Mutual reconstruction of arguments in dialogue

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Analyzing argumentative discourse is not an activity exclusively reserved for scholars in argumentation theory, rhetoric, and language philosophy. The proposal of this paper is that the faculty of analyzing argument structure is a basic precondition of understanding one another at all in argumentative discourse. Based on an examination of televised debate programmes, it is demonstrated how participants employ quasi-logical schemata to reconstruct implicit elements in other participants’ argument structure for purposes of clarification and criticism. This very descriptive approach entrusts, as it were, the actual argument analysis to the language users themselves.

1. Analysis and Interpretation

Recently, scholars of argumentation have pointed to the need for supplying the hierarchical approach to argument analysis with a linear approach (van Rees 1994 and Sandvik 1997), an approach that can capture the significance of sequential ordering of argumentative speech, with regard to subsequent hierarchisation of the material. Acknowledging this reasonable suggestion, I would like to point to an important aspect of this discussion: When an analyst investigates argumentative discourse, what he does is ideally a reflection of what language users do all the time in order to understand one another.

Seen from a pragmatic point of view, it is evident that linear and hierarchical approaches (I shall refer to them as analysis and interpretation, respectively) is also at work in real life conversation: A hearer will need to first decode the syntax/lexicon and disambiguate the semantics of a given linguistic utterance. Then he will have to infer the intended meaning. These operations are both necessary conditions for understanding the speaker utterance, but they are not individually sufficient conditions for the understanding; they both have to occur for understanding to evolve out of the speech event. In this way, these two conversational operations resemble closely the two methodical levels of analysis and interpretation.

For the present purposes, the decoding of grammar and lexicon is, however, only peripheral. The central aim of this presentation is to investigate the inference level of conversational meaning production: how do participants elicit implicit meaning in other participants’ argumentative utterances?

It is the hypothesis that participants engaged in argumentative exchanges employ for interpretive strategies in reconstructing and criticizing each other’s arguments. What I am interested in is the standards or principles involved in this process. Based on this hypothesis, I assume that participants do in fact carry out ad-hoc argument analyses, and hence, this investigation is the
argument analysis of argument analyses: the method of investigation poses, simultaneously, as the object of investigation.

In particular, this paper will discuss the idea that language users employ quasi-logical forms in making sense of arguments. The assumption is that the particular genre of argumentative speech activates a limited logic as a principle for interpretation. By ‘limited logic’ I do not wish to suggest that such a logic is less coherent or has limited powers of explanation compared to the full, textbook logic, I only want to suggest that, contrary to textbook logic, the everyday logic of language is limited by criteria such as relevance and informativeness1.

Insofar as it can be demonstrated that certain inference forms are being used for reconstructing the adversary’s arguments, perspectives are promising: the normative ideal that involves formal standards of reasonableness will find empirical justification, thus rendering argumentation analysis less vulnerable (though not immune) to the charge of biased interpretation: if logical forms are imbedded in the process of reconstructing and criticizing internally in argumentative discourse, then analysts of argumentation are justified in employing the same logical forms in external investigations of argumentative discourse. The ‘rational judge’ is thus rooted not only in philosophy, but also in empirical practice.

Now, this is a bold proposal, perhaps too bold. Obviously, an analysis examining the mutual reconstruction of argumentative elements involves an analyst in its own right, an analyst who will have to be the rational judge of what reconstructions are reconstructions of, and what criticism is critical of. But this is a precondition of all investigations, one that we cannot - regrettably - escape from. At least, in this framework the analyst is removed from the actual reconstruction effort, which renders the analysis of the specific inference forms rather more descriptive and less interpretive than in more traditional approaches.

2. Reconstruction and Criticism

The words protagonist and antagonist are both construed from the Greek noun agón, which means ‘battle’ or ‘war’. The ideal of critical discussion, however, is intrinsically based on the antagonism to warfare, cooperation, the joint effort at arriving at the truth of a matter by the use of language (assuming that adherence to ‘The Principle of Communication’ as laid out by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992) is necessarily cooperative in the Gricean sense of the word (Grice 1975)). But this cooperation is only at work out of sheer necessity; without it, there would be no meaningful communication. So the metaphor is probably not altogether inappropriate after all. Even if the participants rid themselves of all pride and prejudice, and are only committed to approaching the truth of the current matter, dialectical method dictates that they take on the roles of advocating converse standpoints, and challenging the other’s standpoint. So it is not surprising that van Eemeren & Grootendorst
define the functions of protagonist and antagonist in terms of ‘defence’ and ‘attack’, respectively:

