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1. Introduction

As someone who has been heavily influenced by the informal logic movement and as a former advisee of J. Anthony Blair at the University of Windsor, the author is delighted that Dr. Federico Puppo has made a case for a “Canadian school” of informal logic and argumentation. However, the author’s personal reaction is one thing, and the existence of such a school is another. Argumentation scholars have to be careful not to buy into a thesis without thinking through support of it, particularly if we are to consider and present ourselves as good at reasoning and arguing.

In his OSSA 12 article, Puppo attempts to discharge his dialectical obligation by responding to Blair’s (2019) confession that he is unable “to recognize anything distinctively Canadian about our [John Woods and Douglas Walton, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Michael Gilbert, and Ralph Johnson and Blair’s] contributions” to the emergence of argumentation as a field of scholarly inquiry (p. 59). As someone who has written extensively on the history of the informal logic movement in the 1970s and 1980s (Konishi 2009, 2011, 2016, 2016, 2019), the author would like to focus on the early days of the movement and bring up some relevant issues based on my own research. Because of limited access to materials from the mid-1990s until now on which to base comments, that period is necessarily outside the scope of this paper. Some of my comments will add another layer to address the “Canadian” component of Puppo’s Canadian-school-of-argumentation thesis. Other comments will focus on the “school of thought” component. Section two briefly offers the gist of his article as a starting point for my response. Section three focuses on the notion of a “Canadian school” with reference to my oral history interview with Govier and Blair and Johnson’s published and unpublished documents. Section four focuses on the notion of “school of thought” and offers several thoughts on “an unbroken intellectual tradition” in the history of informal logic and argumentation (Jaspers, 1949/1959, qtd in Puppo 2020, p. 13)\(^1\). Section five concludes the author’s response. Throughout this response, the author would like to modify Jürgen Habermas’ notion of public sphere and examine the informal logic movement, highlighting the media function of Blair and Ralph H. Johnson as well as the relationship between the history and the theory of informal logic and argumentation (Konishi 2009, p. 22).

\(^1\) Although Puppo (2020) refers to the Megarian school as a third sense of the term “school” in his article—specifically, a group of philosophers under the same appellation (pp. 14-16), the author will group Jaspers’ sense of school of thought and the Megarian school together but focus more on Jasper’s sense because of possible distinctions and overlap between them. Another reason to group these two senses together but focus primarily on Jaspers’ is that the line of support that Puppo (2020) introduces in his OSSA article is a new one, distinct from his introduction to Informal Logic: A ‘Canadian’ Approach to Argument.
2. “Canadian” and “school” as key terms in Puppo’s article

In an attempt to make a case against Blair’s question on the existence of distinct Canadian contributions to the birth and rise of argumentation, Puppo (2020) turns his attention to John Woods, who uses such phrases as “Canadian influence on theories of argument” and the “Windsor approach to formal logic.” Accepting Woods’ position, Puppo (2020) states that:

it seems possible to affirm sufficient clues to sustain the idea that there is, fundamentally, a certain tradition of thought or approach among the ‘Canadians’: that of informal logic and of the analytical approach to philosophy, with a particular way of looking at argumentation and reasoning, and a geographical context which spurred them to share—and often to debate—their respective points of view. This is not to say that only Canadian scholars have developed the informal logic orientation or that only Canadians are involved in its study: but it does seem that this tradition exists and that it was born and was developed in Canada, with a notable connection to Windsor. (p. 5)

Thus presuming that there seems to be a “Canadian” approach, he refers to Leo Groarke’s scholarship on visual argumentation, Michael Gilbert’s scholarship on multi-modal argumentation, and Cristopher Tindale’s scholarship on rhetorical argumentation as collective support for the existence of informal logics and “a more expansive view of argumentation.” (p. 10). In section six of his article, Puppo (2020) draws on Karl Jaspers’ work, which offers two ways in which schools of thought develop:

One way is to imitate a master whose work we carry on by extension, adaptation, and analogous achievement. The other way involves an unbroken intellectual tradition, within which the student may be quite as independent as his teacher, since the tradition usually does not center around a single personality but a group. (Jaspers 1948/1958, qtd in Puppo 2020, pp. 12-13)

