Towards an integrated theory of argumentation

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The purpose of this paper is to establish some main characteristics of the argumentation field and to link argumentation theory and Discourse Analysis to contribute to its project with a systematic consideration of power, ideology and culture functioning. After a brief initial summary about the diversity of this field, we consider some central issues of analytical theories (in this case, we leave practically aside argument formation theories) in order to establish contact between approaches normally working in isolation and ignoring each other. At last, we summarize our position and set the link between argumentation and Discourse Analysis. Thus, the following are the ten issues we take into account:

1) Diversity of the field
2) Basic disciplines of the field
3) Expanded frontiers of the field
4) Argumentation places
5) Norm and description
6) Criteria of validity
7) Polemics and cooperation
8) Functions of argumentation
9) The Argumentation Field Matrix
10) Argumentation Field and Discourse Analysis

When we talk about Discourse Analysis, we make reference to the French School of Discourse Analysis and the synthetic model that is proposed in Haidar’s doctoral dissertation (Haidar 1999). At the end of this paper, we expose the general operative model to analyze argumentation in discourse, according to our own approach (Reygadas 1998).

By field of argumentation, we mean Bourdieu’s definition (Bourdieu 1984): The field of argumentation presents itself as a structured space of key theoretical positions. The field has a common history of 26 centuries. It has specific journals (Argumentation, Informal Logic, Argumentation and Advocacy) congresses and societies (International Society for the Study of Argumentation, Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking, American Forensic Association). Argumentation scholars recognize themselves as part of the field and, in accordance to their habitus, they know how to participate in the quarrel on description and norm, dialectics and rhetoric, reason and emotion, polemics and cooperation, criteria of validity, argumentation schemes alternatives, argumentation reconstruction proposals and so on. As a discipline, the field shares some basic truths and
mistakes, a plan of objects to be investigated and a theoretical horizon (Foucault 1980). The force relations between the most powerful institutions define the structure of the field not completely integrated because of different national, linguistic, philosophical, theoretical and empirical positions that divide scholars within the field.

1. Diversity of the field

In the last fifty years, the development of modern argumentation theory can be described in two different movements: the theories that established the logical, dialectical, rhetorical and linguistic approaches for the first time; and the second wave theories that continued the foundation work or proposed new appraisals of argumentation and reconfigured the current set of positions in the field.

After World War II the kingdom of traditional Formal Logic was challenged from different trenches. Contributions like those of Arne Naess (1947, 1953) and Crawshay Williams (1957) helped us to understand how to clarify what is exactly debated on a dispute and how to establish the exact purpose of a proposition act. They widened the scope of Formal Logic towards a dialectical point of view. Logic was not any more a matter of monologue. Lefebvre (1948) tried to defend a Hegelian and Marxist perspective to study syllogism, which was conceived as formal and substantial, inductive and deductive at once. The term "Informal Logic" appeared in 1953 pointing out the emergence of a new stream of logical analysis interested in everyday arguments. Chaïm Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958) published the capital book entitled Traité de l'argumentation -La Nouvelle Rhétorique-. This work established a sound contemporary reflection about the inheritance of argumentation theory since Aristotle. Argumentation and dialectics were seen from a rhetorical point of view to persuade the audience. The very same year Toulmin (1958) worked on a pretended universal and dialectical layout of arguments and on the notion of arguments’ field dependence. Some years later, Hamblin (1970) reformulated the so-called Standard Treatment of the fallacy theory to provide it with a dialectical turn. Therefore, in 1970, the contemporary importance of argumentation was clearly established by the "first wave theories". We were in front of a new conception of syllogism and fallacies, a new pattern of analysis for arguments, an interest on "natural arguments" and new approaches to logic, rhetoric and dialectics of argumentation. Simultaneously, books like those of Curtius (1948) Lausberg (1960) and Johnstone (1968) offered us a general view of the field. Curtius rescued the argumentation topic and developed the idea of topos while Lausberg worked on literary rhetoric.

Grize (1972, 1974) Vignaux, Miéville, Borel and others have worked on Natural Logic at Neuchâtel, formulating a series of schematization operations of discourse objects. Argumentation since then is not only justification but also schematization. Their renewing descriptive approach, based on Jean Piaget’s epistemology and operational logic, included the place of subject, society and culture on argumentation theory. They studied arguments literally and considering their whole context from a constructivist point of view. Ducrot and Anscombre (Ducrot 1980a, 1980b and others) held a new linguistic and "polyphonic" approach to argumentation (Argumentation dans la Langue –ADL-). Their studies about connectors, evaluation phrases, argumentative scales, presupposition, linguistic "direction"
of sentences towards a conclusion, and the rhetoric (or pragmatic, according to Anscombre 1995) "integrated to language" contributed to the microanalysis of argumentation. Argument was defined as a matter of language.

Natural Logic and ADL represent continuity but also rupture with the classical tradition.

The first stage of argumentation theory can be summarized as follows:

- Logic-dialectical approaches: Arne Naess, Crawshay Williams, Toulmin, Hamblin (fallacies)
- Rhetoric: Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Natural Logic (this theory integrates logic, dialectical, rhetorical and linguistic approaches)
- Linguistics: Ducrot

Apart from Perelman, Toulmin, Hamblin, Grize and Ducrot who configured what we now call the modern argumentation theory, other contributions have been added to the field in the last decades. Due to their diversity, we can only provide a brief outline of the second wave movement theories with respect to their regional affinities.

After 1968, Blair and Johnson, Govier, Ennis, Lipman, Weinstein and many others (specially in the United States and Canada) continued to develop Informal Logic, Critical Thinking, Epistemology and Applied Epistemology. They made a basic contribution to argument theory, argument evaluation and the theory of fallacies (mainly Woods and Walton 1989 recompilation and Walton 1995) in opposition to the formal analysis situated out of context. Other North-American scholars renewed the debate tradition and developed rhetorical perspectives to treat argumentation. Willard (1981, 1983) worked on the relation between argumentation and Social Epistemology, widening the theoretical scope from linguistic aspects towards interaction and non-discursive symbolism. Gilbert proposed the coalescent argumentation model which center is agreement (1997) and began to study non-logical modes of argument. Feminism contributed to a cooperative conception of argument principles.

