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Some Outstanding Questions About Analogies

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Abstract: In this paper, I cite a number of examples of briefly stated analogies, in which the arguer cites a source case to make a point about a target case. Though they are short and potentially regarded merely as wit or as rhetorical flourishes, I offer reasons for regarding these passages as arguments. I maintain that they should not be reconstructed so as to amount to deductively valid arguments, although our assessment of their merits is largely *a priori*. In considering the *a priori* aspects of reasoning about the nature and significance of similarities, it is useful to distinguish between what is *a priori* and what is deductive. The conclusions of these sorts of arguments should be regarded as defeasible. The paper considers recent work by Marcello Guarini, Lilian Bermejo-Luque, James Freeman, and Douglas Walton.

Keywords: *a priori*, analogy, argument, case-by-case, deductive, defeasible, inductive

1. Introduction

In this paper I will consider some questions about analogies, in particular about short analogies of the type I and some others have considered to be *a priori* in nature. Departing from usage in my textbook, but in accordance with usage in some recent literature, I will use the terms “source case” and “target case”. The source case is what I elsewhere called the analogue and the target case, subject of the intended conclusion, is what I elsewhere referred to as the primary subject. My hand-out provides a list of examples.

2. Discussion

Here is Example A, from a letter to the editor about gun control: “guns are no more responsible for criminal deaths than forks are responsible for obesity” (Betts, 2015). Implicitly, forks are not responsible for obesity, so guns are not responsible for criminal death. Here is Example B, discussing a proposal to put a large monument to the victims of communism beside the Supreme Court of Canada. “Picture this: a monument to the victims of residential schools put in Red Square, near the Kremlin. Sound absurd? No more than a monument to the victims of communism in front of the Supreme Court of Canada” (Stauch, 2015). The second thing would be absurd; the first is similar to it; so the first would be absurd. And to provide a fuller idea, here is Example C, taken from a column by Tabitha Southey (2015), which discusses a University of Toronto course that incorporated alternate health material. Southey (2015) said, “Students were also required to watch a two-hour interview with the thoroughly discredited Dr. Andrew Wakefield. Citing the work of Dr Wakefield—the data falsifier behind the entirely debunked autism/vaccination link—in a course that covers vaccine safety, is like using Hitler’s diaries as the primary text for World War II in Europe.”

These examples are short and snappy, as are many of the others I provide here. I submit that their brevity does not prevent them from being interesting in a number of ways. The author compares a target case to a source case; the two are deemed by him or her to be relevantly similar; on that basis a stated or presumed characteristic of the source case is attributed to the

target case. About these examples, several questions arise. There is a question as to whether it makes sense to regard such snappy comparisons as amounting to arguments at all. Presuming that we do regard them as arguments, another question is whether they amount to inductive or deductive arguments, or as analogical arguments constituting a distinct type. Again presuming that they are arguments, a question arises as to whether they should be understood as compactly expressed deductive arguments. Since the first of these questions is preliminary to the others, I will consider it first.

Should such cases as A, B, and C and the others cited in my appendix here be regarded as constituting arguments? One might urge that what we find in such cases is purely wit or rhetoric, not intended to provide reasons for an implied conclusion about the target case. One might claim that in such discourse we have only throw-away remarks, perhaps serving merely to introduce a topic, perhaps merely adding humor and fun to a discussion. I submit to the contrary that these passages should be regarded as short arguments. In the examples just stated and the others I will cite, there is a controversy concerning ethics or policy, and the author is writing to express a stance on that controversy, in a context where argument is common (letter to the editor, opinion column, or essay). To be sure, the target case and the source case are described in claims that are not themselves arguments. Yet the confident tone (of dismissal, in a number of the cases) and the context strongly suggest that a claim is made and grounds offered for it. Furthermore, an argumentative scheme readily suggests itself. ‘Case #1 is like Case #2; Case #2 is W; therefore, Case #1 is W.’ For W, we can often substitute “absurd.” Such arguments as in A, B, and C are often used by persons seeking to refute claims or theories. They resemble refutations, by logical analogy, of arguments, but the examples considered here do not amount to arguments about arguments; rather they are arguments about claims.