Identifying with Jaspers’ second way, Puppo (2020) states that: a “Canadian school” of argumentation “respects the same rule: people inspired by the same principle, working together in an institute” (p. 13). Puppo’s position is clearly stated in the following paragraph:

(W)e can now give a positive answer to the question which began this essay: in our opinion, and for the reasons we have already stated, one can speak of a ‘Canadian school of argumentation’ because there exists, at the very least, a group of Canadian scholars who practice a certain philosophical method [analytic philosophy]; share common goals (to understand and teach argumentation); read and react to similar texts and ideas; carry out a common process of preparation, teaching and learning of knowledge; work within shared educational and scientific organizations; and are associated with common conferences and research center. The Canadian ‘school’ inevitably deals with works and ideas that constitute a large set of theories that, like the pieces of a mosaic, may not fit together perfectly: but, as figurative arts and music teach us, a possible dissonance does not diminish a fundamental harmony. Opinions we find expressed by people we can easily recognize as part of that group demonstrate different perspectives on common themes, but
in a way that reflects their dialogue with each other. These are, basically, opinions expressed by people who work or have worked in the same place (in Windsor, in Ontario, in Canada) and who, as we know, have in some cases become friends: everyone can personally testify. And it is in this very quality that we find, perhaps, the most important confirmation of the existence of a ‘school.’” (p. 16)

It is worth noting at this point that Puppo’s arguments in favor of the existence of a Canadian school of argumentation depend on the acceptability of Jaspers’ conception of schools of thought. Jumping from “is” to “ought” may be a common topic among philosophers, but his position can be interpreted as an instance of pragmatic (consequential) argument. Using Jaspers’ second sense of “school” could have positive consequences for the community of Canadian informal logicians and argumentation scholars, a school brand that Dutch Pragma-Dialecticians have enjoyed but the Canadians have not. The logical, dialectical, and rhetorical cogency of this pragmatic definition and/or argument on “school of thought” deserves serious inquiry. However, the author’s goal here is to think through the term “Canadian school” and examine the unbroken intellectual tradition of Canadian and other informal logicians and argumentation scholars. His lines of thought will focus on media or infrastructure of knowledge production and close examination of historical records.

3. Public sphere as a framework for understanding the “Canadian” informal logic movement

In his historico-sociological research, Jürgen Habermas has analyzed the bourgeois public sphere, defining it as “a realm of our social life in which something approaching public opinion can be formed” (Habermas 1974, p. 49). Three major principles of the literary public sphere—an embryotic form of the bourgeois public sphere—are (1) to disregard status so that the force of arguments determines the outcome of critical argumentation, (2) to allow participants to problematize what has been unquestioned, and (3) to make the sphere inclusive² (Habermas 1991, pp. 36-37). It is, of course, beyond the scope of this response to judge to what extent his sense of public sphere is emperical. For the sake of argument, however, the author will extend the concept to view how consistent the informal logic movement led by Johnson and Blair in the 1970s and 1980s looks, given the spirit and the principles of the public sphere: formation of common or public opinions in a philosopher’s community regarding informal logic and argumentation based on open exchange of arguments among participants about an unquestioned presupposition. The process of examination here seems to lay some groundwork in addressing the issue of the “Canadian” component of the Canadian-school-of-thought thesis Puppo has advanced.

If we see scholarly activity as ongoing collective communication among participants, it can be argued that the defining moment in the informal logic movement was the Windsor Symposium on Informal Logic that Johnson and Blair held at the University of Windsor on June 26-28, 1978. Those attending included Michael Scriven, Howard Kahane, John Woods, Douglas

² While Habermas (1991) emphasizes inclusiveness, he admits the public sphere is open to those who have property and are educated. A fair amount of money was necessary to purchase books (commercial commodity) and a certain level of literacy was required in order to read and discuss literary work. If we apply these conditions for inclusion in the public sphere to informal logicians and argumentation scholars, we can say that argumentative literacy is required for engaging in scholarship on argumentation.
Walton, Trudy Govier, Robert Pinto, John McPeck, Robert Ennis, Deborah Orr. At a symposium, Scriven (1980), “a founder of informal logic,” in Johnson and Blair’s (1994) view, powerfully questioned the dominance of formal logic at the time; Woods’ (1980) questioned the existence of informal logic; and Johnson and Blair (1980) described the state of the art of informal logic and presented a list of problems and issues. Most participants were philosophers, but some faculty members from different departments at the University of Windsor attended.