In France, Charaudeau developed a semio-linguistic approach to argumentation and Discourse Analysis, and at Lyon Plantin studied the relation between argument objects, interaction and discourse. Michel Meyer (1986) created his "problematologie" contemplating the main place of the question on argumentation theory. In Switzerland, Moeschler (1985) studied the link between conversation and argument.

In Germany, Wolfgang Klein studied the logical exposition of arguments and classified them in types (public and private, cooperative and polemic, individual and collective). By studying language, action and rationality Habermas (1981) presented his Communicative Action Theory (CAT) that proposed a set of rational norms in critical argumentation. Kopperschmidt (1985) developed this approach from a rhetorical point of view.

Barth (a student of E.W. Beth) and Krabbe (1982) made contributions to Lorenzen’s theory and to the Erlangen School of Dialogue Logic developing their Formal Dialectics. Different rhetoricians developed Perelman’s proposals.
At the Amsterdam school, van Eemeren and Grootendorst's Pragma-dialectics (a fruitful derivation of E. M. Barth doctrine) gave us an ideal model of ten rules for critical discussion (1996). They also established a general view of argument reconstruction (1993) studied the stages of a critical discussion, the role of speech acts in argumentation (1984) and proposed a pragmatic study of fallacies (1987).

In Italy, Lo Cascio (1991) has recently worked on an Argumentation Grammar based on the Chomskyan linguistic model.

Outside the European and North-American borders, Kotarbinski renewed the eristic tradition, submitting a model to analyze argumentation on a polemic context.

The second wave theories then introduced new approaches to rhetoric and dialectics, many reflections on philosophy and ordinary language. These perspectives established the importance of discourse and communication (interaction, conversation, the extended arguments and the global context of each discussion) and introduced eristic, syntax, ideal norms, non-linguistic aspects of argument and other important contributions that expanded the field of argumentation theory.

The founder and the second wave theories are all different from each other. There is not but a little dialogue between theories. Perelman, Toulmin and Hamblin never make reference to each other. Even a book like the recent Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory preferred to expose each theory in isolation without any comment about how to assemble different contributions and without establishing the basic compatibility and the incompatibilities between the main approaches to analyze arguments. Nevertheless a dialogue has begun and there exist an international debate about argumentation in the most recent research and in many conferences as those of Canada and Amsterdam.

We think that at present it is necessary to discuss about the unity and diversity within the field of argumentation theory. We are beginning to work on this direction on our doctoral dissertations. For the next points at issue in this paper in particular, we are mainly considering: Perelman (1958) who is the founder of rhetorical approaches; the logic-dialectic proposals of Toulmin (1958 and 1979) Habermas (1981) Pragma-dialectics’ theory (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1996) and Informal Logic (Johnson 1996) -we do not include Hamblin or Woods and Walton who have mainly worked on the local problem of fallacies--; Kotarbinski’s eristic; ADL as the main linguistic approach (Ducrot 1980a, 1980b, 1996); and Natural Logic (Grize 1973, 1974, 1996) because it represents a new logic and a new rhetoric of arguments. Some of these are classical references, others are recent but have been chosen because they represent the most elaborated positions of the authors. It is just impossible to write about every work on argumentation theory in a single paper, however, we make occasional references to other authors and books. These references attempt to show the complexity of the argumentation field as a whole, especially when talking about the basic disciplines of the field and its frontiers.

In the next seven issues at discussion we try to expose three aspects:

a) The diverse opinions, representing both a wealth and a trouble for the future of the field
b) The implicit, explicit or non-existent unity of the field

c) The way of linking argumentation and Discourse Analysis

2- Basic disciplines of the field

We consider that the basic disciplines of the field are those constituting the core of argumentation analysis (of the argumentation-refutation process, indeed) its origin and specificity:

- Logic: argument and thought

- The dialectics-eristic complex: argument and interaction, agreement, discussion defense and attack

- Rhetoric: argument and persuasion of an audience

- And Semio-linguistics: argument as a significant intelligible practice

When discussing arguments, logic is always linked to dialectics or rhetoric, so we will talk about logic-dialectical theories and Natural Logic’s rhetoric. Moreover, we must ponder that Semio-linguistics is always necessary, that logic-dialectic theories may have a certain rhetorical component, and that rhetorical theories may have a dialectical component. Considering all this, a panorama of the argumentation theories is outlined on figure 1 (as a summary it implies reduction, we apologize if some simplifications of hue occur). We only take into account the principal drifts and those streams that allow us to show the general components of the field, excluding certain important positions (Meyer, Finocchiaro, Göttert, Berk and many others) and differences (like those within the changing studies of Informal Logic and Critical Thinking). We must be aware that there exists a big difference between the theoretical enunciation of a component and its real integration in an analytical model.

- Logical Propaedeutic (Lorenzen’s introduction of dialectics in proposition logic) and Formal Dialectics (a logical theory of discussion) devoted to Formal Logic should be distinguished from the other logic-dialectic theories since they study formal language. Concerning language, Toulmin is in the middle of the way, because he didn’t study "natural argument", he constructed his examples. Toulmin studied the argumentation scheme and described in a very precise way the functioning of argumentation in different fields. Together with various aspects of linguistics (semantics, speech acts, presupposition, fallacies dependent on language, and linguistic markers of argumentation) the logic of argument, argument reconstruction, argument evaluation and dialectical process constitute the core of Informal Logic, Pragma-dialectics and CAT. In these cases, rhetoric is considered inseparable of dialectics (a cognate area as Johnson defines it) but is left practically aside because of "rational" assumptions and normative or evaluation purposes. Hamblin and Woods and Walton must be located in another level because they are mainly devoted to the local problem of fallacies. Kotarbinski’s eristic has a rhetorical core. It describes the discussion process from a polemical perspective.
- New Rhetoric has a certain logical component, makes very little linguistic considerations, is dialectically weak and does not consider everyday discourse but classical examples. This theory established a classification of argumentative objects (real and preferable) and "argumentative techniques" (to link -quasi-logical, based on the structure of reality and those which found the structure of reality- or to dissociate). It included a reflection about the demonstration-argumentation opposition, the universal audience and some classical topoi. In spite of its name and of persuasive considerations, it excludes pathos and other rhetorical elements of its analysis. In some of his works, Kienpointer develops Perelman’s theory. Kopperschmidt develops Habermas model and Walton and Plantin have worked (from different points of view) on emotion. The United States rhetoric conceives argumentation as a practice, as a justification and as a decision under uncertainty conditions (Zarefsky 1995).

