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'Exhilaration and anxiety': The contemporary peacekeeping debate in Canada.

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Canada
'EXHILARATION AND ANXIETY': THE CONTEMPORARY PEACEKEEPING DEBATE IN CANADA

by

Brian Falck

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research through the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
1993

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Abstract

This thesis seeks primarily to analyze the views expressed on peacekeeping from March 1, 1992 to March 31, 1993 by Canadian elites, the press, Members of Parliament and government officials.

After a brief introduction of the topic in Chapter One, Chapter Two examines the literature on peacekeeping from 1948 to 1992. This investigation reveals that the peacekeeping debate during this time period was narrowly focused on a limited range of peacekeeping subjects. As well, this chapter shows how major peacekeeping events spurred a change in opinion of informed observers on the utility of peacekeeping.

Chapter Three discusses the methodology (content analysis) employed in analyzing the current debate on peacekeeping.

Chapter Four sets out to examine the overall nature of the current peacekeeping debate. The findings indicate an unprecedented depth to the debate on peacekeeping. Many new themes were prominent in the discussion. In addition, older peacekeeping themes were debated from new perspectives. An increased interest was shown amongst observers in Canadian-related peacekeeping themes. The data also reveal, however, that a number of peacekeeping themes were neglected. Finally, decidedly mixed views were discovered on a continued Canadian presence in UN missions.

Chapter Five analyzes each forum of debate separately. This chapter finds that while there was a similar amount of attention given to the most frequently discussed themes overall by each forum, a considerable divergence occurred on other themes. In
addition, there were fairly sharp differences of opinion on Canada's participation in certain UN missions.

Chapter six concludes by offering a number of policy recommendations for the Canadian government in the peacekeeping domain. These prescriptions seek to ensure that peacekeeping will be a central component of Canada's foreign and defence policy in the future.
Acknowledgements

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Chapter One

Introduction

The debate in Canada about United Nations peacekeeping has undergone periods of change over time. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, peacekeeping was hailed as the eventual, central instrument of global collective security. The creation of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1956 generated the hope that a more stable international order based on collective security could replace the Cold War. When this objective was not achieved, peacekeeping was condemned by many as a failure, unable to root out the historical causes of conflict. However, there still remained strong support for peacekeeping throughout the years. When the limitations of this instrument were conceded and accepted after 1956, peacekeeping was still lauded as the only effective UN measure for maintaining peace.

The revitalization of the use of peacekeeping started in 1988, but the unprecedented ambitiousness and interest in peacekeeping of the present day began with the launching of UN missions in Yugoslavia, Somalia and Cambodia in March 1992. The intense interest in peacekeeping since the initiation of the above missions requires a comprehensive study of Canadian attitudes towards a foreign and defence policy area which has greatly contributed to Canada's identity, both inside and outside the country. The current debate on peacekeeping in Canada has entered a new phase which is quite different from past debates on this subject. Peacekeeping is no longer of interest to only a select few
specialists, but is now of concern to a wide range of international relations scholars, non-governmental organizations, interest groups and politicians. The more frequent and ambitious use of peacekeeping (especially in Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia) in the last year and a half has considerably broadened the debate in Canada on this instrument. Once again, great hopes are being pinned on peacekeeping as the world lurches to an as-yet-undefined international order. There is a belief that the UN can, indeed, fulfil the role that the framers of the UN Charter intended of an independent authority enforcing the rule of international law. On the other hand, it is also possible to detect a certain disillusionment in the current discussion with the way in which ongoing peacekeeping missions are being conducted as well as with the lack of institutional change at the UN to enable that body to better respond to the new peacekeeping challenges. Thus, all of the optimism and scepticism expressed towards peacekeeping historically have been fully apparent in this current debate. Unlike past peacekeeping debates, it is not possible to categorize attitudes towards peacekeeping in the contemporary era as completely supportive or unfavourable.

The overriding question underpinning the current discussion on peacekeeping in Canada has been whether peacekeeping can, in fact, become the basis for a new collective security system in which peacekeeping is no longer shackled by the constraints of the Cold War. Since the answer to this question is still not clear, uncertainty has reigned over the debate. There is a seeming
recognition in Canada that the fortunes of peacekeeping in the near future are more important to the international community than ever before. While there have been past disappointments with peacekeeping not emerging as an effective collective security tool, the need for a more active UN presence in many international conflicts seems more evident than ever before. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union gave a kind of stability to the global order through their overwhelming capabilities. Presently, there is a void in the international system which has allowed the outbreak of nationalist-inspired conflicts. The UN, through peacekeeping, could fill that void and create a more orderly and stable international order.

For Canadian observers, the uncertainty over the fate of the UN in the new international order has led to differing assessments of what Canada ought to do vis-à-vis peacekeeping. Peacekeeping enthusiasts support Canada's continued high level of participation in missions in the future. On the other hand, others have called for a diminished role for Canada in peacekeeping, feeling it is unrealistic, given the likelihood of a rapid increase in the number of missions, for Canada to continue its current level of participation. Canada, they argue, must begin to refuse to enter into new UN missions. Many Canadian observers, unsure of what Canada's place in the world will be, find themselves unable to propose what level of participation Canada should have in peacekeeping. Clearly, the bewildering array of peacekeeping themes, the apparent chaos of recent international relations,
government fiscal restraint which has directly impacted upon Canada's foreign and defence policy and its relative importance in the array of government functions have all led to a very complex debate on peacekeeping.

How the present attitudes on peacekeeping will affect Canada's future peacekeeping policy is also unclear. While views on peacekeeping have fluctuated significantly over the past 45 years, Canada has continued to participate actively in every peacekeeping mission. Canada's ability to answer the peacekeeping challenge has remained constant. However, this constancy is now under serious question, given the changing nature of peacekeeping and the rapidly increasing number of missions the UN is undertaking.

This thesis focuses primarily on the contemporary debate on peacekeeping in Canada. It seeks to analyze the views expressed on this subject by Canadian elites, the press, Members of Parliament and government officials. The period analyzed is from March 1, 1992 to March 31, 1993.

Chapter two provides a review of the peacekeeping debate from 1948 to March 1992. It demonstrates the changing character of the discussion over time and shows the limited number of peacekeeping themes which were examined prior to the contemporary era. Chapter three discusses the methodology (content analysis) used in examining the contemporary debate on peacekeeping. Chapters four and five detail the findings, with the first of these providing an overview of the debate in toto and the latter presenting the individual findings in each forum of debate included in the study.
Both chapters stress the unprecedented range of peacekeeping subjects raised in the contemporary debate. Finally, Chapter six offers a set of proposals with respect to what Canada's future peacekeeping policy should be.
Chapter Two

The Literature on Peacekeeping, 1948-1992

Examining the discussion of peacekeeping over the last 44 years, one has the overall impression of a constant shifting of opinions and attitudes on the subject by informed Canadians and other writers. While the 1956-1964 and 1988-March 1992 periods were times of optimism over the possibilities of peacekeeping, despair over this instrument permeated the discussion in the 1965-72 period and, to a lesser extent, from 1973 to 1987. Over time, the belief that peacekeeping, with all its inherent difficulties, was still a positive contribution to the international order began to emerge and this idea took a firm hold in the 1970s. While this realization did not lessen the criticisms of some towards peacekeeping, there was thereafter a general acceptance of peacekeeping's utility despite its limitations and a hope that improvements could be made to make it more effective. As Peter Jones put it in 1989, "It [peacekeeping] is at once disparaged, and yet [acknowledged as] desperately necessary, inefficient, and yet inescapable."

In this chapter, the history of the discussion of peacekeeping proceeding the contemporary debate has been divided into five relatively distinct periods: 1948-1955, 1956-1964, 1965-1972, 1973-1987 and 1988-March 1992. While one might quarrel over these divisions, it was found that the literature on peacekeeping changed noticeably from one of these periods to another as a result of
major occurrences in the peacekeeping field.

1948-1955

Most international observers and even United Nations watchers virtually ignored peacekeeping efforts prior to the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956. In fact, analysis of the early UN observer missions was done only retrospectively in other eras when authors explored the history of peacekeeping.

The UN operations during this period were small observer missions designed to oversee elections, supervise cease-fire lines, and to investigate violations of truce agreements. The first peacekeeping effort occurred in 1947 with the UN Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) in which the UN ensured the observance of negotiated frontiers. This type of mission was also carried out in Indonesia in 1948. Also, between 1947 and 1948, the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UN TOK) supervised and observed the holding of elections in South Korea.

The most prominent UN observer missions of this era were the UN Military Observer Group for India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and the UN Truce Supervisory Organization (UNTSO) in Palestine. UNMOGIP was the first UN mission which used military personnel to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. By 1949, it had become apparent to the UN that a negotiated settlement between India and Pakistan on the status of Kashmir, a disputed region between India and Pakistan, would be elusive and that some physical presence was needed to prevent a war between the two countries. Thus, the UN got the two parties to agree to a cease-fire line which UN military
personnel could supervise. UNTSO was a similar operation in which a UN truce line was formed between Israel and Egypt in the area of Suez Canal and the Golan Heights.

The attitude of the intelligentsia towards UN efforts to maintain world peace during this time can be characterized as one of disappointment. The great power consensus which produced the United Nations Charter in San Francisco in 1945 had led to the hope that a global collective security system, backed by an international police force and manned by the great powers, could be created. There was genuine hope that Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which allowed the members of the Security Council to overturn acts of aggression or breaches of the peace by military force, would be the backbone of a newly-formed concert system of great powers that restored and maintained global peace. However, it quickly became apparent that no such international order would emerge from the Second World War; rather, a starkly bi-polar, zero-sum game international system in which the United States and the Soviet Union competed for global influence quickly developed. Under these circumstances, the United Nations was unable to initiate Chapter VII peace-restoring operations under the auspices of the Military Staff Committee. Any permanent member of the Security Council could veto such action, and the veto was an important principle underlying the concert system. As well, the Soviets and the Americans were unable to agree to the composition of the Military Staff Committee and its functions. Thus, the Military Staff Committee lay dormant as it has to this day and with
it the dream of effective collective security under the rubric of 
the United Nations.

In the peacekeeping literature of this era, there was a 
tendency to dwell on these failures rather than on the attempts to 
circumvent superpower disagreement on international security which 
the UN observer missions represented. In fact, Walter O'Hearn, in 
a general overview of the UN's endeavours to maintain world peace 
in 1950, failed to mention any of the five UN observer missions 
that had been created by that time. Instead, he recorded the 
failure of a Military Staff Committee to be established and the 
inability of the Security Council to form a UN force, controlled by 
the Council.²

Even the one instance in which the United Nations did initiate 
an enforcement action—Korea in 1950 (made possible by a Soviet 
boycott of the UN Security Council)—was greeted with scepticism. 
Robert Holland viewed the Korean operation as a war protecting 
American interests and not as something in the interests of global 
collective security.³ In fact, he went so far as to say that the 
hopes that the United Nations would be a better agent of collective 
security than the interwar League of Nations were dashed by the 
Korean operation.⁴

Disillusionment with UN efforts to maintain peace was also 
evident in the analysis of UNMOGIP, the most widely-covered mission 
in this era. Most observers tended to concentrate their discussion 
on UN efforts to negotiate a broad settlement over the disputed 
region of Kashmir rather than on the peacekeeping aspect of the UN 

effort.\textsuperscript{5} UN-appointed mediators of the late 1940s and early 1950s failed to get both sides to agree to a permanent settlement, and many criticized the ineffectiveness of the UN in this and other respects unrelated to UNMOGIP \textit{per se}. Mohammed Khan concluded his book about the UN presence in Kashmir by arguing for a UN-enforced settlement of the Kashmir region over the objections of India as an expression of collective security.\textsuperscript{6} Josef Korbel took the view that the Kashmir dispute should have been settled under Article VII of the UN Charter.\textsuperscript{7} Michael Brecher offered a Canadian perspective, asserting that the UN was creating mistrust between India and Pakistan through its slow-moving process towards hammering out a permanent settlement.\textsuperscript{8} These initial observations on early UN activity identified a continuing problem with peacekeeping that remains to this day: its inability to negotiate permanent settlements in areas where peacekeeping troops are involved.

When the operations of UN peacekeeping missions themselves were actually examined, they were praised almost unanimously. Assessing the work of UNMOGIP, Sylvain Lourié wrote:

Though the United Nations has succeeded to only a limited extent in bringing about the actual settlement or adjustment of disputes and threatening situations that have been brought to its attention, it has achieved a considerable measure of success in its efforts to bring fighting to an end and to assist the parties in maintaining the cessation of hostilities to which they have agreed.\textsuperscript{9}

Similarly, Josef Korbel, while lamenting the failure of UN-mediated talks between India and Pakistan, declared that "Undramatic as [UNMOGIP] is, it remains one of the most commendable
and admirable activities carried on by the United Nations.\textsuperscript{10}

Concluding the most complete account of the nature of the early observer missions, Paul Mohn asserted that they had "proved to be the most successful devices contrived in the postwar era for the containment of minor wars."\textsuperscript{11} Those who praised the early UN missions felt that while the dream of an international police force had been shelved for the foreseeable future, nevertheless, observer missions were developing into distinctly UN presences which distanced the organization from the interests of any one member state and served as an expression of the collective will to preserve peace.\textsuperscript{12}

The peacekeeping themes which were explored during this period were fairly limited. As has been indicated, the progress of the peacemaking efforts of the UN was of more interest than the work of peacekeeping missions themselves. Those themes that were looked at revolved around the nature of the duties of observers on the ground. Essentially, the main duty of the UNTSO and UNMOGIP observer missions was to supervise negotiated cease-fire frontiers and investigate violations of the cease-fire agreements. The authors who examined these missions stressed the passiveness of these functions. The equipment used was restricted to airplanes and military vehicles and weapons were not employed.\textsuperscript{13} It was conceded that if violations of the cease-fire provisions were persistent, there was little an observer force could do; success of these early missions hinged on the goodwill of the disputants, the respect the observer forces engendered and the diplomatic skills of
the military personnel involved.\[14\]

Peacekeeping certainly did not generate the kind of discussion that arose with the first major operation in the Suez in 1956 despite the fact that some important precedents were set at this time. These included the provision that UN forces would enter a region only when they had the permission of the protagonists to do so and that the Secretary General had the power to appoint a mission head who had direct control of all observer personnel. These principles, which formed an important basis for all subsequent UN missions, were generally not recognized by observers in this time period; it was only in retrospect that these early developments in peacekeeping were recognized as important in shaping future efforts.

In sum, it appears that most writers in the 1948-1955 era took the view that, while successful, observer missions were rather peripheral to efforts at maintaining world peace and would remain so. No in-depth discussion of the possibilities of expanding the concept of observer missions was offered, nor were the overall effects of peacekeeping on the United Nations explored.

The Canadian government also did not regard the emergence of UN observer missions as a particularly significant occurrence. The East-West deadlock in the UN convinced Canadian government officials that the focus for Canada's defence must be on the creation and the building of a Western Alliance and the reconstruction of Western Europe. Canada was the most energetic proponent of the North Alliance Treaty Organization (NATO) as an
expression of collective security. There was little faith expressed by the Canadian government that collective security could be ensured by the UN. Canada participated in UNTSO and UNMOGIP very reluctantly and with little public enthusiasm. While Lester Pearson, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, did propose in 1954 the earmarking of troops by UN member states for UN actions, the idea quickly died from a lack of enthusiasm. Canada also agreed to participate in the International Commissions for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos in 1954. Once again, however, official enthusiasm for this non-UN peacekeeping effort was restrained, with the government, in the official press release announcing Canada's involvement, asserting that the task would be difficult and long. Canada also pointed to its dissatisfaction with the fact that the ICSC would not be under UN auspices which it believed might compromise the impartiality of the commissions.15 The government thus reflected, and perhaps contributed, to the scholarly neglect of peacekeeping by initially giving it such a low priority in Canada's foreign policy. There was no indication that peacekeeping would become such an important aspect of Canada's future foreign policy, nor that it would greatly shape Canada's international reputation and national identity in the coming years.

In sum, the scholarly study of peacekeeping during this period was almost non-existent. Those who bothered to analyze peacekeeping16 conceded that, in a limited way, observer missions were a success in restraining the renewal of hostilities. However,
it was felt that peacemaking efforts were sadly lacking and that observer missions were a pale shadow of the international police force that was envisioned after World War II. While helping to control small regional conflicts was commendable, observers felt that the UN would be unable to stop more significant conflicts in the same manner as the League of Nations had failed to do so. Just as the League of Nations was able to successfully supervise the Greek withdrawal from Bulgaria in 1923, so the United Nations could supervise the observance of cease-fires in Palestine and Kashmir. However, the Korean operation notwithstanding, there appeared to be much scepticism that the UN could intervene collectively and effectively in wars which threatened global security any more than the League of Nations had been able to do.

1956–1964

The year 1956 was a watershed for peacekeeping. The formation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) through the skillful diplomacy of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester Pearson, and UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld marked the beginning of a period of greater prominence for peacekeeping on the world stage. It initiated an extensive debate on peacekeeping, centering around the issues of who in the UN might authorize peacekeeping missions, who controlled the operation of a peacekeeping mission, the need for host country consent and the composition of UN forces. These four issues dominated scholarly discussion in this period.

In terms of the general attitude towards peacekeeping, it may
be described as having been very optimistic, for UNEF seemed to have set a precedent for greater UN action in securing peace and security. The initiation of peacekeeping operations in Lebanon in 1958 (UNOGIL), the Congo in 1960 (UNOC), and Cyprus in 1964 (UNFICYP) as well as new observer missions in West Irian in New Guinea (UNTEA) in 1962 and Yemen (UNYOM) in 1963 seemed to confirm the optimism of observers that the UN was able to overcome superpower deadlock and take effective action.

The creation of UNEF was of particular concern for those interested in the constitutional issues related to the United Nations. The question of UN authorization was a particular preoccupation. In November 1950, the UN General Assembly adopted the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution which allowed the General Assembly to maintain international peace and security in the event of a Security Council deadlock. With Britain and France having vetoed a resolution related to the Suez crisis in the Security Council, UNEF was formed through a General Assembly vote utilizing the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution. However, it was unclear whether the General Assembly (rather than the Security Council) really had the authority to initiate this or any other UN peacekeeping force. Many scholars thoroughly examined this question. Some believed that the decisive role of the General Assembly in defusing the Suez Crisis through the creation of UNEF portended a greater role for the General Assembly in international peace and security matters, overcoming objections from the permanent members of the Security Council.17 Most, however, seemed
unsure whether the General Assembly had the authority to create peacekeeping missions over the objections of the Security Council.\textsuperscript{18} While the creation of UNEF thus clearly had constitutional implications for the UN, authors were generally uncertain what precedents, if any, had been set.