The Symposium was followed by the publication of a periodical medium; Blair and Johnson started Informal Logic Newsletter in 1978, later stating that it was “designed to be an informational organ for philosophers and others working in the field. Now in its second year, the Newsletter has begun publication of short articles and critical reviews, and its expansion into a journal seems imminent” (Blair and Johnson 1980, p. 161). As has been written elsewhere (Konishi 2016b), the Newsletter took a theoretical turn, introducing scholarly debate on induction and deduction, conductive argument and a priori analogy, and principles of charity, just to name a few areas.

Another achievement of the 1978 Symposium was the publication of the proceedings in 1980 by Edgepress, a small publishing firm owned by Scriven. The publication helped informal logic develop a presence, as evidenced by Habermas’ (1984, pp. 23-24) quotation of the proceedings in his Theory of Communicative Action. The term “informal logic” and its approach started to gain currency in the early 1980s.

Two more International Symposiums on Informal Logic, held in 1983 and 1989, the creation of the peer-reviewed journal Informal Logic, the foundation of AILACT (the Association of Informal Logic and Critical Thinking) and another symposium proceedings, published in 1994, collectively sustained the informal logic movement until OSSA took over parts of the conference and proceedings. The “Canadian” approach to informal logic and argumentation that Puppo endorses in his article, an analytic philosophizing of informal logic and argumentation, came into being because of different Canadian media for argumentative public spheres in which scholars could freely express their ideas on informal logic and argumentation. The significance of these Canadian argumentative public spheres cannot be overemphasized in terms of the development of informal logic and argumentation studies.

However, informal logicians and philosophers of argumentation in Canada and elsewhere have not given sufficient credit to either this Canadian infrastructure of knowledge production or the Canadian scholarly media/publications that served as vehicles for communication among scholars. In the current author’s opinion, this is precisely because argumentation theorists tend to talk about argumentation theories without recognizing what make those theorizing acts possible. Blair’s article (2019) echoes the author’s opinion in that he recognized the value of the infrastructure and media/publications:

Johnson and I did get support from our university as well as from a small conference fund from the federal government administered by a national research-funding council, but I assume that other countries had similar funding available....Canadians got on board partly because of the Windsor conferences, and because the Informal Logic journal cornered the philosophy side of the market as the journal of record for

3 In the first version of this article sent to the commentator, Puppo seems to be under the mistaken impression that there were two symposiums on informal logic, one in 1978 and one in 1980. In fact, the 1978 symposium was Windsor Symposium on Informal Logic, and its proceedings was published by Edgepress in 1980, and the symposium was re-named The First International Symposium on Informal Logic (FISIL).
philosophically-oriented theorizing early on. Perhaps I am too close to see it, but I must confess to an inability to recognize anything distinctively Canadian about our contributions (Blair 2019, italics in original p. 59).

In the author’s view, although Blair seems to dismiss the notion of a distinctly Canadian approach to informal logic and argumentation, the symposiums and Informal Logic did make them possible. It is true that Michael Scriven was an established figure when Blair and Johnson held FISIL in 1978 and financially supported the publication of the proceedings, so he can be regarded as the founding father of informal logic. However, it was Blair and Johnson who created and sustained Canadian argumentative public spheres for philosophizing informal logic by convening three international symposiums, as well as publishing Informal Logic Newsletter, Informal Logic and two symposium proceedings, furthering research in the field in the process. The author regards Blair as overly humble in stating that there is nothing distinctively Canadian about the contributions he and Johnson, Woods, Walton, Gilbert, and Hitchcock made.

There are two lines of support for the author’s contention that Canadian infrastructure made the “Canadian” approach possible. Blair and Johnson (1980) write in the afterword of the FISIL proceedings that “(f)or many of those who attended the Symposium itself, it served to stimulate an active interest in the field of informal logic” (p. 161). One clear example of this is Trudy Govier. In an oral history interview with the author, she (2007) talks about her memories of FISIL.

