Habermas' proposal : the unity of knowledge, interest and action.

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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÊCHUE
HABERMAS' PROPOSAL: THE UNITY
OF KNOWLEDGE, INTEREST
AND ACTION

by

Jabu Edward Nandy Dube

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of
Political Science in Partial Fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL:</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BACKGROUND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. KNOWLEDGE AND CONSTITUENT</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERESTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. POSITIVISM: THEORY AND</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSTRUMENTAL ACTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. INTERPRETATION, ACTION</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND EMANCIPATION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE INTEGRATION PROBLEM</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IN HABERMAS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACT

This thesis is an analysis of Habermas' proposal concerning the possible unity of knowledge, interest and action. It begins by an introduction to the Frankfurt School and traces the development of "critical theory" within this school. There is an attempt to situate Habermas' analysis within the framework of the Frankfurt School which underscores the constant quest for, and the development of power of each individual "to learn to see himself or herself in others" — this is the task of rational social beings in society. Each aspect (i.e. knowledge, interest and action) of life-experience is conceived in terms of three dimensions: in the sphere of knowledge there are empirical-analytic sciences, historical-hermeneutic sciences, and critical sciences; whereas, the category of interest constitutes technical cognitive interest, practical cognitive interest, and emancipatory cognitive interest — these form the knowledge constitutive interests; and lastly, the realm of action incorporates instrumental action, practical action, and emancipatory action. The thesis also examines Habermas' critique of positivism and the contradictions of positivistic politics; the argument is made that Habermas' proposal falls short of actual realization in practical political life, and also the role of emancipatory interest and action, supposedly
generated by the process of psychoanalysis, is not ade-
quately explained as to how it makes us become aware of this important unity of knowledge, interest and action.
To
Makhada H. Dube
and,
Andrew H. Moyo
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INTRODUCTION

Our purpose in the thesis is to explore the three dimensions of action in the social and political theory of the contemporary German sociologist-philosopher Jurgen Habermas. When one examines the work of a living contemporary theorist, any conclusions one draws must of necessity be tentative. That sets one limit to our enquiry. A second limitation arises from the fact that the thesis does not attempt to cover everything that Habermas has written, but confines itself largely to the works translated into English. However, some use has been made of the introductory essay to Philosophisch-Politische Profile. Habermas is a very dense and frequently a very difficult writer. Essays of considerable lucidity are often found alongside other essays which are overcharged with terminology and practically impenetrable. Some of the essays in Legitimation Crisis are good examples of this latter tendency. Because of the difficulties involved in comprehending Habermas' basic orientation, the thesis envisages nothing more than an effort at clarification, an analysis of the basic concepts and the indications as to their interconnection. From a review of the rather extensive secondary materials we feel that this is a task which remains to be done, at least in so far as achieving a scholarly consensus is concerned. Critics are still trying to get a handle on Habermas. We will concentrate on substantive themes dealing with how we acquire knowledge, its forms and use, the interest underlying
the applications of knowledge and the practical role of critical theory in social and political life. In addition, we shall examine the problem of human domination in society and the impact of positivism on industrialized societies. Habermas traces the plight of human existence from man's initial awareness of himself, of others, and the world around him, to the present stage of man's encounter with the world of work and human interaction. He conceives human existence as manifesting itself within three dimensions of actions, namely, instrumental action, communicative action and emancipatory action. Each dimension of action is realizable within a specific form of knowledge which in turn is oriented toward a particular sphere of human interest exhibited within a specific domain or social medium. For instance, in the first dimension of action, that is, instrumental action, the form of knowledge obtaining is the empirical-analytic sciences directed by technical cognitive interests which are exhibited in an arena whose social medium is work or production. The second dimension of action involves communicative or practical action which specifically pertains to the historical hermeneutic sciences which are under the sole guidance of practical cognitive interests mediated through language. Finally, the third dimension of action comprises emancipatory action which in turn is concerned solely with the critical sciences or critical philosophy impelled by emancipatory cognitive interests whose social medium is power. In addition, it is equally important to take note of the fact that according to Habermas, within each sphere of interest there is a particular orientation to which each form of
knowledge is directed. An example of this phenomenon would be: the technical cognitive interests are geared toward the maintenance of technical control over objective situations and objectified processes. Whereas, it is observed that practical cognitive interests are oriented toward the establishment of intersubjectivity or the maintenance of possible action-orienting mutual understanding among speaking actors. Finally, the emancipatory cognitive interests are necessarily oriented toward the achievement of self-reflection within the framework of psychoanalysis or analytic-dialogue. What Habermas finds characteristic of the human species generally is its foundation in language. Its thinking processes, interests, and actions first become realizable through communicative language. For man to make sense of himself he must make himself understood by others, and this understanding by others can only come about through communication, that is, by means of ordinary language communication. Therefore, according to Habermas, whatever achievement of the good life, enjoyment or misery every human being may be experiencing can only be made known to others through the channel of communication, that is, through language or verbal utterances. It is within the context of the use or misuse of language that Habermas traces the problems of repression and domination in human life. Habermas conceived the human comprehension of the life-world to be firmly anchored in language communication. This we find to be evident when we visualize the situation of an infant who first makes his or her feeling of joy and suffering known to the mother by gesture. The infant's
expression whether be it in the form of a cry or murmur is communicated to the mother who in turn understands what is being expressed. Such an utterance represents the most elementary form of language communication.

Habermas' analysis of social and political life is anchored in the Frankfurt School tradition which advocated research-oriented Hegelian-Marxist dialectics of industrial societies. We find Habermas' relationship to the Frankfurt School a crucial factor in the understanding of the substantive themes of his works. We may add that Habermas' own intellectual roots and interests have directly emerged from the School's concern with the articulation of critical theory, the unmasking of domination as well as the uncovering of repressive systems in society, and finally, its preoccupation with the pretensions and consequences of positivism. Therefore, we have decided to devote most of chapter one to covering the groundwork laid by the School's older members, mainly Horkheimer and Adorno; and at the end of the chapter we concentrate on tying Habermas' social and political theory to the tradition of the Frankfurt School itself.

Chapter two deals with Habermas' concept of knowledge. How does he define knowledge and how is it related to interest? How does Habermas formulate the tri-dimensional conceptualization of knowledge, interest and action? Then follows an examination of each form of knowledge including its respective constituent interest and the orientation of the accompanying action. Chapter three is a discussion of Habermas' critique of positivism or scientism, and the role of instrumental action in domination. We begin
by presenting Habermas theoretical critique of positivism in order to find out whether the positivist's conception of knowledge or science is well founded or arbitrary. Some of the issues we seek to examine concern (1) how the positivists view the relation between science and action, science and conscience; (2) how do the positivists view value-theory, empirical theory and their interrelation. We also focus attention on the critique of positivism as a theory of practice in relation to: (a) the different kinds of actions which can be distinguished, in contradiction to the monistic or reductionist view of action, (b) the notion of what is appropriate, (c) the use or misuse of positivist political science. Finally, we seek to uncover the role of instrumental action in relationships of domination.

In chapter four we look at Habermas' concepts of communicative action and emancipatory action. What distinguishes communicative action from emancipatory action in Habermas' scheme? The enquiry proceeds to discover whether values and facts, theory and practice are separated or connected in each of these two spheres of social action, that is, in regard to communicative and emancipatory actions. How do we go about establishing situations wherein communicative and emancipatory actions become operative? In other words, how do we insure that conditions such as the ideal speech situation, continuous, unconstrained discourse free of domination, and the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding and mutual recognition shared by all the participants obtain?
And how can the rational consensus centered around the thesis, of "the force of the better argument" be achieved? To what extent are communicative actions a product of mutual understanding within the domain of the historical-hermeneutic sciences? In what way can psychoanalysis or the analytic dialogue become a critique of ideology as well as rendering the individual capable of self-reflection wherein arises the emancipation of individuals from all forms of distorted communication? In the political arena, what are the advantages of an enquiry oriented toward communicative and emancipatory actions? It is by analyzing Habermas' ideas in these areas of communication that we hope to answer some of the questions raised above.

Chapter five deals with the interplay between system integration and social integration. Underlying the very concept of interplay exhibited by the two forms of integration is to be found Habermas' interlacing or interweaving scheme, namely, the three dimensions of action. In this final chapter we seek to examine in which form of integration each or more of the dimension(s) of action(s) belongs. This is followed by a discussion of some tentative suggestions concerning the type of political and economic systems envisaged in Habermas' tridimensional conceptualization of social action.
FOOTNOTES

   ————, Legitimation Crisis, Beacon Press, Boston, 1975, pp. 1-166.

2. Jurgen Habermas, Philosophisch-Politische Profile, Frankfurt am Main, Surkamp Verlag, 1971.


   Trent Schroyer, "Marx and Habermas", Continuum, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring-Summer, 1970, pp. 52-64.


5. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, op cit. pp. 308-10.

6. Ibid., pp. 311-15.
Chapter I

THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL: BACKGROUND
We are going to undertake a discussion of the Frankfurt School, and attempt to bring out some of its characteristics in terms of:

1) the view of the individual;
2) the conception of society;
3) the philosophical standpoint, namely, critical theory;
4) the social function of critical philosophy or theory and its view of the social sciences;
5) the critique of positivism.

In addition, we shall attempt to situate Jurgen Habermas in relation to the school.

Before we go into the discussion of the characteristics of the school outlined above, it would be worthwhile if we explain what exactly the Frankfurt School is. The Frankfurt School of Social Research was founded on February 3, 1923 in Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany.¹ The post World-War One scene in Germany presented the German leftist intellectuals with an awkward quandary as to how they should respond to the challenge of the unfolding political events at home and abroad. First of all, there was the dismal failure of the left movements in Central Europe, especially, in Germany, to execute a proletarian revolution under the prevailing, absorptive and co-operative conditions of a bourgeois state.²

Secondly, the impact of the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia was widely felt throughout Central Europe in spite of the subsequent reservations expressed by some members of the leftist intellectual movements who perceived the struggle
for socialism to be undermined by the Bolshevik's statism, that is, the establishment of the national state at the expense of international socialism and solidarity. The exasperated and disillusioned leftist intellectuals in Germany were further torn apart by the real dilemma of whether to pursue their own disinterested intellectual endeavors in the study of Marxist dialectics, or to get involved in the participatory politics of the reformist Social Democrats whose practice was not rooted in a clearly enunciated critical theory. The only other acceptable political option would have been to join the dogmatic, ineffectual German Communist Party whose closed rank mentality and strict party-discipline were anathema to the leftist intellectuals' spirit of intellectual independence and their idea of Marxism as a disinterested scientific pursuit.

It is against the background of these historical events that we may seek to explain the ideas underlying the founding of the Frankfurt School, sometimes referred to as the Institute of Social Research. Martin Jay has observed one major aspect or unique characteristic of the adherents of the school of critical theory:

"Throughout the institute's entire existence, and especially in the period from 1923 to 1950, the fear of cooptation and integration deeply troubled its members. Although the exigencies of history forced them into exile as part of the intellectual migration from Central Europe after 1933, they had been exiles in relation to the external world since the beginning of their collaboration. Far from being a source of regret, however, this status was accepted, even nurtured, as the sine-qua non of their intellectual fertility."
The subject matter studied at the Institute of Social Research was comprised of diverse fields, ranging from musicology to sinology; and it is usually identified as a distinct sociological tendency whose members are frequently referred to as Hegelian-Marxists. Some of the outstanding members of the Frankfurt School were: Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lowenthal, Franz Neuman, Erich Fromm, Otto Kircheimer and Walter Benjamin.\(^6\)

Having outlined the fundamental orientation of the Frankfurt School, we shall next go on to examine the school's view of the individual. The Frankfurt School was concerned not only with the relationship between man and nature, man and man, but also with the total liberation of man from all forms of unnecessary domination and repression obtaining in modern society.\(^7\) The individual was conceived not as an isolated self-seeking being but as a person who knows as well as asserts himself within the realm of a given community. In other words, the person exercises his individuality strictly within the framework of sociality, meaning, his individuality is inextricably bound up with, and inseparable from his social being.\(^8\)

The Frankfurt School's view of an independent, free and self-determining individual was cast strictly in terms of the unity between individuality and generality. An example of such a unity is aptly and vividly illustrated by Hegel's famous remark:
"True independence ... consists solely in the unity and interpenetration of individuality and generality, in that, it is just as much the general which gains for itself concrete existence through singularity, as it is the individual and particular which finds the unshakable basis and true content for its reality only in the general."  

Thus general in this case denotes the community from which the individual arises. The individual arising from the community, is the equivalent of the Aristolelian Zoon politikon (man the political animal). The Frankfurt School conceived the essential nature of man to derive from his sociability which was defined in terms of man's ability to interact and live together with other human beings. It is, in short, the individual's need to realize himself through society and polity.  

Thus, man, the individual, becomes human as well as realizes and actualizes the development of his own capacities through the medium of socialization or sociality. However, the Frankfurt School was eager to draw the line between the unity of the individual and the general, and the subsuming or subordinating of the individual under the general whereby the individual, under the circumstance, becomes an instrument of the community.  

Horkheimer and Adorno, like Kant, perceived the individual to be intended for society as well as being possessed with the inclination to be socialized within the society itself, wherein his innate human capacities are allowed to develop. It is within the context of the above view of man that the Frankfurt School finds itself opposed to the individualistic stance of Schlegel who espoused the view that the individual ought to develop his
selfconsciousness or sense of self-awareness independently of society, as well as being free of other individual influences and social limitations. Similarly, the Frankfurt School was equally opposed to Nietzsche's view which depicted individuality as the "will to power" and the "sovereign individual" divorced from all moral customs and moral restrictions. Despite the fact that the Frankfurt School espoused fully the struggle against domination, against uncritical acceptance of laws or conformism, and against the subordination of one person to another as well as the subjugation of persons by nature or instrumental mechanisms, the school itself rejected both Schlegel's isolationism and Nietzsche's "absolute sovereignty". The Nietzschean view, which the Frankfurt School opposed vehemently, was that, in the final analysis, the individual has to seek the valuation for his actions in himself, because he has to give an individual meaning even to traditional words and actions. The anarchist approach which espoused absolute rejection of the state, the nihilist use of violence and the justification of authoritarian schemes under the banner of "authority is liberty when self-imposed" (the Jacobin principle), was also dismissed by Horkheimer and Adorno as inimical and detrimental to the development of the social individual. Personal autonomy and the responsibility of the individual, according to the Frankfurt School, were realizable within the framework of the community (the general) and not within the realm of the isolated, amoral self of absolute individualism. Therefore, under the circumstance, the self-
consciousness of the individual human being is in reality a product of social consciousness. In other words, this self-consciousness of individuality is not found in a mere given isolated biological entity, but rather in "the truth of the certainty of oneself which achieves its completion and satisfaction only in another self-consciousness" mediated within the framework of a dialogue. The above Hegelian conceptualization, adopted by the Frankfurt School, underscores the inseparable relationship between individuality and society, meaning that one cannot exist without the other. It is within this context that the Hegelian expression "we learn to see ourselves in others" becomes the hallmark and character of the school itself.

The members of the Frankfurt School explored vital issues such as justice and injustice, truth and falsity, substance and appearance not only in terms of generalizing definitions, but also by analyzing the dynamic substantive, concrete social relations wherein the concrete forms of individuality manifest themselves. Therefore, indispensable interaction of the individual and society makes possible the realization by the individual that in order to develop not only his human capacities as a societized individual but also a critical conceptualization of the very society he partakes in, a just and humane society must already be in existence. However, the problematic society, wherein the good life abounds does not prevail within the actual bourgeois private-enterprise, liberal-democracies. This is
why the members of the Frankfurt School decided to chart a new program for the restructuring or transformation of the bourgeois, privatized, consumer-oriented individual. A transformed individual, they envisaged, would not only enjoy the good life but also be freed from domination and repression. Horkheimer, Adorno and other members of the School argued that every individual should be able to cultivate a critical attitude towards society. The ideal situation, it was hoped, would materialize when the very existence of the individual becomes enmeshed within the concrete social relations of society, without having to forego his individuality during the process of socialization.²⁰ The individuality achieved in this case is a socialized individuality manifested within the concrete social relations of society. From the discussion of individuality, the next logical thing would be a consideration of society. What kind of society did the members of the Frankfurt School have in mind?

Horkheimer and Adorno have argued in Hegelian terms that the concept of society incorporates the unity of the community and the individual in the overall multi-faceted relationships of human beings. Under conditions of capitalist production wherein the social labour of workers has become separated from private capital, it is not possible to have a society which incorporated the unity of the community and the individual. What one could expect in a capitalist system is a society seething with actual or sometimes latent forms of social conflicts pitting the owners of the means of production against the non-owners of the means of production.²¹ The members of the Frankfurt School perceived their own society,
Germany, to be very much the symbol of dehumanization and repression under the compulsion of capitalist domination. It is within this context that free-wage labour came to be equated with exploitation and alienated labour. Despite all the progress in rationality and technological advancement, the working men continue to suffer domination and subjection under capitalist production.22

What Horkheimer and Adorno envisaged was a liberated society, free of the domination of man by man and of man by machines. In a liberated society they argued:

The satisfaction of the individual's needs is only possible by means of the universal dependence of all upon each other, ... the satisfaction of the totality of his needs is the work of all ... The activity of labour and needs as the mover of this activity, also has its static aspect in property.23

The thrust of the argument presented by the members of the Frankfurt School was that within the framework of the dialectics of socialized form of production and property there shall emerge not only the universal society, but also the social individual, a human being who is a fullfledged person free of domination. Socialized production would not only pertain to the production of consumer goods, and the equitable distribution of those goods, but also situate the human being within his historical Bildung, that is, his cultural formation and development.24 The concept of society, as seen by Horkheimer and Adorno, is derived from the perspective of the whole of life comprehended as shared activity rather than mere static existence of man as such.25 The ideal society envisaged by the members of the Frankfurt School was one
in which human relationships were linked by the bonds of interdependence and interaction between and among human beings. Horkheimer and his colleagues rejected the idea that society was based on private property, and that the state was bound to care for the protection and preservation of private property. In this sense it can be said that their position is in direct contradiction to Locke's view which saw the role of the state as consisting mainly in the protection of private property. It was also hoped that through interdependence and interaction of human beings, there would emerge a "society with just institutions in which law was based on freedom and not on force" and domination. What we could ask at this juncture is what would be the dominant philosophical standpoint within the society proposed by the Frankfurt School?

Horkheimer contended that critical philosophy or critical theory ought to be the guiding spirit of all of the sciences of man as well as being the emancipating agent of social life itself. What did Horkheimer mean by this term, critical theory? By the term critical theory, Horkheimer and other members of the Frankfurt School meant a philosophical standpoint that concerns itself with the task of restoring self-knowledge to man. Self-knowledge is a process of self-reflection achieved by man under conditions of rational, uncoerced discussion conducted on the basis of a universal consensus arising from mutual understanding and reciprocal agreement among men. It is by participation through unrestrained discourse free of domination that man gets to know himself and
the world around him. In other words, man becomes a mirror image (self-reflection) of himself only through the medium of participation with others incorporating his thinking, actions and language all at one and the same time. Critical theory, argued Horkheimer, is a process that enables men to go beyond the world of mere description, classification and prediction, which is the level of scientific empirical analysis, by coming to grips with the goals served by this method of classification and description of facts. Furthermore, does not the classification of facts serve the status-quo or does it present a radical challenge to the established order of things in life? What critical theory does is to uncover the underlying presuppositions of the method of classification of facts. By discovering what lies behind the facts themselves or the arrangement (organization) of facts critical theory is at the same time giving the fundamental direction of thought itself, meaning, that it reveals to us the manner in which we understand and think about these facts. In other words, the mode of thinking and the meaning structures underlying the understanding of the given facts are brought into close scrutiny in this case.

If critical theory enables man to achieve self-knowledge, namely, the self-knowledge that is made possible by the participation of men in the uncoerced, consensus-based rational dialogue determining the social existence or what every man ought to do in life, then it is evident that that which he knows about himself and others and also that which he does,
are a consequence of social practice. This practice is what is observed during the deliberation and participation of men in the process of achieving self-knowledge. However, it would be more appropriate to depict self-knowledge as rooted in the dual relationship linking man, the knowing subject, to the social practice. Self-knowledge also entails the participation of men in the determination of what is to be accepted as known.

