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UMI®
AN ANALYSIS OF YASIR ARAFAT'S
MEDIA IMAGE IN THE NEW YORK TIMES IN

by

Rosa M. Regula

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of Political Science
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Master of Arts at the
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1998
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ABSTRACT

This study asks if a change in Yasir Arafat's media image in The New York Times coincided with the signing of the first peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.). Evidence suggests that when American decision-makers modify their views on a particular character, they project this new position to the media, which in turn alters the American public's mental picture of the enemy through the newspaper's use of language. This paper examines how all three factors interconnect in the characterization of Arafat in The New York Times in the periods before and after the handshake.

Chapter One provides a review of the relevant literature. It assesses the construction and deconstruction of enemy images, as well as the correspondence between how governments, mass media, and the mass public evaluate leaders.

Chapter Two outlines the political history of Palestine from the 1900s until 1996.

Chapter Three and Four examines the results from frequency and cross tabulation operations on coded material from The New York Times. The results reveal that the newspaper maintained a neutral stance on Arafat before and after the handshake, which was neither analogous to the American government's position or public opinion.

The New York Times thus failed to project a change in the manner in which Arafat was portrayed in both time periods. Instead it is argued that when a media outlet places an enormous importance on the subject matter and devotes vast resources to the coverage of a topic, it is able to project its own view which may not be that of policy-makers or the general public.
For Michael

Without whose good nature, support and tireless encouragement, this task would not have been accomplished.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A country's image of an individual or group is integral in forming government policies. Images of the enemy, as any other images, resonate through public opinion, which in turn affect the content and implementation of foreign policy by government officials or leaders. In most cases, there is a correspondence between how governments, mass media, and the mass public evaluate leaders. This paper examines how all three factors interconnect, keeping in mind that it is government officials who have the unique power to define situations and characterize particular leaders. However, in order to understand the impact images have on public opinion and government policy, a brief explanation of how a belief system functions is essential, since enemy images are initially formed as part of an individual's or society's belief system.

Research Question

This study will examine whether a change in Yasir Arafat's image in the American press coincided with the signing of the first peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) on the White House south lawn on September 13, 1993. The question will be tested by analysing the way the American media portrayed Yasir Arafat, the Chairman of the P.L.O., in the pre-handshake period and in the post-handshake period.

The premise of this paper is that belief systems which are common and central to every society, frame national perceptions. American society perceived Yasir Arafat negatively because for a long period of time the American government defined him, and the American
press portrayed him, as an enemy of the United States.

Therefore, by examining the change in governmental policies, we are able to see in turn if and how perceptions change. The American media, attuned to changes within the U.S. government, play a central role in this process. As the nation’s primary source of “information and perceptions of the world,” it portrays new policy directions through the images it projects and thus modifies American public opinion to coincide with the new foreign policy direction set by the government.

Literature Review

There are several schools of thought in the literature pertaining to belief systems in international relations. All of these centre on the gap between belief systems and the reality of the operational environment. In other words, misperception often plays a key role in the making of a country’s foreign policy. First, we must attempt to understand how individuals in a society formulate images of a particular event or a person on the international scene. The theory of cognitive dissonance offers a great deal to understanding this process.

The literature on cognitive dissonance is voluminous. Therefore, this review will deal solely with the formation and deconstruction of enemy images and how they function within the theory. It must also be kept in mind that the literature on misperception focuses on the factors in society which influence individuals to interpret the world in the manner in which they do. These views of the world are acquired through social interaction; they help explain

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how decision-makers implement policy.

As Kurt and Kati Spillman outline in their work on social cognitive development, the perception of an individual depends on a progressive sequence of information processing. Interacting with one another, individuals gather information from sources within society such as the history of a particular group, past experiences of an individual, and, perhaps most importantly, the media. These pieces of information lead to the formation of opinions on various issues.\(^2\) These opinions in turn play a role in imposing a particular perception upon an individual’s mental repertoire which is compatible with the social identity of a particular society.

The group a person belongs to therefore influences the basic premise of his/her thinking. This occurs even when he/she makes a conscious effort to free himself/herself of its control and to look at the world in an objective manner. Ralph White in his article “Images in the Context of International Conflict” describes the process as cultural and ideological relativism. The perceptions and beliefs acquired from an early age are based on the social background of a nation which creates in the minds of its citizens a point of view regarding ingrained and unchallenged assumptions about the world.\(^3\) These values, ideals, and normative obligations, as well as expectations, are internalized in such a manner that a system of common values prepares the ground for common interpretation and assessment of data, as well as common


action. Furthermore, these values determine the perception of a group's social reality and distinguish one's own group from other groups. This contributes to an individual's self concept and social identity. Thus, the belief system of the group acts to predetermine how new information is received, processed and interpreted.

This unconscious cultural conditioning causes individuals to feel that they are "right." "Right" and "wrong" perceptions are therefore evaluated and distinguished by their successful contributions to the survival of a society’s belief system. In this process, unsuitable perceptions and assessments are eliminated by natural selection in order to avoid psychologically uncomfortable inconsistencies.4

Images of the enemy are shaped in the same fashion. A particular view of an enemy is achieved through the mental process of absorbing information that fits the framework of the image. These perceptions are acquired by generally viewing the actions and beliefs of the enemy as contrary to what is socially acceptable to our own society and our own belief system. Thus, images of the enemy often have evil and violent connotations. In relation to the enemy, the individual now perceives himself/herself almost exclusively as a member of his/her group, just as he/she perceives individuals of the opponent group as exponents of the enemy group. In this fashion, the literature on enemy images explains how a society's belief system allows them to see the enemy as only capable of negative actions.5 Images of the enemy, then, are not the result of a developmental process. Rather they are the product of


5Spillman and Spillman, "On enemy images and conflict escalation," 68.
a regressive process leading back to emotions and perceptions that a society endorses of a particular individual and the way society views his/her actions. This information processing task precedes and accompanies decision-makers in making policy choices with regards to the enemy.⁶

Stereotypes and antagonistic ways of relating to the enemy are thus a natural progression of the theory and a means of distorting reality. According to White, this is confirmed by enemy images being formed solely on negative assessments acquired from the values and belief system within a community. In addition, stereotypes help individuals divide the world into understandable and easily grasped units in order to avoid cognitive discrepancies. In other words, one’s mental formation of enemy images helps to distinguish the “good” from the “bad”.⁷ As well, enemy images explain difficult realities by blaming calamities on the enemy group, thereby allowing one’s own values to be enhanced and the cohesion of one’s own group to be strengthened. The moment enemy images dominate perception, attempts at being objective vanish and the emotional sphere is dominated by the “good” and “bad” (friend and foe) framework. This means that the reciprocal intercourse of perception and empathy necessary for an adequate handling of the international environment, may be compromised.

Distortion in perception is thus a natural psychological occurrence which overwhelms

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decision-makers when confronting policy choices with respect to the enemy. Once the image of the enemy is established in the belief system of a particular society, misperception occurs in the following four ways:

1) “Distortion by omission” results when one group, convinced of its moral superiority, fails to realize its unintentional behaviour may be seen as an act of aggression by the other side. This normally results in the second side taking aggressive action in its defence. It is this counter action by the second nation which projects its enemy image and reinforces the first country’s distrust and suspicion.⁸

2) The “mirror image phenomenon” points to predictability in the way belief systems tend to depart from what historians regard as reality. It is based on the tendency to view the world in black and white and to see one’s own group as white and the opposing side as black. Thus, a country will often exaggerate its own virtues, while emphasizing the diabolical character of the leaders of the opposite side.⁹

3) Distortion also occurs through “selective attention.” By focusing on information which is compatible with one’s image of the enemy (in order to serve the immediate need of cognitive consistency), one excludes facts which, if taken at face value, might shed new light on the enemy. This is a highly powerful tool for both media and leaders who want to project an idea or view. Focusing only on material which fits within society’s cognitive repertoire, the media and political leaders are able to discard all information which does not conform to what is believed to be true. As Robert Jervis explains it, “actors within society tend to

⁸Ibid. 253.
⁹Ibid. 255.
perceive what they expect."\(^{10}\)

4) Suspicion of the other group also creates a typical blindness to the genuine beliefs of the other side, the tendency toward misperception, and an extreme failure of empathy. As a result, by not empathizing with the other group, one fails to see the true psychological context of enemy actions as seen by members of the other side. Often their actions are merely measures of survival and not intended to be of an offensive nature. Thus, by allowing a belief system to play such an integral role in one’s cognitive process, an enemy’s actions are interpreted in terms of the image and not objective reality. This leads to poor decision-making on the part of leaders.\(^{11}\)

It must also be noted that there is considerable literature emphasizing the possibility of acknowledging “some” validity to the enemy’s view point without challenging one’s belief system or causing subjective dissonance.\(^{12}\) For instance, emphasis may be placed on giving validity to the enemy’s point of view in order to avoid ethnocentrism. However, this process still leads to misperception, image distortion and lacks the objectivity required on the part of the viewer in dealing with the opponent.

The literature on cognitive dissonance and misperception also states that distortion of perceptions may be overcome. Enemy images may be dismantled by slowly breaking down


the rigid form of interaction at the group level and turning it into an inter-personal reaction.\textsuperscript{13} As Kurt and Kati Spillman refer to it, the enemy must be "re-individualized". This occurs by developing a mutual acceptance and understanding of the enemy. Contact may take various forms, such as student exchanges, journalistic missions or common conferences. All these endeavours, if organized properly, can lead to a better understanding and positive implications between opposing sides. It must be noted, however, that unprepared or forced contacts often prove to be counter-productive. Thus, before personal contact can take place, careful and differentiated information about the other group has to be presented regarding their history, their achievements, their norms, their values, their lifestyles, and their different concepts of life and human relations.\textsuperscript{14} This leads to a modification in the stereotypes associated with the enemy image, and a new image of the enemy, based on his legitimate needs, begins to slowly form. Through the intake of information, the dangers of black and white patterns of perception, typical of enemy images, are overcome. Creating a common network among well-known politicians and the media is one way to ensure the continuous and systematic destruction of an enemy image. Without the positive support of these officials and members of both communities, such a demanding and difficult task cannot be achieved.

Herbert Kellman used this approach on Israelis, Palestinians and Egyptians. He trained the three groups in communication and perspective-taking seminars before bringing them together. The result was a successful and constructive session between the three, despite

\textsuperscript{13}White, "Images in the Context of International Conflict: Soviet Perception of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.," 266.

\textsuperscript{14}Spillman and Spillman, "On enemy images and conflict escalation," 72.
differences of opinion. However, the readiness that makes the inner reflection on the causes of hostility possible developed slowly. Therefore, understanding enmity and reducing enemy images needs three items: public relations, development of educational programmes, and the building of networks.\textsuperscript{15}

This study will now examine how enemy images relate to and coincide with a new government policy direction towards the enemy. In order to do so, the paper will examine the role of decision makers in foreign policy and how the process of altering enemy images is initiated. New images are conveyed to the general public through the press and result in a new way of viewing the enemy.

As the literature on perception outlines, rational policy development is often hampered due to cognitive dissonance. A nation’s leaders are not immune from this principle. They, too, share society’s values and perceptions regarding an individual or group. In regard to enemy images, these often linger for a long period of time because they serve to reinforce the legitimacy and rationality of earlier decisions and reflect public opinion. Government officials usually ensure that they project and adhere to societal values when making foreign policy decisions, particularly in western democracies where the approval of the majority of the public is essential for the successful execution of policy and governance.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, the ultimate power of mass opinion, as leaders perceive it, can be clearly seen in the positions leaders

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\item \textit{Ibid.}
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endorse or avoid.\textsuperscript{17}

At times this can be detrimental, particularly when revisions of judgements are desirable and public opinion is unswayable. Under these circumstances participants in the policy process feel inhibited from utilizing the degree of freedom which is necessary in policy formulation.\textsuperscript{18} However, while public opinion operates as a constraint upon foreign policy, it rarely prevents innovations. A new foreign policy stance may usually be adopted without causing domestic conflict. An overwhelming national consensus on an issue need not inhibit policy flexibility or delay policy revision. Nor does it imply that there must be an automatic failure in attempts to foster reorganization. The literature on image-making states that image transformations are possible through communication of information, journalistic exchanges, contacts with the enemy and inter-governmental negotiations.

The initial step for changing enemy images at the international level is taken by a nation’s decision-makers. This is because they are not only better informed on the intricacies of foreign policy, but also, because they have a considerable amount of leverage in foreign affairs. In general, the public tends to be quite uninformed on foreign policy issues and does not seem to be preoccupied with such concerns.\textsuperscript{19} Hence, leaders are able to use their relative freedom in foreign affairs to pursue new policy directions towards the enemy with few domestic constraints. Leaders begin to transform their perceptions of the enemy through a

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibid, 292.

learning process which results in a new image of the enemy. Once this image is altered, the media is used as the vehicle for projecting this new view to the public. The following pages will attempt to outline this process.

It has been established that feelings and beliefs towards an individual tend to fit in a rather consistent pattern. It is also true, as the literature on overcoming cognitive dissonance states, that the inconsistencies in one’s belief system will prevail until they are reduced by the inclusion of new information based on precepts and arguments which are seen as justified. Thus, given the opportunity to consider policy alternatives, a deeper understanding of policy problems may be achieved by government officials who are often at the forefront of this process.

There is a small portion of society which follows international relations and has considerable knowledge of various government policies. These are usually government officials who devote their careers to a particular area of study. This group realizes through a process of gathering information, interacting with the other side, and examining domestic issues and external factors, that the present perception of the enemy has to change. Thus, as the theory on cognitive dissonance states, enemy images begin to dissolve through the intake of new information. Decision-makers realize the nation cannot remain as intractable and unvarying as it has been towards the enemy. Hence, the nation’s leaders are informed of the need to adopt a new policy in order to accommodate the forces acting within the international community. This may result from a long process of persuasion, wrangling, and fact finding amongst governmental officials, or could occur overnight due to an unexpected incident in the international arena which forces leaders to immediately change their perception of the
enemy. For example, during World War II, when Germany suddenly invaded the Soviet Union, not only did a shift in the war occur, but the Soviet Union became an ally overnight. Thus, the image of the enemy may change due to sudden events occurring in the world, pressures on leaders to interact in the international community, or through the initiative of a select few within the government bureaucracy to change policy.

Once a new policy direction is established by decision-makers, the press plays a vital role in disseminating and framing the message to the general public. Even though government officials play the central role in shaping foreign policy, they rely on the press as the vehicle for getting their message across to the mass public. Thus, interaction between government officials and the press is necessary. Not only does mutual cooperation often result as the two pursue their respective roles in foreign policy, but there is also to some extent a consistency in views between the two. This has a profound impact on how the public adapts to the new image of the enemy which is being presented.

As Bernard Cohen outlines in his book *The Press and Foreign Policy*, there are several ways in which policy makers use the press as a tool for signalling policy preferences in foreign affairs and influencing public opinion. First, the press serves as our main source of information. Journalists gather material from external sources interpret it and repackage it for consumption. However, a nation's leaders, as the main players in foreign affairs, dominate foreign policy and are primary sources for foreign news coverage. They not only devote vast resources to following world events, but also have large staffs who follow events and study policy implications on a daily basis. Due to the limited ability of the press to devote a large staff and significant resources to foreign affairs, the lack of interest on the part of the
American public, and the ready accessibility of government officials as source of news on
foreign events for reporters, the American press relies heavily on governmental agencies for
information on foreign affairs. In essence, the press serves as a mouthpiece for government
policies and views. As Soderlund and Briggs point out in their article, “Left, Right and
Center: Cold War Press Portrayals of Caribbean and Central American Leaders,” less than
(two publications which offer a considerable amount of foreign coverage) could be traced to
non-governmental sources and less than one percent were based on a reporter’s own
analysis. Thus, the press is highly vulnerable to government manipulation since government
officials use reporters as a medium to project their views on the American public. It should
not be surprising that, more often than not, governmental views and policies are conveyed by
the press to the mass public, rather than independent judgements.

Second, the press plays a vital role in mobilizing and shaping national public opinion
through the images and information they project. In the case of an enemy, news coverage will
usually characterize the individual in a manner analogous to the established cognitive image.
In addition, the language, images, analogies, and metaphors the press use to describe the
enemy and his/her actions not only reinforce a belief system, but also confirm a society’s

Relations and Media Agenda Setting,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 78,
September 1984: 643.


22 Walter C. Soderlund and Donald Briggs, “Left, Right and Center: Cold War Press
Portrayals of Caribbean and Central American Leaders,” International Communications
expectations of the enemy. Furthermore, as Farrel Corcoran argues, the language the press uses (i.e. their descriptive words or phrases) in reporting is capable of shaping the meaning of an event or person:

The key concept here is the power of the media to define, not merely reproduce reality through their narrative devices which actively make things mean. Reality is no longer viewed as a given set of facts,...Instead, it is the result of a particular way of constructing, through preferred meanings, a ‘reality’ which would have credibility, legitimacy and a taken-for-grantedness.23

The press as the carrier of the written word is a powerful agenda-setting tool for decision-makers. Leaders realize both its informative role and its power in influencing public opinion. Most readers evaluate words and symbols according to their precise meaning, and it is the precise meaning of the written word that people use to influence their judgements. In other words, “language is the raw material out of which meaning is constructed...[and] valanced words and phrases used to describe [an enemy] are reasonable indicators of a journalist’s position with respect to that [individual].”24 In the case of foreign policy, the journalist’s view is usually close to that of the government.

Relevant communications that reach the public on a particular issue through the press thus have an attitude-shaping effect upon the mass population, buttressed by the force of consensus as outlined in the previous literature on cognitive processes and belief systems. Hence, governmental officials use the press not only to gauge public reactions to policy changes, but as a primary means of shifting public opinion in a desired direction.


Government officials publicize a new program and promote the acceptance of new ideas by sending out feelers to the general public through mass media. Innovative departures in foreign policy are often tested in “trial balloon form” in order to measure the degree of opposition or acceptance by the public. This enables leaders to gather ideas on how constituents view situations. The leaders’ analysis of the public response will then determine the way in which a policy change is initially presented to the public, or the way it is defended. Leaders may introduce new symbols into the communication channel in order to attempt to change the message being transmitted, or they may change the language used towards the enemy, but hold off on introducing any new content until the public is more accepting of it. In the case of an overnight crisis, a new policy will usually occur quickly and the general public usually follows a leader’s direction. As Robert Shapiro states, the public generally responds rationally to changing circumstances, especially if it perceives it to be in its own interest or in the interest of the nation, given shared values and common standards of judgement obtained from the media or policy-makers. In addition, people follow well informed leaders whom they trust and view as competent and capable decision-

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29 Shapiro and Page, “Foreign Policy and the Rational Public,” 214.
makers who hold the nation's interests firmly in mind.

As the projector of governmental views, the media then test the new direction by slowly shifting their perception and following the government's characterization of the enemy. A new image starts to take shape as the general public follows the press and begins to change its perceptions. Thus, an individual's images of actors on the international scene are heavily and unavoidably media dependent.30

Third, the media aid in shifting public opinion by projecting an official's activities. If the public detects an image of concern being transmitted by an especially able official who conveys strong emotions, public pressure will generate a policy modification.31 Therefore, the rhetoric of an official is an important part of his/her manipulation of symbols in order to fashion and sustain a policy shift.

Finally, government officials will collaborate with journalists in the formulation of a new policy by providing them with the first glance at a new policy initiative. This process not only outlines the foreign policy shift of a nation, but also provides journalists with a story. This tactic works well, particularly when a new, sudden, and unexpected shift in policy is introduced. Journalists caught off-guard tend to follow leaders' directives and inform the public accordingly.32

The literature thus seems to indicate that it is the nation's political elite who make the


31Shapiro and Page, "Foreign Policy and the Rational Public," 222.

overall decisions, while the press frames and establishes the importance of the issue. The press is particularly subject to governmental influence in the reporting of foreign news. However, this is not exclusively true, since many events will occur over which leaders have no control. But by and large, the literature indicates that the decision-making elites of a nation, particularly in foreign policy, set the agenda which leads to enemy images being altered.

There are instances when the press is able to influence public opinion and initiate image transformation. The literature on the media’s role in foreign policy also explains how public opinion and foreign policy may be influenced by mass media. The media are, after all, the primary source of rapid raw information on events in the world, and virtually the only source of information in a crisis situation. 33 Journalists cover events continuously as they occur and project these images into the nation’s homes through television, print and radio. By focusing attention on a particular issue, the media thus attract the attention of decision-makers and place the issue on the nation’s foreign policy agenda. As a result, decision-makers must be attuned to media coverage, since the content the media project as a priority is often a reflection of what the general public is thinking and willing to accept (given the press’s ability to shape perceptions through the use of language). In addition, leaders will process this information given their established beliefs and formulate views accordingly.

The press is also able to initiate a new point of view because journalists are among the most knowledgeable and sophisticated individuals on a particular field or issue. Many foreign correspondents devote years to covering a particular region of the world. As a result, they

acquire considerable expertise, knowledge, and experience in a given area. In addition, when covering a story, journalists interact with both sides of a given dispute. This may include being exposed to the enemy’s thoughts, goals and belief system. In fact, in some cases, journalists seek to interact with the enemy in order to get the other side of the story. Thus, according to the literature on cognitive dissonance, the destruction of an enemy image or perception should accelerate as communication increases.

It is this change in perception that eventually leads to a shift in public opinion. As journalists write their stories and communicate them back to the nation, they project new perceptions of the enemy in their messages. Television and print media may then project a characterization of the enemy in a more favourable light. The public continually seeing this new approach, eventually adopts such a view and endorses a change in policy. Particularly in foreign conflicts, the public tends to rely on media presentations and to evaluate the conflict in a manner highly similar to that seen in media presentations.\(^{34}\) The press and public opinion, then, seem closely linked. Editors have a keen sense of what readers are concerned with, and the public reads what editors identify as a priority in their coverage.\(^{35}\)

Furthermore, the media influence public opinion by being influential in the initial formulation of foreign policy. Given the power of public opinion in western democracies, decision-makers must adjust their policies and agenda accordingly. If the press characterizes a policy option in a particular manner early on in the decision-making process, it is difficult

\(^{34}\)Cohen and Adoni, *Social Conflict and Television*, 170.

for officials to turn that image around to their preferred perspective.\textsuperscript{36} It becomes difficult for policy makers to control an issue once the media have already projected an image of the situation and society has accepted the particular view. At this point leaders may find it difficult to formulate foreign policy contrary to public opinion.\textsuperscript{37}

Moreover, the press expresses national opinion which is useful for policy decisions and agenda-setting. When government officials see an item in the newspapers increasing in importance, they will devote more attention to it.\textsuperscript{38} They will change their evaluation of the issue and possibly change governmental policy.

In conclusion, a new policy direction will affect press images. Whether this new policy stance is established within society, initiated by elite decision-makers or by the media, the particular view will make its way into the press and will be projected accordingly.

Method

Before proceeding to outline the research method which will be used to test my hypothesis and to define concepts useful in establishing the validity of my research, the following research question is posed: “Did Yasir Arafat’s image in the American press change from negative to positive coinciding with the signing of the peace agreement on the White House south lawn on September 13, 1993?”

In answering this question, the independent variable will be time (before and after the

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Ibid.} 94.

\textsuperscript{37}\textit{Ibid.} 118.

\textsuperscript{38}Dunn, \textit{Public Officials and the Press}, 103.
handshake) and the dependent variable will be the image of Arafat projected in *The New York Times*. Specifically, I hypothesize that a change in Arafat’s image should occur, coincident with and hence as a result of the events occurring on September 13, 1993.

In this scenario, there should be a change in Arafat’s media image from negative to positive between the two time periods examined. The rationale is that with the passage of time, the American administration began to change its view of Yasir Arafat and the Palestinian peoples’ goal of acquiring a homeland. For years, Arafat had been considered an enemy of the U.S. He was consistently seen in the company of other enemies of the United States (like Mohammar Qaddafi of Libya and various Soviet leaders), and associated with international terrorist acts. This evoked negative sentiments among the media and the general public. However, by the late 1980s, international pressure dictated that a peace settlement in the Middle East was long overdue and that a cessation of hostilities had to be achieved. In order to be involved in the peace initiative seeking a positive solution to the conflict, American decision makers slowly modified their views on Arafat and his cause and eventually sponsored the historic Peace Accord between the P.L.O. and Israel on September 13, 1993.

As a result of the handshake on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993, there should be an immediate change in Arafat’s image as presented by *The New York Times*. As stated in the literature review, media often cooperate with government officials in order to publicize a cause. On September 13, 1993, the media was called to the White House in full force to witness the historic signing of the peace agreement. The media, caught off guard and shocked by the images of two former enemies shaking hands, would be expected to follow the lead of the White House. They should endorse the historic event, and project it to the
American people in a positive light. Therefore, the image of the handshake should have had
a powerful impressionable effect on the American population. As Soderlund has stated, “not
only are ‘images’ key components in our understanding of reality, but once these images are
formed, they tend to act as ‘screens’ through which new information on the subject must
pass.”

Hence, I predict that Arafat’s image in the American press was altered from one that was
basically negative to one that was basically positive. As the American media witnessed the
historical event and visualized the handshake, it absorbed the meaning of a powerful symbol.
Realizing that the government no longer held Arafat in the position of “enemy,” they should
start to characterize Arafat as a friend, peacemaker and leader of a legitimate cause. In so
doing, cognitive consistency should also be achieved. The intake of new information rendered
the old image inconsistent with the new reality, and a new image should be constructed to
correspond to this reality. Thus, it is predicted that a majority of all portrayals of Arafat in
The New York Times subsequent to September 13, 1993 will be positive. If this is the case,
the American people should be sensitized by images in the media (symbolism of the
handshake); ill informed on foreign policy and reliant on the press for opinions and
judgements on international events they would alter their mental picture of Arafat
accordingly.

Hence, government officials through their coordination of a historical event on the White
House lawn, should have generated the initial transformation in the characterization of Arafat.

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The press had little choice but to follow, and we believe that The New York Times, through the use of language (descriptive words and phrases), was a major vehicle in the process of changing the American people’s mental image of Arafat from foe to friend, thereby, legitimizing the official change in governmental policy towards Yasir Arafat and the P.L.O.

Definitions of Key Concepts

**Agenda-setting:**

Agenda-setting is defined by Thomas R. Dye as the activities by a government or the media which define issues, identify alternative policies and focus on political, economic or social crises in order to implement a policy at some level. These policies become part of the national ideological plan and program.  

**Belief system:**

A belief system is composed of a number of images of the past, present and future. It includes all the accumulated and organized knowledge that an organism has regarding itself and the world. It may also be thought of as a set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. Furthermore, it orients the individual in his environment, by defining and identifying for him salient characteristics.

**Cognitive dissonance:**

Individuals usually strive towards consistency between what they know and believe.

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However, when new information presents itself which does not conform to the established beliefs, a momentary mental inconsistency is created. This is known as cognitive dissonance; a psychological conflict resulting from incongruent beliefs and attitudes held simultaneously.\textsuperscript{42} An individual attempts to rationalize these inconsistencies within the established framework of his/her beliefs. These changes in evaluation are always in the direction of increasing congruity with the existing frame of reference. The result is usually the active avoidance of situations or information which are likely to increase cognitive inconsistencies. However, as mentioned in the literature on cognitive dissonance, distortions in perception may be overcome. This process usually involves the re-examination of policies which are not providing the required solutions. Therefore, new information is processed in such a manner that new evidence becomes congruent with the environmental conditions.\textsuperscript{43} Feelings are modified in accordance with new information and cognitive consonance is re-established.

\textbf{Image:}

An image is a human construct imposed on an array of perceived attributes projected by an object, event or person which is subject to influence by messages issued by some external actor.\textsuperscript{44} In other words, they are mental pictures of events, individuals or actions usually held in common by members of a particular group. These mental pictures change when external

\textsuperscript{42}Festinger, \textit{A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance}, 3.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid, 20.

\textsuperscript{44}Manheim and Albritton, "Changing National Images: International Public Relations and Media Agenda Setting," 645.
factors (such as events or actions in the world) that carry a lot of symbolism reshape our constructs of perceived attributes (i.e., images). These symbols, which are normally projected through the media and taken at their precise meaning, not only serve as powerful forces in modifying one's established perceptions, but also serve to simplify complex realities into easily understood meanings. Thus, the general public uses these symbols as its framework for generating or changing perceptions or mental pictures of world events or individuals. These new perceptions in turn establish new images of a particular event or individual.

Research Procedure:

The research question will be tested by examining the language used in The New York Times to describe Yasir Arafat between 1988 and 1996, with September the 14th, 1993 as the date when Arafat's image in the American press is predicted to have dramatically changed. Before explaining the research method which will be used to test this hypothesis, an explanation of why this newspaper was chosen as the medium to be analyzed will be given.

The New York Times was selected as the best publication for examining the evolution of the descriptors (descriptive words and phrases) used to characterize Arafat for several reasons. First, it is one of the most widely read newspapers among elites both within and outside the American government.45 Thus, it provides information on how government officials change their views and the direction of new policies, given the fact that the press is normally the carrier of their message.

\[\text{\footnotesize45 Ibid. 647.}\]
Second, it has been shown to have a strong agenda-setting effect on public opinion.\(^46\) If a new policy direction towards Arafat did occur, it would be projected in the newspaper through the use of language in an attempt to change the way the American population views Arafat. Thus, as a primary target for public relations efforts by the government, The New York Times serves as a credible medium for testing the effectiveness of these efforts and confirming the hypothesis that press images do change coincidentally with a change in government policy.\(^47\)

Third, the newspaper carries a high volume of foreign news coverage, thereby providing a sufficient amount of material upon which to base a study.

Finally, The New York Times is often used as a data source by researchers, as it provides annually catalogued indexes of events which aid in gathering the material required. Since it devotes a large percentage of its space and resources to foreign news coverage, and because it is one of the most reliable U.S. newspapers in its information gathering, The New York Times was chosen for this study.

Testing will proceed by using content analysis as the research method for examining the change in descriptors associated with Arafat in The New York Times. Content analysis is a method which enables researchers to extract numerical measurements (quantitative data) from an extensive set of written (verbal, nonquantitative) material. The numerical data generated from this process will enable a researcher to apply, examine and compare findings to a hypothesis in order to formulate conclusions and test the validity and accuracy of the

\(^46\)Ibid.

\(^47\)Ibid.
predictions. Thus, content analysis as a research technique will result in “objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication,” which is necessary for relatively accurate, valid and unbiased research. An examination of how these three objectives are achieved follows:

1) Objectivity is achieved in content analysis by having the categories of analysis defined precisely, thereby allowing different people to apply them to the same content and get the same results. The results therefore depend upon the procedure, not the analyst.

2) It is a systematic method because it categorizes all relevant content to be analysed and ensures the procedure is applied in the same manner to all content that needs to be analysed. This enables the analysis to be designed in such a manner that it results in acquiring data relevant to the research question or hypothesis.

3) It is also a quantitative method because it records numerical values or frequencies for the content collected. In doing so, content analysis takes into consideration the importance of time and changes over time in a particular phenomena (descriptors of Arafat), thereby allowing the researcher to draw inferences from the data acquired.

The goal of the study is to document the evolution of the images of Arafat in The New

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50Ibid.

51Ibid.

52Ibid.
The New York Times before and after the handshake through the characterization of words and phrases used to describe him as "positive," "neutral" or "negative," and by calculating the positive, neutral and negative percentages.

