime built up and consolidated local governments at various levels in the wake of the PLA's advance. In the countryside, the communist regime carried out land reform to gain peasant support and destroy landlord and feudal clan authority. In urban areas, the new regime eliminated opposition through the suppression of people.

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with close ties to the KMT party. Through one year's efforts, the new regime took a firm control of the mainland.

(2) Economic Reconstruction

China had experienced the anarchic warlords wars in the 1920s, the Japanese aggression in the 1930s and the war between the communist party and the nationalist government in the 1940s. However, the war damage to the economy was different in different regions.

In the vast inland area, the traditional self-sufficient agriculture had no change in the war. In the China of 1949, 75% of the total population was engaged in agriculture. But due to the backward production methods, agricultural output production only contributed about 40% of the GNP in 1948. Agriculture was very sluggish and food was hardly self-sufficient. Moreover, in 1949, some of the provinces suffered famine caused by civil war and severe natural disasters.

Light industry was located mainly in the relatively modern coastal areas, where the ports had been opened since the Opium War of 1840 and Western business had great effect. The national industry had developed quickly there, especially in Shanghai and its nearby area. When the communist party took over power, Western

business withdrew and many pro-nationalist entrepreneurs removed their equipment and money from these coastal areas to Hong Kong, Taiwan and Southeast Asia.

Heavy industry suffered the most from the war. China's main heavy industry was concentrated in the Northeast area. It was built by the Japanese throughout the 1920s and the 1930s. Then the Soviet Red Army occupied the region after the World War II. They dismantled many key industrial installations and sent them back to the Soviet Union. After the Red Army withdrew from the area, it became the main battlefield of the KMT and the CCP. When the communists finally took over the region, it was already in ruins.

Therefore, Mao described the Chinese economy in 1949 as "poor and blank". The large traditional agriculture area was poor, and the industrial sector was almost zero. However, the new leadership

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33 Known as "Manchuria" under the Japanese occupation, Mao's China 8.

40 During its Japanese occupation a fairly large-scale heavy industrial development occurred in Northeast China. To the extent that machinery had not been removed during the brief postwar occupation by the Soviet Union, a substantial initial base for the development of modern industry was created. See Joyce K. Kallgren ed. Building a Nation-State: China after Forty Years CA: University of California Press, 1990, 100.


was optimistic about the country's economic development. Mao said with full confidence:

   Our country is poor and blank. However, it is on a blank paper that we can draw the most beautiful picture.\footnote{Ibid.}

The new leadership had first to deal with the most urgent tasks of relieving famine, stabilizing commodity prices, and restoring basic transportation and communication. 1950-1952 was the period of rehabilitation, therefore, China needed industrial equipment and plenty of commodities in order to heal the war-torn economy and stabilize the domestic market. However, the Western sanctions were watertight at the time, and Mao Tse-tung had no option but to turn to the Soviet side for help.

While trying to cure the wounds of war, the Chinese leadership began to work on its economic development strategy. The CCP had to evolve from a revolutionary party into a ruling party. Accordingly, Mao ordered the party to study how to manage the economy.

   We shall soon put aside some of the things we know well and be compelled to do things we do not know well... . We must learn to do economic work from all who know how.\footnote{Mao Tse-tung, "On People's Democratic Dictatorship", \textit{Selected Works}, Vol.IV 422.}

To the Maoist leadership, those who knew how were the Soviets. Mao believed that

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union... under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin... learned not only how to
make the revolution but also how to carry on the socialist construction. It has built a great and splendid socialist state. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher and we must learn from it.

Therefore, the young Chinese communist regime copied not only the Soviet political system but also the Stalinist model of the economy. The Soviet economic model was to put the development of heavy industry as the priority, followed by agriculture and light industry. This pattern of production demanded massive state investment in the construction of large-scale infrastructural projects and heavy industry. It was according to this model that Chinese leaders designed the First Five-Year-Plan (1953-1957).

China’s first major planning effort, the First Five-Year-Plan, was predicated on the belief that China, with extensive Soviet aid, would follow the basic lines of development charted by the Bolshevik Revolution and above all Stalin’s focus on centralized heavy industry...

This strategy needed large amounts of capital, industrial equipment and technology. Under the international situation at the time, though, Western sources were not available to China. Therefore, the Chinese leadership not only adopted the Soviet model, but also sought Soviet aid for financing, equipment and technology.

\[45\] Ibid, 423.

2. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS

(1) Post-war International System

The PRC was established when the Cold War was escalating. The world was divided into two hostile camps headed respectively by the United States and the Soviet Union. The first question on the new regime's foreign affairs agenda was to define itself with respect to these two camps. However, under the overarching two-bloc structure, there seemed no possibility for China to pursue a middle way. China's leaning to the Soviet side was not only actuated by their common ideology, but also by U.S. hostility.

The CCP's initial foreign policy was not as hostile to the West as it later became. Before the establishment of the PRC, the communist leadership began to design a foreign policy strategy for the new republic. Zhou En-lai, who was in charge of the CCP's external affairs, and his associate, Chen Yi, advocated to build up a good relationship with the United States. They argued that U.S. recognition of the new government would be an important determinant for it to enter the UN Security Council, and a good relationship would also be helpful to China's economic recovery and development. Mao Tse-tung seemed not to be opposed to Zhou and Chen sounding out America's attitude.

In late 1948 and early 1949, the CCP sent their messages to the Americans through various channels. Zhou's assistant approached American ambassador Leighton Stuart in Beijing, and Chen Yi
personally contacted U.S. Consul General John Cabot in Shanghai. Mao also made it clear in a speech on June 30, 1949 that "there will be the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with all foreign countries, including the United States."47

However, the response of the Truman Administration was cold and slow. Since the U.S. was the leader of anti-communist camp and it was committed to support of the KMT government, which had been defeated by the communist party, the Truman government had already defined the would-be communist government as a member of an antagonistic camp even before the People's Republic of China was established.

In 1948, the CCP started the decisive battles against the KMT government. Aware of the inevitable victory of the CCP, the U.S. began to help Chiang Kai-shek and his army withdraw to Taiwan, and imposed an embargo of American goods transferred to the communist-held area. After the October 1949 takeover, owing to overt ideology and political Cold War reasoning, the United States not only refused to give recognition to the PRC, but also imposed political isolation and economic sanctions against China. In addition, the U.S. continued its assistance to the Nationalist Government, its commitment to the protection of Taiwan, and its opposition to China's claim to replace the Nationalist government in the permanent seat in the UN security Council.

These actions were seen by Mao and his government as the Americans trying to isolate China and subvert the new government.

47Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, 408.
By late 1949, the Chinese leadership believed that it was impossible to set up a good relationship with the Americans and of course to receive financial aid. Therefore, the Chinese asked the U.S. Ambassador Leighton Stuart to leave China because "there was nothing more for him to do, and he had to take to the road, with his briefcase under his arm." The new regime not only was disappointed with the U.S. hostility but also feared the U.S. threat of subversion. Consequently, China had to ally with the Soviet Union and join in its camp. In February 1950, China and the Soviet Union signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, the aim of which was to "prevent imperialist invasion and maintain peace in the Far East and the world."

(2) The Korean War

The outbreak of the Korean War reaffirmed the Chinese leadership's suspicion that the United States intended to subvert the Chinese communist regime; the American military presence in Korea increased China's sense of insecurity. China's concern was heightened by the U.S. bombardment along the Sino-North Korean border, and especially by the fact that some of the American bombs were dropped into Chinese territory along Yalu river. This region

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adjacent to the North Korea, rich in resources and the centre of heavy industry for China, was a key area for China's economic development.

Furthermore, China had the traditional sensitivities about any threats around its periphery, especially so in 1950, with the new regime vulnerable to subversion at home and to external threats. In this context, Mao Tse-tung described the relationship between Korea and China as lips embracing teeth. He said, "when the lips are gone, the teeth will suffer cold."\(^{50}\) Therefore, "We must regard the Korean people's defensive as our war."\(^{51}\)

The object of China's military involvement in the Korean War was to stop the American invasion at its doorstep and to prevent the spread of war to China. In addition, the Chinese leadership also hoped that the Soviet Union would increase its economic and military aid to China in terms of supporting China against the United States. Although China expected the Russians would supply military goods free in the "spirit of socialist fraternity", Stalin sent the materials on credit and stipulated that China had to repay within ten years from the end of the war. China, therefore, undertook a heavy debt, and further increased its dependence on the USSR. Despite this, the Korean War aggravated to a far greater degree the hostility between China and the United


\(^{51}\) *People's China*, 1 September 1950
Therefore, the military involvement into the Korean War finalized China's pro-Soviet, anti-American pattern of foreign policy.

3. HISTORICAL LEGACY: ANTI-IMPERIALISM AND ANTI-COLONIALISM

In 1949, anti-imperialism was very strong among the Chinese people, as the memory of the humiliation suffered at the hands of foreign powers over the past century was quite recent. Beginning with the Opium Wars (1840-1842 and 1856-1860), China was forced to sign a number of unequal treaties in which it not only paid Western powers large amounts of "war reparations", but also ceded or lent territories to foreign powers. By the end of the 19th century, much of China had been divided into spheres of influence among Britain, Russia, Japan, France and Germany. The United States did not possess territory in China, but it enjoyed many of the privileges of the other Western powers. The foreigners enjoyed extra-territoriality, and had the freedom to establish military bases and exploit natural resources within their spheres of influence. Because of this, the Chinese people suffered racial discrimination in their own territory. A feeling of humiliation and resentment, therefore, cultivated a hostility to colonialism.

With the outbreak of the Korean War, the United States initiated multilateral sanctions against China in the UN, and most of non-communist countries in the world joined in the sanctions. Li Hong Yang, History of China's Military Involvement in Korea, Beijing: New China Publishing House, 1989, 178.
and imperialism among the Chinese. As Mao said:

All these wars of aggression, together with political, economic and cultural aggression, have caused the Chinese people to hate imperialism, and compelled them to bring their revolutionary spirits into full play and become united through struggle.  

Historically, there were several mass rebellions against foreign colonization. The largest was the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, which was later suppressed by the Qing Dynasty with the help of foreign armies. Later, the 1911 Nationalist revolution, led by Sun Yat-sen, gained popular support by calling for anti-feudalism, anti-imperialism and the abolishing of unequal treaties. However, the Nationalist government, established after the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, put aside the question of these treaties and maintained good relations with Western powers for support and aid. When the CCP came to power, however, the question of unequal treaties became the touchstone of the new regime.

In 1949, Mao claimed that the new government would review these treaties. The conclusion of his review was that these treaties, imposed upon China by foreign powers, were unequal, illegal and unacceptable. This anti-imperial posture gained the support of the Chinese and also distinguished the new regime's image from that of the old one. However, it aggravated the relations between China and most of the Western powers.

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4. SUMMARY

Mao Tse-tung and his young regime intended to develop an independent foreign policy at the beginning, based on China's historical experience with semi-colonialism beginning with the Opium War in the 1840s. The CCP hoped that its new foreign policy could assert autonomy and destroy the residues of colonialism. Maoist leadership, therefore, hoped to build up a strong new China which had the capability of standing equally in front of the great powers.