The protagonist’s task is to defend [a] point of view (and no other) and the antagonist’s job is to attack the same point of view (and no other). (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984: 82)

What I want to explore specifically is what kinds of actions in particular dissociate the role of antagonist from the role of protagonist, and what exactly does it mean to ‘attack’ a point of view? Are there any regularities in antagonistic attacks that can be described systematically? A specification of the definition (ibid.) states that

...the antagonist’s attacks consist in principle of statements calculated to elicit argumentation in favor of the protagonist’s point of view and ... that argumentation is then (or may be) called into question. ...the protagonist’s defenses consist in principle of statements advancing argumentation in favor of his point of view and in favor of the argumentation attacked.

Evidently, the antagonist can perform two different kinds of speech act, the further "elicitation" of the protagonist’s argumentation, and the "questioning" of the elicited argumentation. In this paper, these two functions are called reconstruction and criticism, respectively. Obviously, not all instances of elicitation involves an actual reconstruction of the protagonist’s argument. Elicitation is often realized by questions such as "how do you get to that conclusion?", or "why do you think so?", etc. But it may also take the form of questions like "why do you think that p?", and assertions like "when you say that p, you must assume that q." In the last cases, the antagonist has actually rephrased something the protagonist has said, and/or produced something which the protagonist must mean; and that goes beyond the ‘innocent’ asking for further argumentation, it also involves reconstructing the protagonist’s argument.

The notions of reconstruction and criticism will be further developed below. For the moment, however, it will do to simply assume, that three different actions are involved in discussion: argumentation (by the protagonist), reconstruction and criticism (by the antagonist).

Assuming that reconstruction and criticism together may provide us with a clue to the inferential standards as employed by language users, we can phrase the central question: Do antagonistic reconstruction and criticism provide evidence that certain inference forms are considered generally valid, and others generally invalid?

The obvious way to achieve an understanding of peoples’ validity criteria is to observe what kinds of statements they produce and what their illocutionary goals are, when they reconstruct other people’s arguments. It appears that people tend to go through the trouble of inferring other peoples’ reasoning for
two purposes only: for the sake of clarification and for establishing a base for criticism. As we leave the clarification issue (because it is not typically antagonistic), it should now be evident that when reconstructions are produced for the apparent purpose of criticism, what we are dealing with is counter argumentation (not to be confused with ‘contra-argumentation’ which is a protagonistic activity cf. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984). In the following section I will discuss in some more detail what is involved in producing counter argumentation (a difficulty that arises in connection with calling the performance of the antagonist a form of argumentation, is that, according to the definition above, the antagonist can not advance argumentation at all - without, that is, becoming a protagonist. This difficulty could be overcome by saying that whenever antagonistic reconstruction and criticism are employed as premises for a conclusion in a standpoint contrary to the protagonist’s, then this counter argument is over-all protagonistic while employing antagonistic strategies in the establishment of the premises. We could say that, if we wanted to complicate things further, but we don’t, so let’s just use the term ‘counter argumentation’ as a term for antagonistic reconstruction and criticism - with the mentioned reservation in mind.).

3. Characteristics of counter argument

In the following, I am going to argue that the act of reconstruction can be subdivided into two different activities: the paraphrasing of (parts of) some expressed argument on the one hand, and the cogent elicitation of unexpressed elements in the same argument on the other. Criticism, in turn, is basically the refutation of parts of the other’s argument, and I propose that such refutations come in two variants: refutation of substance and refutation of form.

For the purpose of investigating such processes, I introduce a set of terms: paraphrase and implicatum are reconstruction devices, whereas formal refutation and factual refutation are critical devices. To illuminate the use of these terms, let us look at a fictional example:

(1)

Doorman to clubguest:

Sorry Mate, this is members only. I can’t let you in.