In citing these examples as instances of argument, I offer brief accounts of the context of disputes that provide their context. I assume that those explanations are sufficient to explain the point in question. That is to say, I assume in my treatment here that broad considerations about social discourse in the wider society are not needed at this point. I work at the level of micro-analysis at this stage: I do that because I believe that many points of interest arise and are appropriately addressed at this level.

When such analogically claims as these are made argumentatively, especially in an attempted refutation, the tone is characteristically one of confidence, as though the arguer took the case-by-case comparison to suffice by itself to establish his point. However, even with a confident tone, an implication of sufficient reason is not always present. We can see this phenomenon in several further examples. In Example G, Paul Krugman (2015) states with regard to the crisis in the Greek financial situation that the attempt to terrify Greeks by cutting off bank financing was shameful. Krugman (2015) maintains first of all that “Europe’s self-styled technocrats are like medieval doctors who insisted on bleeding their patients—and when their treatment made the patients sicker, demanded even more bleeding.” He claims that the medieval technique was harmful and implies that the contemporary technocratic one will be similarly harmful. Krugman then adds further points about suffering in Greece and the shrinking of its economy under imposed austerity. The addition of further points suggests that he does not regard his analogy between economists and medieval doctors as sufficient to establish his claim. In example F, columnist Andrew Coyne (2015) is also tough on economists. Coyne compares economists making predictions to motorists driving through fog and navigating only by views through the rear-view mirror. He then expresses a further analogy between economists and unlicensed physicians, saying that “nothing is as likely to kill the patient as the remedies
proposed by its unlicensed physicians” (Coyne, 2015). Supplementing these analogies, Coyne (2015) goes on to state that the policy recommendations of austerity economists are characteristically ambiguous, dated, and inaccurate. The analogy with medieval doctors is embedded in a larger argument.

As for the one-liners, just in case anyone should suppose that these snappy attempts at refutation are found only in letters to the editor, I bring to your attention examples D and E. Example D comes from an article about questioning the existence of Diotima, whose existence is disputed. Diotima is described by Socrates, in Plato’s Symposium, as his teacher. Burrell Walsh (1991) said, “It is an anachronism to demand that everything of importance in classical Greece should have documentary evidence. It is as if in the 1990s, “We don’t believe in Franklin Roosevelt because there are no videotapes of him” (Walsh, 1991). The argument is that the second demand would be anachronistic and the first one is just like it, so that one would also be anachronistic. Example E comes from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, the article on informal logic written by Leo Groarke (2006/2011), who quotes therein a claim made by David Hitchcock with regard to teaching good reasoning by teaching fallacies. Hitchcock (1995, p. 324), as quoted, said that the claim that we should teach good reasoning by fallacies is “like saying that the best way to teach somebody to play tennis without making the common mistakes … is to demonstrate these faults in action and get him to label and respond to them” (as cited in Groarke 2006/2011). We have again the same basic scheme: Case #1 is like Case #2; Case #2 would be absurd; therefore Case #1 is absurd.

The cases discussed so far are all refutational in nature. The source claim is cited as evidently absurd and obviously to be rejected; its absurdity is put forward as a reason that the target claim is absurd and should also be rejected. One might infer that all analogies of this general type are refutational in character. I submit that that is not the case, although my experience suggests that the refutational use of such analogies is rather common. Case H illustrates a positive urging on the basis of analogy; there a writer urges a claim that students should be allowed to keep out of a photograph on the grounds of its similarity to another claim, that people should be allowed not to sign a petition (Couchman, 2015). Case I appears similar, though its interpretation is somewhat more complicated. Mark Simpson (2015) writes “Any Canadians feeling smug about Americans struggling with slavery’s aftermath should visit a northern reserve in this country before wearing their sanctimony on their sleeve.” The point seems to be that conditions on Canada’s northern reserves are similar to those under slavery in the United States; the latter are shameful; so too are the former. Simpson is maintaining that Canadians are relevantly similar to Americans in having something to be ashamed of and therefore they should not be smug about American struggles.

Granting that these examples exemplify analogical arguments from case to case, we arrive at further questions about their nature. Some have claimed that these are a priori arguments by analogy, a stance I have taken in my textbook A Practical Study of Argument (Govier, 2010) and in several essays on analogy (Govier, 1985; 1989; 1999; 2002). In an a priori analogy, the source case may be real but need not be real; the reasoning is based on an appeal to consistency; and we are urged to make a decision, to decide to treat the target case in a certain way, as distinct from predicting an outcome as we would on the basis of an inductive argument. But these considerations are not as clear and definitive as one might like, as has been revealed in some recent discussions.