(H)e [Michael Scriven] gave a very fiery sort of speech, in which he really claimed that there was a cheat with formal logic, because it simply couldn’t handle all of these kinds of arguments and it couldn’t really, couldn’t usefully describe them and couldn’t usefully be used to teach people to handle them. I was very influenced by that speech. I thought there was a whole research agenda here, because if people have this kind of logic, it doesn’t handle these kinds of arguments. Then the question arises: “Well what does handle these kinds of arguments?” And it just seemed to me to be a whole new territory. So I was very influenced by that and that’s the thing that I remember the most of it.

Although Govier had reviewed the manuscript of Logical Self-Defense prior to FISIL, what direction might her scholarly career have taken without FISIL? For that matter, where would the community of informal logicians and philosophers of argumentation be now if there had been no FISIL? It is an important “what-if” question, given that Govier’s (1987) Problems in Argument Analysis strongly influenced Johnson’s Manifest Rationality: A Pragmatic Theory of Argument, and that her textbook, A Practical Study of Argument can be seen as a clear instance of the pluralistic theory of argument encapsulating deduction, induction, and a third class of arguments, including conductive or a priori analogy.

Informal Logic Newsletter and Informal Logic constitute another line of support for my contention that Canadian infrastructure enabled a “Canadian” approach to develop. Their immediate influence may not be as easily recognizable as the face-to-face medium of the symposium as instantiated by Scriven’s influence on Govier. However, these periodical media sustained the scholarly discussion and communication on a regular basis, and Blair and Johnson (1988) recognized their implications for the scholarly communities when they applied to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC) in Canada for the grant to publish Informal Logic in 1988.
Informal Logic serves Canadian authors by providing a forum with an international audience for their research; it serves Canadian Subscribers by putting on display the results of the best research in the field both in and out of Canada….To both our contributors and our readers it provides a sense of the field and the problem that face it.

In the same document, they (1988) refer to Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Douglas Walton, John Woods, and Robert Binkley as scholars who have been published in the Newsletter or Informal Logic and are involved in the editorial process. They also refer to Leo Groarke, Christopher Tindale, Sharon Bailin, and James Gough as young scholars.

As Habermas’ sense of public sphere was limited to people with property and education, Informal Logic also consciously took a position regarding its accessibility.

We avoid as much as possible publishing articles about logic which can be published in other more appropriate journals, such as Journal of Philosophical Logic, Journal of Symbolic Logic, Studia Logic, or Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic. We have adopted a liberal interpretation of what relates to informal logic, because the field is new and we have been the only journal devoted especially to the publication of such research. (Blair and Johnson 1988)

This passage reveals that, in the 1980s, Informal Logic tried to be as open as it could to informal logicians and argumentation scholars, but it also tried to create a sphere separate from those of other logic journals. While argumentation scholars need more careful historical research on the substance of the articles published in Informal Logic to conclude whether the “Canadian” approach to informal logic and argumentation is a distinct version of analytic philosophy, it can be distinguished from other versions of analytic philosophy that other logic journals both consciously and unconsciously endorse.

In summary, the author does not see evidence to suggest that the “Canadian” approach to informal logic and argumentation is characterized by analytic philosophy. Further research is needed to characterize the Canadian analytic philosophy developed in Informal Logic and/or OSSA conferences. However, it seems clear that the Canadian public sphere or infrastructure that Blair and Johnson created and sustained in the 1970s and 1980s enabled informal logicians and philosophers of argumentation to develop the “Canadian” approach to argumentation.

4. What can an unbroken intellectual tradition of informal logicians be traced to?

In advancing a position that a “Canadian” informal logic and argumentation school of thought exists, Puppo seems to be informed by Woods (2019), who states that “(t)he Canadian brand was never as well-defined and organizationally and doctrinally sustained as the Amsterdam brand” (p. 94).