According to Horkheimer, this dual relationship linking the knowing subject to social practice is manifested in a duality of opposites, that is, a dialectical relationship. To elaborate further on the notion of the dialectical relationship existing between the knowing subject and social practice, let's take, for example, the idea of electing the chairman of the department of Political Science. To begin with, the department of Political Science comprises, let us say, twenty faculty members each of whom has different notions about what kind of a chairman ought to be elected. Secondly, all the members of the faculty in this department share the basic belief in liberal-democracy, namely, deliberation, participation through discussion and choosing the most competent and efficient of administrators. Thirdly, the basic belief in the tenets of liberal-democracy shared by each of the faculty members, is characteristic of liberal-democracy as it is known and practiced today, and not as it was known and practiced during the time of John Stuart Mill. This indicates that the notion of liberal-democracy underlying the very concept of election
has undergone a historical transformation, or shall we say, liberal-democracy has evolved through historical development. Thus we cannot look at the idea of liberal-democracy, underlying the concept of election, as a figment of the imagination or arbitrary, haphazard notions existing in the minds of the faculty. Their notions about elections and liberal-democracy as such are rooted in historical development dating from Mill to Max Weber and then to Raymond Aron today. Fourthly, owing to the fact that the organizational framework employed in this election process is liberal-democracy, it is unlikely that a dictatorial or authoritarian administrator can be elected chairman of the department of Political Science.

Returning to the notion of the dialectical relationship underlying the concept of election, let us suppose Professor Finley, thinks, within the framework of liberal democracy, that a good chairman of the department should be a person who is not only a competent administrator but also a solid scholar. On the other hand, Professor Hopkins and eight other colleagues are of the opinion that a chairman should be somebody who is innovative as well as an able administrator. Professor Feelgood and nine members of the faculty would like to choose somebody who has a dynamic personality, a person who can promote the spirit of comradeship and solidarity among faculty members, and finally, a teacher with a keen interest to assist students.

To the extent that each of the professors have in their own ways different interpretations as to what a good
chairman of the department of Political Science should be, they each have in their heads specific notions about what type of a chairman they want elected. Their ideas on who is fit for the position of chairman remain subjective and passive until such time when they get together for deliberation over the matter. Since there are selection committees, it is a two-stage affair. The day of deliberation through participation by all in the discussion on the issue of chairmanship marks the movement of the electoral concept from the arena of subjective passivity (election ideas in the heads of professors) to the public domain of objective activity.

We call the stage of deliberation the public domain of objective activity because here all the twenty faculty members are gathered together and everyone participates in the rational, uncoerced discourse on who should get elected. From this participatory discourse there emerges a universal consensus about the type of candidate to be elected, and subsequently followed by the actual election itself conducted through the casting of secret ballots. This movement of the concept election from subjective passivity to objective activity is what Horkheimer has referred to as the duality of opposites, the unity of passivity and activity, or, simply, the dialectical relationship linking passive and active elements or aspects of the concept of election. In as far as the election of the chairman of the department is concerned, the subjective passive views of the individual professors are crucial, otherwise there would be no suggestions or ideas shared during the important stage of deliberation and
participation through a rational dialogue concerning the issue of who is to be elected. Therefore, the passive aspects of election are inextricably bound with the active aspects of election. They are like the two sides of the same coin. Having demonstrated the dialectical approach toward the electoral process, we shall go on further to show that a similar dialectics exists in the socio-economic sphere of human experience. We may add, it is argued by Horkheimer and his colleagues that critical theory is seen to form the basis upon which the dialectical perspective is founded.

When dealing with the problem of the capitalist form of production, critical theory is able to situate the problem of class interest within the framework of social conflict comprising the essential contradiction between the interest of the capitalist and the interest of the proleteriat. These opposite interests indicate the polarization between the small group of people who appropriate the largest portion of the socially produced goods to themselves and the largest number of working persons who end up with the smallest portion of the social product. Critical theory rejects the bourgeois economy with its notions of free exchange, free competition, and the harmony of interests. Instead it unmask the internal contradictions embedded in these notions, thus pointing the way to the unmasking or the dissolution of the bourgeois capitalist system itself. Horkheimer took issue with the notion, advanced by Marx in the Communist Manifesto, that the communists are the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class movement of every country, and that
this section pushes forward all others. And that the Communists are best informed about the nature of the working-class movement because they have an advantage of lucid understanding of the correct line of march of the proletarian movement as a whole. This meant that priority in leadership and decision-making matters was to be given to the communists. Horkheimer argued that since the working-class movement comprise not only the communists but also the non-communists, it would be important that the deliberation and participation in decision-making and formulation of policies guiding the proletarian movement be open to all the members irrespective of whether they are communists or non-communists. He went on further to point out that what was involved in this case was mainly the important question of human interactions and interdependence requiring the involvement and participation of all the members belonging to the proletarian movement. And that the class interest and class-consciousness of all the members would come to flower along with the liberating forces.

To illustrate the interaction and interdependence that should exist among all the members of the proletarian movement in every country, Horkheimer contends, it would be worthwhile to examine the input of all (the collective) in the decision-making areas of the proletarian movement. First, a wider, open forum for the discussion of goals and issues of the working-class movement should be provided and made available to all members. Secondly, it is hoped that through participation in this open forum the backward section of the working-class movement will not only discard the illusions, the false-consciousness concerning its social
existence under capitalist domination. But also whatever valuable suggestions and ideas it may offer, even if those ideas may be at variance with those of the communists, are bound to contribute to the development of the single interest of the whole of the membership of the working-class—namely, the interest of liberation and emancipation from capitalist domination and exploitation.

According to Horkheimer, the interaction and interdependence among all the members of the proletarian parties would reflect the interplay of conflicting ideas among the members who resolve their differences through the medium of a universal consensus-based decisions. This interplay of conflicting ideas resulting into a single, consensus-based decision is indicative of what Horkheimer calls "the unity of the social forces is at the same time their distinction." It is clear, then, that Horkheimer's application of critical theory to social forms of existence underscores succinctly the thesis that in the social life-world differentiation and integration of life-experience and life-activity are inextricably bound-up and interwoven with the problem of human interaction and participation. Differentiation, in this case, refers to the variance of opinions to be found among the various members of the proletariat. On the other hand, integration characterizes the unity of opinion represented by the universal consensus-based decisions emanating from a deliberating body of initially-differing opinions. The participants with different opinions have managed to come to a common mutual agreement concerning matters of social-existence. It is within this context of differentiation-integration that Horkheimer sees the individual regaining his personal autonomy and responsibility.
Having discussed the philosophical-standpoint or critical theory of the Frankfurt School, it would now be worthwhile to look at the social function of critical theory and its view of the social sciences. In order to do this in a coherent manner we shall begin by reviewing the role of philosophy in society. First, there are some philosophers who saw philosophy to be related to natural/social sciences as a meta-science. Among those who held this view were thinkers belonging to the school of positivism, thinkers such as Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach. On the other hand, there were thinkers of the analytical school, for instance, Bertrand Russell who held that the task of philosophy was "that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis". Phenomenologists such as Edmund HesseI espoused the Platonic and Kantian views which regard philosophy as an exact science in its own right, with its own field and subject matter.

Radical empiricists like Henri Bergson denied that metaphysics, for example, followed the method of science. Philosophy, therefore, came to mean different things to the various schools of thought. The social function of critical philosophy, according to Horkheimer, aims toward the following tasks: (1) not to accept blindly and without questioning the actions and aims of man; to be informatively critical about the concepts of science and the forms of social life, the mode of thinking of people, their custom and mores; (2) to conduct an enquiry into the underlying assumptions or pre-suppositions of the rules of the game upon which liberal-democracy is based; and also to examine the goals served by the method of the
classification of facts: (3) to uncover what lies beyond
the limits of scientific specialization by not focusing
on what is immediate, which is observable through sense-
perception and understood by empirical analysis; but by
seeking to discover the true nature of the particular
scientific specialty which "can be revealed only in the
larger context." 37

When we compare the social function of the critical
philosophy with that of any of the disciplines of social
science, for instance, empirical sociology, we find that the
views of sociologists concerning the role played by ideology
in society differ markedly. On one hand, some sociologists of
knowledge consider the social function of philosophy to be
ideological, because, philosophical thought is seen by them as a mere
expression of a specific social situation. This would mean
that each and every cultural or social group acquires a prism
or conceptual framework, particular modes of thought and style
which are unique to itself, or typical of its social position.
Ideology in this case becomes the equivalent of philosophical
thought. But, on the contrary, Horkheimer argues that critical
philosophy enables these social groups to be liberated from
their particularistic, parochial orientation, and in turn
facilitates the discarding of the ideological outlook itself
as particularity. 38 In other words, critical philosophy
situates the particular social group and its mode of thought
within a comprehensive or general category of social life
extending beyond the limits of the social situation of the
particular group. This is what happens when the particular
is grasped within general categories. Therefore, under the circumstance, critical philosophy has no choice but to repudiate the role of ideology assigned to philosophy by some sociologists of knowledge. Instead, critical theory exposes ideology as humbug, a mere illusion produced by parochialism and particularism, while saving philosophy. Finally, Horkheimer concludes that critical philosophy exposes the internal contradictions afflicting man who is labouring and existing under the one dimensional life of the isolated ideas and unrelated concepts of every day existence. The individual through the aid of the conceptual framework of critical philosophy is able to distinguish appearance from reality.\textsuperscript{39}

The next question to tackle is to see how the members of the Frankfurt School, employing critical philosophy, go about challenging some of the basic presuppositions underlying the practice and application of science and technology as ideology. Horkheimer, Adorno and other members of the Frankfurt School see the failure of science and technology to transcend their particular role in society, or what we may refer to as their specificity-orientation, manifested in the specialization of tasks and division of labour and which has made science and technology become uncritical, passive tools of society. The blind belief in science, that is, science for its own sake, has turned men into instruments of domination and objects of mechanical manipulation. Scientists and technicians have remained contented with the specialized positions they occupy in society,
positions which are placed side by side, separated from one another according to the tasks they each perform in the contemporary scientific world. Last, but not least, these are positions which because of particularity of orientation necessarily exclude the incorporation of the general or comprehensive view of social life in their conceptual frameworks.

The uncritical belief in science, the unquestioning commitment to the mathematical, scientific method of procedure, and the inability to see the goals that the classification of facts serve, that is, the inability to understand the underlying presuppositions of the classification of facts, -- all are components of positivism and scientism. Horkheimer further asserts that with the emergence and success of the scientific method in contemporary industrial societies, the thinking and acting of the scientific-oriented individuals have become much more mechanical and less rooted in living consciousness at the convictions characteristic of the pre-scientific era. The implications of the positivistic attitudes underlying technological progress are far reaching and do not all portend well for the future of man's relationship to his fellow man and to humanity as a whole. First, scientific progress and technological advancement have not completely done away with man's particularistic, situationally-determined mental outlook which generates ideology in the sense of false-consciousness, parochialism and prejudice. But they have actually facilitated the cementing of these old illusions as well as encouraging the reception of new illusions within the uncritical minds of
men, without interference from reason, despite all the emphasis on the rationalized scientific method. 42

This phenomenon which cements old illusions and serves as a convenient receptacle for new ones owes its success to man's mesmerization with the image of the scientific method which has to be copied or adopted without ever questioning its philosophical standpoint, or its underlying presuppositions. Horkheimer and Adorno go on to suggest that the spirit of positivism and technological progress have succeeded in stilling the intellectual curiosity of individuals by numbing their intellectual powers and doing away with people's individual creative powers. These deprivations and shortcomings are reflected in man's cultural institutions, for instance in the standardization and uniformity of television and radio programs. The standardization and uniformity of television and radio programs are geared to the preservation of certain consumer interests and the belief in the reward-punishment structure of the capitalist system. 43

The relation between two notions of progress is succinctly stated by these spokesmen of the Frankfurt School:

"It is true that neither the achievements of science by themselves, nor the advancement of technology, are immediately identical with the real progress of mankind. It is obvious that man may be materially, emotionally and intellectually impoverished at decisive points despite the progress of science and industry." 44 In summary, what Horkheimer and other members of the Frankfurt School were actually saying is that positivism and the emphasis on technological progress in
a rationalized industrial society, go hand in hand
with irrationality and eventually may lead to the outbreak
of barbarism and the destruction of man himself.

In situating Habermas in relation to the
Frankfurt School's substantive themes, we shall refer to
the respective themes in the order followed earlier. Jurgen
Habermas, we may add, comes closest to being the most
faithful to Horkheimer's and Adorno's intellectual out-
look amongst those who may be called the second generation
members of the Frankfurt School of Social Research.
Habermas has not only articulated and sharpened further
the conceptual framework of the school, namely, the
approach of critical theory, but also his intellectual
pursuits and research in the spheres of work-oriented
relationships, symbolic interaction, and relation of
theory and practice, and the problems of power, have
without doubt opened a new page in the history of critical
philosophy and the development of social theory itself.
However, all in all, his substantive contributions in
the critique of the work world and symbolic interactions,
stemming from his solid philosophical grounding and
insight, are a landmark in the historical development of
thought.

Habermas' view of the individual is very similar
to the Frankfurt School's conception of individuality. But
there is an added dimension to Habermas' concept of individuality
which incorporates and emphasizes the notion of inter-subjectivity or mutual understanding taking place through the medium of a dialogic language spoken by two or more individuals. Habermas embraced the Frankfurt School's concept of individuality in the full measure of its Hegelian sense and expressed its notion of self-consciousness in the clearest of terms and in the most succinct manner when he said that "the truth of the certainty of oneself which achieves its completion and satisfaction, only in another self-consciousness." The older members of the school (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse) seemed to focus attention more on the original Hegelian conceptual framework of individuality which incorporates the interdependence and interaction of men without specifically indicating the crucial and indispensable role of dialogic language or linguistic communication, so eloquently demonstrated by Habermas.

One is left with the impression that the older members, notably Horkheimer and Adorno, talked about work and human interaction, without really making a clear distinction between the types of actions involved in each of the cases. For instance, while in the world of work there are only instrumental actions involved, in human interaction there occur practical actions, mediated through linguistic communication. These distinctions are clearly brought out in Habermas' conception of individuality. However, suffice it to say that both Horkheimer and Adorno, as well as Habermas, when they talk of individuality born out of societal existence, refer to an individuality that is not the Nietzschean amoral sovereign
individual, but is, in no unmistakable terms, an individuality that develops as a social individuality where the ego becomes the "we" and the "we" the ego. 47

Horkheimer, Adorno and Habermas are in total agreement with the thesis that the threat to the social individual's personal autonomy, freedom and responsibility emanates from human relationships and social institutions that are based on domination, authoritarianism and power mechanisms. To prove their thesis Horkheimer and Adorno point to the domination, subserviency and conformism being perpetrated upon individuals by the concept and myth of enlightenment which for them means the blind belief in science, the spirit of positivism exemplified by the culture industry and its ideology and its ideological outlook. 48 In addition Adorno's work, The Authoritarian Personality is a testimony to the problem of domination and subserviency affecting individuals in industrial societies. Similarly, Habermas in his works concerning knowledge and human interests, social theory and social institutions, has remarkably demonstrated the gulf separating knowing from acting particularly anomalous when it afflicts individuals who have become committed to the scientific method. But he has also uncovered the domination of one individual by another, the domination of individuals by power-backed social institutions and human relationships founded on force. All these repressive elements are to be found in universities, government institutions, and in the proselytizing of science and technology as ideology. 49
Habermas' view of society is similar to that of Horkheimer and Adorno except that his view goes a step further than the mere "unity of the particular and the general whereby everyone and everything depend on everyone and everything". For Habermas, the element of reflection which makes true liberation of the critical-revolutionary class possible, meaning the working class with a critical class consciousness, becomes clearly delineated here. Instead of making it appear that both the forces of production and the relations of production, work and industrial interaction, are equally responsible for the emergence of reflection, as the older members of the school seem to suggest, Habermas argues that it is only human interaction, specifically, symbolic interaction that is responsible for the emergence of reflection or self-reflection. In this regard, Horkheimer and Adorno are much closer to Marx than is Habermas.

Habermas looks at man in society as a self-constitutive species which manifests itself in two distinct but interdependent processes, namely, the generative and the self-formative process. To elaborate the distinction between self-generative and the self-formative process, Habermas remarked:

"So far as the identity of a society takes form via this level of scientific-technical progress (as Marx suggests), it is the self-consciousness of the social subject. But as we now see, the self-formative process of the species does not coincide with the genesis of this subject of scientific-technical progress. Rather, this self-generative act, which Marx comprehended as a materialistic activity, is accompanied by a self-formative process mediated by the interaction of class subjects either under compulsory integration or in open rivalry."
Habermas goes on to state, in no unmistakable terms, that:

"The course of the social self-formative process, on the other hand, is marked not by new technologies but by stages of reflection through which the dogmatic character of surpassed forms or domination and ideologies are dispelled, the pressure of the institutional framework is sublimated, and communicative action is set free as communicative action. The goal of this development is thereby anticipated: the organization of society linked to decision-making processes on the basis of discussion free from domination. ... The two developments (self-formative and self-generative processes) do not converge. Yet they are interdependent. ... If the idea of the self-constitution of the human species in natural history is to combine both self-generation through productive activity and formation through critical-revolutionary activity (mediated through dialogic language) then, the concept of synthesis must also incorporate a second dimension."\(^{52}\)

Habermas perceives thought to be comprehended within a conceptual framework comprising two categories, that of the natural sciences and that of the sciences of man. The self-generative or productive aspect of the self-constitutive species is operative only in the category or the natural sciences mediated through work.\(^{53}\) In other words, man can reproduce what he makes, what can be called the external nature of man, and appropriates only within the medium of production (work) which is oriented toward technical control or the exploitation of technical knowledge. Technical control of knowledge through the behavioural system of instrumental actions is peculiar to the natural sciences as applied in the sphere of production or work. Habermas asserts that reflection or self-knowledge the mirror-image of oneself, is alien to the control-mechanisms provided by the natural sciences and as such is rendered impossible within the domain of production.
This is something that Marx, and later Horkheimer and Adorno, failed to uncover or, at least, anticipate, despite the fact that they all assumed a critical attitude in their analyses of the capitalist system of production.

Habermas focuses his critique of Marx’s thesis on self-consciousness mainly on the failure of Marx to delineate the specific task performed by each of the two processes of man as the self-constitutive process is concerned with the productive activity of man, whereas the self-formative process deals solely with self-reflection and the critical revolutionary activity mediated by symbolic interaction. Habermas contends that Marx’s failure emanates from the inability to see that control of production and control of technical knowledge, mediated through work, can manifest themselves in no other form of human activity than instrumental action. In the final analysis knowledge-control and production-control are manifested through the control of man himself. In the domain of instrumental actions, according to Habermas, reflection is non-existent, and as such, production cannot usher in the emancipation of human consciousness.

Therefore, it is the self-formative process, characterizing the internal nature of man, which is capable of developing self-knowledge. The appropriate course of critique is found to lie in the sphere of the self-formative process embedded in human self-consciousness. Critical theory becomes operational in the domain of the sciences of man. The self-consciousness of the socialized individual realizes
itself in practical or communicative actions mediated through intersubjectivity, mutual understanding, reciprocal recognition, and universal consensus based on reason, all formulated within the framework of dialogic language free of domination and coercion.\textsuperscript{54}

The conceptualization of reflection which is conducive to the critical revolutionary activity encompasses a broad constituency rather than being limited only to the proletariat. This broader constituency will seek to establish radical reforms within the political system, by means of a dialogic communication between participating opponents. In support of the above thesis Habermas has remarked:

"Thus Marx by no means excludes situations in which confidence in the opponent's capability to carry on a dialogue is not in principle unjustified and in which the weapon of critique will have greater effect than the critique of the weapons. These are situations in which the initiatives of radical reformism, which seeks to persuade not only within the group, but also externally, are more promising than the revolutionary struggle".\textsuperscript{55}

Habermas argues further that "a political struggle can only be legitimately conducted under the precondition that all decisions of consequence will depend on the practical discourse of the participants -- here too, and especially here, there is not privileged access to truth"\textsuperscript{56}; we can refer to the position of communists within the proletarian party, as advocated by Marx. In other words, Habermas seems to be dismissing the necessity for Marx's tenet of armed-struggle which by definition incorporates the use of physical violence during the process of smashing the bourgeois state, instead of the opponents engaging in the dialogic encounter.
The older members of the Frankfurt School also took issue with Marx’s thesis espousing the advanced sector, the “communist vanguard” of the proletariat as the most progressive group which can become the catalyst of revolution leading to the total emancipation of the whole proletariat.