We classify Natural Logic as a rhetorical theory of discursive performance but it represents one of the most complex perspectives. It is logical in a sui generis way, that of schematization operations. Its dialectic constituent is weak but it has in return a strong component of rhetoric (cultural pre-constructions, disposition, pathos, ethos and persuasion) semantics and pragmatics (speech acts, deixis, modals and subjectivity implicit in language use).

- Lo Cascio (1991) studies the syntax of argumentation, the order of argument components according to a Chomskyan tree-model (argumentative discourse as a form of language use governed by a set of underlying syntactic rules). Although ADL is absolutely focused on semantic and pragmatic aspects, it establishes a logical algorithm: \( E1 + E2 \Rightarrow C \) -an enunciation sequence is directed towards a conclusion- and pretends to demonstrate that language is intrinsically argumentative and polyphonic, with a "rhetoric" being integrated to it-. Plantin, Moeschler and Charaudeau analyze different aspects of argumentation as discourse practice.

We believe that ADL is necessary when doing argumentative microanalysis studies but, following Plantin, we do not agree with Anscombe and Ducrot when they claim that language is intrinsically argumentative and ADL does not require other theories to study argumentation. Language is sometimes directed to a conclusion but "connecteurs", including the famous "mais" /but/ can also be used for narrative purposes (Anscombe and Ducrot accept it now and they consider the informative and the argumentative value of an emission). Moreover, linguistic analysis needs to be completed with the study of interaction (dialectics) persuasion (rhetoric) and thought operations (logic).

If we look at this picture, the majority of theories develops a zone of argumentation analysis and should be considered in that level. Lo Cascio’s syntax, Ducrot’s semantics and pragmatics (many theories); formal analysis (logical approaches) and everyday Discourse Analysis; critical discussion (pragma-dialectics) and polemics (eristic); argumentation schemes and argumentative practices. We must remark that dialectical defense and rhetorical and eristic attack are both part of argumentation theory. Nevertheless, in certain occasions the same problem is studied by different theories and then we have to decide which one to choose, depending on our philosophical point of view or the problem to be solved.

In some aspects, logic-dialectic approaches and rhetorical perspectives exclude each other.
About this exclusion we consider that even if we understand that when proposing a rational ideal of evaluation we may exclude rhetoric, real life arguments almost never exclude the rhetoric components of emotion and ethos, the persuasive strategies. North American rhetoricians have argued we are guided also by a rhetorical reason in the negotiation of social selves and situations. Plantin (1998) has demonstrated that we can argue about emotions and that much argumentative discourse has strong emotional implications. Others have wondered if we can evaluate certain arguments without considering voice modulation and emotion. Gilbert has exposed (Amsterdam 1998) the pragmatic importance of emotion and its necessity in our voice modulation. He also has written about feelings, physical aspects, intuitions and non-sensorial elements to support a claim (Gilbert 1994 and 1997) expanding the traditional view towards non-logical modes of argument. So, we could still hesitate about the place of emotion in argument evaluation (from a rationalistic point of view) but the necessary co-presence of logic, debate and rhetoric in everyday argumentative discourse is out of the question. We should recall that, very often, we are not only convinced by reasons, but also by emotions and desires. As Lukács, Wittgenstein and others have shown, a human being is a totality that wishes, has feelings and is simultaneously able of reasoning. Implication (the basis of emotion) is always there: "The interest on what we say... is something experienced that we attribute to ourselves... It is not an accompaniment of what we say" (Wittgenstein 1967: 239).

As long as we consider that language is not necessarily argumentative, ADL is not opposed to other theories. We can use ADL's instruments when doing linguistic microanalysis of arguments. Natural Logic that studies schematizations and disposition of discourse objects is neither opposed to other theories. After doing any dialectical analysis we can apply Natural Logic technique to elucidate arguments and emotions related to a certain object. Eristic and dialectic rules are not opposed but context dependent.

A comprehensive theory of argumentation has still to be done, one including the different aspects of linguistics as well as the new logical approaches, the dialectical and rhetoric considerations. Semiotics may also be very useful because a verbal argument can be stressed, modified or contradicted by visual signs and these may even be ostensive arguments. The systematic inclusion of semiotics will render argumentation theory socially more efficient since at present our Western culture is mainly visual. So, we think that all the basic disciplines are essential when analyzing real life arguments in their actual discourse context. What we propose is just to progressively continue the old tradition historically drawn back to Aristotle (the Organon but also the Rhetoric and the always present study of language: meaning, sign and fallacies dependent on language) and the changing elements of the medieval Trivium (logic-dialectics, rhetoric and grammar). Indeed, there already exists integration: linguistic is considered by all approaches; there is a continuum from logic to dialectics; and the dialectics-rhetoric isolation is merely artificial. In this perspective, the discursive turn on argumentation theory allows us to make a first expanding movement: to really integrate new logical, semiotic and linguistic approaches, logical criticism and emotion-physics-intuition modes, dialectic debate and eristical polemics. Argumentation is part of Discourse Analysis.

3- Expanded frontiers of the field
Besides linguistics, logic, rhetoric and the dialectics-eristic complex, each theory makes different considerations about the expanded frontiers of the field, the relation with some other disciplines out of the argumentative core:

- Communication
- Philosophy (epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language and the theory of rationality)
- Sociology
- Psychology
- Anthropology
- Law
- Politics

We will try to summarize the relationship between argumentation theories and these other disciplines that constitute the external circle of argumentation studies. ADL research is not considered here because it is aimed to semantics and pragmatics as its field and maximum frontier. Once again, there exists a difference between the enunciation of a discipline relation and its real consideration and assumption in a theory or analytical model. In this case we expose the results depending on each discipline, to remark the partial unity of the field instead of showing the difference between linguistic, logical, dialectical and rhetorical theories.