Club guest to doorman:

1. OK, you tell me this club is members only (Paraphrase)
2. And you tell me I can’t get in (Paraphrase)
3. I guess you think that I’m not a member, then (Implicatum)
4. Well here’s my member’s card! (Factual refutation)
5. See, what you’re saying simply doesn’t make sense (Formal refutation)

This example is highly manufactured. I give this example in order for all reconstruction and criticism activities to be present in one and the same counter-argument. The exchange involves reconstructing the doorman’s line of reasoning by paraphrasing what he has said (lines 1 and 2), and by eliciting what he must necessarily assume for that reasoning to be coherent (line 3). It also involves the refutation of an element in the reconstructed argument (line 4), and a refutation of the internal coherence of the whole argument (line 5). Such examples may be useful for explanation, though not for persuasion. We will have to look at empirical language for that. But before we do so, figure 1 depicts the proposed system of the various strategies associated with the two argumentative roles, and the ways these strategies are realized in dialogue:

Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARGUMENT Role</th>
<th>ARGUMENT Strategy</th>
<th>COUNTER ARGUMENT Strategy</th>
<th>COUNTER ARGUMENT Realization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protagonist</td>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Antagonist</td>
<td>Reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Paraphrase Implicatum</td>
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<td>Factual Refutation</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Formal Refutation</td>
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</table>

This categorization entails a systematic dissociation of protagonist and antagonist in keeping with the definitions of van Eemeren and Grootendorst: Constructing argument is a protagonistic strategy, whereas the antagonist counter-argues by reconstructing or criticizing, or both.

An empirical study of the reconstruction strategy displays certain linguistic regularities: paraphrases are meta-linguistic whereas implicata are results of the inferential process of implicature\(^2\). Consequently, such utterances tend to be linguistically realized in different ways; these differences are primarily the denotation of main verbs, and the use of tentative/assertive modality. Paraphrases are generally marked by meta-linguistic devices such as verbs denoting communicative actions, like say, claim, state, but also by an invariant level of modality: on a scale ranging from ‘tentative’ to ‘assertive’, paraphrases are in the ‘assertive’ end, realized by the absence of modal verbs and other modal indicators. Conversely, implicata are generally marked by references to internal cogency, partly by using such verbs as mean, understand, think, etc, and partly by using modality of varying tentativeness (indicating the likelihood of the implicature), like the modal verbs must, may, can.

4. Reconstruction and Criticism in a Real Context
It is now time to turn to some empirical argumentative dialogue, in order to demonstrate the claims I have made about counter argument so far. A brief word on the context of the data:

The investigation is based on a small corpus of transcriptions developed from three television debates that preceded the Danish referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty under the European Union in May 1998. The debates focus on various issues of the treaty, each debate initiated by a single question like e.g. "What are the effects of the Amsterdam Treaty with respect to domestic policies on refugees and immigration?". The format is very simple: two debaters participate, one for and one against the treaty. The debate is regulated by a host, and witnessed by a studio audience with no participation right. Here is an excerpt that can illustrate some of the points made above. The debate theme is "What are the effects of the Amsterdam Treaty with respect to eastward expansion of the EU?":

(2)

Ant. then you claim that it says in the treaty that only five countries can join that’s not true you also said yourself that the treaty says nothing about expansion so both can’t be right what you’re saying is illogical Holger

Prot. No I never said that [[uncl.]]

The antagonist's turn consists of three types of counter-argumentative utterances:

1. then you claim that it says in the treaty that only five countries can join (Paraphrase 1 (PA1))
2. that’s not true (Factual refutation (FA))
3. you also said yourself that the treaty says nothing about expansion (Paraphrase 2 (PA2))
4. so both can’t be right (Formal refutation 1 (FO1))
5. what you’re saying is illogical (Formal refutation 2 (FO2))

Lines 1 and 3 have verbs denoting expression ("claim", "said") and pronominal reference to the counterpart ("you", "yourself") as the agency of these communicative acts. Consequently, we can safely treat them as clear-cut paraphrases, PA1 and PA2, respectively. Line 2 refutes PA1 directly by reference to its non-factuality, and hence we treat it as an instance of factual refutation (FA). Line 4 is treated as a formal refutation (FO1), because it indicates that the combination of PA1 and PA2 is a contradiction. It is not considered a factual refutation, because it does not say that the propositions in question are not right (factually), but that they cannot - both - be right (in any context imaginable, apparently). Line 5 is considered a further refutation (FO2)
of the form of the reconstructed standpoints in combination. There is no reconstructed implicatum in this case, and this follows from the fact that, according to FO1, the combination of PA1 and PA2 constitutes an invalid form, and implicating a necessary but unexpressed premise presupposes a valid form as guiding principle. In this instance paraphrasing alone seems to rule out the existence of a valid form, and consequently there is no rational base for eliciting further - implicated - premises.

Apparently, FO1 and FO2 relates to a general principle stating that $p \lor \neg p$ is a logical contradiction: it is not possible that the treaty says *nothing* about expansion *and* that the treaty says *something* about expansion (namely that five countries are allowed to join the EU). We could also say that FO1 indicates that given PA1 and PA2, *no rule of inference applies*.