It is clear, nevertheless, that, in the day-to-day operations of a peacekeeping mission, most wanted the UN Commander appointed by the Secretary General to maintain predominant control.\textsuperscript{19} The creation of UNEF had strengthened the position of the Secretary-General as Hammarskjöld was able to control the establishment of the force and create important precedents for the operation of peacekeeping which remain to this day. However, most observers recognized the need for a greater planning capability for the Secretary-General if similar forces were to be established in the future.\textsuperscript{20}

The consent of the host country to a peacekeeping operation became another dominant issue. While the UNEF operation was more active in preserving the peace than the earlier observer missions, UNEF could not function without the authorization of the country it was operating in because it was not a Chapter VII initiative backed by the coercive power of the Security Council. In the case of UNEF, Maxwell Cohen wondered whether this principle meant that Egypt had effective control of the peacekeeping functions.\textsuperscript{21} It was generally conceded that UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld needed to obtain Egypt's consent for the force in order to ensure a UN presence in the Middle East without superpower control of the
operation. 22  

Related to the above issue was the force composition theme. In order to get host country consent for a peacekeeping operation, it was necessary for the peacekeeping force to be composed of troops from middle and small-sized countries which were considered to be impartial; direct involvement by permanent members of the Security Council was ruled out. Nevertheless, Egyptian President Nasser was still able to prohibit the Canadian contingent, the Queen's Own Rifles, from UNEF. While this came as a shock for many Canadians, it did not shake the enthusiasm towards peacekeeping in this era. The editors of Saturday Night insisted that the rejection of the combat contingent would not mean a downgrading of Canada's role, for it had become apparent that UNEF desperately needed administrative personnel, a role Canada was eminently qualified to undertake. 23  The participation of small and middle powers in peacekeeping missions was seen as an important contribution to world peace and security, since it allowed these states an opportunity to influence the international order in ways that they could not during the starkly bi-polar system of the late 1940s and early 1950s. 24  The response of these peacekeeping nations to the needs of UN missions became of increasing concern. Issues such as domestic resistance to peacekeeping, earmarking of troops by countries specifically for peacekeeping, rules of engagement for troops in peacekeeping missions and the type of equipment used for peacekeeping were beginning to be explored in the latter part of the 1956-1964 period. 25  As a topic of
discussion peacekeeping was evolving away from constitutional questions (although they remained prominent) towards the means by which individual peacekeeping countries might respond through their defence policies to the demands of UN missions.

While the above major issues were fairly extensively explored, it was unusual to find many in-depth accounts of the day-to-day operations of UNEF. In general, journalists were the only ones who attempted to describe how the operation ran on a daily basis. Blair Fraser of Maclean's magazine presented a very positive picture of the Commander of the UNEF operation, Canadian E.L.M. Burns, in terms of his role of setting up cease-fires, handling administrative work and the general respect he engendered amongst Arabs and Israelis.²⁶ Peter Worthington, writing for Saturday Night, chose to investigate the life of the Canadian soldiers. He found Canadian peacekeepers bored and continually fighting the bureaucratic red tape of the UN which held up the supplies needed for the peacekeeping operation. While noting that patrolling the frontier between Israel and Egypt was the prime task of UNEF, Worthington remarked that, "The actual task of watching the border often seems a secondary one for our [Canadian] troops, since less that 150 of them (the armoured 56 Reece Squadron) are physically involved in it."²⁷ In effect, peacekeeping in this era was not discussed so much as a military technique as it was an act of diplomacy by the UN.

While there was criticism of the UNEF operation from those who saw it as a result of partisan bloc voting and not as a call for
international justice and also from those who believed it was an insufficient response to the problems of the Middle East, most viewed the operation as an auspicious beginning for UN peacekeeping and a harbinger of greater UN activism. Many believed that an international UN force was now a possibility. Gabriella Rosner concluded her positive account of the UNEF experience as follows:

...It may be reasonable to foresee an international force which, although functioning mainly to secure a cease-fire, maintain law and order, supervise an armistice, patrol a frontier, or oversee a plebiscite, would not be limited to use of weapons solely for purposes of self-defence.

John Gellner praised Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's call for the creation of an international force as a positive contribution to the peacekeeping debate. Gellner declared that, "Threats to world peace could perhaps be dealt with quite effectively by an international military force capable of compelling aggressors to desist." It is interesting to note that while Gellner referred to the past failures of the UN in terms of creating a Military Staff Committee and getting member states to earmark forces specifically for peacekeeping duty, he maintained that Canada should pursue the idea of an international force even if the chances were slim that it might be approved. In addition, serious academic discussion centred around how a permanent international UN force would operate, how to get troops to switch their national loyalty to the UN and what kind of military command was needed. This kind of discussion was indicative of the sense of possibility that surrounded the peacekeeping debate.

The high hopes for peacekeeping that the formation of UNEF
spawned initially carried over into assessments of the UN's role in the Congo. John Holmes, Canada's pre-eminent scholar in international affairs, saw UN intervention in the problems of the Congo as an excellent opportunity to increase the authority of the UN and bolster its reputation as an active player in peace and security matters. King Gordon, in assessing the peacekeeping operation in the Congo (ONUC) in its first two years (1960-62) said, "The amazing thing about ONUC has been that in the face of incredible difficulties and frustrations it has discharged its central purposes so well...ONUC's filling the vacuum headed off major conflict." Most observers, however, viewed ONUC with diminishing enthusiasm as time progressed. Holmes, who had earlier welcomed the UN initiative in the Congo, became increasingly critical of ONUC as damaging the UN's reputation of neutrality in peacekeeping that UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld had created with the launching of UNEF and UNOGIL. In deciding to support one side in the domestic conflict in the Congo, the UN, he argued, had alienated some African states. Arthur Lee Burns and Nina Heathcote made similar arguments, asserting that the Congo operation produced "a crisis for the Secretary-Generalship" that risked undoing much of Hammarskjöld's painful building of the office. Paul Martin, the Secretary of State for External Affairs in 1964, assessed the Congo mission as having "drained the patience and skill of Secretariat officials, the morale and support of [UN] member states, and, to some extent, the political credit of the
Organization. In the same article, Martin seemed to downgrade the importance of peacekeeping when he concluded by saying, "United Nations peace-keeping operations are one small...aspect of the wider process in which confidence in the possibility of a peaceful world order is predicated on patient negotiation pursued step by step in whatever forums are available." It was the first serious criticism of peacekeeping and it foreshadowed more intense ones in the coming years.

Another indication that the era of near unanimous praise for peacekeeping was over was the emergence of discussions over the need to improve peacekeeping. The speed with which UNEF, ONUC and UNFICYP had to be assembled led to early organizational and supply problems. These problems underlined the need to have a UN planning group to assess the needs of each UN mission and quickly organize the dispatch of UN troops. As Prime Minister, Lester Pearson became a vocal advocate of an institutionalized process in launching peacekeeping missions which would facilitate early preparation. Pearson specifically proposed that UN member states have stand-by forces ready for UN peacekeeping, and an international staff to co-ordinate training. Clearly, Pearson was concerned that the need for speed could jeopardize the effectiveness of peacekeeping if UN members did not make the necessary advance preparations. The experience of the UNEF and ONUC missions also prompted others to urge a more institutionalized response to peacekeeping in order to overcome the problems associated with the ad hoc nature of early forces. G.S. Murray
concluded his analysis of the ONUC and UNEF by writing that, "Experience points to the need for peace-keeping machinery, easily and promptly available. This international method has passed beyond the experimental stage." King Gordon, in a generally positive account of the early efforts of the UN Cyprus mission, criticized the lack of UN preparedness, writing:

...It had become clear that the United Nations would be called on to provide military forces to prevent local disputes escalating into full-scale wars and permit the working out of a political settlement. But in each crisis, an international force had been hastily improvised, with no attempt to plan ahead, maintain continuity of staff structure, or make use of a wealth of field experience.

Clearly, there was concern that peacekeeping was not progressing into the conflict resolution tool that many envisioned would occur with the formation of UNEF in 1956. The seeming momentum towards active collective security through UN peacekeeping and even peace-enforcement had ground to a halt. This foreshadowed a period in which peacekeeping was subject to more vocal criticisms brought on by the perceived failures in ongoing missions and the UN financial crisis which reached its peak in the mid-1960s.

In conclusion, the 1956-1964 period of discourse was an era of considerable optimism towards the possibilities of peacekeeping that the creation of UNEF had spawned. The initiation of more peacekeeping missions, including the ambitious peace-enforcement operation in the Congo, seemed to confirm that the UN, through peacekeeping, was becoming a major player in peace and security issues to a degree it had not been in the late 1940s and early 1950s. However, the difficulties with the Congo mission and the
criticisms it received from African states, the organizational chaos that surrounded the preparations of the Cyprus mission and the emerging controversy over the financing of peacekeeping all served to create some disillusionment towards peacekeeping by 1964. 1965-1972

Criticism directed at peacekeeping became much more vocal by 1965. By this time, peacekeeping was often dismissed as an unrealistic mechanism to promote global peace. It was thought that the superpowers would ultimately decide the fate of global peace, not the puny efforts of small and middle-sized countries participating in peacekeeping missions. The feeling was that peacekeeping simply could not assume a greater role in international affairs in the Cold War era, despite the progress evident in the preceding period. As John Conway, a professor of History at the University of British Columbia, said, "The peacekeeping ideal...makes singularly stringent demands upon the human beings of the twentieth century. It calls, as Inis L. Claude once said, for a moral transformation of political man."44

The main themes that were discussed in this period were the financing of peacekeeping, the Cyprus mission and the withdrawal of UNEF. These issues and their apparent intractability served to fuel the criticisms of peacekeeping. It is important to note, however, that a substantial number of scholars still defended peacekeeping and its accomplishments so that there was never a universal clamour against peacekeeping; this fact may account for the revival of peacekeeping in the 1973-1987 period and beyond.
The question of who should pay for peacekeeping in the UN became a subject of increased interest in this period. The UN financial crisis of this era had its roots in the financial arrangements of UNEF. A special account, outside of the UN operating budget, had been established for UNEF to which all UN member states paid according to a scale of assessments established in 1957. However, during the ensuing five years, fully one-third of the total assessments for UNEF went unpaid.\textsuperscript{45} France and the Soviet Union expressed publicly their intention not to pay for UNEF which they regarded as illegal since it had been authorized by the UN General Assembly rather than the Security Council. The Soviet bloc countries also refused to meet their assessments for ONUC on the grounds that this force exceeded its mandate (by staying on in the Congo to maintain peace and stability after the withdrawal of Belgian forces, whose intervention following the Congo's independence had prompted the creation of ONUC). While the International Court in 1962 did rule that UN member states had an obligation to contribute to the peacekeeping fund, the decision had little tangible effect as there was no way to compel non-contributing states to pay, except through expulsion from the UN.\textsuperscript{46} The financing crisis reached its apex when the French and the Soviets announced their intention to withdraw from the UN if forced to pay for peacekeeping. This threat hastened the creation in 1965 of a UN committee (known as the Committee of 33) to study and report on the funding problem in order to head off a major crisis for the United Nations as a functioning international body.
This issue did not receive a great deal of attention until the French and Soviet threat and the formation of the Committee of 33. At that stage, the prevailing view of the financial crisis was that to insist, as Canada did, that all countries must contribute to the financing of peacekeeping was unwise because it might hasten the withdrawal of the USSR and France from the UN altogether.\textsuperscript{47} There was a certain resignation that the method of paying voluntarily for peacekeeping by states contributing to the missions had to be the funding method for at least the time being. Thus, when Canada retreated from the principles of the universal and compulsory financing of peacekeeping, this was viewed by writers as an example of pragmatic and mature internationalism that helped save the UN.\textsuperscript{48}

The inability of the Committee of 33 to make any substantial progress on the financing issue or any other peacekeeping-related theme also proved to be a source of frustration. In 1972, Murray Goldblatt wrote that seven years of negotiation on the issue had not solved the funding question nor any of the other controversial subjects related to peacekeeping such as control of the missions.\textsuperscript{49} He concluded that Canada was correct in pulling back its commitment to peacekeeping in the late 1960s and early 1970s as long as the UN was still groping to find solutions to peacekeeping's problems; otherwise, Canada might have found itself in peacekeeping missions which were chaotically run and exposed Canadian soldiers to intolerable risks.\textsuperscript{50} In sum, the desire for peacekeeping to become an agent of UN collective security was now seen as an overzealous pursuit which threatened the UN with financial ruin; greater
realism was required.

The peacekeeping mission in Cyprus was of particular concern to analysts in this period. Overall, it garnered a mixed response. While most observers felt UNFICYP had been adequate in stopping the hostilities between Greek and Turk Cypriots, most were dissatisfied with the subsequent peacemaking efforts. James Boyd summed up the sentiment on UNFICYP in this period when he wrote:

UNFICYP has proved to be an effective agency for peacekeeping and, in the view of many observers, has been one of the more noteworthy efforts of the United Nations in this area. However, peacekeeping in the larger sense involves more than merely interposing a military force to restore law and order. Hand-in-hand with this effort is the need to create the conditions for a basic settlement.

Most observers seemed resigned to a long, drawn-out mission in Cyprus because of the unwillingness of either side to compromise. In a review of the situation in Cyprus, William Dobell was fairly optimistic that slow progress towards a negotiated settlement might be realizable with more flexible Cypriot leadership, but also acknowledged that the situation in Cyprus might become even worse in the future.

The withdrawal of UNEF in 1967 was undoubtedly the most severe blow to the ideal of peacekeeping in this time frame. The disbandment of UNEF, at a time when it was most needed in the Middle East, and in particular the quick compliance of UN Secretary General U Thant to Egyptian President Nasser's request to withdraw UNEF created the impression that peacekeeping was a weak and ineffective tool for maintaining the peace. For most, these actions signalled the limited nature of peacekeeping and that the
notion of progress towards an international police force, which had seemed unstoppable to many in the previous era, was a dangerous illusion. In a post-mortem of UNEF, Maxwell Cohen said:

...It is clear that as between large or great powers the principle and practice of peacekeeping has little desired relevance, while even among smaller states the function of peacekeeping is essentially symbolic and informational—not enforcement by force but pacification by 'presence'.\textsuperscript{54}

It is significant to note that E.L.M. Burns, the commander of UNEF, concluded his examination of this mission by asserting that, "the United Nations could not be used to 'keep the peace' in any particular situation if in it there was not a consensus...between the United States and the USSR as to policy."\textsuperscript{55} In addition, Burns listed a number of conditions that needed to be met for peacekeeping to be effective, an onerous set of criteria requiring much greater superpower will to become involved than had been demonstrated in the past.\textsuperscript{56} In effect, Burns' criteria, if applied, would have put an end to the ongoing missions of the time and made future ones almost impossible to launch. Finally, at least one author argued that UNEF had hindered opportunities for hammering out a long-term settlement in the Middle East. By launching UNEF before an agreement was reached in the Middle East, Robert Matthews contended that the UN had served to reinforce the unstable status quo.\textsuperscript{57}

Scepticism over the effectiveness of peacekeeping spilled over into discussions about the launching of new peacekeeping missions. While this theme was not extensively studied, speculation of another possible peacekeeping role for Canada in Vietnam did
receive some attention from informed observers in Canada. Analysts and government officials were wary of any new peacekeeping role in Vietnam, given the past experience in the ICSC. Jerry Silverman emphasized the difficulties of peacekeeping in Vietnam. Arranging a withdrawal of military forces, the problem of distinguishing separate warring parties and the rugged terrain were all cited as obstacles to creating an effective peacekeeping mission in Vietnam. Only a very modest observer mission, supervising a military disengagement by the disputants, was thought to be possible. Similarly, the government also reacted cautiously to the prospect of renewed peacekeeping in Vietnam with the Minister of External Affairs, Mitchell Sharp, insisting that an impartial body outside of the UN was needed to supervise a peacekeeping mission. Nevertheless, Canadian officials did not entirely reject out of hand peacekeeping in Vietnam. There was still a belief within the government that a revitalized ICCS could be an important component of a comprehensive settlement.

Canada's role in peacekeeping generally became a theme of increased interest in this period as a result of its extensive participation in every peacekeeping mission. Because this increased interest coincided with greater scepticism about peacekeeping, some analysts, from different foreign policy perspectives, tended to view Canadian participation negatively. Donald Gordon saw peacekeeping as alienating Canada from its allies (for example, Belgium in the Congo) and distracting Canada from what should be its main focus in defence policy: the defence of
Canada, North America and Western Europe. From another perspective, Thomas Martin argued that peacekeeping was not a policy that increased Canada's independence vis-à-vis the United States; rather, Canadian peacekeeping had mainly served the interests of the United States, particularly in Vietnam. He also questioned whether, as many peacekeeping enthusiasts contended, peacekeeping had increased Canada's international prestige and wondered whether host countries thought more highly of Canada as a result of its role or whether Canadian peacekeeping units were seen more as occupation forces.

Another perspective on Canada and peacekeeping which emerged during this period was the view that disillusionment with this UN function was healthy because it served to place peacekeeping in its proper place. J.L. Granatstein believed that peacekeeping would only be as successful as the superpowers wanted it to be. Since the US and USSR were not inclined to see the UN become a source of independent power in world affairs, peacekeeping was destined to play only a peripheral role. Thus, he argued that it was unrealistic to believe that Canada could have a substantial part in international affairs through peacekeeping. In fact, Granatstein contended that Canada's military role in peacekeeping itself was a relatively minor one in comparison with the massive logistical support of the United States for UN missions. John Holmes held similar views, believing that the collapse of UNEF would erase the illusion that collective security via the UN was attainable.

In general, however, peacekeeping was largely defended in
Canada during this period. The most extensive look at peacekeeping produced at this time was the book *Peacekeeping: International Challenge and Canadian Response*, based on a conference at Queen's University in 1967. It is interesting to note that as peacekeeping reached its nadir in 1967, there was still the belief amongst participants at this conference that peacekeeping was a useful tool for conflict resolution. In summing up the prevailing attitude of conference participants, Alastair Taylor wrote, "However frustrating the immediate problems may be, the evolving pattern of international politics makes the peacekeeping function more, not less, necessary."67

Despite his criticism of individual missions and the delusions surrounding peacekeeping, Jack Granatstein still contended that peacekeeping was a successful enterprise in most cases and that peacekeeping should be the "*raison d'être* of the Canadian forces."68 Similarly, John Holmes, in defending peacekeeping, argued:

...It is particularly necessary to realise that sometimes their principal value [peacekeeping] is not in what they accomplish but in their having been a procedural measure on which the parties could agree when, to cool off a crisis, they had to be persuaded to an agreement on something...They [peacekeeping missions] will always be unsatisfactory and indispensable at the same time.69

Barry Tackaberry, who monitored peacekeeping operations involving the Canadian Armed Forces for the Department of National Defence in the mid-1960s, expressed frustration at the lack of planning for UN missions and the inability of the UN to respond quickly to peacekeeping demands.70 However, he was sufficiently
supportive of peacekeeping to urge UN member states to earmark troops for that purpose. Thus, while he believed that peacekeeping was flawed, he also felt that there were measures that could be taken to improve it so that it need not be abandoned altogether.\textsuperscript{71}

In conclusion, the 1965-72 period can be characterized as one of considerable disillusionment with peacekeeping. The hopes that collective security via the UN would eventually be realized as a result of the UNEF experience were dashed. Many felt that the UN had missed the opportunity to become the world's premier guarantor of security and that peacekeeping was now destined for only a marginal role in the Cold War era. The length of the Cyprus mission, the chaotic nature of the Congo operation, the inability of the Committee of 33 to solve the financial question or any of the other controversial topics related to peacekeeping fed negative perceptions regarding this UN activity. It must be pointed out, however, that, in the final analysis, most observers still felt peacekeeping had a place in international affairs because of its ability to at least prevent the renewed outbreak of hostilities. Thus, it was not surprising to find that when new opportunities for peacekeeping arose in the 1973-87 period, informed observers of this UN activity did not reject out of hand the launching of new missions.