To Horkheimer and Adorno such a stand would be bound to undermine the class interest and the class-consciousness of the proletariat at large. They also argued that the promotion of the advanced sector at the expense of the interest of the proletariat as a whole would only manage to create an unbridgeable gulf separating thinking on the part of the advanced sector, from acting on the part of the majority of the proletariat, who would shoulder the brunt of revolutionary practice through armed struggle. Such a disparity between the two sectors ensured the exclusion of the majority of the proletariat from full participation and involvement in the decision-making preparation of the struggle. But their thesis in no way excludes reflection and class-consciousness from production itself, as Habermas’ thesis is doing. Instead, we could say that it affirms the position that production does contribute to the development of class-consciousness. According to Horkheimer and Adorno it was the issue of universal participation that mattered most in this particular case rather than the knowledge-control aspects and instrumental actions entailed in production. Thus, while Habermas comes out of the Hegelian-Marxist perspective of the Frankfurt School of Social Research, he has become an important social theorist in his own right. Perhaps his originality is most
directly apparent in his examination of the relation between knowledge and interest. Having touched on the salient aspects characterizing the Frankfurt School and its relevance to Habermas' current socio-political theory, we shall go on, in the following chapter, to discuss how Habermas comes to view life-manifestations, namely, work and human interactions, in terms of knowledge and its constituent interests.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 4.

3. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

4. Ibid., pp. 4-11.

5. Ibid., p. xv.

6. Ibid., p. xvi, p. 303.


8. Ibid., p. 41.

9. Ibid., p. 42.

10. Ibid., p. 42.

11. Ibid., pp. 42-3.

12. Ibid., p. 42.

13. Ibid., p. 43.

14. Ibid., p. 43.


17. Ibid., p. 45.

18. Ibid., p. 45.

19. Ibid., p. 46.


24. Ibid., pp. 24-25.
"The communist do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties. They have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole. They do not set up any sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement. The communists are distinguish from the other working class parties by this only: 1) In the national struggles of the proletariat of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality. 2) In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class against the bourgeoise has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole. The communists therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most advanced and resolute section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement."

32. (b) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1970, p. 46.


34. Ibid., pp. 215-16.

35. Ibid., pp. 253-54.

36. Ibid., p. 254.

37. Ibid., p. 263.
38. Ibid., p. 263.
39. Ibid., p. 265.
40. Ibid., pp. 258-60.
41. Ibid., p. 258.
42. Ibid., pp. 258-9.
   Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Beacon Press, Boston, 1971, p. 56.
46. Ibid., pp. 53-55.
47. Ibid., p. 49.
51. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, op cit., p. 54.
52. Ibid., p. 55.
53. Ibid., p. 55.
54. Ibid., pp. 49-62.
56. Ibid., p. 34.
Chapter II

KNOWLEDGE AND CONSTITUENT INTERESTS
What we are attempting to establish in this chapter is the connection between knowledge and human interests. We shall begin by defining knowledge as man's understanding of life, human interaction and the world around him. Knowledge is viewed as something that human beings acquire rather than being something they are naturally equipped with. This means that the establishment of knowledge as such requires an effort on the part of those who seek to grasp it. The direction of the effort required in the acquisition of knowledge emanates from the wilful acts of human beings. We would be inclined to pose the logical question, then, what is the intention behind the pursuit of knowledge? In other words, are the wilful acts performed by knowledge-seeking human beings acts geared toward the preservation or the acceptance of a certain value entailed in the acquisition of a particular form of knowledge? That in this constitutive value, we would assume, the very meaning of knowledge itself lies anchored. By value we mean those components of reality which have become significant to us, and accordingly, we derive an unwavering commitment to the preservation and promotion of these significant components at the expense of other components of reality which we deem insignificant or unimportant in the acquisition of the particular knowledge.

Firstly, we would like to identify the various forms of knowledge and also show why they can be called forms of knowledge. Secondly, what is the object, method, and mode of verification or proof of each form of knowledge? Thirdly,
how are the various forms of knowledge related to each other? Fourthly, what is the orientation of each form of knowledge including its respective interest? Knowledge is manifested through a systematic arrangement of ideas. It is subsumed under the common name science which in turn is divided into the natural sciences and the sciences of man, the cultural sciences.¹

The object of the natural sciences is empirical reality, nature and its laws, causal or conditional relationships, means and ends relationships. The examination of empirical reality in the natural sciences, without exception lays emphasis on the selection of facts, and is conceivable only as an applicable standard of selection which is recognized as valid by everyone who wants to acquire scientific knowledge in the natural sciences. The standard of selection determines what parts of reality are to be regarded as important or essential in the given array of the multiplicity of facts. The natural-sciences' standard of selection specifically prescribes the choosing of those empirical elements which are common to many concrete phenomena, while at the same time, neglecting the individual differences between those elements. In other words, the natural sciences' standard of selection lays emphasis on the general aspects of concrete phenomena. The people who select these facts, converting them into a single body of meaningful knowledge, have a common aim, namely, a universal agreement in the selection of the same facts and the same relations between these facts. This common aim of the formulators of scientific knowledge is defined in terms of the commonality of interest existing among the formulators.
themselves, meaning, for instance, a common agreement in
the selection of a class of facts, \( x, y \) and \( z \) to constitute
the material of knowledge. In other words, behind every
body of scientific knowledge is to be found a commonality
of interest.\(^2\) This is what Habermas has referred to as the
knowledge constitutive interest.\(^3\) Moreover, the commonality
of interest existing among the formulators of the particular
body of knowledge leads to the logical conclusion that such
commonality of interest has come about through intersubjective
agreement and intersubjective recognition of relevant facts,
that is, a universal consensus that only the class of facts
\( x, y \) and \( z \) will constitute the content of knowledge.

The method of the natural sciences is description,
analysis, explanation, and the prediction of phenomena. The
verification of the natural sciences lies in the ability of
the scientists to reproduce the scientific experiments, and
also to show that the consequences of a given hypothesis are
as they were deduced to be.\(^4\) Another standard of selection
is that which requires the choosing of "those component
elements of one individual phenomenon which in their combined
occurrence constitute the unique features of this phenomenon
and distinguish it from all others; everything else is
neglected as irrelevant."\(^5\) This standard of selection is
adopted mainly by historians whose interest is to individual
rather than general features of phenomena. Therefore, we
may add, there are two ways of looking at reality, that is,
either we choose to adopt the general perspective or the event-
centered approach in the study of objective phenomena. In
addition, the type of choice in regard to the perspectives will determine the type of the knowledge constitutive interest; for instance, the generalizing perspective of the natural sciences incorporates the technical cognitive interest, whereas, the event-centred approach of the historical sciences incorporates the practical cognitive interest. Habermas has demonstrated in the most succinct manner how the origin and application of these perspectives or orientations are responsible for establishing the connection between knowledge itself and the human interests underlying the constitution of such knowledge.  

According to Habermas knowledge can be divided into two major categories, that is; the natural sciences and the sciences of man. The natural sciences are the same as the empirical analytic sciences. The category of the sciences of man is subdivided into three: the systematic sciences of social action or the empirical-analytic behavioural sciences which comprise economics, sociology and political science; the historical-hermeneutic sciences constitute history and linguistics; and finally, the critical sciences include disciplines such as philosophy and philology. Habermas has remarked that the empirical analytic behavioural sciences or "the systematic sciences of social action, that is economics sociology and political science, have the goal, as do the empirical-analytic sciences, of producing nomological knowledge." This would mean that the empirical-analytic behavioural sciences try to be like the pure empirical analytic sciences of the natural
sciences in their method of description, analysis, explanation and prediction of phenomena. Secondly, it would also mean not only do the empirical analytic behavioural sciences have to acquire the general perspective of the natural sciences, but as well will be bound to the technical control orientation characteristic of the natural sciences. Let us examine whether this is the case in the discipline of empirical political science.

In regard to the study and application of political science in contemporary Western politics, Habermas has observed that there has been a shift away from viewing political behaviour or political practice in terms of the promotion of justice and the restoration of the good life, to the modern view that scientifically grounded political behaviour "aims at establishing once and for all the conditions for the correct order of the state and society as such". This has changed the object of political science. The object of political science is no longer the promotion of the virtuous, ethical conduct of citizens, but the regulation of social intercourse. This conception of an ordering or regulation of human behaviour and human relationships, we may add, derives from Weber's concept of science which holds that "science is the ordering in thought of facts. It is the transformation of sensations into facts and the organization of facts into a scientific account of the empirical world." What this new interpretation of political practice entails according to Habermas, is that the ordering or regulation of social intercourse was, first of all designed to guarantee or secure the permanency of
communal life irrespective of the historical circumstances. Secondly, this regulation of social intercourse was supposed to occur independently of time, place and social conditions. Thirdly, the conversion of political knowledge into political practice and application no longer become a matter of practical or prudential action of citizens toward each other, but a technical problem involving technical control, the regulation of social intercourse of human beings.  

Habermas further argues that the behavioural system of instrumental action imposes technical control over human beings. Political behaviour as a controlled-mechanism has for all intents and purposes become the object for science itself. No longer is the object of science exclusively nature and natural laws. It is within this context that Habermas was led to comment:

the engineers of the correct order can disregard the categories of ethical social intercourse and confine themselves to the construction of conditions under which human beings, just like objects within nature, will necessarily behave in a calculable manner. This separation of politics from morality replaces instruction in leading a good and just life with making possible a life of well-being within a correctly instituted order.14

The inability of empirical political scientists to achieve the success and rigor of the analysis of the natural sciences with their undisputed accuracy and the reliable method entailed in the description, explanation and prediction of scientific facts, and the reproducibility of experimental results, has set a severe limitation on the use of empirical political science in the sphere of political practice or political action.
Another limitation is caused by the failure of empirical political scientists to come to terms with the unrecognized cultural grounding of their supposedly scientific political terms and concepts which are being espoused as value-free. What has happened is that the utility and application of these empirical political terms and political concepts has only received the approval of a certain segment of specialists in political science, most of whom are to be found in North America which is under the overwhelming influence and the cultural biases of the liberal-democratic political system. The implication of such an often unrecognized North American value-orientation, underlying the definition and the conceptual framework of empirical political science, is that from a global perspective the task of achieving intersubjective agreement on and intersubjective recognition of these political concepts has yet to be accomplished. An example of the often unrecognized value-judgement bias implicit in the definitions and conceptual framework of North American empirical political science is the view that political science concerns itself with the mechanism of control of conflict, the successful resolution of conflict, determining who gets what, when and how, and the distribution of political power within the political system. The underlying assumptions of liberal-democracy manifest themselves through and through in the conceptual framework of empirical political science, in that, the belief system advocates the thesis that "whatever works, is right. Which is to say that what ever enables the existing class-stratified society to operate without intolerable
friction is best."15 This belief is deeply engrained in the very definitions of empirical political science.

The question is what about those non liberal-democratic political systems which do not share the belief that whatever works is right. What about those societies which espouse the necessity of contradiction or conflict within a dialectical perspective of society rather than the emphasis on the ongoing successful resolution of conflict? The former systems accept the necessity of continuous, permanent conflict wherein the resolution of one conflict necessarily leads to the emergence of a new conflict, this process repeating itself ad infinitum, which is the idea behind the cultural revolution in China and the Maoist conception of permanent revolution.

The view of political science as a discipline that concerns itself with the successful resolution of conflict, the distribution of power, and the determination of who gets what, when and how, does not address itself to other equally important needs of man which pertain to the development of man's innate individual capacities, whereby he becomes "essentially the doer, an exerter and enjoyer of his human attributes."16 Some political theorists have persuasively argued that the perspective of empirical political science is characteristic of the "utilitarian liberal concept of man as a consumer of utilities, for whom a share of power of any sort (wealth, or the power to command the services of others) is valued primarily as a means to a future flow of utilities to him from outside himself."17 On the other hand, there are other political
theorists who have staunchly held the view that the role of empirical political science is to deal with empirical appraisal in political matters, and is not necessarily related to the view of man as a consumer of utilities. Robert Dahl, an important theoretician of the empirical-analytical school is one of those who espouses such a view. He has argued that:

"factual or empirical appraisals are often in the form of prediction or can be interpreted as prediction; and predictions are the domain of the empirical sciences rather than of philosophy, religion, or ethics."18

It is surprising that Dahl does not go a step further to indicate the goals and aims which these empirical appraisals serve rather than limiting himself to talking about the mere prediction of the facts themselves.

Habermas has argued that behind the empirical-analytic behavioural sciences, for instance empirical political science, stands a technical cognitive interest manifesting itself within the behavioural system of instrumental action.19 Further, Habermas asserts that the character of, or what is distinctive about, instrumental action is the element of technical control. In other words, the empirical analytic behavioural sciences translated within the framework of the behavioural system of instrumental action are necessarily oriented toward technical control, and thus oriented toward knowledge for control. The emphasis on knowledge-control, contends Habermas, is ultimately converted into the control of the human being himself.

Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan have acknowledged the technical control or manipulative aspect of the knowledge constitutive interest, that is, the technical cognitive interest
of empirical political science:

it must be emphasized, however, that a
scientific interest in political inquiry
need not exclude a political interest in its
outcome and applications. Inquiry has not
only a creative role in the formation of
policy ... serving as a means of self-
orientation in a flow of events of changing
significance ... but also an instrumental
role in implementing policy. The purport
of inquiry is not necessarily 'theoretical'
rather than 'practical' both manipulative and
contemplative standpoints may be adopted.20

According to Lasswell and Kaplan the manipulative standpoint
which is similar to Habermas' concept of technical control,
is problem-solving oriented and tends to limit inquiry to
a consideration of ways and means, or means and ends of
instrumental action, thereby ensuring the maintenance of the
technical, manipulative, cognitive interest entailed in the
method of scientific inquiry in empirical political science.
However, they also acknowledge the existence of the contemplative
standpoint, in scientific political enquiry which is
conducive to practical interests. Lasswell and Kaplan have argued
that the contemplative standpoint oriented to practical action
"is not concerned with the isolation of goal variables, and the
discovery of the operations required for them to assume
specified magnitudes (characteristic of the manipulative stand-
point). Rather, relations of interdependence are formulated
in terms of their significance for the ongoing of inquiry itself.
Here, propositions state the existence of functional co-relations.
It is evident that these formulations may be translated into
those of manipulative standpoint, and conversely."21

However, Habermas rejects the notion that the two
standpoints can be said to be interchangeable, or that there can be a reduction of one standpoint (contemplative) to the level of the other (manipulative):

But the communication of investigators requires the use of language that is not confined to the limits of technical control over objectified natural processes. It arises from symbolic interaction between societal subjects who reciprocally know and recognize each other as unmistakable individuals. This communicative action is a system of reference that cannot be reduced to the framework of instrumental action.22

Lasswell's and Kaplan's contemplative and manipulative standpoints together manage to secure the two distinct components of political inquiry, namely the empirical propositions of political science and the value judgments of political doctrine. Dahl also concurs with the view that "systematic political analysis, particularly when it is directed to the persistent problems of politics, generally contains both factual and moral judgements."23

David Easton, a renowned empirical theorist of the behavioural school, has argued in his book, The Political System, that what is distinctive about political activity is the character of "control over others."24 One wonders why political activity or political practice should necessarily concern itself with the issue of control over others or the power over others as manifested in one group's ability to make other groups do what it wants. Why not say that political practice is a cooperative undertaking designed to generate the development of the human capacities of each individual, the social consciousness of the individual, and finally the securing
of the good life to all individuals living in the community? Perhaps it is because the empiricist sees the situation this way, and partially because that is the way politics is bound to be seen given the operational framework of analysis namely, the scientific perspective.

Habermas contends that political activity defined in terms of the approach of the empirical-analytic behavioural sciences cannot be explained in any other way except through the one and only operational framework of analysis, namely, the technical control orientation which guides all the empirical-analytic behavioural sciences. In other words, according to Habermas, the empirical-analytic behavioural sciences cannot exist without this character of technical control. 25

Dahl has contended that political analysis is concerned with power rule or authority. 26 The failure by Easton and Dahl, to examine the aims or goals that are served by their empirical classification of facts not only facilitates the uncritical acceptance of the element of technical control entailed in their notions of political activity. It also makes the task of developing a meaningful critique of the empirical approach a difficult one; instead, we end up with the method of fact classification being used at the service or in support of the status quo. Habermas does make clear the point that political activity defined along the lines of the approach of the empirical-analytic behavioural sciences is bound to lead to the exercise of technical control over human beings. Also these manifestations of technical control and instrumental action would be seen as a limitation rather than
as a justification or legitimation of the empirical analytic behavioural sciences themselves. What Habermas challenges is the legitimation of this notion of technical control over human relationships in society.²⁷

Habermas, instead, goes on to state that it is of great importance that political man must transcend the limitation imposed upon him by the essential features of the empirical analytic sciences. Transcending the limitation of technical control entails the ability of each social individual to engage in political practice in a manner that leads to the development of the human capacities of individuals, the restoration of their self-formative wills, and, in the process, regaining their personal autonomy and responsibility. Finally, it entails the creation of political systems that are free of domination.²⁸

As long as there is wide and uncritical acceptance of the empirical theorists' thesis that "political activity is control over others", one sooner or later is bound to find oneself focusing attention on issues like the source of power of those who exercise control over others. Furthermore, one asks how do they achieve and renew their power? What are the conditions to be fulfilled in order to preserve a stable political system with inputs to and outputs from the political system, meaning political control?²⁹ Once again the conception of political activity as power over others or control over others does not address itself to the vital issue that the use of this power over others is for the purpose of deriving something from the controlled for the benefit of the controllers. The benefit of control over others is derived in the political
arena by the political power-wielder's ability to determine the actions of others in the direction of his own ends.\textsuperscript{30}

For instance, the question of political patronage and political favours doled out to party-members in return for their votes are cases in point. The control mechanisms of power are clearly discernible in the economic sphere wherein the owners of capital purchase and control the labour power of workers. This control of the workers' labour-power by the capitalists is what Macpherson referred to as the extractive power.\textsuperscript{31} Macpherson employing a political economy approach sees in Western industrialized societies a connection between the power of politicians and that of capitalists. He argues that the power of politicians does in effect consolidate the extractive power of the owners of land and capital.\textsuperscript{32} The empirical political theorists, however, reject Macpherson's Marxist view of political economy in the analysis of power in society. What seems to be analyzed, under the circumstances are the control-mechanisms of power rather than the purposes of power and the underlying assumptions upon which this thesis that politics is power over others is based. Moreover, this is significant in view of the fact that the political systems being subjected to empirical political analysis are those of basically unequal, class-stratified societies.

Having discussed the empirical analytic behavioural sciences including their technical cognitive interests and the orientation toward technical control, we shall now undertake an examination of Habermas' second form of knowledge, the historical hermeneutic sciences. The object of the historical hermeneutic
sciences is interpretation including that of tradition, cultural and moral relationships. Max Weber contends that "we seek knowledge of an historical phenomenon meaning (that which is) significant in its individuality. And the decisive element in the (historical phenomenon) is that only through the presupposition that a finite part alone of the infinite variety of phenomenon is significant, does the knowledge of an individual phenomenon become logically meaningful." 33

Underlying the concept of the significance of the individuality of the historical phenomenon is the theory of correspondence which aims to establish a coincidence between the ideal-type the mental construct stressing the significance of historical cultural phenomena, and concrete reality. By comparing the ideal type with concrete reality one can discover the divergence or convergence of historical concepts with actual concrete reality. In other words:

the ideal type gives the impression of being a description of a number or empirically existing identical states of affairs, whereas it is actually the state of affairs in which the existing phenomena would be if the relevant actors had been able to pursue consciously and exclusively certain clearly defined goals or plans of action in clearly defined ways. When this construct is compared with an empirical instance to which it is applicable, the divergence between the empirical situation and the ideal type gives clues to what extent motives than the ones mentioned in the construct actually existed as causes of certain actions which are part of the concrete situation under consideration. 34

Habermas' alternative, as compared to Weber's ideal-types, deals directly with practical questions which require a resolution through practical answers emanating from a rational consensus of community of human beings engaged in a dialogue.
On the other hand, Weber's approach seems to be more concerned with the convergence or divergence from ideal types of the empirical situation rather than the practical rational discourse of human beings. Therefore, the trappings of technical control embedded in the empirical situation undermines Weber's ideal-type model.  