- With different approaches and emphasis, most theories make some considerations about communication because argumentation is aimed at increasing or decreasing the acceptability of our standpoint for others (or for a rational judge).

- Almost every important dialectical or rhetorical approach has considered philosophy when establishing a difference with other points of view. Philosophy is a central matter of reflection for logical approaches (Logical Propaedeutics and Formal Dialectics) for Perelman is axiology (he is an "anti-absolutist" philosopher indebted with Frege, Lorenzen and Dupréel) and for Habermas theory of rationality. Informal logic is linked to epistemology (Willard) applied epistemology (Weinstein and others) and the theory of rationality (critical thinking).

- Sociology and psychology are considered, in different ways, as important associated disciplines of argumentation. Toulmin, for example, considers that warrants, backings and other elements of argumentation depend on each forum (that means that when we are studying argumentation we have to know simultaneously a little bit of sociology, anthropology and the pertinent discipline of the studied forum: mathematics, law, medicine, etc). Kotarbinski’s eristic is necessarily conceived as a social discipline. Habermas (1981) considers that sociological concepts are the best
connected with rationality problematic and that argumentation requires a comprehensive theory of meaning and validity (a methodology). Natural Logic considers sociology (enunciated) and psychology (a psychological-communicative model of how the image we have of others configure our arguments) as basic components. Linguistic proposals are in general reticent to include other disciplines but usually have connections with sociology and psychology. Informal Logic considers knowledge, intelligence and thinking as problems of critical thinking and reasoning. Indeed, the consensual definition of argumentation in Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory (van Eemeren et al 1996) describes it as a verbal and social activity. And as long as argumentation is a matter of knowledge and belief, most theories are interested in cognitive and psychological perspectives.

- The modern basis of argumentation theory (especially Toulmin and Perelman models) is tributary of law, which is continuously a source of inspiration for different approaches and analysis. The juridical discourse is prototypical of logical argumentation.

- Ideal model dialectics segregates anthropological-rhetorical perspectives from the study of argumentation. Rhetorical and eristic models necessarily consider the different audiences and are interested in cultural diversity. North-American rhetoric has contributed to the study of many rhetorical issues of argumentation as a social, cultural and philosophical activity linked to communication theory. Sociolinguistic models may contribute to a great extent to the study of argumentative culture variation in the immediate future to let us know whether universal principles of argumentation are possible or not.

- Politics are considered by non-logical theories such as the New Rhetoric. Johnson (1996) and others have written about the specific relations of argumentation and politics. Govier has worked on unequal power distribution. Eristic is thought from a political perspective of polemics.

As we can see, excluding pure linguistic and logical approaches results in a partial unity of the expanded field frontiers conception and relations. From a discursive perspective, we think that all human dimensions affect everyday discourse. Discourse is linked to a variety of what we call its "materialities" included those representing the argumentative core:

- The one corresponding to its "signifiant" (language, visual system, etc.)
- Communicative-pragmatic (including the eristic-dialectical complex)
- Logical and Philosophical
- Rhetorical, Poetical and Esthetical
- y Component (psychology, psychiatry, psychoanalysis)
The different materialities correspond to the associated disciplines but contemplated from a discursive viewpoint. The global approach of Discourse Analysis allows us to make a second integrating movement: to open the artificial expanded frontiers to better refract the real continuum. Reduction is necessary but without isolation. Frontiers are useful but must not be rigid. Although practically we cannot consider all materialities, theoretically we should bear in mind that we are dealing with a real total and continuous complex. When studying different materialities we should eliminate those tensions and contradictions produced by integration. We have to choose what we must put in the foreground and what must be a simple background when constructing an operative model to analyze argumentation and discourse. We have to decide as well the theory to be used when studying each materiality. Characteristics of the object and research interest must be considered to make our choice. Some argumentation theories place the accent in a certain materiality and are better to study it. If we are interested in the complexity of discourse, Natural Logic, Informal Logic and Willard’s epistemology are good choices. Natural Logic considers the importance of culture and studies psychology, semio-linguistics and (to a lesser extent) sociology. As long as it is integrated to a philosophical theory of rationality (critical thinking, problem-solving and decision-making) Johnson’s Informal Logic considers a conceptual, linguistic, historical, empirical (sociological & psychological) and normative component that must also incorporate rhetorical insights and speech communications (Johnson 1996: 232-233). Willard states that, once we have an argument, anything used to communicate within it is important to be analyzed.

4- Argumentation places

Traditionally, argumentation theory takes into consideration the roles of proponent, opponent and the third (rational judge, audience or experts). But, canonically, these three roles are not regarded in the same way nor they are granted the same importance by every theory:

- Proponent: logical theories
- Proponent-opponent: dialectical theories
- Proponent-third: rhetorical theories
- Logical theories that do not deal with the opponent may be useful for argumentation theory but are not argumentative theories.
- All argumentation theories must consider the proponent. In contrast, for several theories the
opponent is not always examined in such a deep manner. Toulmin conceives his layout of argument as dialectic but for him the opponent is weak. Other dialectical and eristic theories strongly consider the roles of proponent and opponent. Formal Dialectics and Dialogue Logic do not consider the third role, which characterizes the rhetoric approaches. This role is present in Pragma-dialectics (the rational judge) and Informal Logic (Competent Audience) but it is ideal, especially in the first case. Dialectics studies persuasion of the audience but excludes it when evaluating arguments and conceives rhetoric as a dissociated component. Rhetoric as the art of influencing an audience with an efficacious discourse and dialectics as the art of solving differences by means of a regulated debate are conceived as separated and opposed to each other by pragma-dialecticians (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1996). Dialectics appears when the third is erased.

- The New Rhetoric model works with the proponent and the audience (but when writing about a universal audience it is close to dialectics). Natural Logic and other rhetorical theories, with different focuses, consider also the proponent-audience relation and very weakly the opponent.

- ADL and other linguistic theories do not work with proponents and opponents but with the "locuteur" and the "allocutaire", the "énonciateur" and the "énonciataire".