However, we have not yet taken the factual refutation (FA) into account: FA states that PA1 is false. So apart from criticizing the argument for being invalid (FO1 and FO2) the counter argument points to the *reason* for this discrepancy: one of the premises is false (FA). If this analysis is credible, we may infer that the counter-argument refers to the principle of contradiction as the external, rational standard for assessment. PA1 and PA2 cannot both be true, since they refer respectively to the proposition $p$ and the negation of that proposition $\neg p$, so one of them must be false. And, incidentally, the antagonist happens to know that it is $p$ which is false.

To this reconstruction and criticism, the protagonist replies by saying "No, I never said that." What he is referring to anaphorically by "that", PA1 or PA2, is hard to say, as the discussion is cut off at this point, moving on to another aspect of the discussion. But the protagonist’s reply, *denying a paraphrased statement* indicates that there is something more to the analysis of counter argument: how should we treat the protagonist reply?

5. Dialogical Dynamics: the Negotiated Argument

Evidently, it is necessary to refine our understanding of counter-argument somewhat: For the present purposes, we deal only indirectly with the protagonist's initial argument, by looking at the way it is being represented in the counter argument reconstruction. The representation need not be fair or adequate, indeed, the argument that it is supposed to be a reconstruction of, may not have been advanced at all by the protagonist. So it is not at all uncommon that the protagonist challenges the antagonist's reconstruction. In such instances, we can say that the reconstruction is being developed dialogically, as a negotiation between antagonist and protagonist. In other words, we need to distinguish between three kinds of argument: the *original* argument, the *reconstructed* argument, and the *negotiated* argument. The original argument is the defense of a standpoint advanced by the protagonist. The reconstructed argument is the antagonist’s proposed reconstruction of the original argument. The negotiated argument is the argument which may be established in an interactive process, in which the antagonist’s reconstruction
is adjusted the protagonist (The term 'negotiation' does not necessarily mean that the exchange is equal in terms of power and dominance: in many cases, the adjustments that the protagonist is allowed to make, are being instrumentalised for further criticism by the antagonist.).

As a general rule, it seems that, in reconstructed arguments, formal refutation occurs when there is no implicatum, and implicata occur when there is no formal refutation: the relationship between them seems to be *mutually exclusive*. There is an explanation for this: When you implicate that some claim is a ‘needed’ assumption (in the sense of Ennis (1982)) in order for the opponent’s argument to be acceptable, you do so by reference to a form you consider valid. This is essentially the practical application of the principle of charity (Scriven 1976: 71ff.). But having reconstructed the opponent’s argument on a valid form, there is obviously no ground for a formal refutation. Conversely, when paraphrases alone seem to indicate an invalid form having been used, there can be no implicatum, as implicata (of this sort) are performed according to an expectation of validity (or a *maxim* of validity, if you like). So formal refutations occur only when there are *paraphrased* indications of invalidity, or when an implicatum is negated. The implicatum can be negated by a factual refutation produced by the antagonist, like in the doorman/club guest example above. But negation may also come about through a negotiation in which the protagonist comments on the antagonist’s reconstruction. Such a comment might be the denial of the antagonist’s implicatum. And when the implicatum - the needed assumption - is denied by the protagonist, the antagonist can reply by way of formal refutation.

Example (3) is an instance of this mechanism:

(3)

*Ant.* Can I just ask you er now you said that the new treaty is going to draw a line across Europe

*Prot.* Mm

*Ant.* Does that m- does that mean that you oppose the inclusion of Poland the Chzech Republic and so on three four countries in accord with the *old* treaty?

*Prot.* No

*Ant.* But then your argument doesn’t hold

The subject matter of this exchange requires a brief explanation and an interpretation of the textual manifestation. Firstly, a preceding argument has established that the protagonist thinks that the new treaty involves the inclusion of four - and only four - new member states in the EU. Accordingly, we take the expression "the new treaty" to stand for "the inclusion of four countries". Secondly, there is tacit agreement about the norm that no one wants a new line
across Europe after the fall of the iron curtain. So, what the antagonist is saying is that, seeing that no one wants a new line across Europe, and seeing that the protagonist is of the opinion that including only four new member states will create such a line, the protagonist is obliged to be against the inclusion of this limited number of new members under the old treaty, too, and indeed under any circumstances. Which means that the protagonist’s original argument is irrelevant to the question of whether or not to ratify the Amsterdam Treaty. In a rhetorical term, the antagonist accuses the protagonist of committing the fallacy of ignoratio elenchi - of ignoring the issue.