Habermas argues that behind the historical hermeneutic sciences lies embedded the practical cognitive interest of the community of human beings. Weber similarly underscored the importance of the connection between knowledge and the knowledge constitutive interest. He observed that the worth of an historical explanation, for example of a socio-economic event, does not lie in its objective existence as such but rather in the conditioning orientation of our cognitive interest, since that particular historical situation or episode arises from the specific cultural significance which we attach to it.  

Weber goes on to point out that those outstanding values, for instance, the work-ethic in capitalism, underlying the practical interest of human actors are and always will be decisively significant in determining the direction to which our thinking is ordered in the domain of the cultural or historical hermeneutic sciences. The values espoused are those of the community at large of which the historian is a member.  

According to Habermas, the method of the historical hermeneutic sciences is the interpretation of the textual tradition and moral relationships within a historical context. This interpretation is accomplished by means of an intersubjective communicative language or simply, a dialogue involving two or
more persons. In comparison, we may note that the empirical analytic behavioural sciences depend on observation, description, analysis and prediction of facts and the relations between facts, while the historical hermeneutic sciences are dependent on personal dialogue. By the use of a dialogue, a communication is established in which the understanding subject is a participant. Dialogue also makes possible intersubjective understanding, reciprocal recognition and mutual agreement among subjects who confront each other in unconstrained rational discourse.

According to Weber, only what is value-relevant is to be known and therefore, must be understood. Understanding entails knowing that which is value relevant. It is only within this context of value-relevance that comprehension becomes the specific aim of history. Comprehension contends Weber, enables us to look for certain substantive aspects of action.

In history, it is the knowledge of human actors' "inner states" that is, their motives, feelings, plans and interests, which we strive to discover when analyzing the historical individual's decision and action. By knowing these inner states of historical actors we are at the same time understanding the actions of the actors. In other words, we gain an insight into what lies behind the actions of historical actors.

Habermas has remarked that what is characteristic of the empirical analytic behavioural sciences is that all operational variables can be linked to the language game of physical measurement, even those with instruments which can only be constructed with the aid of complicated theories can
be organized through sense-perceptions or observation which are expressed descriptively. But in the domain of the historical hermeneutic sciences there are not operational physical measurements. It involves rather the "understanding of meanings based on the observation of signs, as well as a language expressive of a person, that is, in which the understood utterances could be expressed descriptively." In this domain of the understanding of meaning we depend on the interpretation which is rooted in hermeneutic disciplines. In other words, we use hermeneutics instead of a scientific measurement procedure, as is the case in the empirical sciences. According to Habermas, hermeneutic inquiry deals with experience, expression and understanding in a manner which ensures that understanding combines linguistic analysis with experience.

The fact that hermeneutic inquiry is rooted in ordinary language which in turn is linked or intertwined with practice, that is, we say what we do and simultaneously do what we say, helps us explain the twofold character of the method. The method exposes the empirical content, the concrete reality of individuated conditions of life, while at the same time investigating the grammatical structures. Habermas further contends that hermeneutic inquiry ensures that "the integration of given symbols into the chosen frame of reference that is the process of application, both decodes the material and at the same tests the code on the material -- in other words, linguistic analysis and experiential control at once."
The historical-hermeneutic sciences are oriented toward a type of inquiry which makes possible the interpretation of the expression that is difficult to understand owing to the blockage of the mutuality of behavioural expectations. While, on the other hand, the empirical-analytic behavioural sciences are oriented toward a method of inquiry which seeks to replace rules of behaviour that have failed in reality with tested technical rules. The former relies solely on the preservation of the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding and reciprocal expectation of behaviour entailed in the dialogic language of two or more acting persons whereas the latter relies on the exercise of technical control or rules of instrumental action. Hermeneutic inquiry has one thing in common with the experimental scientific inquiry of nature. Both demand a familiarity with the skill of mastering the general rules of the game. For instance, in hermeneutic inquiry we acquire the skill by mastering the rules of grammar and acting in accordance with those grammatical rules; but in the scientific experimental inquiry of nature we seek to establish the mastery of technical rules dealing with operations of physical measurements.47

The historical-hermeneutic sciences are rooted in human interactions mediated by dialogic language, while the empirical analytic behavioural sciences are anchored in the behavioural system of instrumental action mediated by work. We may add that both are guided by cognitive interests deriving from the life-contexts of communicative and instrumental action.
respectively. The method of the empirical-analytic behavioural sciences aims at revealing and understanding concrete reality within the context of technical control, whereas the historical hermeneutic method seeks to preserve the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding in ordinary language communication and in action according to norms.48 Whatever historical hermeneutic understanding there is in the social structures is geared toward ensuring the possible action-oriented self-understanding of individuals and groups including the mutual understanding between different individuals and groups within cultural traditions. It is hoped that uncoerced consensus based on rational discourse will be rendered possible under the conditions of open intersubjectivity upon which communicative action depends. Under the circumstances, there will be no danger of communication breakdown in both dimensions,

"the vertical one of one's own individual life history and the collective tradition to which one belongs, and the horizontal one of mediating between the traditions of different individuals, groups, and cultures."49

It is evident, based on the preceding analysis, that experience is mediated by the interaction of two or more participants and also that understanding is communicative experience. Therefore, to sum up, the historical hermeneutic method has managed to merge experience, expression and understanding into one coherent life structure. It gives knowledge of history as well as facilitates communication oriented toward practical action. Inquiry in the historical-hermeneutic sciences is the
vehicle through which mutual understanding as well as self-understanding occurring on the pre-scientific level in the tradition bound structure of symbolic interaction is established. The empirical analytic inquiry manifests itself along the lines of a systematic, cumulative learning process which is geared toward technical control, and is mediated by work.

The goal of the historical-hermeneutic inquiry is to clarify practically effective knowledge, whereas the aim of the empirical analytic inquiry is the production of technically exploitable knowledge. Reality within the context of the historical hermeneutic sciences reveals the intersubjectivity of probable action orienting mutual-understanding on the vertical and horizontal levels of the life-world. The vertical level involves the interpretation of one's own traditions, and the horizontal pertains to the interpretation of foreign cultures. Finally, the historical hermeneutic sciences manifest themselves through communicative action, whereas the empirical analytic sciences proceed on the level of instrumental action.

Habermas maintains that there is a third type of knowledge, the critical sciences or critical philosophy, which go beyond the accomplishments of the empirical analytic sciences and the historical hermeneutic sciences. Firstly the critical sciences reveal the connection between the three types of knowledge and their knowledge constitute interest. Secondly, critical sciences lead the self-formative process of
human consciousness to develop the character of self-reflection, whereby as a community of human beings through symbolic interaction we become at one and the same time actors and critics in our life-world.\textsuperscript{51}

Habermas, commenting on the impact of the critical sciences upon the self-formative process of human consciousness remarked: "For the final state of a self-formative process is attained only if the subject remembers its identifications and alienations, the objectivations forced upon it and the reflections it arrived at, as the path upon which it constituted itself."\textsuperscript{52} Thirdly, through self-reflection the mirror image of oneself, critical sciences enable us to correct the distorted communication which manifests itself in the form of power and ideology within the political systems.\textsuperscript{53} Fourthly, the process of inquiry in the critical sciences is organized in the categorical framework of emancipatory action, which, in addition to bringing a process of self-inquiry, is also linked to the conditions of analytic dialogue obtaining in psycho-analysis the dialogic encounter between the psycho-analyst and the patient.\textsuperscript{54} Fifthly, according to Habermas the self-inquiry process, bound to the analytic dialogue of psychoanalysis and psychoanalytic interpretation makes possible the "unity of intuition and emancipation, of insight and liberation from dogmatic dependence and of reason and the interested employment of reason developed by Fichte in the concept of self-reflection."\textsuperscript{55} Sixthly, critical philosophy's view of social institutions, and of individual consciousness is that there is a pathological condition afflicting these elements
in society, and that this pathology shows its symptoms in language and communicative action which in turn are translated into distorted communication. This pathological condition can be corrected only by a process of self-reflection deriving from the analytic dialogue of psychoanalysis. Finally, the critical sciences enable us to come to terms, in the most cogent manner, with the realization that, indeed, the orientation of the empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest, that of the historical-hermeneutic sciences incorporates the practical cognitive interest. And the approach of the critical sciences encompasses the emancipatory cognitive interest. In addition, Habermas has observed that in self-reflection made possible by the critical sciences, knowledge coincides or becomes one with the interest in personal autonomy and responsibility of each social subject.

We have analyzed the three kinds of knowledge as constituted by interests, technical, practical and emancipatory. Now we will turn to examine Habermas' theory of action and along with it his concept of what is appropriate in different spheres of human activity. For, as has been made evident in the critique of empirical political theory, an approach which is fitting in our world of work may be objectionable when it is a matter of human relations.
FOOTNOTES

5. Ibid., p. 22
7. Ibid., pp. 44-47.
8. Ibid., pp. 303-12.
9. Ibid., p. 310.
12. Habermas, Theory and Practice, op cit., p. 43.
13. Ibid., p. 43.
14. Ibid., p. 43.
16. Ibid., p. 79.
17. Ibid., p. 79.
21. Ibid., p. xii.


26. Ibid., p. 7.


28. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, op cit., pp. 308-17.

29. Macpherson, op. cit., p. 47.


31. Ibid., p. 40-52.

32. Ibid., p. 46.


35. I underlined this portion of the passage to emphasize the role of the correspondence theory entailed in Weber's notion of the ideal-type.

35. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, op cit., p. 292.

36. Weber, op. cit., p. 64.


38. Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 11.

39. Ibid., p. 11.


41. Ibid., p. 105.

42. Ibid., p. 11.
43. Ibid., p. 11.

44. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, op cit., p. 171.

45. Ibid., p. 173.

46. Ibid., p. 173.

47. Ibid., p. 175.

48. Ibid., p. 176.

49. Ibid., p. 176.

50. Ibid., pp. 286-7.

51. Ibid., p. 260.

52. Ibid., p. 260.

53. Ibid., pp. 281-2.

54. Ibid., p. 287.

55. Ibid., p. 287.

56. Ibid., p. 288.

57. Ibid., p. 314.
CHAPTER III

POSITIVISM: THEORY AND INSTRUMENTAL ACTION
Before the emergence and the dominance of the scientific method, the theory of knowledge was based on (1) the consciousness or mind of the community of human beings, (2) the understanding of things in their totality as well as in their origins, (3) the distinction between essence and appearance, ego and non-ego, and (4) the connection between the knowing subject and his actions; theory and practice were seen as inseparable. The interaction of human beings underscored the subjective aspects of human experience, for human beings were seen as actors rather than as passive objects subject to control. The theory of knowledge or epistemology was oriented toward the comprehension of subjectivity, or a self-constitutive human species endowed with the capacity of self-reflection, through which the knowledge constitutive interests of human beings were revealed. Habermas in the discussion about knowledge constitutive interests is specifically referring to Kant’s concept of the interest of reason which seeks to establish a link between the self-sufficiency or the self-subsistence of the ego and the interest in freedom of rational beings. In addition, the theory of knowledge dealt with practical questions raised by human subjects who shared in unrestrained, consensual discourse mediated through ordinary language communication. The thrust of the theory of knowledge was to establish a level of human reflection which would not only ensure a rational consensus among human beings, but also enable
mankind to achieve practical resolutions of conflictive life-processes rather than providing technical control over its life or destiny.⁴

To begin with, we should note that the rationality realized within the framework of unrestrained consensual discourse is practical rationality which must be clearly distinguished from technological rationality. Furthermore, the theory of knowledge, comprehended within the framework of unrestrained consensual discourse, made possible the connection between reason and the commitment of persons, thereby ensuring the union of theory and practice. However, with the emergence of positivism or the belief in the absolutism of the scientific method, the theory of knowledge was effectively replaced by the philosophy of science.⁵

Positivism brought about a radical change in the conceptualization of knowledge. No longer was knowledge rooted in the consciousness of human subjects and their reflective potentialities, but now the essentials of knowledge were to be discovered through the scientific method of inquiry whose object-domain is based on facts and the relation between facts.

The positivistic interpretation of knowledge, viewing knowledge only through the prism of the scientific method, has facilitated the illusion that scientific knowledge exhausts all knowledge. This claim, we may add, is not only unjustified, or unverifiable, but also excludes the
considerations of practical questions by focusing only on the technical questions arising from scientific analysis. The exclusion of practical questions in the employment of the scientific method is achieved either by a total disregard of the practical questions themselves or by the pretense that the scientific method is capable of resolving practical questions within the framework of technical control. It is worthwhile to note that in our lives we continue to be confronted with both practical and technical questions. The positivist's interpretation of knowledge is rendered inadequate when one sees that practical questions require the participation of human subjects whose consciousness constitutes a component of the practical problem itself. Technical questions, implicit in the scientific method, required only the object-domain of facts and the relations between facts. Practical questions are concerned with subjectivity, while technical questions, defined within the framework of the scientific method, deal with objectivity alone. This dichotomy between practical questions and technical questions, and the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, lead us to the realization that what has happened is that the scientific method has in one way or another managed to exclude the consciousness of human subjects from consideration. It allows no place for any rational consensus based on unconstrained language communication. Within the perspective of the scientific method, we talk only of the object-domain of
facts, but never about consciousness and human subjectivity. For instance, psychology does not figure in Comte's map of science.

Practical rules are necessarily rooted in the coherent consciousness of human subjects whose rational interest coincides with the commitment to practical action realized through uncoerced ordinary language communication. When he is concerned with action, the positivist operates according to the given technical recommendations of the scientific method and not according to his personal consciousness or the practical considerations tied up with the rational consensual discourse of human beings. What this means is that the positivist does not do what he says and does not say what he does at one and the same time, but does what the technical rules of the scientific method compel him to do. The professional behaviour of the positivist is oriented toward the description and prediction of facts as well as toward the technical control implied in scientific procedure. It is decidedly not oriented toward man himself, or to that process by which man develops his consciousness and the capacity of self-reflection, and becomes a self-constitutive species. Therefore, within the framework of the scientific method rooted in technical control, positivists argue that informed actions are determined by our ability to master the technical rules of applied science. In the final analysis, positivists take the position that all knowledge must be
capable of proving itself through sense-certainty or sense-data that can be systematically observed and described in an intersubjective manner. According to the positivists, reality is that which can be seen, touched, heard and smelled. In this way the positivists share common ground with the empiricist schools. That is why the positivists readily accept the view that scientific reality can mean nothing except empirical reality.

Positivists see the scientific method as something reliable or dependable, something consistent and allowing experimental verification. While metaphysicians strive to restore the composite unity and the linkages within being as a whole, the nature of being as well as ego and consciousness included in it, the positivists aim at securing scientific knowledge on the foundation of methodical certainty. Since the scientific method forms the frame of reference for the judgment of everything, the positivists no longer grant precedence to noumena over phenomena. The positivists believe in the reliability and precision of the scientific mode of procedure but at the same time, are not willing to admit that what looks like an obvious advantage to them (i.e. the reliability and precision of the method) is also a disadvantage, a limitation of their horizon, imposed by "the formally cogent construction of theories that allow the deduction of lawlike hypotheses". The limitation stems from the fact that knowledge which cannot be converted into
theories and lawlike hypotheses is considered incapable of precision and reliability, and consequently is often dismissed as not worthy of the name "genuine knowledge" at all. The positivists do not look for isolated facts in their search for or construction of workable scientific theories, but strive to sort out the important connections between relevant facts amongst a multiplicity of facts. A composition of such connected facts constitutes a pattern of operational lawlike hypotheses which in turn form the basis of scientific theories. Even statements about life or life-activity obtain meaning and acceptance only if they can first be rendered into factual statements, transformed into controllable objectified processes.

The positivists do not limit their pursuit of knowledge only to the sphere of connected facts determined with reliability and precision; they also seek to use these connected facts for making predictions. It is within this context that Comte, the father of modern positivism, came to understand as well as to articulate the principles of the social sciences in the terms used by Bacon to characterize the natural sciences: "To see in order to foresee: that is the permanent distinguishing feature of true sciences." However, Comte goes on to point out that the role of reason in prediction is not only indispensable, but also crucial, to the development and unification of scientific theories. The operational basis of such theories is defined by the
lawlike hypotheses of empirical science. Comte saw the role of science as aiming at the replacement of previous empirical research by the foresight of reason. According to him, replacement of sheer description with prediction was the cornerstone upon which positivism stands. Habermas contends that knowledge derived through sense-certainty, methodical certainty and the prediction of technically, exploitable knowledge, is by definition relative knowledge. Hence we no longer can talk about absolute knowledge or knowing things in their origins or in their essence.

What is possible within the perspective of the positive spirit is only the relative value of scientific knowledge. In this way positivism is unlike ontology, for the former deals only with the relative aspects of knowledge, whereas the latter seeks to grasp knowledge in its totality, its width and depth, leaving no stone unturned. Once the positivists accepted the viewpoint that knowledge was relative, they could not help but see knowledge as dependent on the situation. Of course, the consequence of this viewpoint was that knowledge acquired the characteristics of being situationally-oriented. Knowledge itself became sociologically-derived because the thought of every human community was seen to emerge out of its life conditions. In addition, this discovery meant that now it was possible to speak in terms of the bourgeois-mode of thought, the proletarian way of thinking, and the peasant-outlook since a definite "interrelationship between the intellectual point of view
held and the social position occupied was established.\textsuperscript{15} What are the implications of such modes of thought? Firstly, we would say a situationally-oriented mode of thought encourages each group of people to either become apologists for, or condone conformism within a situation or system in which they happen to find themselves. Of course, this need not always be the case. Sometimes a particular group may realize the need to liberate itself from and transcend its situation or condition of life.\textsuperscript{16} Secondly, a situationally-oriented mode of thinking makes difficult the emergence of views and aspirations which are in contradiction with the social status or station of life of the particular group. This means that the particular group forgoes any effort to uncover or expose those ideas with which it may not necessarily agree, but instead will accept those ideas because they happen to represent the group's social status and interests.

Positivists view themselves as having managed to substitute the relative knowledge of science for the absolute knowledge of metaphysics or ontology. Metaphysicians saw themselves as preserving the concept of being as a whole in which the regions of reality were comprehended. They presupposed a necessary connection or linkage between "the cosmos of being (universe) and the logos of man (human mind)".\textsuperscript{17} Positivists came to view problems of essence, consciousness, ego, non-ego, identity and non-identity as
matters that could not be transformed into objectified facts and become quantifiable through observation, description, analysis and the prediction of phenomena. This means that once these metaphysical issues were identified as unquantifiable there was no way in which they could be refuted or justified within the framework of the scientific method. Hence, such metaphysical issues were simply excluded from consideration by positivists like Comte and Mach, or later were dismissed by Carnap as meaningless. Habermas has aptly observed that “positivism does not come to grips with metaphysics but simply knocks the bottom out of it”. The irony of this whole situation, according to Habermas, is that positivism can make itself understood only within the context of metaphysical assumptions in spite of its announced rejection of metaphysical thought.