The data used in the research method will be gathered from a list of articles found in The New York Times Index under the subject header of "Yasir Arafat." All stories from 1988 through 1996 which mention Yasir Arafat are included (this includes all entries pertaining to Yasir Arafat and the P.L.O., and also all stories on Israel and the Middle East which happen to mention Arafat). Since I am only dealing with an eight year period, I decided to include all the entries found in The New York Times Index, thereby eliminating the need to perform random sampling. Each item listed in the index was read and coded as a unit of analysis (these include news stories, letters to the editor, editorials, feature columns, advertisements, cartoons and any photograph accompanying the news story). The news source (local staff, Associated Press, Reuters, etc.), dateline, as well as overall "tone" or evaluation direction of the item were also coded (i.e., pro-, neutral or anti-Arafat).

All entries were read for descriptors pertaining to Arafat, and phrases used to describe him were recorded. Similar descriptors were grouped on a list, and a complete list was sent to a panel of five people with instructions to adopt an American perspective and place each descriptor in one of the following categories:

1) those that are considered negative (e.g. terrorist, untrustworthy, evil, etc.)
2) those that are considered neutral (e.g. chairman, leader, Mr., etc.)
3) those that are considered positive (e.g. peacemaker, ally, visionary, etc.)

A descriptor was rated "positive," "neutral" or "negative" based on the majority opinion
of the five panel members. The positive/neutral/negative balance of all the descriptors was then calculated.

Finally, once all the data was collected, I examined the variance in the coverage before and after the handshake in order to assess whether a change in the characterization of Arafat in the mass media did occur after September 13, 1993. Thus, the data permitted an examination of whether there was a relationship between a shift in American foreign policy and press coverage of Arafat. These results were then also compared to public opinion polls conducted before and after the handshake in order to determine whether the public accepted the government's and/or media's view of Arafat. In other words, the study examines whether the public, when presented with this new information modified its feelings about the head of the P.L.O. and achieved cognitive consonance.
CHAPTER 2

THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF PALESTINE FROM 1900-1996

This chapter will discuss the political history of Palestine from the early 1900s to the end of 1996. By studying the history of Palestine from the turn of the century on, we can achieve a better understanding not only of American foreign policy towards the region, but also the reasons behind the U.S.'s perceptions of the region and its peoples. The attachment and interest in the region by the U.S. can only be truly understood by analysing the political events which occurred at the turn of the century. It is those political events and their consequences which led to the development of the region and the resulting divisions which we have today.

Political History 1900-1959

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire. This geographical region encompassed Galilee, which includes the towns of Nablus, Hebron, Bethlehem and Jerusalem; the coastal plains where Haifa and Gaza are located; the Jordan Valley/Dead Sea region and the Negev Desert. Culturally, it was an ethnically diverse region inhabited by Greeks, Turks, Romans, Persians, and Jews. Although the region was predominantly Muslim, it also contained significant Christian and Jewish communities.

As a political entity, Palestine was divided into three administrative regions: Jerusalem, including the territory to the south of the City; the districts of al-Balqa/Nablus on the east

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34Ibid, 10.
coast along the Jordan River, and Acre to the north.\textsuperscript{55} Representatives from the three regions were elected to the Ottoman parliament beginning in the 1870s, but for the most part, Ottoman rulers were uninvolved in the day-to-day administration of local affairs. Prominent families and/or religious leaders were responsible for the governance of their respective town or region. In addition, the Ottoman Empire’s use of the \textit{millet}\textsuperscript{*} system of governance allowed the Christian and Jewish populations in the region a great deal of autonomy.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, there was communal responsibility for religious, social, cultural and legal affairs, and also a high degree of religious tolerance and ethnic acceptance among the various cultural groups.

The end of the First World War, however, brought drastic political and social consequences to the region. With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1917, the western allies gained authority over Palestine, Iraq, Lebanon and Syria, while Jerusalem was placed under international status. In 1915, the British established a Mandate in its Palestinian and Iraqi territories, placing political, social and economic affairs under the direct control of the British Military Administration. This would help administer the political affairs of the area, while preparing it for eventual independence. But the ensuing political division would fail to bring stability to the region and prove fruitless in the quest for a united independent Palestine.

In addition, British rule in the region proved to have severe implications for Palestinians. Prior to the end of the war, Britain already held a pro-Zionist policy. Like many other nations in western Europe, it desired the creation of a Jewish state. In the early 1900s, this seemed


\textsuperscript{56}Gerber, \textit{One Land, Two Peoples}, 200.

\textit{* millet:} the Ottoman system of self-administration by non-Muslim religious groups.
a logical solution to the domestic "Jewish problem" many western European nations were experiencing. Due to the dramatic increase of Jews in western Europe, many believed that the creation of a Jewish state would allow the community to emigrate to a new land while remaining sympathetic to European policies. A Jewish homeland would protect Western interests in the region by adopting foreign policies similar to those of Europe, and reduce the amount of Jews immigrating to western Europe. It was also believed that Jewish emigration would help spread civilization to the non-Western world.

The concept for the creation of a Jewish homeland was initiated by the British Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour on November 2, 1917 in a letter to Jewish philanthropist and Zionist supporter, Baron Lionel Walter Rothschild. Known as the Balfour Declaration, it recommended the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine with protection for the "civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities" in the region, which at the time comprised 90 percent of the population. This would allow Britain to maintain a presence in Palestine, protect the Suez Canal from the east, and ensure a trade route between Britain and India once the allies were victorious. By claiming Palestine as a national home for the Jewish people (rather than another British colony), Britain could resist French demands that Palestine be internationalized. As well, it was hoped that the Balfour Declaration would encourage the U.S. to join the war effort and Russian Jews to pressure their government into remaining in the war.

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57Ibid, 15.
58Ibid.
59Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 55.
60Ibid, 52.
At the end of the war, the declaration gained the endorsement of the U.S. and European states, and was included in the League of Nations statement regarding the British mandate over Palestine. As part of its obligations, Britain was to assist all incoming Jewish immigrants to Palestine, and help them in their path towards ultimate dominance in the region.\textsuperscript{61} The Balfour Declaration thus came to serve as a symbol of the western world’s commitment to a Jewish homeland in the post war period. Jewish immigration to Palestine in the inter-war era did increase significantly. Comprising 10\% of the population before the outbreak of the First World War, the Jewish population in Palestine had increased to 30\% by 1939.\textsuperscript{62} Fearful and anxious of their political future, as well as Britain’s clearly pro-Zionist stance, Palestinians began to respond in a confrontational manner. In particular, Palestinians feared the pre-eminence of Jewish immigration from Europe, and its consequences for the political and economic rights of Palestine’s indigenous population.\textsuperscript{63}

At first, Palestinians attempted to have Britain renounce the Balfour Declaration and establish a representative government in the region. Their aim was to create a progressive, democratic and secular state over the entire territory.\textsuperscript{64} Hence, all Jews living in Palestine would have the same political and legal rights as everyone else. However, in the 1920s, when these measures failed, violent clashes between Palestinians and Jews began as both sides attempted to gain supremacy in the region. The best known conflict during this period was perhaps the riots over access to the Wailing Wall in the Old City of Jerusalem in August 1929.

\textsuperscript{61}Ibid. 63.
\textsuperscript{62}Ibid. 103.
\textsuperscript{63}Ibid. 87.
\textsuperscript{64}Ibid.
The Wall is part of the ancient wall that surrounds the area in which Solomon and Herod built their temples. For Muslims, the Wall is considered the third holiest site of Islam, and for Jews, it is equally sacred. Under the Ottoman Empire, although Jews were permitted to pray at the Wall, all chairs or semi-permanent items were forbidden. The British even issued a government policy statement in November 1928 reinforcing the position that the Wall was the legal property of the Muslim community. Violence broke out when Jews attempted to bring in chairs and screens during their religious observances. For Muslim leaders this represented a direct challenge by the Jewish community to the established status quo. Given the Balfour Declaration and the obvious pro-Zionist inclinations of the British authority, they feared that any alteration in the region could then be used as a precedent to argue for further changes. The Arab community immediately protested to the British authority. The ensuing struggle for the Wailing Wall quickly evolved from a religious matter to a political confrontation over power between Muslims and Jews. To this day, the matter has yet to be settled. The result was the beginning of a series of committees to investigate the Arab-Israeli conflict which for decades eluded a peaceful settlement.

In the 1930s, several government papers were created to clarify the British role in Palestine as well as the competing balance between Jewish and Palestinian claims. For example, the 1922 The Churchill White Paper established the idea of treating Jewish immigration as an economic issue rather than a political one. It also stated that Jewish immigration should not become a burden on the Palestinian population or deny them

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"Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples. 26.
"Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict. 88.
"Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples. 37."
employment. Again in 1929, the Shaw and Hope-Simpson reports condemned the Jewish policy of excluding Palestinian labour from Jewish lands. Little came of these recommendations as violence continued to occur on a daily basis.\(^68\)

By 1937, the Peel Commission report proposed the partition of Palestine into two states. The commission concluded that the Palestine Mandate was impossible to sustain, and that the situation could only be resolved through the partition of Palestine into separate, independent Arab and Jewish states. It also recommended that the holy cities of Jerusalem and Bethlehem remain under British mandatory power in the region. This would ensure free access of religion while also allowing Britain continued access to sea routes.\(^69\)

Opposition to the partition was swift from both parties. The Arabs immediately rejected the proposal on the grounds it was favourable to the Jewish community. Although Arab land comprised 80% of post-1922 Palestine, the fertile northern area would be granted to the Jewish population and 250,000 Arabs in Galilee would have to be evacuated.\(^70\) The ensuing tension led to the second and more violent stage in the Arab Revolt as British, Palestinian and Jewish forces clashed over control. In large areas of Palestine, the British lost their ability to govern as Jewish forces took over Palestinian communities and established control. To restore order, the British sent in more than 20,000 troops and imposed emergency rule to create some semblance of authority.\(^71\) The result was the massive dislocation of thousands of Palestinians which contributed to the destruction of the Palestinian leadership. It would

\(^{68}\)Ibid.

\(^{69}\)Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 98.

\(^{70}\)Ibid.

\(^{71}\)Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples, 28.
be decades before Palestine would once again be able to coherently project a unified voice to the international community.

World War II had further implications on the conflict over Palestine. At the end of the war, when the horrors of the Holocaust were apparent, Zionist organizations promoting the creation of a Jewish state gained an enormous measure of international support. In the U.S., Americans were appalled at the treatment of Jews by the Nazis, and could not fathom to oppose Jews in their aspirations for a safe homeland. Hence, the United Nations, as the newly established international organization to maintain international peace and security, undertook the mandate to attempt to resolve the conflict over Palestine.

The UN set up an eleven member Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), which presented two alternative proposals to the General Assembly. The principal proposal recommended the rapid end to the British mandate and endorsed the UN establishment of two separate political entities in Palestine that would be joined economically.\textsuperscript{72} The second proposal called for the creation of a single federal state containing autonomous Jewish and Palestinian areas, with Jerusalem and its environs internationalized.\textsuperscript{73}

Both proposals were unacceptable to Zionist supporters, who insisted that their homeland must be distinctively Jewish rather than religiously or ethnically pluralist. Prior to the end of the war, the World Zionist Congress had already met in New York with representatives from the U.S., Europe and Palestine to discuss a series of declarations on the position and goals of the Jewish people, as well as to publicly announce the end of any Zionist efforts to find


\textsuperscript{73} Smith, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, 138.
a compromise with Palestinian leaders.\textsuperscript{74} Known as \textit{The Biltmore Program}, this resolution clearly stated that the only solution to the conflict in Palestine would be the establishment of a Jewish state after the war, which would welcome unrestricted Jewish immigration from around the world.

Arab leaders also rejected both proposals since any partition plan would mean the expulsion or transfer of local residents. They preferred a single, unified state in Palestine that would be democratic and secular, with equal rights for all its citizens.\textsuperscript{75} However, on November 29, 1947, at the UN General Assembly, Zionist leaders were able to gain enough votes for a Resolution which called for the creation of a Jewish state within a partitioned Palestine, with Jerusalem and Bethlehem under UN jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{76} This new plan gave the Jewish state 57\% of Palestine, even though Jews only represented 33\% of the total population at the time.\textsuperscript{77} In addition, UN estimates at the time stated that this division would give the Jewish state economic revenues three times as great as those accruing to the Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{78}

Between November 29, 1947 and May 15, 1948, violence in Palestine increased dramatically. The Israeli forces used the partition plan as a stepping stone for the expansion of their control over parts of Palestine considered essential to the newly created Jewish territory. Palestinians proved to be powerless in their attempts to prevent Israeli dominance.

\textsuperscript{75} Gerner, \textit{One Land, Two Peoples}, 44.
\textsuperscript{76} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Ibid}, 45.
\textsuperscript{78} \textit{Ibid}.
over the country. On May 15, 1948, with the creation of the State of Israel, war officially broke out between Arabs and Israelis. Fighting continued until 1949, when an armistice agreement was finally signed. The resulting territorial division, however, was no longer the one agreed upon by the UN. During the war, Israel expanded its control to over 77% of the area comprising Palestine; Gaza was occupied by Egypt; Jordan took control of the West Bank; and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were displaced from their homes. Of the total approximate Palestinian population of 900,000, only 120,000 to 150,000 remained in what became Israel after the Palestine War. The rest were scattered into refugee camps bordering Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt. With the Palestinian leadership in exile, its economic and social basis was destroyed, as those Palestinians which remained were officially under Israeli rule. For the ensuing decades, the Palestinians attempted to return to their homeland either with Arab assistance or by guerilla military tactics organized from neighbouring states. The 1950s thus witnessed a flourishing of Palestinian nationalism in the Gaza Strip. With refugees trebling its population after 1948, the Gaza Strip became the nursery of the most committed nationalists and the focus of resistance activity. Thus began the period of underground resistance movements in Gaza as young men began cross border raids into Israel.

The American government in the inter-war period had little interest in the Middle East. At the end of the First World War, President Woodrow Wilson made declarations in support

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Ibid. 46.

Ibid. 22.
of self-determination for the peoples of the former Ottoman Empire. But for the most part, the U.S. supported the British mandate in Palestine to preserve friendly relations with its European ally. It was not until the close of the Second World War that U.S. foreign policy shifted strongly in favour of Jewish interests in the area. By 1946, the U.S. government began to come under pressure from its large and politically active Jewish community, which used its influence to promote Zionist demands for immigration and statehood. By October 1946, President Truman, fearful of losing the Jewish vote to the Republicans (who favoured the admission of several hundred thousand European Jews to Palestine) in the upcoming congressional election, announced his support for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

However, it was not until the onset of the Cold War that the U.S.'s pro-Israeli stance was firmly established. The U.S.-Israeli relationship had its origins during the time that the U.S. and the Soviet Union competed for control following World War II. Both superpowers courted Israel in their efforts to incorporate a new state into their spheres of influence. By that time Israel was seen as a valuable prize in the newly important, oil rich Middle East. Over the years, the U.S. would focus on the survival, security and well being of Israel. The U.S.'s national interests in the area preceding World War II and the eventual outbreak of the Cold War came to be defined by the maintenance of secure, internationally recognized

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boundaries in the region, the protection of petroleum resources, and the minimization of Soviet influence. This could be achieved through friendly links with conservative Arab states in the region as well as through good terms with Israel. Hence, Jordan could control most of the portion of Palestine intended by the UN for an independent Arab state – the West Bank – and could still speak for the Palestinians. Egypt could continue its military presence in Gaza, while Israel would be allowed to annex the remaining areas of Palestine. In no way were Palestinians viewed as a distinct national group with political rights, nor was their plight given much thought.

1960-1986

The 1960s saw the reemergence of Palestinians in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in a major way, due to the creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) in 1964 at the First Arab Summit. President Nasser stated that the P.L.O.’s official purpose was to serve as an “autonomous institutional expression of Palestinian national identity and to provide a means to achieve Palestinian self-determination.” 85 In reality, it was created by Egypt in an alliance with other Arab nations to serve principally as an instrument for keeping the Palestinian problem under the supervision of its neighbouring Arab states. Egypt in particular needed to ensure that Palestinian actions against Israel did not involve it in a war, while Jordan did not wish to give up the West Bank to rebel Palestinian forces. 86 By controlling Palestinian guerrilla action, the neighbouring Arab states hoped to keep Palestinians in check.

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85 Gowers, Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution, 46.
in order to protect their own political interests with Israel. Whatever its initial purpose, the P.L.O. quickly gained strong support within the Arab community. By the late 1970s, it had become the official voice against Israeli occupation in addition to providing the official statement and goals of those dispersed as a result of the Palestinian War.

Other guerrilla factions such as Fatah were incorporated into the governance of the P.L.O. Formed in 1959, Fatah’s membership comprised predominantly of young Palestinians who fled to Gaza during the Palestinian War of 1948. Among these young student advocates was Yasir Arafat, who believed that the liberation of Palestine could only be achieved through militancy.

Throughout the 1960s, Palestinians increased their guerrilla attacks from neighbouring Arab countries. These attacks increased Israeli retaliation in the northern region and it eventually annexed the demilitarized zone separating Israel and Syria. Even though the situation endured for a decade, conflict came to a head in April 1967 when the Israeli government announced it would begin the cultivation of the entire demilitarized zone, including land owned by Syrian Arabs. Military clashes broke out between Syrian and Israeli forces and war ensued. Fearing a massive military attack on Syria by Israeli forces, President Nasser of Egypt put his forces on alert and began moving them into the Sinai in May 1967. UN observatory forces stationed in the Sinai since the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 withdrew completely and Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran to Israeli ships – an action viewed by Israel as an act of aggression. With tensions riding high, Egypt’s actions in the Sinai and

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“Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 189.
“Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples, 70.
“Tbid, 71.
its new defence pact with Jordan gave Israel the justification it needed to launch a pre-emptive defensive attack against Egypt.

In June 1967, Israel took control of East Jerusalem, the remainder of the West Bank, the Golan Heights (an area demilitarized since 1949), the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. Known as the Six-Day War, the results were devastating for Palestinian-Israeli and Israeli-Arab relations. There were massive casualties on both sides, disastrous economic consequences and the Israelis were able to once again further disperse Palestinians in their aim to achieve a unified Jewish state.

Israel’s consolidation of power began immediately. Palestinian villages were bulldozed and replaced with Jewish settlements to ensure that inhabitants would not return, and that new circumstances were created in order to pre-empt UN resolutions mandating the return of territory. For Palestinians, the result was the creation of another group of refugees, many of whom swelled the existing camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Jordan, in particular, became home for thousands of new Palestinian refugees fleeing the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, in addition to those already relocated after the War of 1948.

For the first time, Palestinians realized they could not place their faith in Arab regimes to liberate them. Two consequences emerged from the Six-Day War. First, Palestinian nationalism increased significantly in the occupied territories as many dispersed Palestinians began to believe that Fatah’s approach of militaristic measures was the only solution to their plight. Relying on Arab neighbours would only result in the same disastrous outcome.

Second, under increased pressure from Palestinians, Fatah took over the P.L.O. in 1967 and initiated its own measures. The P.L.O.’s Pan-Arabism, which was endorsed by Egypt, proved
to have severe negative consequences during the Six-Day War. In addition, after the Six-Day War, it was obvious that the P.L.O.’s links to the Arab states were discredited among the vast majority of Palestinians. Racked by internal division, the organization had come to be seen as little more than an Egyptian platform for defeat. The sponsoring Arab states not only lacked the military capabilities to combat Israel, but had their own internal problems; and in some instances actually preferred the status quo. In the case of Jordan, the status quo enabled it to benefit economically through its annexation of the West Bank. Arafat was thus contacted to take over the P.L.O. leadership to reinvigorate the organization through guerrilla tactics. At the P.L.O.’s first meeting with the Palestinian National Council (the P.L.O.’s legislative body) since taking power in July 1968, Arafat re-wrote the P.L.O.’s National Covenant to reflect Fatah’s militancy. Its statement of beliefs and objectives called for the endorsement of guerrilla war against Israel. In other words, struggle would be the only way to liberate Palestine. It would be the overall strategy and not merely a tactical phase. Palestinian guerrilla factions immediately began to organize a resistance movement in the occupied territories among Palestinians who realized the disastrous effects of not being able to take control of their own struggle.

Sporadic fighting continued in the years that followed the Six-Day War as Egypt, Jordan and Syria unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate the return of the territories occupied by Israel. However, due to its security concerns, Israel had no intentions of returning to the 1949 armistice lines. Surrounded by Arab enemies, Israel’s intentions were to use the

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91 Ibid., 68.
occupied territories as a buffer zone from Arab attacks. Thus, guerrilla warfare seemed the only alternative for many Palestinians.

For a period of time, the Palestinian-Jordanian alliance proved successful. Arafat used Jordan as a springboard for continued raids into Israel and Jordan tolerated the P.L.O. assaults in the West Bank as a means of discouraging Israel from retaining the occupied land in the area. These measures also allowed King Hussein to gain support among the Palestinian population in Jordan. Hussein, however, erroneously believed that he could both control Fatah and discard it should an agreement be reached with Israel.\textsuperscript{92}

However, once military acts became a daily occurrence, Hussein found it increasingly difficult to restrict Fatah's activities and those of other groups that began to emerge. Hence, relations between the Palestinians and Jordanians quickly deteriorated. Many Palestinians blamed the Jordanian fighters for losing the West Bank to Israel, and Jordanians were also displeased with the situation. The refugees on their borders were both an economic and social burden. In addition, many Jordanians felt that their positions of power were being threatened by the well-educated and politically astute immigrant Palestinians, who had become politically involved in Jordanian domestic affairs. As well, an increased number of Palestinian guerilla fighters began to gain greater influence in Jordan. The guerilla factions established in the bordering refugee camps had grown to a point where they began to act as a state within a state. Fatah's military activities had generated enormous enthusiasm among politically active Jordanians as well as Palestinian refugees. They even managed to penetrate the Jordanian

\textsuperscript{92}Smith, \textit{Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict}, 214.

43
army and recruited senior ranking officers. King Hussein realized that he was not able to control the P.L.O.'s activities. Furthermore, Jordan feared that the military activities of the Palestinian fighters against Israel would result in counter Israeli retaliatory measures against the country since Palestinians were able to attack Israeli troops in the West Bank without restraint and cross border attacks by both Israelis and Palestinians became more frequent.

Jordan's uneasiness began to increase and war broke out in late 1970. The precipitation for war occurred in early September with a hijacking by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). This was a guerrilla faction associated with the P.L.O. which advocated the overthrow of Arab monarchies as the first step towards the liberation of Palestine and which was fearful of Nasser's decision to accept a U.S. mediated cease fire agreement with Israel. Most Palestinians interpreted this action by Nasser as an indication of the Arab world's willingness to forsake Palestinian interests in order to secure a peace treaty with Israel. During the hijacking of three planes which had set down in the eastern desert of Jordan, Palestinians held passengers hostage in spite of Jordan's efforts to negotiate their freedom. Even though the passengers were eventually released, the incident was clearly intended to threaten King Hussein's authority. In retaliation, he gave orders for his military forces to attack the Palestinian guerrillas. The Palestinians had expected military support from Iraq and Syria. Yet, the Syrian air force refused to provide the necessary air cover, and military support from Iraq never materialized. Within ten days, thousands of Palestinians were killed, and the Palestinian guerrilla movement in Jordan was exiled. Most ended up

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*Gowers, Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution, 74.*
*Ibid, 72.*
*Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples, 82.*
regrouping in Lebanon, where they would provide the impetus for the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982.

The significance of the event had profound implications for the Palestinian movement. Jordan's military actions and the lack of Syrian and Iraqi support were the ultimate betrayal for Palestinians who saw themselves fighting on behalf of all Arabs. Finding themselves abandoned by their Arab brethren yet again also reinforced Palestinian convictions that they could not rely on Arab states for assistance, but instead would have to rely on themselves to achieve self-determination. As a result, although relations between Jordan and the P.L.O. did improve over the years, the war forever changed the Palestinians' approach in their quest for a homeland. They realized that their problem was not just with Israel but also with the Arabs. Therefore, the Palestinians once again revised their political strategy in two ways. First, emphasis was placed on political diplomacy. The P.L.O. under Arafat was now ready to promote the establishment of a Palestinian state on any part of liberated Palestine since they realized they could not liberate territory held by Israel. Second, militant factions of the P.L.O. tried to gain attention for the Palestinian cause through a series of dramatic hijackings and bomb attacks. It was during this time that terrorist activity succeeded in gaining international attention, focusing solely on the P.L.O.'s terrorist activities. The most well-known international incident during this terrorist phase of the P.L.O. was the kidnapping of a group of Israeli athletes during the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, Germany. This terrorist operation was widely condemned in international circles, and led to the deaths of eleven Israelis and five Palestinians. This incident provoked Israeli reprisal raids in which hundreds of Palestinians - mostly civilians - were killed.
By the summer of 1973, tensions between Israel and its Arab neighbours once again reached high levels. President Nasser’s successor, Anwar Sadat, attempted to recapture the Occupied Territories by force after negotiations failed. The war began on October 6 with attacks by Syrian and Egyptian forces on Israeli troops in the Occupied territories. Caught off guard as a result of the religious Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, Israel was unable to replicate its decisive victory from the Six-Day War. It was three weeks before the Israelis were able to drive the Syrians back over the 1967 cease-fire line. On October 22, the Security Council passed UN Resolution 338 which called for a cease-fire to be implemented. But it was not until January 1974 that both Egypt and Israel signed a disengagement agreement. As part of the agreement, Israel withdrew several miles east of the Suez Canal and had to evacuate the territory conquered from Syria during the Yom Kippur War. However, these stipulations did not result in Israel experiencing a significant loss of territory under its control on either front.

Even though the P.L.O. was uninvolved in the military operation and its neighbouring Arab states did not gain territorially from the Yom Kippur War, there were favourable benefits for Palestinians. First, the initial decisive military victories permitted the Arabs to realize and achieve unity and strength. This in turn refocused attention on the Palestinian plight. Second, Saudi Arabia began to reconsider its past willingness to separate its policy on petroleum from its concerns regarding the Palestinian issue. Saudi Arabia made it clear that in the future any increase in the production of oil to meet U.S. needs — Israel’s strongest ally — would have to correspond with an Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967,
especially East Jerusalem, one of Islam's holiest sites. The Oil Crisis of 1973 showed this new resolve on the part of Saudi Arabia. In October 1973, Saudi Arabia placed an oil embargo on the U.S. Although the U.S. did not rely solely on oil from the Middle East, the crisis created an economic disaster for the U.S. as well as a drastic shift in American-Arab relationship. For the first time since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948, the U.S. began to realize that its high level of support for Israel had a potential economic cost. It also helped the Palestinian cause gain international support.

For the first time since 1952, the UN General Assembly set aside time for a special debate on the question of Palestine. In November 1974, Arafat addressed the Assembly specifically for that purpose. The UN would remain a major focus of Palestinian political activity. The P.L.O. would attempt to use it as an instrument for passing motions to support its views. It also resulted in an international profile for Arafat, as European nations began contacts with the chairman of the P.L.O. By 1975, the P.L.O. had achieved diplomatic representation in 40 countries. Furthermore, just prior to Arafat's address to the UN, the Arab world unanimously hailed the P.L.O. as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. Arab leaders were thus forced to treat him as an equal. As well, Arab states significantly increased their financial contributions to the P.L.O.

Conflict erupted in Lebanon in April 1975, and hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were dispersed. By the 1970s, the Palestinian population in Lebanon had grown to 300,000.

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96 Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 231.
97 Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples, 81.
98 Gowers, Behind the Myth: Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Revolution, 137.
99 Ibid, 130.
100 Gerner, One Land, Two Peoples, 83.
Even though most Palestinians in Lebanon remained in refugee camps, a few were able to acquire employment and integrate themselves into the Lebanese society. However, very few were granted citizenship rights by the Christian-dominated minority government. When a civil war broke out in Lebanon between Maronite and Muslim factions in April 1975, the Palestinian population in Lebanon remained relatively uninvolved until their aid was requested by the Lebanese National Movement (LMN), a group that supported the P.L.O.'s quest to recover part of Palestine. The cost of involvement for the Palestinians was severe, particularly in the refugee camps surrounding East Beirut where an estimated 2,500 Palestinians were massacred by both Phalangist and Israeli forces (sympathetic to Maronite forces who were attempting to destroy Palestinian camps). The event further proved to Palestinians that, as with the Jews during the Holocaust, they could only be secure with the creation of their own homeland.\textsuperscript{101} The Lebanese experience showed them that while they needed the territorial base of Arab states in order to continue their operation against Israel, the host Arab nations could not be trusted nor could they secure their safety.

Israeli air raids against Beirut continued throughout the early 1980s. The air raids eventually ended with a U.S. negotiated cease-fire between Israel and the P.L.O. on July 24, 1981. However, peace did not last long. Ten months later, Israel again provoked war in Lebanon in an attempt to remove Palestinian fighters from Lebanon once and for all, and to eliminate the political and military infrastructure of the P.L.O.\textsuperscript{102} Israeli troops were sent into the northern border area to conduct a variety of training maneuvers. When this did not elicit

\textsuperscript{101}\textit{Ibid.} 84.
\textsuperscript{102}\textit{Ibid.} 86.
a response by the P.L.O., Israel sent a convoy of military vehicles into Lebanon to deliberately pass near P.L.O. bases. Finally air strikes were conducted by Israel through April-May 1982. The P.L.O. restrained from a response primarily due to Arafat, who wanted to prove he was a strong leader capable of maintaining the cease-fire, even under difficult conditions. In addition, Arafat recognized that Israel was attempting to provoke a response by the P.L.O. in order to achieve a legitimate excuse to attack. Although Arafat’s decision to avoid retaliation gained international approval, it also proved to be a controversial tactic among Palestinians. Thus, when Israel engaged in a massive shelling of Beirut on June 4 as a response to the attempted assassination of the Israeli ambassador to London by an anti-P.L.O. splinter group, the P.L.O., under heavy internal pressure, responded with an air attack. This gave the Israeli government reason to launch an invasion on June 6.

The result was vast international criticism of Israel’s military action. Since the P.L.O. had refrained from responding to the initial air attacks and acknowledged the cease-fire for a year before retaliating, many believed Israel’s justifications for air strikes were not sound. U.S. envoy Philip Habib returned to the region to negotiate a second cease-fire agreement between the P.L.O. and Israel. The deal would prevent Israeli attacks on Beirut in exchange for Palestinian fighters to leave Lebanon with the U.S. guaranteeing the security of Palestinian civilians remaining in Lebanon. On August 21, the P.L.O. evacuated and a multinational force of French and Italian troops went in to supervise the region. The military, political and administrative structures of the P.L.O. were destroyed and eventually reconstructed in Tunis, where Arafat was granted permission to establish new headquarters.

103 Ibid.
Thus, the late 1970s and early 1980s were difficult times for the P.L.O. Even though it used every opportunity available to reiterate its willingness to negotiate with Israel – as well as its desire to establish an independent state of Palestine - in whichever part Israel wished to withdraw from – it did not realize its goals. The more guerilla attacks occurred, the sharper the criticism it received from the international community for its terrorist actions. During the signing of the Camp David Accords by Egypt, Israel and the U.S. in 1978, the P.L.O. was not allowed to voice an opinion. Rather, it was Egypt which was granted the right to speak on behalf of the Palestinians.

As for American policy during this period, it remained favourable to Israeli interests. The U.S.-Israeli relationship remained strong since congress had always supported a Jewish state, beginning with its unanimous support for the Balfour Declaration in 1922.104 The positive perception of American public opinion toward Israel was reflected during this period with substantial levels of economic and military aid, related policy decisions that favoured Israel, and the commitment to protect Israel’s security and right to exist.