In terms of counter argumentation, I propose the following analysis:

1. [the inclusion of only four new member states] is going to draw a line across Europe (Paraphrase (PA))
   1.1 (Affirmation (AF))

2. we should not include [only four new member states] in accord with the old treaty [either] (Implicatum (IMP))
   2.2 (Denial (DEN))

3. your argument doesn’t hold (Formal refutation (FO))

An interpretation of this sequence observes that the counter argument consists of two reconstructional utterances, a paraphrase in line 1 which is affirmed by the protagonist in line 1.1, and an implicatum in line 2 which is denied by the protagonist in line 2.2. So we have a paraphrased utterance negotiated to be true, and an implicated utterance negotiated to be false. Following this, the antagonist in line 3 claims that this negotiation of truth values renders the argument invalid. But what is the argument exactly? According to the reconstruction, which is displayed in lines 1 and 2 only, the argument is:

Reconstructed argument (antagonist’s version)

The inclusion of only four new member states is going to draw a line across Europe

So:

We should not include only four new member states.

Interpreted charitably, the premise needed for validating this argument is the norm that "we do not want a line across Europe", which is not controversial in this context, it is a trivial premise and thus a reasonable deletion. When we interpret the reconstructed argument in this way (and I think we can), the reconstructed argument is in fact valid - it can be assessed according to the inference form modus tollens, without eliciting unexpressed content which is wildly controversial.
When we then look at the *negotiated* version of the same argument (involving lines 1, 1.1, 2, and 2.2), the conclusion is negated (in line 2.2). So an assessment of this argument by reference to modus tollens will render it invalid:

*Negotiated argument* (protagonist’s version)

The inclusion of only four new member states is going to draw a line across Europe

So:

*We should* include only four new member states.

This is why the antagonist formally refutes the negotiated argument (in line 3). The formal refutation (your argument doesn’t hold) refers to the protagonist’s refusal of the conclusion of the reconstructed argument: when the conclusion is refuted, the form is invalid; if not, it is valid, according to the antagonist.

Note that the reconstruction could also be interpreted in the form of modus ponens, in which case the unexpressed norm (we should not draw a line across Europe) takes on the role of conclusion. Whichever way the reconstruction is to be understood, it seems that the antagonist has a strong case in claiming that the negotiated argument is in fact invalid - to the extent, that is, that the reconstruction is a fair rendition of the *original* argument (in fact, it is not; the protagonist has claimed that the new treaty involves a *restriction* which will prevent the remaining Eastern-European countries from inclusion in the EU for the duration of the treaty. And that does not imply that inclusion of the four countries in other contexts - e.g. as a first step in a gradual process of assimilating all eastern-European countries - will "draw a line across Europe". But this delicate point is lost in the antagonist’s reconstruction.). For the moment we are content in concluding that the antagonist has successfully applied a valid argument form (either modus tollens or modus ponens) for the formal refutation of the protagonist’s argument (at this point, reservations are probably in order; even if the modus tollens-form employed is of course valid, nonetheless we have had to interpret the textual material in order to make it fit, and consequently, we dare only call the form "quasi-logical".).

As we stick to the modus tollens-interpretation, we can further analyse the mechanism of the negotiated argument as follows:

1. from the antagonist’s paraphrase "if p then q" *combined* with the protagonist’s acceptance of this reconstruction, it is negotiated that "if p then q" is true.

2. from the antagonist’s implicature "not-p" *combined* with the protagonist’s denial of this reconstruction, it is negotiated that "not-p" is false, and, consequently, that "p" is true.
3. based on 1 and 2, the antagonist formally refutes the negotiated argument on the charge of the fallacy of affirming the antecedent.

If this negotiation is typical (and that still remains to be seen in further analyses of this kind) we could say that there is a regularity of how negotiation works: in the negotiation of an argument, the protagonist is allowed to decide what interpretation is right. After all, it is his argument that is being reconstructed, so he should know. But the negotiated clarification may then serve as firm ground for criticism, like in the above example, where the criticism employs the tactics of a formal refutation of the negotiated argument. The protagonist is moved into a position in which he faces a destructive dilemma: as the protagonist is the judge of the correctness of the reconstruction, the subsequent refutation of the form of the argument is so much more amplified; the antagonist offers the protagonist an impossible ultimatum: "either we accept your version - but then your argument is invalid, or else we accept my version - but then your conclusion runs counter to your general standpoint. Have it your way!"