As an alumnus of graduate programs in communication studies at Wayne State University and the University of Pittsburgh (both in the United States) and in the philosophy graduate program at the University of Windsor, the author wonders what is wrong with a non-existence of school of thought among philosophers, or why must a school of thought exist among philosophers, in the first place. Inquiries into argumentation theories and practices within communication studies enjoy the diversity or suffer from the chaos of different approaches,
depending on the viewpoint. Communication studies, as a field of inquiry, consists of humanities and social sciences, with rhetoricians and rhetorical historians (Joseph Wenzel and David Zarefsky), discourse analysts (Scott Jacobs and Sally Jackson), social constructionism scholars (Charles Willard), and public argument scholars (Thomas Goodnight and Gordon Mitchell) seriously inquiring into argumentation theories and practices. It is doubtful that they buy into a common doctrine. They may view argumentation from different ontological and epistemological perspectives and treat different types of argument with different methodologies. Pragma-Dialectics is, arguably, an exceptional branch of argumentation studies whose substance has been controlled for thirty years by van Eemeren and Grootendorst or van Eemeren and Houtlosser.

In maintaining Informal Logic as a forum for theorizing, Blair and Johnson consciously decided not to create a “Canadian brand” like the Amsterdam brand of Pragma-Dialectics, so, under their leadership, a Canadian school of argumentation has always been a non-starter. The grant application document states that: “(w)e have tried to avoid imposing our personal theoretical outlook upon it. However, by selections we make we encourage what seems to us interesting new developments” (Blair and Johnson 1988). In the oral history interview of Blair in Amsterdam at the ISSA Conference, Blair (2018) recalls how editors of Informal Logic operated:

We⁴ didn’t have any—any direction in mind at all. We weren’t—we weren’t leading the— we weren’t sending a signal that this is what we wanted papers on….If…everybody was writing about argument schemes, then we were getting lots of contributions on argument schemes. If everyone was writing about deductive-inductive, we were…getting papers about deductive-inductive and we were publishing those papers. So, we…followed the interests of…the community rather than led by it. Now, of course…there’s likely to be…a mutual interest. We had certain kinds of papers, we publish them, people read the journal, they get interested in those topics, they start writing about them and they send us papers – and so the papers that had earlier appeared in the journal…led to the papers that later appeared in the journal. But it was not because we said, “We want papers on this topic.” It was because that’s how the scholar—the interests of the contributors developed.

Based on their experience of communication studies of argumentation theories and practices, the informal logic movement seems to have more in common with communication studies of argumentation rather than with the Amsterdam school of Pragma-Dialectics. The records of the editorship of Informal Logic also strongly imply that the two leaders of the informal logic movement did not have the ambition to create an explicitly “Canadian school” of argumentation. These written records and oral testimony serve as additional support for Puppo’s (2020) conclusion that “a Canadian school of logic in the strong sense does not exist (p.94)⁵.

Setting aside the position that a “Canadian school exists” in a strong sense, the key question is whether it exists in a different sense. Puppo (2020) cites Jaspers’ conception of

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⁴ The pronoun “we” here probably includes Hans V. Hansen and Christopher Tindale as well as Blair and Johnson. The editors of Informal Logic were Blair and Johnson between 1984 and 1999, Blair, Johnson, Hansen, and Tindale between 2000 and 2016, and have been Blair and Tindale since then.

⁵ It is open to debate whether it is worth pursuing a “Canadian brand” in argumentation studies. When Johnson and Blair (1994) lamented the lack of paradigm in informal logic at the Third International Symposium on Informal Logic (TISIL) in 1989, Scriven pointed out that the notion of paradigm is a dubious construct in history and the philosophy of science (Johnson and Blair 1994, p. 4, 15). The search for paradigm in informal logic, therefore, could mean commitment to a dubious notion. In a similar vein, Puppo’s search for a “Canadian brand” based on Woods could be problematic. The onus is Puppo and Woods to defend the value of the “Canadian brand.”
schools of thought as an unbroken intellectual tradition to maintain his position on the “Canadian school” of argumentation because:

there exists, at the very least, a group of Canadian scholars who practice a certain philosophical method [analytic philosophy]; share common goals (to understand and teach argumentation); read and react to similar texts and ideas; carry out a common process of preparation, teaching and learning of knowledge; work within shared educational and scientific organizations; and are associated with common conferences and research center. (Puppo 2020, p. 16)

It is worth tracing whether “an unbroken intellectual tradition” exists among philosophers to argue for the existence of a “Canadian school” of argumentation. Puppo’s quotation above looks fine on the surface. However, it makes us realize that we need closer examination of theoretical scholarship to see if these conditions are met. Is it generally true that Canadian scholars use analytic philosophy as a method? Do they read and discuss similar texts and ideas? What does it mean that the process of preparation, teaching, and learning of knowledge is “common”? What does it mean that people work within common educational and scientific organizations? How do we judge whether people are associated with common conferences and/or a research center? These are questions about, but not criticism on the above text. However, we should not presuppose that these conditions are met because they constitute support for Puppo’s position.