Specifically, the goals of new regime's foreign policy at the early stages were as follows: 1) To ensure the security of the new republic, the CCP must protect the republic from subversion and the possible foreign military interference. 2) To consolidate the communist regime, the new government needs to gain maximum international support, and to win popular recognition and take a permanent seat in the UN Security Council from the Nationalists. 3) To rehabilitate the national economy, the new foreign policy must also serve to explore more foreign financial aid for the recovery and development of national economy.

However, the foreign policy outcomes departed from Chinese leadership's initial intention of independence because of internal and external constraints.

(A) Domestic Factors

Domestically, the political instability and economic difficulty
made the newly-born regime extremely vulnerable to external and internal subversions. Therefore, the new regime must seek strong support, either politically and financially, to maintain and consolidate its rule.

(B) External Factors

However, the external environment only enabled one choice of such support. Facing a hostile U.S. administration after the abortive overtures towards reconciliation with the Americans, Mao Tse-Tung had no other choice but to lean to the Soviet Union. Later, the Korean War forced China to become further dependent on the Soviet Union.

(C) Factors of Political Culture

Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism as the main trend of the political culture during the Restructuring I also made the new regime take an anti-Western stance in order to gain popular support at home.

(D) Decision-making Variables

Communist ideology was another element which affected Restructuring I. The United States and the Soviet Union, as well as China itself, readily assigned China as a member of the socialist camp because of its ideology. However, the Maoist decision to lean to the Soviet side was caused by pragmatic as well as ideological considerations. China had to temporarily put aside
its desire for independence and rely completely on the Soviet Union for political and economic support.

Mao Tse-tung's personal views did not have an important influence in forming the new regime's foreign policy. Under the external constraints and internal limitations, he had no other choice but to reluctantly sacrifice independence in return for Soviet support even though Mao personally did not like this only choice.

Restructuring I - China's alignment with the Soviet Union - was therefore, not merely the expression of China's ideological preference, but was an obvious necessity for both security and economic recovery. The rejection by the West and the Korean War, all intensified China's anti-Western stance, and increased its dependence on the Soviet Union.
Chapter 3

Restructuring II (1958–1962)

The Shift to Isolation

The second foreign policy restructuring occurred from 1958 to 1962. During this time, the most important issues in China's political and economic development were the Anti-rightist Campaign and the Great Leap Forward Movement. Concurrently, intra-party disputes intensified over these issues, with the result that Mao turned to ultra-leftism to defend his authority. Reflecting this, China's foreign policy became radicalized during this period. Accordingly, the Sino-Soviet alliance began to drift apart after 1958, the Sino-American relationship further deteriorated with the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis, and the 1962 Sino-Indian border war further inflamed an already hostile environment. These events marked the entry of China into an era of isolation.

After Restructuring II, China's foreign policy tended to become more and more isolationist. Since both the West and the East imposed economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation against China, China's external involvement was at a very low level. Throughout the whole of the 1960s, China pursued a policy of political independence and economic self-reliance, which led to political isolation, economic autarchy, and China's diplomatic activities being substantially decreased except for maintaining relations with
some Third World countries.

China's isolation was further intensified in the mid-1960s by the Cultural Revolution Movement. During this time, it advocated opposition to the hegemonism of the two superpowers, and supported world revolution. However, in 1969, the Soviet military threat forced the Chinese leadership to abandon isolation and seek Western help.

1. DOMESTIC SITUATION: ENTERED AN ULTRA-LEFTIST ERA

(1) Anti-rightist Campaign and Intra-party Struggle

Since the establishment of the People's Republic of China, Mao Tse-tung, as the party chairman and the chairman of the CCP military committee holding control over the military, maintained the prime power in China. But in the mid-1950s, his authority encountered challenges from various fronts within and without the party.

The first wave of criticism came from outside the party, mainly from the intellectuals and non-communist elites. Ironically, the criticism was released by Mao himself when he sponsored the "Hundred Flowers Blossom" campaign. In 1956, with the communist regime consolidated, society relatively stable and the national economy growing steadily, Mao Tse-tung decided to give some limited freedom of speech in the fields of culture and art. In his words,
he said,

To artists and writers, we say, "Let a hundred flowers blossom". To scientists, we say, "Let a hundred schools of thought contend." 54

Mao sponsored "Hundred Flowers Blossom" because he realized that there are two kinds of unity: one is built on mechanical obedience and the other on our own conscious free will. What we want is the latter. 55

However, this freedom of thinking and speaking is limited. As the party’s propaganda chief Lu Ding-yi said:

"Letting a hundred flowers blossom, and a hundred schools of thought contend" means that we stand for freedom of independent thinking, of debate, of creative work; freedom to criticize and freedom to express, maintain and reserve one's opinions on questions of art, literature or scientific research. [Italics added.] 56

Nevertheless, the freedom of speech soon was out of the party’s control, and criticism of the party’s policy and Mao’s authoritarianism emerged.

In the economic field, the state chairman Liu Shao-qi and his associate Deng Xiao-ping, expressed their suspicions of Mao’s "Great Leap Forward Movement" 57. They insisted that China needed a practical strategy of steady growth instead of pursuing unrealistic quick development.


55 Ibid., 69

56 Ibid., 69

57 See next section "Economic Impetuosity: Great Leap Forward Movement".
More serious challenges came from the military. Defense Minister Peng De-huai disagreed with many of Mao's policies. Peng opposed Mao's military ideology of a "people's war"\(^{58}\), which called for "everyone to be a soldier".\(^{59}\) Peng also advocated military modernization, and hoped to decrease the party's interference into military affairs. Additionally, he wanted to change the PLA into a more professional and highly institutionalized army. Peng also criticized Mao's Great Leap Forward and asserted that it would damage the national economy and therefore undermine his plan of military modernization.

In foreign affairs, both Liu and Peng held that China needed a safe environment to concentrate on economic development. They felt, therefore, that China should decrease tensions with foreign countries. Peng De-huai was in favour of maintaining a good relationship with the Soviet Union so that China could get more military technology to update its army. Liu Shao-qi and Deng Xiaoping even hoped to improve relations with Western countries and sought their economic aid.

Mao Tse-tung sensed that the criticism of "Hundred Flowers Blossom" was getting out of control by undermining the authority of the party and himself. In late 1957, therefore, he declared a stop

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\(^{58}\) Mao believed that "the richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people...by mobilizing the masses and relying on them." Mao Tse-tung, *Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-tung* [known as "little red book"], Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1972, 88-89.

to the "Hundred Flower Blossom" movement and started the "Anti-
rightist Campaign" against his critics. Those who had criticized
the party in the previous year were accused of being "rightists"
and suffered ruthless punishment.

Mao also could not tolerate Peng De-huai's continual public
criticisms. In a top party conference party in 1959, Defense
Minister Peng De-huai broke out into a fierce argument with Mao
Tse-tung. In the conference, Premier Zhou En-lai and Deputy
Defense Minister Lin Biao defended Mao's authority. Peng was
subsequently accused of being an anti-party opportunist and was
replaced by Lin Biao.

(2) Economic Impetuosity: Great Leap Forward Movement

Political ultra-leftism, reflected in the economic field,
became over-anxious policy pursuing a quick success. The First
Five Year Plan (1953-1957) achieved an annual average growth of
6%, with people's living standards enjoying a remarkable
increase. In 1958 the Second Five Year Plan was scheduled to
start. It was designed by a pragmatic economist, Chen Yun, who
aimed at maintaining the steady development of the First Five Years
Plan. He also sought to adjust and reform the rigid Stalinist
model to a certain extent by allowing a limited free market and by
increasing investment in agriculture.

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60 Jean Chesneaux, China, 66.
However, the achievements of the First Five Year Plan created an optimistic mood among the Maoist leaders and the population as a whole. Mao could not be satisfied with the same steady pace of growth. He wanted to eliminate China's backwardness and catch up with the advanced countries as soon as possible. Therefore, in 1958, Mao abolished the Second Five Year Plan and declared the start of the Great Leap Forward Movement. According to his plan, China would catch up to the advanced countries, such as the United States and Britain, within 15 years and enter a communist society described by Marx within 30 years. To realized this aim, the steady pace planned by the Second Five Year Plan was considered not enough; China would have to "leap forward".

The Great Leap Forward Movement stressed the rapid development of heavy industry and hoped that this would qualify China as an industrialized country. Consequently, large state investment went to heavy industry. Moreover, the provinces and regions competed with each other for more and larger projects, this resulting in inefficiency, disorder, and production loss. The national economy suffered greatly.

While the Great Leap Forward Movement was at its height, the Soviet Union decreased its economic aid in early 1958 and then completely cut off all assistance in 1960 with the intensification of the Sino-Soviet disputes. This sudden withdrawal of the Soviet financing and technical experts left China with many unfinished construction projects.
Agriculture was neglected during the Great Leap Forward Movement. Since peasants were busy building up iron and steel factories in their villages, grain production dropped dramatically. In July 1959, therefore, Mao was finally forced to abandon the Great Leap Forward Movement. Severe damage had already been done. As the result of the food crisis, production drops and the halt of the Soviet aid, famine spread all over the country from 1960-1962. It was impossible, however, for China to turn to a Western-style commercial alternative due to the continuing Western trade embargo and China's lack of hard currency. China had to cope with its problems without external help. Mao charged that this "imperialist economic blockade" was a national insult and the cause of domestic economic problems. He therefore called on the people to make "arduous efforts" and realize "self-reliance". This principle of self-reliance was formed in an environment of economic sanctions imposed by both West and East and therefore was characterized by an anti-foreign bias. By the mid-1960s, this ran to the extreme and became an overarching theme of China's domestic and foreign policy.

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51 Among the Western Countries, Australia and Canada started a nominal grain trade with China in the late 1950s, the annual amount averaged US$16 million and $5 million a year respectively. This trade stopped during the Sino-Indian war and resumed in 1963. David Leyton-Brown ed. The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, 1987, 62.
2. EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT: THE INCREASING HOSTILITY

(1) Sino-Soviet Split

The Sino-Soviet split was partly the result of a historic mistrust between China and the Soviet Union, and underpinned their growing differences over a wide range of issues. These were aggravated in the late 1950s by ideological disputes, conflict of interests and by Mao's intractability towards the Soviet command. China therefore adopted a policy of independence from the Soviet Union.

China and the Soviet Union had long been rivals in history. In terms of long-range aspirations, Mao Tse-tung wanted to establish China as a world power. The Soviets, however, attempted to maintain at least some measure of restraints over China. Consequently, the Soviet Union refused to provide nuclear technology to China, since it did not want a strong, intractable neighbour with nuclear capacity. Furthermore, their old territorial disputes became tense once again in 1958. When the Moslems rebelled in China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, causing a large-scale exodus of Muslim insurgents from Xinjiang to the Soviet Union, China accused the Soviets of providing assistance to the Moslem exodus.

Beijing was also unhappy with Moscow's relaxation of tension with the United States. Especially after the 1959 Camp David meeting between the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev and the U.S.
President Dwight Eisenhower, at which time the two superpowers decided to impose a nuclear test ban, China felt that the Soviet Union was not only refusing to support China's development of nuclear weapons, but was also colluding with the United States to block other countries from developing nuclear weapons.