6. Functional roles in argument

Initially in this paper, stipulatory definitions of the terms ‘protagonist’ and ‘antagonist’, provided a role-based way of isolating counter-argumentation as an activity performed exclusively by antagonists. This distinction can be illustrated in a functional model:

Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROTAGONIST</th>
<th>ANTAGONIST</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Defending standpoint)</td>
<td>(Attacking Standpoint)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assertion</td>
<td>paraphrase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>justification</td>
<td>implicatum</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>affirmation or denial</td>
<td>factual refutation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>formal refutation</td>
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So assertion and justification (and in negotiated arguments, affirmation and denial) are protagonistic activities, whereas paraphrase, implicatum, factual and formal refutation are discretely antagonistic. In these definitions, the roles of protagonist and antagonist are functional, as they are activated by particular,
linguistic actions by which they can be identified. The arrows in the model symbolize the degree of relation to the actual utterances of the counterpart: paraphrase is directly related to the original argument, as it is (supposedly) a repetition of an explicit part of the original argument. This is symbolized by a straight arrow. Implicatum is related to the original argument by virtue of being (supposedly) consequential of what has been uttered, an inferential reconstruction of an implicit part of the original argument. The relation is weaker than in the case of paraphrase, as the implicatum is not directly verifiable, so this relation is symbolized by a broken arrow. Factual and formal refutation are not necessarily related to the original argument at all, but need only relate to the reconstruction (paraphrase and/or implicatum). Hence, no arrow. On the protagonist side, assertion and justification (constituting the original argument) is of course unrelated to any later reconstruction or criticism advanced by the antagonist. Affirmation or denial, however, are direct comments on reconstruction made by the antagonist, thus symbolized by a straight arrow.

7. Conclusion

The empirical survey on which these findings are based, is not a scientifically or statistically valid examination. Rather, it has served as a source of inspiration for defining central issues of reconstruction practices and to provide evidence in support of the hypothesis that valid forms of inference play some role in practical argumentation. Having provided some evidence to that effect, further work in this area can then proceed: the claim that inference forms are systematically referred to in argumentative discourse might be investigated in a larger, and genre-neutral, text corpus. This in turn might provide statistical data, by which a more substantiated discussion of the concept of counter argument could be undertaken.

As for the notions of reconstruction and criticism, realized as paraphrase/implicatum and factual/formal refutation, respectively, we can say that such notions are useful as they seem to be invariant to context. I believe that they pertain to any instance of argumentative discourse regardless of situational parameters. The reconstruction mechanism - paraphrasing and implicating - is the conversational engine of argumentative dialogue. It clarifies positions, it problematizes inferences, and it warrants criticism, so that deadlocked positions may be unlocked and the argument exchange can progress.

ENDNOTES

1I have willfully avoided the term 'informal logic' for a variety of reasons: first of all, the very name seems to me close to being a contradiction in terms. Secondly, and more importantly, I don't think that the logic of everyday language is informal (in the sense 'not formal'), rather, some inferential forms are selected, others discarded for pragmatic reasons. Hence the term 'limited logic'.
It should be noted right away that the use of the notion of implicature deviates somewhat from Grice (1975): Contrary to the Gricean meaning of the word, implicature in this context is not conceived of a communicational mode which is necessarily *intentional*; often what is seen as implicata are not "used assumptions" but really "needed assumptions" as in Ennis (1982).

The original passage reads:
Ant. du pastar at der sa *star* i traktaten at der kun kan komme fem med det passer ikke du har jo også selv sagt der star ikke noget i traktaten om udvidelse sa begge dele kan ikke være rigtigt det er ulogisk det du siger
Prot. nej det har jeg ikke sagt [[ukl.]]

In traditional logic it is accepted that anything follows from a contradiction (*Ex Falso Quodlibet*). This is hardly the case in the limited logic of everyday discourse, where I find it more likely that the expectation of relevance will entail that no conclusion can follow logically from a contradiction.

The original passage reads:
Ant. ma jeg lige spørge dig oh nu sagde du at oh den nye traktat vil lave et skel i Europa
Prot. mh
Ant. vil det s- vil det sige du er modstander af at Polen Tjekkiet og sa videre tre fire lande bliver optaget i den *gamle* traktat
Prot. nej
Ant. sa holder dit argument jo heller ikke

REFERENCES