1973-1987

During this period, a fairly sharp dichotomy developed between enthusiasts and detractors of peacekeeping, making for a more impassioned debate. While there were only four missions that were
launched during this fourteen-year period (the UN Disengagement Observer Force in the Golan Heights, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, UNEF II, and the reconstituted International Commission for Control and Supervision in Vietnam), peacekeeping maintained a high profile especially amongst scholars in Canada, and Canada's role in peacekeeping became of increasing attention for them.

With respect to the critics, John Gellner was perhaps the most vociferous in this era. In 1973, he declared peacekeeping as not having a future, asserting that, "...It would perhaps be fair to say that paralysis has set in for UN peacekeeping and that, to save it, a heroic cure would have to be found." Gellner offered the following assessment of the three peacekeeping missions ongoing in 1985:

...The force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has achieved just about the opposite of what the creators of the scheme had intended, the Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) has proved to be totally useless, and the Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights is, for the present at least, of marginal utility, positioned as it is on a sector of the Israeli-Syrian front where clashes are least likely to occur.

He thus recommended that peacekeeping become the lowest priority in the planning of Canada's defence policy.

Others were just as caustic about peacekeeping. F.S. Manor dismissed peacekeeping as, "faulty in conception and futile in execution," and argued that it was "hardly worth the dubious prestige acquired by Canada as 'chevalier sans peur et sans reproche.'" Patricia Waring-Ripley believed that peacekeeping had become an outdated concept because it worked only in post-colonial crises and that era of international relations had clearly
passed. Cal Bricker was also inclined to support a scaling back of Canada's peacekeeping commitments. He found "Particularly perplexing...the reliance of decisionmakers on 'ad-hocery' in committing Canadian personnel to international peacekeeping operations." Canada's decision to enter into peacekeeping was, he said, based on immediate circumstances without a thorough appreciation of long-term factors which tended to lead to ineffective and protracted missions. From a different perspective, David Dewitt and John Kirton argued that peacekeeping had failed to solve the underlying problems of the Middle East and that if Canada wanted to have an effective role as a peacekeeper and peacemaker in the region, it must broaden its bilateral relations with Middle East countries and regional organizations. UN peacekeeping in the Middle East was viewed by Dewitt and Kirton as an ineffective instrument and not an enterprise to which Canada should greatly commit itself. Thus, from a variety of perspectives, many argued against a substantial commitment to peacekeeping during this period.

There were, however, just as many who argued that peacekeeping should remain an integral part of Canada's foreign and defence policy. At a conference at Carleton University which explored the possibilities for peacekeeping in the 1980s, many participants defended this UN function as a worthwhile endeavour. Henry Wiseman, a leading proponent of peacekeeping, believed that criticisms of it were based on individual analyses and that these
showed a lack of understanding of how peacekeeping had developed and how it fit into the international order in toto. Wiseman also argued that peacekeeping was evolving into a more effective tool for preserving world peace. "Peacekeeping," he said, "has taken on broader dimensions than its original interpositionary role and demonstrates renewed support and potential for use as a component instrument for conflict resolution." For his part, Albert Legault calculated the cost of peacekeeping for Canada and found that it was miniscule in relation to overall defence spending. In addition, he argued that the small cost had been an excellent investment as it brought Canada heightened prestige. Another workshop on peacekeeping in 1983 concluded that peacekeeping still had a useful role in maintaining international peace and security. While acknowledging that heightened East-West tension made peacekeeping harder to initiate, the participants argued that there were still areas of the world where peacekeeping could limit the scope of conflicts, prevent escalation, stabilize situations and promote confidence building.

In a general analysis of peacekeeping, Alastair Taylor also defended this UN function. While he acknowledged the need for peacekeeping to be viewed as the first step in a process which must include peacebuilding and peacemaking, he still saw peacekeeping as useful, even if it merely froze a conflict on the ground. He argued that while no permanent settlement of the Cold War had come, few suggested that NATO and the Warsaw Pact ought to be disbanded because they had failed to solve the Cold War. The same attitude
should be taken towards UN peacekeeping. Taylor contended that international disputes were rooted in such evils as global economic inequality and arms proliferation and that these issues ought to be addressed in order to build a more stable international order. Criticizing peacekeeping simply missed the point.87

The creation of UNEF II in 1973 was perhaps the most important event in reversing the pessimism about peacekeeping of the late 1960s and early 1970s. UNEF II was on firmer ground than previous peacekeeping missions because the Soviets and Americans both supported its creation, a financing formula was agreed to prior to its launching, and the mandate was much clearer than those of previous forces.88 Henry Wiseman hailed UNEF II as having created a new momentum for peacekeeping as it had overcome many of the obstacles that had hampered operations in the past. It proved that it was possible to overcome superpower deadlock, confounding the sceptics who had believed that would never be possible.89

It is also worth noting that accounts of the day-to-day operations of UNEF II were quite positive. Recording the everyday life of Canadian peacekeepers in UNEF II, Bill Aikman stressed the multi-faceted challenges of the mission, the relative lack of danger involved, the benefits of being exposed to other cultures, and the travel opportunities.90 A greater respect for peacekeeping was thus apparent during this era than in the previous period.

The launching of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was also widely praised by observers. Henry Wiseman viewed the mission as an initial success and saw UNIFIL as a model for future
peacekeeping missions. While the mandate of supervising the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon appeared to make the mission a fairly standard one, he argued that the need to engage in political negotiations with various non-state actors on the ground and the objective of having Lebanese refugees return to their homes made UNIFIL a relatively ambitious mission with multiple roles. For his part, Poelieu Dai praised the mission as having prevented the break-up of Lebanon.

Reassessments of Canada's participation in the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Vietnam from 1954-65 published during this period were also an indication that peacekeeping was regaining its lost lustre as a feature of Canadian foreign policy. In two separate studies, Ramesh Thakur and Douglas Ross evaluated Canada's participation in the Commission in Vietnam as a positive experience that produced concrete results. Previously, the Canadian experience in the ICSC had tended to be viewed as a failed attempt at peacekeeping. Thakur argued, however, that the ICSC in Vietnam was an effective institution from 1954-6. During this period, Canada, India and Poland successfully supervised the military withdrawal in Vietnam. While noting the failure of the ICSC to achieve a political settlement in Vietnam, he argued that factors outside the control of the Commission were responsible for this failure, such as lack of superpower support. Similarly, Douglas Ross praised Canada's participation in the ICSC as an astute foreign policy decision which served to prevent a more widespread East-West war, and
dismissed criticisms that participation in peacekeeping was the result of woolly-headed idealism.97

The above and other studies of this period revealed a more pragmatic assessment of peacekeeping than was the case with the early idealists preoccupied with collective security or the sceptics who flourished in the period after the withdrawal of UNEF. While recognizing the limitations of peacekeeping as a means of maintaining peace and noting the failures of peacemaking in most peacekeeping missions, many analysts were not willing to dismiss peacekeeping as a pointless exercise. While rejecting attempts to elevate peacekeeping to a collective security instrument as untenable in the Cold War era, most scholars similarly rejected suggestions that peacekeeping ought to cease altogether. The value of peacekeeping in preventing the outbreak of conflict in most situations was seen as a sufficient reason for peacekeeping to be attempted.98

During this period, supporters of peacekeeping began to probe more fully ways of improving peacekeeping's effectiveness and expanding its use to other regions of the world. S.R. Elliot, for instance, proposed that the Commonwealth assume a role as peacekeeper.99 He felt that with its wide membership and reputation as an internationally respected institution it could form its own permanent peacekeeping force with a planning staff, something which the UN had been unable to achieve.100 While this proposal reflected some dissatisfaction with the UN, it did reveal a belief in the usefulness of peacekeeping. Participants at a
conference looking at the possibility of peacekeeping in Central America were favourably disposed to its extension to this region, viewing it as a way to bolster trust between Central American states without the divisive presence of the United States.\textsuperscript{101}

There was also considerable attention paid to how Canada could better respond to peacekeeping demands within its defence policy framework. For example, one conference examined a possible future role for Canada's reserve forces in peacekeeping. Participants anticipated a greater demand for Canada's forces in UN missions and most envisioned a role for reservists in this respect as regular forces became less readily available. As a result, measures to ensure the preparedness of Canadian reservists for peacekeeping needed to be taken.\textsuperscript{102} In a separate study, W.J. Yost recommended a greater Canadian focus on the administrative dimension of peacekeeping. He contended that the earmarking for peacekeeping duty of a combat force was a largely symbolic act since Canada's logistics expertise was what was most needed for UN missions.\textsuperscript{103}

In sum, this period of discussion of peacekeeping revealed a mixed picture. While criticism of peacekeeping remained in the 1970s and 1980s, there was also a strong sentiment among many writers that peacekeeping was a worthy international endeavour. The widespread disillusionment with this UN role in the 1965-72 period had given way to either a total rejection of peacekeeping by some or an acceptance of it as a limited function which was still worthwhile to pursue.
While the Cold War is often said to have ended in November 1989, the normalization of East-West relations had positive effects for peacekeeping as early as 1988. There was a flurry of peacekeeping activity in 1988-89 with the creation of four new UN missions: the UN Good Offices Mission for Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGMAP), the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), the UN Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM) and the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia. In addition, several other peacekeeping missions (which eventually were launched) were in the planning stages at this point. These included the UN Observer Group in Central America (OUNCA), the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), and the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). This sudden proliferation of peacekeeping missions in areas where the UN did not contemplate peacekeeping previously because of the superpower struggle for influence was a source of increased hope that peacekeeping had entered a new and exciting phase in which it would play a heightened role in international affairs. Jane Boulden asserted that "The United States and the Soviet Union no longer view peacekeeping as potential interference in their affairs, but see it rather as a way of facilitating their own foreign policy goals and of working to control conflict."\textsuperscript{104} The discussion in this period was also characterized by the consideration of new themes, foreshadowing the debate of 1992-93. At the same time, however, a sense of anxiety crept into the discourse on the question of whether Canada was
prepared for the new challenges that peacekeeping offered.

A striking feature of the 1988-March 1992 period of debate on peacekeeping was the absence of substantial discussion on the 'classic' issues of peacekeeping: who controls the forces, who may authorize peacekeeping missions, who pays for peacekeeping and must the host country's consent be obtained. Greater Security Council consensus seemed to lessen the importance of these issues to observers. Alex Morrison remarked that, "UN peacekeeping operations...proceed better and accomplish more when all member states exhibit a positive attitude."Brian Urquhart enthusiastically noted that, "We have, for the first time, a very broad consensus behind peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts." He added that the developments on the international front even made it "possible that the technique of peacekeeping and peacemaking" would be "as important, on the international level, as the rule of law and the civil police" were "in the nation state." This optimism characterized the feelings of many participants in the peacekeeping discussion at this time.

The renewed possibilities of peacekeeping, coinciding with the end of the Cold War, triggered debate on how to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping. Alex Morrison felt that:

The overall lesson to be drawn from this discussion of peacekeeping is that the ad-hoc practices which have in large measure characterized peacekeeping up to the present must be institutionalized and formalized. If not, the ability of the international community to respond in times of need will be impaired.

While the practices of past peacekeeping missions were adequate when peacekeeping was only a marginal player in
international affairs, change was required in order that peacekeeping could become an effective expression of international will.

As indicated above, some of the peacekeeping themes which were to become prominent in the current debate surfaced in this period. Jane Boulden saw preventative peacekeeping measures as an idea which needed to be institutionalized in the UN's response to conflict, since peacekeeping could be particularly effective in dealing with conflicts at the early stages of their development.109

Boulden also anticipated the current debate when she saw peacekeeping as being an important way to solve intrastate conflict as well.110 Alex Morrison noted the same evolution in the context of the Namibian operation when he asserted that "The range of roles undertaken by peacekeepers has expanded to include supervision of the process which will see Namibia transformed...'from colony to nation.'"111 Thus, the theme of new types of peacekeeping, a prominent topic of discussion in the current debate, made its debut in the late 1980s.

Perhaps the most important issue in the 1988-March 1992 debate was the need to improve the planning capacity of the UN for peacekeeping missions. The initiation of new peacekeeping operations in 1988 had caught the UN unprepared and the number of its officials charged with the planning of missions remained unchanged from the preceding period. Norman Hillmer recounted the experiences of the Canadian commander of UNIIMOG, John Annand, as a way of illustrating the need for better planning. Annand
received only a few hours of preparation for the mission and was given no terms of reference. In addition, while he regularly sent reports to the UN on the progress of UNIIMOG, he did not receive any replies from the UN, making it difficult for him to know whether or not he was proceeding correctly.\textsuperscript{112} Such experiences led many to conclude that much more needed to be done in preparing and monitoring closely the progress of peacekeeping missions. Alex Morrison asserted that substantially more UN officials responsible for the creation and scrutiny of peacekeeping operations were needed. As well, a logistics planning cell within the UN, perhaps staffed by Canada, was needed.\textsuperscript{113} F.T. Liu, in a brief study of the UN's management of peacekeeping operations, also concluded that more UN staff was required in the peacekeeping department. Specifically, the Secretary General needed to assume a larger role in peacekeeping with a larger staff which could launch peacekeeping operations more quickly. In addition, force commanders needed to enjoy greater autonomy in the day-to-day operations of their missions, with much more communication and consultation from United Nations headquarters.\textsuperscript{114}

Training for peacekeeping troops also began to emerge as an important theme as the variety of roles increased for UN missions. Friedrich Hassel discussed the special training received by Austrian troops, including a comprehensive course dealing with the geographical, historical and cultural features of the regions in which the UN was likely to be involved.\textsuperscript{115}

Authors who addressed themes related to Canada's role in
peackeeping expressed apprehensions about Canada's ability to respond to what was anticipated to be a proliferation of new peacekeeping missions. Specifically, the capacity of the Canadian Armed Forces was an area of concern. General Paul Manson, Canada's Chief of the Defence Staff in 1989, suggested that Canada's heavy commitment to peacekeeping was coming to an end when he wrote:

...The Canadian Government is committed to a programme of deficit reduction: consequently, funding for defence in the coming years will be leaner, forcing us to make difficult choices about our defence priorities... [Requests for participation in peacekeeping] will be evaluated on the basis of their appropriateness and their impact on our other defence commitments.¹¹⁶

J.L. Granatstein also argued that a substantial decrease in defence spending would lessen the capabilities of Canadian forces to perform the tasks needed in any peacekeeping mission.¹¹⁷ This questioning of Canada's role in future peacekeeping was to continue in the contemporary debate.

In sum, the 1988-March 1992 period was still one of optimism regarding the possibilities of peacekeeping without the anxiety that has developed in the contemporary debate because of the problems associated with the current missions in Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia. Basking in the glow of the end of the Cold War, many observers felt that the end of the East-West deadlock heralded a new, brighter future for peacekeeping. At the same time, features of the contemporary debate were beginning to emerge.

The overall debate on peacekeeping over the last 45 years has been a cyclical affair. Norman Hillmer once wrote of the "idealism
which usually soured, the frustration...and every so often the pride of achievement"\textsuperscript{118} associated with peacekeeping, and this seems to be an apt description of the discussion of peacekeeping from 1948 to 1992. The creation of UNEF instilled the hope that collective security could be the basis for a more secure world order, replacing the Cold War. When this did not occur, UNEF was withdrawn and the UN failed to solve long-standing disputes in areas where it kept the peace, a backlash against peacekeeping emerged. As an instrument of conflict resolution, however, peacekeeping endured and it even began to thrive in the immediate post-Cold War era, leading to new optimism amongst informed observers about its future.

In 1989, Peter Jones wrote that, "...While attitudes and policies have alternated, the realities of peacekeeping itself have remained constant as, to a surprising degree, have Canada's peacekeeping capabilities."\textsuperscript{119} Whether that will continue to be the case in the future is uncertain. As this thesis demonstrates, the attitudes towards peacekeeping expressed by Canadian elites, the press, Members of Parliament and the government have shifted in the current era. The optimism of the 1988-March 1992 period has given way to confused, mixed opinion on peacekeeping's effectiveness and the potential role for Canada, and this could presage a shift in Canadian policy away from peacekeeping. On the other hand, Canada's historic commitment to peacekeeping, which, as this chapter has demonstrated, has weathered doubts about peacekeeping in the past, may lead the country to rise to meet the
challenges of the future.
ENDNOTES


2. Walter O'Hearn, UN Struggle for Peace, Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1950, Behind the Headlines, 10.


4. Ibid.


10. Korbel, p.163.


12. Lourié, p.31.

13. Mohn, p.64.


15. Jones, p.xii.

16. The term 'peacekeeping' was not, in fact, used extensively until the creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956.


27. Peter Worthington, "SNAFU in UNEF," *Saturday Night*, March 1, 1958, p. 36.


32. Ibid., p. 7.
33. Ibid.


50. Ibid., p.18.


56. The conditions included: Permanent members of the Security Council must agree to the mission, the UN mission must have firepower equal or superior to that of the local forces, the Security Council must be willing to take enforcement actions if necessary, an embargo on arms must be put in place, an agreement on how to finance the mission must be in place, and negotiations for a political settlement must be undertaken under UN auspices., Ibid., pp.16-17.


59. Ibid., p.160.


63. Ibid., p.160.

65. Ibid., p.419.


71. Ibid., pp.22-3.


74. Ibid.

75. F.S. Manor, "By Abandoning Peace-keeping NATO could be Reinforced," International Perspectives, July/August 1977, p.28.


77. Ibid.


80. David Dewitt and John Kirton, "Canada and the Process of Peacemaking in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," in The Middle East:


83. Ibid.


86. Ibid., p.424.

87. Ibid., p.425.


92. Ibid.


95. Ibid.

96. Ibid.


100. Ibid.


107. Ibid., p.40.


110. Ibid., p.10.


112. Ibid.

113. Morrison, p.16.

114. Ibid.


119. Peter Jones, p.xxxii.
Chapter Three
Methodology

The knocking down of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989, seemed to herald the beginning of a new, more peaceful international order. The Cold War was officially over and the possibility of great power co-operation in conflict resolution globally appeared limitless. In fact, serious academic discussion centred on whether the end of history was at hand and the moment had arrived when humanity could spend an eternity perfecting itself and the surrounding community, for humankind had rid itself of the scourge of war forever. The collective security action, as a result of an unprecedented post-Cold War consensus in 1990-1, reversing the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, appeared to provide strong evidence that a more secure international order was emerging.

However, events in 1992 put to rest any thoughts of an imminent 'heaven on earth'. The post-Cold War tranquillity was shattered by civil wars in Yugoslavia, Somalia and the former Soviet Union. As it had done in the Gulf War, the United Nations attempted to use its new-found power to resolve these conflicts and other ongoing strife through peacekeeping operations. As a result, the launching of UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia and Yugoslavia in March 1992 catapulted peacekeeping onto to the global agenda in an unprecedented way.

Because of these developments on the world front and the way they are impacting upon Canada, it is an opportune time to conduct a systematic study of contemporary attitudes towards peacekeeping
of different groups of Canadians. In this thesis, the views expressed on United Nations peacekeeping of elites, the press, Members of Parliament, and government officials are content analyzed and compared in a systematic, empirical fashion. March 1, 1992 was chosen as the beginning date for this analysis of the contemporary debate because this month witnessed, in Yugoslavia and Cambodia, the formation of the two most ambitious and largest UN peacekeeping contingents since the Congo mission of 1960. These missions are examples of new types of peacekeeping beyond the traditional, interpositional UN missions of the past in that they are comprehensive undertakings in which attempts are being made to rebuild whole societies. The Somalian mission of December 1992 is also an example of a new dimension for UN missions with its emphasis on humanitarian assistance; it is thus an important part of the contemporary debate on peacekeeping. Limiting this study to a thirteen-month period provided the researcher with a manageable set of data which was still large enough to analyze and compare how the four fora of debate dealt with the new issues related to peacekeeping. It was anticipated in undertaking this study that the data would demonstrate that the debate over this thirteen-month period intensified and widened in scope as new missions were launched.