Mao Tse-tung's personality also greatly affected the split with the Soviet Union. He was especially disappointed with Stalin's indifference to the Chinese Communist Party before it came to power. He was also averse to the Soviet interference into China's internal affairs. Furthermore, his intractable personality prevented him from obliging and ceding to the Soviet demand. Therefore, from the mid-1950s on, he began to challenge the authority of the Soviet Union with the socialist commonwealth and competed for the leadership of the international communist movement. As the two communist powers competed for legitimacy within the socialist world, China intended to gain an equal relationship with the Soviet Union.

With the onset of deteriorating Sino-Soviet relation, by 1958, the Soviet Union conversely no longer felt obliged to support China in issues of international disputes. Khrushchev not only refused to support the Chinese against the United States during the Taiwan Strait Crisis in terms of increasing economic and military aid, but also supported India during the Sino-Indian war by dramatically increasing Soviet military and economic aid to India.

Finally, the Soviet Union instigated the imposition of sanctions by the Eastern Bloc against China in late 1959. It
sought to change China’s independent stance towards the Soviet Union and to punish its separation from the socialist commonwealth.

(2) The Taiwan Straits Crisis and Increasing Sino-U.S. Tensions

In 1954, the United States and Taiwan signed a Treaty of Mutual Defense in which the United States committed itself to the defence of Taiwan. Under this U.S. protection and support, Chiang Kai-shek built up a military force on the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu, and claimed that a KMT military force would soon "counterattack" the communist Mainland. By 1958, Chiang had had large part of his total ground force stationed on these offshore islands.

At the same time, the United States subsequently expanded its military aid to Taiwan. In early 1958, the U.S. declared that its Matador surface-to-surface tactical nuclear missile would be set up on the U.S. air bases in Taiwan. Taiwan and U.S. officials also frequently visited these islands and had cooperative military exercises. In 1958, the KMT army increased its military reconnaissance of the mainland coastal area.

With this arms escalation and war preparations of Taiwan and the U.S. forces in Taiwan, Mao Tse-tung believed that Chiang’s attack on the mainland was imminent. Therefore, despite the Soviet vacillation of support for China’s claim to Taiwan, Mao decided that China must take action to enhance its security from this
external threat. In July 1958, Mao launched a "liberation Taiwan" propaganda campaign, mobilizing people for a possible war, while warning the United States that China would take action to destroy Chiang's "counterattack" ambition.

Supported by the United States, the Chiang Kai-shek clique has for long been using coastal islands such as Quemoy and Matsu as advance bases for conducting all sorts of harassing and disruptive activities of the Chiang Kai-shek clique against the Chinese Mainland. The Chinese government has every right to deal resolute blows and take necessary military action against Chiang Kai-shek's troops entrenched on the coastal islands.\textsuperscript{89}

In September 1958, the PLA began to bombard Quemoy and Matsu. Although Mao's initial aim was to destroy Chiang's main military facilities on the offshore islands, this turned out to be beyond the PLA's capability, - as was Chiang's ability to "counterattack". As the result, both sides only exchanged shelling across the Strait. However, the Taiwan Straits Crisis once again increased the hostility between China and the United States.

(3) The Sino-Indian War: Further Isolation

The borderline between China and India had long been unclear. In 1913, the British colonial authorities in India held a "three-sides" convention in the northern Indian city of Simla. India, China's Beijing warlord government and representatives of the Tibetan local government took part in the convention. At the

\textsuperscript{89} Beijing Review, 9 September 1958, 16.
meeting, the British representative Arthur H. McMahon drew a line on the map and decided that it would be the borderline between India and Tibet. India's government accepted the McMahon Line as the well-established borderline. The Chinese representatives, however, refused to sign the Simla Treaty, since it granted independence to Tibet and most of the disputed area to India. After the PLA entered Tibet in 1950, the Beijing government declared that the PRC would not accept the artificial line drawn by the British colonialist. However, at that time, China decided to put aside this dispute and did not take substantial action, remaining on the Chinese side of the McMahon line.

In the late 1950s, however, the Tibetan rebellion resurrected the border disputes. Especially after the Dalai Lama escaped from Tibet into India to seek asylum in India in 1959, China accused India of supporting the Tibetan insurgency and re-arming the Tibetans in exile. By 1959, although the PLA had put down the Tibetan rebellion, the Indian government had become very sensitive to Chinese military action in Tibet. India, therefore, increased its military force in the border area and built up new posts in the Chinese-claimed territories and skirmished with Chinese troops.

Beijing believed that India was using the Chinese internal and external difficulties to seize Chinese territories. Beijing also worried that the U.S. and Taiwan were helping to re-equip the Tibetan rebels via India.

By 1962, the border disputes had actually escalated into a war between China and India. The war caused widespread criticism
against China. Not only Moscow supported India, but also "the U.S., Britain and other Western powers, had been seen to step forward staunchly in the hour of India's need, denouncing China, offering India weapons and other assistance." Western countries which had resumed trade relations with China after the Korean War, such as Canada and Japan, again imposed their trade embargo against China in 1962. As a result, China was further isolated in the international community.

3. ROLE OF IDEOLOGY

Ideology was a subtle factor in the Sino-Soviet discord. The first overt ideological dispute between China and the Soviet Union was over ideological purity. It started after the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, at which Khrushchev condemned the rigidity of Stalinism and modified some of the most widely accepted doctrines of Marxist-Leninism. He also introduced the concepts of peaceful co-existence and peaceful competition with capitalist countries, and peaceful transition from capitalism into socialism.

Khrushchev's modification was far from acceptable to the Chinese leadership. Mao observed that Khrushchev's Soviet Union had betrayed Leninist-Stalinist line and had become revisionist.

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Therefore, China launched a polemical debate with the Soviet Union over the two roads to socialism—socialist revolution or peaceful transition.

At the same time, within the international communist community, the Hungarian and Polish crises of 1956, and Yugoslavia's Titoist independence from the socialist bloc in 1957, caused some loss of confidence in the future of the communist movement and gave rise to doubts about the leadership ability and credibility of the Soviet Union. Maoist China used this opportunity to challenge the Soviet authority within the socialist community. It also condemned the Soviet Union for the problems existing in the world communist movement and for its failure in dealing with the new situation that had arisen in Eastern Europe.

China claimed that Khrushchev's "peace" served only his intention to align with imperialist United States. Mao also reaffirmed China's full commitment to world revolution and total opposition to American imperialism, and that this should be the policy of the entire communist bloc.

In its historical relationship with the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communist Party had suffered under Stalin's "great nation chauvinism", Mao himself being dissatisfied with Stalin's attitude toward China. However, when Khrushchev denounced Stalinism, China upheld the Stalinist legend against Khrushchev's "revisionism" and played the part of apologist for Stalinism. This was because, China was even more dissatisfied with Khrushchev's failure to assist China than it had been with Stalin's very limited
assistance. It was very clear however that China had intended to maintain the alliance with the Soviet Union, even after they had started to dispute ideologically in 1958. However, this alliance was ended with the lack of Soviet support throughout the "test of the Taiwan Straits Crisis"§4, as China realized that the Soviet Union was not reliable in providing China with security and developmental assistance, China's two principal concerns. Therefore, this ideological battle was essentially a front for Sino-Soviet competition. Under the ideological surface, the substantial contradiction came from their conflict of interests over competition between the two biggest communist countries and neighbours.

4. SUMMARY

Foreign policy created out of the second restructuring (1958-1962) was characterized by economic self-reliance and political isolation. It was the result of interactions between China's domestic situation and its external environment. Self-reliance was the only option for Mao Tse-tung, since China was facing enormous economic difficulty without the possibility of getting foreign assistance. At the same time, China had entered a gradual political isolation with the split with the Soviet Union, the tensions with the United States during the Taiwan Strait Crisis and

§4 China Under Threat, 79.
international criticism after the Sino-Indian War.

(A) Domestic Factors

The compound factors of domestic political factionalization, power struggle, public criticism to the party during the "Hundred Flowers Blossom Movement", and economic failure of the Great Leap Forward Movement, enabled the Maoist leaders to overestimate internal and external threats and over-react to these threats.

(B) External Factors

The overwhelming hostility of the external environment was another main determinant of Restructuring II. China faced nuclear threats from the United States, the hostility of the Soviet Union, and economic sanctions imposed by both East and West. This grim situation, therefore, created the climate well suited for the dominance of the "left wing" within the party (including Mao himself) and propitious for an ultra-leftist foreign policy, which, in turn exacerbated tensions with other countries and finally led to complete isolation.

(C) Factors of Political Culture

The ideological factor was the fuse of Sino-Soviet disputes. However, the conflict of interests was the crucial cause of their cleavage.

The historical disputes also increased the hostility between the two countries and contributed to their split.
(D) Decision-making Variables

Mao Tse-tung's personality was important in the break with the Soviet Union. His aversion to the Russians and his intractable personality did not allow him to obey and cede to the Soviet Union.

Throughout the 1960s, therefore, China remained in isolation, its foreign activities decreasing to minimal levels. Since the guideline of domestic policy in the 1960s was to "take class struggle as the central task", China paid little attention to the changes in the outside world. A rigid anti-superpower foreign policy of self-reliance was pursued for more than a decade without any adjustment or attempt to re-evaluate the changing international situation until the end of the 1960s, when the Soviet military threat forced China to break through the isolation and turn to the West for support against the Soviet Union.
Chapter 4

Restructuring III (1969-1972)

Sino-American Strategic Partnership

By the end of the 1960s, China's relations with the Soviet Union had so deteriorated that finally the two countries came to a border military conflict in 1969. The Soviet military threat and the urgency of national security forced China to move away from its complete isolationism toward a tactical alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union.

In 1972, the historic visit of President Richard Nixon to China marked a relaxation of Sino-American tensions after hostility and confrontation for two decades. In the wake of this Sino-American detente, China improved its relations with other Western countries.

In the 1970s, China and the United States both considered each other a "strategic partner" in the anti-Soviet front. Such strategic partnership relations were maintained until the end of the decade, when China's fourth foreign policy restructuring took place.
1. DOMESTIC CHAOS: CHINA AT ITS MOST VULNERABLE TIME

(1) Political Anarchy

Facing the failure of the Great Leap Forward Movement and the ensuing famine years of 1960-1962, the Party pragmatists, headed by Liu Shao-qi, with the help of his major associates Deng Xiao-ping and economist Chen Yun, finally had the power to handle the national economy and successfully carry out their economic rehabilitation plan (1963-1965). Under pragmatic economic guidelines, state policy tended to be more flexible and agriculture became more brisk with the emergence of a limited free market for peasants and the reduction in power of communes. By 1965, starvation was past, and production had been restored to its pre-1958 level.

Liu's success in achieving economic recovery was a sharp contrast to Mao's disastrous failure in the Great Leap Forward Movement. Furthermore, Liu's policy gained him popular support, which was a threat to Mao's cult.