President Carter’s administration did attempt to consider Arab views in his attempt to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He saw the conflict both as a human rights issue and a security concern for the U.S. In a speech on March 6, 1977, Carter indicated there were three conditions for peace in the Middle East. First, the P.L.O. would have to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Second, boundaries would have to be established along the pre-1967 guidelines. Third, there would have to be the creation of a “homeland for the Palestinian

104Reich, “The United States and Israel: The Nature of a Special Relationship,” 234.
refugees." However, he was unable to meet any of these conditions. During the Camp David negotiations to broker a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel in September 1978, Carter did attempt to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. There were two documents in the Accords which were specifically directed towards the Palestinians. The first document, *A Framework for Peace in the Middle East*, dealt with the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It called for the creation of a Palestinian self-governing authority to be followed by a five year transition period, with the final status of the West Bank and Gaza to be negotiated. The second framework for peace between Egypt and Israel outlined an understanding for an eventual peace treaty between Israel and the P.L.O.\(^{105}\) Israel would also have to give up the Sinai Peninsula. However, many details pertaining to the Palestinian people were left unspecified in order to achieve an agreement. There was no chance that Israel would be compelled to move quickly on the proposed autonomy for Palestinians. The Camp David framework had called for a "self governing authority...freely elected by the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to replace the existing Israeli military government."\(^{106}\) The exact details of this clause were to be agreed upon by Egypt, Jordan and Israel, but after a year of negotiations over the format of Palestinian autonomy, nothing had been accomplished and the matter was put aside. Hence, no fundamental changes came about under the Carter administration, and the election of President Reagan in 1980 continued to promote Israeli interests over those of the Palestinians.

\(^{105}\) Smith, *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 257.

\(^{106}\) Ibid.
The social uprising known as the *Intifada* began in December 1987 with massive street demonstrations by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. These demonstrations quickly gained momentum and spread to East Jerusalem. More and more Palestinians joined the protest against the conditions which the Israelis had forced them to live under for forty years. Initially the protests were intended to be non-violent. The preferred methods of protest consisted of strikes, the refusal to pay Israeli taxes, a boycott of Israeli products, and the development of Palestinian industry and institutions to replace Israeli dominance.\(^{107}\) However, in time they became more militant and political as street riots became a common occurrence and both Israelis and Palestinians engaged in violent clashes.

The *Intifada*, however, was significant in contributing to the eventual outcome of a Peace Accord in September 1993 which offered limited self-determination for Palestinians in the Israeli Occupied Territories. The spontaneous uprising by unarmed Palestinians revealed the existence of a united Palestinian people determined in their cause for self-determination that could not be quashed by an aggressive military response. As a result, after decades of military occupation, Israel realized there would not be a military solution to the problem of Palestine. Although the Israelis were able to contain the uprising during certain periods of time, they were never able to defeat it completely. In addition, the methods employed by Israel in its attempts to contain violence and restore law and order came under the increasing criticism of domestic and international public opinion. Israel’s use of live ammunition on unarmed civilians – many of them children – provoked protests by the U.S. State Department as early

as January 1988. As well, Israel's deportation of Palestinian civilians charged with inciting the demonstrations led the U.S. to vote for the first time in favour of a UN resolution critical of Israel. Even though it did not affect the broader relationship with the U.S., Israel realized other measures would have to be used to solve the situation.

Second, as events in the Occupied Territories took on a dimension of their own, the P.L.O. quickly took advantage of the situation to reassert its leadership and direct the course of events in the Occupied Territories. By July 1988, King Hussein of Jordan was unable to control the uprising. He announced that Jordan would relinquish legal and administrative ties to the West Bank, thereby increasing the P.L.O. leadership's political maneuverability. Any future settlement pertaining to the West Bank would now have to include an active role for the P.L.O. and Arafat. The P.L.O. quickly responded by readapting its political stance yet again in order to achieve its desired political goals. In November 1988, the Palestinian National Council (PNC), under significant pressure from Arafat, decided unanimously from exile to declare the independent state of Palestine based on UN Resolutions 181, 242 and 338. These Resolutions called for the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, as well as extending significant concessions to Israel. The P.L.O. not only agreed to accept the existence of Israel, but renounced its use of terrorism. These statements in effect abolished

108 Reich, "The United States and Israel: The Nature of a Special Relationship," 240.
110 The PNC called for Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territory it occupied in the 1967 War (the West Bank, East Jerusalem, Gaza and the Syrian Golan Heights) and for the establishment of a Palestinian state next to Israel. The P.L.O. retains the right to resist Israeli occupation inside the occupied territories, but it rejects all forms of terrorism.
the 1965 National Charter which called for the abolition of the Zionist state of Israel, and shifted the power balance in the region. On December 14, 1988, the U.S. announced that Arafat’s statements had met American conditions for the initiation of talks between the P.L.O. and the U.S.\footnote{Reich, “The United States and Israel: The Nature of a Special Relationship,” 240.}

Secretary of State George Schultz did attempt to initiate talks between Israel and the P.L.O. by proposing a land-for-peace formula.\footnote{Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 344.} But the U.S. was not prepared to accept the idea of an independent Palestinian state just yet. As well, Israel rejected all initiatives, which yielded no concrete results from the first year of talks.

A resolution to the dispute among Israel, its Arab neighbours, and the Palestinians only resurfaced again as a result of the Gulf War in 1991. The P.L.O. angered many of its Arab allies and the U.S. by ardently supporting Saddam Hussein during the war. However, with the end of the Cold War the Bush administration realized something had to be done to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. First, the stability of the region was vital to the maintenance of peace. Saddam Hussein had attempted to link a resolution to the Gulf War with the Palestinian issue. In order to ensure that another outbreak would not occur, the U.S. had to address Arab concerns in the region. Second, with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. no longer placed a large emphasis on the strategic importance of the Middle East in its

\begin{flushleft}
in accordance with UN resolutions. These resolutions on terrorism have upheld the right of liberation movements to resist occupiers. Gerber, One Land, Two Peoples, 126.
\end{flushleft}
ideological struggle with the Soviet Union. For the next four months, Secretary of State James Baker travelled constantly to the Middle East, Europe and the Soviet Union in attempt to arrange an international conference on the Middle East. Talks began with the Madrid Conference in October 1991. The result of intense lobbying by U.S. policy makers and Arab Americans failed to reach any significant progress in the peace process. In addition, both Israel and the P.L.O. were under increased domestic pressures to halt all attempts at a peaceful settlement to the conflict.

For his part, Arafat faced increasing pressure to suspend peace negotiations from Hamas, an Islamic militaristic guerrilla faction established in August 1988 precisely to counter P.L.O. measures. Comprised of former Fatah supporters who left the organization due to their disillusionment with PLO tactics in the Intifada, Hamas felt the cause would be better served by a military response. In addition, it believed that "not one inch of Palestine should be ceded to Israel (or any other non-Muslim entity)." Thus, it has carried out military campaigns not only against Israel but also against the P.L.O., which had adopted a more secular, nationalist ideology. The tension between Hamas and the P.L.O. grew out of the November 1988 PNC meeting, in which the P.L.O. formally accepted not only a two-state solution to the conflict with Israel, but also the existence of the State of Israel. Hamas, in accordance with its fundamental beliefs, rejected outright the PLO's two-state solution as a betrayal to the

\[112\text{Digorgio, "The U.S.-PLO Relationship: From Dialogue to the White House Lawn," 252.}\]

\[114\text{Schulzinger, American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, 376.}\]

\[115\text{Ibid, 151.}\]
Palestinian people. From that point on, Hamas became an alternative to the P.L.O. and continues to challenge its leadership.

For its part, Israel was confronted by increased opposition from right-wing religious parties which were fundamentally opposed to any negotiations with the P.L.O. However, neither faction could afford to continue with the status quo. For Israel, the fight against the Intifada had become costly in both financial terms and international support. Arafat also insisted on continued Palestinian participation in the quest for a peaceful resolution despite growing pressures to withdraw. The loss of employment among Palestinians in the Occupied Territories and severe economic conditions due to Israeli measures to curb the revolt were causing rising apathy in the Occupied Territories. In addition, increased support for Hamas and a possible Israeli-Syrian rapprochement further threatened Arafat’s leadership. As a result, Arafat bypassed any U.S. diplomatic measures and entered unilateral talks with Israel through Norwegian mediators, while Palestinians participated in the Washington rounds of bilateral talks that began under the Bush administration after the convening of the Madrid Conference in October 1991.

1993-1996

Secret negotiations between the P.L.O. and Israel – which had been on going in Oslo for months – were finally unveiled in August 1993. Once the agreement was made public, Prime Minister Rabin and Mr. Peres, the Israeli foreign minister made arrangements to meet with Secretary of State Warren Christopher in an attempt to get the U.S. to endorse the plan. This

would be necessary in order to help the Israeli government sell the Accord at home.\textsuperscript{117} Palestinians and Israelis also wanted American backing because only Washington had the money and the influence with wealthy Arab oil states to produce the money that would be necessary to sustain an autonomous Palestinian entity in Gaza and Jericho.\textsuperscript{118} The Clinton administration although initially sceptical of the lasting effects of the Accord, quickly agreed to sponsor the Peace Accord in the U.S. This would certainly prove to be a major foreign policy success for the Clinton administration even though it was not formally involved in the Oslo negotiations.

Thus, on September 13, 1993, the Oslo Accord (formally known as the Declaration of Principles) between Israel and the P.L.O. started the process to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. On that day Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime Minister of Israel, Yasir Arafat, the chairman of the P.L.O. and President Bill Clinton sat down to sign the first agreement between Jews and Palestinians to end their conflict. Moments after the documents were signed, President Clinton took Mr. Arafat in his left arm and Mr. Rabin in his right arm and gently coaxed them together.\textsuperscript{119} The handshake that ensued between the two former enemies was perhaps the most dramatic image in the history of Middle East peace-making. The image transformed Arafat into a statesman and peacemaker and ensured both Rabin and Arafat’s commitment to make the Accord work. In addition, it signified that both parties to the dispute have an


\textsuperscript{118}Ibid.

equally valid claim. For the Israelis, it signified the beginning of the healing of the Arab-Israeli conflict and for the P.L.O. it meant that it had at last accepted that Israel is here to stay and that this fact cannot be altered through violence.\textsuperscript{120}

The basis of the Accord was the establishment of a five year interim period that would allow for negotiations in the final arrangements to end the conflict over Palestine and the eventual establishment of Israel’s borders. In addition, it would allow the Palestinian Authority (PA) to set up a self-government arrangement in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip until the declaration of a Palestinian state.

The interim arrangements themselves took two years to be concluded. The initial agreement signed in Cairo in May 1994 gave Palestinians autonomy in most of Gaza and in the West Bank town of Jericho.\textsuperscript{121} The remaining details were negotiated in September 1995. Known as Oslo II, the final interim agreement gave the Palestinians control of an additional 7\% of the West Bank, and shared control with Israel of over 24\% of the area, with additional Israeli withdrawals anticipated in the future.\textsuperscript{122} The document itself began the process towards Palestinians achieving their desired state. Oslo allowed the Palestinians to actually visualize a concrete homeland as the document stated that the end product would be the creation of a Palestinian state.\textsuperscript{123} Second, Oslo revived the fiscally bankrupt P.L.O. and allowed it to consolidate its power. Its decision to back Iraq during the Gulf War led directly

\textsuperscript{120}Thomas L. Friedman, “The Brave New Middle East” \textit{The New York Times} 10 September 1993: 11.

\textsuperscript{121}Robinson, \textit{Building a Palestinian State}, 175.
\textsuperscript{122}\textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{123}\textit{Ibid}.
to the suspension of financial aid from alienated Arab donors. Due to the disappearance of major sponsors, the P.L.O. had to close a number of its offices and cease many of its political and economic functions. Thus, Oslo saved the P.L.O. from oblivion and allowed it to once again be an active participant in the process.

The negative side of Oslo, however, was that even though it started the process towards an eventual Palestinian state, the negotiations themselves only focused on short-term issues. All the contentious issues, such as the status of Jerusalem, Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the right of Palestinian refugees to return to the region, were left for future negotiations. It thus guaranteed strong opposition from many groups in Palestinian society which Arafat would have to consolidate.\(^{124}\)

On its return to Gaza from Tunis, the P.L.O. encountered various other difficulties. Even though the P.L.O. shared the same goals with Palestinians and was their official voice internationally, it had been in exile for twenty years. Thus, it had no practical political experience with the population in order to consolidate its own power. Arafat tried to consolidate power by undermining the organizational and political system which had evolved at the grass roots levels in many Palestinian communities.\(^{125}\) The result was an abuse of power by Arafat when he placed the police force under his own political grip, and not that of the PA or the P.L.O. In addition, he placed individuals in positions of authority who were loyal to him, cracked down on dissent, and detained people without reason. For example, in December 1995, \textit{al-Quds}, a Palestinian newspaper, carried a flattering story on Arafat, but

\(^{124}\textit{Ibid.}, 176.\)
\(^{125}\textit{Ibid.}, 177.\)
the editor was detained because the story was not put on the front page.\textsuperscript{126}

On January 20, 1996, Palestinian elections for the 88 member legislature council and for the President of the Executive Authority took place. As Robinson states in his book \textit{Building a Palestinian state: the incomplete revolution}, the elections held significant consequences for Arafat and the P.L.O. More than representing a democratic process, the election further consolidated the political power of Arafat and his majority PA. The elections were constructed in such a way as to lead to a predictable outcome. In particular, they were designed for an overwhelming victory by Fatah. This was accomplished by adopting a district-based winner take all electoral system. Thus, many smaller political fringe movements were excluded, as is normally the case in the first-past-the-post electoral system. Through these means, Arafat was able to further consolidate power with the election of many of his supporters.

As President of the PA until the eventual declaration of a Palestinian state projected for May 4, 1999, Arafat continues to negotiate on a daily basis with the Israeli government in order to meet the remaining outstanding issues of the Oslo Peace Accords. The main contentious issues have been the withdrawal of Israeli troops from towns in the West Bank (specifically the town of Hebron), and the free movement of Palestinians between Israel and the former Israeli Occupied Territories for reasons of employment. The election of Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing Likud Party in May 1996 Israeli elections has not facilitated the process. Backed by religious right-wing parties who oppose the transfer of territory to Palestinians on security concerns, Netanyahu has wavered in his compliance with the

\textsuperscript{126}\textit{Ibid.} 182.
withdrawal of troops from Hebron, and has allowed the continued expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. Increased suicide bombings by Hamas have also contributed to the fear of many Israelis to pursue peace with the PA. Arafat is seen as a weak leader who is unable to control extreme factions within his own territories. As for the U.S., it continues to support the peace process since it played a major role in promoting the Oslo Peace Accords. In October 1996, it once again hosted emergency meetings between Arafat and Netanyahu in an attempt to seek discussion on outstanding issues. But at the end of 1996, negotiations over Hebron were still ongoing and a peaceful settlement did not seem possible in the near future.

The twentieth century brought drastic changes for Palestinians and their political history. They initially began the century under Ottoman rule. But by the end of World War I, the Palestinians were struggling against Israeli demands for a homeland on the same territory. Their struggle to achieve a homeland over the years would take various routes. Initially, their focus was on aid from neighbouring Arab countries, usually in the form of a supportive base from which to launch attacks against Israeli targets. But by the 1970s under Arafat’s directives, the P.L.O. focused on military actions to get international exposure for their cause while also settling for a Palestinian homeland on any portion of Israeli land. In the late 1980s, Arafat modified the P.L.O. in order to ensure not only his own survival but that of his people. In recognizing Israel’s right to exist in the face of strong Islamic opposition, he guaranteed international support for the Palestinian cause and positioned himself to finally negotiate peace with Israel. The Accord which followed has brought the Palestinian people closer than ever to achieving their own state.
CHAPTER 3

HOW THE NEW YORK TIMES EVALUATED YASIR ARAFAT'S IMAGE IN THE PRE AND POST HANDSHAKE PERIODS

This chapter will test the validity of the hypothesis presented in Chapter 1 that Yasir Arafat’s image in the American press changed from being predominantly negative to predominantly positive, and that the dividing line in that image change was the signing of the Peace Accord on the White House south lawn on September 13, 1993.

A second goal of this study was to determine whether public opinion responded to government and/or media cues about Arafat and the Palestinian cause. In order to answer this question, survey data from U.S. Gallup polls conducted from 1973 to 1996 will be analysed. These opinion polls not only tracked American’s perceptions of Arafat, but also illustrate whether their views coincided with the signing of the Peace Accord in September of 1993.

The question which was tracked over time in the Gallup Surveys was: In the troubles between Israel and the Palestinian Arabs in the Middle East, are your sympathies more with Israel or more with the Palestinian Arabs?127

127 Since Gallup public opinion polls relating specifically to Arafat were not found, I decided instead to track a cause closely identified with Arafat.
## TABLE 3.1

GALLUP SURVEYS ON AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, 1973-1996<sup>128a</sup>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>More with Israel</th>
<th>More with Palestinian Arabs</th>
<th>Both: Neither</th>
<th>No Opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>December 23, 1973</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 26, 1975</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 27, 1975</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 26, 1977</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 13, 1977</td>
<td>46%</td>
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<td>21%</td>
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<td>September 5, 1978</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>30%</td>
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<td>November 26, 1978</td>
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<td>13%</td>
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<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 27, 1982</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4, 1982</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 12, 1982</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 29, 1988</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 15, 1989</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 16, 1989</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 16, 1990</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 21, 1991</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 15, 1991</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 21, 1996</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Gallup Poll Sources may be found in Appendix E

Table 3.1 indicates that American public opinion in the Middle East conflict has predominantly been sympathetic to Israeli interests, while sympathy towards the Palestinians has been very low. In March 1991, and August 1991 Israeli sympathies reached their highest levels of support possibly due to the Gulf War which created increased sympathy towards Israel. However, it must be noted that by the end of our study in November 1996, Israeli sympathies were at their lowest point since April 1975. A possible reason for this sharp decrease in American sympathies towards Israel may be the uncertainties of the Peace

<sup>128a</sup>Our analysis of the Gallup poll question starts in 1973 because it is the earliest entry found pertaining to this question. There were two other entries in 1993 specifically dealing with the Peace Accord. However, because there were only two entries the study was not conclusive and I opted to track the question asked over the longest time period.
process. As the survey in November of 1996 indicates, a large percentage of Americans were either undecided on the question or held no opinion. Many Americans might still have been weighing the consequences and positive aspects of the Peace Accord. Another reason for the decrease in favourable sympathies towards Israel could be attributed to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s continuing construction of settlements in the West Bank, an action viewed negatively by many Americans.

Favourable responses towards the Palestinians did begin to increase in May of 1988. This sharp increase was most likely a result of the negative press the Israeli government received for its military tactics at the start of the Intifada. Favourable sympathies towards the Palestinians then peaked in January 1989, following the U.S. government initiating talks with the P.L.O. However, these responses comprised less than half the favourable response Israeli interests received. After 1988, responses favourable to the Palestinians continued to be higher than those experienced in prior years, but remained a smaller percentage of the overall responses and eventually decreased to low levels in November 1996 as the proportion of “neutral” or “no opinion” responses among Americans began to rise again.

In addition, there were years when a large percentage of Americans did not have an opinion on where their sympathies lay during the conflict. From 1988 onwards, there were two years where the percentage of “no opinion” responses was higher than that indicating Palestinian sympathies. And there were three years where “neutral” sympathies were either equal to or larger than Palestinian favourable responses. Combined these results seem to indicate a general sense of non-interest or neutral feelings towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict since the percentages of “no opinion” or “neutral” sentiments are larger than
Palestinian responses. However, in order to gain a true understanding of American sentiments the “no opinion” responses and “neutral” responses must be analysed separately.

These results, then, indicate four conclusions. First, American public opinion only partially followed American foreign policy. A month after the U.S. government initiated direct talks with the P.L.O., Palestinian sentiments reached their highest levels, even though these responses were a little under half the responses garnered by Israeli interests. Second, there seems to be a sense of neutrality among Americans with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the 15-20% range. As the percentages indicate, many Americans were unable to express a definite opinion either way. This is most likely the result of lack knowledge about the complexities of the conflict. There was also a percentage of the American public which had “no opinion.” However, these percentages for the most part were lower than those who held “neutral” sentiments on the subject matter. These findings are a result of many Americans not placing a large emphasis on foreign policy matters, other than in times of war. Third, throughout the survey, support of the Israeli position was clearly more pronounced, thereby confirming America’s historical alliance towards the country. Finally, American public opinion seems to shift throughout the years with no consistent pattern. For example, with respect to Palestinian sympathies, 1973 to 1982 witnessed low levels of support for Palestinians. These positive sentiments increased from 1989 to 1991, but were once again at a low level of 15% in November of 1996 (though this was double the percentage of the initial poll). Israeli sympathies also experienced the same fluctuations except they remained more consistent with higher levels of support than those experienced by Palestinians.

The results of the Gallup Surveys will now be compared to the coverage of Arafat in The
New York Times. This will help to determine whether there has been a change in the American media parallel to government policies, and to establish who is responsible for the construction and deconstruction of enemy images: the media or the government.

In order to determine whether The New York Times' coverage of Arafat did indeed become positive coincident with the signing of the Peace Accord, the frequencies of the coded newspaper articles were compared before and after the Accord. The 837 entries for the entire period from 1988 to 1996 were divided into two periods: 406 entries from 1988 until the signing of the Peace Accord on September 13, 1993 (the period referred to henceforth as the pre-handshake period), and 431 entries for the period from the signing of the Peace Accord until the end of 1996 (henceforth referred to as the post-handshake period). For each article, the dateline, type, source, tone, etc., was recorded on a coding sheet (See Appendix A - Code Sheet).

My first task was to examine whether Arafat's image in The New York Times changed as a result of the signing of the Peace Accord. The hypothesis predicted that there would be a change in Arafat's image from negative to positive. For this to hold true, there should be an increase in the number of positive articles associated with Arafat in the post-handshake period, as well as a decrease in the number of negative articles. Accordingly, we counted the number of positive, neutral, and negative articles in the pre-handshake period and compared the number to the post-handshake period in order to examine the pattern of sentiments towards Arafat.129

129 An article was considered either "positive", "neutral" or "negative" according to its overall tone. The tone of an article was established by 4 out of 5 readers (i.e. 80%) of the five member panel giving either a "positive", "neutral" or "negative" rating to each
Since the manner in which Arafat is described in the media provides us with a mental picture of his character, this process should give us an accurate description of any change in Arafat’s image. By examining the results of two time periods with a specific date serving as a divider, we are be able to determine whether a seminal event in Israeli-Palestinian history indeed served as a catalyst for Arafat’s permanent image modification in the American press.

**TABLE 3.2**

**TONE OF ARTICLES IN THE PRE AND POST HANDSHAKE PERIODS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Handshake</th>
<th>Post-Handshake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>N= 46</td>
<td>N= 60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>N=291</td>
<td>N=296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>N=69</td>
<td>N=75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N=406</td>
<td>N=431</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[x^2=11.10 \quad DF=2\]

Non significant

\[P=.85\]

If one compares the number of positive to negative articles in both the pre and post handshake periods, two interesting results are revealed. There was a small increase in the percentage of positive sentiments, while negative sentiments remain stable. However, even with the increase in positive sentiments, there were still more negative (17.4%) than positive articles (13.9%) in the post-handshake period. Second, the negative and positive sentiments for both time periods are not especially high. At approximately 11-14% for positive coded descriptor from the 837 articles read (when there was a 2-3 split the majority opinion was recorded). The positive/neutral/negative balance of the coded descriptors was then calculated for each article to attain its tone.
sentiments and 17% for negative sentiments there does not seem to be any indication of either strong positive or negative sentiments towards Arafat in the two time periods examined. What is more telling is the incidence of neutral articles. As Table 3.2 indicates, over two thirds of the articles in both time periods were neutral, though the percentage of neutral articles declined in the post-handshake period by 3%, in favour of positive evaluations.

There is no statistically significant relationship between the evaluation of Arafat’s coverage and the signing of the Accord. A possible reason for this result is the consistently high percentage of neutral articles. Since the percentage of neutral articles in both time periods is high, the difference between positive and negative articles does not stand out.

Thus, our results do not confirm our hypothesis. Contrary to our prediction, Arafat’s image did not become positive after September 1993 as was expected, but remained consistently neutral, and negative images continued to outweigh positive ones. In fact, his image was not overwhelmingly negative in the time period prior to the signing of the Accord as had been hypothesized. Both time periods indicate that Arafat’s image in The New York Times was predominantly neutral, even though there was an increase, albeit small, in positive sentiments in the post-handshake period.

However, it is worth noting that there does seem to be a small improvement in Arafat’s image over time. As Table 3.2 indicates, even though the overall tone towards Arafat in The New York Times remained neutral, the gap between positive and negative articles decreased somewhat in the post-handshake period. This seems to indicate that over time, Arafat’s image did improve slightly although the overall tone remained neutral. There are several reasons which help to explain the slight improvement in Arafat’s image. First, Arafat did
experience positive coverage as a result of the Peace Accord which was signed on the White House south lawn. In the days leading up to the event and thereafter, Arafat was referred to for the first time in the Western media as a “partner in peace,” “peacemaker,” and “statesman.” The images in *The New York Times* immediately after the ratification of the Accord were also positive. For the first time in history, an Israeli Prime Minister shook hands with a Palestinian leader. Articles also examined Yasir Arafat’s new role in Middle East politics. No longer was he referred to as a terrorist, but was instead described as the legitimate leader of Palestinians living in a newly created self governed territory (the Gaza Strip and the town of Jericho in the West Bank) who was committed to living alongside Israel in peace. Articles dealing with “conditions for peace,” “the peace accord,” and “peace negotiations” increased significantly in the post-handshake period, indicating a certain amount of positive coverage for Arafat as a signatory to this historical Accord (Appendix B).

In this instance, it is clear that the American administration initiated an increase in Arafat’s positive portrayal (in the post-handshake period) by sponsoring the Peace Accord and thereby providing the venue for positive commentary by the mass media. The media who were caught off-guard when witnessing the unprecedented handshake, thus projected its symbolism to the American people. The symbolism of the handshake between the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and the P.L.O. chairman, Yasir Arafat, on the White House south lawn with U.S. President Bill Clinton in the background was a powerful force in changing the American

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131 Appendix B was not included in the body of the paper due to the low percentages of some issues, instead references will be made to relevant results in the text.
people's mental picture of Arafat. The handshake symbolized the acceptance of Arafat as a friend and ally of the U.S. Not only was Arafat standing next to Rabin, a friend of the U.S., but he was actually shaking his hand, normally a sign of greeting and friendship. In addition, the event had added legitimacy since the American President, representing the nation, was standing approvingly between the two men.

Second, Arafat may also have received an increase in positive coverage in the post-handshake period as a result of the coverage of the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin on November 4, 1995. With the death of Rabin, most newspapers, including *The New York Times*, focused on the Peace Accord as the major accomplishment of Rabin's life, since it was presumed opposition to the Peace Accord with the Palestinians which caused his untimely death. By implication, Arafat was also mentioned extensively since he was the other signatory to the historic peace forged between Israel and the P.L.O. on September 13, 1993.

Third, it is fair to say Arafat received positive coverage in the post-handshake period because of the decrease in articles dealing with terrorism. As Appendix B indicates, the number of articles mentioning terrorism and/or Arafat's association with it decreased considerably. Whereas 147 articles referred to terrorist acts by Arafat or factions associated with Arafat in the pre-handshake period, in the post-handshake period, the number of references decreased to 102.

However, the positive portrayal Arafat received during these times was not sufficient for his image to change from largely neutral to positive, nor to experience a larger percentage of positive coverage as compared to negative coverage. The *New York Times* continued to project a consistent pattern of neutral articles on Arafat, regardless of his seemingly positive
actions. And, when there was a pronounced stance, it was usually on balance unfavourable.

These results do not confirm the literature on belief systems and media images as described in Chapter 1, which implied that there was a causal link between governments, the mass media and the formation of public opinion. According to this literature, governments usually take the lead in constructing or deconstructing a nation’s belief system on a foreign enemy due to the specialized nature of foreign policy and the difficulty which many Americans have in comprehending its implications. Therefore, because the American public does not have a high level of interest in foreign affairs, other than in times of war, U.S. government officials are usually in a better position to initiate a change in attitude towards an enemy. In other words, the U.S. government shapes a particular foreign policy objective, thereby in most instances setting the agenda. On the other hand, the mass media has the secondary but critical role of framing the message for the American people.

Given our results, this argument appears only partially to hold true. The signing of the Peace Accord, an event coordinated by the American administration, did result in The New York Times increasing its favourable coverage of Arafat and projecting a view analogous to government policy during its coverage of the event. However, although we argued that the gap between negative and positive articles narrowed due to the signing of the Peace Accord, and again as a result of Prime Minister Rabin’s assassination, The New York Times did not follow and/or reflect American government initiatives in its portrayal of Arafat in a sustained manner. On the contrary, results indicate that The New York Times continued to project its neutral image of Arafat in its daily coverage of events in the Middle East. This is the result of two factors. First with reporters from The New York Times following Arafat on a daily
basis, the newspaper was in position to report its own views of the conflict. This would result in images which were not always positive in tone or analogous to government policy. Second, in the reporting of news stories, The New York Times as a reputable American newspaper tried to conform to objective writing thereby producing overwhelming neutral articles.

The New York Times was unable to influence the American public toward its views. Although the American public did show neutral sentiments towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, these sentiments were in the 15 to 20% range in both the pre and post handshake periods, as opposed to The New York Times which projected neutrality at around the 70% range.

As Michael Parenti partially explains in Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media, this is the result of journalists and newspaper editors choosing not to project a radical viewpoint. Therefore, apart from the coverage of historical and monumental events that force them to take a different outlook - such as the initiation of talks with the P.L.O. in December 1988 and possibly the signing of the Peace Accord in September 1993 - the mass media seldom look to project a radical viewpoint. Rather, they tend to inject into the news their established views of the world. In other words, “they find confirmation for the images they report in the images they have already created.”

Seemingly distinct reports and diverse events have a continuity; the message portrayed is usually congruent with previous views in order to maintain cognitive consistency. Hence, even after the signing of the Peace Accord, the newspaper continued to project its neutrality despite vast coverage on the historical event.

In terms of our hypothesis, four conclusions can be drawn from our findings. First, there was no significant change in Arafat’s image from the pre-handshake period to the post-handshake period. Although there was a slight improvement in his image – the gap between negative and positive articles was narrowed – his overall image projected in The New York Times over the nine years of study remained neutral.

Second, the signing of the Peace Accord in September 1993 did not result in a long term reversal in the perception of Arafat. Contrary to the predictions stated in Chapter 1, the government was not able to project its modified view of Arafat onto the media in a sustained manner. The New York Times’ views and perceptions of Arafat remained neutral in nature. Although positive sentiments may have increased due to the signing of the Peace Accord, they did not permanently modify Arafat’s characterization in the American media.

Third, unfavourable portrayals were negative for varying reasons. In the pre-handshake period, there were still numerous references to Arafat as a terrorist, but in the post-handshake period, unfavourable references were attributed to his difficulties in governing and the difficult decisions which accompany the task. As Appendix B indicates articles dealing with “Palestinian self-rule” and “P.L.O. government initiatives” increased substantially in the post-handshake period as Arafat attempted to implement unfavourable policies. Many coded articles relating to these issues would comment on misuse of funds and authoritarian manner of ruling.

Fourth, The New York Times was not able to strongly affect, in a decisive way, American public opinion in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. As the comparisons between Gallup polls and the tone of articles indicate, the American public’s views towards the Palestinians
fluctuated throughout the years. Although it did express the highest level of sympathy shortly after the initiation of government talks with the P.L.O., and Palestinian sympathies improved over the study period, for the most part it did not take its cue from government policies or the newspaper. The only factor which did remain constant was the higher levels of sympathies towards the Israelis in the conflict, certainly due to America’s close ties to Israel and the fact that there was a certain amount of neutrality projected on the part of the American people with respect to the conflict.