Positivists have put the philosophy of science in the place of the theory of knowledge. This standpoint taken by then necessarily defines knowledge in terms of scientific knowledge; positivists acquire a scientific self-understanding of the sciences. The scientific self-understanding of the sciences ensures that positivism rejects the claims of all other forms of cognition. Positivism is rendered incapable of engendering reflection on the meaning of knowledge itself. What is made available to it is only the meaning of that knowledge which can be acquired through the scientific method which replicates reality. Since positivism can only deal adequately with objectified
processes and objective situations, it can only focus on knowledge to the extent that the prism of objectivism permits. In view of the fact that positivism remains deeply steeped in sense-certainty and methodological-certainty, it has sought to uphold the immediately given as the starting point of knowledge along with the fundamental belief of empiricism that the form of knowledge is similar or very much akin to the form of sense-perception. This bias exhibited by positivists in favour of the immediately given accounts for the view that only what is quantifiable is worth researching and what is not so reducible is not worth studying. Mach, in articulating his doctrine of elements, was striving to come to terms with the viewpoint which conceives of the world as a sum total of facts; the facts themselves are seen as constituting the very foundation of reality. Facts, though comprehended within the conceptual structure of sense experience, are without doubt defined intersubjectively. There emerges a mutual understanding and reciprocal agreement among scientists as to what will be considered valid fact, and what will be dubbed non-fact. The standard measure used to test the facticity of facts as well as the relations between facts and non-facts is, of course, the universal scientific method. In testing the facticity of fact, we are confronted with a twofold problem implicit in the very definition of fact: (1) the problem of the certainty of our subjective perceptions: in what way does our subjective perception influence the
objective situation or the object under study; (2) the problem of the certainty of our subjective perceptions, concerning the way in which the external material existent or object influences our subjective perception. The solution to this two-fold problem will go a long way to inform us about the validity of facts and will shed some light on the fallibility of the supposedly infallible, objective facts. Facts become defined in terms of the dual-relationship between sensations and external bodies. It is in this context that Mach envisages his conception of fact to be situated somewhere between phenomenalism and physicalism. 26

The observations about the origin of facts confirm the conclusion that we really cannot talk about facts as elements which are neutral to our psychic make-up, our feelings, motives, interests and intentions. The constituents of fact, sense-perceptions and the object observed, mutually influence each other. If fact is rooted in both sensation and material object how could positivists deny the role of consciousness in defining fact, since sensations can be only given through the medium of consciousness? This only goes to show that the positivists' assertions of fact as the authentic reality of the immediately given leaves much unexplained and is in need of further clarification. It also points to the realization that "facts would once again have to be interpreted metaphysically". 27 It is
evident that through sensation or the analysis of sensation the positivists unconsciously find their way back to the theory of knowledge, a category they had thought replaced effectively once and for all by the philosophy of science. Through reification of the ego, positivists manage to objectify even the observing human subject, thereby laying the groundwork for the reception and acceptance of the viewpoint that reality is indeed the totality of facts. In this regard the knowing ego, including its sensations and other states of consciousness, is transformed into the object domain of facts.

Because of its scientific self-understanding, positivism fails to address itself to practical questions, practical aims and practical interests. It only knows the scientific world comprised of facts and the relations between facts.28 Under conditions of objectified processes, wherein everything is rendered into a mere object of fact, it becomes impossible to conduct an "epistemological inquiry into the subjective conditions of the objectivity of possible knowledge".29 Whatever reflection may be obtainable within the framework of positivism is seen by Habermas to effectively facilitate the self-abolition of reflection by the knowing subject. Mach's theory of elements is an affirmation of the position that scientific analysis or the scientific mode of thinking has nothing to do with one's consciousness. Everything in the context of the doctrine of elements is seen within the prism of facts which replicate reality.
ill objectified processes are comprehended in terms of the
transitory combination of changing elements. In short,
Mach's doctrine of elements recognises in reality only a
configuration of facts in their totality. Reality is the
equivalent of facts. What Mach's conceptualization of
reality amounts to is that the unity of being, and of theory
and practice are completely ignored. Mach rejects the
existence of such unities as a mere illusion, since they
are not convertible into facts. Since Mach's conceptual
framework does not recognize the existence of consciousness
and of being as such, it is evident that his schema is bound
to meet with failure in any attempt to comprehend knowledge
taking into account the contribution of the knowing subject.
Moreover, Mach's doctrine of elements ensures that the
priority is placed on the object of science (facts and the
relations between facts) and not on the contribution of the
human mind and reflection.

In the final analysis, the positivist approach toward
reality is mimicry or a copy-theory of reality, customarily
referred to as the correspondence theory. Thus when positi-
vists talk about developing the ability "to see in order to
foresee" or "to know in order to foresee", they are actually
talking about a copy theory of reality. Claims to truth
that transcend the domain of facts and sense-data cannot be
taken seriously given the restrictive method of analysis -
the scientific method - employed by the positivists. This
explains why positivists share the belief that the search for truth ends with the attainment of reproducible sensory facts which are partial truths, instead of with the achievement of an understanding of the whole, Hegel’s sense of truth. Hegel contended that truth is the whole. Since a concentration on facts takes priority over an examination of the contribution of the knowing subject within the framework of positivistic science, it is no wonder that Mach, the positivist, conceived the goal of science as that of adapting thought to the facts. If we were to follow the positivistic presuppositions to their logical conclusion, it could be asserted that before positive science came into being there was no knowledge. But this is an unacceptable position. Historically speaking there were other forms of knowledge before the emergence of positive science. The positivists might not deny this important fact of history, but they would argue that those forms of knowledge were either infra-scientific or inchoate forms of positive science.

Habermas contends that since everything, including the consciousness of human subjects, has been reduced to the level of facts and objectified processes within the framework of positive science, it is not possible to talk about the role of self-reflection among human subjects. Where there is no self-reflection we cannot expect to find instances of self-doubt. Thus the world of facts or objectivism can only serve as self-justifying and self-
affirming mechanisms’ exempt from self-doubt. The world of facts has been rendered immune against any kinds of doubt. There is also no guarantee that science as it is structured is indeed a description of reality. It seems that scientific method, or what we may call the methodical rules for comprehending reality, are imposed upon phenomena. Habermas points out that the positivist’s claim about science describing reality as it is does not constitute a proof or support for the claim. Moreover, because of its method, positive science can only reveal a selected portion of reality, and not the whole of reality as the positivists claim. Habermas makes this point quite clear in his critique of positivism.

To sum up, the role of consciousness is regarded as inconsequential or insignificant in the positivist conception of science, since the scientific method recognizes only what is objectifiable. Furthermore, the essence of rationality is seen as being constituted solely as technological rationality. This means that what the positivists recognize as rational, and for which they implicitly want to claim the status of exclusive rationality, is in reality only a part of rationality. Positivist contentions that technological rationality is the only rationality necessarily replaces the traditional notion of practical rationality with technological rationality, thus excluding practical rationality, as a distinct form, from consideration in the theory of knowledge.
What the positivists, adopting the scientific method, exclude, is a kind of rationality which Habermas says takes into account the consciousness of human subjects and their active participation in the rational consensual discourse free from domination. Habermas argues that technological rationality as espoused by the positivists incorporates two essential features of industrial societies: efficiency and economy.\(^3\) Positivists do not recognize the character of the values involved in technological rationality since from their perspective what can be considered value-laden is only that which is concerned with ethical or social norms. Normative discourse is set over against an examination of the objective situation based on description, analysis, explanation and prediction of facts. Thus, according to the positivists there is a clear distinction between value-judgements and factual-judgements.\(^4\) And this distinction is often taken as the hallmark of positivism. This rigid distinction between facts and values leads consequently to the separation of theory and practice, for reason and the interest of reason are isolated from action, thus making impossible the achievement of what Habermas has called committed reason.\(^5\) The positivists retain the belief in pure theory. In other words, if we may employ the Kantian terminology, positivists only recognize the theoretical interest of reason, not its practical interest. Habermas has argued that the value-orientation of technological
rationality, with its stress on efficiency and economy, manifests itself at four levels of analysis. Firstly, rationalization is confined within the limit of production which not only reduces everything, including human behaviour, to the level of the objective situation and objectified processes, but also gives rise to technical control over the objects and objectified processes including human behaviour. Therefore, the first level of rationalization by definition excludes the consideration of all practical questions. This form of rationalization is capable of handling only technical questions dealing with objects and objectified processes that can be conceived empirically as mere facts, and systematically excludes subjectivity, the consciousness of human subjects. Hence, it would appear that the first level of rationalization encompasses all the information that can be translated into the semantics of scientific discourse and manipulated as facts within the guidelines of the method of the empirical-analytic sciences.

What is desired or valued at this stage is the commitment to the scientific method which makes researchers interested only in the pursuit of the objective situation and objectified processes. Behind the arrangement of factual information within the domain of the empirical-analytic sciences is the a priori of the technical cognitive interest of the empirical analysts. The second level of
rationalization requires the translation of scientific propositions into the technical application of the theories of the empirical-analytic sciences. The strictures of technological rationality entail the imperative choice of the most "rational" alternative to be implemented or acted-upon, measured by the relative degree of efficiency and economy of any particular alternative at a given time. Efficiency and economy are aspects of technical utility, and are contrasted with the moral perspective on action. These values conform to utilitarian standards where the purpose is not at issue; rather than to moral norms where it is. The values of technological rationality ensure that the individual who is oriented toward technical control acts according to the technical rules of the scientific method.

Empiricists, in spite of the emphasis on technological rationality, have to live in a society that to a great extent is still operated according to traditional norms or ethics.

This leads to the conclusion that the empirical inquiry of positive science must come to terms and resolve the possible conflict between the requirements of technical rationalism and the imperatives of ethical or societal norms. Can we not argue, therefore, that the promotion of one kind of value-system is bound to affect the other, at least in a negative way? Habermas has observed that:
the institution of formal rationality of choice, thus an extension of technological thinking to the selection of scientific techniques, changes the previously given value systems themselves. By this I mean not only the systematization of value conceptions required by this decision-theoretical analysis; I mean above all the reformulation or even total devaluation of traditional norms, which fail to function as principles of orientation for a technical realization of concrete goals.  

The choice is between an assimilation of all norms of action to technical norms or the subordination of technical norms to practical or ethical ones. There is no doubt that there is a dialectical relationship existing between traditional norms and the values served by scientific techniques, technical rationality. Therefore, the question is, as Dewey succinctly pointed out, "how shall we employ what we know to direct our practical behaviour so as to test these beliefs and make possible better ones?"  

Dewey's intention was to pose the question in such a way that it becomes resolvable within the framework of committed reason, oriented toward practical discourse serving the practical interest of enlightenment and facilitating participation in political activity. However, we may point out that this opinion represents Dewey's earlier idealist standpoint as opposed to his later position which supports the employment of instrumental reason in problem solving.  

The third level of rationalization deals with the strategic situations of game theory in which two opponents, each with his own interest, are pitted against each other. One opponent, desiring to achieve self-assertion and the
imposition of his will over the other, sets out to plan a grand strategy which is geared toward the maximization of benefits and the minimization of risks. Such a strategic-action plan is specifically designed, not only along the lines of technical control produced by scientific techniques, but also seeks to predict the conduct of the opponent who is to be brought under control. The flaw in this strategic action plan lies in the inability of either opponent to recognize the limits of the predictive capabilities of the scientific method of analysis which is being employed.

The fourth level of rationalization pertains to decision-making by means of machines or cybernetics. There is no doubt that many technical problems have been rendered solvable by machines or computers for which task they are well suited or appropriate in certain circumstances. But the limitation of these machines is set by the fact that there are certain kinds of activity or experience requiring practical discourse and practical resolution which cannot enter into their operations. Habermas says that the positivist understands society in terms of the socio-technical control of objectified processes rather than within the perspective of a coherent total consciousness of human subjects whose symbolic interaction underscores the importance of interested reason in practical discourse and in the sphere of political activity. Thus within the framework of socio-technical control, the positivist views research,
technology, production and administration not as constituting a whole system but as separate, interdependent subsystems, with each sub-system having its own special task in the division of labour. Such a perspective facilitates the acceptance of the thesis, held by empirical theorists, that politics and economics are two distinct disciplines which function as specialized sub-systems. Unlike Hegelians, empiricists argue that the whole as such is not an object of inquiry. According to the Hegelians, wholes are understood dialectically in terms of mediations, whereas empiricists are bent on making clear cut distinctions between specialized sub-systems. 31

The discussion about the dichotomy between the Hegelian "whole" and the empiricists' distinction of specialized sub-systems leads us to the question of the role of interest in the two spheres of life-activity: symbolic interaction and work. Within the sphere of symbolic interaction the interest of reason enables human beings to develop a critical insight into the nature of life-processes as they affect society and its members. In the domain of work the technical interest is capable only of producing more technical control of objectified processes manifested through the behavioural system of instrumental action. For reason to reveal itself in life, it must do so through self consciousness which must actualize itself through practical action. Therefore, man must necessarily participate in the implementation of
his own actions by becoming an actor rather than a passive spectator of the world around him. It is within this context that the appropriate interest of reason is seen to be identical with the practical interest. Instrumental action can only be operative within the framework of social production, work. Therefore, any attempt to reduce all action to the level of instrumental action entails the exclusion of both communicative (practical) action and of emancipatory action, and the implied denial of their respective knowledge constitutive interests. By reducing all action to the single level of instrumental action, one also manages to reduce all orientation of action and interest to the singular preoccupation with technical control.

The interest in technical control is the foundation upon which the scientific method of the empirical-analytic sciences is built. It is evident then that any attempt to impose the positivistic approach on practical politics, which traditionally required practical discourse and the achievement of consensus free from domination, is bound to result in the institutionalization and legitimation of technical control or domination in the sphere of practical politics. Habermas has in the most succinct manner demonstrated what aspect of reality is revealed under conditions of technical control:

Empirical-analytic sciences disclose reality insofar as it appears within the behavioural system of instrumental action. In accordance with their inmanent meaning, nomological statements about
this object domain are thus designed for a specific context in which they can be applied - that is, they grasp reality with regard to technical control that, under specified conditions, is possible everywhere and at all times. 53

Habermas states those subjects which are excluded from consideration when he says:

Within the framework of research operations that expand our power of technical control we can make no cogent statements about "value systems", that is, about social needs and objective states of consciousness, about the direction of emancipation and regression. 54

What is clearly excluded by this approach are "value systems" which pertain to ethics or moral relationships. Now we can examine the presuppositions of the positivization of politics. Firstly, we find that the monologic language of the empirical analytic sciences is dependent on repetitions of technical-learning operations. There is an unquestioned acceptance of the superiority of the scientific method over methods which aim at achieving the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding, and the reciprocal agreement between or among persons engaged in a rational discourse free from domination. These technical learning operations when extended to the sphere of practical politics necessarily entail the acceptance of the pretested, and proven scientific techniques of political analysis, as, for instance public-opinion polls, survey research and data analysis.

Secondly, within the framework of the behavioural system of instrumental action, the traditional exercise of practical politics, requiring citizen participation,
practical uncoerced discourse and rational consensus, is transformed into the control of power mechanisms or the regulation of social intercourse. Key political variables are measured according to their power input and policy output within the political system. Thirdly, in the arena of scientific politics, political action is divorced from communication and reduced to purposive rational activity of instrumental action. Hence individuated experience and personal autonomy are excluded by the selective employment of measurable, repeatable experiences guided by the demands of instrumental action. Under the influence of technical control interests manifested in the behavioural system of instrumental action, it is not possible to effectively bring about the necessary conditions of communicative action in the arena of practical politics. Political behaviour within the framework of technical control and instrumental action is not evaluated according to binding consensual norms. These norms define reciprocal expectations about behaviour in terms of the intersubjective understanding and mutual agreement of at least two or more speaking and acting persons. Habermas has observed that the technical recommendations or learned technical rules of instrumental or purposive-rational action in the empirical science of politics furnish us with certain skills. These skills enable people to solve problems, manipulate crowds, while, in contrast, motivations make possible the pursuit of consensual
norms by speaking and acting individuals whose internalized core values enhance their socialized personality structures. Habermas concurs in Marcuse's critique of the Weberian concept of rationality. Marcuse's thesis is that what is said by Weber to be "rationalization" in the political sphere is in reality the revelation of unacknowledged political domination. Marcuse maintains that this "rationalization" in the political arena is based on the "correct choice" among strategies. The criteria of the "correct choice" among strategies are efficiency and success in problem solving rather than the promotion of the total social framework of interests based on reflection and the rational reconstruction of human relations. Habermas contends that rationality defined in terms of efficiency and the success-rate of results is nothing but the application of skills or strategies which are rooted in technical control. Thus technical control when extended to the sphere of practical politics becomes the equivalent of domination. Habermas argues that it is inconceivable to talk of skills and strategies based on the application of purpose-rational action or instrumental action in both technological and political spheres without at the same time acknowledging this inherent character of technical control. Instrumental action is identical with technical control; one cannot exist without the other. It is within this context that Marcuse was led to remark:
The very concept of technical reason is perhaps ideological. Not only the application of technology but technology itself is domination (of nature and men) - methodical scientific, calculated, calculating control. Specific purposes and interests of domination are not foisted upon technology 'subsequently' and from the outside; they enter the very construction of the technical apparatus. Technology is always a historical-social project: in it is projected what a society and its ruling interests intend to do with men and things. Such a purpose of domination is substantive and to this extent belongs to the very form of technical reason.

Marcuse further notes that a peculiar phenomenon has occurred in industrially advanced capitalist societies; domination has acquired a new character. Formerly domination used to reflect itself visibly in the economic and political spheres by the massive exploitation of labour power and by oppressive authoritarian political regimes. But now such domination has been effectively masked in the affluent society with the development of consumerism in the economic sphere. However, it still remains present in the form of elite dominance within liberal-democratic political systems.

Industrial productivity in capitalist countries continues to function on principles which justify the exploitation of social labour, though now the system has acquired a more humane form which stresses the cooperative domination of nature. It inhibits the growth of a revolutionary consciousness in the working class by increasing the worker's appetite for the possession and consumption of material goods. Through the achievement of affluence and consumerism, the capitalist domination of
labour is institutionalized or legitimized. It renders numb the revolutionary potential of the workers without removing the element of technical control in the domain of production. 63 Again citing Marcuse, Habermas maintains that owing to the belief in affluence and consumerism, the forces of production under capitalist production have become supportive mechanisms of stability for the economic status quo and the political establishment. 64 The development of critical insight in the proletariat, that Habermas and Marcuse talk about, continues to be impeded by the prevailing conditions of affluence and consumerism in advanced capitalist industrial societies. Habermas and Marcuse see the domination of nature to have become identical with the domination of men. 65
FOOTNOTES

2. Ibid., pp. 67-68.
3. Ibid., pp. 206-7.
5. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 87.
7. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 74.
8. Ibid., p. 75.
9. Ibid., p. 75.
10. Ibid., p. 75.
11. Ibid., p. 75.
12. Ibid., p. 77. Conte's motto: Savoir pour prévoir.
13. Ibid., p. 77.
17. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 79.
20. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 80.
21. Ibid., p. 80.

23. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 80.

24. Ibid., p. 81.

25. Ibid., p. 82.

26. Ibid., p. 82; and,
Phenomenalism: the doctrine, set forth by Hume and his successors, that percepts and concepts actually present in the mind constitute the sole object of knowledge, the objects of perception themselves, their origin outside the mind, or the nature of the mind itself remaining forever beyond inquiry. Physicalism: the doctrine that all phenomena can be described in spatio-temporal terms and consequently that any descriptive scientific statement can in principle be reduced to an empirical physical statement.

27. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 83.

28. Ibid., p. 85.

29. Ibid., p. 85.

30. Ibid., p. 85.

31. Ibid., p. 86.

32. Ibid., p. 86.

33. Ibid., p. 86.

34. Ibid., p. 77.
Comte's motto was: Savoir pour prévoir.


36. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 88.

37. Ibid., p. 89.

38. Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 255.

39. Ibid., p. 271.

41. Habermas, Theory and Practice, p. 268.

42. Ibid., pp. 269-70.

43. Ibid., pp. 270-71.

44. Ibid., p. 271.

45. Ibid., pp. 271-72.

46. Ibid., p. 272.


49. Ibid., p. 273.

50. Ibid., p. 255.

51. Ibid., p. 255.

52. Ibid., p. 260.

53. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 195.


56. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 193.

57. Habermas, Toward A Rational Society, p. 92.

58. Ibid., p. 92.

59. Ibid., p. 83.

60. Ibid., pp. 81-83.

61. Ibid., p. 82.

62. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
53. Ibid., p. 83.
54. Ibid., pp. 82-103.
55. Ibid., p. 83.
CHAPTER IV

INTERPRETATION, NOTION AND EXHIBITION
The historical-hermeneutic sciences concern themselves with the understanding of the meaning of traditional norms and historical texts as mediated through language. Habermas conceives of hermeneutics as an art which relates the human sciences to our present existence as historical brings in society. Paul Ricoeur contends that hermeneutics, the art of interpretation reveals a profound intention, that of overcoming distance and cultural differences and of matching the reader to a text which has become foreign, thereby incorporating its meaning into the present comprehension a man is able to have of himself. Consequently, hermeneutics cannot remain a technique (or methodology) for specialists - the technè hermeneutikè of those who interpret oracles and marvels; rather, hermeneutics involves the general problems of comprehension.