The data for this study were gathered from a variety of sources. For Canadian elite opinion, the principal sources were opening statements before the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT), the House
Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs (SCNDVA), and the Senate Sub-Committee on National Defence (SSND). During the period analyzed, all three committees dealt extensively with various aspects of peacekeeping. Other sources for elite views were articles in scholarly journals and op-ed pieces and letters to the editor in the Canadian press. The Canadian News Index was used to identify elite views as they appeared in seven Canadian daily newspapers from March 1992 to March 1993: the Globe and Mail, Montreal Gazette, Toronto Star, Halifax Chronicle-Herald, Vancouver Sun, Winnipeg Free Press and the Calgary Herald. While admittedly this thesis does not offer an exhaustive study of elite views that are on the public record, it is believed, nonetheless, that the data collected provide an accurate reflection of elite attitudes towards peacekeeping during the period analyzed.

For the purposes of this study, elites were defined as those specialists in peacekeeping who were academics, representatives of interest groups, former bureaucrats, ex-politicians or retired military personnel. It was occasionally difficult to determine whether or not an individual belonged in this category. For example, Major General Lewis MacKenzie, the Canadian UN Commander of the Sarajevo operation in the summer of 1992, could have been considered a government official. However, his impending retirement from the Canadian military, his new occupation as a commentator on international affairs for CTV, and his outspoken views on the use of UN force in Yugoslavia as well as his criticisms of Canadian defence policy and UN headquarters qualified
him more for the elite than governmental category. He was a source of independent analysis and did not merely reflect governmental attitudes on peacekeeping. It was also difficult to categorize Gwynne Dyer who had a regular column in both the Toronto Star and the Montreal Gazette during the study period. While Dyer could have been considered a journalist and included in the press category, it was determined that his position as a professor, specializing in defence and international affairs, qualified him as an elite with specialized knowledge of peacekeeping.

In the content analysis of elite submissions, it needs to be noted that only the opening statements of elites before the parliamentary committees were examined and not the responses to questions from Members of Parliament or Senators. It was thought that analyzing the responses would unnecessarily complicate the study. More importantly, it was believed that they would not provide an accurate reflection of the preoccupations and views of elites on peacekeeping, but simply reflect their responses to the agenda of Parliamentarians.

The survey of press attitudes on peacekeeping was a more cumbersome process than for the other three fora of debate. The Toronto Star, Globe and Mail, Vancouver Sun, Calgary Herald, Winnipeg Free Press, Montreal Gazette and the Halifax Chronicle-Herald were included in this study. These newspapers are indexed in the Canadian News Index and represent a wide range of press perspectives. Every issue of these seven newspapers from March 1, 1992 to March 31, 1993 was examined for stories that were
identified in the Canadian News Index as related to peacekeeping. It was decided, however, that the press survey would include only those articles that had an evaluative dimension and when that dimension emanated from a Canadian source, since the purpose of the survey was to determine the attitudes of Canadians on peacekeeping. Factual news stories about peacekeeping were as a result not included. Had they been, the amount of data would have been enormous, given the amount of coverage on peacekeeping, particularly with respect to the mission in Yugoslavia. In addition, it would have been difficult to determine press attitudes on peacekeeping from the mere reporting of peacekeeping activities. Columns, feature reports from on-the-spot correspondents and editorials were thus the most common newspaper pieces included in this study. It is believed that the data size was sufficiently large to get a good sense of the Canadian press's preoccupations regarding peacekeeping.

It was sometimes difficult to separate factual articles in the press from evaluative ones, since there were many that encompassed both. In general, if an article went beyond describing immediate day-to-day peacekeeping developments and focused on the journalist's own perspective(s) on particular aspects of peacekeeping, it was included in the study.

The collection of data for Members of Parliament was somewhat easier. All speeches, questions in the House of Commons and in the SCEAIT and SCNDVA committees, and statements pursuant to Standing Order 31 were included in the data. For questions that were posed
in the House of Commons during question period by MPs, the first and supplementary questions were treated as one piece of data. For questions put by MPs to witnesses appearing before the SCEAIT and SCNDVA committees, the coding process was a little more difficult. Some MPs gave long monologues and asked several questions all at once. Others made shorter interjections and asked one question at a time. Given this disparity in style, it was decided to treat each round of questioning from an MP as one piece of data for the sake of simplicity and to ensure an accurate reflection of the MPs' views.

The peacekeeping data from government officials were somewhat scarce during this survey period. Nonetheless, there was enough information to analyze to some degree the attitudes of the Canadian government on peacekeeping. The Statements and Speeches series of policy statements released by External Affairs and International Trade Canada was a principal source for government attitudes on peacekeeping, especially those of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall. Other sources included statements by the Ministers of Defence and External Affairs in the House of Commons and in the SCEAIT, SCNDVA and SSND committees. As well, there were published articles by Barbara McDougall in the International Journal, Winnipeg Free Press and the Calgary Herald.

Finally, there were several articles by Canadian military personnel and other bureaucrats in various journals. Most of these appeared in Canadian defence publications and recounted the experiences of military personnel in various peacekeeping missions.
involving Canada. Admittedly, the survey of government attitudes on peacekeeping in the contemporary period is only a partial glimpse of government views, but it is hoped that the data do convey some sense of the discourse in policy-making circles.

All items identified as pertinent in the four fora of debate were coded on the basis of major themes related to peacekeeping as set out on a code sheet (see Appendix A attached). In analyzing the items, it was decided that a theme would be coded if it received more than a passing mention. Thus, it was quite common that more than one peacekeeping theme was coded for any item. In fact, this occurred frequently. An alternative method of coding only those themes which covered a certain percentage of any item was rejected as being too restrictive for this particular study. It was thought that a percentage threshold method would be inappropriate given the wide-ranging nature of the contemporary debate on peacekeeping.

As well as major peacekeeping themes, all items were coded for opinions on Canada's participation in existing and possible, future peacekeeping missions, using four categories: favourable, unfavourable, mixed and neutral. This study thus attempted to determine the degree of support in each of the four fora for Canada's continued participation in peacekeeping.

Another statistical measurement used was the Sperman's Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient. It was employed to measure the degree to which two fora of debate were in agreement with respect to the peacekeeping themes emphasized. When this statistic is
used, the results may range from +1.0 to -1.0 with +1.0 representing a perfect positive correlation (in this study, that would mean two fora of debate had the same rankings for all the peacekeeping themes included in the measure) and -1.0 a perfect negative correlation (the ranking were completely different in the two fora). This measurement was found particularly useful for determining if the peacekeeping debate featured the same or different themes amongst the four fora.

In general, it is believed that the data which follow convey an accurate sense of the tenor of the contemporary peacekeeping debate in Canada, a debate that is occurring at a time of major change in a dimension of international relations in which Canada has historically had an extremely high profile.
ENDNOTES

1. *Forum* and *Sentinel* were magazines which published articles by Canadian peacekeepers in various UN missions.
Chapter Four

Aggregate Findings For the Four Fora of the Peacekeeping Debate

This chapter examines the overall peacekeeping debate in Canada from March 1, 1992 to March 31, 1993. It explores those peacekeeping themes which were discussed frequently as well as those which were not explored by participants in each of the four fora of debate. The chapter also attempts to explain the nature of the issues involved in UN peacekeeping during the current period.

The findings of the content analysis reveal an extraordinary depth to the discussion on peacekeeping. While traditionally the discussion had focused principally on three or four UN-related peacekeeping subjects and perhaps one or two issues related to Canada, the increasing ambitiousness of current UN missions caused an explosion in the number of topics discussed related to peacekeeping in 1992 and 1993. The coding process for all four fora of the contemporary debate revealed that twenty-three UN-related topics on peacekeeping received more than a passing mention on at least ten occasions. For Canadian themes, that figure was an impressive thirty.

New Themes

Table 1 below records in descending order the top 25 peacekeeping themes in the four fora of debate. The dominant issues for participants in the discussion were, not surprisingly, the Yugoslavian and Somalian missions and Canada's participation in the UN forces in Yugoslavia. Beyond these themes, however, there were several that reflected the widening character of the
Table 1

Top Twenty-Five Peacekeeping Themes for the Four Fora of Debate
N=788

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yugoslavian Mission</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Yugoslavia</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Somalian Mission</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>New Types of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Canadian Military Personnel</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Security Risks to Canadian Peacekeepers</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Somalia</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nature of Canadian Role in Peacekeeping</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>UN Financing of Peacekeeping/Payments</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>UN Mandate</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>8.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Current Missions-Gen.</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Future Missions-Gen.</td>
<td>65</td>
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</tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Cyprus</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Training</td>
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<td>Canadian Armed Forces Capacity</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces Equipment</td>
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<td>6.1</td>
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<td>Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>State Sovereignty</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>Current UN Missions--General</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>Preventative Actions</td>
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<td>NGOs and Peacekeeping</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4.7</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Agenda for Peace Report</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>United States and Peacekeeping</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Standing UN Force</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cambodian Mission</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>4.3</td>
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*Does not add to 100% due to multi-coding.
discussion on peacekeeping. The most widely discussed of these new themes was the changing nature of peacekeeping as a conflict resolution tool which ranked fourth overall, with 16.8% of all items coded discussing this theme in some depth.

As discussed in Chapter Two, peacekeeping was traditionally a fairly modest United Nations device often used to keep wary combatants apart. Interpositional peacekeeping was a mission in which UN troops were placed between warring parties as was done with UNEF between 1956 and 1967 and UNFICYP for the past twenty-nine years. The term peacekeeping was also used to describe observational missions that were launched by the UN in Kashmir and Israel in which the UN watched over and reported on incidents that occurred between warring factions.

The contemporary debate on peacekeeping has seen an increase in the number of terms used to describe the more ambitious UN missions currently operating. One term used frequently in items in this data set was 'peacemaking.' However, the term was usually misused if one deems the parlance of the United Nations secretariat as definitive. Duncan Fraser, a retired Political Science professor from Acadia University, gave the standard definition of the term for the majority of people in the contemporary debate when he wrote, "Peacemaking is a matter quite distinct from peacekeeping and involves either the threat or actual use of military force to bring about a settlement between warring factions."1 However, in The Agenda for Peace Report, written by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in June 1992, the UN military actions in the

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Korean War, the Gulf War and the current mission in Somalia are referred to as 'peace enforcement' actions--i.e. ones in which UN troops actively enforce an end to a conflict without the consent of all parties involved. What Fraser was referring to was thus 'peace enforcement.' Peacemaking so far as the UN is concerned involves diplomatic action in which the United Nations, in conjunction with peacekeeping missions, attempts to forge a long-term negotiated settlement between the disputants.

Another term which entered the peacekeeping vocabulary in the contemporary debate was peacebuilding. The missions in Cambodia and Somalia in particular have been so described, since they are interventions in which the UN is attempting to reconstruct societies by rebuilding states' institutions and infrastructures in order to prevent further outbreaks of violence. Clearly, the term 'peacekeeping' now encompasses many different types of UN missions, entailing different responsibilities for peacekeepers and these new activities and the definitions of them generated considerable discussion in Canada during the period under analysis.

It is also interesting to note the emergence of other themes not traditionally associated with peacekeeping that have entered the contemporary debate on peacekeeping in Canada because of the nature of the current UN missions. The issue of state sovereignty was one such example. State sovereignty, in the context of UN peacekeeping, was discussed forty-five times, ranking nineteenth in this overall survey. One of the most important principles upon which the United Nations was founded was the inviolability of state
sovereignty. Non-interference by the UN in a member state's internal affairs was a critical guiding principle of UN peacekeeping missions. The UN authorized peacekeeping missions when all parties involved agreed to allow a UN presence. Indeed, one important criterion for Canadian participation in UN peacekeeping was the consent of all parties to a UN mission. However, this principle came under increasing challenge in the period studied. The Somalian mission in December 1992 was seen by many observers as an important turning point in the history of the UN and peacekeeping because the UN decided to intervene in Somalia without a request from the local government and without full consent from the warring parties. It appeared that the UN had set an important precedent and that state sovereignty might no longer limit UN action. Most observers approved of this development. Stephen Handelman, a Toronto Star correspondent, typified the sentiments of most in the contemporary debate when he wrote:

The defence of sovereignty, which regimes have historically used to block intervention in their 'internal affairs,' should be on the way out for good. The concept owes more to 19th-century power politics than to any concern for justice, equity or human rights."

In the same vein, Barbara McDougall, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, asked rhetorically,

How many men, women and children have become victims of all manner of brutality, racism and discrimination because the shield of national sovereignty was raised before the international community? Now that the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall have fallen, is it not time to respect human dignity as much as, if not more than national sovereignty?"

While some expressed concern about the erosion of state
sovereignty, a substantial number of observers in Canada felt some state sovereignty ought to be ceded to the UN in the interests of a more peaceful international order. The debate on sovereignty was an example of how newly-organized peacekeeping missions prompted discussion on basic principles of international relations, giving UN peacekeeping an importance and a relevance that it had not previously enjoyed.

Another example of a peacekeeping theme which was not widely discussed until the emergence of new types of peacekeeping in recent years was the issue of peacekeeping training. Peacekeeping training ranked fourteenth in the overall study, with 7.4% of items exploring this theme. In the traditional peacekeeping mission, little additional training was needed for a soldier. General purpose forces—that is, forces trained for war—were considered more than adequate for peacekeeping missions, and the quality of Canadian soldiers solidified Canada's reputation as providing excellent peacekeepers. During the period studied, government officials continued to insist that Canada's forces were ready for any new responsibilities in future UN missions. Marcel Masse, the then Minister of Defence, argued that, "We are...well-served in this area of peacekeeping operations by the priority which our defence policy attaches to the training of versatile forces, which means that our troops are trained for a wide variety of tasks..." However, the move to more sophisticated types of peacekeeping led some observers to ponder whether Canadian soldiers were fully prepared for new types of peacekeeping and to argue that riskier
peacekeeping missions demanded that special attention be paid to training in negotiation skills and cultural sensitivity. Barney Danson, Canada's Minister of Defence from 1976 to 1979, believed that the increasing number of responsibilities in peacekeeping missions meant Canada should take the lead in establishing a staff college, affiliated with a Canadian university's strategic studies facility, in order to train peacekeepers from Canada and around the world. Peter Langille, a member of Common Security Consultants, wanted the Canadian government to turn Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis into a peacekeeping training centre. He wondered, "...whether Canadian Forces personnel will be provided with a few days of superficial briefings prior to their new UN assignments, as is currently the case, or whether they will receive general and specialized training at an established Cornwallis centre of excellence." This question was another unique feature of the increasingly complex debate on peacekeeping. It was an issue which likely would not have received as much attention if the UN had not embarked on the ambitious missions in Cambodia, Yugoslavia and Somalia.

Similarly, the theme of regional organizations and their role in peacekeeping was a new source of debate generated by the UN missions started in 1992. There was wide debate in all fora on this theme, and it ranked 18th in the overall findings. During the Cold War, it would have been inconceivable for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, to contemplate being an active participant in peacekeeping missions. However, in the post-
Cold War environment, regional organizations needed a new raison d'être. In addition, the strain on UN resources caused by the proliferation of new UN missions led some observers to call for regional organizations to take greater responsibility in defusing conflict in their areas. The Canadian government led the way on this issue. Barbara McDougall pointed to the European Community as a key player in any negotiated settlement that might be reached between the warring parties in Yugoslavia.\(^8\) Major General Lewis MacKenzie, the former commander of the Sarajevo operation, believed that because NATO had better equipment and troops available than the United Nations, it should play a greater role in the Yugoslavian conflict. "NATO," he said, "is much better equipped to play a role as a 'subcontractor' of the United Nations [in Yugoslavia], that is, under a U.N. resolution and operating in accordance with U.N. direction..."\(^9\) The discussion surrounding regional organizations and their role in peacekeeping testified to the creativity in the contemporary debate on peacekeeping in Canada, as observers attempted to propose ideas which would forge a more peaceful international system.

Another prominent example of a peacekeeping theme which had only recently entered the peacekeeping debate was the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in peacekeeping missions. 4.7% of the items (many of them interventions by new participants in the peacekeeping debate) discussed this theme, placing it twenty-second overall. This theme came to the fore with the mounting of the United States-led Somalian mission. The press focused in on
efforts by the UN mission and NGOs to co-ordinate the delivery of food and medicine to Somalis.\textsuperscript{10} In general, the humanitarian thrust to newly-organized peacekeeping missions in which NGOs were present prompted calls from many observers for UN missions to exploit NGO knowledge of conditions in countries in which the UN would like to initiate missions. Hans Sinn, a founding member of \textit{Peace Brigades International}, argued that, "The time may have come for people and governments to take another look at the work of the NGOs and to examine it as a possible source of information and inspiration for peacemaking on a larger scale."\textsuperscript{11} Ernie Regehr, the research and policy director of Project Ploughshares, believed that NGOs could be key in facilitating the diplomatic resolution of disputes.\textsuperscript{12}

The government was the only forum of debate where the theme of NGOs and their potential role in peacekeeping was not discussed. The Departments of National Defence and External Affairs did not seem to be very enthusiastic about the prospect of working closely with NGOs in peacekeeping missions. It appears inevitable, nevertheless, that NGOs will have to have some role in any future UN mission which has a humanitarian component to its mandate as the ongoing Somalian mission has demonstrated. The question seems to be whether NGOs and UN peacekeepers will have an \textit{ad hoc} relationship or a more regularized one in which NGOs routinely 'de-brief' UN troops on the conditions on the ground in any given country. Once again, the debate on the role of NGOs in peacekeeping represented a considerable broadening of the discourse.
into areas which were not traditionally associated with UN peacekeeping.

New Perspectives on Old Themes

Apart from the above new topics, the contemporary debate on peacekeeping in Canada included two traditional topics with new dimensions to them. One was the question of the mandates of current peacekeeping missions. Past peacekeeping missions had quite restrictive mandates which limited the rules of engagement of peacekeeping troops in dealing with belligerents. The new commitment of UN missions to carrying out the humanitarian function of delivering aid to civilians in war zones necessitated allowing commanders on the ground to use their own judgement in fulfilling this mandate. Several observers discussed how the UN rules of engagement in Yugoslavia had become increasingly flexible in order to realize the humanitarian objectives of the mission. To cite one specific example, the UN Commander of the Yugoslavian mission, General Philippe Morillon, at one point, allowed a UN relief convoy to travel without a military escort which some commentators felt was an improper decision, endangering the lives of those in the aid convoys.13

The discussion on UN mandates also centred around the need to make the UN mandate in Yugoslavia more ambitious. Many observers felt that the rather modest goal of delivering aid to Bosnian civilians was not enough; more vigourous efforts were needed to halt the war. Typifying the concerns of many Canadian observers with regard to the peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia, Lloyd
Axworthy, Liberal Member of Parliament and the party's External Affairs Critic, asked whether "The Prime Minister [will] be instructing the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the meeting of foreign ministers this week in Oslo to raise whether or not the mandate of the UN forces in that region should be expanded ...?"14

Another old issue with a new twist in the contemporary debate on peacekeeping was the UN financing of peacekeeping. The specific issue was the non-payment of UN dues by several countries, most notably the United States, whereas historically the major culprits had been the Soviet bloc countries and France. Many newspaper editorials called for the United States to pay its UN dues, noting how much the U.S. was using the institution for peace enforcement operations as in the Gulf War and Somalia.15 Perez de Cuellar, the former UN Secretary General, was quoted approvingly by Bernard Wood and Nancy Gordon when he said, "It is hardly comprehensible that Governments impose far-reaching and costly responsibilities on the Organization, as they judge they must, but are themselves unwilling to fulfil corresponding financial obligations." Gwynne Dyer wrote that, "if they [current UN missions] end in fiasco because the money wasn't there to do the job properly... then we will all end up worse off than if they had never been attempted."16

The financial contributions of UN member states was also a dominant theme in the speeches of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall. In a rare show of Canadian dissatisfaction with American foreign policy during the Mulroney
administration, Ms. McDougall named the United States as a member state that needed to pay its UN dues. She put the case strongly, asserting that the United States, by not paying, was putting at risk the chances of the UN to act as a more effective peacekeeper globally. There was widespread despair amongst Canadian observers that, while the new-found vigour of the UN in intervening globally to keep the peace was encouraging, it might be scuttled by the rather mundane and technical issue of non-payment of UN membership dues and special assessments for peacekeeping.

