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Diversity in Argumentation Theory

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Abstract: There is still a high degree of expectation that argumentation should be understood from the perspective of the logical mode of reasoning with little attention to intuitions, emotions and physicality. Our proposal intends to develop a comprehensive understanding of argumentation from the perspective of Michael Gilbert's Theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation. This approach allows the introduction of diversity in Argumentation Theory, investigating in depth the relations between logic, intuitions, emotions and physicality in cases of argumentation.

Key words: Diversity, emotional mode, kisceral mode, logical mode, Multi-Modal Argumentation, visceral mode.

1. Introduction. It has been now a long time since we decided to introduce changes to the way we had been teaching a critical thinking course called Modes of Reasoning. That happened when we read *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (1984) by social and political theorists Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. That book helped us to understand that power relations existed in many areas of the social processes: social classes, gender relations, racial and ethnic relations, sexual orientation and preferences, body abilities, and several others. In each category, we included the dominant groups and the subdued ones:

- ⇒ Men over
 - women
- ⇒ Whites over
 - non-whites
- ⇒ Heterosexuals over
 - people of different sexual orientations or preferences
- ⇒ Able body people over
 - people whose bodies have a physical condition
- ⇒ Human beings over
 - the rest of nature

In all these cases, the main issue is the dominant position of the upper layers over the subdued ones: they have power over the others, resulting in imbalances of status in each category.

We added a category at the end that referred to modes of reasoning: Logic is dominant over intuition, emotion and the physical in the case of human capacities. Thus, the teaching of Modes of Reasoning courses entailed to discuss the logical mode in detail and systematically and show whenever it was the case the problems of the subdued modes of experience. Thus, for example in the case of emotions, show that they are likely going to take us to fallacies.

We called all of the above: “structures of domination.”

Very significant advances have taken place in all the structures mentioned except for the one in modes of reasoning.

Therefore, the main purpose of this paper is to show that we need to confront the fact that all modes of reasoning need to be studied, evaluated and assessed in a way that is fair to their specific nature.

For this purpose, we start from Michael Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation. However, before we introduce this theory it seems appropriate, given the title of this paper, to refer to an analysis that argumentation theorist Catherine Hundleby (2011, p. 61) undertakes of what she evaluates as “androcentrism as a fallacy of argumentation.” She claims that this fallacy: holds significantly for ethnocentrism and other forms of ‘centrism’. Centrism is treating members of a privileged group of people as standard or ideal; it takes the forms of racism, hetero-sexism, and ableism, as well as other types of discrimination.

In Hundleby’s rich elaboration, the main point is that androcentrism is a fallacy in so far as it treats men as the standard or ideal and thus it becomes another type of discrimination.

In introducing Michael Gilbert’s theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation, it is interesting to mention that shortly before he does so in his book *Coalescent Argumentation* (1997, p. 2), he discusses the topic of the relation between feminism and argumentation. A quote from this book summarizes the problem.

[W]hen an approach is official, when it is presented as the only way to proceed, or as the correct way to proceed, when the bureaucratic establishment in government, business, and academe will brook no deviation, then its power is too great. People are not heard and their communications dismissed because they do not ‘make sense’ according to the Critical-Logic mode. They are set aside because they are emotional, fallacious, mystical, based on feelings, argued incoherently or illogically. In this sense, it is not women who are illogical, but logic that is illogical, because it is illogical to expect every person and every community to fit into a specific pattern, be it formal or informal, in order for it to be acceptable.

Michael Gilbert introduces his theory of Multi-Modal argumentation in Chapter 6 of his book mentioned above. Because of its significance for this paper, the introduction is quoted in full:

It has been argued in previous chapters that the traditional and dominant mode of arguing, the C-L, Critical-Logical mode, is restrictively narrow. When this mode is seen as the only one legitimate form of rational argumentation, then there are profound and unreasonable limitations on actual argumentation as performed by real actors, and the limitation of methods favored by one group over another. These limitations provide both descriptive and normative reasons for rejecting the C-L mode as the sole legitimate form of argumentation. In this chapter, three new modes of argumentation, raising the number to four, are introduced. In addition to the classical logical mode (usually and egregiously identified with “the rational”), there are the emotional, visceral (physical) and kisceral (intuitive) modes. This chapter introduces these modes (p. 75).