Ricoeur goes on to point out that hermeneutics is quite unlike the method of the natural sciences:

It is a question of avoiding every way of formulating the problem grkennnistheoritisch and, consequently of giving up the idea that hermeneutics is a method able to compete on an equal basis with the method of the natural sciences. To assign a method to understanding is to remain entangled in the presuppositions of objective knowledge and the prejudices of the Kantian theory of knowledge.

Thus he contrasts it with the positive method. According to both Habermas and Ricoeur, the empirical-analytic sciences give us knowledge of objects, while hermeneutics give us knowledge of subjects. The former can produce intersubjective knowledge of objects (scientific agreement), whereas, the latter can produce intersubjective knowledge of subjects whereby we understand each other and we are in agreement.
Reality within the framework of the historical hermeneutic sciences is conceived tridimensionally by linking experience and understanding directly with linguistic expression. Habermas contends that hermeneutic inquiry or the art of interpretation deals with norms or with a cultural life-context which incorporates intersubjectivity and reciprocal expectation about behaviour of speaking and acting persons. Unlike empirical inquiry, hermeneutics does not centre around the observation and prediction of facts, but facilitates the understanding of the meaning of traditional norms or institutional frameworks. The question of understanding in hermeneutic inquiry cannot be looked at as isolated and separate from experience and linguistic expression. That which we understand is what we experience as well as express in the form of ordinary communicative language all concurrently. 5

Hermeneutic understanding entails the understanding of oneself (in Hegel's sense of the term) by understanding others via the medium of dialogue or intersubjective language communication. It is within the context of hermeneutic understanding that Habermas conceives individual life-experience to be linked through communication with other life-experiences:

The individual viewpoint that clings to personal life experience corrects and expands itself in common life experience. By this I understand the sentences that form in any group of persons related to each other and that are common to them.... Their distinguishing mark is that they are creations of the common life.
The importance of hermeneutic understanding is not only that it presupposes the unity of experience but it also forms the basis of a linguistically structured community wherein individuated human beings communicate and find their unity as homogenous subjects through intersubjective interaction. Yet, says Habermas, hermeneutic understanding is not synonymous with empathy. Through hermeneutic understanding Habermas envisages the preservation of both one's identity and one's non-identity or distance from others, whereas empathy in historical interpretation would result in the annihilation of one's ego through the complete identification with the other. By the process of empathy, Dilthey argued that it was quite possible for us to penetrate the psychological make-up of others by transposing our very selves into the psychic states of historical actors. This means that through empathy we would be forsaking our own psychic states for the adoption, through mimicry, of the historical actors' psychic states.

Empathy was seen by Habermas to be identical with the copy theory of truth which is standard in the empirical-analytic sciences. The empirical analytic sciences ensure, through the experimental verification of hypotheses, that the understanding of our practical existence is ignored by the perspective of the scientific method. Similarly, empathy in historical interpretation necessarily becomes defined in terms of the substitution of our psychic instincts, feeling and intentions for the psychic states of others.
So, we would be infusing ourselves with the psychic instincts, feelings and intentions of historical actors at the expense of our own. Habermas looked at Dilthey’s thesis of empathy-knowledge as capable only of achieving substitute experience rather than genuine hermeneutic understanding. For in the latter the process of understanding acquires a relation whereby “the art of comprehending gravitates around the interpretation of human testimonies preserved by writing, and also we call exegesis, interpretation, the art of comprehending the written manifestations of life”. By this process of hermeneutic understanding a connection is established between the past and the present historical situation through which life can become aware of itself in its depth.

Habermas contends that hermeneutic understanding enables us to understand ourselves as well as others in a manner which incorporates our own life experience and expression with that of the historical actors. Therefore, if we are to adopt the perspective of hermeneutic understanding, it would be inappropriate for us to speak in terms of putting ourselves in Napoleon’s strategic mode of thinking or trying to capture his state of mind during the final days and decisive moments leading to the debacle at Waterloo. We can manage to put ourselves in Napoleon’s shoes only by simultaneously annihilating the understanding of our own life-experiences and expression. This process presumably can be followed through reconstruction which
"eliminates" our consciousness by a substitution with that of Napoleon. This process of elimination by substitution would be seen, under the circumstances, to inhibit the ideal situation for hermeneutic understanding which stipulates that the condition for understanding others is understanding ourselves. Understanding others by understanding ourselves is the task that hermeneutic understanding seeks to perform in the interpretation of a historical text.12

According to Habermas, it is only through history that we come to know ourselves, what we are or what we have become. This means that history is forever present in our thoughts and actions, consciously or unconsciously. It is in this respect that our norms or moral relationships are seen to be historical. To elaborate further on the connection between hermeneutic understanding and the historical consciousness we must respond to the fundamental question: what is understanding?

Understanding has always and continues to this day to mean comprehending something within a given context. Gutterm Fløistad in his essay, "Understanding Hermeneutics" has remarked:

I shall point out how the temporal senses, past, present, and future are located in the part-whole structure of understanding. Temporality turns out to be the most fundamental meaning of this structure. The temporal character of the understanding of something is the present, that of the context the past and future. The past and future aspect of understanding hence necessarily precedes its present aspect, in as much as understanding of a context (or whole) is prior to understanding of a part.13
The temporal character of understanding something in a hermeneutic manner involves defining it in terms of a dialectical part-whole relationship, sometimes referred to as the hermeneutic circle. The handed-down knowledge or history constitutes the basis upon which one's present experience is founded. The past aspects of understanding are by definition the framework within which the present is understood. The past aspects of understanding become the whole and the current understanding of the present situation of the individual, constitutes the part. The understanding of the part presupposes the understanding of the whole and the whole presupposes the understanding of the part - a true hermeneutic circle. It is evident that both Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jürgen Habermas view the life-experience and moral relationships of human beings as consequences of historical development. This means an individual's existence is a temporal process in which his being and understanding is forever in the making, continually being shaped. What their position amounts to is that to be is to become or being is identified with becoming.

Since hermeneutic understanding entails the understanding of traditional norms and historical texts expressed in language, through the communication of speaking and acting persons, we must find out how the structure of ordinary language permits what is undoubtedly individual to be comprehended within the general categories of a dialogic
relation. The answer to this important question is furnished by hermeneutic understanding itself which functions as the vehicle giving meaning to communicative experience and communicative expression. Individual life-experience finds expression through communication in the larger context of a human community, and definitely not through the Nietzschean conception which puts priority on the amoral, asocial, sovereign individual who sets his own standards on the ground that he has no peer, and no master. Hermeneutic understanding reveals life-activity as structured by a triangular pattern constituted by action, linguistic expression and experiential expressions, such as facial expressions like winking, crying, exclamations, gestures.

Linguistic expression is ordinarily manifested in one of two ways: either we have a monologic linguistic expression in which are found repeatable statements based on the observation and measurement of objectified processes in the domain of the empirical-analytic sciences, or we are confronted with a dialogic encounter requiring the involvement of two or more persons in the formulation of rational consensus-based decisions. These are capable of being converted into statements and the statements in turn converted into actions. In the dialogic encounter it is the understanding of the meaning of statements that is sought through hermeneutic inquiry. The method of the historical-hermeneutic sciences is then employed rather than the
observation and description of objectified processes characteristic of the empirical analytic sciences. The dialogic form of linguistic expression characterizing hermeneutic understanding entails intersubjectivity, mutual understanding, reciprocal agreement, a rational uncoerced consensus based on the force of the better argument. Finally, it implies unrestrained continuous discourse free from domination. In the political realm the conditions of a dialogic encounter seem to approximate those of participatory democracy.

The principle of participatory democracy has as its core the notion of participation by all the citizens in the decision-making process which pertain to the affairs of their own polity. This is related to Habermas' idea of intersubjectivity and reciprocal expectation about behaviour based on unrestrained rational consensus emanating from dialogic communication. We draw this parallel because in both cases it is through the involvement and participation of citizens in the political decision-making processes that their deliberations and exchanges become the basis upon which decisions are formulated. Secondly, participatory democracy was supposed to entail the cultivation of a democratic character in the life of every free citizen, whereby he is rendered capable of virtue, capable of distinguishing good from bad, justice from injustice, as well as becoming public spirited. 19 Rousseau's notion of
democratic practice was realizable only through each citizen’s direct participation in the affairs of his political community. What Rousseau advocated was direct popular democracy in which every citizen learns through discourse and practice, and in the process develops his or her human capacities and public spiritedness.  

John Stuart Mill and G. D. H. Cole emphasized that it is participation as contributing to the development of the individual’s human capacities which constitutes the democratic character. Moreover, Cole conceived the direct participation of each citizen in associations, other than governmental structures, essential to the development of a cultivated educated population. Rousseau, Mill and Cole, all advocates of participatory democracy, express their faith in the ability of each citizen to participate in the decisions that affect his or her life. They were convinced that each person should be given the opportunity to develop the democratic character which would render the citizen capable of virtuous acts.

Habermas is expressing somewhat similar views in his theory of intersubjectivity or mutual understanding in dialogic communication free from domination. He particularly envisages the personal autonomy and responsibility of free citizens as arising from a situation of dialogic communication. In the political realm, Habermas is clearly concerned about the citizens’ involvement and participation through dialogic
encounter in matters pertaining to their lives. He talks about the preservation of "that interested reason which can only attain practical power through the minds of politically enlightened citizens". The unmistakable connection between Habermas' theory of communication and the idea of participatory democracy is established in the following passage:

When theory was still related to praxis in a genuine sense, it conceived of society as a system of action by human beings, who communicate through speech and thus must realize social intercourse within the context of conscious communication. Through this communication they must form themselves into a collective subject of the whole, that is capable of action...otherwise, the fortunes of a society over more rigidly rationalized in its particular parts must slip away as a whole from that rational cultivation, which they require all the more urgently.

In order to examine the use of dialogic language incorporating intersubjective meaning in regard to power and authority in the political arena, we need to employ "performative utterances" or "performative speech acts". The performative speech acts specifically pertain to situations where two or more people are speaking and acting simultaneously. What is the significance of performative speech acts or performative utterances in dialogic relation? Habermas says that the meaning of a performative utterance includes a reference to (a) an act of utterance in a particular and appropriate interaction relationship (i.e., I hereby promise...); (b) the definition of a (suitable) situation which is explicitly determined by the performative utterance of the speech act itself; and (c) the propositional content of the dependent clause. One should differentiate, between the levels of 'saying
something' and of 'doing something' (locutionary level versus illocutionary level). Being composed of speech act and dependent clauses of propositional content, utterances in general have, in addition to the meaning of their propositional content, a meaning which is linked to the speech situation as such. This following Austin, we can call the illocutionary force. A theory of communicative competence can thus be developed in terms of universal pragmatics.25

In the political realm let us take for example utterances utilizing the word vote and see in what ways we can go about showing its use in performative speech acts. The word vote can be employed in three dimensions. Firstly, vote related to other words, that is, its syntactic use. Secondly, the term vote can be related to the thing meant, meaning, its semantic application. Thirdly, vote can be related to persons, the pragmatic use of the term. It is in pragmatics that performative speech acts are employed.25 An example of the pragmatic use of the term is the exhortation, vote for our candidate. In this case the word vote is related to performance both at the level of expression and action, encouraging other persons to do as we are about to do, to support one candidate over others. By at once doing and saying, we transform our statement into action and our action into a statement. When we say, vote for our candidate, we mean to say that not only do we prefer this candidate over others, but also that we find him acceptable and commendable as a candidate of your choice and, under the circumstances, worthy of your vote. Therefore, when we say somebody is a commendable candidate we signal our intention
of supporting the person recommended. Hence, in this context, when we say: vote for our candidate, we do not appear to be saying at the same time, we disapprove of this candidate, or alternatively, we find this candidate unworthy of your vote.

For Habermas, dialogue, communicative action is the avenue through which not only performative speech acts can be realised, but also makes possible the eradication of domination and repression in society. What actually happens in dialogic relations, communicative action, is that utterances or verbalized sentences are converted into actions and at the same time actions into verbalized sentences. In this manner language is seen to be continuous with action. It is also from this perspective that dialogic communication becomes action orienting. Communicative action theory rejects any form of imposition and domination exercised by one individual over another, the kind which results from authority/subordinate relationships and thus monologic discourse. Instead, it seeks to render indirect privatized communication understandable hermeneutically within the framework of a dialogue maintaining intersubjectivity and reciprocal expectation about behaviour. Within the framework of communicative action the intentions, feelings, motives and bodily movements (crying, winking and gestures) of speaking and acting persons become compatible with reciprocal expectations about behaviour. Indeed, through
communicative action dialoguing participants become honest and authentic in spirit, intention, expression and action by at once doing what they say and saying what they do.

The role of communicative action in the sphere of hermeneutic understanding is not only to secure the unity of language and action but also to effect a connection of action to the practical, as opposed to the technical, interests of life. What emerges in communicative action (mediated by hermeneutic understanding) is spontaneity, honesty and authenticity of language; action, motive and intention all combine in one form of life-expression or experience. The purpose of promoting communicative action through hermeneutic understanding is to strive at making communicative action itself the framework of "the thought generative work of life". Under the conditions of communicative action, the vehicle of participation for socialised individuals is intercourse with others in the medium of ordinary language free from domination. Habermas, citing Dilthey, addressed himself to the important question of the individual and his relationship to others in the community:

In the realm of the objective mind every individual expression of life represents something common. Each word, each sentence, each gesture or civility, each art work and each historical deed is understandable only because there is something common linking him who expresses himself in them and him who understands. The individual constantly experiences, thinks, and acts in a sphere of what is common, and only in it does he understand.
Hermeneutic inquiry, which proceeds within the framework of communicative action, seeks to interpret life-expressions whose meaning is obscure and needs clarification by removing the blockage that inhibits the process of mutual understanding. Communicative action in the sphere of the historical hermeneutic sciences is not only oriented toward intersubjectivity or mutual understanding in ordinary language communication and normative discourse, but can also be shown to stem from the practical cognitive interest.  

Habermas envisages communicative action as deriving from the unrestrained rational consensus of persons engaged in a dialogue free from domination.

But there are certain basic questions that Habermas' theory of communicative action leaves unanswered. What is the basis for an unconstrained rational consensus? Habermas emphasizes the point that the force of the better argument should be the measure of rational consensus. But the force of the better argument may prevail where there is a difference in the level of information, in spite of the fact that there is a symmetrical relationship in the power-distribution equation as to who says what, when and how among participants engaged in dialogue. This difference in the level of information concerning the subject under discussion is crucial in determining the contribution of the various participants in the search for a rational consensus. It is evident that those individuals who have a higher level of information concerning the issue at hand will contribute
more than those whose level of information is lower. Thus, the potential for contribution or achieving political efficacy among individuals with lower levels of information is less than those with higher levels of information. Secondly, if the criterion of truth is based on the force of the better argument does it necessarily mean that this standard becomes the absolute measure against which all norms, traditions and historical events are to be judged? Is the better argument always correct? Is it not possible that the force of the better argument at a particular time in history may be a persuasive argument owing to the rhetorical skill of certain debaters rather than being founded on a genuine consensus theory of truth? History is full of such examples: witness the once strong belief in the theory, held by many, during the middle-ages, that the earth was at the centre of the universe and that the sun was constantly moving around it. Today most of us know that such beliefs have no rational basis of fact—which can be justified in a practical, universal manner.

Concerning the question of the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding with regards to traditional norms, there is implicit a sense of justification or legitimation of the traditional norms asserting that whatever is mutually agreed upon is by definition just and right. Might not such a normative standpoint be indirectly supportive of the status-quo by affirming the viewpoint that mutual under-
standing and reciprocal agreement in the conduct of norms is necessarily right? It is also clear that this normative standpoint appears to reject an equally valid thesis, that misunderstanding or lack of mutual understanding may lead to radical changes in the status-quo, necessitating the emergence of a totally new set of values. To the extent that lack of mutual understanding may result in system changes, the alteration or overthrow of the status-quo, it may be said that misunderstanding or lack of mutual understanding can contribute to the development of a new morality or a different set of ethical standards which are suited to the needs and aspirations of a dynamic, fast-changing society.

It is within this context that Habermas' notion of the "intersubjectivity of mutual understanding" may be seen to promote the very conformism to which he claims to be staunchly opposed. Radical changes in system values, or the rules of the game upon which a society is operated, have often occurred under conditions of intense conflict marked by the absence of mutual agreement and the lack of mutual understanding among opposing groups engaged in the struggle for power.

Habermas contends that communicative action, made possible by the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding, puts the dialoguing participants in a position to engage in a reciprocal interpretation of the textual tradition. He says that two or more persons engaged in communicative
experience through communicative action are caught in a
dialogic encounter which replaces the framework of the
empirical sciences. The problem of the objective situation,
characterizing empirical analysis with its dependence on
the model of controlled observation, is not relevant to
speaking and acting subjects who participate in communica-
tive experience because the experiential realm of
communication, under the prevailing conditions of communi-
cative action, cannot be reduced to the level of technical
control. Can we speak of an objectivity of understanding
within the framework of communicative experience? Habermas
answers affirmatively:

Nevertheless, hermeneutic understanding
can arrive at objectivity to the extent that the
understanding subject learns, through the communi-
cative appropriation of alien objectivations, to
comprehend itself in its own self-formative
process. In interpretation can only grasp its object
and penetrate it in a relation in which the inter-
preter reflects on the object and himself at the
same time as moments of an objective structure
that likewise encompasses both and makes them
possible. In this sense the objectivity of
understanding rests on the principle that Dilthey
set forth for autobiography and that only seems to
be subjectivistic: 'A person's (group's, epoch's)
reflection upon himself remains as both orientation
and foundation'.

The objectivity of hermeneutic understanding materializes
in the form of knowledge rooted in communicative experience
mediated by dialogic communication. But also within the
framework of dialogue the subjectivity of both participants
is incorporated and expressed outwardly as communicative
experience. In conclusion, it is clear that within the
context of communicative action, language, action, symbols, intentions and experience are all united into a single form of communicative expression. But the communicative perspective allows only for the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding of those speaking and acting persons who interact through participation in communicative experience in matters of traditional norms.³⁶

Habermas argues that the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding, achieved by the historical-hermeneutic sciences (i.e. linguistics, philology, history), aims at the understanding of symbolic structures in general and by itself does not produce self-reflection. In order to achieve self-reflection it is necessary that we extend our inquiry to the level of psychoanalytic hermeneutics or what is usually referred to as psychoanalytic interpretation.³⁷ This form of interpretation aims at transforming the act of understanding into a process of self-reflection which goes beyond intersubjectivity of mutual understanding achieved by historical-hermeneutics.³⁸ The transformation of understanding into self-reflection makes possible the unmasking of what is unconscious by translating it into consciousness, and the exposure of repressed instinctual impulses of communicating individuals.³⁹ In order for speaking and acting persons to be rendered capable of self-reflection in which they become a self-formative autonomous community of human beings, they have to engage in emanci-
patory action guided by the emancipatory cognitive interest which is mediated by power or authority. It is within the process of psychoanalysis that the individual is emancipated from the constraints of power and ideology. Habermas wants to point out that, there is a clear distinction between the role of communicative action and that of emancipatory action: the former restores intersubjectivity or mutual understanding; the latter makes possible self-reflection.

Psychoanalytic interpretation, or what Habermas refers to as the analytic dialogue, makes possible the understanding of institutions as power-mechanisms that exhibit external repressive force which is internalized by individuals living in class-stratified societies. This internalised repressive force manifests itself in the form of compulsive neurotic impulses reflected in distorted language communication ("the range of incomprehensible acts and utterances dealt with in psychoanalysis"). Therefore through psychoanalysis it would be possible to reveal the source(s) of this inaccessible meaning which fails to be expressed in public speech, or in the medium of ordinary language communication. It is only through psychoanalysis that the origin of distorted communication, that is, the faulty or misleading meaning entailed in language communication, can be explained or unearthed. During psychoanalysis the roots of distortion in language communication are unmasked, and the institutional
force and repression are eliminated from language, as well as from society. The repressive force embedded in distorted language communication facilitates the split between motives and communication. Such a split leads to a situation in which "motives are driven incessantly about and are directed by the excluded symbols into channels of substitute gratification," resulting in what Freud has called compulsive neurosis.