**Canadian Themes**

Turning to the discussion of Canadian themes, apart from Canadian involvement in Yugoslavia, the most prominent was Canada's military personnel. Overall, 10.4% of the items in the peacekeeping debate in Canada delved into this theme so that it ranked surprisingly in fifth place overall. This subject was examined extensively by the Members of Parliament in the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs (SCNDVA), although other fora of debate also dealt with the topic to a significant degree. The primary issue surrounding military personnel was the increasing percentage of reservists or militia who were joining peacekeeping missions, particularly in Yugoslavia. This increasing reliance on reservists was a result of the Total Force Concept which brought regular soldiers and reservists onto an equal footing. Under the plan, reservists were to receive the same equipment and to be assigned to the same difficult peacekeeping assignments as regular soldiers were. Concerns were raised,
particularly by MPs citing the Auditor General's Report of November 1992, that reservists did not receive enough training and were badly under-equipped. Vice-Chairman of SCNDVA, Marc Ferland, was fearful that the reputation of Canadians as peacekeepers would suffer with the presence of ill-prepared reservists. Liberal MP Fred Mifflin raised the matter in the House of Commons, suggesting reservists were not prepared for the danger and ambitiousness of current peacekeeping missions. This issue was an important source of anxiety for those who wondered whether the government had the will to make the necessary policy changes in order for Canada to remain at the forefront of UN peacekeeping.

Preoccupations with the security risks for Canadians of UN peacekeeping missions also had a prominent place in the debate, with this theme ranking sixth overall and featuring in 10.2% of the items. Previous peacekeeping missions were relatively safe operations for Canadian soldiers and thus this issue was not an important dimension in past peacekeeping debates. However, with UN missions becoming more ambitious and facing gunfire in Somalia, Cambodia and Yugoslavia, this theme became a prominent one in 1992 and 1993. The press was particularly concerned with the dangers associated with current missions and evaluative pieces by journalists frequently referred to this topic. The perils of minesweeping by Canadian peacekeepers in Cambodia, Iraq-Kuwait and Croatia were particularly noted. Alan Ferguson, correspondent for The Toronto Star, wrote that, "The accidental discovery of three Yugoslav-made T500 mines was a jolting reminder to the troops of
the hazards they face in a country littered with the dangerous debris of a war which is not yet over." Regarding Somalia, another Toronto Star correspondent, Paul Watson, wrote that searching for guns by Canadian soldiers was "...dangerous work and the Canadians have been lucky to avoid any serious casualties so far."21

While most observers remained quite favourable to Canadian participation in these missions in spite of the dangers, a vocal minority pointed to the increased security risks in peacekeeping as a reason to re-evaluate and downgrade Canada's participation in the more ambitious peacekeeping missions. A Toronto Star editorial argued that UN peacekeepers in Sarajevo could not "stop the sniper fire" and were exposed "to unacceptable hazard." As things stood, the editorial continued, the Canadian contingent would "only be lightly armed, with no artillery or armour. Thus, it would be "hamstrung in the face of hostile forces" that had "shown only contempt for the U.N.'s role."22 David Bercuson, a professor of History at the University of Calgary argued that, "Too many peacekeepers have been killed already in Yugoslavia...It would be criminal to see more UN troops killed as they pay the ultimate price for hesitation."23 Thus, the security risks of UN peacekeeping missions became an important factor in judging whether Canada ought to participate in this function. While the majority of observers were still willing to see Canada accept the risk of current and future UN missions and contribute to them (see Table 2 below), an increasing number of people were concluding that the
price in terms of Canadian casualties was too high for some UN missions.

Another area of particular concern for observers of peacekeeping in Canada was the nature of Canada's role in peacekeeping. This theme ranked eighth overall and was discussed on 72 occasions. It was a multi-faceted topic which varied from discussion of the responsibilities of Canadian peacekeepers in current UN missions to discussion of possible future roles for the Canadian military in UN peacekeeping. Marcel Masse, the then Minister of Defence, envisioned a different peacekeeping role for Canada, suggesting:

We could increasingly focus our participation on the initial phase of missions which call for logistical and communication expertise, among other things... Then, having established that the mission is feasible, we would leave it to other countries to take over in time.  

Martin Shadwick, a Research Associate at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies at York University, similarly stated: "Some might argue that our inability to sustain [our] commitment based on major combat arms formations will mandate a return to our peacekeeping roots--i.e., support functions."  

Implicit in these two statements was the conviction that peacekeeping was no longer a domain in which Canada could act as a principal power. Rather, with the increased importance of peacekeeping in maintaining global security, peacekeeping was becoming a great power function. In responding to this new reality, many observers exploring the nature of Canada's role in peacekeeping, reasoned that Canada should concentrate its efforts

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in peacekeeping in areas where it had expertise. This was a classic case of the functional approach to policy-making, a long running theme in Canadian foreign policy.

Opinions on Canadian Involvement

The above doubts expressed about Canada's role in peacekeeping were reflected in the opinions on Canadian participation in various UN missions as reported in Table 2.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (N=175)</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>18.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (N=76)</td>
<td>56.6%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (N=63)</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (N=15)</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
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<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Missions--Gen. (N=66)</td>
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<td>6.1%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Missions--Gen. (N=65)</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>38.5%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most notable was the lack of enthusiasm for Canadian involvement in Cyprus (with only 33.3% of observations favourable and 44.4% unfavourable) and Cambodia (26.7% favourable and 13.3% unfavourable). However, also noteworthy was the ambivalence over Canada's assuming a role in new missions in the future, with 9.2% of comments on this topic unfavourable and 38.5% mixed. Support for existing missions was only somewhat higher.

While Canadian involvement in Yugoslavia garnered by far the most frequent discussion, featuring in 175 items (22.2% of the cases), the most interesting discussion was of Canada's participation in Somalia. This theme was discussed seventy-six times in the findings, ranking seventh overall. The coding process revealed that there was a wide consensus in favour of Canada's
participation in UNSOM in all fora of debate while that was not the case for other ongoing missions. Less than 10% of those who commented on Canadian participation in the Somalian mission opposed a continued Canadian role unequivocally, while fully 56.6% supported Canadian involvement. Even mixed sentiment, in which observers expressed both support and criticism of Canada's role in Somalia, accounted for only 13.2% of the cases. These findings contrast noticeably with the conflicting feelings about the Cyprus mission and to a degree the Yugoslav one, as well as about Canada's future participation in peacekeeping missions in general. They are also at variance with the broadly neutral view of involvement in Cambodia.

The need for the UN and Canada to intervene in Somalia on humanitarian grounds was a main argument for many Canadian observers. A Toronto Star editorial stated:

The move [to send Canadian peacekeepers to Somalia] will help Somalis near death, without recklessly risking the lives of Canadians. Parliament should also have its say, but without a protracted debate that squanders a rare window of opportunity.

In a special parliamentary debate which approved Canada's participation in Somalia, Barbara McDougall said,

...We agreed to participate in the enforcement mission. We did so because we concluded that only such a mission as this can effectively put an end to the rule of warlords. Only such a mission can restore sufficient order that the hungry can be fed, the sick can have medicine and the injured can have treatment.

In supporting Canadian participation in the Somalian mission, the Liberal party's External Affairs Critic, Lloyd Axworthy, was concerned that Canada might pull out of Somalia too soon. He said:
It is important now as a signal of hope to the people in Somalia and other places that the international community including Canada is prepared to stick in...Canada is prepared for the kind of commitment that will not only give immediate relief but long-term hope to the people of Somalia and show that in these kinds of adventures, international initiatives, one must be prepared to play out the long haul.\textsuperscript{28}

Thus, if there was any criticism of Canada's participation in Somalia it was that Canada's commitment might not be firm enough.

The above findings regarding Canadian involvement in various peacekeeping missions may prove to have relevance to policy on peacekeeping. In determining which UN missions to participate in, Canada may choose to enter those where societal support is likely to be enthusiastic, i.e. those with a strong humanitarian mandate and which involve the rebuilding of societies and pose limited risks to the peacekeepers themselves. Canada could then avoid missions for which societal support is less likely to exist—those that are dangerous and involve inter-ethnic strife which may signal long, drawn out operations, as in the cases of Cyprus and probably Yugoslavia.

\textbf{Neglected Themes}

Finally, a striking feature of the findings was the lack of attention paid to certain issues that it had been expected would produce intense discussion. For example, it was surprising to find little mention of the Cambodian mission. It was discussed only thirty-four times overall, placing it in a tie for 24th place. Given the attention paid to other UN missions by Canadian observers, it was puzzling that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was rarely discussed. The Cambodia
mission seems to be a prototype of the new type of peacekeeping, a theme that all observers discussed with great frequency, as has already been documented. In discussing the changing nature of peacekeeping, it would thus have been natural to look at the Cambodian case. In Cambodia, the UN is, inter alia, attempting to rebuild an entire country, monitor an election, remove mines, and resettle refugees. It is arguably the most ambitious peacekeeping operation ongoing, with the largest number of troops of any current or past mission. It is thus not unreasonable to have expected elites, the press, Members of Parliament and government officials to monitor closely the progress of UNTAC, for the relative success or failure of this mission in fulfilling its varied mandates may be crucial in determining whether such ambitious peacekeeping missions are a viable UN function for the future.

All four fora of debate were equally guilty of neglect of this vital mission. MPs did discuss UNTAC in the Standing Committee of External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT) to some extent, but this was a little misleading because one session of the committee was devoted entirely to Cambodia. In other sessions, when the agenda was open-ended, the Cambodian mission was rarely mentioned. The press also avoided regular, evaluative stories on the Cambodian mission. While there were some series of stories by foreign correspondents of the Toronto Star, Globe and Mail and Vancouver Sun on the peacekeeping mission in Cambodia, there was not the sustained coverage that this important mission warranted.29 It is particularly surprising that the Vancouver Sun did not report
more on the Cambodian mission, given British Columbia's purported interest in South East Asian affairs. Elites also chose to ignore the topic despite their strong interest in the new types of peacekeeping. It had been expected that even if press or MP attention was not fixed on Cambodia, peacekeeping specialists would at least have a sustained interest in UNTAC. The government also neglected UNTAC in official statements about peacekeeping. While the Canadian contingent in Cambodia was small (about 200), the Canadian government could have been more vocal in pointing out the importance of the Cambodian mission as a peace-building exercise, a theme which the Secretary of State for External Affairs consistently emphasized in most of her speeches. It had been expected that no regional bias would exist in discussions about peacekeeping since UN missions are in every corner of the world. Clearly, however, South East Asia was a neglected area in the discussion of peacekeeping. This finding is difficult to understand, since in the post-Cold war international system South East Asia may become a region of considerable tension in which the UN's conflict resolution skills may become quite important.

Another UN mission which should have warranted greater attention, given its size and scope, was the UN peacekeeping mission in Mozambique. It is striking to contrast the extensive discussion of the entry of the United States into the Somalian mission in December 1992 with the virtual absence of interest expressed in the Mozambique mission, launched in January 1993. Overall, observers looked at the Somalian mission 144 times versus
a mere three times for that in Mozambique. While it could be argued that, given their small size and modest mandate, some UN missions are not worthy of heavy coverage, the Mozambique mission certainly does not fall into this category. The UN has 8,000 troops stationed there, policing the country during the disarmament and demobilization of the warring parties and ready to supervise the upcoming elections. As part of its mandate, the UN is also securing the safe passage of relief convoys to starving Mozambiquans. Thus, this UN mission is another ambitious one similar to those in Cambodia and Somalia. Accordingly, it is hard to comprehend why it was almost entirely ignored in the current debate on peacekeeping. The similarities with the UN mission in Somalia should have invited comparisons on how well each mission was doing in rebuilding the country and ensuring a more permanent settlement between the warring parties.

Another somewhat surprising finding was the lack of discussion of the composition of the permanent membership of the Security Council in the context of peacekeeping. This issue was discussed at length only fourteen times overall, a meagre figure considering the size of the data sample. This finding was particularly surprising because those who did discuss it felt it was a very critical issue in ensuring the success of future UN missions. The need to have a wide consensus from all regions of the world for UN actions was and continues to be vital. Without widespread global support for the launching of new UN missions, peacekeeping may lack legitimacy, with many member states seeing it as a tool of great
power foreign policy. As Nancy Gordon and Bernard Wood wrote, "The majority of the world's states and peoples will not support the maintenance of order if they become convinced that such law enforcement basically consists of the preservation of a privileged order in which they have a limited stake and say." The Canadian government was particularly silent on the matter of membership on the Security Council. However, if Canada is serious in wanting financial reform of the UN and peacekeeping to become a more effective tool of conflict resolution, it would be wise to push for a more accountable, larger Security Council where Canada and its peacekeeping allies may exercise significant influence. In sum, despite the seeming importance of Security Council reform to both Canada and peacekeeping, recognized by the few elites who did discuss it, there was little in-depth discussion amongst Canadian observers.

The lack of discussion of German and Japanese involvement in peacekeeping missions also came as a surprise. While American participation in peacekeeping missions was canvassed adequately, especially in the context of the Somali mission, the lack of a fuller discussion of great power involvement in general in peacekeeping was disappointing. It was especially surprising that Japan's decision to allow its troops to join the UN mission in Cambodia was discussed only a paltry eight times in the overall study. This shift in Japanese foreign policy sparked a bitter debate in that country and represented a fundamental reorientation in Japan's post-World War II foreign and defence policy. Despite
this fact, only a few elites and journalists had the insight to comment on this profound shift for Japan and the post-Cold War world. One was Jeffrey Simpson who noted that, "The UN...has undertaken long-term and very costly peacekeeping commitments, in Yugoslavia and Cambodia. A rich Japan, feeling an even greater commitment and role in the United Nations, could be a helpful source of finance."\textsuperscript{31}

Similarly, there was a lack of discussion on Germany as a potential peacekeeper. Its modest participation in the UN mission in Yugoslavia in enforcing the UN embargo sparked intense domestic opposition. Bill Schiller, foreign correspondent for the Toronto Star, described the peacekeeping debate in Germany as "Kohl's [German Chancellor] first major crisis of the new year [1993]..."\textsuperscript{32} Despite this observation and the intense pressure on the German government from the UN and Germany's allies to participate more actively in peacekeeping ventures, Canadian observers did not fully analyze the repercussions of German involvement for UN peacekeeping.

The assumption of peacekeeping responsibilities by great powers such as Japan, Germany and the United States will have a considerable impact on those states principally responsible for performing the peacekeeping function in the past. As a significant contributor to past UN missions, Canada will have to decide whether it wants to participate in missions dominated by the great powers or, instead, concentrate on more modest UN missions, staffed by small and middle powers, the types of missions with which Canada
traditionally has been associated.

Another peacekeeping theme which was badly neglected during the contemporary debate was the *Agenda for Peace* report, prepared by UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and released in June 1992. While several of the themes of the report were dealt with satisfactorily—such as the possibility of UN member states earmarking troops for peacekeeping missions, new types of peacekeeping the UN might enter into and the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping—it seemed that the document itself was not discussed very fully. It was prominent in only 36 of the cases analyzed, ranking 23rd overall. Of the four fora analyzed in this study, only the Canadian government discussed the UN Secretary General's report in great depth. Barbara McDougall said of it:

> I have, at every available opportunity, including at the UN General Assembly last year, expressed Canada's support for this report—the most comprehensive since the Charter—because I believe that it maps out creative and effective approaches to international peace and security.33

Given the above characterization of the report, it is uncertain why a document with such a broad, sweeping agenda for the UN in maintaining international peace and security received so little attention from elites, the press, and Members of Parliament. Michael Valpy, a columnist with the *Globe and Mail*, noted the lack of attention paid to the *Agenda for Peace* report, believing that the reason for the muted response was that the Secretary General was looking for the UN to play a more active role in internal affairs of states and that ranked many.34 The press had ample opportunity to look at the report in some depth. Canadian
newspapers had a number of evaluative articles on current UN missions in general, Canada’s role in peacekeeping and even a few personality profiles of Boutros-Ghali. A critical analysis of the report, in the context of examining the above themes, would have been more than appropriate. It was natural that in any look at current and future peacekeeping missions, a document produced by the UN Secretary General, which charted the future course of the United Nations in international peace and security, would generate considerable interest for journalists. Issues such as Canada’s position on the report, the chances of its getting approved in the UN and whether the report was an appropriate vision for the UN’s future role in conflict resolution should have been examined. Instead, only four journalists looked at the Agenda for Peace report in any depth.

Members of Parliament were equally guilty of neglecting the report, especially members of the SCEAIT. It was surprising to find that only six MPs discussed the Agenda for Peace report, since it was the mandate of the SCEAIT to determine what Canada’s position vis-à-vis the report ought to be. It would not have been unreasonable to expect members of the committee to ask witnesses appearing before the committee whether Canada ought to wholeheartedly support the report or, instead, raise some specific problems with it. While the eighth report to the House of Commons by SCEAIT did deal substantially with the Agenda for Peace report and worried that its specifics were being opposed or ignored internationally, individual MPs were as guilty as others in not
paying sufficient attention to the grander vision that the report represented.

Related to the above finding was the paucity of discussion on preventative actions by the UN as a peacekeeping measure, a topic that arose only 38 times, ranking 21st overall among themes. In his *Agenda for Peace* report, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali emphasized the need to prevent conflict before it starts. Canadian government officials and elites did admittedly give some attention to preventative actions. Barbara McDougall underlined their importance by referring to them as one of the major themes of the *Agenda for Peace* Report. "The 'political' or diplomatic function of the Secretariat," McDougall stressed, "must be strengthened to enhance its capacity to resolve disputes before they break out into armed conflicts."36 The Canadian government realized that the pressure on the United Nations' resources necessitated that the UN use troops as a last resort only and focus its primary attention on pre-empting global conflicts. The current problems of UN peacekeeping operations also prompted such elites as Bernard Wood and Nancy Gordon to observe:

> In hindsight, it is...clear that a readiness to confront the issue of the crumbling Yugoslav federation before the spiral of violence had been unleashed might have yielded much better results, either for the United Nations or for one of the aspiring European mediators.37

The media was especially guilty of neglecting the preventative actions theme. It is particularly puzzling that, despite the heavy press coverage of several dimensions of the Yugoslavian conflict, little attention was paid to UN efforts at preventative diplomacy
In the Balkans. During the survey period, UN peacekeeping troops were sent to Macedonia in an observer mission designed to halt the spread of the Yugoslavian conflict into other Balkan states. While the press provided ample coverage of the Croatian and Bosnian peacekeeping missions, little attention was focused on the one in Macedonia and whether it was having any noticeable effect in heading off a conflict in that region. Similarly, little mention was made of UN preventative diplomacy efforts in the Kosovo region of Serbia even though the media reported the repression of Albanians in Kosovo by Serbian authorities.