We think that, depending on our purpose, we can place a certain role in the foreground but once again, theoretically the three roles are essential (we must consider that the second role is not always an opponent, it can be cooperative, as Gilbert states it) for a complete description of many ordinary situations and the argumentation-refutation process:

- Proponent-Opponent-The third

Discursively, the argumentative role has to be thought as related to the more complex problem of subject theory considering individual and social factors. Although rational, arguers are not always coherent but contradictory. They have a complex identity and oscillate from contradiction to coherence, from sociality to individuality, from the right to the left pole of a multidimensional web:

- Individual Collective
- Active Passive
- Psychological Social-cultural-historical
- Autonomous, independent, not free
- Origin of Meaning support (the meaning matrix is on the Discourse Formation, the Institutional Place and the Discursive Place)

- Coherent Contradictory

As enunciation theory, sociology and communication have shown, in the mass media world,
proponents and audiences must be considered in all their complexity: individual/collective, present/not present, direct/indirect, etc. The roles (or places as we prefer to call them) are certainly important, the position defended may change because of the argumentative place in a discussion. However, the argumentative place is still only an aspect of the discursive place:

- Institutional place

- High interaction position Low interaction position

- Transmitter Receptor

- Speaker/Writer Hearer/Reader

- "Enonciateur" "Enonciataire"

- Proponent Opponent (or Partner)

5- Norm and description

Argumentation theories are divided according to their research object:

- Description

- Or Evaluation

Description is the task of explaining the discourse characteristics, of making explicit, clarifying and interpreting its actual functioning. On the other hand, we must distinguish the discursive evaluation (antiphony, discourse and counter-discourse opposition) from the optional transcendental evaluation (ideal criteria, ideal norms or ideal grammar rules).

- Dialogue Logic, Formal Dialectics and CAT are evaluative, normative and universalistic. Toulmin’s model, although normative, postulates a relativistic (but not arbitrary) approach to argumentation criticism (warrants and backings are forum dependent). Informal logicians and pragma-dialecticians consider both aspects: description and norm, but attention is greatly paid to the normative standards in order to evaluate arguments.

- Natural Logic is descriptive. The New Rhetoric is descriptive and strongly relativistic but has some weak interest in rationality and the argumentative force.

- ADL is descriptive (and also Charaudeau’s analysis). Lo Cascio’s Grammar is descriptive but postulates also the argumentative grammar rules, so he normatively exposes when a construction is grammatically correct.

The main problem of an integrated argumentation theory is the difference between normative and descriptive theories. Even in this case we may consider that compatibility is possible if unjustified pretensions of universality are abandoned and if it is recognized that there is a big gap between ideal critical contexts and real life contexts affected by subjects’ emotions and
intuitions, by power, culture and ideology. We think that first of all we need a good description of what happens in a discourse or a debate, a non-normative and non-reductive description of every discourse. Ideal types, models and transformations may help to investigate arguments but if they are conceived as proof instruments, then Weber is misunderstood. Ideal types and norms are univocal but empty; they cannot replace the empirical regularities of argumentation and their historical concretion. If we do not respect the order, the repetitions, and the complexity of an argument we are not analyzing the real functioning of discourse. Only if we are able to describe the real functioning of arguments in context we may get a benefit from the comparison with ideal criteria or ideal norms (we prefer the term evaluation) but this is not so simple, as we will see when discussing the criteria of validity. Moreover, ideal norms must be strongly aware of their colonialist nature. We are not in front of a real universal norm if we have not studied yet many languages and cultures (and even men-women differences) a task that has just begun with the researches on the universal presence of argumentation in every language and culture.

6- Criteria of Validity

Since Toulmin, we can talk about three approaches to rationality and controversy to which we add a fourth one related to linguistics:

- Logic: Geometric perspective (formal criteria)
- Dialectics: Critical perspective (transcendental criteria)
- Rhetoric: Anthropological perspective (empirical criteria)
- Linguistics: Grammatical perspective (formal linguistics criteria)

- Logic has traditionally considered deductive validity (included soundness, where a sound argument is one resulting from true premises) and inductive strength of inferences. But the argument process is much more than inference results. Cogency is not only a matter of logical form. So, logical criteria are useful only in the demonstrative pole of discourse. However, to talk about logic is nowadays to talk about many perspectives and about flexibility. We have different approaches to logic and validity: epistemic, alethic, modal, deontic and temporal. If we talk about possible worlds, what is invalid in one world may be valid in another world.

- Peirce (1987 edition) has attacked the supremacy of logical inference and has written about the importance of abduction. Contemporary, Lee (1973) has exposed the difference between the necessity of deduction, the probability of induction and the supposability of hypothetical inference which is better connected to argument. Dialectical criteria (standard of the premises acceptability) are different from epistemic (standard of knowledge) and alethic criteria (standard of truth). Structural logical criteria are different from dialectical criteria of debate:

- Sufficiency
Dialogue Logic established in the logical core the importance of inter-subjective validity, of the refutation process and the consideration of objections and criticisms.

Toulmin, at the middle of the way between logic and dialectics, was interested in substantive soundness. When writing about grounds, he exposed six evaluation criteria: truth, sufficiency, appropriateness, relevance, acceptability and weight. When writing about warrants he considered reliability and applicability and when discussing backings he referred to sufficiency and relevance (see Johnson 1996).

Informal Logic has largely discussed the criteria of validity when evaluating argumentation. Johnson has considered relevance, sufficiency and rational acceptability as the most important criteria when evaluating argumentation (but he has recently reconsidered his position about truth). He postulates that "an argument might not be good in the alethic sense and yet good in the dialectical sense" where there can exist good arguments for and against a conclusion (Johnson 1996: 72) establishing a rupture and a link between argumentative and logical criteria. He also has stated the asymmetric relation between criteria of validity and invalidity as well as the difference between cognitive and communicative criteria. Considerations about degrees of adequacy are important in the Informal Logic debate (Thomas) and some authors such as Scriven have written about the importance of consistency.