Puppo (2000) draws on the work of three scholars in advancing an expansive view of argumentation: Leo Groarke’s, Michael Gilbert’s, and Christopher Tindale’s (pp. 6-11). Groarke’s scholarship on visual argumentation, to the best of my knowledge6, first appeared in Argumentation and Advocacy in 1996—an important American medium for argumentation studies; Gilbert’s (1997) conception of argument is heavily influenced by Charles Willard, an American communication scholar, in developing multi-modal argumentation (p. 29); Tindale (1999) draws on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (rhetoricians) as well as Sperber and Wilson (communication scientists) in developing his version of rhetorical argumentation. Arguably, these Canadian scholars’ research can be linked to argumentation studies traditions other than Canadian ones, so the issue of inclusion in or exclusion from a Canadian school of argumentation, if there is such a species, calls for more careful and thorough empirical examination.

Turning our attention again to the Canadian media or infrastructure, the author draws on an agenda published in 1980 in Informal Logic: The First International Symposium as part of the proceedings. In the agenda, Johnson and Blair (1980) offered thirteen problems and issues

1. The theory of logical criticism
2. The theory of argument
3. The theory of fallacy
4. The fallacy approach vs. the critical thinking approach

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6 Groarke also published an article on visual argumentation in Informal Logic in 1996. However, this joint issue was published in 1997 or 1998, due to the perennial delay in publication of the journal (Blair and Johnson 1996). Which article was first published is one issue, but the author would like to point out that an American journal Argumentation and Advocacy was more open to publishing multiple papers on visual argumentation in the same issue. This concerns whose infrastructure or which media for publications, those dedicated to American communication studies or those dedicated to Canadian philosophy, can be linked to Groarke’s scholarship and is related to the “Canadian” component “Canadian-school-of-thought” thesis, as well.
5. The viability of the inductive/deductive dichotomy
6. The ethics of argumentation and logical criticism
7. The problem of assumptions and missing premises
8. The problem of context
9. Methods of extracting arguments from context
10. Methods of displaying arguments
11. The problem of pedagogy
12. The nature, division and scope of informal logic
13. The relationship of informal logic to other inquiries (1980, pp. 25-26)

Groarke’s (1996) inquiry on visual argumentation is related to items 2, 9, 10, 11, and 12 and possibly to item 7 on the agenda; Gilbert’s (1997) multi-modal argumentation is related to items 1, 2, 7, 9, and 10.; Tindale’s (1999) rhetorical argumentation is related to items 1, 2, and 13.

Turning our attention to other informal logicians, Walton has studied the nature of argument and reasoning as well as fallacies (items 2 and 3); Hitchcock (1979, 1987) has inquired into deduction and induction as standard for evaluating argument but not argument types (items 2 and 5) as well as enthymemes (item 7). Govier (1987) has examined conductive argument and a priori analogy as a third class of argument (items 2 and 5), as well as fallacy theory and critical thinking (items 3 and 4). Simply put, Blair and Johnson’s research agenda serves as a checklist for us to examine an unbroken intellectual tradition of the informal logic movement.

The author does not imply that reference to Blair and Johnson’s agenda will decisively establish a claim about the existence of a “Canadian school” of argumentation. A careful textual analysis is necessary to see whether a particular article actually embodies the above agenda item. Also, the author understands that some informal logic scholarship, such as Woods and Walton’s joint articles (2007) predates the 1978 FISIL, so an argument can be advanced that the impact of the informal logic movement is not so significant. However, if we regard informal logic as a philosophical community’s movement to establish a field of philosophical inquiry, the infrastructure (including symposiums, conferences, books, and periodicals) and leadership aspects are important because theorizing and philosophizing can be easily done within the infrastructure prepared by leaders of the movement.