Dealing with imbalances of power in the structures of domination mentioned at the beginning does not mean that the power relations need to be turned around such that women should now become dominant over men, that non-white racial and ethnic groups should now

have power over white people, that people of other sexualities and preferences should now have power over heterosexuals, etc. In the case of modes of reasoning, that intuitive people, emotional people and physical people should have power over logical people. The crucial task is to ascertain the relations between them in a way that can be fair. Thus, sometimes the mode stressed should be the intuitive, other times the emotional and still other times the physical or the logical mode.

When people argue (argument 1 or argument 2, although we are concerned in our research mainly with argument2), we need to be aware of the mode that is at stake: it could be the logical mode of course such as in the case of a mathematical theorem, but it could be the emotional mode such as in the case of a sentimental relation, or the intuitive mode in cases for example of assessing the best course of action when we have no experiential basis to judge, or the physical mode when the issue is for example a case of tasting.

The concern, given our educational system, is that the logical mode tends to be overvalued in all cases of argumentation. Indeed, if we are dealing with a mathematical theorem or a logical deduction, the logical mode is paramount. Although, the intuitive mode plays a part here since the principles of logic seem to be intuitively ascertained.

2. Reflections on Gilbert's four modes of argumentation

We proceed now by examining each mode in detail beginning with the logical mode.

2.1 The logical mode has a history of approximately 2,500 years. We could perhaps say that it appeared together with writing in either the 9th or 8th century B.C. For the development of philosophy, the logical mode was crucial. It was Aristotle who gave it the pre-eminence as a respectable structure that became a cornerstone of Western Civilization.

In his book *Coalescent Argumentation*, Michael Gilbert (1997) prefers to call it logical mode instead of rational mode arguing that the term rational leads to a more general discussion than what is necessary given the topic of his theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation. Indeed, Gilbert believes that his theory relates closely to natural language.

The logical mode of argumentation has been very relevant in history. Among other contributions, it has allowed the development of science and technology, the development of discussion, deliberation, of finding agreements and disagreements through the use of logical argumentation.

Gilbert acknowledges that universities guide themselves by this traditional mode. However, he claims that, at the same time, the term "rational" which tends to be identified with logical has become too narrow and restrictive.

Multi-Modal Argumentation theory as proposed by Gilbert opens up to the world of everyday life by searching natural language. In that way, he manages to identify other ways of arguing besides the logical mode. He maintains that through conversations in everyday life, people argue in the four modes that his theory proposes.

Consequently, it seems very difficult to find the logical mode in a state so to speak "pure" in daily life or even in academic endeavors. Given this fact, it is possible to claim that a definition of the logical mode becomes a complex task, although we can count on many academic papers that provide logical definitions. The point here is that these papers are fundamentally academic, developed with great effort in universities to communicate what we believe is relevant for the development of human knowledge.

In this paper, we follow Michael Gilbert's approach in order to study argumentation from the perspective of how it appears in daily life. Now, the task is to define the logical mode from that vantage point.

Michael Gilbert says that the term "logical" is used in order to isolate a sense of the "rational" that can be correlated with reasoned linearity that ideally happens in dialectical argumentation. He highlights the linearity of logic according to which arguments are presented in a sequential way, that is, propositions follow from others in a dialectical argumentation. However, the process as it happens in reality is not exactly linear. In this sense it is appropriate to refer to contemporary philosopher Byung-Chul-Han (2019), who claims that with the development of globalization culture has been losing that linearity in so far as it is insufficient to explain the high degree of violent social and political upheaval. In this sense, the logical mode does not seem to be sufficient to explain many things that happen in our contemporary world.

Gilbert also maintains that an argument is evaluated as logical if it takes its information, that is, its support and evidence, from traditional rationalistic sources and besides, if it can be put in a traditional rational form.

Broadly, we could characterize the logical mode as the attempt to present ideas to other people in the form of arguments where those ideas could be validated. Therefore, how should we understand validity? We could do so if we do it in the shape of premises that would validate conclusions. In any case, we appeal directly to the logical capacity of interlocutors. We do not appeal to their emotions or their intuitions or to their physicality. Rather we treat the interlocutor as of equal reasoning capacity, someone with whom we can establish a relation of logical equality.