Habermas has many reflections on validity, rationality and intersubjective communication. For him, force is related to appropriateness of reasons. He discusses validity to establish the importance of a critical approach, of the susceptibility to rectify reasons to achieve consensus. As Habermas (1981) has shown, since truth is related to efficacy (given certain circumstances, there is adequacy to the purpose) frequently validity pretensions are conquered by non-discursive means and the proponent may support his claim on experience and intuition. Validity goes from world facts to social norms and subjective life. At last,
criteria of validity, writes Habermas, are a matter of three different worlds: proposition’s truth, rightness of the norms and intelligibility of symbolic expressions.

Pragma-dialecticians write about validity criteria considering some of the previous features (like cogency and acceptability) but indeed consider validity from a different point of view. This theory establishes an ideal model and ten rules for critical discussion (see van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1996). Arguments are considered valid or invalid in accordance with the ideal norms and the moment of the discussion (confrontation, opening, argumentation and conclusion).

Feminists have written about connectedness or attachment, concern or inclusion, agreement or consensus that are relational criteria (see Gilbert 1997: 48-64).

Kotarbinski considers a quite different scenario. Within eristic everything is valid. We are dealing with argumentation as a fight.

- The relevant task when dealing with rhetorical theories is mainly the identification of argumentative discourse. Nevertheless, these theories establish a point of view about some problems associated to criteria of validity, to the effective, successful, plausible or persuasive arguments:
  - Truth and verisimilitude
  - Argumentative force
  - Relevance
  - Connection
  - Effectiveness
  - Adherence

The New Rhetoric makes a difference between conviction and persuasion and opposes demonstration and argumentation. Mainly descriptive, this theory considers tolerance and cultural variation as essential and is not strongly interested in criticism. However, argumentative force and the way it is appreciated by the proponent are relevant to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s conception of argument, which takes into account different factors (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, p.700): audience adherence, connections, relevance and interaction (refutation).

Natural Logic, which debates with Perelman, discusses also the difference between truth-values and belief values, conviction and persuasion. Truth-values and form are not enough to describe argumentative discourse. A proposition that is true may have different belief values (Grize 1996).

- In the particular case of ADL, the validity criteria problem has no relevance at all. For this theory language is always argumentative and describes the "direction" of every argument towards a conclusion. Nevertheless, ADL studies certain notions associated to an evaluation:
ADL compares different "argumentative scales" structurally and semantically determined.

Lo Cascio criteria of validity are related to the correct component sequence of an argument, accordingly to certain formal rules of "grammaticality".

We agree with informal logicians when they write that there are contexts in which it is possible to discriminate strong and weak arguments, that people can be wrongly persuaded by bad arguments and can mistakenly fail to acknowledge the force of good arguments, and that arguers can succeed or fall short in meeting their obligations to defend their claims (Johnson 1996: 50). Moreover, out of rational ideal discussion, validity universal rational criteria must be confronted with history, culture, power and ideology. In everyday-life discussion, what is valid somewhere is not always valid everywhere. Before considering a criterion or a norm as universally valid we have to study many languages and many cultures and once we have considered them, we have to distinguish ideal critical contexts and everyday life exercise of power and cultural expressions. Maybe relevance, sufficiency and rational acceptability are universal (we are not sure about that) but what is relevant, sufficient and acceptable is quite different in each time and culture, and we will not be able to convince anyone if we are not aware about this. Validity and value standards are not universal nor eternal but cultural as Habermas stated.

We must think in the continuum and the ruptures that permit us to go from rhetorical to dialectical and logical criteria; from belief, to opinion and knowledge; from plausible truth to possible and evident truth; from persuasion force to inter-subjective validity and formal validity; from goodness to effectiveness and evidence. We must consider validity-invalidity criteria in all their complexity: formal, dialectical, persuasive and linguistic; alethic, epistemic and dialectical; formal and pragmatic; cognitive and communicative; logical and emotional, physical or intuitive; and as a matter of proposition, social-cultural-historical evaluation or symbolic expression. The different criteria of validity represent the weakest point of integration and there still remains the problem of the simultaneity of rational and irrational aspects of everyday discourse.

7- Polemics and cooperation

Argumentation theories are oriented either to cooperation or to polemics:

- Cooperation

- Polemics

- Cooperation and polemics

- Dialogue Logics and Propaedeutic are cooperative. Pragma-dialectic and Habermas norms of a rational judge only operate if discussion is critical, which means it is cooperative and consensus-oriented. Informal Logic supposes that we can convince the Competent
Audience with sufficient, relevant and acceptable reasons. However, Walton considers cooperation, negotiation and quarrel in fallacy evaluation. Other informal logicians such as Govier have written about the difference between agreement areas and adversariality. She has also stated the importance of unequal power distribution. Gilbert (1995, p. 837) has written about coalescent argumentation, which is "a normal ideal that involves the joining together of two disparate claims through recognition and exploration of opposite positions". Eristic, on the other hand, is intrinsically polemical.

- We may think that New Rhetoric is also cooperative; it looks for rational persuasion. Natural Logic describes cooperative and polemical discourses but its aim is just to describe what happens in an argumentative discourse.

- ADL states that language serves to manipulate others. When we talk, we try to transform the receptor to make him believe or do something.

In English the verb to "argue" is intrinsically polemical but it is not the case in other languages. Many languages must be studied to define the most important features of argumentation in the world languages and cultural practices because argument is a "cultural artifact" (Johnson 1996: 231). We think that this study will change the argumentation scene of the polemic-cooperation opposition. Now we can only say that language is neither intrinsically argumentative nor polemic and, once again, the actual functioning of discourse should be described. There are degrees of "argumentativity". There are differences between short and long term goals that may drive us to conflict or agreement (Gilbert 1997). There are contexts where we need a polemic approach (a theory of conflict) and there are contexts where we need a cooperative approach (a theory of consensus). Pragma-dialectic norms are not very useful for war arguments and eristic description is not very useful if we assist to a regulated scientific debate. Both approaches are necessary. In everyday life we find cooperative and polemic ingredients and a confrontational stage must be considered even in critical debate. There are dialectic contexts where critical discussion and ideal criteria oriented to consensus are useful (electoral mass media debates, dialectical games and highly regulated negotiations) and there are eristic contexts where ideal norms and pure rational criteria are even absurd because conflict is crucial. Both, dialectic arguer and eristic and rhetorical orator, share the necessity of dealing with criticisms.