Another exercise in UN preventative diplomacy which was ignored by virtually everyone in the contemporary debate was the joint UN/Commonwealth effort in South Africa in attempting to avert civil war. While there was plenty of attention given to South Africa as it lurched towards a new, post-apartheid system of governance, nothing was said about the UN's efforts to keep communication lines open and to encourage dialogue. This type of peacekeeping which does not involve the use of troops seems likely to be an important aspect of future UN operations. The difficulties of current UN missions in keeping the peace in volatile situations ought to underline the importance of the UN's anticipating and acting decisively before conflict starts instead of involving itself in peacekeeping situations where armed conflict is already under way and chances of success are smaller. Yet, overall this important topic received little discussion.

A peacekeeping theme related to Canada that warranted greater
study during the survey period was the criteria Canada used in determining whether it ought to join a UN mission. This topic arose in only 24 items, ranking outside of the top twenty-five themes. This issue was not crucial when there were few peacekeeping missions and they were fairly modest operations with little risk to soldiers. However, the dangers inherent in the Yugoslavian mission should have led to greater debate on Canada's criteria for joining peacekeeping missions. As Geoffrey Pearson, an ex-Canadian diplomat, said: "Past criteria for Canadian participation in peacekeeping operations—consent of the parties, clear objectives, adequate financing, a mutual desire to negotiate solutions and the like—are becoming more difficult to satisfy."38 The Canadian government appeared to agree and Barbara McDougall did discuss several times the theme of Canadian criteria for participation. On one occasion, she speculated that "Before taking part in future UN missions, we may have to consider factors such as the costs, risks, and potential economic interests in the regions of conflicts as well as our bilateral and multilateral commitments."38 This comment, which appeared to represent a considerable shift in Canadian policy towards UN peacekeeping, ought to have triggered more debate on this theme amongst elites and the press where in particular the subject was ignored. The Canadian dimension of peacekeeping would have received a more thorough and thought-provoking debate if the criteria question had received greater attention, focusing on such questions as whether or not the Canadian government sets out criteria for involvement.
that are rigorously applied and whether new ones are required.

In conclusion, the overall findings indicate that, over the period examined, there was a wide-ranging discussion of a myriad of peacekeeping issues, many of which were new to the agenda. As well, the data disclose the mixed feelings of Canadian observers in each fora of debate on the subject of peacekeeping and Canada's place in it. In the eighth report of SCEAIT, the committee summed up these feelings when it asserted that with each new international crisis, the "international community devises new forms of intervention, a fact which explains both the exhilaration and deep anxiety that now pervade the United Nations." 40
ENDNOTES


8. An Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the Empire Club of Toronto, November 12, 1992, Statement, 92/57, p.5.


17. An Address by the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, at a Seminar of the Centre Quebecois des Relations Internationales, "Peacekeeping and the Limits of Sovereignty", December 2, 1992, Quebec City, Statement, 92/58., p.3.

18. See the Honourable Marc Ferland's comments in the proceedings of the House of Commons Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs, February 16, 1993, pp.31:17, 22-24.


35. Ibid.


Chapter Five

The Four Fora of Debate Compared

Breaking down the overall findings of the contemporary peacekeeping debate in Canada into the four fora of debate produced some interesting results. The varied perspectives of each forum meant that there was a unique peacekeeping debate within each.

Elites

Table 3 ranks the most frequently discussed peacekeeping themes among elites. The most important issue was the emergence of new types of peacekeeping in the contemporary era. While this was an important theme in all fora of debate, only amongst elites did it rank first. This finding is consistent with the tendency overall for elites to discuss peacekeeping in a broad context. While the Somalian and Yugoslavian missions did garner a considerable amount of attention from elites, wider issues such as preventative actions, UN financing of peacekeeping, the state sovereignty issue and current UN missions in general were all discussed more frequently by elites than participants in the other fora of debate.

In the context of the theme of preventative actions (which ranked in a tie for tenth place in terms of frequency of discussion), elites discussed the need to institute global policies which would erase the factors which lead to war, such as economic inequality and arms sales. This preoccupation seemed to stem from their wariness of the ability of the UN to resolve conflict once it starts. Elites also provided a somewhat different perspective than
Table 3

Top Twenty Peacekeeping Themes for Elites (N=125)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>New Types of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yugoslavian Mission</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Future Missions--Gen.</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Yugoslavian Mission</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Current Missions--Gen.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping Training</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>UN Financing of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Somali Mission</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Current UN Missions--General</td>
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<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preventative Actions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.6</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Nature of Canadian Role in Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Mandate</td>
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<td>Agenda for Peace Report</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
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<td>Canadian Military Personnel</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Somalia</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping</td>
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<td>7.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NGOs and Peacekeeping</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expanding Number of Peacekeeping States</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
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*Does not add up to 100% due to multi-coding.
other fora on the increasingly ambitious peacekeeping of current UN missions, expressing a greater degree of caution. This wariness was reflected in the level of unfavourable reaction to Canada's participation in the Yugoslavian mission (see Table 4). Of the items discussing Canada's participation in the Yugoslavian mission, 30.4% expressed unfavourable opinions on Canada's continued presence, the highest level of unfavourable views of the four fora. This figure reveals considerable elite hesitation in seeing Canada join risky UN missions with imprecise mandates and little chance of success. Reviewing Canadian participation in current peacekeeping operations, Nancy Gordon and Bernard Wood said of the Yugoslavian mission:

The deployment of United Nations peacekeeping forces, including Canadian forces from Germany, to part of that crumbling state [Yugoslavia] has starkly revealed the limitations of peacekeeping when effective consent and a manageable mandate are not in place. The impulse to act in the face of spiralling chaos and carnage has led peacekeepers into a situation of intolerable risk with little prospect of being able to help.

Arthur Andrew, a former Canadian ambassador, added: "If no changes are made...UN forces in the former Yugoslavia are doomed to become witnesses to events they cannot influence, as the UN has been in Cyprus and as Canada once was in Vietnam." Later in the same article, Andrew advocated the idea of creating an enclave in Yugoslavia where citizens could be protected from the raging war. This idea was consistent with the elite consensus that any UN military intervention in Yugoslavia would be unworkable, requiring many troops with an ill-defined mandate.
Table 4
Elite Opinion on Canadian Participation in Peacekeeping Missions

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (N=23)</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>30.4%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (N=10)</td>
<td>70.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Missions--Gen. (N=29)</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>27.6%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Missions--Gen. (N=22)</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Not only was a peace enforcement mission in Yugoslavia greeted with scepticism, but the concept of peace enforcement concerned elites discussing other situations. George Cram, the director of the Horn of Africa Policy Group, worried "very greatly about the effects on the long-term peace prospects" in Somalia of peacekeeping there, and argued that "the intervention should have been more limited in size..." Lissa North of the Centre for Canada-Caribbean-Central American Policy Alternatives, commenting on peacekeeping efforts in that region, said, "Enforcement capacities in those situations would certainly have made any kind of national political reconciliation much more problematic afterwards." William Barton, a former ambassador for Canada at the UN, also doubted the value of peace enforcement actions, asserting:

If we are talking about military intervention in the absence of general agreement among the major disputants then we should not be there unless we are prepared to engage in peace enforcement by military occupation with all the dangers and complications that go with it.  

None of the other fora of debate demonstrated the same level of explicit criticism of peace enforcement as a conflict resolution tool.
The extensive discussion of Canada's participation in current missions in general and possible future participation was also a unique feature of the elite findings. While most observers from other fora of debate tended to avoid making overall judgements on Canada's current and future participation, these two themes ranked fifth and third respectively for elites. This was another demonstration of the elite characteristics of viewing peacekeeping through a wide lens and making general evaluations rather than focusing on narrow issues.

Discussion of the first of these two issues also reflected the scepticism of elites about peacekeeping. As Table 4 demonstrates, only 40.1% of elites unequivocally supported Canada's continued participation in current peacekeeping missions, while 40.9% held mixed or unfavourable views on the subject. Surprisingly, by contrast, 58.6% of elites favoured Canada's accepting future peacekeeping commitments while only 34.5% held mixed or unfavourable opinions on this subject. These findings are in contrast with the other fora of debate where there was a greater tendency to support Canada's current participation in peacekeeping generally, while more guarded views were expressed about future participation.

An interesting division of elite opinion occurred on the issue of Canada's contribution to current peacekeeping. Those who supported Canada's current participation were enthusiastic about the prospects of peacekeeping becoming an increasingly important instrument for maintaining global peace and security and believed
that Canada needed to maintain its high profile in peacekeeping in order to play an influential role in shaping the emerging international order. Those of a different point of view tended to focus instead on the apparent aimlessness of Canada's foreign policy which had led to Canada's becoming involved in the current dangerous UN missions without reflection on the consequences. Jack Granatstein, a York University History professor, was perhaps the most vociferous critic of Canada's policy of joining current missions. "Increasingly," he said, "we are going into exceedingly dangerous peacemaking roles, without the right equipment, and into roles that to me make little or no military sense." Columnist Dalton Camp observed that, "Even while it has become obvious that the people who are empowered to make the decision [for Canada to join peacekeeping missions]...do not know any more about what our forces are getting into than the rest of us, Canadians feel virtuous about" their involvement. Joel Sokolsky, a professor at the Royal Military College, noted that, "The early post-Cold War era finds Canada pursuing a security policy broader and in many ways potentially more costly and dangerous than it [had] conducted during the four decades of the Cold War."

Paradoxically, the elite division on Canada's current peacekeeping commitments did not translate into a similar split on Canada's future participation in UN peacekeeping. There appeared to be strong support amongst elites for Canada's assuming a role in future UN peacekeeping missions. Gregory Wirick, in an article in which he explored, *inter alia*, Canada's current and future
peacekeeping commitments, enthusiastically endorsed peacekeeping as a dimension of Canada's future security policy, noting that, as Canada's security commitments to Europe receded, more opportunities opened up for Canada to use its peacekeeping expertise to influence the shaping of the coming international order.\textsuperscript{10}

It can be speculated that much of the elite scepticism about Canada current contribution to peacekeeping was based on the apparent aimlessness of Canada's foreign policy which had led to Canadian participation in new operations without the development of an overall policy on peacekeeping. It did not, therefore, reflect a rejection of peacekeeping per se, with most elites believing that Canada should maintain a high level of commitment despite the problems associated with ongoing peacekeeping missions. As Harold Von Riekhoff, a Political Science professor at Carleton University, said, "...The message here is to condition ourselves [Canada] to expect the possibility of some failure [in current UN missions] and not to use this as a pretext to opt out of the [peacekeeping] program altogether in the future."\textsuperscript{11}

The Press

Table 5 ranks the twenty peacekeeping themes most frequently discussed in the press. Individual UN missions were clearly of the most concern to journalists. Four of the top five peacekeeping themes discussed in evaluative articles by journalists were on the Yugoslavian and Somalian missions and Canada's participation in them. Clearly, press attention was fixed strongly on UN missions themselves and there was considerably less interest in other

\textsuperscript{10}
### Table 5

Top Twenty Peacekeeping Themes for the Canadian Press (N=398)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yugoslavian Mission</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>29.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Somalian Mission</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Yugoslavia</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Security Risks for Canadian Peacekeepers</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Somalia</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>UN Mandate</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>New Types of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Nature of Canadian Role in Peacekeeping</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Cyprus</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>UN Financing of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Canadian Military Personnel</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Cambodia Mission</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Current Missions--General</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>United States and Peacekeeping</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>NGOs and Peacekeeping</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Lewis MacKenzie--Personality Profiles</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Standing UN Force</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Current UN Missions--General</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>State Sovereignty</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not add up to 100% due to multi-coding.*
peacekeeping themes. It is worth noting the steep drop in the frequency of discussion of peacekeeping themes beyond the top three.

The immediacy of conditions on the ground in various peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus and Cambodia and the security risks to peacekeepers dominated the press coverage. By contrast, the newspapers showed little interest in themes related to the new types of peacekeeping and effectiveness of peacekeeping as a tool of conflict resolution. The new types of peacekeeping actively used in Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia ranked as only the seventh most frequently discussed theme for the press, appearing in only 9.8% of evaluative articles on peacekeeping.

Since evaluative press items aim to go beyond the immediate hard news coverage of any story, it was surprising that they tended to ignore larger issues associated with the changing character of peacekeeping, focusing instead on themes like the security risks for Canadian peacekeepers, which ranked fourth. While one would have expected to find the casualties resulting from peacekeeping expeditions ranking highly as a theme in an analysis of factual news stories, it was somewhat surprising to find that this subject did so in an analysis of evaluative items.

Overall, then, the data reveal a press emphasis on the immediate challenges of specific missions on the ground without a thorough look at how peacekeeping has changed, how it might change further and what the implications are for Canada. The press
neglected to examine the institutional challenges facing UN peacekeeping in the present and future as it moves its coverage from one mission to another. Few attempts were made to provide a picture of UN peacekeeping missions in their entirety or to explore what the UN might learn from them in organizing future missions.

Looking more specifically at press opinion on Canadian participation in UN missions (Table 6), it was interesting to note that no dominant press view on Canadian peacekeeping policy was expressed. Bernard Cohen, in his seminal work, *The Press and Foreign Policy*, cited three evaluative roles for the press: those of critic or supporter of government policy and advocate of policy change. In the case of peacekeeping policy during this survey period, the press could not be described as a consistent critic, supporter or advocate of change. It assumed different positions with respect to each peacekeeping mission, thus manifesting an ever-changing and inconsistent attitude on peacekeeping overall.

Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (N=99)</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
<td>25.2%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (N=47)</td>
<td>46.8%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (N=22)</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia (N=12)</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Missions--Gen.(N=19)</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Missions--Gen.(N=12)</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, the Canadian press strongly endorsed the Canadian government's decision to pull out of Cyprus. As Table 6 discloses, almost 60% of evaluative pieces which discussed Canada's role in
Cyprus were opposed to any continued Canadian presence in this mission, while only 18.2% were in favour of continued Canadian participation. The Halifax Chronicle-Herald aptly summed up press opinion on the withdrawal when it said editorially: "...It is the threat of termination of the UN presence [in Cyprus] that finally has forced whatever action is being taken."\textsuperscript{13} The Canadian press thus essentially agreed with the Canadian government that a Canadian withdrawal would hasten the process towards reconciliation in Cyprus. In this case, the press acted as a supporter of government foreign policy.

Press endorsement of the government's policy of involvement in the Somalian mission was also quite strong with support for participation expressed almost twice as frequently as unfavourable and mixed views. The press supported the Somalian mission principally because it was aimed at ensuring the delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalis. A Montreal Gazette editorial saw Canada's participation in Somalia as particularly gratifying because it was "a rescue operation on a grand, humanitarian scale."\textsuperscript{14}

By contrast, the press sent out a very mixed message on the issue of participation in the Yugoslavian mission. No single outlook emerged as dominant. The Globe and Mail's editorial position was especially illustrative. In June 1992, it supported the movement of Canada's troops to Sarajevo in order to open up the airport and allow humanitarian aid to get through to civilians, seeing this as "a legitimate humanitarian task for U.N. forces."\textsuperscript{15}
However, at the same time, it implicitly rejected a UN military intervention requiring thousands of troops in an area ideal for guerrilla warfare and where the military objective would be uncertain.\textsuperscript{16} However, by December 1992, the \textit{Globe and Mail} had changed its editorial position and called for limited UN military intervention to support the creation of safe havens in Bosnia-Hercegovina.\textsuperscript{17} UN peacekeeping was now seen by the \textit{Globe and Mail} as a costly and dangerous, but nevertheless necessary venture for Canadian troops.\textsuperscript{18}

The other newspapers were similarly uncertain about Canada's role in Yugoslavia. In March 1993, the \textit{Toronto Star} believed that the Sarajevo contingent of Canada's peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia was being asked to perform "an impossible mission fraught with danger."\textsuperscript{19} Earlier, however, the \textit{Toronto Star} had lauded the peacekeeping mission in Sarajevo as a more than worthwhile effort in providing "a lifeline of food and medicine to helpless civilian victims."\textsuperscript{20} Clearly, press opinion on Canadian peacekeeping in Yugoslavia changed with developments in the Balkan war. Thus, it was not surprising to find that mixed and unfavourable views of Canada's peacekeeping efforts almost equalled those of a favourable nature.

With regard to UN involvement in Yugoslavia in general, most columns, features and editorials analyzed in this study did support a more aggressive approach by the UN in Bosnia in particular, either by arming the Muslims, strategic bombing of Serb-held positions or full-scale military intervention. However, they did

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not advocate any specific role for Canada in these actions.

Compounding the rather confused press message on what Canada's response to the situation in Yugoslavia ought to be was the high profile in the Canadian press of Major-General Lewis MacKenzie, Canadian commander of the UN Sarajevo operation in the summer of 1992. In the seven newspapers surveyed during the thirteen month period, there were seventeen profiles of Major-General MacKenzie which placed him in a tie for fifteenth place in terms of peacekeeping themes discussed by the press. Nearly all of the profiles were positive. Profiles of MacKenzie approvingly noted his impressive military background and cool professionalism under fire in Sarajevo. It was apparent that his quick wittedness and penchant for producing quotable material and his willingness to criticize the UN headquarters and Canadian defence policy endeared him to the Canadian press. The press' admiration of Mackenzie produced a noticeable effect on press opinion on Canada's peacekeeping role in Yugoslavia during his term as commander of the Sarajevo operation. His charisma managed to blunt criticism about the Yugoslav mission, especially as the Sarajevo operation was becoming increasingly dangerous in the summer of 1992. There can be little doubt that, without his presence in the contemporary debate on peacekeeping, the press would have been more unfavourable towards Canada's continued presence in Yugoslavia and perhaps in other missions as well. Illustrative of his impact on press treatment are the following contrasting observations by Bill Gold, columnist for the Calgary Herald. In August 1992, he wrote, "His
[MacKenzie's] calm perseverance finally got the airport in Sarajevo open long enough for some flights to bring needed food and medicine to a city remorselessly pounded for weeks by Serbian artillery and mortar fire.\textsuperscript{21} A month earlier, he had asked, "What on earth are the Canadians, who are really armed non-combatants, doing in such a place [Sarajevo]? This is not a situation like Cyprus, where it well suits Greeks and Turks to be separated by a thin blue line."\textsuperscript{22} Clearly, the press had some difficulty in separating the personality and accomplishments of MacKenzie from its evaluations of the efficacy of the Canadian contingent in Yugoslavia in general.