According to some authors, logic, argumentation, and critical thinking are disciplines open to accept their limits and able to question and confront their very nature. As we can see, this way of conceiving logic includes self-analysis as one of its distinctive characteristics, and moreover it legitimates the question for its definition and even its relevance. We can therefore say that logic, understood as an open discipline, allows to permanently update its limits and delineate its sense and meaning.

However, we believe that, so far, we still need more elaboration in order to understand what is meant by logical argumentation. In this way we can be prepared for a better understanding of what Michael Gilbert calls the logical mode. Perhaps, a few comparisons may help us to advance in the understanding of this concept.

It is important that we point out at this stage that research in psychology has recently discovered empirically that the physical or visceral mode is connected to the logical mode. In particular, psychologists refer that when we speak, simultaneously we move our hands. Such movement according to them is not just a meaningless gesture. We will examine this view in the section of the paper that refers to the physical mode.

We should perhaps digress at this point in order to show an example of the way non-verbal language has been viewed as no more than simply appearing together with verbal language. For example, J. L. Austin (2003), in the sixth lecture of one of his best-known works, *How to Do Things with Words*, mentions that non-verbal language, that is to say certain gestures that would provide some strength to the verbal expressions, are simply elements that accompany them.

As we know, this posthumous work by Austin is a collection of the lectures he gave over several months at Harvard University in 1955. These lectures became the culmination of his theory of speech acts. Therefore, the sequence of these lectures, show the advances that Austin

made throughout that year. Now, in spite of what he said in the sixth lecture, in the ninth one he changed his view by assigning for the first time a legitimate and proper space to non-verbal language: here Austin mentioned that illocutionary acts may also be developed by non-verbal acts. He remarks, however, that these non-verbal acts must be necessarily conventional in the same way as verbal acts. Thus, at this point, Austin does not characterize non-verbal acts as simply appearing together with verbal acts.

In a different way, psychologists, as mentioned above, today have verified that the movement of the hands is a thought which allows oral speech to be articulated. That is to say that hand gesture contributes inherently to the development of thoughts.

This development in psychology may be interpreted as a way to validate even further Gilbert's theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation.

Since we have worked for many decades in universities, Multi-Modal Argumentation theory has helped us to deliver our teaching, in the area of critical thinking and other areas, with a 'high doses of reality.' Given that the logical mode is central in universities, we tell students half joking that the university is the 'cathedral of logic' so that the introduction of Gilbert's theory allows students to be aware of other ways of experiencing arguments. It becomes a sort of opening to a different way of interacting with people with other ways of arguing, thus allowing students to be aware of the way we all argue. We believe that this is a necessary attitude to improve communication in social groups that are increasingly more heterogeneous and interdisciplinary.

For that reason alone, we must acknowledge that we consider Michael Gilbert's theory as ground-breaking. For academics who work with ideas, concepts, categories, and theories, we believe that logical argumentation is vital for the development of the analysis of all sorts of topics. At the same time, that logical praxis itself shows that frequently we find areas that are not commensurable with the realities that we are dealing with from the logical perspective. We may even discover that the logical mode is not sufficient to understand the issues that we are dealing with. When that happens, we may seek help from literature, poetry, the fine arts and the humanities. In that way, we may find for instance intuitions that allow us to continue working in the logical endeavour. Or in more extreme cases, we just stay at the level of intuitions!

2.2 We examine now the emotional mode of argumentation

First, we need to introduce the way in which emotion is understood in our research and in this paper. For this purpose, we agree with the approach taken in the book *Emotion in Discourse* edited by J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Laura Alba-Juez (2017): In our research and in this book, as its title makes evident, we have chosen the term emotion, and within emotion we include, indistinctly, feelings, moods and all kinds of affective experience (p. 15). We think that a definition like this one is necessary and sufficient for our main purpose at this stage of our research.