Employing Freud's psychoanalytic schema, Habermas conceived the likelihood of curing man of this internal compulsion of distorted communication as possible through self-reflection in which the individual regains his or her personal autonomy, responsibility and liberation from ideological power-mechanisms. Hence Habermas sees the problem of domination, power, and ideology, to be rooted in distorted communication. He claims that Marx was unable to see this phenomenon, since he contended that "institutions derive their force from perpetuating a distribution of rewards and obligations that is rooted in force and distorted according to class structure." Habermas goes on to embrace the Freudian position which depicts the direction of the historical development of the human species as divided into a two-fold process: the process of self-generation mediated through work, and the process of self-formation operating under factors or conditions of distorted communication. The self-formative process deals with
traditional norms, values or what we normally refer to as the institutional framework of society and this is where distorted communication in the form of ideology appears. The psychoanalytic encounter, as envisaged by Habermas, ensures that the process of inquiry becomes simultaneously a process of self-inquiry. Through psychoanalysis it becomes possible for individuals to achieve self-reflection. In self-reflection individuals are liberated from power-mechanisms and ideology. Self-reflection reveals the union of knowledge and interest. Hierarchical social institutions confront man as power or authority which invariably secures legitimation or justification through ideological symbols. What we ought to do at this juncture is to conduct an examination of emancipatory action and its constitutive emancipatory interest in the area of analytic dialogue and see what political utility such an approach could have for modern society.

Since self-reflection aims at the self-understanding of the individual, its role in the psychoanalytic encounter is to expose those aspects of non-verbalized symbols and intentions which fail to be expressed in ordinary language communication and consequently continue to manifest themselves in the form of neurosis. These aspects of non-verbalized symbols and intentions are exhibited outwardly by the distortion of language communication which effectively separates symbols, action and intentions from language
itself. What transpires under conditions of distorted language communication is that individuals do not at once say what they do and do what they say. Thus, it is evident that psychoanalytic interpretation would perform the task of unmasking those symbols and non-verbalized expressions which are responsible for the individual misunderstanding himself. Analytic dialogue is concerned with problems of self-deception. It is within this framework of analytic dialogue that self-reflection can be realized and, in the process, achieve the capability of unearthing those symbols responsible for man's self-deception or false consciousness.

The problem of self-deception in distorted language communication can be compared to the situation of an individual who has been dreaming, bearing in mind that this dreamer is the author of his own dream text. But upon waking up this very individual who is identical with the dreamer finds out that he no longer can clearly recall or understand what he himself created during the dream-spell. The individual does not understand his dream-text at the level of consciousness because the dream itself was separated from action, expression and language; it was experienced only as a product of imagination during sleep. What then ought to be done by the individual who suffers from self-deception or the false-consciousness of an ideological mode of thinking is to reconstruct, aided by an analyst, a situation similar to a dream text which will make self-reflection possible.
Habermas contends that such a situation can be achieved through psychoanalysis. Habermas, like Freud, believes that the interpretation of dreams can serve as a useful tool in the elucidation and explanation of pathologically distorted meaning structures. They both argue that the method of interpretation of dreams surpasses the art of hermeneutic inquiry in that it makes possible the self-understanding of the meaning of the distorted dream text. The analysis of dreams is a means to the end.49

The essence of self-reflection lies in the transformation of what is unconscious into consciousness through the process of psychoanalysis. Habermas has observed that what is unconscious continues to be excluded from public communication. Therefore, he sees the role of self-reflection in the social sphere as that of restoring what is unconscious to the level of public communication.50 And also he argues that what dreams are to individuals, ideologies are to groups. On the other hand, the refusal to examine what is unconscious constitutes repression itself. If we accept the thesis that that which is unconscious can be transformed into consciousness and raised to the level of public communication, such transformation signals the elimination of repression in both private and public spheres of communication. By engaging in self-reflection the individual becomes both actor and critic.51 Habermas conceives the process of self-reflection as restoring to the individual not only his sense of self-awareness through
which he becomes transparent or a mirror image of himself, but also his capacity to become self-dependent. In this process the ego liberates itself from ideological thinking and doctrinal beliefs. \textsuperscript{52} In the context of emancipatory action where self-reflection is achieved, the emancipatory cognitive interest connotes the interest of reason in emancipation as well as the promotion of the self-sufficiency of the ego.

In contrast, instrumental action, guided by the technical cognitive interest, signifies the tendency of man to depend on things, the dependence on nature. The overwhelming concern with man's dependence on nature and his quest to dominate it invariably leads to thinking of man as a product of nature, and accordingly, he discovers his self-consciousness only in the representation of things. Habermas has noted that when men become exclusively dependent on things, their self-consciousness is "dispersed and immersed in objects and can be gleaned only from their manifold. Their image is visible to them only through things as in a mirror. When the latter are taken away from them, their self disappears at the same time". \textsuperscript{53} Men who engage in emancipatory action are imbued with the keen sense of self-reflection which in turn liberates them from the belief in the independence of things as well as emancipating them from objectification in things. \textsuperscript{54} Habermas is saying that things are dependent on us, as knowers, for their existence.
Yet, Habermas' theory of self-reflection and emancipatory action, in spite of the depth of the philosophical arguments employed in it, fails to show a definite connection between psychoanalysis and political practice. Secondly, he does not demonstrate how psychoanalysis, which is the basis of self-reflection, can be applied in today's political arena. Thirdly, since psychoanalytic interpretation requires trained psychoanalysts who have a good grasp of medicine, psychiatry, physiology and psychology, are we to assume that individuals who engage in the psychoanalytic interpretation of the political sphere will be equipped with the prerequisite training and grounding required of psychoanalysts generally? Fourthly, if domination and the power constraints of social institutions can indeed be traced back to compulsion or the force underlying distorted language communication which manifests itself in neurotic behaviour separating language from action and intention, how then do we go about setting up psychoanalytic "therapy sessions" among a large group of politicized and depoliticized people? Fifthly, if a psychoanalytic therapy session were to be implemented in the political realm who will play the role of "doctor" and who will be "patient". Sixthly, what is the basis for distinguishing between "doctor" and "patient"?

These questions lead us to another important matter: does Habermas achieve the critical aims envisaged in his theory? What are the prospects of success for a psycho-
analytic interpretation of the contemporary political arena, particularly in view of the questions we have posed above? It is evident that Habermas' theory of communication leaves much to be explained before we can begin to apply it to contemporary politics. However, in spite of all the problems entailed in Habermas' theory, and particularly in his notion of psychoanalysis, there is no doubt that his contribution is a landmark in the areas of critical philosophy, critical sociology, and social theory. He has built a strong case on behalf of hermeneutic inquiry and psychoanalytic interpretation, both using language communication, while managing at the same time to underplay or minimize the role of causal empirical analysis. Habermas' basic argument is that when dealing with the power-mechanisms and ideology of social institutions, we should seek to understand the meaning structures of statements concerning these social institutions. Such statements can be understood only by way of interpretation, that is, in terms of practical questions involving practical and emancipatory interests, communicative and emancipatory actions, dialogue, examination of practical motives, reason and intentions.

By way of summation we may relate the three levels of action in terms of the fundamental dualism between instrumental and communicative action. The establishment of this epistemological dualism in Habermas' theory of action prepares the way for a super-imposed, all encompassing, higher dimension of action, emancipatory action which reveals
the constituent cognitive interest as well as the particular orientation of each of the other two dimensions of action. Habermas argues that there is a linkage between knowledge constitutive interest and the orientation of each dimension of action, and that this linkage can be revealed or demonstrated by the emancipatory cognitive interest of the critical sciences (i.e. critical philosophy, psychoanalysis). He envisages the three kinds of inquiry in relation to their respective interests and identifies the highest stage:

There are three categories of processes of inquiry for which a specific connection between logical-methodological rules and knowledge constitutive interests can be demonstrated. This demonstration is the task of a critical philosophy of science that escapes the snares of positivism. The approach of the empirical-analytic sciences incorporates a technical cognitive interest; that of the historical-hermeneutic sciences, incorporates a practical one; and the approach of critically oriented sciences incorporates the emancipatory cognitive interest that, as we saw, was at the root of traditional theories.  

The sharp epistemological distinction between instrumental and communicative action leads to the realization that the dimension of action oriented toward technical control (i.e. instrumental action) should not be confused with the dimension (communicative action) which is oriented toward the "expansion of the intersubjectivity of possible action orienting mutual understanding".  

From an analytic point of view each kind of action has a specific knowledge constitutive interest and issues from a specific form of knowledge (the three kinds of science).
From a synthetic point of view, the three kinds of action mark stages in the process of self-consciousness. At the first level, we know the world of objects, the natural world. Hegel argued that contemplation does not reveal the self, human interaction does. Habermas says that neither empirical-analytic knowledge nor instrumental action are capable of self-consciousness. At the level of hermeneutics, the knowledge of other subjects, historically situated or our contemporaries, is sought and achieved, but it is only at the third level that self-reflection, self-knowledge is realizable. The self is then at home with itself. But it appears that one has to understand the first two stages if the final one is to be consummated.

Habermas accepts Gadamer's view of history and historical text:

But the historical world is not a coherence of experience in the way that, in autobiography, history presents itself to the inner world of the subjective consciousness. Historical coherence must, in the end, be understood as a coherence of meaning that wholly transcends the horizon of the individual's experience. It is like an enormous alien text that one needs the help of hermeneutics to decipher.

In the following passage Gadamer illustrates the connection between hermeneutics and the written historical text:

Perhaps we must ask at this point whether the inner connection between hermeneutics and writing is not to be regarded as a secondary one. It is not the fact of its being written as such that makes an idea in need of interpretation, but the fact of its being in language; but that includes the universality of meaning from which, in turn, follows the possibility of its being written down. Thus both codified law and the written text point to a deeper connection that is concerned with the relation between understanding and application, as I think I have shown.

Gadamer further elaborates on the idea of understanding and its roots in history. Implicit in this relation between history and understanding is the importance of the historical text:

The being that is concerned with its being presents itself through its understanding of being, as a way of access to the question of being. The movement of the understanding of being is itself seen to be historical, as the basic nature of historicalness... Human self-understanding is deepened by every such experience. In every case it is an "event" and the concept of self-understanding an historical concept.
2. Ibid., p. xiii.


4. Ibid., p. 7.


6. Ibid., p. 155.


8. Ibid., pp. 146-47.

9. Ibid., p. 146.

10. Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 64.

11. Habermas, op. cit., p. 146.


   Everything that is set down in writing is to some extent foreign and strange, and hence it poses the same task of understanding as what is spoken in a foreign language. The interpreter of what is written, like the interpreter of divine or human utterance, has the task of overcoming and removing the strangeness and making its assimilation possible. It may be the case that this task is complicated if the historical distance between the text and interpreter becomes conscious; for this means that the tradition that supports both the transmitted text and its interpreter has become fragile and gapped.


   Habermas, op. cit., pp. 171-73.


16. Habermas, op. cit., p. 163.

17. Ibid., p. 163.

19. Ibid., pp. 22-27.

20. Ibid., p. 38.


22. Ibid., p. 255.

23. Ibid., p. 255.


28. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 166.

29. Ibid., p. 168.

30. Ibid., p. 173.

31. Ibid., p. 156.

32. Ibid., pp. 175-76.

33. Ibid., p. 176.

34. Ibid., p. 180.

35. Ibid., p. 181.

36. Ibid., p. 286.

37. Ibid., p. 218.

38. Ibid., p. 228, p. 214.

39. Ibid., p. 228.
40. Ibid., p. 228; and

41. Ibid., p. 217.

42. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, p. 282.

43. Ibid., p. 277.

44. Ibid., p. 283.

45. Ibid., p. 314.

46. Ibid., p. 283.

47. Ibid., p. 218.

48. Ibid., p. 218.

49. Ibid., pp. 220-21.

50. Ibid., p. 238.

51. Ibid., p. 261.

52. Ibid., p. 205.

53. Ibid., p. 206.

54. Ibid., p. 207.

55. Ibid., p. 308.

56. Ibid., p. 310.
CHAPTER V

THE INTEGRATION PROBLEM IN HABERMAS
According to Talcott Parsons what is characteristic of the social system is its institutionalized value system. Hence, we conceived the basic function of the social system to be the maintenance or preservation of this value system. The successful maintenance of the value system necessarily requires its stability and its protection against external threat or pressures which could alter it radically. Pressures may emanate from either incompatible cultural factors, (i.e. forces which function in contradiction to the given value system) or motivational change which produces stresses and strains affecting both inter- and intra-personal relationships in a manner which renders untenable the once unquestioned individual motivation to conformity with regard to institutional role expectations. The mechanism which stabilizes the value system by eliminating all "foreign" cultural factors is referred to by Parsons as "pattern-maintenance". While, on the other hand, the mechanism responsible for stabilizing the motivational sources of change in which motivational tensions are resolved is called "tension management". Therefore every viable social system ensures that "pattern maintenance" in the sphere of values, and "tension-management" in the realm of motives are secured. This means that the social system strives in both the value and motivational categories to bring about a
stabilization thereby preventing any potential source of change which may upset or adversely affect the social system itself. Parsons has defined the social system as:

any system generated by the interaction of two or more behaving units. The basic criterion for establishing the existence of meaningful inter-dependence between the actions of the units (interactions) is what happens is that the impact of actions caused by each interacting unit is traced throughout the system and eventually terminates by way of "feedback" to the units which originally initiated the actions.

Within the Parsonian social system interacting units are seen to form a functional interdependence which may be either supportive and thus of benefit to the survival and progress of the system as such; or it may take the form of obstruction which is indicative of conflict within the system. The social system is patterned along the lines of the physical, chemical and biological sciences which are defined in terms of organizational principles. These systems function according to specific controlling, steering mechanisms which determine what will be accepted or rejected. An organizational structure is by definition a unique, separate and autonomous entity which distinguishes itself from non-organized structures by its ability to select, control and steer all its constituent elements. Therefore to be organized systematically is to be selective, steering-prone and control-oriented. For instance, in the biological sciences we talk
about the existence of the nervous system wherein the brain acts as the central control mechanism to which "stimuli" (messages) carried by the receptor (sensory nerves) are transmitted, and from which "response" messages conveyed by the effector (motor nerves) emanate. The input and output of messages come under the central control of the brain. There is a "feedback" relationship connecting the receptor to the brain; the brain to the effector, and the effector back to the receptor. The boundary or the limit of the nervous system encompasses only those components which are of neural origin, composed of dendrites and neurons. That which is not composed of neurons and dendrites is automatically excluded from the nervous system. There is a homeostatic balance within the nervous system, which ensures that an equilibrium is maintained. The brain (the central control apparatus) which of the nerve-impulses will function as excitatory and which will be inhibitory. The dialectical relationship between excitatory and inhibitory nerve impulses is maintained throughout the cycle of the nervous system. 

Bertalanffy, Parsons, Easton and other behaviouralists have argued that it is possible to talk of a social structure as a system in the same manner as "system" is used in the physical and biological sciences. For instance, they maintain, in the natural sciences there is a concept of system which is guided by specialized organizational principles; so too it
can be established that in the social sciences there exists a system called the social system comprising generalizable, specialized processes which are patterned along definite organizational principles. It is in this context that the social system can be interpreted in terms of a tridimensional perspective comprising the economic, political and socio-cultural systems. Each aspect of the social system has its own specialized, unique organizational principle which determines the manner and method of exchanges (external and internal functions), interactions, control and steering mechanisms, boundary (limiting factors) and the separation from other interacting units which are external to each part of the social system. If each aspect of the social system follows a definite, specialized organizational principle, it means the organized structure has the ability to preserve or maintain its identity as a separate entity with specialized functions or role determination. It also means that for this organized structure to continue to survive it must be equipped with the ability of self-sustainence which is defined in terms of a homeostatic balance or dynamic equilibrium and a corrective method of checking out all external threats as well as combatting every internal excess (overload) which may develop within the given system. In short, this means that the organized structure, which consists of the economic, political, socio-cultural systems must of necessity be able to guarantee its own "pattern-maintenance" in order to
preserve its own identity, and also be assured of its "Tension-management" capability, that is, in so far as its internal cohesion is concerned.

David Easton in his analysis of one of the three aspects of the social system, namely, the political system, contends that the organizational principles of the political system are defined in terms of: (1) inputs which are demands (e.g. the commitment and mass-loyalty required for the continued existence or survival of the political system) made upon the political system — (that emanate from the environment i.e. economic system, socio-cultural system, biological system, ecological system and etc.). (2) The effect of the intrasocietal environment and the extra-societal environment determines the type of inputs injected into the political system. (The intra-societal environment comprises the ecological system, biological system, personality systems and social system; whereas the extra-societal environment is made of international political systems, international ecological systems, and international social systems.)

(3) Inside the political system the inputs (demands, support) are converted into outputs, that is, decisions and policies which in turn are fed-back or respond to the original environmental factors generating the demands and support (i.e. support meaning the commitment or loyalty that ensures the persistence of the
political system). The political system by the use of regulative responses (or what Habermas has referred to as the steering, controlling mechanisms) selects which of the demands and support will be converted into outputs. In other words, the political system determines which of the demands and support it will respond to favourably and which will be ignored or rejected outrightly. To elaborate on what exactly is meant by the "regulative responses" or the "steering, controlling mechanisms" of the political system, David Easton said:

I can briefly illustrate what I mean by this if we look at some of the typical mechanisms. Thus, not all members are equally likely to give voice to a demand. Because of their general social status, some individuals or groups are more inclined to feel efficacious enough to articulate a political position. If this is so, persons occupying these roles in the social and political structure will have an important measure of control over the number of demands put into the system. For this reason we may call them structural regulators of the volume of demands; they are gatekeepers who stand athwart the admission channels to a system. In modern societies we may identify them as interest groups, parties, opinion leaders, or the mass media.

The political system is perceived by Parsons to have an internal cohesion which is maintained through "pattern maintenance" and "tension management". He also says the political system has an external cohesion, meaning that there is a compatible relationships between the political system and other aspects of the social system, such as, the economic system and the socio-cultural system. The cooperative interaction between the three aspects
of the social-system forms what is referred to as the "maintenance of solidarity". The "maintenance of solidarity" constitutes the functional relationships and cohesion between the economic system and the political system, between the political system and the socio-cultural system, and finally between the socio-cultural system and the economic system. When such a "maintenance of solidarity" exists between these three aspects of the social system it is called "system integration".9:

The two fundamental types of processes necessary for the maintenance of a given state of equilibrium of a system we call, in the theory of action, allocation and integration. By allocation we mean processes which maintain a distribution of the components or parts of the system which is compatible with the maintenance of a given state of equilibrium. By integration, we mean the process by which relations to the environment are mediated in such a way that the distinctive internal properties and boundaries of the system as an entity are maintained in the fact of variability in the external situation. It must be realized that self-maintenance of such a system is not only maintenance of distinctive relationships of the parts of the system within the boundary. The system is in some sense a unity relative to its environment. Also, self-maintenance implies not only control of the environmental variations, but also control of tendencies to change - that is, to alteration of the distinctive state - coming from within the system.10

Our interest in this chapter is to focus attention on the concept of integration. Having discussed the idea of the social system, what it is and how it functions or operates, we shall now undertake a thorough examination of the concept
of integration. We shall also review the interpretations of the concept as articulated by social theorists, such as, Werner Landecker, Karl Deutsch, and David Lockwood. Finally, we shall examine Jürgen Habermas' analysis of integration as it is linked to his concept of action.

Landecker identifies four types of integration: (1) the cultural which denotes similarity and consistency of cultural standards in a given society. In other words, cultural integration denotes the existence of a fixed pattern of standards upheld in a particular culture - these standards do not vary from one period to another; (2) normative integration which entails conformity of behaviour to the community or the group to cultural standards; (3) the communicative, or exchange of meanings throughout the group; and finally (4) the functional, or interdependence defined in terms of the division of labour among the members of the group or community. He subscribes to the anthropological view of Linton and Benedict who see cultures to be configurations that differ in internal consistency or integration. But he qualifies his acceptance of the interpretation of this view by recognizing the need to further explore experimentally quantifiable definitions which would, from the point of view of research, improve the explanatory power and coherence of the concepts involved in cultural integration.