In early 1966, therefore, Mao Tse-tung expressed his dissatisfaction with some party leaders. He blamed them for taking the wrong attitudes towards production and revolution by "pulling the cart forward without looking at the direction".\(^5^5\) He concluded that they were no longer revolutionaries putting "power-holders taking

\(^5^5\) "A Talk By Chairman Mao With A Foreign Delegation (31 August 1966)", A Documentary History, 556.
the capitalist road. " Therefore, Mao decided to launch another revolutionary movement and hoped that it would kindle the party to maintain its revolutionary spirit, and that this movement could remove some of his challengers. In August 1966, Mao initiated the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution Movement by publishing his own poster "Bombard the bourgeois Headquarters within the Party". He declared that

the fundamental purpose [of the Cultural Revolution] is to overthrow those in authority taking the capitalist road."

This political movement was directed against elites and intellectuals because Mao believed that his rivals were from the elites and the existing suspicion towards his cult mainly stemmed from among the intellectuals. The Cultural Revolution was carried out in the form of a mass movement. Revolutionary masses were authorized to "overthrow persons in authority taking the capitalist road and seize power from them through class struggle." 68

The movement to seize power started first in 1967. Students established a rebel organization - the "Red Guard" - claimed that they were the guard of Mao Tse-tung's authority. Workers and peasants also set up rebel organizations. By 1969, all the leaders of the provinces and regions were overthrown from their positions

66Ibid., 557.


by mass rebels. Liu Shao-qi and his associates were the focus of attack. Liu was removed from his offices of vice-chairman of the party and state chairman without due process by the mass movement. Deng Xiao-ping was driven out of his office and exiled to the remote countryside.

The chaos of the Cultural Revolution reached its peak in 1969. As a violent mass "power-seize" campaign led by the Red Guard and other mass rebels spread over the country, the country fell into anarchy, and factories and schools closed. Different factions of the Red Guard, and other mass rebel associations, however, came to fight among themselves for power.

The crisis worsened after Mao ordered the army to intervene in the political struggle and "to support the left". As a result, the PLA was deeply involved in internal politics and factional struggles. With the PLA's focus removed from national defence to internal politics, its defence preparedness was adversely affected.

Within the party, the moderate leadership led by Zhou En-lai tried to restore national order and production. However, the radicals - Defence Minister Lin Biao with the help of Mao's wife Jiang Qing - held strong power and influence, and backed the mass movement. Lin Biao was concerned only with increasing his fame by supporting the mass movement, and strengthening his control over the military force by removing his opponents in the name of the seizure of power by mass. At the Ninth Party Congress in 1969, Lin's power reached its peak. He was officially assigned to be the successor of Mao Tse-tung by the new constitution. However, the
new successor was so anxious to replace his leader that he and his military cohorts plotted an assassination of Mao Tse-tung. After the failure of his attempt, Lin was killed in an airplane crash as he escaped to the Soviet Union in September 1971.

(2) Economic Chaos

China's economy had enjoyed a short-term prosperity from 1963 to 1965 due to a rehabilitation plan. The food crisis was alleviated, as is shown by comparing the agriculture net output growth rate in the second five-year-plan (1958-1962) which was -5.9%, with that in the rehabilitation period (1963-1965) it became 11.5%.

However, the pragmatic economic policy was not continued after 1965. Owing to his leftist attitude, Mao Tse-tung decided to adopt a new economic readjustment to counter the increasing external threats China was facing. In 1965, U.S. economic sanctions against China were tightened again in response to China's support of North Vietnam. Meanwhile, Sino-Soviet tension also increased. Mao Tse-tung believed that the hostile environment indicated a coming war. With the strong support of the Defence Minister Lin Biao, Mao declared that Chinese economy would develop a "Three Fronts

\(^{69}\text{Carl Riskin, China's Political Economy: The Quest For Development Since 1949, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988, 78}\\
^{70}\text{Ibid., 72}
Strategy". According to this strategy, China would be divided into three fronts from the border and coastal areas to the inland. In order to minimize the loss of industrial assets in the event of war, the whole country's industrial layout would have to be redistributed, and moved from the first front (coastal and border areas) and the second front (vast plain areas in the eastern part of China) into the third front (west inland areas), so that to ensure that the entire industry would be able to survive a prolonged war. The "Three Fronts Strategy" lasted from 1965 to 1971. During this period, more than 400 large-scale factories and their workers were moved inland.\textsuperscript{11} Newly built petroleum complexes and other industrial bases during this period were all located within the third front. Inland railway lines, power stations, and water projects also saw widespread construction at this time. Indeed, two-thirds of the industrial investment went to third front construction. Although this strategy greatly promoted the development of the backward inland, the waste was tremendous. Furthermore, with the state's priority turned to the Cultural Revolution, the national economy dropped again after 1967 with the GNP of 1967-68 having decreased by 6-7\% from 1966.\textsuperscript{12}

By 1972, the "Three Fronts Strategy" ended, because of the fall of its main advocate, Lin Biao, and the problem of its enormous cost. Furthermore, with the Sino-American detente, China had American support against the Soviet threat, the "Three Fronts

\textsuperscript{11}The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, 75.

\textsuperscript{12}Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo hwang, China Under Threat, 200.
Strategy" was no longer important to the Chinese leaders.

2. EXTERNAL THREAT: AN IMMINENT WAR

(1) Sino-Soviet Military Conflict

Sino-Soviet hostility grew even worse in the 1960s. The confrontation had escalated from oral slanders and economic non-cooperation to military threats. In 1966, the Soviet Union signed a defence treaty with Mongolia which authorized Soviet troops to be stationed in Mongolia. The Soviet Union increased its military force along the Sino-Soviet border as well as the Sino-Mongolian border. The Chinese responded by reallocating its military force. The PLA troops were moved from the coastal area of the Taiwan Strait to the Sino-Soviet border.

Historical territorial dispute, reenforced, therefore, especially over the ownership of certain islands in the Amur and Ussuri rivers between the two countries. Both China and the Soviet Union increased their border patrols and expanded the patrolling range into these disputed islands. Finally, in March 1969, military conflict broke out between the two countries on Zhenbaodao Island\(^{73}\) in the middle of Ussuri River.

The scale of the Zhenbaodao battle was limited. Each side had

involved only around 300 soldiers in the war, and it lasted only a few days. However, the symbolism of the Zhenbaodao battle was important to China. Chinese leadership worried that it was only the prelude to a major war with the Soviet Union. Since the Soviet Union continued to increase its military deployment along the frontier. "By 1970 the Soviet build-up of conventional forces along the frontier had reached at least thirty-five combat divisions with another twenty-five divisions ready to reinforce them." 75

China's fear stemmed from the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and the unveiling of the Brezhnev doctrine, which upheld the principle of the collective defence of socialism in any country of the socialist commonwealth. Chinese leaders feared that China would become the next victim of Soviet military intervention. With respect to its political crisis, economic chaos and the military weakness, "China was in a particularly weak and vulnerable position, in part because its military forces had become bogged down in domestic chores involving the maintenance of order and management of civilian administrative affairs". 76 China's capability did not allow it to enter a major war with the Soviet Union. China, therefore, had to break out of its isolationism and

74 Ibid., 999.
seek alliance with foreign countries.

(2) Turning to the West

Moderate leaders, represented by Zhou En-lai, suggested seeking American help. Considering that the United States had deescalated the Vietnam War and entered into the Paris peace talks, they argued that the United States had become less aggressive. It was time, therefore, to relax Sino-American tensions. Because the Soviet Union was the number one opponent of the United State, the U.S. would welcome China in its anti-Soviet front.

Radical leader Lin Biao opposed the approach to America. He advocated decreasing tensions with the Soviet Union in order to alleviate its pressure upon China's border. With his aim of seizing complete power, Lin Biao preferred to concentrate on internal revolution, enabling him to remove competitors within the party and the PLA.

Mao Tse-tung finally adopted the strategy of the moderates, even though he viewed the United States and the Soviet Union as equal enemies. But by the late 1960s, the increasing Soviet threat outweighed the U.S. threat. Of the two superpowers, the Chinese leadership believed that the Soviet Union was the more aggressive and that the United States was on the defensive. Evidence of this, they felt, lay in the fact that the Soviet Union carried out expansion in all directions with its increasing influence in the
Indian sub-continent, its naval presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and its expansion in Africa and Asia.

Consequently, by late 1969, China proposed the holding of ambassadorial level Sino-American talks in Warsaw. During this time, China also sent messages to the U.S. through various other channels. Chinese leaders did not conceal their fear of the Soviet Union and admitted that it was the impetus behind their approach to the Americans. China’s official Xin Hua News Agency announced that Peking [Beijing]... needs to improve her relations with the United States because of her realistic appraisal of the current international situation, including her fear of an aggressive Soviet Union..."\(^{77}\)

The United States responded positively, because the U.S. leadership held a common perception of Soviet expansion. Newly elected president Richard Nixon reassessed the relationship between the United States and China right after he came to power. By 1972, China and the United States finally had improved.

The relaxation in Sino-American relations led to a wave of foreign recognitions of the People's Republic of China. Between 1969 and 1972, nearly forty countries recognized the PRC. This recognition was not only from the third World, but also from other Western countries such as Canada and Italy in 1970, Belgium, Luxembourg and Iceland in 1971, and other U.S. allies in 1972.\(^{78}\)

\(^{77}\)"Xin Hua News Announcement on the U.S. President Nixon's Visit"(July 16, 1971), Essential Works of Chinese Communism, 512

\(^{78}\)Dictionary of International Relations, 42, 45, 70.
With the recognition of Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China, the United Nations in 1971 voted for the admission of the PRC and the expulsion of Nationalist Taiwan. After two decades of being rejected from the international community, communist China not only entered the United Nations, but also held a permanent seat on the Security Council; hence becoming the only Third World country having the same right of veto as the two superpowers. It greatly enhanced China’s status in the international community.

3. RECURRENCE OF HISTORICAL LEGACY

Historical disputes were the main cause of the Sino-Soviet military conflict. In the nineteenth century, Tsarist Russia joined with other foreign powers in the colonization of China. Russia was the nation that nibbled the most out of Chinese territories by forcing China to agree to the ceding of the vast Amur and Ussuri basin to Russia through the Treaties of Aigun (1858)\(^{80}\), Beijing (1860)\(^{81}\), and Ili (1881)\(^{82}\). Territory ceded in

\(^{73}\)Known as "Heilongjiang" in Chinese, Sino-Russian Relations, 72.

\(^{80}\)The Treaty of Aigun, signed between Russia and the Manchu governor of Heilongjiang (the northernmost Manchurian province) of China on 23 May 1858, recognized the north bank of the Amur River as Russian. See R.K.I. Quested, Sino-Russian Relations: A Short Story, Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1984, 74.
these treaties amounted to over one and a half million square
kilometres.\textsuperscript{81}

When the CCP came to power in 1949, China declared the
abrogation of all unequal treaties. However, China put aside the
territorial disputes with the Soviet Union and maintained the
status quo but reserved the right to re-negotiation. In the face
of the Soviet military enforcement along the Chinese border, China
recalled the legacy from the past and argued that conditions were
ripe for re-negotiation over these territories, demanding that the
Soviets military forces draw back from the disputed area. The
Soviet Union refused any negotiation about old treaties and
declared that they would defend these territories. Mao Tse-tung,
employing China's nation-wide media, reminded the people of the
humiliating memory of semi-colonization when China had accepted
unequal treaties and ceded territories to other countries. By
arousing a popular anti-Soviet mood, Mao mobilized the people for
a possible war with the Soviet Union.