This mode represented for us a challenge in our teaching of courses in Modes of Reasoning, especially when we had to deal with informal fallacies and in particular with the fallacies that some authors label as emotional fallacies. From the perspective of Multi-Modal Argumentation, the emotional fallacies may be seen in a different light. It was for us surprising to realize that many of them were not necessarily fallacious. Moreover, they could be evaluated as a legitimate way of arguing especially in the context of everyday life. The experience of teaching the course in this new light took us to reflect deeply on this paradoxical issue. Students

tended to agree with us that we ought to be careful when assessing emotional fallacies. We realized that one core problem is that emotions have tended to be seen in a rather negative light in western civilization, especially as contrasted with logic which has been assumed as the paradigm of good reasoning in that tradition.

This approach to the study of fallacies precipitated in our courses of Modes of Reasoning a fruitful debate. However, the exchanges with students and among ourselves was longstanding and difficult until we realized that Gilbert's theory could provide an answer to our queries. The answer can be summarized by reference to the notion of "context."

Given that arguments in general happen beyond the academy and relate intimately to the language used in daily life, it is important to concentrate on the illocutionary force that the context provides to discourses. This awareness took us to realize that in many cases of argumentative exchanges the emotional mode was a legitimate one. This can happen when emotions appear as central in exchanges in which the issues involved relate rather to private life such as the relations between members of a family, or the relations between friends or lovers, in general, relations that can be defined by intimacy or trust. The question is whether such cases could be properly investigated in the context of the academy if only the logical mode is accepted. This suggests that the approach provided by Gilbert's theory could be useful in dealing with intimate relations or those that involve trust.

It seems easy to judge arguments in which emotions appear as ipso facto fallacious, so the concept of context may provide a way in which emotional expressions could be examined more fairly in the academy. Now, of course it is possible that some emotions can lead to fallacies, however that should be evaluated with fairness. Furthermore, we should also be prepared to examine arguments that are 'logically fallacious' which can happen for example if there is an exaggerated stress on logic in their analysis.

Since context is being considered now in the approach that we take to emotions, actually a very interesting and challenging way of dealing with them relates to the following: what happens when we examine what we do when we teach as compared with what happens when we have exchanges with students outside the strictly lecturing or tutorial situation. During the class (lecturing or tutorial), it is expected that teachers will try their best to keep their emotions under control. For example, if teachers become angry with some students, they may try to keep that emotion under control and deal with the situation in a calm and restrained way. More interesting is the inevitable state of mind that many teachers have when lecturing: many teachers in our experience have difficulty in controlling their excitement when dealing with a subject for which they have a very positive feeling. Furthermore, many students seem to like that excitement. Indeed, as well as with other matters pertaining to pedagogy research would be needed.

Now, what happens when a class is over, and a student approaches us and begins to tell us about the reason why she could not attend the exam the week before. She had a personal problem and wonders as to whether she could still have another chance. Probably in such case there is a combination of emotional and logical arguments. And what do we as teachers do in such case? Perhaps a combination of emotions and logical analysis as well. We are still in the university but beyond the classroom, so other factors come to play. Our relation with the student is just institutional, we may hardly know the name of the student, and, in fact, we know almost nothing about the student. But the student wants badly to have a chance to write the exam, so the emotions are running very high. The issue for the teacher is still institutional and may feel emotions as well, but a sense of fairness is central to the job.

In the case of medical professionals, emotions will develop in their relations with patients as well: and they perhaps will recognize the need to allow emotional reactions on the part of the patients and even in their own selves. And so is the case when a very tough social and or political situation develops. People are expected to react emotionally.

Therefore, we must be able to recognize that emotional arguments do exist in every aspect of our lives and we cannot just assume that either they should be controlled and be considered fallacious or worse, repressed. Rather, the role of the argumentation theorist is to be able to investigate emotional arguments without assuming that by nature they are fallacious. Of course, some emotional arguments may be fallacious, but clearly not inherently.

In our pedagogical experience, we have come to realize that teaching involves emotional argumentation as well as physical and kisceral argumentation. It is true that in our fields, logical argumentation tends to predominate and of course we must be respectful of this fact. At the same time, we must be aware of the input of the other modes of argumentation. We tell our students that when we enter into the classroom, it is not only our heads floating in the air one or more meters from the floor. True, it must be made clear that we are there to understand and develop knowledge at the same time that we must be clear that we think with the mind that is related to the brain, and ultimately that we are a multi-dimensional unit of body, mind, emotions and subjectivity.