8- Functions of Argumentation

The main argumentative functions that differentiate each perspective are the following:

- Logical demonstration

- Eristic-dialectical defense (justification)

- Rhetorical persuasion

- Logical demonstration is, at the limit, beyond the scope of argumentation, it is a matter of science.
- Dialectical theories consider mainly justification and eristic defense and attack. They are interested in the reasons given to support a conclusion.

- New Rhetoric is interested mainly in persuasion but also in justification. Natural Logic is also interested in persuasion and justification from the point of view of a discursive rationality (non-contradiction, deduction and semantic equivalence).

- ADL is interested in persuasion and in the linguistic "direction" towards a conclusion, in how semantic markers serve to justify a claim.

We consider that there is a general agreement about the importance of the defense-justification function. This leads us towards a key concept of argumentative theories: the "questio", the problem to be solved. Dialectical theories neglect persuasion but this position is due to a confusion between the descriptive purpose (how a discourse is) and the normative purpose of an argumentation theory (how a discourse must be). We can conceive an evaluative function but in an objective way. Evaluation is certainly a theoretical problem but, also, an argumentative function. There exists a discursive evaluation. When we argument, we justify and ponder reasons, we evaluate their strength. When we evaluate arguments we leave aside an erroneous point of view or we try to find a stronger argument. We evaluate by constructing a counter-discourse to refute the initial discourse. Antiphony and attack is a kind of internal, discursive evaluation.

From demonstration to argumentation there is a continuum. Only at the extreme we can talk about pure demonstration. Scientific theories are justified with arguments. And within argumentation defense and attack we find also persuasion. We can separate dialectical justification to study it but we have to reintegrate it to the totality of discourse. Finally, from a discourse perspective, argumentation is not only a matter of function but also a matter of functioning (see paragraph 10).

9- The Argumentation Field Matrix

According to the points at issue, what we may call The Argumentation Field Matrix has to consider the following aspects:

a) Depending upon our epistemological basis, to define argumentation we must choose our basic components: logical, dialectical rhetorical and linguistic.

Lo Cascio is necessary when studying syntax. ADL is useful when working syntactic-semantic relations: connectors, evaluative phrases, argumentation scales. Argumentation markers and fallacies dependent on language have been studied by almost all logic-dialectical approaches. Pragmatics has been studied by different approaches: ADL speech acts (which we prefer to call Discourse Acts because they involve ideological and institutional aspects) presupposition and polyphony; Pragma-dialectics has defined speech acts in relation to the argumentative stage; Natural Logic has studied spatial, temporal and personal deixis with much care. Moeschler studies conversation, Plantin studies interactions, etc.
If we are studying logic we may refer to Dialogue Logic, to Formal Dialectics, to Informal Logic, to the eclectic approach to fallacies by Woods and Walton or to the operational logic of Grize and Vignaux as well as to many individual contributions (like the critical one of Finocchiaro about fallacies).

If we study dialectics we can do it also in very different ways. Lorenzen formulates a dialogic propositional logic. Toulmin pays some attention to the interactive construction of the argumentative scheme. Informal logic studies extended arguments and looked for evaluative criteria. Pragma-dialectics looks for the norms of a critical ideal debate.

If we study rhetoric we may study the audience (Perelman, Informal Logic) the emotions (Plantin, Walton, Gilbert and others) the ethos (Natural Logic) the schemes or techniques of persuasion (Perelman, Kienpointer) the argumentative sequence (Kopperschmidt).

b) If we study argumentation we need to clearly distinguish between micro and macro-analysis. Depending upon the discourse analyzed and the analyst interest we may or may not consider a certain level. ADL performs microanalysis, discursive theories may be interested in micro and macro-analysis and Informal Logic works in the space in between. Each analysis requires different corpora to demonstrate the theory. Discussion about the corpus construction, the overall communicative situation and the discourse production-circulation-reception conditions are fundamental in argumentation theory contemplated from a discursive angle.

c) We need to choose the materialities that are relevant to fix the frontiers of each study. Out of ideal situations we think that culture, power and ideology must be studied.

d) We have to study the proponent and the opponent argumentation because every utterance in context is dialogic, language is addressed even when self-speaking as Bakhtin demonstrated it. The role of the third can be studied normatively (rational judge or experts) as in logic-dialectical theories or as a real audience studied by rhetorical theories. The classic argumentative roles must be integrated in a general theory of the subject to acquire a profile that will enrich argumentation analysis. In real life we do not deal with empty actants but with full subjects that have an institutional place, a psychological density and cultural conditioning.

e) Description is always necessary. If we are interested in norms we may construct criteria or ideal models like Informal Logic and Pragma-dialectics but we can not consider any evaluative criterion or norm as universal if it has not been empirically demonstrated in a significant sample of languages and cultures. Otherwise we have to talk of a cultural-relative criterion. Even in that case we have to consider that in the majority of real life cases norms are just an ideal because of the presence of ideological, cultural and power practices.

f) Criteria of validity are related to the normative-descriptive preference. Studies of different fields still have to be developed. Norms have to consider differences between natural sciences criteria (like those studied by Weinstein) and social science criteria (that have not been studied yet). Moreover, evaluations have to consider cultural and historical practices.

g) Cooperation or polemics is a matter of degree. We have to study dialectic norms in cooperative contexts and eristic rules in polemic contexts.
h) If we want to consider how a claim is supported in the simplest way we only need to study the defensive function of an argument. We need to study persuasion simultaneously and we may study the evaluative function (as real evaluation of each subject and discourse, not as a theoretical appreciation). And, if we are interested in respecting the discourse, we have to study its functioning also.

10) Argumentation Field and Discourse Analysis

When we analyze an argumentative discourse in all its complexity we have to study other criteria of discourse typology besides the dominant demonstrative, argumentative, narrative or descriptive macro-operation:

  a) The discourse object in question (Grize & Vignaux 1982).
  b) The functions of communication (Jakobson 1980).
  c) The Ideological Apparatus or Institution underlying the studied discourse (Gramsci 1975, Althusser 1985, 1987).
  d) The subject of the discourse in its complexity (Pêcheux 1969 and others).
  e) The formal or informal character of the discourse (various authors).
  f) The written or oral character of the discourse (Ong 1987 and others).