\textsuperscript{81}The Treaty of Peking [Beijing], was signed on 14 November
1860, which gave Russia unconditionally the whole region from the
Stanovoi range to the Amur. Ibid., 76.

\textsuperscript{82}The Treaty of Ili, signed between China and Russian in 1881,
in which China ceded another piece of territory between the Muzart
and the Talki passes and the Tekesh and Ili rivers. Ibid., 81.

\textsuperscript{83}Ibid., 82.
1. SUMMARY

The third foreign policy restructuring, from 1969 to 1972, ended China's isolation. Through the establishment of a Sino-U.S., anti-Soviet strategic partnership, China exploited American assistance and protection against the Soviet expansion. As a result, although the Soviet Union still maintained heavy military pressure on China's northern border, the Chinese leadership's fear of the Soviet threat was alleviated.

(A) External Factors

The most important determinant of the third foreign policy restructuring was the Soviet military threat. The 1969 border conflict convinced Chinese leaders that a war with the Soviet Union was imminent.

(B) Domestic Factors

1969 was a most vulnerable time for China. Domestic problems such as the severe political crisis, economic chaos and the bog-down of the PLA into domestic political struggle forced the Chinese leadership to do everything possible to avoid a war with the Soviet Union.

Inside the party, with the fall of radical leader Lin Biao, the moderate leaders represented by Zhou En-lai regained their influence in the making of foreign policy, and contributed to the adoption of a pro-West policy.
(C) Factors of Political Culture

The perceived threat from the Soviet Union was a powerful factor in cementing the Sino-American alliance regardless of their different systems and ideologies. Therefore, during the third restructuring, ideology did not play an important role because national security concerns outweighed revolutionary doctrines. The historical legacy of territorial disputes also increased the hostility to Russians during this restructuring.

(D) Decision-making Variables

Under the formidable Soviet military threat, the role of Mao’s personality also gave way in foreign policy decision-making to the pragmatism of ensuring national survival.

The third foreign policy restructuring greatly contributed to the rise of China’s status in the international arena. The People’s Republic of China finally won universal acceptance and recognition. It was a quick success considering it had been refused recognition by many Western powers and isolated from the international community for two decades. Furthermore, the third foreign policy restructuring marked the first time that China began to play the triangle game, seeking benefits from the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This new discovery then enabled China to derive considerable diplomatic leverage from the competition between the two superpowers in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Chapter 5

Restructuring IV (1978-1982)

Non-alignment Diversification

With the reforms, initiated at the end of the 1970s, China has been undergoing a period of substantive and far-reaching transformation. The installation of a new leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping, and the ensuing pursuit of new policies marked by economic reforms and the opening to the outside world, have ushered in a new era of change in China. Chinese foreign policy has experienced its fourth restructuring.

The "open-door" policy was first unveiled at the historic Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress in December 1978, which decided to carry out economic reform and open China's door to the outside world. During the following four years, a set of new foreign policies was developed and completed. These aimed at achieving a more favourable external environment, in order to ensure security for domestic economic development, and to seek more economic and technological advantages from the outside world for China's modernization. Therefore, the foreign policy orientation changed from the 1970s' pro-American and anti-Soviet strategy to diversified diplomacy in the 1980s.

In 1982, the Twelfth Party Congress endorsed the foreign policy reorientation by reaffirming the open-door policy, stressing that
diplomacy must serve modernization. In the same year, China abandoned its international anti-Soviet front, and stepped on the path towards the orientation of non-alignment-diversification. This pattern of external relations has continued into the 1980s with China having largely extended its external interactions with foreign countries and international organizations, and avoided military commitments to any military blocs.

1. DOMESTIC MODERNIZATION: THE BASIS OF FOREIGN POLICY

The Cultural Revolution (1967-1976) left China with an economy with many serious difficulties. However, the approach to the West in the 1970s enabled the Chinese to finally realize the large gap in economic development existing between China and the advanced countries.

As senior leader Deng Xiao-Ping aptly observed:

China is both a major country and a minor one. When we say it is a major country, we mean it has a large population and a vast territory, But at the same time, China is a minor country, an undeveloped country. It is a minor one in terms of its ability to safeguard peace and deter war. 84

China's influence in the international arena was quite small because of its long absence and weak capability. There were growing anxieties among the Chinese elite over the increasing disparity in economic development between China and the advanced

countries in the world, and the fact that China was excluded from the international economic mainstream. The standards of technology in China were also backward. When China woke up from the Cultural Revolution, it suddenly found that world technology had entered an era of computerization, while China had wasted decades in political movements. In addition, what further alerted Beijing was the sustained rapid economic growth in neighbouring East Asian countries. It sensed that if China remained weak and poor and continued to fall behind the rest of the world, it would become a loser in the process of interstate competition.

Economic backwardness also seriously crippled China's defensive strength against external threats. The traditional Maoist "people's war" strategy had impeded the Chinese People's Liberation Army from updating its technological level. Consequently, the 1974 military conflict with South Vietnam over the Paracel (Xisha) Islands and the 1979 border war against Vietnam exposed the backwardness of Chinese military technology. It was not surprising that the Western military experts judged that "China could not outgun any major military power in the world today."^{55}

Furthermore, the economic chaos and continuous decreasing living standards during the Cultural Revolution raised people's doubts about the present system, thus undermining the party's ruling basis. Most Chinese were tired of the endless political movements. The disastrous Cultural Revolution brought an

unprecedented level of doubt about to the party's legitimacy, which the Chinese leadership described as a "faith crisis", which comprised the Chinese public's lack of faith in socialism, of trust in the communist party, and of confidence in China's future.

In 1974, therefore, during his second short-term restoration, Vice-Premier Deng Xiao-Ping tried to pay more attention to economic development than to political movement. He and his supporter, Premier Zhou En-lai began to advocate the Four Modernization Program, which aimed to modernize China's agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology. Before they could implement this plan, however, Zhou En-lai died in January 1976, and soon Deng was once again removed from his office by the "Gang of Four", headed by Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, who believed that modernization would only lead China to capitalism.

Reformers led by Deng Xiao-Ping eventually gained the control two years after Mao's death and the collapse of the "Gang of Four", both in 1976. At that time China's national economy was on the verge of bankruptcy, and the new leadership realized that ending political movements and raising people's living standards was the only way to appeal for popular support and to consolidate the party's rule.

Therefore, the urgent task that the new leadership faced was to somehow find a way to maintain the validity of socialism and the

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86 The "Gang of Four" included Mao's wife, Jiang Qing; Vice-president of the state, Wang Hong-wen; Members of the CCP Central Committee Zhang Chun-qiao and Yao Wen-yuan. Alan P.L. Liu, How China is Ruled, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1986, 66.
communist regime. China's new leaders came to the conclusion that economic performance was the key to national security and the party's legitimacy, and recognised the need to change the rigid Maoist economic model. At the time, not only reformers, led by Deng Xiao-ping, wanted to promote economic development through reform, but also conservatives, headed by Chen Yun, a cautious economist, who did not oppose this program. The disputes between reformers and conservatives arose only on how far, and how fast any economic reforms should go. For the reformers, priority was on economic development, at the expense of orthodox ideology. In foreign policy this group was eager to increase China's economic interaction with the advanced market economies. Conservative leaders shared with the reformers a strong interest in the rapid modernization of the Chinese economy. They, however, advocated reform of the Stalinist economic model based on a pragmatic adjustment of internal economic structures. They were suspicious and cautious of the open-door policy and the Western influence.

In December 1978, the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress formally endorsed the shift in the party's central task from class struggle to the Four Modernizations. Since then, modernization has become China's central program and formed the basis of its domestic and foreign policy.

The imperatives of the process of modernization and the need to respond to such imperatives with external resources are the primary factors that account for this opening to the outside world. By the end of the 1970s, there were 400,000 existing industrial
enterprises in urgent need of technological transformation, without which it would indeed be impossible to obtain any meaningful augmentation of productivity. Such transformation required not only equipment and technology, but also required large amounts of capital and investment. China also needed sufficient capital and the appropriate 'know-how' to utilize to rich natural resources and to avoid waste caused by extensive, inefficient exploration. Historical experience proved that thorough self-reliance did not perform well in promoting China's economic development and technological progress. Thus, the alternative was to seek assistance from foreign countries for investment, technology and equipment. As Premier Zhao Zi-yang admitted:

In the world today, production, commodity circulation and science and technology are so highly developed that no single country has all the resources and technology needed for developing its economy.  

As the economic reform started in 1978, a new foreign policy of opening to the outside world was put forth for the purpose of serving the state's "central task" - modernization. In addition to domestic economic reform, therefore, China now needed two external conditions to secure and realize modernization. Firstly, it required a peaceful external environment. As Foreign Minister Wu Xue-qian stated:

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The fundamental aim of China's foreign policy is to preserve world peace and secure an enduring peaceful environment for devoting all its energies to socialist modernization. 

Deng Xiao-Ping put it more explicitly:

China needs at least twenty years of peace to concentrate on our domestic development. 

Secondly, it needed sources of foreign investment and technology. Deng Xiao-ping declared that

China has now adopted a policy of opening our door to the world, in a spirit of international cooperation.... Our country's modernization would be impeded if we rejected international cooperation. In no country has the process of modernization occurred in isolation. To accelerate China's modernization we must not only make use of other countries' experience, we must also avail ourselves of foreign funding and technology.

Therefore, China, on the one hand, exerted itself to change its bellicose image. It made great efforts in the 1980s to search for security by substantially improving relations with neighbours and other countries in the world. On the other hand, it also tried to seek maximum economic advantages for modernization, and "economic diplomacy" became an important content of its foreign behaviour.

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90 Deng Xiao-ping, Fundamental Issues, 74.
2. EXTERNAL DIVERSITY: DIPLOMACY SERVES ECONOMY

(1) Quest for Security

By the end of the 1970s, the changing international circumstances promoted the reassessment in China of its relationship with the two superpowers. The Chinese decision-makers appeared to have concluded that the momentum the Soviet Union, had established in the 1970s was now fading. As Soviet power declined because of its own economic problems and difficulties in Eastern Europe, its threat to China's security seemed less serious than before. On the other hand, American military power enjoyed a resurgence under the Reagan administration. The Chinese analysts generally believed that, in the 1980s, the two superpowers seemed to be getting into a new balance, and that they were locked in a strategic stalemate characterized by confrontation and dialogue. The Chinese leaders saw in the early 1980s that such a balance and stalemate provided an opportunity to seek a greater advantage from the superpowers. By playing a balancing game between them, China could gain more bargaining power and seek more economic benefits. China could now strike an independent posture in its foreign policy to work to ensure China's security and increase China's manoeuvrability.

The process of improving Sino-Soviet relations was lengthy, and a return to the "honeymoon" of the 1950s was not anticipated. However, it was clear that China's foreign policy was pointing to
an eventual normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. In April 1979, while the Chinese on the one hand notified Moscow that the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Alliance would not be renewed on its thirtieth anniversary the following year, they also called for normalization of relations on the basis of peaceful co-existence. Border talks, which had occurred on and off for 10 years without producing any significant result, were resumed in September 1979.