Our intention is that in a course on argumentation and critical thinking, students could be in a position of overcoming the positivist limits according to which critical thinking is just an intellectual competence.

Also, it is worth mentioning that, for example, when a student becomes uncomfortable and begins to close the laptop and put away the pencils and books, it may be a visceral sign that the class is about to be over in spite of our emotional involvement with the lecture. Or if a student gestures with the hand, another visceral sign, indicating a disagreement with our view, we should be prepared to stop and ask the student to express the disagreement. This one may be an emotional disagreement and then we should be able to discuss as openly as possible the matter with that student and possibly with all of them.

In summary, we are now in a position to quote one of Gilbert's main characterizations of emotional arguments as compared with logical arguments:

Logical arguments are based on an appeal to the linear patterns that lead us from one statement or set of statements to a claim. These arguments are linguistic, dialectical and classically identified with serial predications. Emotional arguments demonstrate how we feel about certain claims or aspects of the argumentation procedure, and communicate emotional reactions through a variety of means to a disputed partner. In addition, emotions are sometimes used as warrant or data for claims. (p.84)

In developing theories, we foremost rely on our analytical capacity. In the process of analyzing, we tend to separate what in reality appears unified. Perhaps, it happens that since the beginning of the educational system, we are taught that we are rational beings who must always try to argue in a logical way, therefore neglecting the role that emotions may play in our education.

We inherited from Ancient Greek philosophers, as well as medieval and later in particular modern philosophers, a certain reverent fear of expressing emotions. According to Plato, the

development of the lower parts of the soul was characteristic of the class of producers who were ignorant of true knowledge. True knowledge, which only can be achieved by philosophers, is eminently rational and logical. Rational knowledge must be grounded in reason and it may be still conceived as emancipatory. As Kant (2000) said in the eighteenth century, rational knowledge allows us to come out of childhood.

In that way, western civilization divided us from the inside into irreconcilable parts: emotion corresponds to the animal side and reason to the human side. However, in fact we are emotional animals as well, whatever the level of our logical potential. This allows us to understand emotions as active, real and profound components of human beings.

We tend to conceive of emotion as different from reason. Furthermore, we tend to view emotions as clouding reason. As an example, we refer here to the concept of “psychological transference” that Irving Copi (1995) uses to explain the way in which the emotional fallacy of offensive ad hominem functions. Copi suggests that the impact of this emotional fallacy on the auditorium is so strong, that by mobilizing their emotions their rational capacity is clouded, making a transfer unconsciously from the person who was disqualified, to the invalidation of that person's argument.

Now, while that explanation of how that fallacy functions may be accurate, the issue is that we must make a clear distinction between emotions and emotional fallacies. Not all expressions of emotion are fallacious: conceiving emotions as fallacious per se, is not adequate. We rather believe that between reason and emotion there should be a bridge of real and profound contact. This view does not mean that all emotions are positive for human life, certainly there are negative emotions. But, at the same time, reason without the involvement of emotions can be very negative. In this context, we need to be aware that efforts need to be made to relate emotions to logic in argumentation processes.

In this respect, we quote from argumentation theorists Moira Howes and Catherine Hundleby's paper “The Epistemology of Anger in Argumentation” (2018, p. 1):

While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises and underscore the importance of related inferences. For those reasons, we claim that anger can serve as an epistemic resource in argumentation.

This quote shows that there may be a positive relation between emotions and logic. Moreover, it is important to extend the analysis of emotions beyond argumentation theory to statements about world society and politics. In this sense, a quote from the Indian writer, Panjak Mishra (2016) helps us to move in that direction.

The stunning events of our age of anger, and our perplexity before them, make it imperative that we anchor thought in the sphere of emotions; these upheavals demand nothing less than a radically enlarged understanding of what it means for human beings to pursue the contradictory ideals of freedom, equality and prosperity.

In this way, we believe, Mishra relates emotions to logic and politics.

One question that comes out at this point concerns which is first. Several studies claim that first comes emotion and subsequently logic explains them. But there are also studies that claim that first is logic and then emotion follows. Be that relation as may be, there is, in our view, a strong imbrication between emotion and logic, something that is argued by several approaches in psychology.