As the memory of MacKenzie's heroics in Sarajevo faded from the press's consciousness, criticism of Canada's participation in the Yugoslav mission heightened. By the end of the survey period in March 1993, it was at its peak. Paul Koring, reporting on the dangers associated with the Canadian peacekeeping effort in Bosnia, wrote: "Canadian soldiers are escorting the most dangerous and difficult convoys in war-torn Bosnia-Hercegovina in some of the oldest, slowest and least protected vehicles of any of the battalions flying the United Nations flag."\textsuperscript{23} In the same vein, a Halifax Chronicle-Herald editorial, stated that it was "morally reprehensible...for the Canadian government to send young soldiers to war zones in equipment which belongs in a museum."\textsuperscript{24} In sum, the press presented a confused message on Canada's role in the Balkans. When Lewis MacKenzie or the plight of sick and dying Bosnian citizens were the foci of press examination, the Canadian
peacekeeping effort in Bosnia was praised. However, when the press examined the Canadian forces' equipment or the dangers of their functions, it opposed the mission.

Adding to the uncertainty of the press perspective on contemporary peacekeeping, and consistent with the difficulty of the press in developing an unwavering attitude on Canada's place in UN peacekeeping, was the lack of discussion on how Canada ought to respond to future calls for peacekeeping troops. While Canada's participation in the Yugoslav, Somalian, and Cyprus missions and in current missions in general all rated in the top twenty themes discussed by the press, Canada's participation in future peacekeeping was discussed only twelve times, ranking only in a tie for 24th place. Further, when this subject was examined, little attempt was made to advocate a specific peacekeeping policy. One Winnipeg Free Press editorial, in expressing its concern about the danger of current peacekeeping missions, stated that "...the federal government must be able to convince Canadians--who are justly proud of their peacekeepers--that the game is worth the candle." It further stated that the increased risk of UN missions required the UN and Canada to redefine their roles. The editorial, however, did not suggest what the future role for Canada should be, given the increased risk and ambitiousness of current peacekeeping missions. A Globe and Mail editorial worried that the government had "issued no formal policy on the dramatically changing role of Canadian peacekeepers--no white paper, no legislation, nothing except the piecemeal statements of Mr.
Mulroney and the External Affairs Minister, Barbara McDougall. Yet, the paper shied away from putting forth its own suggestions on what Canada's level of commitment to UN peacekeeping should be or what form it should take.

It seems surprising that, during a transition stage in Canadian foreign policy when the press perhaps had the potential to play an advocacy role in policy-making, it did not step into the vacuum and boldly proclaim what Canada's peacekeeping policy ought to be. While it might be unreasonable to have expected one dominant press outlook on peacekeeping to have emerged, it was, nevertheless, disappointing to find individual newspapers and their journalists changing their opinions on peacekeeping with every new headline. The press seemed to form its views from visceral reactions to immediate events in any given peacekeeping mission. A calmer, studied view of peacekeeping was needed in which all of the experiences of current missions were taken into account by the press in forming a consistent view on peacekeeping that might have been of value in the shaping of future policy.

Members of Parliament

As Table 7 discloses, Members of Parliament focused their discussion on Canadian rather than general peacekeeping themes, viewing peacekeeping as a domestic defence policy issue. Fourteen of the top twenty themes for MPs were Canadian-related with another theme, peacekeeping training, being discussed mainly in terms of training for Canadian soldiers.

The key point of discussion in the peacekeeping debate for MPs
### Table 7

Top Twenty Peacekeeping Themes for Members of Parliament (N=215)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yugoslavian Mission</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Canadian Military Personnel</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>New Types of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Yugoslavian Mission</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces Equipment</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces Capacity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Cyprus Mission</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Peacekeeping Training</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Costs of Peacekeeping to Canada</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Somali Mission</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nature of Canadian Role in Peacekeeping</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Somali Mission</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Future Missions--Gen.</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Financing of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criteria for Cdn. Participation in UN Missions</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security Risks for Canadian Peacekeepers</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Current Missions--Gen.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Parliament and Peacekeeping</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not add up to 100% due to multi-coding.*
during the survey period was whether Canada's military was ready for the new types of peacekeeping the UN was launching. In particular, the issue of the preparedness of Canadian reservists for peacekeeping missions was intensely discussed under the theme of Canada's military personnel. As well, Members of Parliament focused their attention on Canadian military equipment for peacekeeping, wondering whether the capital equipment available was adequate for the more ambitious types of peacekeeping that were emerging.

Another issue of concern was the capacity of Canada's armed forces in light of the increased peacekeeping responsibilities Canada was assuming. Many MPs were worried that Canada would be unable to respond to future calls for Canadian peacekeepers and that there was excessive troop concentration on peacekeeping to the detriment of other defence responsibilities. Liberal MP Fred Mifflin felt that the strain caused by doubling Canada's peacekeeping soldiers while, at the same time, reducing the number of troops in Canada's armed forces was hampering the military's ability to carry out all of its duties. He called for a re-evaluation of Canada's peacekeeping policy. Conservative MP Arnold Malone speculated that cuts to defence spending would further limit the capacity of the armed forces which would necessitate a reduction in Canada's commitment to peacekeeping.

Members of Parliament also had a particular interest in the costs of peacekeeping to Canada. A number of MPs, especially from the Conservative Party, were concerned that Canada was not being
reimbursed for its contribution to UN peacekeeping. Garth Turner, a back-bench Tory MP, said "...The United Nations should immediately pay Canada millions of dollars it owes us so that we can keep our troops in place. It is unfair to ask Canadian taxpayers to do it all." 30

The decision of the government to make cuts in defence areas related to peacekeeping (despite purchasing the EH-101 helicopter) was particularly controversial for opposition MPs. Lloyd Axworthy, the Liberal Party's External Affairs critic, asserted: "...The government made a number of major defence cuts which severely limited our capacity to provide full-time professional peacekeeping forces. As a result 50 per cent of our peacekeepers are now reservists who have had to have a rush training." 31 Fred Mifflin, a Liberal MP and former general, added:

My... concern is that at a time when we are at the highest for peacekeeping, at the highest for risk taking operations in Canadian forces, the operations budget is being reduced: $225 million this year, $375 million next year and $740 million the year after. I would not want to think that defence policy was being made by the Minister of Finance. 32

Charles Caccia, another Liberal MP, was also alarmed that Canada was entering the Somalian operation while announcing budget cuts to the Department of Defence. Caccia asked:

Are the funds available for a peacemaking action of this nature [in Somalia] which may take much longer than anticipated? Only a few days ago the Minister of National Defence was expressing doubts as to whether he would have sufficient funds available to carry out a measure of this nature. 33

The other fora of debate did not discuss as extensively the question of the cost of peacekeeping to Canada. However, it was
not unusual for Members of Parliament, whose discussions of public policy are predominated by matters of expenditures, to show such a preoccupation.

MPs did not have the same concerns about individual missions as other observers of peacekeeping in Canada did. While the Yugoslavian mission ranked first, at just over 20%, it represented a smaller portion of the peacekeeping debate than was the case in the other three fora. As well, the Somalian mission rated only tenth for MPs, a significantly lower ranking than in the other fora. Interest in the Somalian mission was limited to one special debate on Canada's participation, but it quickly faded, perhaps because Canada's peacekeepers did not enjoy the same high profile as American marines in Somalia did.

Canada's participation in the peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia was also not as important a topic for debate with MPs as was the case in other fora, ranking only fourth. As Table 8 discloses, Members of Parliament seemed to side with the government and support Canada's contribution to this peacekeeping effort unlike elites and the press where there was a greater tendency to voice criticisms. This was a somewhat surprising finding, since opposition MPs' main role is to act as critics of government policy and the opposition parties certainly had plenty of ammunition in the Yugoslavian case with which to hurt the government. While criticism of the risks to Canadian peacekeepers in Yugoslavia did heighten towards the end of the survey period, few opposition MPs ever explicitly said that Canadian forces should be withdrawn from
Yugoslavia as many elites and those in the press did. The consensus on the support for peacekeeping amongst all political parties still held.

Table 8

Parliamentary Opinion on Canadian Participation in UN Missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Missions</th>
<th>Fav.</th>
<th>Unfav.</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (N=33)</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia (N=16)</td>
<td>68.8%</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (N=25)</td>
<td>68.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Missions--Gen. (N=13)</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Missions--Gen. (N=14)</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By contrast, MPs seemed unusually preoccupied with Canada's participation in the United Nations Mission in Cyprus, loudly expressing criticisms of government policy in this case. A surprising 11.6% of statements by MPs examined Canadian participation in the Cyprus mission, ranking it in a tie for sixth place in terms of frequency of themes discussed. In no other fora of debate was the Cyprus mission discussed in more than 10% of the statements. While it was to be expected that UNFICYP would generate some discussion in the contemporary debate due to speculation on whether Canada might pull out of the mission, it was, nevertheless, surprising that in Parliament this rather modest, long-standing and traditional-style mission rated ahead of more prominent and ambitious peacekeeping missions that Canada was involved in, such as the Somalian and Cambodian missions. As well, Canadian participation in the Yugoslavia mission ranked only slightly ahead at 15.3%, even though this operation was arguably the most important international conflict that the UN was actively
involved in. In addition, the high rate of approval (68% of statements) for continued Canadian participation in Cyprus was unexpected, given the long time the mission had lasted, the apparent unwillingness of both sides in the dispute to come to some sort of peaceful resolution, demands for Canada to participate in more urgent missions and signals from the Canadian government that it was seriously considering pulling out. Despite these factors that might have prompted MPs to support a pull out, all opposition MPs and even a majority of governing party back-bench MPs opposed the pull out. This finding is at odds with the other three fora of debate where Canada's continued presence in the Cyprus mission was strongly opposed.

While it is difficult to determine why MPs wanted Canadian forces to stay in Cyprus, one possible factor was the influence of Greek constituents on MPs from large urban ridings. Most MPs expressing their support for Canadian participation in the Cyprus mission echoed the concerns of Greek Canadians who feared a Canadian pull out might trigger a Turkish takeover of the island. In general, the parliamentary debate over Canada's presence in Cyprus suggested that MPs wanted Canada to continue its traditional peacekeeping role, while they were perhaps hesitant about involvement in new, riskier UN operations.

The above conclusion is substantiated by the discussion of parliament's role in authorizing Canadian participation in new UN missions. This theme ranked in a tie for nineteenth place (6.0% of cases). No other fora discussed this issue to any significant
degree. It was considered solely by opposition MPs, primarily during the special debate on Canada's role in the Somalian mission. Essentially, opposition MPs argued that, given the dangers inherent in new missions like that in Somalia, Parliament must have a more direct role in approving missions than it had had previously. Lloyd Axworthy asserted: "We cannot begin to assume automatically that these kinds of new initiatives which are moving Canada, along with other nations, into a substantial new role of intervention and enforcement can take place without consensus, without agreement of the Canadian people." Audrey McLaughlin, the federal leader of the New Democratic Party, made the point even more forcefully when she said:

I would like to begin by expressing my profound regret that we are tonight debating a motion on a decision that has already been taken [for Canada to participate in the Somalian mission]. I cannot say too strongly how anti-democratic I feel this is, how arrogant it is of this government to have taken the decision and then to allow elected members to debate a decision already taken.

Parliamentarians apparently wanted a greater role in decisions about sending Canadian peacekeepers abroad because they were increasingly hesitant about unconditionally supporting Canadian participation in future missions.

The clearest evidence of parliamentary hesitancy over Canada's role in peacekeeping was the limited discussion on Canada's future participation in peacekeeping. In spite of the extensive debate on Canada's ability to respond to the new types of peacekeeping, there was little comment on what Canada's future commitment to peacekeeping ought to be. Whereas Canada's participation in the
Cyprus mission was discussed twenty-five times, Canada's future participation in peacekeeping generally was discussed only fourteen times. As Table 8 discloses, of those who commented on this subject, half of them had mixed or unfavourable views, while only 28.6% expressed their support for Canada's continued high profile in peacekeeping. Those MPs who had mixed or unfavourable views cited the costs of peacekeeping, the open-endedness of peacekeeping missions, and the limited manpower of the armed forces as reasons for opposing a Canadian role in any UN standing forces that might be established in the future.

The preoccupation of MPs with themes related to the Canadian military and its capability to deal with new types of peacekeeping left MPs feeling that Canada would be unable to participate in future large-scale, ambitious peacekeeping missions. More modest efforts at peacekeeping, like UNFICYP continued, however, to have their support. As the UN was moving to more ambitious peacekeeping, the position of MPs appeared to place them on the side of a smaller Canadian role in the future than had characterized past policy. The preoccupation with fiscal restraint that pervaded public policy discourse in all areas of government during the study period seems to have affected the parliamentary debate on peacekeeping.

The Government

While the amount of information for government officials was limited, it is still possible to make some observations on government attitudes towards peacekeeping during the period
studied. While ministers, bureaucrats at External Affairs and Defence and military personnel made only a limited number of public statements on peacekeeping, they naturally tended to choose their themes carefully in order to give to peacekeeping the desired official emphasis. Thus, over the survey period, it was possible to get a fairly good understanding of governmental attitudes towards peacekeeping.

As Table 9 discloses, the most striking aspect of the government survey was the frequency with which several peacekeeping themes were discussed. Government officials discussed four peacekeeping themes in 30% or more of the statements and eleven topics were discussed in 20% or more of the items. In no other fora of debate was there such a high level of concentration on several themes. Clearly, the government wanted to explore consistently a number of specific peacekeeping themes where it believed that detailed discussion and reflection were required.

In particular, the government decided to stress the changing nature of peacekeeping in a global context. Three of the top four themes were, broadly speaking, of this nature (New Types of Peacekeeping, Agenda for Peace report, and the UN Financing of Peacekeeping). The government also discussed to a considerable extent how the changing nature of peacekeeping would impact upon Canada. Thus, its contribution to the current peacekeeping debate was balanced between focusing on the impact of new types of peacekeeping on the UN and on Canada.

The government's concentration on Canada's contribution to the
Table 9

Top Twenty Peacekeeping Themes for Government Officials (N=50)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Yugoslavia</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>New Types of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><em>Agenda for Peace Report</em></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>UN Financing of Peacekeeping</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Regional Organizations and Peacekeeping</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Yugoslavian Mission</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Nature of Canadian Role in Peacekeeping</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Current Missions—General</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Preventative Actions</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Current UN Missions—General</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Cdn. Participation in Future Missions—General</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Canadian Participation in Cyprus</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Canadian Military Personnel</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Criteria for Cdn. Participation in UN Peacekeeping</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Expanding Number of Peacekeeping States</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Canadian Armed Forces Capacity</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Security Risks for Canadian Peacekeepers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>State Sovereignty</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Canadian Defence Policy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peacekeeping Training</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not add up to 100% due to multi-coding.
peacekeeping mission in Yugoslavia (the top ranked theme) was certainly noteworthy. It appeared that the government felt it needed to defend vigorously Canada's participation in this mission in the face of the criticism that was emanating from the other three fora of debate. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, went to great lengths in many of her speeches during this survey period to emphasize the need for Canada to continue its peacekeeping duties in Yugoslavia. In one speech she stated:

We are not in Yugoslavia by accident. We are there because peace and security in Europe are essential to peace and security in Canada. We cannot overestimate what Europe means to Canada in terms of our political, economic and even environmental interests. We are in Yugoslavia because our armed forces have assured us that they have the means to participate and the necessary expertise to make an important and constructive contribution. We are there because thousands of Canadians have urged us to help the UN in its efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of this terrible conflict.36

In essence, the government argued that the decision to participate in Yugoslavia was based on fundamental assumptions about Canada's enlightened self-interests and was not, as some of the government's critics contended, a knee-jerk response related to preserving Canada's perfect record of participating in every peacekeeping mission without regard to the dangers.

Nevertheless, despite positive statements of the above character regarding the Yugoslavian mission, the dominant strain in the government's discussion of peacekeeping during the study period was one of cautious reserve. For example, while vigorously defending Canada's role in the peacekeeping effort in Yugoslavia,
Barbara McDougall still questioned the value of traditional-style peacekeeping in this situation when she said that the war in the former Yugoslavia had "demonstrated the limitations of highly passive techniques for conflict resolution, and we must be prepared to consider more active forms of intervention when circumstances warrant."³⁷

Canada's 29-year experience in the UN mission in Cyprus, culminating with Canada's decision to withdrawal its troops from this island in December 1992, seemed to contribute to the government's ambivalence towards peacekeeping. In announcing Canada's decision to pull out of Cyprus, Mary Collins, Associate Minister of Defence, said:

"Peacekeeping must never be considered as an end in itself or as a substitute for political leadership and honourable compromise. The basis for any peacekeeping operation has always been an agreement by the parties involved to work towards a political settlement."³⁸

Another indication of the Canadian government's scepticism of the effectiveness of UN peacekeeping during the current debate was its emphasis on certain themes highlighted in the Agenda for Peace report, such as the role of regional organizations in peacekeeping and preventative diplomacy. The former theme was discussed in 24% of the government statements on peacekeeping, going well beyond the frequency of discourse in the other three fora of debate. Barbara McDougall stressed particularly the role of regional organizations in maintaining global peace. She often pointed to Canada's membership in a broad range of global organizations as a means by which Canada could push these organizations to play a greater role
in containing conflict. The Canadian government's concentration on this theme suggested an interest in lessening the extent to which the UN was called upon to launch new peacekeeping missions. Preventative actions was another theme of the Agenda for Peace report that the government stressed. John Noble, Director General of the International Organization Bureau of the Department of External Affairs, said in his opening statement before the SCEAIT committee: "We [Canada] commended the [UN] Secretary-General's emphasis on preventative diplomacy and peacemaking as the preferred options and encouraged him to continue to use all of the means at his disposal to defuse crises." Barbara McDougall also suggested that Canada concentrate its peacekeeping focus primarily on diplomatic efforts to keep the peace. Thus, by highlighting ways in which UN peacekeeping could be avoided, the government displayed a certain wariness towards future peacekeeping.

Another illustration of the apparent move by the government away from peacekeeping was the discussion of the theme of the expanding number of peacekeeping states generally (the 15th ranked theme), a subject which only rarely arose in the other three fora of debate. The government attitude seemed to be that Canada's disproportionate contribution to peacekeeping, relative to Canada's population, could no longer be sustained when larger powers had the manpower to contribute to peacekeeping. While the participation of other states in peacekeeping was still in its formative stages, the government chose to highlight this development as a trend which would impact upon Canada significantly, enabling it perhaps to
assume specialist roles like initially setting up new peacekeeping missions or helping to train other countries' soldiers as peacekeepers. The focus on this type of theme seemed to indicate the government's desire to reduce its peacekeeping commitment and concentrate on other areas of concern related to international peace and security.

In the contemporary debate, the Canadian government also emphasized the limited resources of the UN and of Canada. In particular, the government focused its attention on the UN financing of peacekeeping and the late payment of UN dues by many prominent member states. Barbara McDougall often emphasized that the UN could not fulfil its overall aim of defending global peace and security if UN member states, particularly the U.S., did not pay their dues. 42 This issue appeared to be one of the most serious irritants in the bilateral relations of the U.S. and Canada during the survey period. The Canadian government was clearly worried that if the UN mounted more peacekeeping missions without serious financial reform, then peacekeeping states like Canada would have to bear the financial burden. While the government had been prepared to do this, albeit grudgingly, in the past when there were few missions, it made it clear that it was not prepared to do so in the future.

The government's discussion of Canada's participation in current UN missions generally also reflected its unease about the evolution of peacekeeping. This theme was discussed twelve times, but as Table 10 discloses, only four times did government officials
explicitly support Canada's continued presence in the ongoing UN missions, whereas neutral observations accounted for seven of the twelve times this theme was developed. While government officials did not hesitate to make favourable comments about Canada's contributions in Yugoslavia and Somalia, they were less inclined to defend its contributions to other missions, such as those in Angola, Cambodia, and Lebanon and they were strongly negative about the Cyprus operation.

Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Missions</th>
<th>Fav.</th>
<th>Unfav.</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia (N=20)</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (N=9)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current Missions--Gen.(N=12)</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Missions--Gen.(N=10)</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>90.0%</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Perhaps the most revealing finding that illustrated a clear ambivalence towards peacekeeping was the mixed feelings expressed by the government on Canada's future participation in peacekeeping. As Table 10 reveals, of the ten instances in which this theme was discussed only one reflected a favourable attitude towards future involvement while nine were mixed in nature. Most government suggestions for possible future roles (a start up specialization, concentration on preventative diplomacy, logistical and training support\textsuperscript{43}) reflected a clear downgrading from Canada's current level of peacekeeping involvement, and government officials acknowledged this to be so. While officials may have floated these roles only as 'trial balloons', the effect was to contribute to a
sense of foreign and defence policy drift, heightening the anxiety of other participants in the debate who wondered if Canada would continue to be a leader in peacekeeping in the future. In short, during the period analyzed, the government's policy on peacekeeping seemed to be on hold as it waited for a definitive new global order to be established before deciding what Canada's place in this new order would be.

Finally, The Sperman's Rank-Order Correlation Coefficient was employed to measure the level of agreement in attention to themes between every two fora of debate with a score of +1.0 indicating perfect agreement and -1.0 perfect disagreement.

The results were positive for all six comparisons. However, except for the government/elite comparison, the co-efficients were only weakly positive, ranging from +0.14 to +0.24 for the top twenty themes'1, showing that there were distinct differences in the treatment of themes. The Yugoslavian and Somalian missions, new types of peacekeeping, and Canadian participation in Yugoslavia were important themes for all fora. However, beyond these, there was little similarity overall in the attention given to the myriad of other peacekeeping themes. This finding suggests a general disagreement about what should be the dominant themes of the peacekeeping debate in the contemporary era.

For the government-elite comparison, the Sperman co-efficient was +0.48 for the top twenty peacekeeping themes overall and +0.63 for the top ten. To a degree, therefore, there was a convergence
between elites and government officials in terms of the priority attached to different peacekeeping themes. In general, both fora tended to give attention to broad peacekeeping themes and to consider the changing character of peacekeeping. Substantively, both also shared a certain wariness about peacekeeping as the only way to resolve international conflict and were more likely than the other fora to explore options which would avoid the need for employing UN troops. This elite-government convergence could suggest that elites are in the best position to influence future government policy on peacekeeping, as they tend to address more frequently than other societal groups those peacekeeping themes which are of concern to the government.
ENDNOTES


3. Ibid., p.5.

4. Opening Statement at SCEAIT, p.50:45.


6. Opening Statement at SCEAIT, p.45:5.


16. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


29. See questioning by the Honourable Arnold Malone in the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, February 24, 1993, pp.35:18-22.


38. Notes for a Statement by the Honourable Mary Collins, Associate Minister of Defence, on behalf of the Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, in the House of Commons,


41. An Address by The Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to a Seminar on Canada's Agenda for International Peace and Security, Ottawa, February 8, 1993, Statement, 93/7., p.6.

42. Ibid., p.3.

43. Ibid.

44. The Sperman's Rank-Order Correlation Co-efficient for the other five relationships when using the top twenty peacekeeping themes overall were as follows: The press and Members of Parliament was +0.22, elites and Members of Parliament +0.24, the press and government +0.21, Members of Parliament and government officials +0.14, the press and elites +0.19.
Chapter Six

Conclusion

The unpredictable world of international politics which has emerged from the ashes of the Cold War has made foreign policy-making in Canada a much more difficult task to undertake. In the past, Canada, as a middle power, played a supportive role in an American-led Western alliance, designed to contain the Soviet Union. As an ally of the United States, it attempted to curb American foreign policy adventurism and to maintain alliance solidarity. Peacekeeping became an excellent vehicle for achieving both objectives. In particular, it was valuable in terms of preventing superpower involvement in regional conflicts to protect bloc interests, the effect of which might have been to escalate local disputes into major threats to global security. The end of the Cold War has, however, brought into question whether it remains in Canada's interests to continue as a peacekeeping nation.

The above examination of the contemporary debate on peacekeeping has demonstrated that there is considerable interest in this subject amongst elites, the press, parliamentarians and government officials. The themes explored are also more varied than in the past. Topics like the new forms peacekeeping is taking, state sovereignty, training of forces, the roles of regional and non-governmental organizations in peacekeeping and preventative actions have all extended the debate. At the same time, however, important subjects have been ignored. In addition to discussion of certain missions, like those in Cambodia and
Mozambique, the neglected topics have included the future composition of the UN Security Council and its pertinence to the efficiency of peacekeeping, Japanese and German involvement in peacekeeping, and the Secretary General's *Agenda for Peace* report, exploring the future direction of UN peacekeeping.

The contemporary debate has also demonstrated substantial interest in peacekeeping from a Canadian perspective. Apart from Canada's role in specific missions, prominent topics have included the preparedness of Canadian military personnel for peacekeeping, the risks attendant upon performing this function, and the specific nature of Canada's role in peacekeeping. Most particularly, this study has shown that there is a considerable degree of scepticism in Canada about peacekeeping and the extent to which and in what ways Canada should be involved in this activity in the future. While the opportunity for the UN to play a more active role in resolving conflict through peacekeeping is generally welcomed by Canadians as an exciting prospect, the financial state of the UN, the need for institutional reform, and the difficulties and dangers of current missions are all serving to cast doubts in the minds of many as to whether the UN can ever assume its intended role as the prime agent for global collective security.

In light of the nature of the contemporary debate in Canada and the themes it has entailed, this concluding chapter outlines the author's views with respect to the place peacekeeping should have in Canada's future foreign and defence policy. Clearly, the proposals that follow are only tentative, given the constant flux
in world affairs. Nevertheless, it is hoped they reflect the approach policy-makers should be considering in order to end the uncertainty that currently pervades Canada's policy on peacekeeping.

Peacekeeping was always considered by the Canadian government as a secondary role within its defence policy framework. While it may have had the highest profile of all of the functions of the Canadian military, Canada always regarded a nuclear attack on North America or a conventional war in Western Europe as the main threats to Canada's security and, thus, the main foci of defence policy. These threats have now virtually disappeared. The international order is characterized by a diffusion of power and the explosion of nationalist-inspired conflict. In this atmosphere, peacekeeping can assume a much greater prominence in the maintenance of international peace and security, as a means of managing change in a peaceful manner.

It appears likely that, despite present difficulties, peacekeeping will become a more important focal point for preserving and enforcing peace. Security Council members are much more enthusiastic about peacekeeping than they were in the Cold War era and the permanent members are now participating directly in several ongoing missions. While it is important that UN interventionism not become overzealous, since that could create a North-South rift, the general movement towards more active peacekeeping is, nevertheless, a very positive sign for greater global stability. Under these hopeful circumstances, it is
important that Canada maintain its traditional high commitment to peacekeeping in an era of uncertainty.

Some have argued that it is no longer in Canada's interest to involve itself so heavily in peacekeeping because the fear that localized wars will escalate into world wars has evaporated with the end of the Cold War. While it is true that Canada's military security is no longer directly threatened by regional conflicts, a broader definition of security is needed. World conflict is costly for Canada in many ways. Warring states do not trade with Canada. War-torn countries need Canadian developmental assistance and, in addition, more refugees come to Canada from conflict-ridden regions. All these circumstances entail a drain on Canada's resources. As well, in a broad way, it is in Canada's interests to be involved in peacekeeping because it is a multilateral enterprise which helps to create a more orderly international system, and this has always been a key objective of Canadian foreign policy. If Canada chooses to ignore peacekeeping requests along with the rest of the international community, a global atmosphere of considerable anarchy and chaos could reign. Such an environment would not be in the interests of Canada, a trading nation and a middle power, because its ability to influence global security issues would lessen and the possibility of greater global trade protectionism would increase. Canada's participation in peacekeeping should thus be based on an enlightened view of its national interest, with security seen in a broader context than in the past.

Peacekeeping is also the one field of foreign policy in which
Canada has acknowledged expertise which is recognized by the international community. Canada's security commitments have dwindled with the end of the Cold War. It has withdrawn troops from its NATO bases in Germany and the threats to the military security of Canada itself and North America have clearly diminished. Thus, there are few urgent security priorities for Canada in the near future so that it cannot be said that a continuing strong commitment to peacekeeping would significantly infringe on any other defence priorities.

Without a significant change in its defence policy, however, Canada will be unable to contribute to future peacekeeping missions and may be forced to withdraw its forces from ongoing missions. This would certainly mean a diminished capacity for Canada to influence global security affairs. Maintaining Canada's commitment to peacekeeping should not, however, be equated with increasing the defence budget. It should be remembered that less than one-half of one percent of Canada's defence budget from 1949-1980 was allocated to peacekeeping missions in which Canada participated.¹ What is needed simply is a reallocation of spending within Canada's defence budget. If peacekeeping is to be the main priority of Canada's defence, spending needs to be tailored to that function.

Clearly, the most important obstacle to Canada's remaining a peacekeeping country is the limited capacity of the Canadian armed forces to respond to future peacekeeping demands and even to maintain current UN missions. A commitment to increase the troop level of the Canadian armed forces is thus required.
Along with this commitment, however, a substantial reduction in Canada's air force and navy, as well as a decrease in the acquisition of capital equipment required for these military branches, is required. Currently, air force personnel have a full-time strength of 19,000, which exceeds the army's full-time strength of 18,000.\textsuperscript{2} An air force of that size was based on Cold War strategy in conjunction with the rest of the Western Alliance. As one of the richer countries which did not conscript young people for military service, Canada agreed to focus on air defence for the Western Alliance and thus bought expensive CF-18 fighter-bombers.\textsuperscript{3} Clearly, this role has become obsolete and it is thus no longer necessary to allocate a large percentage of Canada's military budget to the air force.

Canada's navy does play an important role in domestic duties such as patrolling the fisheries and search and rescue operations. However, this branch of the military has also not updated its strategy to reflect the new geopolitical realities. The main reason why Canada is currently in the process of purchasing twelve frigates and 50 EH-101 anti-submarine helicopters (both of which would be at the cutting edge of military technology) is the erstwhile submarine threat to North America, once posed by the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{4} Clearly, neither of these expensive capital commitments is necessary in the post-Cold War era and cheaper alternatives should be sought.

In short, two branches of Canada's military are still focused on fighting a threat which no longer exists. A new emphasis should
be placed on increasing the capabilities of the army branch for peacekeeping while the air force and navy are contracted to perform essentially domestic surveillance functions plus a back-up role in support of peacekeeping forces. Canada must ensure that its armed forces are able to respond effectively to peacekeeping challenges as peacekeeping is currently and likely to be in the future the most worthwhile task of the Canadian military.

In addition, serious consideration should be given to closing surplus domestic military bases in Canada. While this decision has been delayed because of the political consequences of such a move, it will be considerably easier to do this immediately after the next general election. It would be wise, however, to keep Canadian Forces Base Cornwallis open and to transform it. It should be the base for a comprehensive peacekeeping training centre. While acknowledging the professionalism of Canada's peacekeeping efforts, the trend towards more sophisticated types of peacekeeping, involving humanitarian efforts, more contact with warring parties and rebuilding countries' infrastructures, requires more training in such areas as diplomatic skills, and the history, culture and traditions of the region the UN will enter. As the problems of the Canadian contingent in dealing with civilians in Somalia suggest, more training is needed in non-military aspects of peacekeeping.

Within the above general defence budget framework, it is still possible to envision a reduction in expenditures. While it is never easy to estimate the defence budget, it is safe to assume that a reduction in navy and air force personnel, accompanied by a
reduction in the purchase of capital equipment for these two branches, as well as the closing of military bases, would generate major savings. Peacekeeping is a relatively inexpensive task for the Canadian military that does not require expensive weaponry. Thus, it should be very possible for Canada to both upgrade the importance of peacekeeping within its defence policy and at the same time reduce the size of the defence budget.

In terms of what the Canadian government should do on the diplomatic front for peacekeeping, a predominant concern ought to be a call by Canada for the convening of a high-level UN summit on the subject of peacekeeping, involving the foreign ministers of UN member states. Peacekeeping has become the most important UN function in maintaining global peace and security, but the UN still lacks a comprehensive strategy on how to deal with future global conflicts. A summit of foreign ministers could break the impasse which has frustrated similar attempts (such as those of the Committee of 33) at establishing a more efficient approach to launching UN peacekeeping missions. The issues of how peacekeeping should be financed, whether the UN should be actively involved in civil wars, and the question of a UN stand-by force all need to be addressed in an international forum in order that peacekeeping can become an effective tool of conflict resolution. It has never been more imperative that the ad hoc approach of past peacekeeping missions be replaced with a more institutionalized response to peacekeeping's demands.

In this peacekeeping summit, Canada should also explore with
other active peacekeeping states the possibility of forming a UN standing army that would be at the permanent disposal of the Security Council. In combining the efforts of several countries, increased efficiency and effectiveness would result. As well, the delays which have been encountered in the creation of past peacekeeping missions would be avoided. Rapid deployment of a UN force would also ensure that a peacekeeping mission would have a better chance of containing hostilities and lessening the suffering of civilians affected by the war. The difficulties of the Yugoslavian mission, well documented in the contemporary peacekeeping debate in Canada, confirm the need to enter a disputed country at an early stage of the conflict.

On the question of how the UN should finance peacekeeping missions, Canada ought to support UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's proposal, as set out in his report, *Agenda for Peace*, for a peacekeeping fund into which member states must pay. The wrangling over how each peacekeeping mission will be financed could be thereby avoided and the UN Secretary General would be able immediately to access the funds necessary for the launching of a mission once UN authorization had been granted. In addition, Canada should place the United States' non-payment of its UN regular dues and assessments for peacekeeping at the top of the global affairs agenda in Canada's bilateral relations with the United States. Canada must continue its traditional role of guiding the United States into multilateral action and limiting American unilateralism abroad by urging the U.S. to be a more
supportive and active member of the UN.

The need for greater attention to preventative diplomacy efforts by the UN and regional organizations should also be an aspect of Canada's peacekeeping policy. Specifically, the Canadian government, consistent with its historical desire to strengthen the position of the UN Secretary General, should support increasing the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the office, thereby enabling the Secretary General to pre-empt the outbreak of hostilities more effectively. Canada should also use its membership in several regional organizations to push for greater emphasis in their deliberations on identifying and resolving early on potential conflicts in their regions. This would include the discussion of the development of regularized procedures under which a regional organization would first attempt to mediate in its area. If this failed to achieve any concrete results, the regional organization would then report its findings to the UN Secretary General and a meeting of the Security Council would then be called to deliberate on the Secretary General's recommendations for appropriate UN action. If the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), for instance, had focused on the potential for war in Yugoslavia at an earlier stage, the CSCE and the UN together might have been more effective in containing or, indeed, stopping the conflict altogether.

Another important focus for Canada's peacekeeping policy must be reform of the Security Council. It is critical that a consensus amongst the major blocs of states in the UN be achieved on the need
for a peacekeeping mission. It is important that peacekeeping not be used or perceived as being used by Western states as a foreign policy tool carried out to meet their own interests at the expense of the Third World. Brazil, Nigeria, India, Germany, Japan, and even Canada may be potential candidates for permanent membership in the Security Council. This would ensure a better representation of all major continents and better reflect the current global dispersal of interests and power. It might also be advisable to amend the UN Charter so that two negative votes by permanent members rather than one would be required in any vote to veto a resolution. While Security Council reform is a contentious issue that goes to the very heart of the UN power structure and it may thus be difficult to achieve agreement, Canada must be a leading voice in a movement for Security Council reform. As a middle power, it is in Canada's interests to see a greater dispersal of influence within the UN, instead of seeing it remain an organization in which great power interests are paramount.

A final major issue that Canada must raise energetically is UN command and control of peacekeeping missions. The need for a Military Staff Committee in some form is clearly evident. While the Military Staff Committee envisaged in the UN Charter may not be feasible, some type of military advisory committee of countries who contribute UN troops would help ensure the better co-ordination of peacekeeping efforts. In addition, Canada should heed the advice of Major-General Lewis MacKenzie and demand that a more effective UN headquarters be created which would stay in constant contact.
with UN force commanders on the ground. The greater number and volatile nature of the new types of peacekeeping missions require that the force commanders be in communication with UN officials in New York in order to receive regular guidance in the execution of their UN mandates. Clearly, the UNHQ was inadequate in advising Major-General MacKenzie who, in many instances, had to act on his own without UN assistance.

The increased complexity of peacekeeping has made policy-making in this area much more difficult. In the past, few specific defence commitments were needed for Canada to be an effective peacekeeping nation. However, today, a radical restructuring of Canada's defence policy is required for Canada to remain a significant peacekeeper. The central question becomes whether there is the government will to implement any of the above recommended policy changes that are necessary for Canada to be a useful peacekeeper today and in the future. One can be sufficiently confident that Canada will be energetic on the diplomatic front in the UN, pushing for institutional reform in order that peacekeeping may become a more effective UN function. The examination in this study of government attitudes towards peacekeeping has shown that in its foreign policy, Ottawa does place a high priority on the UN and reform of its institutions. In terms of defence policy, however, the situation looks bleak. There has been little inclination shown to alter Canada's defence policy to meet the needs of peacekeeping. As well, there is clearly an institutionalized bias in the Department of National Defence in

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favour of capital equipment over personnel resources. In fact, DND proposed to the cabinet in 1991 that military personnel be cut by 25% and that the savings be diverted to the purchase of new military equipment. Thus, there is little bureaucratic will to see peacekeeping become the most important role for Canada's military. As well, as this study has demonstrated, Conservative cabinet ministers do not seem terribly enthusiastic about peacekeeping. The survey of statements by defence and external affairs ministers over the period studied indicated that they generally envisage a substantially reduced role for Canada in peacekeeping. Under these circumstances, Canada may be less inclined to participate in future missions and when it does join, it may be only for a limited stay in any one mission, as was the case in Somalia. With respect to MPs, they were mainly silent on the future of Canadian peacekeeping, suggesting that they also place a low priority on a continued high level of Canadian participation. At the same time, during the study period, elites and the press were often cautious in their support of peacekeeping as a function of the Canadian armed forces, making it easier for the government if it chooses to de-emphasize this activity in the future.

It is to be hoped that, whatever the results of the next general election are, it will produce a government that still regards foreign policy as an important dimension of overall government policy. It is also to be hoped that the next government will continue Canada's traditionally strong support for UN
endeavours to institute greater global order and that it will thus encourage active Canadian participation in peacekeeping. However, the current preoccupation in Canada with domestic questions and particularly the need for fiscal restraint may cause foreign policy issues to be downgraded in the future. The recent cuts to Official Development Assistance and to diplomatic postings are certainly not encouraging omens for peacekeeping. In the next government, strong proponents of peacekeeping will be needed in the posts of Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of Defence. They must be able to withstand the bureaucratic inertia of the Defence Department and to resist the populist urge to cut Canada's foreign and defence commitments. Given the nature of the debate in 1992 and 1993, the outlook for peacekeeping in Canada seems uncertain if not bleak.
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4. Ibid.


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7. Ibid.
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