The process was disrupted, however, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at year's end. Headway was made once again in 1982, when Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev made a conciliatory speech in which he reaffirmed the Soviet Union's support for China's sovereignty over Taiwan and proposed that both sides make new efforts to improve bilateral relations. The Chinese responded to it by resuming ministerial-level talks with Moscow. This time the atmosphere that surrounded the dialogue was more relaxed than on previous occasions. China ceased its hostility against the Soviet Union and disengaged from the U.S.-led anti-Soviet crusade. By the end of the year, "at the 12th Party Congress in 1982, fundamental doctrinal changes bearing on foreign policy, were made more particularly on Sino-Soviet relations..., the Maoist doctrine of the ‘inevitability of war’ was abandoned."32 Therefore, China completely stopped its appeal for the establishment of a broad

international anti-Soviet front.

At the same time, China kept the United States well-informed that China and the Soviet Union were improving their relations. During Ronald Reagan’s visit to China in 1984, Chinese leaders disappointed their guest by reiterating China’s intent to normalize relations with the Soviet Union, instead of re-stressing the anti-Soviet partnership as Reagan had hoped.

The Sino-Soviet detente and the disbanding of the Sino-American partnership portended the end of China’s anti-Soviet, pro-American strategy. For the first time in its forty year history, the People’s Republic of China could maintain an equidistant, yet relatively good relationship, with both the United States and the Soviet Union simultaneously. "This was a singular achievement, especially in view of the record of preceding decades which is filled with endless polemics, tensions and frequent conflicts between China and one or both of the superpowers." Furthermore, improvement of Sino-Soviet relations had removed, at least for the foreseeable future, its largest security threat posed by this traditional rivalry. It greatly decreased the Soviet military pressure on China along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders that had lasted for decades. Under the aegis of this foreign policy, China also greatly improved its relations with other countries along its periphery.

Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979 caused, to some extent,

ASEAN countries and China to move closer to each other. China's decrease and even renouncement of support for the communist parties of several neighbouring countries was also attributed to the improvement in relations with its neighbours. As the result, it respectively resumed and established diplomatic relations with Indonesia and Singapore. By the end of the 1980s, China had improved its relationship with its neighbours and the ASEAN countries. For the first time in its history, China now could say it had no serious conflict with any one of its 12 neighbours and another nearby countries.

(2) Opening up to the Outside World

With top priority given to modernization, China rapidly expanded its foreign trade and economic cooperation with other countries, especially the advanced market economies, and increased the inflow of capital, equipment, technology and managerial expertise after it opened its door in 1978. Given the fact that West as a whole, predominated in the world economy and was the main source of advanced technology and capital, China's open-door policy emphasized increased economic exchanges with the West. In the decade following the opening door, China received a great deal of

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Before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, China had common border with 12 countries, including: North Korea, the Soviet Union, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Sikkim, Nepal, Bhutan, Burma, Laos, and Vietnam. Dictionary of International Relations, 1.
advanced technology and capital from the United States, Japan and other Western countries, which significantly contributed to the speedy development of the Chinese economy. Japan, Hong Kong, the European Community as a whole, and the United States became China's first, second, third and fourth largest trade partners respectively. As the result of the open-door policy, by 1988, the total import and export value had reached US$102.8 billion, 3.9 times that of 1979, or 28% percent of the year's GNP.\textsuperscript{55} China's export volume ranked 16th in the world in 1989, whereas it stood at number 32 in 1979.\textsuperscript{96} Some US$32 billion in foreign loans and US$14.7 billion of direct investment had already been committed by 1989.\textsuperscript{97}

China saw the Soviet Union and East Europe as a potential partner in economic cooperation. The Soviet union, as a neighbour with a vast market for large amounts of consumer goods, and a wealth of natural resources, would no doubt be good for China's fast-growing economy. From East Europe, China sought information about experiments in the reform of Soviet style economics and diversification of its economic relations. Beijing was also interested in the less advanced, but also less expensive, technologies that could serve as a useful complement to those imported in the 1950s.

\textsuperscript{55}Asia Year Book 1991, 1.


\textsuperscript{97}Ibid., 21.
In addition, China joined and actively participated in almost all major international financial and trade institutions, which it had accused earlier of being "capitalist instruments to exploit the Third World". As the Chinese "discovered" the reality of an interdependent world economy in the early 1980s, they also accepted the existence of the prevailing set of international economic regimes, from which they hoped to gain advantage. Thus, in the financial realm, China signalled the end of its isolationism by joining the IMF and the World Bank in 1980, and it increased its borrowing from Western financial markets and international organizations. China's desire to increase its trade also led it to apply for membership in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), an organization from which it withdrew in 1950. It also became a member of the International Bank for Recovery and Development (IBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).  

98 China's Growing Linkages to the International System

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Memberships</th>
<th>1949-65</th>
<th>1966-77</th>
<th>1978-88</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Conventions (Multilateral</td>
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<td>Treaties)</td>
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<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nongovernmental</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>574</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. CHALLENGING TRADITIONAL DOCTRINES

The open-door policy signalled a radical departure from many basic doctrines, as well as from old perceptions toward the outside world. However, the open-door policy was also a sensitive topic in Chinese history, closely related to its semi-colonial experience in late eighteenth century at the time the United States pursued an "open door policy" in China.\(^{99}\) For a long time, communist China's official history book described the open-door policy as "American imperialist's colonial policy intended to make China become a colony shared by all imperialists."\(^{100}\) Therefore, adopting an open-door policy risked challenging China's traditional historical view and the party's past ideological stance. As preparation to the overall restructuring of the internal and external policy, therefore, Deng Xiao-Ping sponsored a public discussion called "Practice Is the Sole Criterion For Judging Truths". This nationwide discussion lasted for more than two years and involved state leaders, party theorists and scholars of social science. Many old ideological doctrines were criticized or reinterpreted, and some new perceptions were developed or introduced.

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\(^{99}\) In 1899, the U.S. State Secretary John Milton Hay delivered an official note to the governments of Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Italy and Russia, in which the United States advanced an "open-door policy" in China, i.e., the United States would recognize their "spheres of influence", however, the U.S. must enjoy all privileges and freedom of trading and low tariff within these "spheres of influence". Dictionary of International Relations, 126.

\(^{100}\) Ibid., 126.
(1) Putting aside traditional aversion to Western influence, the party's theorists poured out large number of articles in order to change the people's old impressions of the open-door. They argued that opening China's door to the outside world would not contradict the preservation of its cultural and historical identity if the party can screen "more fresh wind (economic benefits) through the door but fewer flies (Western 'spiritual pollution')." Technology and capital, from foreign countries was therefore seen to be necessary for establishing China's capability and the party's legitimacy.

(2) In contrast to its call in the 1970s for world-wide awareness and for nation-wide preparation for the imminence of war, the Chinese leaders in the 1980s publicly indicated that China had changed its perception of the inevitability of war. Premier Zhao Zi-yang commented that

Although the present international situation is very complicated and the factor of war still exists...The forces of peace and the tendency of cooperation have been growing, and through the joint efforts of the world's people it is entirely possible to obtain world peace.

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101. "Spiritual pollution" in China was considered including influence of "bourgeois liberalization", individualism, and Western culture. See *Fundamental Issues*, 114.

102. Li Peng, "Insist Opening Policy, Against Spiritual Pollution" *People's Daily*, 15 January 1988

This optimism was claimed to be based on "long-term studies and sober analysis of the postwar strategic conditions." 104

(3) Chinese theorists also re-defined the global economic system. In the early 1950s, China had accepted the Soviet "two-bloc" view of the world market, which saw two separate markets, capitalist and socialist, the latter the stronger. However, when the Soviet Union attempted to enforce an international division of labour in the socialist market, China regarded it as a form of covert imperialism, and therefore rejected joining the socialist market bloc. In the early 1980s, as Chinese analysts examined the patterns of international economic interaction more or less free of ideological blinkers, they not only acknowledged that there was a single world economic system, but also accepted the fact that "capitalism and imperialism occupy a dominant position in this unified market." 105 In order to push forward its modernization drive, they felt that China had to participate in this world market.

(4) Mao Tse-tung's self-reliance was reinterpreted. Maoist self-reliance was designed to attain a two-fold objective: 1) to promote internal development, and, 2) to avoid external dependency. As the new leadership looked back, they found that Mao had gone too far in making the virtue of self-reliance a necessity. It had been


elevated into "close-doorism" and denied China's right to benefit from participating in the international economic system.

China's revolution and national construction are not and cannot be carried on in isolation from the rest of the world. It is always necessary for us to try to win foreign aid, and, in particular, to learn all that is advanced and beneficial from other countries. The closed-door policy, blind opposition to everything foreign and any theory or practice of great-nation chauvinism are all entirely wrong. 106

The experience of the past twenty years proved to Chinese leaders that a closed-door policy would hinder national economic development. When Deng Xiao-Ping put forward the open-door concept, he argued that the open-door policy mutually complemented self-reliance rather than contradicted it, because it would profit China's modernization and strengthen the country's national self-reliance in the long-term.

(5) Support of world revolution had long been disputed between China's two key foreign decision-making organizations, the government's Foreign Ministry and the CCP Foreign Liaison Ministry. The Foreign Ministry argued that support for foreign revolutionary parties would seriously damage inter-governmental relations. With Burma, for instance, the Foreign Ministry complained that aid to the Burmese Communist Party impeded further improvement of relations with the Burmese government. The Chinese local governments adjacent to Burma also strongly demanded the abandonment of the Burmese Communist Party. They saw the Burmese

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Communist base along the Sino-Burmese border as an obstacle to developing trade relations with the Burmese government and a barrier in its way of transportation to the Burmese harbours which, for these governments were much nearer than China’s coast. In the early 1980s, this dispute seemed to come to an end, with the conclusion that the state’s interest was more important than the ideology of supporting world revolution.

4. SUMMARY

Restructuring IV changed China’s pattern of external relations from strategic partnership with the United States to non-alignment diversification. Different from the previous three foreign policy restructurings, which were mainly swings within the big triangle pattern, the fourth restructuring from 1978 to 1982 basically, although not completely, broke away from this pattern by opening to the outside world and diversifying China’s external relations. Such change was greatly attributed to the changes within China and without.

(A) Domestic Factors

The most important determinants of the fourth foreign policy restructuring were found among the domestic factors. Economically, the change of developmental strategy had critical influence on this foreign policy restructuring. When the Chinese elite realized that
economic vulnerability had threatened the party's rule and undermined the state's position in the international arena, economic growth and modernization were made the state's priority and became impetus behind the foreign policy restructuring.

Politically, the people's "faith crisis" with respect to the party's legitimacy and the future of socialism after the disastrous Cultural Revolution also required a reforms. The reformers's victory in the post-Mao power-shift factional struggle ensured this pragmatic foreign policy restructuring.

(B) External Factors

Among the external factors, the disparity in economic development between China and the advanced countries in the world, and the fact that China was excluded from the international economic mainstream were viewed as threatening China's status in the international arena, therefore this threat became an impetus to the change in China's developmental strategy, and to the fourth foreign policy restructuring.