We also have to establish the production-circulation-reception conditions of a discourse:

  a) The emergence conditions (how a discourse comes to appear) –Foucault-.
  b) The Social, Ideological and Discourse Formations (the latter is related to the argumentative scripts: what can and must be said and done in a certain institutional and argumentative place) –Pêcheux, Haroche and Henry-.
  c) The Imaginary Formations (to put it simply, the image of the place of the proponent, the opponent, the audience and the image of the discourse itself) –Pêcheux-.
  d) The conjuncture (the unity of contradictions –determined by the political level- on a specific temporality when a debate or change of force relations on a certain sphere is taking place) or temporality –Robin-.
  e) The social-historical acceptability conditions (internal and external) of a discourse –Faye-.
  f) The "reception grammars" –Veron-.
  g) The inter-discursive process (how a discourse is related to others) –various authors-
  h) The communication situation (studied in detail by Ethnography of Communication) –Dell Hymes and Gumperz-
Finally, from a discursive perspective, we distinguish between function and functioning. Specific argumentation issues must be studied as related to the functioning of discourse:

a) Imaginary Formations

b) Deixis

c) Discourse Acts

d) Organization: of arguments (the sequence, the order of arguments and the syntagmatic succession of a discourse) and of schematization operations (the Natural Logic study of the disposition of the operations related to a certain discourse object)

e) Schematization (of discourse objects)

f) Justification strategies (argumentation schemes, included the so called fallacies)

g) Persuasive strategies

h) Discourse objects schematizations

i) Topoi, stereotypes, clichés

f) Repetition, emphasis and redundancy processes

 g) Metaphor

h) Explicit/implicit relations

Organization (dispositio) means that if we alter the order and the number of operations applied to an argument we modify what the discourse is really telling us. Not even repetition, nor redundancy and emphasis are irrelevant for persuasion or conviction. Certainly we can reconstruct implicit premises with caution and we can alter some elements to clarify reasons given in support of a claim but we also have to consider the real linear order if we do not want to loose the meaning of a discourse. An implicit premise does not mean the same that an explicit one, we have to consider the implicit/explicit relation because it is one of the main mechanisms of discourse functioning. Schematization is of great importance from a discursive point of view because this function exhibits the main features of the central issue of an argumentative discourse.

We may begin an argumentative analysis of a discourse describing its production-circulation-reception conditions and then its typology. Next, we continue the argumentative analysis: deixis and ethos; general disposition and layout of the arguments; justification of the claims and microanalysis; pathos and other persuasive strategies; evaluation of the arguments (by antiphony and/or by ideal criteria or ideal models); schematization of the relevant objects; and, finally, the overall analysis.

Conclusion
The logical kingdom has loosened. New logic, rhetoric, dialectics and linguistics have born. Now, to sum up our point of view, we defend the necessity of a definitive discursive turn in argumentation theory to illuminate the differences from an integrative perspective. Argumentation has to be thought as related to discursive practices, to historical and cultural changing rationality, to interaction and refutation. We think that argumentation theory of ordinary language must return to Wittgenstein’s fusion of emotion and reason, to Hegelian totality (considering the detail and each part as related to the concrete whole, the whole as related to each part) to Peirce’s pragmatic and complex appreciation of argument. The logic of arguments cannot be studied anymore from a scientific point of view without considering humanities. All materialities of the social continuum must be considered if we want to overcome isolation and fragmentary visions of the logical products, the pragmatic procedures (conflictive or consensual) and the social practice process of argumentation. Partial visions and reductionism develop interesting instruments but a very poor analysis of argumentation reality because they reproduce a unidimensional human being. The New Argumentation, the Integrated Theory, the New Organon of the 21st century must include linguistics, dialectical theories of criticism, rhetoric, eristic and the different modern formal, informal and natural logic approaches that help us to solve different argumentative problems. Influence of the audience and resolution of disputes, acceptation and rules, persuasion and cogency, reflection and prescription are not isolated universes. The analytical separation of components, materialities and criteria must be completed with a synthetic and re-integrative movement. The argumentation places must be thought as part of a complex subject theory. And last but not least, language and culture have many things to teach to argumentation theorists because universal norms cannot be drawn out from the crystal tower of Western episteme of rationality. Argument analysis must be done on its own real extended context articulated to communicative situations, culture, power and ideology. But, even if many scholars do not agree with these points of view and there is a great amount of work to be done by the theory of argument and argumentation, we have shown that the argumentation field is not so disperse. The possibility of a discursive appraisal of argumentation is open. What we now need is to establish the main discussions to construct an agreement, to brake the barriers, to save the gaps between theories. We defend not a dominant but a global, an integrated theory of argumentation with the contributions of distinctive methodologies that are not finished but are proper of the field. Each theory must understand itself as a part of the whole theory of argumentation.

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Table 1: Argumentation theories and basic disciplines of the argumentation field

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<th>Logic*</th>
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There are different approaches to formality in logic (Logical Propaedeutic just incorporates dialectical criteria to traditional logic). Grize and Vignaux’s Natural Logic works on the schematization operations.

Dialectical approaches go from descriptive discursive and conversational points of view (Plantin, Moeschler) to formal rules (Logical Propaeduetic, Formal Dialectics) pragmatic norms (Pragma-dialectics) and evaluation criteria (Informal Logic). The place of the opponent is weak in Toulmin and the New Rhetoric.

Rhetorical considerations go from ADL’s "integrated rhetoric of language" to the rhetoric tradition of Lo Cascio, the external considerations of Pragma-dialectics and the real rhetorical approaches.

Some aspects of linguistics (markers, modals) are essential to all analytical theories. Rhetorical theories, Informal Logic and Pragma-dialectics work with "natural arguments", Toulmin constructs his own examples, The New Rhetoric uses classical ones and logical approaches even control the meaning of argumentative operators.

Walton 1995 pragmatic approach contemplates cooperation, negotiation and quarrel.