In some sense, we could argue that logic is analytical whereas emotion is synthetical. That is to say, logic helps us to separate what in reality appears as united; whereas emotion is global and therefore tends to bring together instead of dividing. Therefore, both logic and emotions could be understood as complementary. According to Gilbert (1997):

In many arguments, and especially intimate relationship arguments, emotion can be essential to break a deadlock by bringing attention to one dispute partner's level of involvement.

2.3

We continue now with visceral or physical arguments. Physical arguments would be those in which the main thrust of the arguments is constituted by physical expressions. There could be words and speeches, emotions, logic involved but the essence here is physical.

We need to refer to the distinction between arguments₁ and arguments₂. Let us say that the physical aspect refers to both:

- 1) Argument₁: Somebody raises a hand arguing that the other should stop.
- 2) Argument₂: An argumentative encounter where the arguers relate to each other by dismissive gestures with the arms and hands while not attempting to understand each other.
- 3) As is the case of logical argumentation, arguments₂ involve arguments₁ as units of the interactions.

It can happen, probably many times it happens, that at the same time when physical expressions appear, there are sentences and/or words produced: "You don't understand this", while making a gesture with the hand, for example.

Now, the expression of sentences or words, let say speech, is already a physical action! Indeed, the phoniatric system is the physical apparatus that makes it possible to interact verbally in an argument. Moreover, ultimately the brain is involved and perhaps other parts of the body. So, the process of arguing₂ is inherently physical and so is the production of arguments₁. Since the ears are involved as well, let us say that arguing is already a highly complex physical activity.

We need to consider as well that arguments may be developed by people with no speech or are hearing impaired. In this case the arguments would proceed in written form or some other forms. In all these cases physical expressions of one kind or another are present.

Therefore, the very nature of argumentation involves the physical, something that we need to take into account to start with.

However, it seems that generally what is meant by argument is not this physical base but the intellectual activity involved: To explore this view, we use as an example the following one:

Somebody claims that ‘Plato’s main dialogue is the *Gorgias* because it has gone beyond the strictly Socratic approach of earlier dialogues and is not yet encumbered by the metaphysical doctrine of *The Republic*’(argument from E.R. Dodds, *Plato Gorgias*, p. 25). Clearly this argument₁ is expressed physically, one way or another, and invites a response from the interlocutor. However, the thrust of the argument goes beyond the purely physical expressions of the utterance.

Indeed, the interlocutor may comment that the arguer has used sounds that are unpleasant, and that does not help for facilitating a discussion, but s/he understands the academic point involved.

The response may be for example that in her/his view *The Republic* is Plato’s main work. This would constitute the beginning of an argument₂ which would proceed by highly intellectual exchanges from both arguers.

What exactly is meant by highly intellectual? Remember, the exchange is still based on physical activity in both arguers. But it goes well beyond that. This is now an exchange that requires careful and systematic reading of Plato’s dialogues, indeed other authors’ interpretations of Platonic philosophy, etcetera. This is what happens especially in departments of philosophy in universities. There is a long tradition going back to Plato’s time. Scholarship is deep and could cover hundreds of thousands of pages in books, papers, articles, etcetera. The arguers need to be aware of the Platonic scholarship to be able to participate successfully in the argumentation.

Therefore, we could say that the argument₂ taking place, although based on a physical basis, cannot be resolved just at this level so to speak. We agree that this argument₂ has a physical basis: it could not take place if there are no alive bodies being involved. This is clear.

However, psychologists who specialize on empirical research on hand gestures claim that the hands function in speaking, thinking and communicating in a way that needs to be addressed. We quote several passages from the book *Why Gesture?* (2017). The first passage refers to the Information Packaging Hypothesis (IPA):

[that Hypothesis] holds that gesture helps speakers package information into units appropriate for verbalization. (p. 15)

When information packaging is more difficult, speakers produce more gestures. (p. 15)

We focus in this chapter on evidence that gesture plays a role in producing speech. (p. 15)

The key claim of the Information Packaging Hypothesis is that producing representational gestures ‘helps speakers organize rich spatio-motoric information into packages suitable for speaking. (Kita, 2000, p. 163) (p. 16)