Thus, I conclude The New York Times had taken on the responsibility of projecting its neutral view which was neither analogous to government policy nor to American public opinion. This is due to most of its reporters covering the Middle East being stationed in the region. By living in the region, communication with the PLO did increase, but in this instance it did not affect coverage in a positive manner. I argue this is the case because of three factors. First, by being stationed in the region, New York Times reporters were exposed to the unpredictable, authoritarian and corrupt mannerisms of Arafat on a first hand basis.

Second, apart from momentous occasions, belief systems tend to adhere to preconceived images. Information will be conveyed in which parallels are perceived with conventional wisdom for the audience, thus offering a sense of well-being.\textsuperscript{133} News will be presented in a fashion that is effectively read and digested while corresponding to a normative belief system. Therefore, new information was fit into existing beliefs in order to maintain cognitive consistency. Even though in the post-handshake period Arafat was no longer predominantly associated with terrorism, his portrayal in The New York Times remained slightly negative

\textsuperscript{133}Ibid. 53.
based on stories that focused on other issues which would reinforce that negative image such as corruption, financial mismanagement and authoritarianism. Third, journalists try to adhere to an ideal of journalistic objectivity of straight reporting and unbiased opinions.

Therefore, a momentous event with enormous symbolism did not reshape or reconstruct the ingrained image of Arafat in *The New York Times* in a sustained manner. This is substantiated by the fact that *The New York Times* did not consistently mirror government perceptions of the enemy, but instead projected its own neutral views to the American public through the length, placement and source of articles published in the newspaper. A brief discussion of how a newspaper can control the established viewpoint through these variables follows.

The length of a particular article indicates the importance placed on an issue by a newspaper and/or reporter. The longer the article, the more importance the newspaper devotes to it. This holds true for two reasons. First, space in a newspaper is at a premium. On any given day, a newspaper will go to press with relatively the same number of pages. This number is established according to the costs and revenues of running a newspaper. Should more pages be added to the paper on a given day, there would be an increase in the printing costs, thereby reducing the newspapers' revenue. As a result, most newspapers tend to establish the number of pages devoted to each section, such as news, sports, business section, lifestyle, and so forth. This task is not always simple; in the case of international news, there are always world events which could be reported on. However, not all news stories can be covered given the limited space within which the newspaper has to work. An editor must therefore pick and choose which events to cover, the amount of space given to
each story, the importance placed on the story, and the interest he/she believes the news item has for its readers. It is by excluding certain stories in favour of others – or devoting more space to some stories over others – that a story obtains its importance as a newsworthy item. So the length of a story is very important since it establishes the amount of space a newspaper is willing to devote to a story at the expense of other information.

Second, the length of an article indicates the importance of a story because of the resources involved in producing the news item. A longer article will provide the reader with more content. As a result, editors will project the importance of a story by devoting more space to it. In a long story, more emphasis is placed on writing a good piece – including better developed arguments which are presented in greater detail – than would be the case in a smaller article. In addition, by devoting more space to an issue, the newspaper obviously establishes its importance by expecting readers to place a larger effort on reading the whole piece and absorbing its larger amount of information.

For the purpose of our study, the length of an article was established in the following manner: short articles were considered to be one to five paragraphs in length, medium articles were between six to fifteen paragraphs in length, and long articles consisted of more than sixteen paragraphs. Table 3.3 compares the length of the articles in the pre and post handshake periods.
TABLE 3.3
LENGTH OF ARTICLES IN THE PRE AND POST HANDSHAKE PERIODS (COLUMN PERCENTAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Handshake</th>
<th>Post-Handshake</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short</td>
<td>N=67</td>
<td>N=42</td>
<td>N=109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>N=176</td>
<td>N=146</td>
<td>N=323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43.3%</td>
<td>34.1%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>N=163</td>
<td>N=242</td>
<td>N=405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>56.1%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N=406</td>
<td>N=430</td>
<td>N=837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>99.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 23.02 \quad DF = 3 \quad \text{Significant} \quad P = .00 \]

In this instance, there is a difference in the importance The New York Times placed on stories relating to Yasir Arafat in the pre and post handshake periods. The majority of articles in the pre-handshake period were considered to be of medium length (43.3% of total articles). Conversely, in the post-handshake period, both short and medium articles decreased, while the number of long articles increased by 16%. In addition, there were more short and medium articles in the pre-handshake period as opposed to the post-handshake period.

The chi-square coefficient reveals that there is a statistically significant relationship between the dependent variable (length of the articles) and the independent variable (time period in which articles were written). Therefore the handshake did seem to influence the length of articles appearing in The New York Times.
There are a few reasons for the increased importance associated with Arafat in the post-handshake period. First, the signing of the Peace Accord was a momentous occasion in Israeli-Palestinian history. As a result, The New York Times devoted substantial coverage to the event in the post-handshake period. As Appendix B indicates, 88% of the 150 articles dealing with the Peace Accord during our study were printed in the post-handshake period. In covering the Peace Accord, The New York Times not only outlined the substance of the agreement, but also Arafat’s new role as a legitimate player in the Middle East. Also of interest to many Americans was the role of the U.S. in sponsoring the Peace Accord and encouraging a positive outcome to the Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations. In addition, The New York Times also devoted substantial coverage to the historic event because of the large and influential Jewish community living in the U.S., the majority of whom would have a fundamental interest in issues relating to Israel. As a result, stories were longer due to detail, the consequences of the agreement and the speculation of reporters, and the newspaper’s attempts to outline the future implications of the agreement for the PLO and Israel.

Second, longer pieces began to appear in the post-handshake period possibly because of the nature of the issues under observation in the Middle East. No longer were stories solely written on the daily military turmoil in the region. After the signing of the Peace Accord, stories began to focus on the daily developments in the region occurring as a result of the implementation of the Accord. These stories included social, financial, and military issues associated with the Peace Accord, specific clauses of the Accord, daily reports on the progress towards the implementation of certain clauses, and the ongoing negotiations to get to the next round of talks.
Furthermore, many articles now discussed the positive and negative aspects of administering the new Palestinian governed territories under the leadership of Yasir Arafat. Appendix B shows there was a substantial increase in articles dealing with Palestinian self-rule, and PLO government initiatives in the post-handshake period. As a result, the stories became lengthier as all these issues required more detailed explanation than articles on military actions, and because new information developed on a daily basis about this unfamiliar political structure.

Thus, the signing of the Peace Accord on September 13, 1993 resulted in *The New York Times* placing added importance on Yasir Arafat in the post-handshake period. The increase in long articles following the signing of the Peace Accord was to some extent the result of government initiatives. Not only did the White House call the media on September 13, 1993, but several articles in *The New York Times* covered government officials holding press conferences outlining the details of the US’s Middle Eastern Diplomacy. However, we are unable to determine to what extent the increase in Arafat’s importance based on article length and the resulting perceptions was a result of government initiated policies, or the result of journalistic efforts in the region by *The New York Times*. In order to better understand the origin of the articles relating to Arafat, and to confirm the newspaper’s ability to project the importance it places on an issue, the placement, source and dateline of the articles must be examined.

The placement of a story indicates the importance a newspaper gives an issue. For the purpose of this study, the placement of articles was coded in the following manner:

The *Front Page* has historically carried the day’s top stories, and its contents is what often
sells a particular newspaper issue. Readers will pick a copy of the newspaper according to whether the day’s top stories appeal to them. Furthermore, a reader will often glean the perspective a newspaper gives to a news story by the tone of the headlines. Therefore, the front page will communicate the newspaper’s slant on the story and could influence a particular point of view among its readers.134

The Inside Pages of a newspaper are where most news stories can be found. Since front page space is at a premium, stories which are not considered of momentous importance for the day will be placed in the inside pages. Stories in the inside pages usually require more effort on the part of the reader, since they will have to search through the newspaper to find a particular news item which may interest them.

Editorials are very important for a newspaper. They are located in the inside pages, and are usually written by a staff member on the editorial board. But most importantly, they are the items which establish the slant that a newspaper will give to an issue. As a result, the editorials give a newspaper its political persuasion and thereby establishes the type of readership the newspaper appeals to.

Column/Features are also found on the inside pages of the newspaper. They can either be written by freelance writers who wish to portray their opinion on an issue, or by staff reporters who will write a longer article on a story by giving a more detailed outline of the issue. These pieces will often appear in the weekend edition of the paper to give the reader a synopsis of the week’s events in a particular region or news item.

Letters to the editor are usually responses from the public to a particular article or editorial.

The Business Section is where articles about economics, finance and management issues are located. This section of the newspaper is in a separate location from the main news section.

Thus, from the descriptions of the six possible locations of an article, a newspaper places more importance on pieces on the front page, editorials or column/features since these locations have a greater role in shaping reader's perceptions because of their location or opinions.\textsuperscript{135}

A comparison of the two time periods follows:

\textsuperscript{135}Letters to the Editor and Business section articles were also coded. However, because of the small number they were declared as missing data.
TABLE 3.4

PLACEMENT OF ARTICLES IN THE PRE AND POST HANDSHAKE PERIODS (COLUMN PERCENTAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Handshake</th>
<th>Post-Handshake</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=60</td>
<td>N=96</td>
<td>N=156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front Page</td>
<td>N=273</td>
<td>N=259</td>
<td>N=532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>67.2%</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inside Page</td>
<td>N=28</td>
<td>N=29</td>
<td>N=57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editorial</td>
<td>N=43</td>
<td>N=47</td>
<td>N=90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Column/Feature</td>
<td>N=404</td>
<td>N=431</td>
<td>N=835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>99.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>99.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

x²=33.54  DF=3
Non significant
P=.07

As Table 3.4 indicates, there is a slight variation in the placement of articles from the pre-handshake period to the post-handshake period. The editorial pieces and column feature articles remained relatively consistent, within a few tenths of a percentage point in both periods. The majority of articles in both periods are predominantly found in the inside pages. In both periods, about 2/3 of all articles were found in the inside pages of The New York Times. The percentage of articles found in the inside pages and on the front page are of most importance to this study. They differ marginally but consistently, as the number of front page articles increased by 7.5% in the post-handshake period, and inside articles decreased by relatively the same amount. Consequently the chi-square test revealed that there is no
significant relationship between the placement of articles and the time period in which they were printed.

As well, the increase in front page articles may be to a large extent attributed to the Peace Accord. The signing of the Accord, which was an historical event of major significance. Up until a week prior to its signing, most Americans would not have predicted that the leaders of Israel and the P.L.O. would ever appear together for the signing of an Accord outlining the secession of power by the Israeli government in the Occupied Territories to the P.L.O. It is not surprising, then, that the majority of coverage which occurred on that day and in the subsequent weeks would appear on the front page of all newspapers, not only *The New York Times*. Thus, the increase in front page coverage can be attributed to the importance of the signing of the Peace Accord and the subsequent negotiations which were intended to transfer further powers to the P.L.O. Hence, *The New York Times* placed a greater importance on the developments in the region in the post-handshake period as opposed to the pre-handshake period in its attempts to properly cover the new developments in the region.

The importance that the newspaper placed on Arafat and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the post-handshake period – as seen in Table 3.4 – partially confirms that the newspaper conformed with government policies. The newspaper printed stories in prime locations as a result of a government initiated event. However, though importance was given to the issue in terms of location by *The New York Times*, its views do not reflect those of the government. It still held a neutral stance. *The New York Times'* power to give prominence to Arafat can be further observed in the relationship between the length and placement of articles in the pre and post handshake periods:
| TABLE 3.5 |
|-Length of Articles by Placement in the Pre and Post Handshake Periods (Column Percentages) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.5(a)</th>
<th>Front Page News</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Handshake</td>
<td>Post-Handshake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short</td>
<td>N=1</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>N=4</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>N=55</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2=8.6$</td>
<td>DF=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non significant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P=.65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.5(b)</th>
<th>Inside Page News</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=64</td>
<td>23.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>N=124</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>N=85</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2=18.75$</td>
<td>DF=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P=.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.5(c)</th>
<th>Editorials</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=1</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>N=21</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>N=6</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2=2.66$</td>
<td>DF=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non significant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P=.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.5(d)</th>
<th>Column/Features</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=1</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>N=25</td>
<td>58.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long</td>
<td>N=17</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\chi^2=3.66$</td>
<td>DF=2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non significant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P=.16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

84
As Table 3.5(a) indicates, the relationship between front page coverage and length changed little between the two time periods. Over 90% of front page articles were long. The chi-square results confirm there is no significant relationship between the length of articles and the time of printing for front page articles.

By deciding to publish stories on the front page, a newspaper indicates to readers what issues are most important among the many subjects vying for public attention as stated above. In this circumstance, The New York Times did project the importance it placed on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and in Arafat in specific, by placing an overwhelming number of long articles on the front page during both time periods. This interest in giving prominence to the Arab-Israeli conflict and Arafat may be due to several reasons. First, as mentioned previously, the U.S. has a large Jewish community which has an interest in developments in the region. Second, due to the prolonged Middle East conflict and the region’s importance to American interests, it is not surprising that an elite U.S. newspaper would devote extensive coverage to events there.

Of greater interest are the shifts in the editorial section and column/features section (Tables 3.5(c) and 3.5(d)). In the post-handshake period, long editorials decreased by almost 15% while long column/features increased by 17.9% in the post-handshake period. However, the chi-square statistic reveals that there is no statistical significance between the length of articles in the time period, except for the inside page news.

Since the editorial section is normally where the established views of the newspaper on a particular issue are located, these results seem to indicate that the publishers decreased the importance of this medium in projecting their views. For opinion pieces on the region and the
ensuing developments, *The New York Times*, increasingly relied on freelance articles or special reports. These results indicate it projected its views on Arafat through the front page and freelance articles it chose to publish. The role of the editorial section of the newspaper was not as prominent in projecting its stance on Arafat in the post-handshake period. Instead, the newspaper relied on its reporters and columnists to portray their views on Arafat. Possible reasons for this action may be the overwhelming number of other events occurring in the world which the newspaper had to cover and/or possibly the fact that by devoting increased space to opinion pieces in the form of column/features which are longer and more detailed, a more pronounced view could be projected. Or, simply, the newspaper did not wish to take an editorial position.

Finally, Table 3.5(b) reveals that there was a statistically significant increase in both the absolute number and percentage of long inside page articles from the pre-handshake period to the post-handshake period. One possible reason for this is that with many new developments in the region as a result of the Peace Accord and the transition of power from the Israeli government to the Palestinian National Council, many news pieces required additional column space. And since most articles are located in the inside pages of a newspaper due to space constraints on the front page, *The New York Times* chose to elaborate on the developments in the region on the inside pages.

The source of an article will also provide valuable information about the importance a newspaper places on an issue. A newspaper has access to news stories from several sources. The most obvious source is its own local or in-house staff. These are usually reporters which the newspaper employs in order to cover a particular issue or topic on a regular basis. Their
job is not solely to report bare facts but to also devote their resources to explaining what the news means to its readers.\textsuperscript{136} This can often consist of either personal opinion or the newspaper's established stance as they interpret the significance of a piece. This source tends to be costly for the paper since they must keep reporters on the payroll and at times send them abroad. In addition, the allocation of a person to a particular area validates the importance of following the issue on a regular basis. Other sources include freelance writers who are paid per piece used.

Wire services also gather news. Few American newspapers can afford to gather the bulk of their out of town news. As a result, large news services which have the resources necessary for covering the events will provide most American newspapers with international coverage. These news dispatches are written primarily to give information to geographically dispersed newspapers.\textsuperscript{137} Upon receiving the factual information, newspapers may incorporate its content into their own news stories with their own slant, or, as is most often the case, the newspaper will only run the wire story.

\textsuperscript{136}Quincy Howe, \textit{The News and how to Understand it} (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968), 10.
\textsuperscript{137}\textit{Ibid.}, 36.
Table 3.6 shows that The New York Times over the years has placed a consistent amount of importance on the region. The figures for both the pre and post hand shake period indicate that The New York Times preferred to use its own local staff to cover these stories, accounting for 75% of content in the pre- and nearly 82% in the post-handshake period. Concomitantly, the percentage of freelance and wire service sources decreased. Such a large percentage of local staff use certainly indicates the importance The New York Times attributes to this issue. This emphasis is enhanced even further by the fact that when we tested the datelines of the articles for both time periods, most of their local correspondents were placed abroad, and as such incurred increased costs for the newspaper.\textsuperscript{138}

These numbers indicate that The New York Times chose to place a large amount of

\textsuperscript{138}Most of the local staff articles had foreign datelines. The majority of reporters were placed abroad. Over 75% of the stories originating abroad (such as Europe, Middle East, Israel, and the Israeli Occupied Territories), were written by local staff reporters.
attention on Arafat in the post-handshake period. By relying on its own staff to cover the events in the region, it ensured that its neutral view of the region was projected instead of other sources it could not as easily control. Thus, the length, placement, and source of its articles, indicates that The New York Times was be able to project its neutral views on Arafat to the American public.

In conclusion, by 1988, the American administration saw a need for a settlement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by 1988. Not only was a solution necessary for American strategic interests in the region, but most European nations, including Britain – the U.S.’s closest ally on the continent – were applying pressure on the American government to recognize Arafat and the P.L.O. as a legitimate player in the conflict. With Arafat’s statement in December 1988 agreeing to meet U.S. demands, the American government could no longer fail to recognize the P.L.O. leader. American foreign policy towards the P.L.O. thus shifted as talks were initiated between the U.S. and the P.L.O., and they formally recognized Arafat as a legitimate leader with the signing of the Accord. However, the American government was unable to project this change in image to the mass media.

Table 3.2 indicated that Arafat’s image - contrary to what was predicted in our hypothesis - did not become positive as a result of the signing of the Peace Accord as it should have if The New York Times followed government policies. Instead, The York Times' coverage remained neutral over time, although there were signs of Arafat’s image slightly improving as seen in the narrowing ratio of negative to positive articles.

However, it is important to point out that Arafat’s negative characterization in The New York Times remained negative for different reasons over time (see Appendix B). Whereas
his negative portrayal in the pre-handshake period focused on his terrorist past, in the post-handshake period, his negative portrayal was based on his governing methods.

Second, the results only partially confirm the literature on belief systems and media images. According to the literature cited in Chapter 1, government changes in foreign policy are usually reflected in the media. The New York Times did place added importance to the issue in the post-handshake period. In the post-handshake period there was an increase in long articles and more front page articles possibly due to the Accord which was initiated by the government. However this only partially confirms the role of the government in agenda setting. For my hypothesis to be completely confirmed, the Peace Accord - which resulted in a fundamental revision in America’s foreign policy approach towards the Middle East - should have also resulted in predominantly positive press for Arafat in the post-handshake period. However, The New York Times continued to project its established neutral view of Arafat in accordance with Parenti’s argument which claims that the media, fearful of cognitive inconsistencies, will continue to project established views in order to achieve a comfort zone. This is certainly the case with regards to our study. Even though Appendix B indicates Arafat’s image changed in terms of how he was seen (from terrorist to inadequate leader of a self-governing territory), he was portrayed largely in a neutral light. Thus, The New York Times, through its use of article length, source, and placement, was able to appropriately projected its neutral stance. Most articles in the post-handshake period were long (Table 3.3), thereby ensuring that the newspaper’s neutral views were given prominence. The prominent placement of the articles also ensured that the newspaper’s neutral views were projected to its readership. Furthermore, The New York Times demonstrated its commitment
to covering the issue by relying on local staff stationed predominantly abroad to cover most stories related to Arafat. However, contrary to our predicted results, these efforts by the newspaper did not result in a modification of American public opinion. As Table 3.1 indicated, American public opinion continued to be pro-Israeli. Although there were neutral responses, they were not nearly as pronounced as those of The New York Times. Chapter 4 will examine in more detail The New York Times' portrayal of Arafat, based on an analysis of the actual language used to describe him, as well as further analysis of the evaluated direction of the entire articles during the two time periods.
CHAPTER 4

AN EXAMINATION OF THE TONE OF COVERAGE ON YASIR ARAFAT IN THE NEW YORK TIMES IN THE PRE AND POST HANSHAKE PERIODS

In Chapter 3, we tested whether Arafat's image changed from negative to positive as a result of the signing of the Peace Accord. By comparing two time periods (pre and post handshake periods), it was established that Arafat was seen predominantly in a neutral manner over time; that is, there were more neutral than negative and positive articles for the nine years which were analysed. In addition, Table 3.2 indicated that Arafat's image became slightly less negative after the signing of the Peace Accord in 1993. However, these sentiments were not sustained over time. There were still more neutral than positive articles for the entire post-handshake period.

Second, we argued that although Arafat's image remained neutral throughout the two time periods studied, the basis of negative evaluation in The New York Times differed in the pre and post handshake period. Prior to the handshake, Arafat's negative image was to a large extent a result of his association with terrorism. In the post-handshake period, although his terrorist past were still mentioned, the basis of the negative sentiments were largely due to his poor administrative skills.

Third, we also argued that the results of our study do not confirm the literature on agenda-setting. Even though the American government modified its stance towards the P.L.O. and initiated a new policy agenda, it was not able to change the predominant media image of Arafat, nor was it able to change public opinion (Table 3.1) in any fundamental way. Although The New York Times did partially follow government initiatives by placing
increased importance on Arafat through long articles and front page coverage, its reporters continued to project a neutral image of Arafat (one established long before government policy changed). This was contrary to American government policy, which officially changed in December 1988 through the initiation of talks with the P.L.O. and its formal recognition of Arafat in September 1993. Thus, it was The New York Times, through its neutral coverage of events, which continued to shape its readership's image of Arafat, and in turn formed the basis of its judgements of future events.

In order to further explore these conclusions, this chapter will cross tabulate the descriptors, placement, length, source and dateline of the articles against their tone over the two time periods. This process should enable us to acquire a better look at the image variances between the two time periods.

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139 It does so because it is considered to be one of the most widely read newspapers among elites both within and outside the American government. As well, it has been shown to have a strong agenda-setting effect on public opinion.
### TABLE 4.1

**Tone of Descriptors in the Pre and Post Handshake Periods (Column Percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Handshake</th>
<th>Post-Handshake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>N=166</td>
<td>N=216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>N=389</td>
<td>N=416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>N=191</td>
<td>N=220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N=746</td>
<td>N=852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 9.86 \quad DF = 2 \]

Non Significant

\[ P = .20 \]

As Table 4.1 indicates, the near majority of descriptors used to characterize Arafat in *The New York Times* were neutral in both time periods. In the post-handshake period, the percentage of positive descriptors increased slightly while negative descriptors were stable. However, the absolute number of positive descriptors increased more than the absolute number of negative descriptors, thereby confirming our results from Chapter 3 which argued the gap between negative and positive sentiments towards Arafat was decreasing. But overall neutral descriptors were the predominant trend. In addition, the chi-square values indicate that the difference between pre and post-handshake results are non-significant.

These results seem to confirm the conclusions arrived at in Chapter 3. First, *The New York Times* continued to project its neutral characterization of Arafat. When there was an expressed view, negative sentiments were slightly more prevalent by 3%. Thus, the newspaper
seems to have portrayed an image of Arafat partly similar to American public opinion. When the American public did have an opinion about the conflict, it was usually more unfavourable to the Palestinian cause. However, 49-52% of the descriptors in The New York Times were neutral, but only 20% among the American public.

Second, positive sentiments increased slightly in terms of absolute numbers and percentage in the post-handshake period, so that the gap between positive and negative images of Arafat narrowed. This may be due to increased exposure during the peace negotiations\textsuperscript{140} and the decline in references to his terrorist association. Articles in the post-handshake period would refer to his efforts in the peace negotiations and his attempts at trying to curb Hamas military actions.

In addition, as Appendix C indicates, negative images of Arafat in the post-handshake period were based on different issues. In the pre-handshake period, negative references were to a large extent based on his association with terrorism and his defiant stance during the Gulf War (Appendix D). In the post-handshake period, there was an increase in negative sentiments focused on issues dealing with his role as leader of a self-governing territory. Of particular interest is the increase in negative sentiments with regards to his role in the negotiations for “land settlements” and “P.L.O. governmental initiatives”. In terms of articles dealing with the land transfer in the former Israeli Occupied Territories and P.L.O. government initiatives, negative sentiments increased by 8.2% and 8.1% respectively (Appendix C).

\textsuperscript{140}The Table was not included in the body of the paper, instead relevant issues have been incorporated into the text - See Appendix C.
In Chapter Three, we established that the majority of articles on Arafat were on the inside pages of *The New York Times*, followed by the front page. This pattern is normal, since space on the front page is limited and therefore most stories on any particular issue followed over time will be found in the inside pages. What is interesting in our results, however, is the tone of the stories as they relate to placement. In Chapter Three, we stated that Arafat’s neutral image was perpetuated by *The New York Times*. This implies that *The New York Times* as an organization and its reporting staff continued to project a neutral view of Arafat. In this case they did so through the tone of the “hard” news articles and in-depth news articles. In order to confirm this hypothesis we recoded the placement of articles according to “hard” news (consisting of front page and inside page articles written by the newspaper’s staff) and in-depth news (consisting of editorial and column/feature pieces, which tend to be more opinion pieces and often written by outside sources). By comparing these two categories, we will be able to determine if the newspaper - through the use of straight reporting - continued to project a neutral image of Arafat, or if opinion pieces were more analogous to the predominantly negative public opinion.
TABLE 4.2

TYPE OF NEWS BY TONE IN THE PRE AND POST HANDSHAKE PERIODS (ROW PERCENTAGES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Handshake</th>
<th></th>
<th>Post-Handshake</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hard News</td>
<td>N=35</td>
<td>N=253</td>
<td>N=45</td>
<td>N=50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In depth News</td>
<td>N=11</td>
<td>N=36</td>
<td>N=24</td>
<td>N=10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2=29.932 \quad \text{DF}=2 \]

\[ x^2=22.923 \quad \text{DF}=2 \]

Significant \quad \text{P}=.001

The chi-square statistic reveals there is a significant relationship between the type of news articles and their tone in each time period. In-depth news was more likely to be negative in tone, while "hard" news pieces were predominantly neutral during the two time periods. Furthermore, while in-depth news contained a bare majority of neutral images of Arafat, the proportion of negative articles in both time periods was more than double the percentages of positive articles.

These results indicate that in-depth news pieces contained a far more unfavourable portrayal of Arafat. These results may be due to several reasons. First, hard news pieces are mainly intended to relay the day's events and occurrences, whereas in-depth news coverage is more likely to analyse the situation and the results of the day's events. As a result, editorials and freelance pieces (which are primarily opinion pieces) projected a negative image of Arafat due to his behaviour in the Peace Accord and subsequent land settlement negotiations. During this period, Arafat would often stall at peace negotiations when he felt
that his interests were being ignored (land settlements, independent self-rule for government, etc.) and walk out on talks. Thus, these articles would project Arafat’s volatile nature during these encounters in an unflattering manner. In addition, the stories may also have indicated Israel’s unhappiness with the negotiations and its difficulties with Arafat. In fact, there was an increase from the pre-handshake period in negative articles which referred to “Israeli Statements/Actions”, as noted in Appendix C.

Second, Arafat’s negative portrayal particularly during the post-handshake period may be due to an increase in negative articles dealing with his “domestic legitimacy”. Once again, as Appendix C indicates, there was an increase in negative articles that dealt with Arafat’s “domestic support”. As the governing leader of the formerly Israeli occupied territories, he had to make administrative decisions which did not always meet the needs or wishes of the populace’s and his coverage reflected this unhappiness among his subjects.

All of these results seem to support our previous conclusion. First, although there was favourable “hard” news coverage, this represented a small percentage of Arafat’s overall coverage in The New York Times and may be due solely to the Accord. Second, the view of The New York Times on Arafat did not become positive over time or change after the signing of the Peace Accord. As the results for both the “hard” news and “in-depth” news indicate, the newspaper’s views on Arafat remained predominantly neutral. Since the opinion pieces, in the form of editorials and column/features, project the slant of a newspaper on any particular issue, it is fair to state that The New York Times’ view on Arafat remained neutral even after the Peace Accord was signed. Third, among those who did follow the conflict on a regular basis, their view of Arafat would be unfavourable as is seen in the “in-depth” news pieces often written by the newspaper’s editors or
special correspondents in the region. "Hard" news pieces did experience more positive than
negative sentiments during the post-handshake period, but because "in-depth" news actually projects
the views of the newspaper, it is the results for this category which are of importance. Thus, The
New York Times did not make a conscious effort to modify its neutral view of Arafat in accordance
with government policies. One possible reason for this may be that the journalists subscribe to
journalistic norms of objectivity or at least balance, creating overall a neutral image.

An examination of the source and tone of the articles in both time periods confirms the
consistently neutral Arafat stance adopted by the paper.
## Table 4.3

**Source of Articles by Tone in the Pre and Post Handshake Periods (Row Percentages)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Handshake</th>
<th></th>
<th>Post-Handshake</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Staff</td>
<td>N=36</td>
<td>N=217</td>
<td>N=52</td>
<td>N=51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic/</td>
<td>N=4</td>
<td>N=23</td>
<td>N=11</td>
<td>N=2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freelance</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>60.5%</td>
<td>28.9%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associated</td>
<td>N=3</td>
<td>N=30</td>
<td>N=4</td>
<td>N=3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Press</td>
<td>8.1%</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reuters</td>
<td>N=2</td>
<td>N=20</td>
<td>N=2</td>
<td>N=4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>N=45</td>
<td>N=290</td>
<td>N=69</td>
<td>N=60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 10.39 \quad DF=6 \]
\[ x^2 = 11.412 \quad DF=6 \]

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non Significant</td>
<td>Non Significant</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P=.24</td>
<td>P=.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 4.3 indicates, in all categories the coverage was predominantly neutral in both time periods. Table 4.3 also indicates that there were more negative than positive articles written by *New York Times* staff reporters and freelancers during both time periods. In the pre-handshake period, there were 5.2% more negative than positive articles written by staff reporters, compared to 2% in the post-handshake period. The percentages of negative articles in both time periods remained fairly consistent at around 17%. As for academic/freelance articles, a small percentage were positive in both time periods while, an overwhelming percentage of them were neutral. Still, negative coverage in this category increased after the handshake. Nevertheless, the chi-square
operations reveal that there is no significant relationship between the variables before or after the handshake.

The greater number of negative as opposed to positive articles can perhaps be attributed to the background of these writers. These are individuals who have followed Middle East politics for years and have acquired a particular expertise in the area. In addition, many are located in the region and are as a result better equipped to report on daily events. In the case of reporters stationed abroad, they would have first-hand experience in Arafat’s unpredictable and contradictory actions and would accordingly project them back to The New York Times readers in their written pieces. This is particularly true in the post-handshake period. After the signing of the Peace Accord, political authority in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of Jericho was transferred over to Arafat, which made him responsible for the administration of these two regions. However, the expected benefits to this area did not materialize under his rule. As reporters stationed in the Gaza Strip and Jericho witnessed, there was increased confusion in the areas as Arafat attempted to play the role of both dove and hawk. No sooner had he arrested militant factions in order to appease Israeli and American demands, he would turn around and release them once again in order to maintain the support of his own people in the former occupied territories. Freelance pieces tend to be opinion pieces rather than accounts of facts and events. As a result, the views projected in freelance pieces tended to be more pronounced. In addition, although a newspaper will on occasion print opposing view points by freelance writers, it tends to print opinion pieces which are in accordance with its preferred views. This enables the newspaper to maintain its understood news

bias, and to report the news primarily from that chosen position. In this case our results partially
conform with public opinion - although Arafat's image in The New York Times was predominantly
neutral as a result of the established views of The New York Times, among those with a slant as
with the American public, his image was unfavourable.

The results from the news wire services are also not surprising. The overwhelming number of
articles originating from a wire service in both time periods were neutral. The reason for this is that
news items received from a wire service normally do not have a political spin on them - most articles
are strictly factual - while articles written by reporters often have a spin. Therefore, if the event is
positive, a positive interpretation will normally follow. In addition, factual information is less likely
to contain a negative connotation.