Looking back at the examples considered, most of the source cases are indeed hypothetical—although unlike the famous Thomson violinist case, they are not entirely fanciful
or *a priori* in nature. Indeed, one might submit these cases to scrutiny on broadly empirical grounds. Marcello Guarini (2004) pointed out, correctly, that empirical evidence can be relevant to the qualities of both the source case and the target case. This point can be applied to my examples here. For instance, in Example A, someone might indeed maintain that in fact forks do cause obesity. He might contend, against a premise of the analogical argument, that a person can eat more quickly and efficiently with a fork than with a knife, hands, or chopsticks; one can eat more with a fork, so forks contribute to obesity. Such a person might even establish that finding as the result of a formal study. As to Example B, it is possible that people in Russia would favorably consider putting a monument to residential school victims in Red Square; such an initiative might seem to some Russian citizens to provide a suitable statement of anti-colonialism, strategically placed to remind Russian of a positive difference between their state and Western nations; one could go to Russia to do interviews on the matter. Regarding Example E, comparing the teaching of reasoning to the teaching of tennis, experience could demonstrate that exploring and labeling common errors actually is an effective approach for teaching tennis. Again, a key premise of the analogy would be shown false by such a result.

The responses just envisaged here rely on empirical evidence, and if such claims were correct or even plausible, they could ground significant criticisms. The basic scheme is ‘Case #1 is like Case #2; Case #2 is W; therefore, Case #1 is W.’ If one can cast doubt on the claim that Case #2 is W, the argument would be shown inadequate due to the unacceptability of its second premise. The arguments are based on a clear verdict about the source case being transferred to the target case, and if there is no clear verdict about the source case, the strategy will not work.

I allow, then, that the assessment of such case-by-case arguments such as these is not an entirely *a priori* matter and hence agree with what Marcello Guarini said about this matter in 2004. Empirical claims about the source and the target can be incorporated into reasoning about the merits of case-by-case arguments. In these arguments we are urged to treat the target case as we treat the source case: the reasoning is that we agree about how to treat the source case, and the target case is similar to it. If the source is absurd, so too is the target. If the source is reasonable, so too is the target. If there is something incorrect about the claim about the source, or about the similarity between source and target, the argument does not hold up. Empirical evidence is often relevant to these claims.

One might urge that what is *a priori* in the argument and in our reasoning about its merits is not the features of the compared cases, but rather, the significance of the similarities between them. The inference to be made is one based on similarities between cases and we reason about the significance of those similarities. And yet this point does not mark a firm distinction between supposed *a priori* analogies in which a verdict or decision is urged and inductive analogies in which a prediction is urged. For inductive or predictive analogies too, when we appraise the argument, we will be reasoning about the significance of similarities and differences between the cases. Obviously, for both sorts of analogy, those seeking to appraise the argument will be reasoning. There is an obvious sense in which reasoning as such is *a priori*; its *a priori* nature will not allow us to draw a distinction between *a priori* analogies and inductive one. As urged by Lilian Bermejo-Luque (2012), one can classify all analogies as structurally similar. But I would still maintain that there is a key epistemic difference between *a priori* analogies and inductive ones.

The assessment of the significance of similarities is *a priori* in some arguments while in others it is empirical. A theory that forks cause obesity would strike most readers as absurd; the point of Example A is that a theory that guns cause criminal violence should be similarly
classified. Given similarities and differences between forks and guns, and the use of forks and the use of guns, how much should those similarities and difference count in favor of the classification? I submit that reflection on that matter is *a priori*. Again, in Example C we find reference to Hitler, someone whose credibility is very low, cited in comparison to Wakefield, someone whose credibility should, according to the argument, also be low. Given near unanimity about Hitler and scientific unanimity about Wakefield, is the degree of similarity between the two cases sufficient to support the conclusion in Example C? How similar, really, are Wakefield and Hitler, and how relevant are their similarities to the claim concluded by the arguer? The details pertaining to the source case and the target case may be empirical and empirically explored, but the significance of similarities and differences as to their counting to support the conclusion is a matter for reflection; a decision as to whether to categorize the target case as W is an *a priori* matter. I contend that it is this matter that marks the difference between *a priori* (decision to classify) analogies and inductive (predictive) ones. Guarini (2004) pointed out that there are degrees of similarity between cases. I agree with this comment, which I believe to be consistent with what I just said.