The international situation and the changing relations within the big triangle in the 1980s also contributed to the decision to introduce this foreign policy restructuring. They provided China with the opportunity to attain good relations with most countries in the world, creating not only a safer environment for its economic development, but also offering a great increase in trade, foreign technology and investment, so vital to China's modernization.
(C) Factors of Political Culture

Ideology was not a predominant determinant in this restructuring. The influence of orthodox Communist ideology has gradually decreased with the changes within China and in the outside world. Reforms moved ahead with many ideological doctrines being reinterpreted and new ideological concepts created to legitimise these policy changes.

(D) Decision-making Variables

Since the post-Mao era has seen an emphasis on economic determinants of foreign policy, the leadership personality factor was hardly influential in this foreign policy restructuring.

Bureaucratic influence was also a determinant, as the Foreign Ministry successfully changed the policy focus from the CCP External Liaison Ministry's revolutionary goals to developmental aims.

The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed major foreign policy shifts in China as the fourth restructuring radically changed China's whole pattern of external relations. Due to this restructuring, the People's Republic of China had finally, and for the first time since its establishment in 1949, achieved positive foreign relations - a goal its leaders had long aspired to. As a result, they could now claim to operate in a relatively peaceful international environment that was beneficial to the attainment of their domestic goals of economic development.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

A. THE HOLSTI MODEL AND THE CHINESE CASE

China's four foreign policy restructurings during the past forty years have generally met the criteria of Kal Holsti's model of dramatic changes in a country's external relations.

Table 6.1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reorientation</th>
<th>Disengagement</th>
<th>Restructuring</th>
<th>New Pattern</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>set up new independent foreign policy for the new state</td>
<td>disengage from pro-U.S. pattern and old unequal treaties</td>
<td>lean to the Soviet Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949 to 1950</td>
<td></td>
<td>pro-Soviet dependence</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>escape Soviet control, seek autonomy</td>
<td>end Sino-Soviet Alignment</td>
<td>anti super-powers, economic self-reliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 to 1962</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>isolation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>seek the U.S. support, ensure security from the Soviet threat</td>
<td>break out isolationism</td>
<td>improve relations with Western countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969 to 1972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sino-U.S strategic partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>open to the outside world, seek economic benefits</td>
<td>depart from U.S.-led anti-Soviet front</td>
<td>diversification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 to 1982</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The process of the Chinese foreign policy restructurings basically follows four steps according to Holsti: 1) the intention to reorient foreign policy; 2) disengagement from the old patterns of external relations; 3) restructuring foreign policy; 4) forming a new pattern of external relations through the actions of disengagement and restructuring. (See Table 6.1)

Conforming to Holsti's key hypothesis which asserts that the cause of foreign policy restructuring is often a response to a military or nonmilitary threat, China's foreign policy restructuring has taken place when the decision-makers perceived domestic or external threats to national security, independence and development - the basic goals that have been considered the most important to Chinese policy-makers. Through Restructuring I, which took place from 1949 to 1950 when China leaned to the Soviet side, China's leaders sought to free the country from foreign domination and to cope with American hostility and the instability of the new regime. The principle purpose of Restructuring II (1958-1962) was to escape the Soviet hegemon by pursuing a policy of economic self-reliance and political isolation. Restructuring III from 1969 to 1972, responded to the Soviet military threat; China turned to the West and established a Sino-American anti-Soviet strategic partnership. The diversification of Restructuring IV (1978-1982) was intended to prevent China from being thrown to the periphery of the world economy.

From the examination of the determinants of China's four post-1949 restructurings, some generalizations and conclusions can be
reached that may be useful in analyzing possible future foreign policy restructuring.

(1) Independent variables

Table 6.2
Independent Variables of Chinese foreign Policy Restructurings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Domestic Factors</th>
<th>External Factors</th>
<th>Political Culture</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>political crisis &amp; faction</td>
<td>economic vulnerability &amp; Development strategy</td>
<td>military or non-military threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
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<td>yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(A) Domestic Factors

1. China's foreign policy restructurings are closely related to its internal politics. Domestic politics, which includes political crises such as power struggles and mass movements, and party factionalization, has had an important effect upon key foreign policy changes. The making of foreign policy in each of the four
foreign policy restructuring has more or less involved all of these variables. All four restructurings were affected by political crises. At the time of Restructuring I, the instability of the new regime prompted its intention to seek Soviet support against external and domestic subversion. Such domestic upheavals as the Great Leap Forward (Restructuring II), Anti-rightist Campaign (Restructuring II) and the Cultural Revolution (Restructuring III) had a radicalizing effect on foreign policy.

The flow of factional politics also influenced the foreign policy orientations of all restructurings with the exception of Restructuring I, when the factionalization among the new ruling elites was not yet prominent. Factional influence took place with the periodical fluctuations between radicalism and moderation, each holding different views of the outside world and responding in different ways. For instance, during Restructuring II, radical isolationism predominated over Liu Shao-qi and Deng Xiao-ping's moderate stance in favour of approaching the West. In Restructuring III, moderates represented by Zhou En-lai won Mao's endorsement and Zhou's pro-Western suggestion became the mainstream of China's foreign policy during the 1970s. Restructuring IV was a result of the reformers' victory against the radical "Gang of Four".

2. Economic vulnerability and the state's development strategy are also important in all four foreign policy restructurings. Chinese policy-makers usually take into account external economic benefits and constraints when they change their foreign policy.
For example, the necessity of economic recovery was important to the first foreign policy restructuring, while the cessation of Soviet economic aid was decisive in the second restructuring. The economic chaos and vulnerability at the time of the third restructuring suggested to the Chinese leaders that they had to avoid a war with the Soviet Union. Finally, the necessity for modernization became the overarching aim and motive for Restructuring IV.

(B) External Factors

1. Among the external factors, specific events or issues which are considered as military or non-military threats often turn into a catalyst for policy restructuring. Important variables such as a conflict of interests or a war with other countries usually have contributed to foreign policy reorientations. Peripheral threats to China and boundary issues have been more likely to become the trigger of policy reorientations. Since China has a common border with 12 neighbours, border disputes have sown discord and even military conflicts which could lead to sudden foreign policy change. The unresolved questions of national territorial integrity such as Taiwan and Tibet are also very sensitive elements to China's foreign policy decision-makers, who prefer to reorient foreign policy than to cede on these issues.
2. China's external relationship structures, including the changing character of the international system and the Sino-Soviet-American triangle, often have been guiding determinants of foreign policy restructuring. The influence of the structure of the international political system is in its "push-effect" on China to go with the main trends in the international political system as a whole. The two-camp structure during the Cold War era greatly influenced China's pattern of policy restructuring. Realizing that China's influence in the international system was very limited, China's new generation of leadership in the 1980s repeatedly reviewed the often fluid international environment for changes that would affect China's basic security and development goals, and adjusted its policy in order to seek maximum national advantage.

The most important factor in China's external relationship structure was the Sino-Soviet-American triangle. Although China was far from a powerful player in this triangle, the relations with the two superpowers were so important to China that its foreign policy had always to take into account the relations with and between them. China's past foreign policy restructurings were all largely determined by the character of its relations with the two superpowers, and were no more than oscillations between the two superpowers, either pro-Soviet or pro-American, and either intensively anti-superpower or equidistant in friendship with both of them. Therefore, the Sino-Soviet-American triangle has been called the "strategic triangle" in China's foreign policy decision-making.
(C) Factors of Political Culture

1. The impact of traditional culture and historical experience has also been large. The humiliating memory of the experience of semi-colonization over the past two centuries, was the main factor in China's traditional value and historical legacy which influenced the Restructuring I. Attitudes towards foreigners have been formed by these factors, breeding the popular anti-imperialist and anti-colonist mood in 1949. The legacy of historical disputes also increased the hostility towards Russians during the Sino-Soviet conflicts (Restructuring II).

2. Ideology has played a subtle role in foreign policy restructuring. In China, ideology has performed the various functions of explaining the phenomena of the world, expressing the interests of the party and particular social groups, and providing the legitimacy for policy. Ideology is not a predominant determinant in decision-making. Instead, it is changeable in accordance with the need of policy-makers and adaptive to circumstances. Even in the strongly ideological period, ideological concerns never ignored national interests. For example, in 1949, the CCP accepted membership in the socialist bloc under the leadership of the Soviet Union not only because they shared a common ideology, but also because they shared a common enemy. In the 1970s, the perceived threat from the Soviet Union was a powerful factor in cementing the Sino-American alliance regardless of the different systems and ideologies. Therefore,
when the U.S. President Richard Nixon told his Chinese counterpart that "there are times when a giant nation must choose between ideology and survival," he believed that "revolutionary Chinese ideology told the Chinese to oppose the U.S.-Japanese defense treaty, and to oppose the U.S. presence in Asia. Yet China's interests dictated otherwise, and China's leaders recognized this - privately if not publicly. When it came to the choice, interests prevailed." Furthermore, the influence of orthodox Communist ideology has gradually decreased with the changes within China and in the outside world. Entering the 1980s, reforms moved ahead without an ideological guideline and on the practical basis of "stepping from one stone to another while crossing the stream." Many ideological doctrines were reinterpreted and new ideological ideas were created to legitimise these policy changes.


108 Ibid., 140.

(2) Decision-making Variables

Table 6.3

Decision-making Variables (Intervening Variables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Restructuring</th>
<th>Leadership Personality</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Influence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Looking at the role of personality, Mao Tse-tung's Views were not decisive except during Restructuring II. The international situation in 1949 and the Soviet military threat in 1969 did not give Mao Tse-tung much leeway to put his personal stamp on foreign policy reorientations. The post-Mao era has seen an emphasis on economic determinants of foreign policy, with idiosyncratic factors being less influential than in Mao's era.

The bureaucracy had a noticeable effect upon Restructuring IV, with the Foreign Ministry successfully changing the policy focus from the CCP External Liaison Ministry's revolutionary goals to developmental aims. However, there is no evidence of bureaucratic influence on the other three restructurings.

However, the way in which China's foreign policy restructuring departs from the Holsti model is that threat - domestic or external - is not the only explanation of such restructuring. Advantageous
opportunity is also an impetus for policy restructuring. One of shortcomings of Holsti’s model is that he focuses on how the state perceives threats and determines responses to them. He neglects the existence of opportunity in the international area. Accordingly, too little attention has been devoted by Holsti to examining the effects of how a state perceives opportunity and takes advantage of it. A state’s foreign policy is not always the result of responses to threats. It is true that decision-makers, most of the time, are forced to cope with the diplomatic issues that constantly emerge, but a state can sometimes see a favourable opportunity to take initiating action. For instance, in the early 1980s, China saw that the tensions between the two superpowers offered it a chance to seek greater autonomy by playing a balancing game between them. By doing this, China could gain more bargaining power and seek more economic benefits.