The second finding from our results dealing with news wire articles was that in the pre and post
handshake periods, the ratio of positive to negative news pieces originating from a wire service
remained relatively equal. Reuters had the same ratio of positive to negative articles in the
respective pre-handshake (two articles each) and post-handshake (4 articles each) periods. The
Associated Press (AP) experienced a decline in negative articles in the post-handshake period.
Negative articles decreased from 10.8% in the pre-handshake period to 5% in the post-handshake
period. However, because we are dealing with such a small number of AP articles in the post-
handshake period that were either positive or negative (four in total), it is difficult to determine a
pronounced slant on the part of AP towards Arafat other than being predominantly neutral. The
AP is an American news service based in New York which serves to many American papers. The
American newspapers which rely on it for the majority of their international news coverage on
Arafat would thus project a neutral image of Arafat in the post-handshake period. This is consistent
with The New York Times. Even though it does not rely on the AP for the majority its international coverage, but instead relies on its own reporters in the region which already have a preconceived image of Arafat, it too continues to project a neutral slant most likely in its attempts to maintain a consistent view and due to journalistic objectivity.

The results from the cross tabulations between the dateline of an article and its tone also show the lack of substantial change in Arafat's image in the two time periods. The datelines of the articles were divided into two categories, those written in the U.S. and North America, and those written abroad, including articles from Europe, the Middle East, Israel and the former Israeli Occupied Territories.

**TABLE 4.4**

**DATELINE BY THE TONE OF COVERAGE IN THE PRE AND POST HANDSHAKE PERIODS (ROW PERCENTAGES)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Handshake</th>
<th>Post-Handshake</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. and North America</td>
<td>N=10</td>
<td>N=50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>N=27</td>
<td>N=239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>79.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
x^2=8.25 \quad DF=2 \quad x^2=7.02 \quad DF=2
\]

Non Significant  Non Significant
P=.21              P=.38

The dateline was not significantly related to the tone of coverage in either period. Both American based and foreign correspondents wrote primarily neutral articles about Arafat before and
after the handshake. What is interesting is that the percentage of negative articles written abroad in the post-handshake period was greater than those written in North America.

There are several reasons for this trend. Those stationed abroad were more exposed to Arafat’s unpredictable manner and the large displeasure of Palestinians living under his rule. Many articles written from abroad commented on Arafat’s lack of support among Palestinians in the former Occupied Territories and his authoritarian manner of ruling, thus resulting in a 4.3% increase in negative articles in the post-handshake period.

The results from the U.S. and North America also indicate that the majority of articles written were neutral. As for positive and negative sentiments in the post-handshake period, there was a slightly larger percentage of negative as opposed to positive articles. What is of interest is the 10.6% decrease in negative articles from the pre-handshake period to the post-handshake period. This seems to indicate that articles written in the U.S. and North America were responding in a manner similar to government policies by decreasing the percentage of negative articles from the pre to the post handshake period. A possible reason for this trend may be the sources of these articles. Reporters writing these stories may have received their information from government press conferences or spokespersons, thereby portraying a more balanced characterization of Arafat. This may be confirmed by the absolute number of positive and negative articles. Because there are so few articles for the time period and only one more negative than positive article, it is difficult to determine a slant either way, therefore, it is fair to state the majority of articles were neutral in accordance The New York Times projected slant.

Thus, the results from the cross-tabulations seem to confirm our earlier findings. The New York Times coverage continued to project its established neutral position of Arafat. As Table 4.1
demonstrated, the majority of articles used to characterize Arafat in the two time periods were neutral. However, in the pre-handshake period, Arafat’s negative press was to a large extent the result of his characterization as a terrorist (Appendix C). In the post-handshake period, that no longer held true; his negative portrayal was more due to his poor governing skills.

But our second finding is of more importance. The New York Times set the agenda by continually projecting a predominantly neutral image of Arafat, but printing more negative than positive opinion pieces. The balance of positions is similar to the public: when people who followed the conflict in the region were asked where their sympathies lay, the response was usually more favourable to Israeli interests, with only 15-20% holding neutral opinions. And this was indeed similar to how The New York Times as an organization chose to portray him. As Table 4.2 and 4.3 indicate, the newspaper, through its use of editorials and pieces written by local staff, projected a more unfavourable image of Arafat, both before and after the handshake.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This study set out to examine the role of the government, the mass media and the mass public in the construction and deconstruction of enemy images and the forming of government policies. In order to examine this particular topic, I chose to look at the possible changes in image of Yasir Arafat over two time periods. In choosing Arafat as the subject of my study, two criteria were considered: he is someone who has an international media image, and has evoked strong sentiments around the world and in particular in the U.S.

I attempted to examine whether Arafat’s image changed from negative to positive over time by studying the change in both the tone of articles on Arafat and the character of the language used to describe him over two time periods - before and after the signing of the Peace Accord in September 1993, a momentous occasion which focused positive attention on Arafat. In doing so, I believe the study contributes to the study of political science by testing the predominant literature on how government policies affect media images.

The paper first considered how enemy images were formed. In Chapter 1, we concluded that enemy images are established by the way in which governments or the mass media characterize an individual over a long period of time. Arafat had been characterized negatively for decades as the leader of a guerilla faction associated with terrorism. The American public’s beliefs on Arafat were very much the result of government actions and policies, reported on and amplified in the press.

As Chapter 2 indicated, the U.S. historically has had a pro-Israeli stance. In the early 1900s, although the Middle East did not play an enormous role in U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. did indirectly support Israeli interests due to its maintenance of close ties with Britain, which supported
the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. In addition, President Woodrow Wilson briefly mentioned self-determination for the peoples of the former Ottoman Empire following the First World War. As the century moved forward, Israeli interests in the region were more prominent in American foreign policy towards the Middle East. Not only was the Balfour Declaration endorsed and written in the U.S., but many Congressmen began to place the issue of a Jewish homeland in Palestine in their platforms for re-election as the political power of the Jewish community in the U.S. began to grow.

However, it was not until after the Second World War that U.S. interests in the region became predominantly pro-Israeli. This occurred for three reasons, two international and one domestic. First, the Holocaust gave tremendous legitimacy for the establishment of a Jewish homeland. After the atrocities of the Nazi regime became public, a Jewish homeland was justified in order to provide Jews around the world with security. Second, with the creation of the state of Israel, a democratic regime in the Middle East was established. This became of particular interest to the U.S. at the beginning of the Cold War as both superpowers were vying for power and influence in many third world regions. As a result, friendly relations with Israel were firmly established during this time period. Successive U.S. governments would provide not only financial aid but also military support and armaments to Israel in their struggle with their Arab neighbours. Finally, the impact of Jewish voters domestically, combined with an effective pro-Israel lobby, resulted in both major political parties adopting policies that were favourable to Israel.

Therefore, U.S. policy towards the region, although not decisively anti-Palestinian, was staunchly pro-Israeli and therefore indirectly ignored the Palestinian issue or tended to not concern itself with it as a major international conflict. It was not until the period of the late 1960s - early 1970s that
Arafat, as the leader of the P.L.O., began to gain an enemy image in the U.S. With the start of frequent and violent cross border attacks into Israel from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Arafat’s image in the U.S. began to be established as a terrorist and rogue leader. But it was perhaps not until the terrorist incident at the 1972 Olympics by guerilla factions associated with the P.L.O. that this image was firmly implanted among Americans, since the incident attracted massive international attention. During this time, the U.S. did not recognize the P.L.O. and Arafat was often seen in the U.S. negatively due to his involvement in terrorism especially against Israeli targets - the U.S.’s staunchest ally in the region. The media, in turn, characterized Arafat as a terrorist and projected this image appropriately to the American people. Thus, from the late 1960s until the late 1980s, Arafat was associated with violent crimes against Israel as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict escalated over the years.

Thus, a particular perception of Arafat was established within American society. The information which was absorbed through society consistently fit the framework of the image since the American public consistently viewed the actions as contrary to their own socially acceptable norms and values. In this particular case, the image was one often associated with evil and violent connotations. After a while the American people saw Arafat only as an enemy capable of negative actions. The American government, for its part, also continued to view Arafat in this manner. There were no formal talks with the P.L.O. and it was made clear - even with President Carter’s attempt at seeking a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in the Camp David Accords - that the conditions for the U.S. to even consider talking to the P.L.O. would entail the recognition of Israel and the complete cessation of terrorist activities by Arafat and the P.L.O.

In addition, Arafat’s enemy image had a negative impact on decision-makers in policy choices
with regards to the P.L.O. For example, during the Camp David negotiations, clauses relating to the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were conducted through Jordanian officials acting as the Palestinian representatives. In that he was an enemy of the American people, the Carter administration did not wish to engage in talks directly with the P.L.O. or Arafat. Thus, in accordance with Ralph White’s literature on enemy images, Arafat became an enemy of the American state and all new information on Arafat or the P.L.O. was filtered through this framework. In the early 1970s, public opinion polls indicated fairly low levels of sympathy for the Palestinians. This remained the case until 1988.

In order to modify a belief system, as Spillman and Spillman outline in the first Chapter, enemy images must slowly be broken down. First, an understanding of the enemy must increase in conjunction with contact with the enemy. Through contact with the enemy those dealing with the enemy will gain an appreciation of their values, norms and history. In time this would lead to a modification of established stereotypes and images associated with the group. Second, government officials usually become knowledgeable in a particular area of interest. These officials realize through gathering information, interacting with the other side and by examining domestic issues that the present perception of the enemy must be modified.

In the late 1980s, the U.S. began slowly to modify its stance towards the P.L.O. and Arafat. In large measure, this was due to the end of the Cold War. With the ideological struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union coming to an end, policy makers began to re-examine the U.S.’s role in the Middle East. No longer was a friendly democratic state in the Middle East as vital to the U.S. since the Soviet Union had stopped dealing with the other Arab states surrounding Israel. In addition, the U.S. re-examined its financial obligations to Israel. By the late 1980s, with the world
economies facing tight financial restraints, the U.S. realized it would have to seek a solution to the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli dispute in an attempt to lessen its financial burden in the region.

Thus when Arafat’s December 1988 speech recognizing the state of Israel and his renunciation of terrorism was announced, the U.S. was willing to attempt to initiate talks with the P.L.O. as the official representative of the Palestinian people. Hence, it was government policy and actions which initiated a policy modification towards the P.L.O. and leader Arafat. In this case, the American administration realized it could no longer remain as intractable as it had been towards the P.L.O. and Arafat’s speech gave it the opportunity and justification to seek an alternative policy to deal with the problem.

The sponsoring of the Peace Accord at the White House on September 13, 1993 would result in the complete modification of the administration’s view of Arafat. From that day on he was considered a legitimate ally of the U.S. According to the literature, this policy modification should then be transmitted to the American public through the mass media in order to slowly modify the public’s belief system. Such an image change obviously would be projected through The New York Times, the mass media outlet examined.

It was hypothesized that Arafat’s image would change from negative to positive coincident with the signing of the Peace Accord in Washington. Before presenting our findings based on content analysis, we examined the trend in American public opinion towards the Palestinians. Public opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been predominantly sympathetic to Israeli interests, although there has been gradual, long term increase in support for the Palestinians.

From 1988 to 1991, Palestinians continued to receive low levels of sympathy from Americans. Support levels for the Palestinians achieved their highest levels in January 1989, while sympathies
towards the Israelis also rose at this time. Nevertheless, about a third of the electorate were either ambivalent or did not have a clear understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The increase in favourable sentiments towards the Palestinians may be attributed to the American government beginning talks with Palestinians and the initiation of peace talks in late 1990 when favourable polling once again reached 23%. However, the increase in positive sentiments was not sustain. In 1996, the first poll taken after the signing of the Peace Accord in Washington, nearly half of the respondents sided neither with the Israelis nor the Palestinians.

As a result, Americans have had very ambivalent feelings towards Palestinians and when they did have an opinion, it was more favourable to Israeli interests particularly between 1988 and 1991. While over the years, public opinion has slowly improved with regards to the Palestinians, by 1996, it had dropped to the levels seen from 1988 to 1991. It is assumed that perhaps Americans also realize a settlement to the conflict was necessary. In fact, according to a New York Times/CBS poll in January 18, 1989, a month after the U.S. officially recognized the P.L.O., 64% of Americans indicated they strongly supported U.S. talks with Yasir Arafat, even though many stated they did not believe real concessions needed for peace would be achieved.146

These results are quite consistent with the conclusions arrived at from our own statistical analysis of The New York Times. Tables 3.2 and 4.1 both indicate that Arafat’s portrayal in the newspaper has been predominantly neutral. In terms of the tone of the overall articles and descriptors the data show that the vast majority of articles were neutral. In addition, although the overall image was neutral, the gap between negative and positive sentiments was narrowing, thereby indicating some improvement in Arafat’s image over time. Although negative articles were still larger in number


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than positive articles, the proportionate increase in positive articles was larger. In the post-
handshake period there was a 2.6% increase in positive articles from the pre-handshake period while
negative articles remained at the same percentage.

One other conclusion is consistent with the results of the public opinion polls and our statistical
analysis. In Chapter 3, we concluded that *The New York Times* projected a more favourable image
of Arafat in the post-handshake period possibly due to the signing of the Peace Accord. The
newspaper coverage that followed the event in Washington referred to Arafat as a “statesman”,
“peace-maker” and “partner in peace.” Thus, it was concluded that after a momentous occasion,
the mass media will project an image consistent with government policies before reverting back to
its established viewpoint. Although we do not have public opinion polls for the time period
immediately following the Peace Accord, the same conclusion may be surmised from the results
following the initiation of talks with the P.L.O. Shortly after the reversal in American policy,
American public opinion did follow government directives before once again reverting to its
established critical viewpoint.

One other finding is worth noting. In our examination of the number of positive, neutral and
negative articles, Appendices B and C indicated that although Arafat’s image did not become
positive from the pre-handshake period to the post-handshake period, reasons for continuing
negative coverage changed. Arafat was no longer associated with terrorism as was the case in the
pre-handshake period. His negative portrayal in *The New York Times* in the post-handshake period
was the result of his role as leader of a self-governing territory responsible for making policies and
decisions which were not always positively received by Palestinians living under his authority. Thus,
*New York Times* reporters covering stories in the region would be exposed to his lack of support
and authoritarian manner of ruling in the former Occupied Territories of Israel.

Our results thus seem to indicate at times a similar pattern between American public opinion and the manner in which The New York Times projected Arafat, thereby leading us to believe that it was the mass media which set the agenda and not government policies. Chapter 4 outlined the manner in which The New York Times did so. In terms of placement and source, Tables 4.2 and 4.3 indicated that it was the newspaper’s opinion pages which projected its established view of Arafat. The overall tone of both “hard” news and “in-depth” news was neutral in both time periods examined. However, straight reporting in the post-handshake period experienced more positive than negative articles, whereas “in-depth” pieces which comprised of a large portion of editorials, continued to have more negative than positive articles. The “in-depth” news pieces - which are where the newspaper expresses its bias - were consistent with American public opinion. By and large, the paper did project a neutral stance, but when it stated an opinion it was more unfavourable towards Arafat. This is to a large extent due to the favourable sentiments Americans have towards Israeli interests in the Middle East.

Furthermore, our results indicate that even though the U.S. government in the late 1980s achieved cognitive consistency when it reversed Arafat’s enemy status, The New York Times was already projecting a neutral view of Arafat. There are two possible reasons for this. First, The New York Times was not suffering from cognitive dissonance because by placing reporters abroad it dealt with the enemy on a regular basis and did not believe what it witnessed justified the demonization of an individual. Second, the American public does not generally pay a lot of attention to foreign affairs. Thus, the mass media will attempt to project an image congruent with such a view.
These results tend to partially confirm Michael Parenti's theories on politics and the media. When a newspaper follows a particular subject on a regular basis and has its own reporters covering the subject matter, it tends to project its own biases and views to the general public and not necessarily those of the American administration. In the case of The New York Times, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has always been of interest to the newspaper and it has over the years invested an enormous amount of resources in its coverage of events in the region. Thus, the newspaper has over the years had a view of Arafat not necessarily congruent with American foreign policy. As a result, analogous to Parenti's theories, The New York Times has consistently projected the same neutral view of Arafat in order to maintain its own portrayal of the individual even though his image has changed from one that was based predominantly on terrorist acts, to one that is based on his role as a leader of a self-governing territory.

This is important for the study of Political Science because it reinforces the influence and ability of The New York Times to maintain its own slant. This is particularly true when the media outlet itself places an enormous importance on the subject matter. In such circumstances it will continue to project its own view which may not necessarily be that of policy-makers or the general public. This study thus adds to the importance of the mass media as a primary player in the formation of public images particularly when it does not need to rely on the government for information, but devotes its own resources to a matter in which it invests an enormous amount of attention. No longer does the media consistently play a crucial, but rather secondary role. As this study indicates, when a newspaper invests a large amount of resources, time and has a particular belief on a matter, it will project its own view independent of government policies. This is assisted further by the powerful tools which a newspaper has at its disposal to aid it in the continual projection of such
views. Hence, these findings can be added to the continuing study of the mass media as an influential player in international image making.
APPENDIX A

NEWSPAPER COVERAGE OF YASER ARAFAT FROM 1988-1996

NEWSPAPER: The New York Times

HEADLINE: ________________________________________________________

DATE: Day____ Month_____ Year____

DATELINE: ____________________________

LENGTH: Short____ Medium_____ Long____
        (1-5)    (6-15)     (16+)

TYPE: Front Page News___
       Inside Page News__
       Editorial___
       Col/Feature___
       Letter___
       Cartoon___
       Business Section___

SOURCE: Local Staff/Spec Corres___
         Academic/Freelance___
         Associated Press___
         Reuters___
         AFP___

PHOTO: Yes___ No___

ISSUES: Background-Leader_____
        Background-Pol His____
        Domestic Support/Legitimacy____
        Gulf War_____
        Relations w Jordan_____
        Relations w Syria_____
        Relations w Soviet Union_____
        Land Settlements/Gaza/West Bank____
        Conditions for Peace_____
        Peace Accord_____
        Peace Negotiations____
        Status of Jerusalem____
        Terrorism/Military Operations____
        Statement/Action U.N._____
        Statement/Action U.S._____
        Statement/Action Israel____
        Statement/Action Europe____
        U.N. Resolutions_____
        Hamas___
        Al Fatah____
        P.L.O. Gov’t Initiatives____
        Gov’t Initiatives-Israeli Response____
        Palestinian Self-Rule____
        Recognition of Israel____
        Financial Aid____
        Other____

TEXT EVALUATION TOWARDS ARAFAT:
        Pre-Handshake: Positive__ Neutral/Ambiguous__ Negative__
        Post-Handshake: Positive__ Neutral/Ambiguous__ Negative__

LEADER DESCRIPTORS:
## APPENDIX B

### ISSUES COVERED IN THE PRE AND POST HANDSHAKE PERIODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Pre-Handshake</th>
<th>Post-Handshake</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Background-Leader</td>
<td>N=7</td>
<td>N=11</td>
<td>N=18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38.9%</td>
<td>61.1%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Background-Political History</td>
<td>N=19</td>
<td>N=14</td>
<td>N=33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>57.6%</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Support</td>
<td>N=54</td>
<td>N=47</td>
<td>N=101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53.5%</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulf War</td>
<td>N=30</td>
<td>N=0</td>
<td>N=30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Jordan</td>
<td>N=18</td>
<td>N=13</td>
<td>N=31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58.1%</td>
<td>41.9%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Syria</td>
<td>N=22</td>
<td>N=11</td>
<td>N=33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with Soviet Union</td>
<td>N=10</td>
<td>N=0</td>
<td>N=10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Settlements</td>
<td>N=34</td>
<td>N=190</td>
<td>N=224</td>
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<td></td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>84.8%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditions for Peace</td>
<td>N=16</td>
<td>N=78</td>
<td>N=94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Accord</td>
<td>N=18</td>
<td>N=132</td>
<td>N=150</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace Negotiations</td>
<td>N=124</td>
<td>N=158</td>
<td>N=282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status of Jerusalem</td>
<td>N=7</td>
<td>N=28</td>
<td>N=31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.6%</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segment</td>
<td>Pre-Handshake</td>
<td>Post-Handshake</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism/Military Operations</td>
<td>N=147 59%</td>
<td>N=102 41%</td>
<td>N=249 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement/Action U.N.</td>
<td>N=16 80%</td>
<td>N=4 20%</td>
<td>N=20 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement/Action U.S.</td>
<td>N=122 58.9%</td>
<td>N=84 41.1%</td>
<td>N=207 100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Statement/Action Israel</td>
<td>N=71 24.1%</td>
<td>N=224 75.9%</td>
<td>N=295 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statement/Action Europe</td>
<td>N=15 83.3%</td>
<td>N=3 16.7%</td>
<td>N=18 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.N. Resolutions</td>
<td>N=39 95.15%</td>
<td>N=2 4.9%</td>
<td>N=41 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>N=5 6.3%</td>
<td>N=74 93.7%</td>
<td>N=79 100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Al Fatah</td>
<td>N=33 58.9%</td>
<td>N=23 41.1%</td>
<td>N=56 100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>P.L.O. Government Initiatives</td>
<td>N=7 4.7%</td>
<td>N=143 95.3%</td>
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<td>Government Initiatives- Israeli Response</td>
<td>N=0 0%</td>
<td>N=30 100%</td>
<td>N=30 100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestinian Self-Rule</td>
<td>N=53 22.6%</td>
<td>N=182 77.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recognition of Israel</td>
<td>N=75 96.2%</td>
<td>N=3 3.8%</td>
<td>N=78 100%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
<td>N=12 30%</td>
<td>N=28 70%</td>
<td>N=40 100%</td>
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## APPENDIX C

### TONE OF ISSUE COVERAGE IN THE PRE AND POST HANDSHAKE PERIODS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>PRE-HANDSHAKE</th>
<th>POST-HANDSHAKE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
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<td>Background of Leader</td>
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<td>Relations with Syria</td>
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<td>Land Settlements</td>
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<td>Conditions for Peace</td>
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<td>Peace Negotiations</td>
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<td>PRE-HANDSHAKE</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
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<td>13.1%</td>
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<td>N=13</td>
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<td>Statement/Action Europe</td>
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<td></td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>64.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hamas</td>
<td>N=1</td>
<td>N=2</td>
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<td>Al-Fatah</td>
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<td>Gov't Initiatives</td>
<td>N=0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israeli Response</td>
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<tr>
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<td>N=12</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>68%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Financial Aid</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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APPENDIX D

LIST OF CODED DESCRIPTORS IN THE NEW YORK TIMES, 1988-1996

Positive Descriptors

Foremost Palestinian leader/ most important leader of the organization

ready to recognize Israel/accepts Israel’s existence/ accepted United Nations resolutions recognizing Israel/ says P.L.O. accepted Israel/ supported and pushed to accept Israel/ announced decision to seek a negotiated peace on the basis of recognition of Israel/ took a different strategy last fall based on a recognition of Israel’s right to exist and renouncing terrorism/ made declarations that the P.L.O. has contended a renunciation of acts of terrorism and an affirmation of Israel’s right to exist/ renounced terrorism and recognized Israel’s existence

understands the limits and dangers of the uprising

accepts principle of exchanging land for peace

might eventually qualify as an acceptable negotiating partner

unambiguous comments/ left little ambiguity about the meaning of his words

personifies Palestinian resilience/ an image, the symbol and the hope/ image as someone devoted entirely to his cause/ the man and the cause became one/ personal and political lives are virtually intertwined as one/ abandoned what he said was a very successful career as a contactor to devote himself fully to the Palestinian revolution/ lifetime of violent struggle for a Palestinian homeland/ married to the Palestinian cause/ image as a man wholly devoted to the cause/ Mr. Palestine/ enduring symbol of Palestinian quest for nationhood/ he is also the flag and the star spangled banner all wrapped into one person/ symbol of the Palestinian cause/ he is the father and mother of Palestinians/ a distant figure for years, revered as the embodiment of their cause/ symbol of Palestinian nationalism/ hero and father of our nation/ built up Palestinian national consciousness/ fashioned a Palestinian homeland

life centres on his work/ 40 years of struggle/ 40 years of working on behalf of the Palestinian cause/ devoted so much of his career to the Palestinian cause

attracts most Palestinians/ attracts rich Palestinians as well as refugee camp dwellers/ remains the only person who commands sufficient allegiance among the Palestinians/ astonishing hold on those men/ remains the undisputed spokesman for the Palestinian cause/ remains the only person with enough political stature to unite his people and the only one willing to try
is the only one who can keep it together at this point

has put together an infrastructure that links Palestinians into a matrix of social and political organizations

his position in Lebanon and with Syrians has improved/ regaining supremacy in embattled Beirut

on record as favouring an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel/ determined to build his Gaza, Jericho rump entity into a Palestinian state that lives in peace and economic cooperative with Israel/ repeated that his intention remains for an independent Palestinian state

has come tantalizingly close to meeting U.N. demands/ repeated his stated willingness to negotiate on basis of U.N. resolutions/ agreed to mount an urgent effort to conclude the transfer of Hebron to the Palestinians and push forward on broader peace/ pledged that the P.L.O would strive for a comprehensive settlement/ commitment to cooperate on security issues with the Israelis government/ expressed support for American efforts to convene a Middle East peace conference/ expressed his support for a peace conference supported by the U.S. and Soviet Union/ reaffirmed his desire to salvage the peace effort/ sent an emotional appeal to save the peace process/ attributed importance to peace efforts/ emerged with smiles and pledges of further cooperation/ address was part of a quickening campaign in recent days to press Israel into resuming the negotiating process/ reiterated that he was prepared to participate in an international peace conference/ hoped for initiatives that might lead to an international conference on Mideast/ statement on peace/ his peace plan/ taken steps toward peace/ talks in English of peace/ spoke positively of peace/ wants to play Middle East role in peace negotiations/ peace moves/ followed peaceful paths/ constructive role in the Mideast peace process/ courage and commitment to peace/ issuing pledges of peace and tolerance/ reaffirmed their commitment to the peace accord/ said he was able to glimpse the first glance of the crescent moon of peace/ he will spell out more clearly than ever his desire to negotiate/ comments reaffirming his commitment to a peaceful process/ expressing a willingness to negotiate peace with Israel/ backs Palestinian-Israeli dialogue/ conducted peace initiative/ emphasized his desire for peace/ called for a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict/ trying to work out a negotiated settlement with Israel/ willing to go hand in hand to the conference table/ called for an immediate and unconditional cease fire and for all parties involved in the conflict to begin negotiations/ insisted that his organization remained committed to a negotiated settlement and that it would cooperate with the Bush administration/ gave Palestinians permission to enter peace negotiations with Israel/ he has done everything possible these last months to promote the peace process/ efforts to advance peace in the Middle East/ he’s explored all the possibilities to make progress toward a total peace settlement/ appealed to the Israelis to make peace/ presses Israel to accept talks/ protesting his desire for peace/ made a dramatic call in an interview on Israeli television Thursday night for Israelis and Palestinians to forge a brave peace/ historic decision to pursue
a negotiated peace/ has decided to make peace/ also agreed to begin a new critical phase of Middle East peace effort/ seemed to go out of his way too reassert his commitment to peace/ clearly asserted he had meant a peaceful crusade

reported approach appeared to be more cautious/ kept a cautious silence since the Likud action strongly criticized the U.S./ adopted a low profile

greets everyone in Hebrew with wishes for a Happy Jewish New Year/ sent his best wishes to Israelis/ wished the Israeli leaders and all my Jewish cousins a happy Jewish New Year

was beaming/ very pleased/ elated/ pleased with his success/ exuberant/ buoyant/ smiling almost giddy/ relishing his moment of acceptance on the White house lawn/ seemed pleased as he left by helicopter

stretched his hands in a victory salute/ smiling broadly and flashing a V sign/ flashing a V for victory sign with his fingers

urged Bush to re-examine U.S. policy toward Israel/ seized upon the occasion to appeal directly to Bush/ asks U.S. to revive talks/ urges U.S. to press Israelis to negotiate now/ appealed to the U.S. and Moscow to use their influence/ called for U.S. intervention today to rescue his negotiations with Israel from stalemate

seemed to appeal for American leadership in returning the Palestinians to their homeland/ counting heavily on the U.S. to help secure a Palestinian homeland

has distanced the mainstream P.L.O. from attack

victorious/ won/ victorious international hero/ achieved a major personal victory/ newest successes/ chalked up a diplomatic gain/ registered a major advance/ marked a milestone in his long march from the “so called” struggle

at the pinnacle of power/ suddenly found himself at the height of his power/ at the pinnacle of his personal power

has become one of the most successful modern leaders

seemed to overcome longstanding opposition inside the P.L.O./ overcame opposition from his extremist wing

is as much a terrorist as George Washington

referred to the right of all parties/ wanted to broadcast to all mankind that his Palestine, is open to all those of goodwill, whatever their religion
effort to fashion a moderate image for the P.L.O./ brooked internal dissent and moved his
group toward moderation/ groped for the middle ground/ presenting himself as a mediator/
new policies of avowed moderation/ appears willing to use negotiations instead of violence/
positions are more moderate than those of some of his rivals/ tried to strike a balance between
moderate and hardliners/ stands at the intersection of the radical and moderate currents within
the Palestinian diaspora/ led mainstream of the Palestinian movement toward moderation and
conciliation/ pursued diplomatic moderation/ moved towards moderation without splitting the
movement/ has significantly moderated his pronouncements in favour of a compromise with
Israel

using richly religious language and quotations

referring to the shared reverence of Muslims and Jews for the Bible

greeted today with a stirring ovation/ frequently applauded by supporters/ praised for overall
tone/ lavishly praised/ elevated/ cheered on by the Israelis and the U.S./ arriving to a
tumultuous welcome/ initiative widely welcomed by political leaders/ a triumphant visit
received warm applause from the audience/ returned yesterday to a hero’s welcome in Tunis/
triumphal return to the territories/ was given a hero’s welcome at the local headquarters/
warmly applauded/ arrived to more enthusiastic welcomes than the Americans/ praised

afforded the treatment reserved by the U.N. for a head of state/ escorted to the podium by the
U.N. chief of protocol/ met by an honour guard at Gaza’s police headquarters/ given a red
carpet reception complete with honour guards and Palestinian bands playing martial themes/
greeted by every speaker as the popularly elected rais or leader/ welcomed by numerous heads
of state/ accorded the status of a head of state/ given a friendly reception by diplomats/
formally received by President Mitterand/ has already met with the heads of a handful of other
western European nations/ greeted by a secretary by a secretary of state at the foreign
ministry/ attended private meetings with Prime Minister John Major and the archbishop of
Canterbury

satisfied the U.S. ’s three part test for substantive dialogue/ accepted the American formula/
fulfilled American conditions/ prepared today to make an unequivocal statement accepting
the American conditions/ strategy is to bring the P.L.O. as close as possible to the American
vision of peace/ grudging fulfilment of American conditions/ coached into saying the words
needed to satisfy longstanding American conditions/ moves seen as a major concession to win
what amounted to U.S. recognition

laughed and joked with reporters/ appeared relaxed, confident and in good humour/ appeared
relaxed and cheerful/ clearly at ease/ with an air of amusement rather than bitterness/ asserted
nonchalantly/ relaxed and ebullient

saw the light
has abided by his renunciation of terrorism/ issued orders that no one is to resort to guns/ would stand by a commitment to resist terrorist acts/ against terrorism/ renewed a commitment to oppose the use of firearms by Palestinians in the 15 month uprising against Israel in the occupied territories/ said no to using arms in the intifada/ intends to carry out those responsibilities against terrorism and violence/demanded a total renunciation of violence and pressed the point by imprisoning hundreds of Hamas militants/ is taking firm measures to curb the major Muslim opposition movements/ ordered his security forces to crack down on the militants/ vowed to end the intifada/ got the Palestine National Council to state explicitly that it rejects terrorism in all its forms/ announced that he had given permanent orders to his public for not to open fire at Israeli soldiers/ called to cease attacks on Israeli outposts/ does not defend terrorism against innocents/ denounced an Iranian leader’s call for the killing of westerners in retaliation for Palestinian deaths in occupied territories/ plan for ending the violence in the occupied territories/ launched a campaign to convince the world that there is now a new, moderate, realistic P.L.O., and organization that renounces terrorism, accepts Israel’s existence and thus constitutes and acceptable partner in negotiations/ pledged to do whatever he could to end attacks against Israeli troops/ has proved he is more serious now about cracking down on violent Islamic radicals/ cracked down on Hamas in Gaza/ given orders to avoid acts of violence and that he would publicly clarify that position/ called for an end to the violence/ called for an end to violence to safeguard the peace process/ quickly denounced the latest atrocity/ deplored the kidnapping/ denounced the attackers/ calling them the enemies of peace/ sent written instructions to Palestinians to stop the violence and follow instructions from Tunis headquarters/ credited with adhering to his commitment renouncing terrorism

played a role in the release of a red cross official/ tried to help in the abortive attempt/ promised to personally intervene in the case

promised to help find private Saadon’s remains

condemned the downing of the plane

listened to advice, did not get provoked by silly questions

popularity remains huge/ power base is still strong/ riding a wave of popularity/ riding high/ new prominence in the movement/ emerged in a strong personal position

seen by Pope

has a great deal of information, a wealth of information he can give us

a negotiating partner considered of critical value by Israel and the U.S.