The work of Bermejo-Luque (2012) brings forth another question about analogical arguments, and that is the question as to whether the features of the cases need to be spelled out in order to understand and evaluate the argument. Need we be able to say what these characteristics x,y,z are, in virtue of which source and target are similar? Need we be able to articulate the basis of the urged similarity between source and target? Several treatments, including several of my own, seem to presuppose that such articulation is required. Against these accounts, Bermejo-Luque (2012) urges that there is an indefinite character of the content of analogies and that this indefinite character is a necessary element of their cognitive explanatory power. She maintains that analogies are somewhat exploratory in nature and their rhetorical power demands on their rather open and indefinite content. The members of the audience have to think about the matter and work out for themselves what is being said. That indefiniteness, she says, gives the analogy a kind of spell, a spell that is not lost just because the claims are used argumentatively. The point of the argument is that, for reasons of consistency, case #1 and case #2 should be treated in the same way. On this theory, it would be pedantry, and misleading pedantry at that, to insist that the similarities between cases be spelled out in order to understand the argument. For Example A, we can understand how the arguer is appealing to forks and obesity to resist the idea that guns are blamed for criminal violence. We know what he is saying and how he is reasoning without considering differences between (for instance) the contexts of fork use and gun use, fork purchase and gun purchase, and so on. Perhaps there is a kind of spell: in any event, there is humor; there is a liveliness of rhetoric.

If we proceed to consider the merits of the argument, things change. The details of similarity and difference do matter at that point. It seems to me that Bermelo-Luque (2012) is correct with regard to understanding and rhetorical force, but not if we extend the point to include a careful assessment of the merits of the analogies. If we proceed to that stage, we do need to consider specific attributes of the cases, and to consider them we will need to spell out at least some of them. To be sure, it may be hard to do that. What I once called the charm of analogies is often due to the absence of the kind of stodgy detail (do we really want to think at length about how fork use might be similar to gun use, or how contemporary economists might be similar to medieval doctors?) that makes them of interest to some but suspect to others. There may be a similarity to narrative argument here; if one begins to spell out the details, all
plausibility disappears. And yet, once we begin seek careful assessment, stodgy details are needed.

James Freeman (2013) agrees with my distinction between *a priori* and empirical analogies. He submits that epistemic considerations about the adequacy of some case-by-case reasoning are *a priori*. It is *a priori* reasoning when we are reasoning as to whether features x,y,z in a source case make that case W (a conceptual issue) and whether the target case is relevantly similar to that source case insofar as it also counts as W in virtue of features x,y,z. When we reason about such matters, we are not making observations, considering facts, or seeking empirical information. Freeman (2013) maintains that what I called *a priori* analogies presuppose synthetic *a priori* warrants. On his analysis, those warrants are couched in universal terms: ‘all cases that are x,y,z are W.’ Though couched universally and *a priori* in nature, these claims are on his account not true by definition. Furthermore, they are defeasible in the sense that they are open to refutation by counter-example. Freeman acknowledges that from childhood we reason from particulars to particulars long before we would be capable of formulating a general proposition that could provide a warrant for doing so. Freeman works, as I often have, with a model presuming that the similarities between the target case and the source case are spelled out. He maintains that the argument from cases presumes a universal of the form ‘all cases that are x,y,z are W.’ (I did not argue for such a presupposition and would not do so now.) According to Freeman (2013), this claim couched in universal terms should not be regarded as a premise of these analogical arguments. Rather, it is a background assumption.

If one takes the position that similarity of attributes should be spelled out in an analogical argument, one can represent it like this:

Case #1 is x,y,z.  
Case #2 is x,y,z.  
Case #2 is W.  
Therefore,  
Case #1 is W.

Is it the feature x,y,z that make these cases W? Are they W *in virtue of* being x,y,z? If so, then apparently, all cases that are x,y,z are W. We can call that claim a U-claim and represent it as a missing premise of the analogical argument, using the reconstruction containing this U-claim as the basis for our assessment. We then have:

1. Case #1 is x,y,z.  
2. Case #2 is x,y,z.  
3. Case #2 is W.  
*4. All cases that are x,y,z are W.  
Therefore,  
5. Case #1 is W.