It may be necessary to trace principles or documents in order to justify the claim of an unbroken intellectual tradition. It is the author’s contention that the research agenda by Blair and Johnson (1980) is an important document revealing the beginning of the informal logic movement and may help us understand how the “Canadian school” of argumentation has developed within the Canadian infrastructure of argumentation.

5. Summation

Let me just lay out key points offered and developed in this response to further discussion on the existence of a “Canadian school” of argumentation.

Firstly, it is up to the cogency of pragmatic argument, based on Jasper’s conception of school of thought as an unbroken intellectual tradition. Puppo may presume that we should use Jasper’s conception because it helps us defend the thesis regarding the existence of the “Canadian school” of argumentation.

Secondly, however, it may be the case that the Amsterdam brand of Pragma-Dialectics may be an exceptional instance of a school of argumentation studies. American argumentation
scholars in communication studies seem to live with a range of scholarly approaches that represent diversity—perhaps even chaos. In addition, Blair and Johnson, two leaders of the informal logic movement, did not seem to have the ambition to create a counterpart of Pragma-Dialectics.

Thirdly, instead of offering a doctrine that every informal logician must accept, Blair and Johnson helped to set up Canadian infrastructure or public sphere for informal logicians and argumentation scholars including international symposiums and their proceedings, a newsletter, a journal, and a professional organization. The Canadian infrastructure collectively served as a media for exchanging scholarly ideas. More empirical inquiry about the existence of a distinctively Canadian informal logic and argumentation can be done, but it seems clear that the Canadian infrastructure helped scholarship to develop in the 1970s and 1980s.

Fourthly, Johnson and Blair’s research agenda (1980) can be seen as a catalyst promoting the scholarship of a “Canadian school” of argumentation in the sense Puppo’s adheres to. Since the agenda was published within the Canadian infrastructure of the informal logic movement, it can be argued that, in a weak sense, a school has existed because of the Canadian infrastructure.

These four points collectively add additional layers to the research that Puppo has started. On the one hand they remind argumentation scholars of the importance of the infrastructure of knowledge production. As theorists and practitioners of informal logic and argumentation, philosophers tend to praise, admire, agree, disagree, or ignore ideas developed at conferences and journals. However, they do not fully understand significance of the media and infrastructure that enable them to promote the exchange of ideas and maintain intellectual tradition.

On the other hand, Puppo’s research has prepared a new path to further historical research on argumentation studies. How have philosophers of argumentation interacted with each other to develop a school in a weak sense? How can we situate a particular philosopher’s research in the tradition of argumentation scholarship? The author agrees with Puppo that the history of philosophy tells argumentation scholars something important about history and theory of argumentation. However, scholars need to be more careful about carrying out historical research. Philosophers of argument must avoid jumping to conclusions with limited historical evidence. To make the case for an unbroken intellectual tradition, we have to see how people interact in developing philosophizing and theorizing the field of informal logic and argumentation. As the present author (2009) has stated elsewhere, we have to be careful about how the history and the theory of informal logic and argumentation interact with each other (p. 22).

If the author answers his own call for care in jumping to a conclusion with limited evidence, one weakness of the present response must be pointed out. While Puppo draws heavily on scholarship developed in the 1990s, this response draws more on scholarship done in the 1970s and 1980s. Blair and Johnson were productive throughout these periods, and it can be argued that their leadership role gradually decreased over the years because Hansen and Tindale took care of more than ten OSSA conferences and were also partially responsible for Informal Logic together with Blair and Johnson. More archival research in the 1990s and later might change the picture of history of Canadian infrastructure as well as a “Canadian school” of argumentation.

With that said, the the author would like to take this opportunity to thank Blair, Johnson, Hansen, Tindale, Hundleby Parr, Guarini, and the late Pinto for their efforts with regard to the sustainable development of informal logic and argumentation in Canada. The author would like
to thank Hansen and Blair, in particular, for sacrificing part of their own scholarship for the benefit of the community of informal logicians and philosophers of argument.

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