conciliatory moves/ yielding/ aim seemingly was to appear conciliatory/ policy of compromise/
modified his support for the idea/preference was to compromise, to avoid hard choices, to keep options open/efforts to compromise with Israel on achieving Middle East peace/new more flexible approach to Israel/making concessions to the Israelis and Americans his mission is to convince the members, many of them hard core radicals, to make a conciliatory gesture toward Israel/made a crucial concession/continued to make conciliatory statements about the Middle East peace conference

accepted an invitation to come to the U.S. in April

rehabilitated in the eyes of the U.S./gradual acceptance/legitimate/accepted/accepted by Rabin as being a credible partner/registered a major advance today in his quest for international recognition and respectability

needed

did not oppose Israeli proposals for local elections in the West Bank and Gaza, provided Israel first withdrew from those areas

aware that the time was ripe for trying to operate in America as a legitimate party to the conflict

secured the dialogue with Washington which represents a major political gain for his organization

described the document (PLO charter) using the French word "caduc" which means obsolete or null and void/strongest language he used to date to distance himself from the Charter/called the document null and void

suggested that the phase of discussing elections had ended and that it was time for the U.S. to look at Palestinian idea of holding an international peace conference/repeated demands for an international peace conference/looking for negotiations under U.N. auspices/hedged by saying such a discussion should be held under international auspices/promoted the idea of an international peace conference/planned a continued diplomatic campaign for a Middle East peace conference/no doubt that he wants a conference

publicly urging Palestinians not to kill other Palestinians without permission

his letter was positive, warm and constructive

said he would call a meeting of the Palestine National Council and submit his resignation as chairman if the peace process reached an impasse

colourful

126
world's most accessible public figure

was like a person

Successful engineer

praised as peacemaker/ praised for helping end decades of conflict in the Middle East/
embraced as a peacemaker/ partner in peace making/ partner in peace/ partner/ man of peace
and the only one who can deliver it/ partner in a fragile peace effort

said that the peace process was given new impetus by the session with Mr. Carter

moving closer to President Hussein in an effort to fight off challenges from hard-liners within
his own organization and to enhance his status among Arab leaders

keeping his word/ can be expected to keep his word

he knows that terrorism cannot force concessions from Israel, that to the contrary every
terrorist act strengthens those in Israel who want to keep the occupied territories forever

knows that direct talks with the U.S. are predicated on the P.L.O.'s dissociating itself from
terrorism

arrived with a joint peace plan calling for mediation

not an accessory to aggression but as the avenger of victims

eager to demonstrate that his mediation effort in the Gulf was still alive

said his positions were a master of principle that could not be changed in return for a few
coins or a few petrodollars

eases stand on Kuwait

acknowledged that by siding with the Iraqis, he had cost his organization much financial
support/ acknowledged that his stand has cost Palestinians and his organization dearly/ helped
bring about their ordeal through his support of President Saddam Hussein/ conceded that his
persistence in talking with Israel has cost him dearly/ acknowledged that the P.L.O. was
passing through a critical period

ready to coordinate in any effort to achieve peace with King Hussein

open minded about the criticism
only leader who could legitimatize a deal between Palestinians and Israel/ only leader with sufficient credibility

frequently praised President Bush and Secretary Baker for their efforts to get peace process moving/ praised the Bush administration for its efforts to bring peace in the Middle East and to change Israel’s attitude toward the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip

is a shrewd tactician

careful to express his desire to overcome differences

praised a letter he received from 28 members of the Israeli Parliament expressing a desire for peace

remains committed to controlling the peace and substance of negotiations

not wanting to be blamed for scuttling the process

great balancer/ tended not to pull sharply in any one direction

charismatic leader

whose personal status within the P.L.O. has risen considerable during the air plane-crash crisis/ strengthened by the air plane episode

only Arafat has the power to pick a new generation of leaders initiate them and protect them

his choices are accepted by the Palestinians inside the Israeli occupied territories

his critics have shrunken considerably

criticized the fundamentalist movement

warned the group of unspecified retaliation if its acts of violence were to continue

acknowledged the dimension of the fundamentalist Palestinian challenge to his organization

reiterated his demand that the U.S. resume direct contacts with his organization

praised for helping to convince his fellow Palestinians that the time had come to begin talking again

gone too far, especially by agreeing to discuss the status of Jerusalem/ appeared too willing
to grant new concessions concerning the 5 year interim self-rule offered to the Palestinians by Israel/ accuse him of making new concessions to Israel without consulting them/ accused of going beyond authorized P.L.O. policy/ charged with being too willing to strike deals

seems about to achieve his goal of Israel's recognition of the P.L.O. as representing the Palestinians

has said he would put aside for now Palestinian claims to East Jerusalem and demands for an immediate Israeli pullout from the rest of the West Bank

faces sharp dissension within his ranks and has decided that if he does not come to terms with Israel now, he may never get a foothold for his desired state

presented the agreement as part of a long, hard road to peace

has taken a risk greater than that of Egyptian President Sadat/ has taken an enormous risk

struggled today to rally his mainstream Fatah movement behind proposals for peace with Israel

expected to secure the backing of Al-Fatah, the most moderate group in the organization

said today that he had won the support of his mainstream Fatah movement for a proposed peace agreement with Israel

struck a resolutely optimistic tone/ appeared confident/ optimistic/ provided no information to justify his public optimism/ said today he was optimistic about prospects for a political solution to the Persian Gulf crisis

seemed determined to suggest that peace is breaking out on all fronts

seeks to conclude pact

appeared to embark on a kind of public campaign suggesting that the P.L.O. cannot go as fast as some Israelis might like in renouncing its past

determination to reach an agreement/ persistent/ determination to push his [peace] plan forward/ determined

closed his letter with the word sincerely

brought prestige to an organization that Washington refused to deal with for years/ leading Arab figure
latest exploit has been to strike a deal with Israel that has revived his bankrupt, nearly defunct P.L.O.

incredible search for prestige and for recognition of an organization that Washington refused to deal with for years

secret of his success remains as always his fine sense of what his people want/ rarely went against the instincts of most Palestinians

cultivates personal loyalties

known to astonish visitors with his memory of previous encounters

always speaks of the P.L.O. as a democratic organization

does allow a margin of freedom

he let dissenters vent all their poison against him

among all Palestinian leaders, by far the one who has a reputation for the greatest personal integrity/ managed to convey to his estimated five million compatriots the notion that while he is far from perfect he is unequivocally devoted to fight for their cause

has never been known to have a good time, go to party or do anything but work/ lived with excessive frugality/ lives simply/ office simply decorated

followers admire him particularly for preventing Arab countries from trying to control and manipulate Palestinians

expressed hope that an agreement with Israel would bring peace to the Middle East

smiled broadly as he greeted about 70 P.L.O. officials, Arab ambassadors and Palestinian - American with kisses on both cheeks/ greeted a group of Islamic clerics, kissing and hugging them

praised the peace agreement before leaving Tunis

met with former president Jimmy Carter

received a visit from former president George Bush

reached out his hand first/ extended his hand
face was painted throughout with the broad smile of a man living a dream

stressed that Palestinian self determination should not come at the expense of Israeli security/ essentially acknowledged that he understood that unless Israel felt secure, the troops would not withdraw/ expressed sensitivity to Israeli security concerns/ told the Israelis that while his focus was on widening Palestinian Authority, we can understand your needs for security

spontaneously appeared on a stairway landing at his hotel to address a crowd of about 300 wildly cheering supporters/ brings joy and confusion to a hotel

this time he said, “I am coming with two olive branches

pleased with the ring of his phrase making

the centre of attention and has embraced his new role with exuberance

received a precession of visitors

grinned for cameras

his thoughts afterward kept returning to the electric moment when he touched Mr. Rabin’s hand in a handshake of peace

during the ceremony, he put out his hand to Mr. Rabin not once, but twice and shook hands with Mr. Clinton several times

tried to shake hands with as many people as he could/ shook hands

sees his visit to the U.S. as an opportunity to make peace not only with Israel, but also with American Jews many of whom have regarded him with loathing and distrust and branded him an unreconstructed terrorist

has received more compliments on his willingness to make peace than cash for him to construct a Palestinian state

displayed a wit that at times won over his audience/ was charming and engaging/ put on a charm offensive that would make him the envy of many an American Presidential candidate

stressed the importance of stability in a region that still has the world’s largest oil reserves

first time in 19 years that the P.L.O. chairman had set foot inside the U.N. headquarters

stressed the importance of stability in a region that still has the world’s largest oil reserves
pledged to the Arab League ministers whose countries shelter some three million Palestinian refugees that Palestinians who fled after 1967 would eventually be allowed to return home

received a polite but restrained reception from the foreign ministers

taught the other speakers a lesson in oratorical delivery/ his voice rang out/ his pronunciation sounded lyrical

denounced the killings of two Hamas members

taken firm command of the peace talks with Israel

exhilarating

condemned the recent killings of an Israeli settler by allies in his P.L.O./ first public denunciating of a lethal attack on an Israeli by Palestinian nationalists

did what was minimally needed/ said the words he was supposed to say today

using financial crisis to eliminate, marginalize and cut down many of those who are still wedded to the revolutionary dream

smiled

gesture of friendship

presented Mr. Christopher with a wooden box inlaid with mother of pearl and inscribed with the Lord's prayer

he has named a team to work with the Pentagon on American aid for the Palestinian police force, as requested by Mr. Christopher

is sanguine on Mideast peace

basking in the warmth of his first official visit to Britain/ toast of London

said he hoped he and Mr. Rabin would overcome all the problems which have arisen

clearly revelled in his new status as international statesmen and peacemaker

dogged at every turn by photographers who seem to chase him as if he were a member of the royal family
received by prominent British Jews
greeted well wishers at an Egyptian embassy reception

sitting across the table from two prominent British Jews, Mr. Arafat referred to them our cousins

enduring leader of the P.L.O.

has amazing stamina/ an amazing ability to work

very courteous and accommodating/ very congenial/ was described by other guests as the very soul of geniality and bonhomme/ was very polite

he’s able to get along with people

agreed that progress had been made toward ending an impasse that has contribute to dwindling support for the accord

said only that he hoped an agreement could be reached

said Arabs and Israelis were beginning a new relationship far away from violence, terrorism and wars, something we can be proud of and we can offer to our new future generations

pointedly took Mr. Peres’s hand to mount the podium

joined the audiences in applauding

supreme effort to bring our two people together in the domain of peace and hope

very constructive attitude

thanked

very much in command, is in charge, and is aware of all details of the talks

used the forum to emphasize to hundreds of international business executives that economic development is the key to success of any accord

initialled the understanding with Foreign minister Shimon Peres

struggling to keep the rancorous P.L.O. from disintegrating even before it takes control of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank town of Jericho/ spoke of his difficulties as he sat, well
after midnight/ what seemed to bother Mr. Arafat most was the struggle to keep the Palestinian movement from tearing itself apart

finds young people restful and inspiring

has adopted 26 children caught in the decades of war in the Mideast

eating off a plastic plate surrounded by noisy children/ ate a chicken leg with his fingers/ often slipped off without fanfare to Palestinian orphanages and schools/ twice in the last week he has shown up at the school for Iftar, the traditional evening meal

described the killings as a true blow to the peace process

asked the U.N. Security Council to meet in urgent session to create an international force to protect Palestinians

left the door open for resuming peace talks with Israel

indispensable figure

looked to for final decisions

seemed at the time the only capable and credible leader of his dispersed people

man of genius

had a certain kind of charisma

his people cared for him and loved him

sincere in telling Washington he wants to get back to the bargaining table/ wants to complete arrangements for the beginning of Palestinian self rule

has plenty of time to rebound before the Palestinian election

said in an interview that the terms of an Israeli troop withdrawal from parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip may be settled sometime in the next few weeks

said that the months of P.L.O. -Israeli negotiations that have been conducted cannot be swept away

good administrator
faced down an emotional revolt on the Palestinian side

departed from his prepared text to say in Arabic that violence strikes at the heart of the peace process

expressed his regret

unusually upbeat

saying for the first time in several weeks that he believed an agreement would be obtainable soon

master of political pyrotechnics

described the accord as a true beginning to complete the march of peace, guarantee the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and realize justice and equality

transforming him from a guerrilla leader who often lived in secrecy to a civil administrator

conducting himself more and more like a head of state

was the most influential man in Lebanon

assuming influence over every day affairs in West Bank town of Jericho

revolutionary phrase maker or co-architect of a historic compromise with Israel

beginning to learn

did not want to interfere with Jewish Sabbath/ a way to show sensitivity to Jewish concerns/
sought to allay Israeli concerns

heralded as the miracle maker, the teacher, the fighter

man coming from the outside to lead them

expected to fix the sewers, create jobs, liberate some 5,000 remaining Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails and impose peace

said he would pray in Jerusalem and widen Palestinian autonomy

said he was committed to continuing to work for peace and that opponents will have to find nonviolent ways of obstructing it or risk tussling with the police

135
placated the fundamentalists

chose to approach Hamas and his other fundamentalist critics with an olive branch

well informed of conditions here during his years of exile

knelt to kiss the ground as he arrived yesterday in Gaza/ made his heralded return to the Gaza/ knelt after crossing the border from Egypt

fiery, flawed and indomitable symbol of the Palestinian struggle for a homeland

wasted not time presenting himself to his people as a prodigal son

used his first speech on Palestinian soil in decades to reach out to almost everyone

seemed intent on avoiding fierce language that might incite the crowd/ largely sticking to noninflammatory language/ did not use the word jihad/ did not even repeat his often stated call for Jerusalem to be the capital of his hoped for independent state

received with remarkable equanimity/ Israelis seem to accept Mr. Arafat’s trip with equanimity

sought to assure welcoming but wary Palestinians that he could not only rally them from afar but also govern them from up close

paid homage to them in a forceful speech

also appealed to Gaza’s many fervent Muslims with verses form the Koran and calls of God is great

used his first full day in Gaza to consolidate his hold on the Palestinian National Authority/ moved quickly to affirm his control of the fledgling Palestinian self-rule

asked for help from religious and secular opponents

informed aides that it was time for belt tightening and self reliance

has fired the imagination of many Palestinians by his long awaited return to territories

has carefully touched important political bases

visiting refugee camps as a reminder that the issue of Palestinian refugees is alive/ rode through the mean streets of his hoped starved refugee camp
touring prison cells/ visited the wounded at Al Shifa hospital/ talking to people crippled/ blowing kisses to children and dedicating factories

is ready to knuckle down and make Palestinian self government work/ genuinely wants to make a success of Palestinian self-rule/ appealed to friends and foes alike to help him make the new Palestinian self-rule work

improving his appeal to Israelis

insisted repeatedly that he will abide by his agreement with Israel

recited an oath to be faithful to the homeland

placed a hand on both a Koran and a brass covered Bible/ placed his right hand on the Koran

said there would be free, honest, and democratic elections as quickly as possible/ is determined to have elections as soon as possible

acknowledged the demand by western donors who want more government structures in place

described the talks as very positive

image transformed from man leading a battle of arms to one leading a peaceful struggle for a settlement with Israel

talked directly to his audience, not above their heads

reached out for support/ asked for patience/ urged patience

described his accord with Israel as the best agreement we could get in the worst possible situation/ has rightly concluded that there is more gain for Palestinians in unglamorous compromise/ took the deal Rabin offered because it was the last, best one he could hope for

he skirted his much promised vow to pray in Jerusalem, accepting the Israeli view that at this point it would be far too inflammatory

decision to make peace with Israel that paved the way for this Israeli- Jordanian rapprochement

likes to tell interviewers that the Palestinian state he envisions will not resemble the stifling autocracies so common in the Arab world

had promised to be more open in explaining how the P.L.O. was spending money
exploits his own weakness by masterly maddening brinkmanship

has won the Nobel Peace Prize/holder of a Nobel Peace Prize/ was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize

clearly felt he had to show Israel and the U.S. that he was taking action in an abduction that he deplored/biggest test to prove that he could keep his commitment to control anti-Israeli attackers

ordered the mass arrests/arrested Hamas members/ has arrested almost all the suspects Israel considers most dangerous

angrily warning Hamas militants in a speech that he would not allow any defiance

he put his reputation and life on the line to work for a peaceful resolution

is the first Palestinian in history to have the realistic right to say he will bring about an independent Palestinian state

Israeli approval of Palestinian leader for getting tough

no longer working in the blood and victory line

he was authority

talked of work to be done, of heavy burdens to be shouldered, of shared responsibility

he is smart enough

took on responsibility for a deeply sick society

promise to disarm the intifada gunmen

has risen form the ashes of self immolation

remains infinitely preferable to the alternative of Hamas

took very courageous steps to make the peace process possible

made clear to those Palestinian militants who carry out terrorists acts that only the political organization which governs in his name is in charge

made it clear that he understands the responsibilities and commitments that he has undertaken
in the Declaration of Principles
grizzled guerrilla leader turned administrator

said today that he could finally gaze into the eyes of the fallen and say their sacrifices were worthwhile

said he recognized that the prize was not so much for what had been accomplished but what lay ahead to encourage us to continue a road which we have started

called for the peace negotiations to be accelerated, for donor countries to make good on their pledges of financial aid

signalled clearly that he wanted to avoid a showdown over settlements

his eye instead was on sustaining talks intended to give him day to day control over the entire West Bank

compelling interest in not letting terrorists who reject all compromise destroy that deal

left a meeting today with P.M. Rabin at Gaza’s northern edge feeling that he had accomplished something

did not call for an end to negotiations with Israelis

now demands that Israel stop stalling and start pulling out forces

invested so much in negotiations

more congenial than confrontational

urged Mr. Rabin to do more to stop militant violence

would pay the price in popularity for the arrests

told reporters Israel should not use its security concerns as an excuse to slow peace negotiations

tried to affirm his control

decided it was time to get tough/ Carried out his most intense crackdown to date

wary of a full scale confrontation that might risk civil war
many remarkable qualities

he is open minded

he is tenacious

when he believes in an idea, he sticks to it in the face of any opposition and implements it

has been successful in recent efforts to rein in Islamic militants

is not another pretty face

said that the Palestinian cause cannot afford even a few minutes wasted on individual pampering

gimmicks like these helped Arafat get through to the popular consciousness

has a foot on the road to a Palestinian state

exhorts his followers with passion

recovering even from self-inflicted political wounds

have stopped ridiculing Arafat

has thus demanded that Israel commit to a firm schedule on every aspect of the transfer

has begun making progress in his leadership after a shaky start

given credit for actually living in Gaza, and for bringing a modicum of security

controls most of the arms in Gaza

will win when elections are finally held

expressed the hope that the coming new year would be a time of real peace between people of the area

escorts P.M. Rabin of Israel into the White House for the signing

was openly relishing the white House ceremonies which grew out of marathon and tempestuous negotiations, demonstrates the irreversibility of the peace process
called the reconciliation the peace of the brave
turned the P.L.O. from a running feud into a near state

has won from the Israelis most of the conditions of independence

has given up virtually nothing for the gains he won for Palestinians

was reportedly prepared to release Hamas leaders and to give the movement greater leeway
in forming parties and publishing newspapers

lifted the ban on the Hamas newspaper in Gaza

emphasizing that the Palestinian people maintained an irreversible commitment to peace with
Israel

in his 1974 speech, he called for the creation of one state in Palestine that would include
Muslims, Jews, and Christians

was the invited guest of prominent American Jewish leaders

enhanced stature

he wished to avoid inflaming passions

expressed shock and sorrow at his (Rabin's) death

ordered Palestinian security forces to ban Islamic fundamentalists from any public gloating
over the death of the Israeli P.M.

told news agencies they should ignore comments hostile to Mr. Rabin to avoid inflaming
sentiments against Palestinian in Israel

paid condolences call to Leah Rabin/ first to pay a call after the funeral/ expressed his
condolences/ insisted on personally paying his condolences

exhorted Palestinians to take part in the elections

inspired a festive spirit not seen in years in a city that once was the scene of daily street battles

concluded with a declaration that marked an unusual public recognition of the sanctity of
Palestine also to Jews

speech touched on the themes he has raised at earlier Palestinian rallies, pledged to win the
freedom of prisoners held by Israel, hailing the martyrs who died fighting the Israeli occupation and affirming the goal of entering Arab Jerusalem and building an independent state

reiterated the themes of peace and harmony

obviously aware that much of the world would be tuned in and that he would have a rare opportunity to project himself as a man of peace, tolerance and statesmanship/ a chance for Mr. Arafat to demonstrate tolerance and orderly authority to a sceptical world two days after the Israeli army pulled out

he has gone to considerable lengths to reassure the Palestinian Christians

relaxed, guaranteed a large victory

undisputed leader, chosen by his people/ legitimate representative of a self ruled people

facing only token opposition

told foreign officials he did not intend to attack leaders or institutions of Hamas not linked to the armed wing

has made extensive efforts to strike a deal with the political forces of the movement, whose leaders have said they have no link to the armed militants

he is trying to co-opt Hamas's political faction to tame it into a loyal opposition/ he has hoped to move Hamas from terror, to the politics of the new Palestinian entity

had been getting results

fears polarizing his society

proclaimed the birth of a new democracy in the Middle East

struggled bravely to put the best face on the day

watched proudly as an elected and legitimate council of his people took the oath of office

called on Israel, the U.S. and other countries to convene a high level meeting on methods of confronting terrorism as a regional and international phenomenon

struggled not to let the crisis undermine his authority
staged interview to bolster Peres' made a number of gestures intended to bolster the chances of Shimon Peres/ openly advocated the election of a new Government headed by Shimon Peres, the Labour Party leader

an attempt to give Muslims a channel of political expression other than Hamas and to demonstrate that his crackdown on Hamas is not a general war on Islamic activities

hoped to demonstrate to Israel that his general strategy of co-opting moderate elements of the Islamic movement and isolating the armed wings is bearing fruit

his campaign themes of peace and security is expounded

impassioned opening speech

neatly barbered

traversed the path from guerrilla leader to peacemaker/ transformation from sponsor of terrorism to proponent of peace

extraordinary symbolic transformation for a man who once wore his pistol to the U.N. and led an umbrella movement responsible for the deaths of hundreds

met his promise to remove any reference to armed struggle and the destruction of Israel from the Charter of the P.L.O./ kept the commitment/ has thus far largely lived up to his commitment to turn away from implacable opposition to Israel and move toward reconciliation and peace

deserves the economic development assistance that he has been promised

must be given credit for winning a reasonably democratic election

demanded that Mr. Netanyahu abide by the peace agreement/ said today that the new Israeli government’s first step should be to fulfill what was promised

in a stronger position

in full control of a large and efficient security apparatus

consolidated his authoritarian rule in a shortsighted effort to insure Israel’s security

an effective interlocutor

has begun an aggressive campaign to gather support both within and outside Israel
directly confronted an Israeli government with which he hopes to revive stalled peace talks has become increasingly assertive deliberately kept his public show of anger within bounds delighted to show the world that the new Israeli government had recognized his importance has avoided crossing the fine line that separates vicious politics from civil war strengthened by the confrontation since his bargaining position against Mr. Netanyahu appeared strengthened and his security forces had taken sides with the people orders appeared to be quieting the situation agreed today to go to Washington this week to seek ways out of a confrontation/ recommitted himself to settling their differences showed he was able to stop the warfare on command could not refuse an invitation by Americans that could to some degree, secure his own future friend showed strength by attending did not order his men to shoot agreed that the armed clashes had been a disaster that cannot happen again praised Mr. Chirac in glowing terms helped raise money for two hospitals in the Gaza Strip and West Bank/ spoke in the evening at a Palestinian fund raiser sincere reasonable leader knows that he must end his pariah status among the winners of the Gulf War if he is to survive politically presented Mr. Rabin with a centuries old Torah from Yemen
suggests he is ready to drop previous insistence that Israel withdraw its occupying forces in the West Bank before elections/ will accept a gradual withdrawal but wants a timetable

is keeping his promise not to attack Israelis and therefore can be trusted as a negotiating partner

did not wear a gun holster

is high on the Bush administration

is trying as hard as he can

vowed to be faithful to the homeland

expressed regret at the fatal shooting of a Jewish settler

his decision has cast him in the supremely unlikely role of an American and Israeli backed symbol of Palestinian moderation and a bulwark against the extremists of Hamas

clever diplomacy

well aware of the risks

is a faded though enduring national symbol to most Palestinians

pledged today to convene the Palestinian parliament in exile to eliminate sections of the Palestinian charter that call for the destruction of Israel/ said the P.L.O.'s policy making body, would meet to challenge the organization's charter, which calls for Israel's destruction

in a rare departure from his constant criticism of American support of Israel

failures are not necessarily his fault and his shortcomings are the understandable mistakes of a man trying his best

irreplaceable

uncanny ability to turn failures into moral victories, to elicit sympathy from ordinary Palestinians who see his predicament as their own

a victim like other Palestinians

wields real power in the Gaza Strip and West Bank town of Jericho
role as a stubble-bearded revolutionary, wandering the world in a uniform and checkered headscarf to promote his people's cause

has continued to attend session after session of the council, bolstering its legitimacy and self confidence even as he struggles with it

Said his first contact with President Clinton was positive

Neutral Descriptors

P.L.O. chairman/ Mr./ Palestinian leader/ leader of Palestinian people/ leader/ P.L.O. chief/
designated spokesman for the P.L.O./ leader of the Palestinian movement/ political leader/
head of the P.L.O./ founder and leader of Al Fatah (largest Palestinian guerrilla faction)/
organization's chief/ head of the P.L.O.