This is a deductivist reconstruction of the analogical argument on the basis of the universal claim made in (4)*. I shall call this a U-claim.

One point against this style of reconstruction is that it seems to make the original analogy disappear. It renders the original analogy redundant, since from the first premise (1) and the starred premise (4)*, the conclusion (5) may be inferred. Claims about the source case are not
needed in the argument. One may for this reason wish to resist the reconstruction. A second reason for this resistance is that the U-claim may be difficult to articulate. If added, such a claim can turn the original analogy into a deductively valid argument. But the U-claim to be added is not in the original argument, is often unknown, and is often open to counter-example. On these grounds, I have maintained, and would continue to maintain, that such a claim should not be read into the argument. I continue to believe that deductivist reconstruction of analogies along these lines is not sound interpretation. Various commentators including Guarini (2004), Freeman (2013), and Bermelo-Luque (2012), have agreed with this stance.

Turning to another account, Douglas Walton (2012) takes the view that short examples of the type considered here do count as arguments and can be deductively reconstructed. Walton (2012) posits a need to grasp the abstract structure present in the source case and attributed to the target case, and suggests that we can use story schemes to understand the similarity posited. He says that story schemes are based on a kind of understanding that enables one party to explain something to another on the basis of shared common knowledge. In moving from the particular to the abstract, common knowledge of explanations is used. Walton (2012) cites a number of examples, which appear here as Example J and Example K. Example J is one in which an argument is made against “a proposal to give the U.S. Federal Reserve more power to regulate the U.S. financial system”. This proposal is said to be “like a parent giving his son a bigger, faster car right after he crashed the family station wagon” (Newsweek, 2009, as cited in Walton, 2012, p. 203). (The proposed common story would be that a careless person would do worse harm with more to control than he would with less to control.) Example K quotes Steven Pinker objecting to a suggestion that Harvard students be required to take a course in a Reason and Faith category. Pinker said that this would be “like requiring them to take a course in astronomy and astrology” (Pinker as cited in Walton, 2012, p. 208-209). The presumption is that the latter would be absurd because the assumptions of the two disciplines would contradict each other; so the latter would be absurd also. The story implied here would be one of students seeking to fulfill an unrealistic requirement and becoming confused.

Walton’s (2012) suggestion is of interest and strikes me as plausible for some cases. However, if we resist the urge to reconstruct a priori analogies as deductively valid arguments containing a U-claim as a missing premise, we have no need to construct a U-claim, and hence no need to use his suggestion to arrive at a suitable reconstruction.

Bermelo-Luque (2012) is in accord with my stance no U-claim is needed. She does, however, think that a priori analogies are deductive, and she offers a different reason for that stance. She says that their conclusions are intended to be established ‘of necessity’ and the conclusions are put forward as though conclusive reasons for them have been provided. Yet on her view the conclusions of analogical arguments are defeasible.

My position is that analogies of the type considered here are a priori, but it is not that such analogies are in any sense deductive. Let me explain what I mean here, since some may suppose that “a priori” and “deductive” are pretty much equivalent in meaning. I take it that the expression “a priori” means prior to experience, not prior to any and every experience, but logically independent for support on any empirical evidence or appeal to experience. One can know a priori that a square is a rectangle, or that an elderly person is not an adolescent. One knows these things by definition, in virtue of understanding the words used or by reflecting on meanings and criteria and reasoning things out. In turn, reasoning is a priori when one is considering concepts, criteria, meaning, and significance. And for reasons just stated I have
argued here that the evaluation of inference in some analogical arguments is mostly an \textit{a priori} matter. I maintain that whether such arguments are deductive is a distinct issue.

Underlying this issue, obviously, is the question of how we are to understand “deductive” in this context. In the late seventies and early eighties, there was a lively discussion about how to distinguish deductive arguments from inductive ones. I was one of many who participated in that discussion, in which were considered different proposals as to what “deductive” might mean, in the contexts of differentiating deductive arguments from inductive ones. There were difficulties. If “deductive” meant “deductively valid”, then there would be no \textit{invalid} deductive arguments, which seemed to pose a problem and went contrary to all textbook treatment of deductive arguments. If “deductive” meant “intended by the arguer to be deductively valid”, there was a problem in that many arguers lack such an intention, lacking the requisite concepts to have that intention in the first place, and nevertheless manage to put forward deductively valid arguments of familiar types such as \textit{modus tollens} and disjunctive syllogism. If we were to define “deductive” in terms of the confidence and tone of an arguer, as presumed by Bermelo-Luque (2012), we would again encounter problems. For instance, a perfect instance of \textit{modus tollens} might be put forward tentatively by a timid person; an induction based on a single vivid anecdote might be put forward with high confidence by a bold person, and so on.