According to Kita (2000, p.163), spatio-motoric thinking provides an ‘alternative informational organization that is not readily accessible to analytic thinking’ (p. 163) and in producing speech ‘the two modes of thinking are coordinated and tend to converge’ (p. 163). This view implies that producing gestures actually influences the way in which information is packaged into units of speech. (p.16-17)

And Finally:

In contrast, speech arises from ‘analytic thinking’, which is a mode of thinking that organizes information in terms of logic and propositions. Gesturing facilitates information packaging for speaking because spatio-motoric thinking can ‘find’ possibilities for organizing information that analytic thinking may not be able to ‘find’ as easily. (p. 33)

From these quotations we may come up with some conclusions about our understanding of the way that the physical aspects of human beings relate to intellectual work.

First, we could say that intellectual work requires the coordination with physical activity of the body: that is, that intellectual work may not be able to be developed if there are no gestures (with our hands) that contribute to the organization of thinking analytically.

Second, this relates to the way our brain functions in analytic thinking. Somehow, what will come out as speech in say an argument about a philosophical issue, such as the Platonic one referred to above, requires physical participation without which there may not be an academic argument¹ at all and so an argument² either.

Third, we are not trying to reduce the understanding of Plato’s philosophy to purely physical inputs. We must begin with a clear sense that the production of analytical ideas has a reality that must be an essential datum, but those ideas require for their production the participation of what is termed “spatio-motoric thinking.”

Now, this elaboration so far is itself a case of analytical thinking. So, how exactly has the spatio-motoric process been involved in its production? This is a topic for further research, moreover one that could most likely provide new views on the relation between the logical and the physical modes of argumentation.

2.4 Finally, we examine in this section the kisceral or intuitive mode of argumentation

This mode appears certainly as the most complex. When Michael Gilbert introduces this mode of arguing in his book as we saw above, the word kisceral is followed by the word in brackets (intuitive). Thus, we could interpret that kisceral means the same as intuitive. We discuss now the relation between both words.

For that purpose, it is important to quote from the section of the book in which Gilbert discusses the kisceral mode in detail.

The term kisceral derives from the Japanese word ‘ki’ which signifies energy, life-force, and connectedness. The kisceral is that mode of communication that relies on the intuitive, the imaginative, the religious, the spiritual, and the mystical. It is a wide category used frequently beyond the halls of the academe, and before the category is disdained, it should be understood. To begin with, we refer to such phenomena as ‘hunches’, ‘feelings’, even ‘coincidences.’ (p. 86)

First, we should refer to the relation between the words kisceral and intuition. There is a long tradition in philosophy that relates to intuition. Suffice to mention the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Bergson, Husserl and others in which intuition has a significant role to play. Generally, intuition (from the Latin “intuere,” meaning “to look”) is understood in general, as knowing the truth in an immediate way without previous logical reasoning. Now, it might

seem strange, to say the least, if we were to associate the use that these philosophers have of this concept with hunches, feelings and coincidences. Or perhaps, we could say that in principle we cannot discount that association. Why should we discount it? Can we just neglect it? After all, these philosophers must have had hunches, feelings and must have had to deal with coincidences even in their most abstract and deep philosophical elaborations.

However, we need to go back to the beginning of this section. One question that requires examination is the very use of the word *kisceral* derived from the Japanese word *ki* which signifies energy, life-force and connectedness. It seems easier apparently to accept that there is a relation between connectedness and intuition: at least in our own experience, intuition relates to connections beyond the ordinary. We are prepared to accept that we have a sense of general connectedness to the world, to other human beings, to happenings, etc. When people say that they understand something intuitively we could understand that they mean it in that sense: some kind of view that it is possible to appreciate, even as something to think about before accepting it. It may be seen as the beginning of a process for further examination. However, it seems somewhat more problematic to relate to energy and life-force, although these two aspects could be left for further examination. The notion of connectedness is sufficient to take seriously this mode of argumentation.

Adding complexity to the analysis of this mode, let us quote the following from Gilbert's book: "The category *kisceral*, carries with it no metaphysical, and certainly no spiritual, baggage. It refers to a category of communication recognizable to most people".