Palestinian

believes Palestinian government in exile would strengthen the P.L.O.'s claim to represent the region’s five million Palestinians and counter U.S. opposition to dealing with the P.L.O./ expressed support to set up a government in exile

Acknowledged dissent within the P.L.O. over the establishment of a government in exile

has offered to accept U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, if America accepts principle of Palestinian self-rule/ said the talks should be based on assurance of a Palestinian right to self-determination/ supported self-determination

he is not without blame but wants to make peace with Israel/ though far from perfect, represents one of the best available investments in Mideast peace

complained that the U.S. wanted the Arabs to speak for Palestinians

spoke mainly in English, slipping occasionally into Arabic/ speaking in English/ English is good, if a bit literal/ improved his English

sounded surprised

still ambivalent about the strategy of peace

objected to the words: “bus attack”

oversized reading glasses/ peering through thick glasses
appears serene, almost bookish, a far cry from the fearsome image of the leader of the P.L.O./ appeared serene but somewhat despondent

skirting the forces battling him/ facing challenges to leadership/ things have been far from rosy for Arafat/ running into fierce opposition/ strains on leadership/ faces a major threat to his leadership from militant Muslim groups/ being torn more than ever by conflicting demands/ on tightrope/ pushed into a dangerous corner/ his political future on the line/ does not feel strong enough with the P.L.O./ embattled leader/ encountering bitter opposition/ engaged in a tense battle for his own survival as leader of the opposition/ leadership has come under challenge from militant Muslims/ must contend with considerable opposition from other extremist groups/ standing will be seriously damaged/ fundamentalists are eroding his authority/ his leadership is being challenged in the occupied territories by factions that take a far harder line/ under attack from Palestinian hardliners/ fears a challenge to his authority/ saw the latest incident as a direct challenge/ asserted that they had usurped his role by inviting King Hussein to Jerusalem/ walks a tight rope/ he has some internal opposition and even more dangerous external opposition from Hamas/ faced his most critical test as leader of the Palestinians/ hamstrung by internal constraints/ challenged

in a difficult position/ in dire political straits/ is in a dilemma/ is going to pay the price for that/ looming problems/ has legislative problems

balding

notoriety

asserted that the P.L.O. could fill the void left by Jordan

dressed in a khaki uniform and wearing a pistol/ wearing a checkered headdress and khaki paramilitary uniform/ clad in customary checkered headdress and fatigues/ freedom fighter’s pistol/ wore an Arab headdress and a green military tunic/ dressed in olive drab fatigues, checkered kaffiyeh, a magnum strapped to his hip, three days’ worth of stubble on his face/ was bareheaded and wore his usual checkered Palestinian scarf, tucked into his shirt inside a brown combat jacket/ his checkered headdress is carefully made to peak and is then draped over his right shoulder so that in profile it outlines the map of Palestine/ always wears an army uniform/ emerged wearing an olive military dress jacket and trousers, a tan open collared shirt and his trade mark black and white keffiyeh and Ascot, no pistol was visible/ wearing an olive military uniform and his checkered headdress

denies the charge/ denied assertions/ denied that he had intended to threaten Mr. Freij/ [issued a] limited denial

no retraction from Arafat on remarks about Mr. Assad

147
the Fatah movement is his power base

stunned by King's move and uncertain of what to do next/ questioned Jordan's motives

he distanced himself from the Seaborne raid without condemning it

expressed the belief that the Arab world would soon come to see that a comprehensive peace without Jordan is impossible

refused to say whether he supported the formation of a Palestinian government in exile

voluble

enjoyed the stunned silence his comments brought

faces a challenge reminiscent of the one faced by David Ben-Gurion

displayed more taste for personal survival than for action in his people's best interest/ master of survival/ canny survivor/ has an extraordinary ability to survive the messes he makes/ is courting hazards as extreme as any in a career marked by conspicuous ability to invite, then survive disaster/ shown extraordinary resilience/ called him the cat with nine lives/ has made a profession of rising from the ashes of miscalculation and defeat/ has survived crises, setbacks and challenges to his leadership/ survivor/ has in his past overcome serious challenges to his leadership/ faced a challenge in trying to maintain his own leadership/ The man who survived a civil war in Jordan ... several assassination attempts, a plane crash, and countless bad decisions of his own will be standing with President Clinton and P.M. Yitzhak Rabin of Israel on the White House lawn/ a non pareil survivor

usually travels by private plane with a party of 20 advisers and bodyguards/ under heavy security/ carried both his usual sidearm and an Italian submarine gun/ obsessive about security/ taking steps to achieve a closer central supervision of the innumerable Security and intelligence organizations/ has enough trouble protecting his own skin from terrorists/ wants all his security and police people firmly in place before he lands/ compact black machine gun tucked behind his desk/ surrounded by his customary retinue of bodyguards/ entered the mosque surrounded by bodyguards/ remarkable ability to take care of his personal security/ keeps departure time, routing and sometimes destination strictly to himself/ always moves without warning/ never reveals his moves before hand/ rarely sleeps in the same bed 2 nights in a row/ sleeps in cars parked in empty lots guarded by his personal security guards/ is known to meet daily with his security leaders and to maintain surveillance on all Mosques and political gatherings

is a real target of assassination

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urged the U.S. to hold Israel to same standards as it does the P.L.O./ consistently held the view that the U.S. can order Israel to be more pliable

seemingly close to oblivion in 1982

will reemerge

knows how to decode his points

asserted that the U.S. had agreed to grant him a visa

making him appear a champion of free speech

insisting he was not engaged in a propaganda game or public relations exercise

repeated some matters must be left vague to serve as bargaining chips

did not repeat his usual distinction between terrorism and acts committed justifiable to gain national independence

shaken by continuing violence

the big man

nonsmoking, nondrinking and wifeless/ unmarried/ does not drink or smoke

drinks his milk

ignores the horseplay of his guards in the back of the plane

he looks more the harassed Arab businessman than the grinning terrorist of the caricatures

complicated and contradictory role as head of the Palestinian movement

part symbol/ part actor/ consummate actor/ part statesman/ head of state/ statesman/ showman/ flair for theatrics and costume/ grandiose schemes/ posturing/ symbolism still seems to matter more to him than the nuts and bolts of governance/ example of grandstanding/ seemed to be posturing/ more concerned with ceremony than substance

consensus builder and a prisoner of consensus/ ability to bridge the various conflicting factions that make-up the P.L.O. -it is both the genius and at the same time a critical weakness/ his very weakness is his strength/ made a virtue of weakness
plays a dual role symbol of the uprising and instrument of its youthful impatience
shuttles from capital to capital/ transient life/ unsettled
tribal leader
godfather
he says he cannot be held responsible for all the Palestinians in the world/ cannot exercise absolute control over all the fanatics in his organization/ does not control all Palestinian groups/ could not control Palestinian militants/ may not have total control over everyone who acts in the name of Fatah/ cannot control most of the 30 organizations
insists on the same breakfast every morning
announced the creation of a nominally independent but largely symbolic Palestinian state/ proclaimed the Palestinian state
saved by the intifada
did not expect anymore/ no sign of disappointment
wants the world to credit his new peace stance
sometimes took credit and sometimes blamed P.L.O. groups he said he could not control
it would seem contradictory for Arafat to order a terrorist operation so soon after winning respectability
transformed the playing field
born in 1929 in Cairo
student leader in Cairo among Palestinians/ student at Cairo University
in the Muslim brotherhood
would visit the U.S. only at the invitation of officials in Washington
remarks represent his own opinions, not P.L.O. policy
taken in an armour plated limousine bearing the Palestinian flag
said he would go further only when the profile of a peace accord with Israel begins to emerge visit both exhilarating and difficult

repaid president Mitterand for the politically lavish gift of an official visit to France refused any further explanation until there is an international peace conference offering glimpses of possible movement

wears a shoulder patch showing the map of the whole of Palestine including Israel

strategy given full endorsement

insisted that elections in occupied territories be held under international supervision and after Israel's military withdrawal/ set conditions for Palestinian-Israeli talks on voting in occupied territories

said the American -P.L.O. dialogue had accomplished little and could go on only if more substantive matters were discussed

expressed skepticism about the possibility of a change in Israel's attitudes

spoke in Arabic

disappointed with the U.S.

reiterated that the uprising against Israeli occupation has begun a new stage in the Palestinian campaign for self determination

shifted position and approved Cairo's proposal for a direct discussion between Israelis and Palestinians to negotiate a settlement

a dramatic gesture that attracts attention just as the U.S. is insisting that the P.L.O. can have no public role in Israeli- Palestinian talks

expressed the fear that the Soviet Jews would displace Palestinians/ has said recently that Mr. Shamir's presence in power and the possibility of thousands of Soviet Jews resettling in occupied Arab land could lead to war/ objecting to the settlements of Soviet Jewish immigrants in West Bank and Gaza

politician
was already a millionaire contractor in Kuwait before giving up a rewarding career to work on behalf of the P.L.O.

fighting a unique form of colonialism

hugged and kissed the black nationalist leader/ hugged and kissed him some more/ leisurely made his way down row, embracing various African heads of state in bear hugs along the way

has agreed to proposed negotiations with Israel as long as P.L.O. nominates the delegates

accused Mr. Assad of encouraging breakaway movements within the P.L.O./ had a falling out with President Assad

move to seek an American entry visa to address the security council/ seriously considering applying for a visa/ seriously considering applying to the U.S. for a visa/ seriously considering coming to New York

urged the U.N. Security Council today to send a new international force to the Israel occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip to protect Palestinians and pave the way for eventual Israeli withdrawal

asked the Council to order Israel to halt all new Jewish settlement in the territories

said today that the P.L.O. was not responsible for the Seaborne guerrilla raid against Israel and had no connection with it

took diplomatic risks in not punishing Abul Abbas

could not have met the American demands without losing the support of an increasingly militant constituency in the occupied territories/ peace plan never offered him enough to justify the personal political risks of appearing to give in to American dictates

only by being all things to all people can he hold together an organization that includes so many competing political forces

did not clearly back Iraq in the Arab League

evicted followers of rival leader Abu Nidal from the main Palestinian refugee camp in South Lebanon

not invited

took a middle course and was attacked by everyone/ has been condemned here for his efforts
to build alliances with moderate Arab nations

said that based on what he knows about the Iraqi armed forces, a war would be so devastating that it would last a long time, cause tens of thousands of casualties and leave the region in economic and political instability/ added that there was no alternative but a peaceful solution because a war would be a disaster for everyone/ said that given the ominous consequences of a war, there was little choice but to avoid one

dismissed talk by his Arab opponents about putting pressure on the P.L.O. to remove him as a leader of the organization

faint smile

argued that a war would produce such huge casualties among Arabs in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, that it would lead to the overthrow of many an Arab government

said Iraqi troops could withstand an assault and fight on for many months perhaps as long as three years

placed the largest responsibility for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on the Kuwait ruling family/ said that in the days before the invasion, he repeatedly urged the Emir of Kuwait to show more flexibility towards Iraq’s demands that Baghdad’s 11 billion debt to Kuwait be forgiven/
moment of self-criticism

accused Mr. Assad of encouraging breakaway movements within the P.L.O/ had a falling out with President Assad

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only by being all things to all people can he hold together an organization that includes so many competing political forces

did not clearly back Iraq in the Arab League

said the passage last month of a Security Council resolution calling for the protection of Palestinians in the occupied territories was “not enough and was accepted by the U.S. only to keep together its alliance with Arab states opposing Iraq

evicted followers of rival leader Abu Nidal from the main Palestinian refugee camp in South Lebanon

vowed today that there could be no peace without Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip

rejected assertions that there was widespread unhappiness within and outside his organization with his stance on the war and the quality of his leadership

seemed at times to sink into despair

apparently fearful that current efforts to resolve the Palestinian issue through negotiation would fail/ fears of losing their support and undermining his own position/ fears irrelevance

seemed particularly infuriated by what he termed the “double standard” applied to him

called upon the Bush administration to produce specific proposals for resolving the Palestinian- Israeli conflict

was not available for an interview

escaped injury

appears to be insisting that Palestinians from East Jerusalem must be included in Palestinian delegation

insists P.L.O. must have a role in a negotiating process/ asserted only the P.L.O. was authorized to speak for the Palestinians

said yesterday that the U.S. must ask him to choose the Palestinian delegation for a Middle
East Peace conference

said he preferred to work throughout the night/ said he usually works until dawn/ starts work at 10am and finishes a little before dawn/ whose habit is to hold important meetings past midnight

prays before sleeping some hours

expressed frustration that the U.S. would not deal directly with him

attempting to demonstrate what Czechoslovakia’s President Vaclav Havel has called the power of the powerless

wants to show these Palestinians that he is not inert or irrelevant, that he is trying to get the most of whatever leverage he has

desperately needs the support of the sceptical

has congratulated President Mikhail Gorbachev on his return to power

offered no specific concessions to meet Israeli demands

Told a news conference that the resignation of Abu Abbas met U.S. conditions for a resumption of the dialogue cut off last year

said the conditions set down for the convening of a peace conference were unacceptable but refused to say whether the conditions if adhered to would result in a P.L.O. condemnation of the U.S. brokered meeting

while calling for an end to the building of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, did not demand a freeze on the construction of settlements as a precondition for any conference

wily

not reconciled to a new status as chairman emeritus of the Palestinian revolution

has married

62 years old

Sunni Muslim

says tape about Jews was doctored
style questioned, political judgement, financial management

ordered all organizations around the world to slash spending by 35%

built the P.L.O. into a major factor in Middle Eastern politics

found alive

spends close to 80% of his time flying from one country to another

wrapping up a trip that had taken him to Sudan and finally to Libya to visit Palestinian guerrillas training

will have at least an emotional edge over his adversaries and critics

man whose moment in history has passed but who may still have one last role to play

essentially a man who has been overtaken by the end of the Cold War

using disparate instruments

remains preoccupied with the inter Arab order and the Palestinian guerrilla movement

viewed as enemy and saviour of the Palestinian people

in good health

brush with death/ narrowly escaped death

commander in chief

suffered head injuries in plane crash/ bruised but not seriously injured/ bruised and bandaged

expected to recover completely/ would suffer no lasting effects from the cerebral blood clot

accused Israeli secret service

remained in charge despite his illness and unhappiness with him among many Palestinians in the territories

wants the U.S. to end its own refusal to deal openly with his group

said that there was no alternative to direct P.L.O. participation
backed off from a comment made Monday that there had been direct meeting in Washington between the P.L.O. and Israel to break a deadlock in Middle East peace talks.

Once-inviolable status

has always appeared to be a hawk holding out for the hardest Palestinian positions

seemed to brush aside the threats from his enemies/ dismissed warnings by the militant Hamas Palestinian group

settled for too little and left too many issues unaddressed

gambled that after recognition from Israel he can quickly get similar recognition from the U.S. and Western European governments

President/ elected leader of a nation/ chairman of the new Palestinian government/ mayor of Gaza/ nominated-elected as president of the self proclaimed Palestinian state/ head of the Palestinian National Authority/ chairman of the Palestinian Authority/ chief executive of the Palestinian administration/ president of the interim self government/ leader of the Palestinian Authority/ first leader of the Palestinian self government/ Palestinian President/ Governor of a territory/ governing leader of the Palestinians/ head of the Palestinian Authority

nervous over just such a deal that contributed to his own lurch forward with the Israelis

appears he has more than enough votes to carry the day/ has just enough support to secure an endorsement/ retained enough support to secure at least the tacit approval of his organization

called on Palestinians in the Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip to begin the normalization of life

without his usual battle fatigues and Arab headdress/ not dressed as usual/ wearing a suit, a tie, dark glasses and was bareheaded

birth place is a mystery

the marriage tempered his wildest excesses but does not appear to have changed his life style much

known to trust a tiny circle of personal guards

Washington informed him to come unarmed to the White House for the ceremony
a man who had spent a lifetime in the political wilderness

speech was delivered with a resonant timbre and a flowing classical Arabic

addressed himself as much to the Americans as to the Israelis

seeking to remind Washington that he will expect and need its continued involvement as he negotiates the details of today's peace accord with Israel

refrained from articulating his goal of creating an independent Palestinian state

said he felt swept up by history

suggested that he and his one time nemesis both aging warriors who fought for a generation for the other's destruction would be seen by history as men of courage

for many years he's exercised leadership over one of the most difficult organizations on earth

his appearance sparked criticism when photographs showed that he wore a pistol holster beneath his shirt

sought a promise from Congressional leaders to repeal laws prohibiting the U.S. from giving any funds to the P.L.O. or requiring it to vote against any loans to the organization from international financial institutions

defiantly refused to back away from his claim to East Jerusalem

played down differences with Saudi Arabia

strummed the chords of militant Palestinian pride by declaring that he would not turn in his familiar khaki coloured uniform and keffiyeh for a business suit

revolver back on his hip after discarding it during his visit to the U.S.

promised Arab foreign ministers today that the peace accord with Israel was only the first step in an effort to regain lands controlled by Israel including East Jerusalem

said the Palestinians had been forced to conduct secret talks which excluded long time allies like King Hussein of Jordan, because the 10 rounds of Middle East peace talks begun in Madrid, had been fruitless

he was not trying to sideline Jordan in the Middle East's power plays
sat stiffly/ very tense

appeared to soften his criticism

moving too slowly in putting the right people in charge

loves chicken soup

deliberately keeps top aides always off balance by retaining key information from them and distributing responsibility evenly among power centres

greeted Rabin comments with dismay and a warning

warned that the situation was very dangerous

has been looking to affirm support for the Accord

calling for limited Palestinian autonomy around Jericho and in the Gaza Strip

has consistently ignored opinions offered by Palestinians in the territories as well as those scattered in Lebanon, Syria and Jordan while flying about the globe to meet with foreigners

vocabulary for presenting his people’s plight hardly exceeds two hundred words in both Arabic and English/ spoke in both English and Arabic

Seems almost to have shaved for the occasion

spotty English requires Mr. Frost to repeat some answers

speaks of himself as a martyr

has taken a similarly tough stand, warning that Palestinians will not accept what he calls Israeli attempts to humiliate them

argues that Israel’s insistence on control over border passages for security reasons would turn Gaza and Jericho into equivalents of Bantustans (so called black homelands created under apartheid)

surprised them with a whole new set of demands/ he should have warned them something like this was coming, but he didn’t

questions about his ability to enforce any agreements he does reach with Israel
reliability and legitimacy as a negotiating partner being challenged
calculates that Mr. Rabin needs an agreement even more desperately than he does

Trying to refute charges by militant nationalists that he sold out statehood in exchange for Jericho and Gaza

[makes] ever changing demands

trying to quiet his people with symbolic victories that the Israelis are not prepared to concede

first visit to Saudi Arabia since then suggesting that his ostracism by Persian Gulf oil countries may have eased

said that the international commitment to the development of the territories could determine whether the area will become another Somalia or another Singapore

personal authority and power in the occupied territories have been severely tested

stressed that the economy in the West Bank and Gaza has been destroyed under years of occupation

badly needs an Israeli accord

backed down on key matters like Israel’s demand for veto power over travellers

wants symbols of authority in the territories and claim victory with the right to post armed Palestinian police officers

he can no longer pay salaries and difficulties in his talks with Israel

eyes watery and red with fatigue

said he has lurched from one disappointment to another since signing the Palestinian accord

slumped forward in a gray swivel chair

said he could not understand why so much had turned so sour on the eve of triumph

dismissed the harsh criticism of the P.L.O. peace accord by Syria and Libya

also said the P.L.O. was in trouble, racked by dissent and by serious lack of money
shut himself in his suite at Le Crillon Hotel in Paris and wept/ tears in his eyes

said today that Israel’s pledge to crack down on Jewish radical nationalists was an inadequate response to the massacre

said in an interview that the measures were empty, hollow and superficial gestures

repeated his rejection of the view that a lone, mentally unstable Israeli was responsible for the killings/ he said that a gang of settlers did the shooting and that Israeli soldiers later opened fire on the worshippers

said that the current break in peace talks was just a pause

been existing all these years in an outlaw state

insists that Israel first take steps

plagued by mounting defections from his dispirited P.L.O.

premature to write off Mr. Arafat/ too soon to count him out entirely

has called for the dismantling of provocative settlements

image wounded

would find no support among his followers for new talks

may be at the nadir of his fortunes

outdated revolutionary slogans he has used for nearly three decades

insisted he would not resume talks with Israel without assurances that an international force would protect Palestinians in the occupied territories/ appeared to flatly reject Israel’s suggestion of a Palestinian force under Israeli command

all along has been looking to something to point to before resuming the talks/ he didn’t go all the way but he’s clearly resuming intense discussion with the Israelis

had asked the Americans at the recent meeting in Tunis whether they could persuade the Arab countries to return a move that would offer him moral support and political cover for resuming talks

conceded that much of the Palestinian’s anxiety, aroused by the massacre and the slow pace
of progress in the talks during the past seven months has been directed against him personally repeatedly stressed it was imperative that the Israeli army ease its pressure on the estimated 2 million Palestinians complained about the role of militant American Jews in the peace efforts outlined his minimum condition which included a private Israeli pledge to act eventually toward moving settlers from Hebron/ said he insists on guarantees of security for Palestinians and palpable measures to restrain armed Jewish settlers his silence was especially troubling not interested in preparation or planning caught between competing pressures of having to show Israel and western countries that he renounces terrorism and to reassure increasingly frustrated militant Palestinians that he is not being overly deferential to Israel/ he is forced to choose whether to alienate his Israeli negotiating partners or the sizeable part of the Palestinian public might have balked to show the Palestinian people how tough a negotiator he is stratospheric prefers to be called president disapprove of management style wrongly interpreted accumulated almost 30 years experience ruling Fatah and the P.L.O./ has led the P.L.O. for 25 years/ a familiar figure on the world stage for 30 years Expert in survival but also in tricks P.M. Rabin understandably challenges him to reaffirm his personal commitment to the peace agreement has had a hard time selling compromise to a Palestinian community criticized for statements seemed to violate the self-rule agreement with Israel warned about the importance of maintaining his commitments
is a political adventurer
not interested in a religious pilgrimage
suffering from mild angina
has had a history of health problems/ twice admitted to a hospital last month after suffering form exhaustion and other ailments
compared this agreement with Israel to the prophet Mohammed’s deal with the tribe of Kuraish
blurted out the truth about secret assurances he received in a letter form Israel’s government they say he is delaying the moment when he must abandon the secretive somewhat glamorous life of a guerrilla leader and adopts the much more mundane role of leader of a small and impoverished country
head of the smallest banana republic in the world
wary of the reaction of Palestinians here to his arrival
growing perception that he is disconnected from his people and their concerns
trying to build a pool of money to be spent upon arrival to win favours and pacify [dissent]
globe hopping revolutionary
elusive
he was not truly connected to the reality on the ground
left no doubt that his eye remained as ever on Jerusalem, saying its name rhythmically three times/ claims Jerusalem as future capital of a Palestinian state
place in Palestinian world history
speech was flat
barely visible from a long podium/ short/ his head barely clearing the lectern/ small man with narrow shoulders
held aloft by police officers
threaded cold eyed realities with valued symbols

has hammered hard at the prisoner issue, demanding above all the release of the long jailed physically feeble leader of the militant Hamas group

the word schedule is not in his vocabulary

his appearance have engaged Gazan crowds but not electrified them/ his turn out fell short of the tens of thousands predicted/ not that the P.L.O. leader found universal affection here

guiding them away from intoning his name

sang in hoarse voice

forced to pause as crowd pressed to get closer

in a nostalgic mood

standing under a picture of Muslim holy places in Jerusalem and in front of a Palestinian flag

bleary eyed

exhausted/ tired/ a bit tired and was in the hospital for a day

told a reporter there is not much tolerance or desire among Palestinians for revelling in celebrations

mobilizing skill

filled the air with sweeping if vague nationalistic phrases alluding to martyrs

he was reflecting the immensity of the work to be done

reflected his uncomfortable metamorphosis in increasingly realistic responses

his entry was deliberately low key and businesslike

did not stand up in his car to greet well wishers/ has not waded into crowds

newly ensconced as head of the provisional government

never been known for his diplomatic politesse
perhaps when he calms down he will change his mind about An Nahar
besieged by social problems that built up over 27 years of occupation
his task further complicated by the failure of other countries to provide financial aid
cannot perform miracles
sought at every turn to show that he leads an emergency state and not merely an impoverished strip/ implored secretary of State Warren Christopher for money to build Gaza and West Bank/ talked about the plight of his people and accused the donors of not living up to their promises/ appeals for help/ appealed to the U.S. and the world community to provide funds to help build the new entity he says will lead to a Palestinian state/ shifts quest from peace to funds/ appealed to Arab countries for financial help
says critical things of these fellow P.L.O. officials
has not yet won the confidence of international donors
seems worried about instability during an election campaign
needs elections so he can have the legitimacy he lacks right now
elections will make him accountable to an elected council and he will no longer be able to govern as an authoritarian ruler
pressed by Israel/ feeling increased pressure/ endured considerable pressure during the negotiations from radical Islamic movements/ beleaguered from within and without/ under heavy Israeli pressure to curb violence by militants/ under pressure/ under pressure from hard line factions/ faced with conflicting demands from the Israelis, the West and his own people
felt he was wrongly blamed
he had condemned the abduction as a challenge to the Palestinian Authority
worries about King Hussein’s intentions/ suspects that Jordanian intelligence agents are surreptitiously helping Hamas/ may not be entirely paranoid in worrying that Israel and Jordan ganged up on him
angered by what he viewed as a direct challenge from Islamic Holy War
devastating political blow to his efforts to show he and his struggling self rule government command the allegiance of a majority of the Palestinian people
sorely testing his often proved ability to rebound
short of cash to run his authority
uncertain about consequences for his peace talks
he was reported to have angrily told a visiting delegation of Arabs with Israeli citizenship that Hamas was trying to undermine him and had to be fought back hard/ won applause for taking a hard line against Islamic forces/ has signalled a hardline attitude toward the Islamic opposition
today to deliver a blunt message to violence scarred Palestinians that he has political control and intends to keep it/ he is in control and that he means to stay that way even if he has to fight other Palestinians
called the demonstration a referendum in favour of his self rule administration
refuses to accept blame
he repeated his contention that a shadowy conspiracy lay behind the unrest/ picked up the conspiracy theme again/ referring to conspirators who get orders form abroad
stopped short of saying explicitly that Israel was behind the violence
Arafat is the problem and Arafat is the solution
he is not only a survivor like Noah, but he also seems to believe in Noah’s theory of management, has two economic planning arms, two different police organizations, two private militias
bobbed by old habits
has always sought to avoid military confrontation with his Palestinian opponents
always preferred to deal with them by trying to buy them off, co-opt them with a little power, or divide and rule
blamed for not collecting taxes
all the problems and all the solutions begin with Yasir Arafat, but they don’t end with him
small gray face under the trademark black and white Kaffiyeh
pendulous lips set in a wide, fixed smile
waving his right hand as steadily as a metronome
a little potbelly
dwarfed by large men on a crowded stage
spoke briefly and baldly
now in political business with the Jews
his future depended entirely on the success of that process
he was a diplomat and a bureaucrat
no longer the romantic leader of an outlaw army in undying opposition to authority
spoke accordingly - sober, rational and practical
barely touched upon the subject of the Jews
has attracted only a tiny peace of the nearly $1 billion
had promised to disarm Gaza’s terror factions
sits in a small room in a half finished building
surrounded by aides and sycophants
strength looked impressive at first
has spent most of his ardent life as a leader of armed, revolutionary forces
told reporters that he had closed the newspaper for its failure to obtain the proper licence
stood behind the table, facing the cameras and asked questions in a stern voice
ticked off, point by point, all the ways he had been done wrong, all the things that had gone wrong, all the mistakes that others - not he - had made
answered briefly and unremarkable
is likely to hang on for at least a while with the backing of his powerful friends

has returned to his pattern of frequently leaving Gaza to travel abroad

should be tougher in his confrontation with Hamas and other Islamic [groups]

politically clobbered in Gaza

forced Israel to recognize Palestinian national identity

if he loses credibility, there is no way he can maintain any semblance of stability in the territories

frustrated by lack of progress in Middle East peace talks

adds that the Israelis must understand his need to appear strong, and when Israel seals off his territory at will, he hardly looks to other Palestinians as though he is in command

did not show a great deal of enthusiasm for the proposal/ not entirely happy

saying that we have to wait and see if a deadlock in negotiations had truly been broken

badly needs to show his people the tangible benefits of peace

for months had communicated with his Palestinian authority constituents in Jericho mostly by rumour

no longer causes a sensation by his mere presence

he believes he had majority support in Gaza

still had to do a better job

has been extremely reluctant to be seen as Israel’s ally in the war against terrorism

cannot hope to make Gaza a model of smoothly functioning Palestinian autonomy

his lips are fleshy

he tends toward pudginess

looks unwashed, his beard is so scraggly
tyrannical but capable of charm
revered by many but also widely reviled
as a speaker he resembles Demosthenes
obscured the fact that he was born in 1929 in Cairo— not Palestine
lacks the loss of a plundered childhood landscape
his name is invented
used to be held responsible for every terrorist attack on Israel
his comments were certain to raise the hackles of the Israeli right
emotional
also admonished Israel that it was exacerbating tensions by keeping militant settlers in the West Bank/ he said that both sides still had to address such issues as the future of the Israeli settlements
assailed the vote in the U.S. Congress mandating the move of the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, calling it a very dangerous precedent
Jerusalem has remained a forbidden city for him because of the political storm any visit there would surely create
announced in the name of God in the name of the Palestinian people, I declare Jenin liberated, liberated, liberated
assumes the manner of a kindly uncle and easily sidestep Ms. Doren’s single reference to his group’s terrorist act
candidate/ running for president of the authority/ he was planning to register on Thursday as a presidential candidate
opened in Arabic with a classic Christmas verse
took his place in the front pew of St. Catherine’s Roman Catholic Church
referred to Jesus in the Muslim tradition as a prophet
shouted to a cheering crowd of thousands from the roof of the former Israeli military headquarters

made a specific appeal to the Arabs of Jerusalem who will be allowed to vote even though they live under Israeli rule

exults at the take over of Ramallah

went to church for Christmas mass/ at midnight mass/ attended part of the mass

took the spotlight off the nativity

marriage to a Christian born woman, was in itself regarded as a demonstration that he was above tribal politics and that the Palestinian nation was one

his Christmas message was ambivalent

attached importance to the meeting because the patriarch had compared him to the seventh century Muslim conqueror

previously unchallenged

from terrorism to negotiation to consistent inconsistency

obviously stung by the summons to a dressing down

not easy for him to deal with Hamas as an Islamic political movement

his future as the first Palestinian president hanging in the balance

is a Moses who can bring his people to the promised land but can never lead them/ a survivor not a leader

he’s finally run up against an issue he can’t duck, maybe he’s constitutionally incapable of confronting it

years of wandering struggle and rejection

felt compelled to pay tribute to the spiritual leader of Hamas

has staked his career on the existing deal with Israel

has tried and failed before to foster an Islamic opposition that would function openly within
faces some hard bargaining over the next three days

natty

picture adorns public spaces/ icon of the Palestinian struggle

expressed confidence the Palestinians will have a state by the end of the century

his world seemed to crumble

scrambling to shore up his position

main concern remains the new hard line government in Israel

is extremely discouraged

has also signalled that he is hedging his bets

has waged a widening campaign to mobilize internal and foreign support against the policies of the new Israeli government/ called for a four hour protest against the hard line policies of the new Israeli government/ his address called for a strike

humiliated when Israelis delayed permission for him to fly in his helicopter from Gaza to the West Bank

cited complaints/ complained

generated sense of urgency

not abandoning his claim to the city

wanted to send a signal to Israel and the world

tough talk

thundered during the last week about an Israeli declaration of war

needs to bring his people more than another dollop of Israeli assurances, words and handshakes

is not in a rush to be photographed clasping the conservative Israeli hand/ ignored insistent
requests from photographers

must have been aware that his calls for strikes and demonstrations could trigger an explosion

needs urgently to move to higher ground

apparently worried about travelling so far to meet Mr. Netanyahu and still coming away empty handed/ wants a meeting but has concerns over where it would be, what it would cover/ did not want to meet Mr. Netanyahu alone without the representative of an Arab country

was said to have demanded that any meeting with Mr. Netanyahu produce concrete progress, arguing that the conservative Israeli government has used all earlier contacts only to prevaricate on moving ahead with peace arrangements

has been unyielding in his public statements about the issues that ignited last week’s violence

expressed reluctance about attending the sessions/ hesitation

has already won an undeserved advantage in the battle for world opinion

asked that the meeting be postponed because of their misgivings about the hastily arranged gathering

appeared to have decided that he could not afford to miss what might yet prove a golden opportunity

left essentially empty handed/ left with little to show for his reluctant visit

no indication he intended the havoc

evident that he was warning of further travails and perhaps violence

grim assessments were a negotiating tactic

offered a bleak assessment of the chances for agreement/ warned today that four days of negotiations regarding the Israeli pullout from Hebron had achieved nothing/ pessimistic portrayal of the talks/ asserted that none of the outstanding problems had been resolved/ declared negotiations were stuck/ expression of frustration over the negotiations/ said today that Middle East peace negotiations had reached an impasse

failed to persuade Mr. Assad to openly endorse the agreement
flashed a grin of satisfaction when he shook Mr. Netanyahu’s hand
realized he had no option but to deal with the Likud government
shoved him out of a mosque as he tried to join the religious service/ treated roughly by angry Muslims/ knocked off his trademark head scarf/ manhandled him roughly
based in Tunis
was tucked away in his seat
knows who his friends are
accurately senses a historic change in White House support of Israel’s right to decide its future
his inability to snap out of the isolation he found himself locked in after the defeat of Iraq
angered the Israelis when he asserted that they had usurped his role by inviting King Hussein of Jordan to Jerusalem
scant hope of imposing himself on the teeming militancy of Gaza
forced out of his wily but ultimately fruitless brokering of today for tomorrow
does not have the clout of a state behind him
flanked by aides during a ceremony in August
has presided over the beginnings of a physical rebuilding, but has yet to establish real optimism
unsteady authority in the self rule zones
shrugged off suggestions that he has had to make a profound adjustment from being a globe trotting symbol of the Palestinian movement to manager of Gaza and Jericho
caught in a vise created by the peculiar circumstances of Palestinian self government in Gaza
seems less the leader of a embryonic state than the steward of an Israeli protectorate, a supplicant who in talks with Israel asks only for more carefully measured doses of freedom
viewed less as an icon and more as a public servant
pressed by French President

spoke in a 90 minute television news program

he was questioned by three correspondents

a man who long insisted that Palestine stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean

orphaned on the diplomatic and military fronts by the collapse of the Soviet Union, cut off from traditional sources of income, isolated in the white washed bougainvillea-draped villas of Tunis

never more beleaguered than in recent months

he had to take an initiative, or an accelerating financial and political crisis would have destroyed what remained of his authority within the next few months

still behaving like a leader of a revolution

he has been cut down to size by his agreement to self-rule greatly limited by Israel

has turned sceptical

Negative Descriptors

has spoken of the stone as a jewel/ praised “the stone generals” (rock throwers)/ praised the children of the intifada/ saluted another potential source of trouble, those he called the children of the stone/ call for a campaign of confrontation/ said Palestinians should use all means at their disposal to resist settlement/ asks Arab nations to provide support for protests by Palestinians in Israeli occupied territories “so the revolution can continue”/ he has had an important role in the Arab uprising in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip/ asserts that the P.L.O. has played a major role in organizing the recent uprising in occupied territories/ obviously took pride in the Palestinian protests/ planned to stir up trouble according to spokesman for popular front/ protagonist/ talked about the armed struggle against Israel/ invoked the intifada/ cajoling negotiations and threats/ warmly praised the year old Palestinian uprising/ called for an intensification of the uprising/ calls on Palestinians to escalate year old revolt/ saluted those accused of terrorism/ undoubtedly encouraged a sharp response to the opening of the tunnel/ stirred the crowd with one of the most familiar bits of battle prose/ ignited a bloody uprising/ a taste of war was what Arafat ordered/ the recurring theme was he had deliberately provoked the confrontations/ used the opening of the tunnel to foment rioting/ deliberate incitements/ has been playing a dangerous and duplicitous game by calling frustrated and angry Palestinians to the street to pressure the Netanyahu
government to implement the Oslo peace agreement/ spoke with respect of those who are still resisting the Israeli occupation

adopted a similarly destructive tone/ for decades advocated Israel's destruction/ threatens in Arabic to destroy Israel/ attacking Israel in speech still part of an ugly death to Israel passion that has prevented peace in Middle East

accused of threatening the death of any Palestinian who call for the uprising to slow down or to stop altogether/ personally threatened to shoot anyone trying to halt the uprising/ asserted that any Palestinian leader who proposes an end to the intifada exposed himself to the bullets of his own people

threatened moderate Arabs/ broadcast a murder threat/ remarks constituted a threat/ threatens the security of the U.S.