Resisting both deductivist reconstruction based on an inserted universal premise and Bermelo-Luque’s (2012) reasons for labeling some analogies as deductive, I deny that these case-by-case arguments of the type considered here are deductive. However I am inclined to maintain my stance that these sorts of argument are \textit{a priori}, even while admitting that in the context of analogy as elsewhere, the distinction between \textit{a priori} and empirical can be somewhat wobbly.

Freeman (2013) observes that the conclusions of these sorts of arguments are defeasible, even in instances where we have judged the argument in question to be good. I am fully in accord with this stance, and would like to note here several points that help to support it. Our reasoning about similarities and differences and their significance is \textit{a priori}. It can nevertheless lead us to a verdict of inferential non-support, some inferential support, or inferential full support. Any of these verdicts may be revised on further consideration, and none of them requires a conclusion to the effect that the analogy, even as appropriately reconstructed, amounts to a deductively valid argument. Looking at the examples cited here, my own assessment is that few offer cogent arguments that should convince us of the intended conclusion. Members of the audience will of course reach their own conclusions, but mine is that only Examples D, G, and H can reasonably seen as giving some support. The intended conclusions for these arguments are:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{D.} Good reasoning and critical thinking should not be taught through fallacies.
  \item \textbf{G.} Europe’s technocrats should not prescribe austerity measures for Greece.
  \item \textbf{H.} Four Muslim students should be permitted not to appear in a school photograph supporting diversity.
\end{itemize}

Given the significance of the issues raised and the brevity of the arguments concerned, it is highly plausible to say that these conclusions are defeasible, as Freeman (2013) has maintained. Examining these conclusions, it would be surprising if any argument at all were to demonstrate

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any one of them in such a manner that they turned out not to be defeasible. Thus my account is in accord with Freeman’s on the matter of defeasibility, though I arrive at that conclusion by a different route.

3. Conclusion

To sum up my discussion here, I have argued that there exist case-by-case arguments, which can be represented in terms of their premises and conclusions. I submit that there is no mistake of logicism or the like, in proceeding in this way. Often such arguments are employed to refute a claim or another argument; however, they may also be used in support of a claim, urging support by consistency of treatment with another case. When assessing these case-by-case arguments, empirical considerations about the nature of the compared cases are often relevant. As stated, these case-by-case arguments are not deductively valid and it is not useful to reconstruct them as deductively valid by articulating a universal claim spelling out the abstract similarity between the cases. Nevertheless it makes sense to categorize such arguments a priori, because in their evaluation a key matter is the significance of similarities and differences, and the appraisal of that significance is an a priori matter. As explained, the conclusions of such argument are defeasible. Lastly, I hope that the many examples cited here can provide some members of the audience with grist for the mill of analogies.

References


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APPENDIX

Example A. “guns are no more responsible for criminal acts than forks are responsible for obesity.” <Paul Betts, letter to the editor, Calgary Herald, December 8, 2015.>

Example B. “Picture this: a monument to the victims of residential schools but in Red Square, near the Kremlin. Sound absurd? No more so than a monument to the victims of communism in front of the Supreme Court of Canada.” <James Stauch, letter to the editor, Globe and Mail, June 27, 2015.>

Example C. With regard to a University of Toronto course on Alternate Health, “Students were also required to watch a two-hour interview with the thoroughly discredited Dr. Andrew Wakefield. Citing the work of Dr. Wakefield—the data falsifier behind the entirely debunked autism/vaccination link, in a course that covers vaccine safety—is like using Hitler’s diaries as the primary text for World War II in Central Europe.” <Tabitha Southey, column “Anti-vaccine course brings U of T one step closer to offering a masters of pseudo-science”, Globe and Mail, July 10, 2015.>