Clearly, therefore, Gilbert uses the term *kisceral* to refer to a series of argumentation processes that are frequently found in life. It may be seen as too encompassing of experiences that should not be classified together, but it does make sense. Perhaps if need be, in further elaborations of this topic, another mode could be added as Gilbert himself says in another context.

To conclude the section on *kisceral* arguments, we quote and analyze an example that Gilbert provides in his book of such mode of argumentation.

It is difficult to create examples of *kisceral* arguments that are not so outré as to take attention away from the example and the more general issue of the validity of *kisceral* communications. The following is as mundane as might be found.

The Offer

Greg looked at Lisa expectantly. 'Don't you think we should raise the offer? He didn't seem too pleased with it.' Lisa shook her head. 'Don't change a thing,' she said, 'be patient, I just know he'll accept it.'

The key to this example is Lisa's feeling her unprocessed belief that the offer they made will be accepted. (p. 87)

What Gilbert says in this quote, first of all, is that we should be concerned with the recognition that there are *kisceral* arguments and that the issue of their validity is something that requires to be dealt with after we recognize their existence. Stemming from this example, we could say perhaps that the validity of Lisa's claim could depend on the number of similar cases

which turn out to be right. In any event, while in the case of logical arguments we do have a substantial number of concepts concerning validity, in the case of the three other modes no such concepts exist as of yet. This is an important task for supporters of Michael Gilbert's Multi-Modal Argumentation approach.

3. In conclusion.

This paper does not have conclusions in the usual way as would be expected. The reasons are several and varied. First, we have only one empirical case of an argumentation process according to Michael Gilbert's theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation: it was an argumentative dialogue that we undertook between us in early 2018 in preparation for our paper for the ISSA Conference of that year (2019). It tended to be a case of a rather deep disagreement that ended up in an agreement that was very difficult to reach. While we still consider that experience as an important step in our research on multi-modal argumentation, it is clearly not enough to come up with solid conclusions. In any case, it opened a door for further research. In summary, in that argumentative dialogue, we showed that Michael Gilbert's theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation made good sense.

A short summary of the main results of that argumentative dialogue would be helpful. The topic involved in the disagreement related to the government of Chilean President Salvador Allende who was deposed by a military coup in 1973. Both of us were supporters of Allende, but one of us was critical of the way he handled the relation with a center party whose support may have helped to impede the military coup. Given our initial views, we discovered that the disagreement tended to be deep. The argumentative dialogue that was intended to overcome the disagreement, took place during the months of January and April 2018. At the theoretical level, we started with a comprehensive approach that involved Gilbert's theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation. The process was emotionally intense although we tended to keep it going within a logical frame. There were also intense physical reactions. Finally, when it appeared that we would not reach an agreement, something surprising and unexpected happened that provided grounds to reach an agreement. Our immediate evaluation of that event took us to consider it as a kisceral case.

Moreover, it has not been easy to find interlocutors to put in place another case of an argumentative dialogue between people who have deep disagreement concerning the tragic events in Chile in 1973.

Now, the present Conference (OSSA 12) has allowed us to deal in detail and depth with an issue that we have been concerned with for a long time. Indeed, diversity in society, politics and ordinary life is an important topic in our research. We are committed to work for a more democratic society and we believe that in such society the way to deal with argumentation requires an opening to several modes of argumentation. Indeed, argumentation is a critical activity in democratic societies, using now the term as broadly as possible to involve not only high level politics but also all the different levels in which human beings get socially involved being the society as a whole or the many and varied groups that exist in it. Of course, the academy is included. We also value that the academy in its entire breadth of activities provides theories, views, ideas of all kinds that have great impact in the lives of all of us. If diversity has become an extraordinary issue in contemporary societies, then argumentation also needs to be dealt with from the point of view of diversity. And this is what we believe is our contribution with this paper: introduce Michael Gilbert's theory of Multi-Modal Argumentation as a way to

deal more democratically with processes of argumentation by recognizing that the four modes of argumentation need to be seen as hopefully working together and not based on the primacy of the logical mode in all cases.

Finally, in the next stage of our research, we intend to reflect upon the advances of the research on gestures by specialized psychologists, as indicated in the section on the physical mode.

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