is no saint

rejected secretary of state Schultz's approach to an international conference on peace/ rejected latest American initiative/ instructs Palestinians to ignore invitation by Schultz to meet

very critical of secretary of state Schultz

objected to American attempts to select Palestinians for dialogue

asks sarcastically

raising his voice/ voice rising to a boom/ angered/ grim and angry expression/ left town clearly frustrated/ fury over several incidents/ infuriated/ his face puffed up in anger/ he was coldly angry/ displayed signs of irritability with reporters when pressed on issues/ bristled at one subject brought up in interview/ responded angrily and with intense bitterness to other questions/ in full rant/ stormed out shouting we are not slaves/ second time he erupted and walked out/ also upset/ his displeasure was ample/ incensed/ year of frustration/ growing visibly irritated/ increasingly agitated/ would jump up from a calm and logical explanation of why he wanted to negotiate with Israel, to an aggrieved and highly rhetorical attack, to a litany of time-worn cliches/ exploded/ angrily roared off in his armoured Mercedes/ has shouted, lectured, threatened and stalked out

ambiguities in his past comments/ has neither endorsed or condemned the statement/ evasive/ ambiguous/ without specifying/ meticulously unclear/ hesitates to speak clear/ career based on ambiguous behaviour and statements/ used vaguely worded statement/ declined to restate unambiguously the statement's key clauses/ too murky/ finds it difficult to say a simple yes or no/ rarely does he repeat his words exactly/ regularly refused to be pinned down on the
question/ remains a difficult man to pin down/ remarks were nothing but an upgrading of the ambiguity and double-talk that the P.L.O. used/ deceptive double-talk/ changing words persists in varying his message/ speaks in a multitude of voices, sometimes affirming but more often contradicting those original commitments/ inconsistencies/ part charlatan

parroted words

made no public statement/ withheld immediate comment/ made no immediate public response/ declined to give his response/ did not speak publicly about the event/ did not offer an explanation/ evaded questions

“Old man”

expelled from Syria/ declared persona non grata/ expelled from Damascus 8 years ago over a policy conflict with Assad

enigmatic leader

Publicly snubbed/ endured a rude sermon from a preacher at a mosque/ assailed/ endured scorn/ denounced by Hamas/ shunned by conservative politicians, who have criticized his visit as inopportune/ publicly lambasted/ denounced

had his revenge at a special Arab summit meeting in Algiers called to support the uprisings

wealthy, free spending tourist/ lived the good life

did not discuss terrorist incidents/ refused to comment on terrorist incident/ ducking an opportunity to condemn the killings openly/ he has said far too little in public to denounce the Hamas violence/ made not a peep about the attack on Lebanon

expressed anger that King Hussein had not consulted him/ spiteful response to King Hussein

pretends the opponent does not exist

the “new” Arafat seems perpetually around the corner

fudging/ same old fudge

persisted in calling Israel a Zionist -and “racist” state/ reverted to his old lines of equating Zionism with racism/ said Israeli P.M.’s plan was racist and expansionist

aroused controversy by addressing the assembly in his usual military dress and declaring that he came “bearing an olive branch and a freedom fighter’s gun/ when wearing an empty holster

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on his hip, he offered a choice between the gun and the olive branch
terrorist/responsible for terrorist acts/unrepentant terrorist/ a killer/ whose hands are stained with the blood of innocent Jews/ personally responsible for the murder of thousands of Jews and Non-Jews, this war criminal/ scraggily bearded face of international terrorism/ arch-murderer/ whose name and trademark head covering were synonymous with terrorism only a scant two years ago/ violent past/ a man who until recently was regularly denounced there as a villainous killer/ told “Time” he would not rule out the use of terrorism/ refusing to forswear the use of terrorism/ distinction that acts of violence committed in lands controlled by Israel were permissible/ continued to imply terrorism justified in wars of national liberation/ guerrilla fighter/ committed to treason/ hijacking appeared to be an effort on the part of Mr. Arafat/ hijacker/ bears considerable responsibility for the disturbances/ he undoubtedly knew about the raid in advance/ as someone who has complicated the Palestinian issue and produced terrorism instead of negotiations/ heads a “gang” that has been officially identified by the government of the U.S. as a terrorist organization/ represented a terrorist organization/ warned today that Palestinians might have to revert to violence if the peace with Israel broke down/ He knows of, condones, knows of, and lends support to acts of terrorism/ association with terrorism/ an accessory to terrorism/ leads an organization committed to terrorist activities/ had not stopped his followers from carrying out “terrorist acts”/ complicity/ may have personally approved a series of terrorist attacks/ responsible for terrorist acts/ hinted that P.L.O. commitment to an unarmed resistance in the occupied Arab territories had limits/ has not in fact renounced terrorism/ may not have been sincere in his renunciation of terrorism/ strayed from his commitment to renounce terrorism/ pretending to have renounced terrorism/ inconsistent with Dec. 14 renunciation of terrorism and with the U.S.-P.L.O. dialogue/ credibility of recent renunciation remains fragile at best/ doesn’t unambiguously renounce this latest terrorist attack against Israel/ has not kept a pledge made in 1988 to end terrorist attacks on Israel/ not lived up to P.L.O. commitment to an unarmed resistance in the occupied Arab territories had limits/ simply adopted other forms of terror/ stopped short of condemning operation/ declined to condemn it/ refusing to condemn guerrilla raid on Israeli beach/ declined to condemn a terrorist attack by a P.L.O. group/ said he will fight for the cause of Allah and kill and be killed/ responsible for killing/ violations of his promise to end incitement and hostile propaganda/ could not possibly have repudiated his commitment to terrorism

praised the Soviet Union and China
cajoling negotiations and threats
earlier die-hard line
denied entry into the U.S. to address the U.N./ refused access to visit the U.N. headquarters/ should be denied access to our country until he renounces terrorism/ banned from the U.S. for nearly two decades/ has not yet earned the privilege of a U.S. visa
would not say whether Palestinian Council’s declaration represented a recognition of Israel/
no explicit recognition of Israel’s right to exist/ declined to say P.L.O. was finally ready to
accept the existence of Israel/ still not ready to acknowledge Israel might have legitimate
security concerns/ resisted saying he would accept a Jewish state of Israel

failed to echo aid who called for settlement between Israel and Palestinians/ no willingness
to break new ground for peace

Cunning exercise in public relations/ a thinly disguised version of the same old propaganda
line

accused Reagan administration

put part of the blame for these developments on the U.S. government which he describes as
completely biased, siding totally with Israel/ blamed the decision on Schultz’s support for
Israel and visceral enmity toward him/ suggested there was ill will toward the P.L.O. at the
highest level of the Bush administration/ denounced in strong terms what he said was
unconditional American support of Israel/ accused the U.S. of double standards over Middle
East peace efforts

had wanted to go further in his speech but was held back by hardline factions/ bowed at last
minute for pressure from hardliners/ failed to go far enough/ his words were still not enough/
woefully insufficient/ balked at crossing the necessary threshold/ unwilling for now to offer
the U.S. any further concessions

could not be counted on to deliver/ uncreditable/ irresponsible/ is not taken seriously/
distrusted/ difficult to tell when he is being sincere/ failure to live up to his word/ not a reliable
interlocutor/ is not credible among the masses/ is not someone they can trust/ credibility is
down in the carpet/ he can be counted on to show he cannot be counted on

does not want to take on the factions that are responsible for the raids from southern Lebanon

voice precise, insistent, his manner bossy/ issues orders

jealous of power

coy

strongly attacked the new Israeli government/ made no secret of his hostility toward recent
Israeli policies/ strongly attacked a statement by Israeli P.M./ replied by denouncing the new
blockade as a breach of agreements between Israel and the Palestinians/ publicly attacked the
Israeli government at the weekend conference, charging it with obstructing peace by slowing
down its military withdrawal from occupied areas/ called on the international community to
act rapidly to put an end to the crimes and the massacres perpetrated by Israel against the population of the occupied territories/unsparing in his condemnation of Israeli policy in the territories/bitterly assailed Israel/complained about Israel's recent treatment of Palestinians living in Israel and the territories it occupied after the 1967 war/charged today that the expansion of Jewish settlements and actions in Jerusalem by the Israeli government amounted to a declaration of war on the Palestinian people-launches against Israel's right wing government charging that its policies on settlement and Jerusalem amounted to a declaration of war on the Palestinians/warned Americans that Israeli intelligence was planning acts of provocation/accuses Israel of planning new attacks against Palestinians/sees a war scenario/asserted that the Israeli cabinet had agreed to three types of operations against the Palestinian movement

refuses an invitation to talk in U.S.

has adopted other tactics in the past when he "needed good press"/ability to change his tactics and word to suit the interests of himselfchanging tactics to keep Palestinian movement alive under his leadership/has secured perceptible political gain with his change of previous P.L.O. policy/he demonstrates his talent to change ground/ability to change his tactics and word to suit the interests of himself said he did not believe that Israel's opposition to an international conference was immutable

inability to make peace with Israel for the foreseeable future/cannot negotiate peace/undermined hopes for a breakthrough/implied he doubts the ability of the P.L.O. to negotiate an Israeli withdrawal/showed his peace initiative has failed

promise of peace that he cannot guarantee/cannot deliver the benefits he has promised to the Palestinians/failure to fulfill all of his signed commitments/has failed to fulfill that promise and there is evidence that he may never be able to deliver/couldn't deliver the goods

is not ready to permit talks between Palestinians and Israelis even at a bargain price

dismissed as inappropriate an American backed proposal for elections in the Israeli occupied territories

did not meet American conditions

usual circumlocutions

aided by fundamentalist militiamen of the unification movement

wasted a strategic opportunity/foot dragging

comments "utter nonsense"
Accused the U.S. of delaying peaceful efforts to give Israel time to crush the Palestinian uprisings in the occupied territories/ his conviction that unless American pressure is applied to ease Israeli army tactics aimed at crushing the Palestinian uprising the peace process in the Middle East may come to a halt

asserted that P.L.O.’s peaceful gestures had not been matched with good will from Americans/ repeatedly suggested that U.S. had failed to fulfill its part of a secret agreement

he has not been cooperating with American Middle East peace efforts

withheld a direct public endorsement of Egypt’s newest Middle East initiative

trying to exploit tensions between Bush and Israel

denounces Arab dealings with Israel over Palestinian issue

accused the Arabs of impotence vis-a-vis Israel

time is running out for Arafat

prefers a continuation of the struggle to any diminution of P.L.O. power in West Bank in favour of the Palestinians who actually live there

totally chaotic way of operating/ chaotic ways

schedules interviews and then cancels them at last moment’s notice

remains very closed and difficult person to really know/ reluctant to discuss his personal life and experiences/ reticent about his private life

ordered several thousand guerrillas from Jordan and other Arab nations to relocate in Iraq for training

alliance with President Hussein/ sided with Iraq in the international crisis over the invasion of Kuwait/ frequent meetings with President Saddam Hussein/ sympathizes with Iraq/ unqualified support of President Hussein/ deepened already intimate ties with President Saddam Hussein

most of his ideas are unacceptable to both the U.S. and Israel

urged the Council to enact economic sanctions against Israel

speech in Geneva was “full of lies and distortions”/ clever liar
raised proposals that he knows have no chance whatsoever to be accepted by Israel

sent away empty handed

declined to express any remorse or disapproval

appeared unlikely to satisfy American requests that he denounce the raid and discipline those responsible for it

rejected the idea that he remove Abul Abbas from the executive committee

clean and pure, worthy of becoming an American negotiating partner (sarcasm)

has faced taunts that the decision has produced no substantive results

he has been a moderate for the moderates and a radical for the radicals, a terrorist for the terrorists and a diplomat for the diplomats/ playing his game of trying to please doves and hawks

has led a comeback by gambling on a continued friendship with Iraq/ embarked on a political gamble

condemning the U.S. military buildup in the region

promoting a settlement that would reward Iraq for its invasion with territorial and economic concessions by Kuwait

has moved to secure a constituency on the streets but has lost the support of so called moderate Arab states

has closed off powerful channels of diplomatic and financial support

anything but impartial

said he strongly supports President Saddam Hussein’s assertions that a withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait must be tied to an overall settlement in the region, including the 40 year old Palestinian- Israeli occupation/ insisted that the resolution of the crisis could not be achieved without a simultaneous settlement of the Arab-Israeli issue/ said he is pressing for a strong commitment from the 5 permanent members of the U.N. Security Council to address the plight of Palestinians as a condition for settling the Persian Gulf crisis/ told Mr. Hussein, “Palestine and Iraq stand in one trench to regain Arab rights”

support of Iraq has been strongly denounced by Saudi Arabia, its Arab allies and Egypt/ left
with few Arab or foreign friends

contradicted assertions by American military officials

said that in trying to persuade the Kuwaitis to compromise he told the emir not to become entraped by what he described as useless and meaningless U.N. and Arab League resolutions against Mr. Hussein's claims

chided the U.S. for asking Palestinians to open talks with their enemies

said he did not take seriously the January 15 Security Council authorization for the use of force to evict Iraq from Kuwait

said Iraqi troops could withstand an assault and fight on for many months perhaps as long as experienced a personal loss/ suffered a deeper loss at the hands of Israel/ has purged himself enough/ imminent demise [predicted]/ world class failure/ failed/ loser

blunder/ committed a crucial error/ proven how badly he can calculate/ egregious miscalculation in supporting Saddam Hussein/ deficiencies as a strategist/ has undone years of his own energetic diplomacy/ foibles in earlier years/ Arafat fiasco/ miscalculated in supporting Iraq against Kuwait/ flaws

denounced the war as western aggression

should resign

internal position is extremely weak/ his authority has been sharply undermined over the last two years by its financial crisis/ analysts believe that his position is so weak, though that in the end he will have no choice but to quietly sanction the conference/ weak/ has been seriously weakened by internal challenges to his autocratic rule of the P.L.O./embarrassed and weakened/ arrived in Gaza in a weak and desperate condition/ leadership weakening/ his footing too, is less secure/ is becoming irrelevant to many Palestinians/ no longer commands automatic respect

dwindling support/ unpopular/ finding little warmth among Gazans and evaporating support among Palestinians/ facing growing wave of discontent/ personal prestige among Palestinians on the decline/ unquestionable drop in Palestinian public esteem/ lost support among disillusioned young Palestinians who live in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip/ growing disenchantment with Mr. Arafat/ support among Palestinians in the occupied territories has eroded over the past two years/ his public support has slipped steadily/ deprived of good will on Gazan streets/ sagging popularity

does not acknowledge that he hurt his cause by appearing to back the losing side/ asserting
that he and the P.L.O. were “more popular than ever” after the Gulf War despite his embrace of Mr. Hussein

referred often to what he described as the American-led conspiracy against us

dismissed assertions that there were historical differences between Israel’s occupation of Palestinian territory and Iraq’s seizure and annexation of Kuwait

expressed no regrets about his support for Saddam Hussein/ expressed few regrets over the effect of the crisis on the P.L.O.’s relationship with the U.S.

remaining suspicious/ appears to be sceptical of the approach taken by U.S.

appeared to be showing increasing exasperation over Israel’s insistence that the P.L.O. play no role in any peace conference

criticized the Bush administration for not doing more to prevent the ill treatment of Palestinians in Kuwait

declared Palestinians would not attend an American brokered peace conference unless Washington asked him to choose the delegation and guaranteed that Israel would trade land for peace

demands are clearly unrealistic

threatening to wreck talks

discredited in America and among many Arabs/ unsuccessful mediation efforts undermined his international standing/ struggling to mend his image in the Gulf states and the West

detested by many Palestinians who lost lucrative jobs in Kuwait because of his decision to support Baghdad/ remarks stunned and frustrated some fellow Palestinians

posture of reluctance

leadership has been criticized by several Palestinian factions/ has no shortage of critics/ criticized that he had been duped into signing a meaningless peace agreement/ leadership has come under criticism among Palestinians/ coming under increasing criticism from other Palestinian leaders/ criticized/ old allies criticizing him/ has been criticized for reshaping the organization

refused to meet conditions of condemning the attack and insisted that Abu Abbas’s removal was all that was necessary

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reluctant to agree to any arrangement that creates an alternative Palestinian leadership or creates the impression of capitulation on his part

stubborn/ seemed at times to maintain a consciously defiant pose

gleefully adept at evasion

constrained

referred to Jews as “dirt” and blamed them for the furor over admission of George Habash/ made derogatory remarks about Jews

blocked decision making process

blamed for his inability to handle the growing strength of Hamas

instead of replacing leaders, has expropriated their function using minor aides who are sycophants

frivolous

declared the solidarity of the Palestinian people with Libya

his loss may trigger a power struggle among Palestinian factions

unsuitable person for the position

he has approved protecting Americans in Beirut, killing Americans abroad, supporting Iraq in the Gulf War, supporting U.S. diplomacy after that conflict aimed at Palestinian peace with Israel

prominent playing the twin themes of terrorism and diplomacy in Beirut

never made the transition

is from a bygone era/ product of the 1960s

traitor/ many Palestinians especially Islamic militants consider his deal with the Israelis to be a sell out/ many Palestinians say he has compromised too much with Israel/ has sold out Jerusalem to Israel/ criticized for giving Israel too much leeway/ accused that he agreed to a bad deal/ betrayed his faith and his homeland/ is now accused of selling out just because he wants to be president of a state on any piece of land/ accused of capitulating to the Israeli enemy/ betrayed Palestinian cause/ committed high treason when he recognized the Israeli
enemy and abandoned the revolution's principles/ made himself into Israel's policeman/ Israel's enforcer/ Israel's enforcer once the accord is carried/ sold his people into enslavement/ collaborator with the Israelis/ tool of Israel/ made peace with our enemy/ Israel's lackey/ has sold the Palestinian people short by closing a deal for limited self government/ has cast his lot with Israel

Seen as Israel's implacable foe

making side deals behind their backs with Israel and the U.S.

appeared to be prodding and cajoling his followers

arguing that he does not have the right himself to amend or change the 33rd paragraph of the Charter (destruction of Israel)

detested Arab leader/ wanted dead/ deserves a bullet in the head/ death threats have multiplied/ rebel hunted by Israel and enemies/ has become one of the most reviled figures in the occupied territories/ the devil beyond redemption no matter what he does/ object of man hunt by Israeli commandos/ attacked as a war criminal/ name is uttered by many Jews in the same breath as Hitler's/ viewed as a scraggly bearded devil for decades/ reviled here for years/ object of hate for many Jews/ name was once anathema to Israelis/ villain

bitter enemy of Yitzhak Rabin

one of the Arab world's most notorious wheelers and dealers

influence in the West Bank has fallen since Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states cut off his money

spoke of his solidarity with Libya and Iraq

had recently rebuked Mr. Rabin for cracking down on Islamic militants

has accused Israel of violating the spirit of the September 13 Accord

lover of young girls

maintaining public silence while Israelis were being killed

has been slow to set up the economic and security institutions that the P.L.O. requires to begin implementing the agreement with Israel

autocratic style/ erratic and dictatorial manner/ dictator/ he's become a little emperor/ one
man rule/ ineptness and autocracy/ accused of autocratic decision-making/ autocratic style and mediocre management of the transition to self rule/ mercurial and unaccountable autocrat/ strong arm style and his resistance to dissent/ keeping too much power to himself/ had rejected systems of accountability/ reputation for uncontrolled spending and allegations of corruption in the P.L.O./ totalitarian tendencies/ autocratic habits developed and refined in his years of exile/ insists on handling every decision himself/ refused to delegate authority/ worse than Ceausescu/ has run the P.L.O. as a dictatorship of disorganization largely by his own word and whims/ set out with conspicuous and purposeful intent, to subvert democracy and the rule of law/ dismissed order/ insisted on making all the decisions himself/ chillingly arbitrary/ free to invent laws as the moment required and did so/ has promoted midnight military courts, arbitrary arrest and torture, endemic corruption and unaccountable security forces/ accused of running an incompetent, brutal and corrupt regime/ repressive policies/ has swept into prison too many innocent people/ frequently abused authority/ brow beats the press/ abused the right of his own people/ patchy on civil rights/ endangered the welfare of the people he represents/ tries to mimic the tyrannical regimes in the rest of the Arab world/ reluctant to delegate responsibility, and takes a dim view of demands for greater accountability/ tight personal control of all decision making/ heavy reliance on several security forces to maintain power and stifle dissent

suffered a reversal on Wednesday

leaves important decisions to the last minute, undercutting the planning for negotiations with Israel and slowing preparations for self rule

under growing pressure to widen decision making in the organization

accused of alternating senior colleagues in the executive committee

took up much of the time railing about the pressures he was facing

was less certain

despotent

stood slumped over the podium with his arms folded

gave few hints today that he is troubled by the growing thicket of problems facing the accord between the P.L.O. and Israel

speeding around London in a Jaguar limousine with Palestinian flag fluttering

managed through his appearances on American television over the years to relegate the Palestinian question to a clownish gibberish

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clown
deporable leadership

probably one of the major disasters that the Palestinians have had in their modern history/ one should blame Arafat for rendering 400,000 Palestinians refugees in the dusty wake of the Gulf War and above all for making the Palestinians pay now, and for years to come, for his calamitous policy during the invasion of Kuwait/ one should blame Arafat for bringing the Palestinians down to a point where they could not ask for more than they were offered by the Israelis in the Declaration of principles

skepticism about his ability to bring into line groups like Hamas

backpedalling

reneged on a deal

ducked every opportunity to sign an economic agreement already negotiated with Jordan

has been an ineffective negotiator with the Israelis/ mishandling the negotiations/ responsible for the impasse

he’s sick and tired of my call for democracy

accuse him of having a questionable commitment to democratic change/ barely 20% consider him democratic

pinned much of the blame for the delay on what he said was the passivity of the Clinton administration

referred repeatedly to weapons that he said are pouring out into the Gaza Strip and the West Bank blaming the Israelis for not halting the arms traffic

an enemy of God

resignation called for

has reacted in only the mildest terms to the professor’s recent barrage of accusations

invites new and dangerous delays

high handed manipulations/ his high handed way
unconscionable concessions

placed much of the responsibility for delays in putting the September accord into effect on
P.M. Rabin

he does not think he has to be accountable

passed up an opportunity to speak out against it (violence)

refused to sign part of the accord

glowered

last minute theatrics on a Cairo stage/ caused an uproar in Cairo yesterday

angered the Saudis and other benefactors by siding with Iraq

quoted as calling for a holy war to liberate Jerusalem for Muslims

hasn’t made the necessary change to become a statesman

signal that he had no intention of accepting his agreement with Israel as binding/ openly
mocks the Declaration of Principle’s he signed with the Israelis

identity crisis

perverse genius for inflammation doubts

attempts to reinterpret his bellicose remarks convince no one/ provided a far fetched
explanation for an unnecessary misstep

appears reluctant

endangers Jewish lives

hardly eases tensions with calls like the one last month in South Africa for a Muslim jihad
changed his mind once more today/ virtuoso of unpredictability/ switched signals

has a record of murders and hostility and it’s difficult to forgive him

sounding a defiant note/ defiance
what Arafat truly wants is not an Arab state beside Israel, but an Arab state in place of Israel

insolent manipulator/expert in the manipulation of the international press and also in the use of terror/debatable manipulation of emotion/cynical manipulation

has irked the Israeli government repeatedly with his assertions about Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital/angered the Israelis

lack of effusiveness

calling Mr. Arafat dog/a pig

both spoiler and supplicant today

inflammatory language/inflammatory rhetoric/used sharp language

dismissed

ordered the closing of a Palestinian newspaper/shut down An Nahar/ordered the effective closure of the East Jerusalem newspaper An Nahar

being accused of clamping down on press freedom/wants to shut down dissent

accused Osman Hallah the publisher of the newspaper, An Nahar of being pro-Jordanian and of engaging in anti-Arafat propaganda

has created growing distrust, fear and disappointment among Palestinians

appointment of allies who had been accused of corruption and mismanagement

may be creating the foundations for a repressive regime

ordered the Police Chief to dismiss the mayor

wouldn’t listen

uses his one credible threat again and again

do not think he tried very hard to get the votes for covenant change and has been playing his usual delaying game

highly rigid/is the walnut/difficult

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weakened by the Hamas violence in October that forced him into a precarious balancing act
people don’t interest him

Hamas have charged that Mr. Arafat personally ordered his troops to open fire in Gaza
has refused to apologize
lost considerable popular support when his police opened fire
unwilling to provide even the most rudimentary accounting of how money is spent/ prefers
his money the old way in unmarked bills and left at the foot of the stairs with his name on it/
accuse him of serious financial mismanagement of billions of dollars/ has misused some of the
funds

barred form setting foot on Israeli soil
he was obliged to arrive by the tradesman’s entrance

incompetence and vanity

prideful delusion

impotence

rejected the requests of foreign nations for an accounting system

isolated and bitter

maintaining power by maneuvering his rival against each other

has never run a government participated in any traditional electoral process or paid even
minimal attention to the conventions of bureaucracy

has always made his decisions in secret, with the concurrence of a few aides

has never been accountable to anyone outside his own organization

unexpected refusal to seat a municipal council that represented all the political factions of
Gaza

public posturing and private impotence
nobody trusts him with the money
he has never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity
his failure has left him on what amounts to a political life support system
accusing donor countries of imposing unrealistic accounting standards
has become vulnerable
increasingly hiding behind his police
obsession with sboring up his rule and that of his police force
needs permission by Israel to leave and come
frustrated his American visitors by failing to get his financial house in order
question his commitment to democracy, his commitment to make the transition from revolutionary to govern
complaints that he has not done enough to control radicals based in territory already under his control
he could never even wipe out the death to Israel provisions of the P.L.O. covenant
telegraphed his frustration by leaving from the meeting without holding a planned news conference with Rabin
Israelis accuse Arafat of not doing enough to rein in extremists
rejected today an Israeli proposal that he quickly widen his self rule authority
concern over his ability to maintain law and order
needs bolstering
losing his popularity every time he uses the word terrorist to describe Palestinians fighting against Israeli occupation
in delicate political position
has moved mainly against preachers, journalists and low level militants, not armed fighters or
commanders

in an unenviable position

some of his troubles are his own fault

unlikely to eliminate Gaza based terrorism

accused the Israelis of acting in bad faith

his problem is he does not like to have people around him who argue/loyalty to him is a one way street, made up of yes men/ no tolerance for dissent/ demanded unity/ has focused on building personal power and sending his people the message that disagreement is dangerous/incapable of comprehending the notions of open criticism and public opposition

unwillingness to make the transition form guerrilla chief to administrator of an embryonic state

always believed money and soldiers must be controlled and he controls both

vain yet self abasing

lives a spare life yet has tolerated spectacular corruption within the P.L.O.

Has a fortune tucked away in secret accounts to which he alone has access

stormed out of the talks on Tuesday after he was finally shown Israeli maps detailing areas over which the Israeli army intends to retain full or partial control/ asserted that the maps represented the canonization of the West Bank and threatened to leave the talks altogether

was somewhat less conciliatory

was near the political end when Oslo was signed

a man who used it (propaganda) against them when he was on the fringe of power and uses it now that he has achieved it

freed a senior Hamas leader in a quickening campaign to strike a truce with the militant Islamic opposition

expelled from a concert for world leaders at Lincoln Centre by mayor Rudolph Giuliani

he has never been held to answer for the murders that he was implicated in
not liked by a lot of people

so anxious was he to get his point of tolerance across that when one Arabic newspaper failed
to give it sufficient prominence, Mr. Arafat’s security chief placed the editor in detention
derives his authority from the gun

he has not really made the commitment to try

has temporized in his dealings with Hamas

dezoeculent

repeated dubious claim that the Hamas suicide bombers had been assisted by Jewish right
wing radicals

loudly arresting militants wanted by Israel and then quietly letting them go/ condemning
terrorism in speeches to the West while exalting assassinated terrorists or lauding jihad

reacted vindictively

has not shown the broad mindedness or the democratic character needed

a pariah

rebuffs Israelis

immediately rejected any attempt to link the issue of an Israeli withdrawal from Hebron and
the status of Jerusalem

does not seem to understand many of the complaints about his administration

does not appreciate the damage he is doing to the Palestinian cause

has never made clear why he needs so many independent security services

challenged on human rights abuses and other matters

risking an outburst of violent protest he might not easily control

the architect of repressive policies and conduct that may do lasting harm to his authority and

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to the peace effort

disappointed them

has ignored challenges from the freely elected Palestinian legislative council to improve his record on human rights

has made the fight against terrorism an excuse to suppress dissent

his repression feeds extremism

rallies from one apparent defeat to the next

has lost his appetite for agreements made with Israel, except those he knows most profit him

may have lost control of the forces once the rioting turned to shooting

has reportedly resisted a meeting unless the Israelis make some conciliatory gesture/ unwilling to meet unless he was guaranteed a concrete gesture by Mr. Netanyahu/ demanded some guarantees that Mr. Netanyahu was committed to continuing with the political process

spent much of today in indecision

angrily defended himself against Netanyahu’s charge that Israel gave the Palestinians guns, only to have them turned on Israelis

suggested that Mr. Netanyahu was either being provocative or dangerously ignorant of the possible repercussions

the incitement to riot were Arafat’s attempt to mobilize world pressure to reverse the verdict of Israel’s democratic election/ has encouraged potentially violent protests in an effort to enhance his diplomatic bargaining

by dangling that false hope to sustain nationalist fervour, he guarantees Arab frustration

his expression- stony, sombre, frowning/ said one word curtly and continued to stare straight ahead/ sat silently and unsmilingly

gave his blessing for the protests but did not issue any directives

bitter comments

often uses term jihad in his speech, but argues that it does not necessarily mean violent
struggle

has always maintained his power by driving a wedge between his rivals/ divide and rule strategy/ his strategy has always been to set Palestinians against other Palestinians so as to dominate all of them

accused Mr. Netanyahu of deliberate provocation in opening a new entrance to the tunnel

placing loyalists in charge of key committees and eliminating opponents in a purge that has shaken the P.L.O./ favours trust over competence/ ignoring talented but outspoken Palestinians who may question his absolute authority/ politics decides appointments for Mr. Arafat, not professional criteria

lack of control/ is losing control of a situation he never grasped firmly/ has lost control of elements known to have sophisticated bomb-making capabilities/ has shown that he cannot deliver peace because he cannot control the armed Islamic factions that regard themselves at war with Israel

stands alone, abandoned even by neighbouring Arab governments

travelled the Middle East to sell his ideas, which it appears were developed in concert with Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi

his maneuvers serve notice that he is not bound to that promise

responded by pinning much of the blame for the violence on Israeli occupation

criticizes Israeli forces

in a very vulnerable position

his stance was still grudging and equivocal

accustomed to leading a guerrilla movement, he prefers to work through personal influence and patronage

declined to say explicitly if he believed that the acceptance of Resolution 242 meant acceptance of Israel

the consummate haggler and juggler, fashioning oratorical labyrinths in the name of the Palestinian cause but never delivering a square inch of turf to his people

faded icon
inability to create effective economic institutions/ failure to establish the political and judicial mechanism of democratic government

many years of conspiratorial rule
APPENDIX E

GALLUP POLL SOURCES


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