Example D. With regard to disputes about whether the figure Diotima actually existed in ancient Athens, or was invented by Plato and the argument, in that dispute, that there is no reliable written documentation as to her existence. “It is an anachronism to demand that everything of importance in classical Greece should have documentary evidence. It is as if we in

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I am grateful to John Wisdom for permitting me to see this manuscript and to Roger Shiner for making it available to me.
the 1990s said, “We don’t believe in Franklin Roosevelt because there are no videotapes of him.” <Burrell Walsh, “Diotima – the Last Teacher of Socrates”, in The Quest, summer 1991.>

**Example E.** David Hitchcock, with regard to the issue of whether good reasoning should be taught by the teaching of fallacies, states that to claim that we should teach good reasoning by fallacies is “like saying that the best way to teach somebody to play tennis without making the common mistakes … is to demonstrate these faults in action and get him to label and respond to them.” <David Hitchcock, “Do Fallacies Have a Place in the Teaching of Reasoning Skills or Critical Thinking?” in Hans V. Hansen and Robert C. Pinto, editors, Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings. University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press.>

**Example F.** Columnist Andrew Coyne asks “Will Canada’s economy survive onslaught of election promises?” Coyne answers his own question affirmatively but states that he fears determined efforts by politicians to save the economy, because “nothing is as likely to kill the patient as the remedies propose by its unlicensed physicians.” Then, adding another analogy, Coyne comments on cutting the benchmark interest rate saying “Central banks, as John Crow used to say, must operate like a motorist driving through fog, navigating only through the rear-view mirror. That is, the evidence on which they base policy will typically be not only ambiguous and inaccurate, but months old, while its effects, as uncertain as they are, will not be felt until many months later.” <This last point is then developed. National Post, July 15, 2015>

**Example G.** With regard to efforts to influence the financial policies of the Greek government in time of crisis, Paul Krugman states that European creditors should not have sought to bully Greek policy makers. “But the campaign of bullying . . . was a shameful moment in a Europe that claims to believe in democratic principles. It would have set a terrible precedent if that campaign had succeeded, even if the creditors were making sense.” Krugman adds, “What’s more, they weren’t. The truth is that Europe’s self-styled technocrats are like medieval doctors who insisted on bleeding their patients – and when their treatment made the patients sicker, demanded even more bleeding.” Krugman then defends this second analogy, saying, “A ‘yes’ vote in Greece would have condemned the country to years more of suffering under policies that haven’t worked and in fact, given the arithmetic, can’t work: austerity provably shrinks the economy faster than it reduces debt, so that all the suffering serves no purpose.” <Paul Krugman, “Ending Greece’s Bleeding,” New York Times July 5, 2015.>

**Example H.** “I sympathize with the four Muslim students who did not wish to participate in the rainbow photograph at their school. Just as people should be allowed to decline a petition, people should be allowed to decline to participate in a demonstration or photograph. The desire to abstain from a particular event does not necessarily represent opposition to the underlying cause.” <letter to the editor by Bruce Couchman, Globe and Mail, June 30, 2015, regarding a previous article “The Dark End of the Rainbow” published in that paper on June 26, 2015. That writer had criticized Muslim students who did not wish to appear in a photograph supporting diversity.>

**Example I.** “Any Canadians feeling smug about American struggles with slavery’s aftermath should visit a northern reserve in this country before wearing their sanctimony on their sleeve.” <letter to the editor by Mark Simpson, Globe and Mail, June 24, 2015.>

Example K. “That insistence on the backwardness of religion is why, on a warm October afternoon in 2006, at a small faculty luncheon at a Cambridge, Mass., bistro called Sandrine's, Pinker launched his bomb. The topic of the meeting was curriculum reform, but Pinker homed in on religion, declaring that requiring students to take a course in a Reason and Faith category would be like requiring them to take a course in Astronomy and Astrology. ‘Faith,’ he said, ‘is believing in something without good reasons to do so. It has no place in anything but a religious institution, and our society has no shortage of these.’” <From Lisa Miller, “Why Harvard students should study more religion”, in a *Newsweek* article, February 2, 2010, retrieved from [http://www.newsweek.com/why-harvard-students-should-study-more-religion-75231](http://www.newsweek.com/why-harvard-students-should-study-more-religion-75231).> Walton (2012) discusses this article in “Story similarity in arguments from analogy, in” *Informal Logic*, 32(2), pp. 208-213.>