Ideology is another factor that Holsti does not include in his analytical framework.110 Although this thesis reaches the conclusion that ideology is not as decisive as it might at first sight appear to be in foreign policy restructuring, ideological factors are still a significant element in the making of foreign policy in a country like China. In China, it often happens that ideological preparation is undertaken before a policy restructuring takes place. For instance, Sino-Soviet conflicts of national interest were in part disguised by the vigorous ideological disputes in late 1950s. In 1978, the amendment of old doctrines

110 See Realign, 14 and 211.
was a prelude to the open-door policy. Therefore, examining the ideological change sometimes may reveal the tendency of a new policy restructuring.

Despite these shortcomings, Kal J. Holsti's model can yet be regarded as a relatively comprehensive model. His concept of restructuring precisely meets the characteristic of Chinese foreign policy, which often changes in such a manner. Furthermore, by analyzing the determinants of such restructuring from a relatively wide and complete range of external, domestic, political cultural and decision-making factors, Holsti's model makes possible a persuading explanation for such restructuring.

In applying Holsti's model to China's four foreign policy restructurings, this thesis offers a new perspective on Chinese foreign policy. Moreover, through the study of China's previous foreign policy restructurings, this thesis also derives several implications of these foreign policy determinants, which may be useful in analyzing and predicting tendencies for China's future foreign policy restructuring.

However, this thesis is limited to the study of the dramatic, wholesale changes in China's foreign policy in the light of Holsti's model of restructuring. The normal foreign policy changes and adjustments which are carried out during the periods in between restructurings are not analyzed. In addition, the predictive analysis in this thesis does not intend to forecast specific events. It only seeks to predict the general conditions in which a new restructuring might take place.
R. PROSPECTS OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1990s

As the 1990s unfold, China is faced with a new international situation where one of its crucial foreign policy determinants - the "strategic triangle" - has dissolved with the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It presents a new challenge to China's foreign policy decision-making and forces the Chinese decision makers to re-analyze the new international system. Inside China, great changes are taking place. Economic reforms have entered a new stage and are heading toward a more free "socialist market economy".

Domestic changes include an economic growth rate that ranks near the top in the world, an economy that is becoming more and more dependent on the world economy, and more penetration of Western cultural values into China. Furthermore, Hong Kong and Macao will soon return to China, and the Mainland and Taiwan are coming closer with their increasing level of economic exchange.

With these new realities, coupled with a change of the leadership after Deng Xiao-ping dies, the remaining few years of the twentieth century will be crucial to China. Uncertainty exists about the future of China's domestic reforms and foreign policy. One cannot, therefore, rule out the possibility of a fifth foreign policy restructuring. Accordingly, it is necessary to apply Holsti's model to analyze when a Restructuring V might take place, and what shape it could take.
A. Domestic Situations in the 1990s

1. While economic reforms move toward a more free market economy, and China's door opens still wider, conservative elements in the Chinese elites continue to complain that extensive contact with the outside world is producing an infusion of unorthodox ideas, including liberalism, individualism and political pluralism. They argue that this is endangering China's cultural integrity, social order, political stability, and, worst of all, is threatening the very legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. They repeat the need to protect their society from "bourgeois liberalization and westernization".

Remarkably, however, at the present, China is not withdrawing from interaction with the capitalist world. Thanks to Deng Xiaoping's dramatic tour of the southern Special Economic Zones in early 1992, and the nationwide media blitz about the speeches Deng made during his tour in which he called for putting aside ideological differences and the speeding up of economic reforms and interactions with the world economy, China has geared up its economic development and created a new wave of open-door actions. Deng's initiative was endorsed later by the 14th Party Congress in October 1992, which dismissed the main conservative headquarters - the Central Advisory Committee - and confirmed the acceleration of economic reform, further opening to the outside world.

The victory of the reformers in 1992 does not ensure that the present policy is unchangeable. Conservative forces were not
excluded from the top leadership. The new leading group elected at the Party Congress in October 1992 is a reflection of bargaining between reformers and conservatives, as it still contains conservative elements such as Premier Li Peng, the main supporter and executive of the 1989 Tiananmen Square oppression. Although the Congress decided that the main task of economic system reform is to establish a "socialist market economy", and foreign policy in this decade must continue to serve this developmental program, it is as yet uncertain that how long the reformers can maintain this policy.

2. Involvement in international economic exchanges has offered opportunities for China's modernization, but has also increased China's dependency on the world economy, and especially the dependence on the industrialized countries. The proportion of foreign trade was approaching 28% of the country's GNP by the end of the 1980s. Foreign enterprises and joint ventures played important roles in the country's economic activities.

China's second restructuring showed that over-dependence on the Soviet Union had threatened China's sovereignty. Therefore, China managed to escape the Soviet control through such a restructuring. Holsti's case studies in Why Nations Realign also reveal that

in some instance high interdependence or dependence cause nationalistic, 'moat-building' behaviour - foreign policy that is designed to assert national independence and autonomy.\(^{112}\)

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\(^{111}\)By 1988, the total import and export value had reached 28% percent of the year's GNP. Asia Year Book 1991, 1.

\(^{112}\)Why Nations Realign, ix.
Accordingly, China's increasing trade and demand for foreign investment and technology promote its dependency on the Western countries and increase the sensitivity and vulnerability of its economy to the West-dominated world economy. Under such circumstances, China's desire for independence has grown concomitantly. Party Secretary-general Jiang Ze-Ming, in his report to the 14th Party Congress stated that China will continue to open its door. Meanwhile,

"China will insist on an independent and peaceful foreign policy. The basic aim of our foreign policy is to safeguard our independence and sovereignty, promote development and peace. China is willing to develop friendly cooperative relations with all countries... In such interactions, we will never impose our system or ideology on other countries, we will also never agree to other countries imposing their systems or ideologies on us. China will never ally with any state or state group, and never join in any military alliance."[\textsuperscript{113}]

While stressing political independence in China's foreign behaviour, there is no sign that China will retreat from entering the world economic system. At the present stage, economic exchanges with foreign countries are considered to be beneficial to China's modernization. Dependence on the world economy is not seen as a threat to the Chinese national economy. For example, China's much enhanced economic strength will increase its capability of repaying foreign debt. By the end of 1991, China's foreign exchange reserve was US$40 billion[\textsuperscript{114}], allowing it to meet


comfortably its foreign debt repayments of US$ 4-5 billion annually over the next few years. Furthermore, Chinese economic dependence on the world economy is varied and different from its dependence on the Soviet Union in the 1950s. Now its economic interactions with foreign countries are much more diversified. Although China's main sources of advanced technology and direct investment are Japan, the United States and other Western countries, China's economy does not depend exclusively on just one superpower or great power. Therefore, at the present stage, economic dependence alone is not enough to cause foreign policy restructuring.

2. External Environment in the 1990s

The international system in the 1990s bears several key characteristics. Firstly, the end of the cold war bipolar era ushered in an emerging multipolarity, demonstrated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relative weakening of the United States, the growing economic strength of Japan and a united Germany, as well as the further integration of Western Europe and the rise in the number of developing countries. Secondly, although the danger of a world war has faded, serious regional and ethnic conflicts and devastating wars are increasing. The resurgence of nationalism and ethnic rivalry has become a prominent destabilizing factor in

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115 Ibid., 26.
international relations, as evidenced by the Gulf War, and the bloodshed in Yugoslavia. Thirdly, with the end of the bipolar military contest, economic and political struggles are sharpening, both between and among the North and the South groups of countries. Fourthly, the economies of all countries and regions are more closely interrelated, calling for more international cooperation.

Under such circumstances, China may need to adjust its foreign policy in the 1990s. If there is no major systemic change in the international environment, and China still continues to pursue its modernization program, it is likely that, while adjusting some aspects to suit the new situation, China's foreign policy will retain many of its features that were evident in the 1980s:

(1) It will continue to attach great importance to its perception of independence and refrain from entering into alliance with any superpower or great power.

(2) It will continue to open up to the world and actively participate in international economic cooperation, including the cooperation with GATT, World Bank and IMF.

(3) It will insist on diplomatic diversification, and hope to continue the improvement of relations with all countries in the world, including the United States in particular.

Sino-American relations came to be the priority issue on China's diplomatic agenda after the "big triangle" dissolved. Some of the difficulties between the two countries seem to be insurmountable at the present stage. China will become more vigilant of America's possible intervention in what China considers
to be China's internal affairs because Chinese leaders believe that after the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the United States may shift its focus of "peaceful evolution" to China. China has to insist on its policy of independence. Unless one of their sensitive disputes such as human rights, the Taiwan question, and the trade imbalance causes deterioration in their relations, China prefers to manage this important relationship in a mature and constructive manner.

In terms of Sino-Russian relations, the growing nationalism in both countries may result in conflicting interests and possibly lead to tensions over historical disputes. However, at the present stage, both countries are greatly concentrating on their own internal development and need to expand economic cooperation with each other. It is therefore most likely that China and Russia will maintain their state-to-state relations in a pragmatic manner for the maximum advantage of their developmental programs.

China's dedication to its own economic development is seen by its neighbors as beneficial to regional peace. On the other hand, modernization means that China will become more powerful in the region. A stronger China may re-arouse the historical issues of border disputes, now laid aside tactically, and compete with its neighbors for national resources in nearby disputed seas which are needed for its economic development. The anxiety of China's neighbors increased when Soviet power disappeared and the United States started withdrawing its forces from the region, creating a vacuum for Chinese power to fill. Therefore, unstable elements
exist in the relationship between China and its neighbours.

3. Changing Values of Political Culture

China's diplomatic success and the rise of its economic strength in the last decade have been accompanied by a continuously growing nationalism in its foreign policy. The nationalism has manifested itself in several ways. Strategically, it can be seen in the conviction that China should be an independent force in geopolitics, with no formal alliances, or even any informal alignment with any power. Nationalism is also evident in territorial issues and in the wiping out of colonial vestiges as China stressed regaining sovereignty over Hong Kong and Macao, opposing Taiwan's independence from the mainland, and insisting on claims to the territories of the Spratly Islands. These issues are the likely source to trigger disputes and may cause policy change.

Nationalism also can be seen through the desire to maintain a distinctively Chinese culture, uncontaminated by too much contact with Western ideas and values. It may facilitate another conservative attempt to close the door. However, the present leadership's concerns are concentrated on economic benefits from the open-door policy.

There is no doubt that China's foreign policy restructuring in the 1980s has been very successful in maintaining its security and
obtaining a peaceful environment, as well as in promoting its modernization program. China has benefited a great deal by pursuing its present foreign policy. In the 1990s, China seems willing to continue to maintain this policy.

Examination of these interactive determinants of foreign policy restructuring shows that the present international situation favours a policy of pursuing diversified diplomacy. Reformers still remain the mainstream force in China. Pragmatism in pursuing modernization appear to have prevailed over nationalistic desire of protecting tradition. Additionally, economic dependence on the world economy does not undermine political independence, in the view of China's present leaders. Therefore, at the present policy stage, factors in favour of maintaining the current foreign policy orientation seem to outweigh the factors of change. However, two unpredictable variables may change this process. One is the possibility of a sudden change in the external environment caused by some old, sensitive issues which present a new threat. Another is the intra-party power struggle between reformers and conservative elements. If the conservative force predominates over the reformers, the present policy orientation may be changed. Therefore, either of these two possibilities may cause a new foreign policy restructuring.
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