According to Linton, a culture that exhibited the
most consistency in unity and coherence of unvarying cultural standards was said to have "universal cultural traits" which embody the largest segment of the population. Linton maintained that the culture with the most consistency was the most integrated, and the one with the least consistency (offering several alternative choices of cultural standards) was the least integrated. But Landecker wonders how "alternative traits", presented as a matter of choice to persons, can adversely affect the internal consistency of a particular culture, and thus making it less integrated, since freedom of choice is not necessarily indicative of a clash of cultural standards, or disagreement in the upholding of moral standards as such. As far as Landecker is concerned, the freedom of choice entailed in "alternatives" may simply be indicative of a culture's capacity to adapt to varying inputs or standards whose consequences are beneficial and contributory to the general growth and enrichment of the culture as a whole. Therefore, it is evident that on certain occasions alternative standards can successfully coexist without necessarily making the survival of a given culture untenable. As long as these alternative standards do not present the established, dominant culture with a serious actual difficulty experienced in real life - a practical difficulty (as opposed to logical contradictions), there is no reason why cultural integration should not fare well under conditions of "alternative traits". Moreover,
"alternative traits" may, in the final analysis, contribute to the enrichment, growth and progressive-orientation of a given culture (e.g. the impact of multiculturalism; and the proliferation of youth sub-cultures). \(^{15}\)

Concerning normative integration it is not only a question of the relation between cultural standards but also it is a matter of persons abiding by the established norms of society. The conduct or behaviour of a group in relation to the cultural standard is the crucial determinant of normative integration. \(^{14}\) Therefore, normative integration cannot be explained without at the same time taking into consideration the indispensable relation between the cultural standards and the conduct of persons. Here it is not a question of the consistency and unity of the given cultural standards which is most important but it is a matter of to what degree or extent the conduct of persons conforms with the given standards or norms.

Thus, a high rate of conformity to norms would indicate a higher degree of normative integration, and likewise, a low rate of conformity is symptomatic of a low degree of normative integration. Issues such as obedience to societal norms and the orientation of persons to common customs or values become the key factors in the examination of normative integration. \(^{15}\)

Landecker sees as closely related to the two types of integration, discussed above, a third type, namely, communicative integration which entails
two or more persons engaged in interpersonal communication conducted by means of a rational discourse based on uncoerced consensus. A situation wherein individuals are subjected to social isolation and thus suffer anomie or alienation would be indicative of a low degree of communicative integration. While, on the other hand, persons participating in continuous interpersonal communication mediated by ordinary language enjoy a high measure of communicative integration. Landecker suggests a correlation between mental disorders and isolation. Communicative integration, we may add, is of greater importance than cultural and normative integration, since these two processes can also be realized effectively and fully through the medium of communicative language. In other words, it is through communicative language that persons get to understand the meaning of, and the norms of society. It is equally evident that communicative language is an indispensable vehicle facilitating the participation of the individual in organized groups as well as promoting the development of social contacts among individuals in the community at-large. With communicative language integration is enhanced. Landecker contends, on the other hand, that prejudice is inversely related to communicative integration, that is, a high amount of prejudice is normally correlated with a low degree of communicative integration between groups.
Prejudice thrives where the communicative ties (i.e., linkages among the various groups in a population) are found to be weak. It is usually the case that groups which lack mutual exchange of opinions, or have very little give-and-take of ideas develop inaccurate, unrealistic, stereotyped notions of one another.\textsuperscript{13}

The fourth type of integration identified by Landocker is functional integration. Functional integration is defined as "the degree to which there is mutual interdependence among the units of a system of division of labour".\textsuperscript{19} Interdependence and specialization of tasks are characteristic of functional integration. Such a process of functional integration could be measured, for example, by calculating the extent to which a population is concentrated in each of four types of economic activity: retail trade, wholesale trade, services, and manufacturing. As an indicator of specialization, we may use the proportion of the population employed in any of these activities, the number of establishments of any of these types per population, and the value in dollars of business done in the kind of establishment concerned.\textsuperscript{30}

Other students of integration, such as Karl W. Deutsch and Richard W. Chadwick, have defined integration in the following terms:

If covariance (i.e., interdependence between two systems and a high flow of mutual transactions) is positive, that is, in line with what each of the two acting systems - or self-steering - treats as a reward (or positive reinforcement, in behavioural terms) we speak of a condition of
integration. Integration as a condition (a state of affairs) refers to aggregate properties of transactions within and between systems. Being integrated represents one end of a continuum, defined by combinations of (1) relatively high volumes of transactions, (2) relatively greater interrelatedness or covariance, and (3) relatively high reward or positive offset stemming from these transactions. 21

David Lockwood has identified two types of integration: social and system integration. 22 He says that social integration is the "orderly or conflictful relationship between actors in a social system". And system integration is the "orderly or conflictful relationship between parts of a social system". 23

Habermas conceives social action to be compatible with social and system integration. Social integration constitutes (in Parsonian terms) the integrative and pattern-maintenance subsystems; whereas, system integration comprises adaptive and goal-attainment subsystems. With regard to social integration, the interaction or exchange (input and output) between the integrative (culture, religion, education, mass communication) and pattern maintenance sub-systems (household, families, individuals) is defined in terms of: (1) patterns of cooperation and motivation; (2) commitment of psychic and social expectations (faith); (3) symbols and images of identity and role; (4) support as believers or audience (piety). 24 In the realm of system integration the interdependence and interaction which take place between adaptive (economy,
technology) and goal-attainment subsystems (government, polity) are expressed in terms of: (1) encouragement of saving and enterprise; (2) taxes; (3) control over capital, currency and credit; (4) productivity. 25

Habermas contends that the exchange between the social system and its environment takes the form of two processes: the process of production and the socialization process. 25 The processes of production and of socialization are the media through which the exchange between the social systems and their environments take place. According to Habermas man's interaction with nature or the world of objects is mediated by work or production - it is through this process of production that he comes to assert himself by actually gaining control over nature itself. And also it is in this regard that nature is seen as something external, an entity outside of man, which requires to be controlled and appropriated by man, the embodiment of society. Hence, Habermas conceives of nature or the world of objects as something not only external to him, but also through production or work this very nature comes to constitute his own "outer nature". On the other hand, man's interaction with his fellowman is a moral relationship mediated through practical, traditional norms, ethics and values which in turn are nurtured by the process of socialization, man's "inner nature". It is the integration of this "inner nature" (socialization process) which renders man qua man a self-
formative, autonomous and responsible species capable of self-will formation. "Outer nature" is adapted to society through control mechanisms which are designed to bring about the reduction of environmental complexities through the expansion of technically exploitable knowledge (i.e. empirical-analytic sciences). The control or the subjugation of "outer nature" takes place within the framework of the behavioural system of instrumental action geared toward problem-solving strategies which in turn are guided by technical rules or technical recommendations. 27

During the process of production the adaptation of "outer nature" to society is achieved by means of gaining actual control over nature itself. Under these conditions of control over the objective situation, and objectified processes, technical problems and empirical statements are frequently tested for causal relationships or empirically verifiable causal explanations which, it is said, determine the veracity (scientific truth) or falsity of empirical-analysis. 28

Habermas asserts that it is in this area of the production process that we find the cooperative patterns and sometimes conflictful relationships between the parts of the social system. It is in the production process that we find system-integration. When we take for example the input, from government (the goal-attainment sub-system), being fed into the economy (adaptive sub-system), we find that the given input (e.g. encouragement of saving and enterprise) is compatible with the interest, growth and survival of the
economic system in question. For instance, a liberal-democratic government would be expected to give encouragement and support to an economy based on private enterprise. The output from the economy is in the form of taxes. Government, in turn, exercises control over capital formation, currency and credit policies in order to guarantee the viability and prosperity of the economy. The degree of economic growth and prosperity will determine the extent to which the economy supports the apparatus of government (the goal-attainment sub-system). In Habermasian terms the rate of productivity will determine the degree to which the institutional order (government) becomes dependent on the material substratum. In orderly relationship between the parts of the economy and the government is indicative of the resilience or capacity of both subsystems to solve successfully any technical problems that may arise within, and between them. The relationship between economy and government is defined in terms of the two sub-systems' ability to solve technical problems, and also their degree of efficiency as well as rationalization. In order to solve the technical problems successfully, the two subsystems (economy and government) will be forced to follow the technical rules of empirical science whose application presupposes technical control over all objectified processes as well as an inherent, constituent technical cognitive interest.

The control factors do not only determine the limit
or boundary of the two subsystems in question, but also manage to maintain a homeostatic balance or equilibrium within and between them. By homeostatic balance of the subsystem we mean its ability to preserve and maintain its integrity and specificity - that which makes it what it is and distinguishes it from other sub-systems. In addition, the function of the control-factors is to rid the subsystem of all alien or foreign elements which may endanger or upset this homeostatic balance. The inability of the control factors (control mechanisms) to check-out the hazardous "foreign" elements from the subsystem, or the failure of the control mechanisms to maintain the homeostatic balance leads to a "crisis" or overload within the subsystem itself. For instance we speak of an economic crisis whenever the subsystem loses its ability to solve problems, which under normal circumstances are within its range and capacity or capable of being absorbed without undermining the established homeostatic balance. Habermas asserts that economic crises have their roots in the fundamental contradictions found in capitalistic production (i.e. the dialectical relationship between the administratively socialized production and the privatized appropriation of surplus value). The basic contradiction between capital and wage-labour is by definition the seeds of "class-interest" conflict, consciously or unconsciously. This means that inherent in capitalist production is to be found the fundamental contradiction
between the interest of the owners of the means of production (appropriators of surplus value) and the interest of the non-owners of the means of production. This contradiction is maintained at the unconscious level in a latent (dormant) form aided by the masking-effects of economic growth, prosperity and consumption. At the conscious level the contradiction of class-interests is reflected in class-struggle and class-conflict. When the contradiction between the class-interest of the owners of capital and that of the wage-labourers becomes sharpened and actualized (level of consciousness raised), the resulting class-conflict and class-struggle transform the economic crisis into a social crisis. This means that overproduction which causes bankruptcy and unemployment - basically symptoms of economic crisis - is responsible for discontent, disaffection and social-malaise. During the period of economic recession and high unemployment, government attempts at shoring-up the economy through administrative intervention, and, if successful, manages to alleviate these economic pressures temporarily. But if government intervention fails to shore-up the economy and keep it vibrant then there is a transformation of economic crisis into social crisis. Government intervention, if successful, can aid not only in restoring the homeostatic balance (checking inflationary spirals, ensuring adequate employment, keeping the economy vibrant) but also ensuring that the inherent contradiction
of capitalist production manifested in the incompatibility
of class interest continues to exhibit itself only in the most
dormant manner (latency). What it means is that the pendulum
of conflict would be turned from the active militant stage
of combative class-struggle, articulated in a higher form
of class-consciousness, and class-interest, back to the
stage of conformity and unquestioning acceptance of the
status quo - the level of unconsciousness and unlimited quest
for consumer utilities.

Habermas argues that government intervention, by
supplementing the capacity of the economy to solve its own
problems, is an encroachment into matters that involve
crises of an uneconomic nature, and as a result contributing
to further crises within the economy. The economy is seen
as a self-regulated, self-sustaining system with its own
self-steering control mechanisms capable of preserving
homeostatic balance. Therefore, Habermas contends that
economic crisis should be solved by the use of economic
solutions and economic methods. Secondly, government
intervention into the economy overshadows the fact that
government viewed as a self-regulating steering system is
involved in a rationality crisis. At the individual level we talk
in terms of people in government suffering from an identity
crisis. This, in turn, is explained by way of legitimation
crises which pertain to matters of support and loyalty of
citizens to their government. Hence at the level of
governmental structure functioning as a political-
administrative system (the system level) we speak of the existence of rationality crisis. At the level of rationality crisis, the political-administrative system fails to distinguish or to separate rational practical questions from rational technical questions. On the other hand, at the level of government defined in terms of personal relationships or human interaction, it is the identity crisis which obtains. The identity crisis afflicting those individuals who exercise power over others and those whom power is exercised upon, manifest itself in the form of the crisis of legitimation at the governmental level. Therefore, government intervention in the economic sphere during the economic crisis, a system crisis, represents the often unacknowledged super-imposition of rationality crisis (system crisis) and the legitimation crisis (identity crisis) over the economic domain - an action bound to boomerang and further complicating the crisis in commodity production. Habermas has succinctly underscored the above phenomena in the following passage:

While the state compensates for the weaknesses of a self-block (self-regulating) economic system and takes over tasks complementary to the market, it is forced by the logic of its means of control to admit more and more foreign elements into the system. The problems of an economic system controlled by imperatives of capital realization cannot be taken over into the administratively controlled domain, and processed there, without the spread of orientations alien to the structure.31

Concerning the question of the fundamental contradiction of class interest between the capitalists and the proletariat
and the possibility or impossibility of the convergence of interest among groups within the capitalist class and among the proletariat, is something which deserves further empirical inquiry. Habermas says that it would be of interest, for instance, to look into whether there is a convergence of interest between the individual capitalists and the multinational capitalists. What is the distinction between collectivist capitalist (state ownership of the public sector by the state) and the monopoly multinational capitalists? Are their interests similar or dissimilar? All these issues require a thorough empirical analysis. Habermas is of the opinion that in state capitalism the individuals who control the bureaucratic machinery are occupying an advantageous position from the viewpoint of allocation and distribution of the national resources and consumer-spending.

If the bureaucracy is run along the lines of a one-party system, it is the party bosses and party functionaries who reap the larger share of social production at the expense of the workers. This may be the case in some one-party systems but is by no means universally applicable in all one-party systems. Habermas says that it would be of interest to see whether there is a convergence of interest between the party hierarchy and the technocrats. Are the party officials of the same background as the technocrats, or is there a mechanism of control exercised over the technocrats to prevent the crystallization of "technocratic
interested within the party hierarchical structure. It is argued by some observers of one-party systems that the institutionalization of the "bureaucratic interest" within the party-hierarchical structure tends to make the managerial group a dominant capitalist class separated from the proletariat, within a supposedly classless society. If these tentative observations are verified empirically from a large sample, then it would be interesting to see what effects "state capitalism" has on the question of economic crisis.

Is the contradiction between the interest of the managerial class and the interest of the proletariat in a state-capitalism society responsible for economic crisis as Habermas and Marx argue is the case in liberal-capitalism?

Habermas sees the problem of defining social evolution to be comprehended within a tridimensional structure: (1) the development of the forces of production; (2) expansion of system autonomy - power; and (3) the alteration of the normative structures. In the evolution of social systems Habermas distinguishes three social formations: primitive; traditional; and liberal capitalist. Primitive social formation takes the form of kinship relations with primary roles defined in terms of age and sex. Social and system integration at this level is not differentiated. Within the context of primitive social formations the most prevalent crisis is an externally induced identity crisis.

On the other hand, the traditional social formation has a principle of organization based on political class rule
which is distinguished from the power and influence of socio-economic classes. Here there is a functional differentiation between social and system integration. The type of crisis found in the traditional sphere is an internally determined identity crisis. Within the liberal-capitalist social formation, the principle of organization is defined in terms of unpolitical class rule founded on the dialectical relationship between labour and capital. In liberal-capitalism, the economic system assumes dominance over socially integrative function and the distinction between system and social integration becomes blurred. The most typical crisis found in liberal capitalism is called system crisis - a self-determining, self-regulating, self-steering nature-like crisis phenomenon which is endemic and endemic in liberal capitalism.35

Labour sees the transition from the "traditional" to the "liberal-capitalist" as marked by a transformation of socially integrative functions (involving relationships between human subjects and the political class rule of persons) into an unpolitical steering system of the market-economy. Such a transformation has altered the aspects of tradition (i.e. natural-law, utilitarianism) which are essential for legitimation, in that they have been made to become dependent on the market ideology based on the free exchange of equivalents (i.e. the exchange of wage and labour).36 Under an ideology of "exchange of equivalents"; and "the
privatized appropriation and use of surplus value”. Political class rule is converted into unpolitical class rule. In “unpolitical class rule”, elements of traditional norms defining socialization processes and legitimation become oriented toward the systematic control mechanisms of the market which functions as a mechanical system capable of maintaining a homeostatic balance without fully managing to rid the economic system of its endemic crises. The cumulative effect of unresolved problems (overproduction, inflationary spirals) within the liberal-capitalist market system, is to perpetuate the crisis which is being produced by the process of economic growth at rather regular intervals. Malornas asserts that this persistent instability inherent in the liberal-capitalist system produces a danger to social integration. On the other hand, crises within traditional societies arise “when, and only when, steering problems cannot be resolved within the possibility (of the) space circumscribed by the principle of organization and therefore produce dangers to system integration that threaten the identity of the society”. Thus, it is clear that in a traditional society a crisis is resolvable as long as the steering problems remain within the limit of its principle of organization, that is, political class rule. In liberal-capitalist societies crisis is endemic and continues to be produced by the process of economic growth and the perpetual unresolved steering problems whose degree
of intensity fluctuates periodically. Crisis in liberal capitalism takes the form of permanent crises. Habermas argues that the social power of the capitalist is legitimized by the exchange relationship defined in terms of the exchange between private labour and the capitalists' skimming-off of surplus value. This form of "exchange of equivalents" has not only replaced the ideology of "political dependency" (characteristic of traditional societies) with the ideology of "unpolitical dependency" (typifying liberal-capitalist societies). But also it has converted the "market-orientation", as well as the cybernetic function of the market, into the very core of bourgeois ideology. What it amounts to is that "political practice" for the first time becomes defined in terms of the market relations of the free exchange-equivalents.

As far as Habermas is concerned the bourgeois ideology of "political practice", as articulated in elite theory, focuses on the abstract tenets of formal democracy. Formal democracy begins by taking for granted the availability of individual freedoms, civil rights, and the opportunities to participate in competitive electoral processes as well as competing in the open market. The advocates of formal democracy accept unquestioningly the presence of those individual freedoms and rights without at the same time acknowledging the realities of their class-stratified social structure, namely, that some individuals or groups continue
to enjoy more of these freedoms and rights than others. In other words, the disadvantaged groups in the class-stratified social structure manage only to lay formal claim to these freedoms and rights without actually getting to fully realize or enjoy them; thus their claim remains only potential. In contrast, substantive democracy entail "genuine participation of citizens in the processes of political will-formation which would bring to consciousness the contradiction between administratively socializing production and the continued private appropriation and use of surplus value". Under the conditions of "cousins' formal democracy", citizens are for all intents and purposes situated objectively in a political society but at the same time they continue to function as passive citizens possessed only with the right to approve or reject the candidacy of a particular, bargaining, competing political elite. Formal democracy has the effect of institutionalizing "civic privatism" among the civil public.

Civic privatism in the political arena has its complement in the economic sphere: "the private autonomous investment decisions". Civic privatism of the civil public manifests itself in the form of general political abstinence from genuine citizen participation in politics. In addition, civic privatism tends to orient citizens' interest toward career, leisure and the possession of consumer goods at the expense of active participation which generates
political will formation. The citizens' depoliticization resulting from civic privatism finds justification in the achievement-reward (money, leisure time, security) ideology propounded and articulated by democratic elite theories and technocratic systems theories. In the state of mass non-involvement in the activity of political practice, and general political malaise afflicting a depoliticized citizenry, the theorists of democratic elitism find justification in defining political involvement as political non-practice. They have without reservation asserted:

If elites are to be powerful and make authoritative decisions, then the involvement, activity, and influence of the ordinary man must be limited. The ordinary citizens must turn power over to elites and let them rule. The need for elite power requires that the ordinary citizens be relatively passive, uninvolved, and deferential to elites. Thus the democratic citizen is called on to pursue contradictory goals; he must be active, yet passive; involved, yet not too involved; influential, yet deferential.

When examining the relationship between government and the integrative subsystem (culture, education, religion and mass media), we find (according to the Parsonian schema) that there are (1) output from the government to the integrative subsystem - allocation and protection of resources; (2) input into government, concerning legitimacy symbols; (3) allocation and protection of civic membership and status (government output directed toward integrated subsystem); (4) psychological and social support (integrative output directed toward the goal-attainment subsystem).
The government seeks to ensure that the resources of culture, education, religion, and mass communication are distributed in a fair and reasonable manner. The task of governmental action is not only concerned with the allocation of these resources, but also there is an added element of protection of the resources in question. Cultural resources would include things like ethnic cuisine, arts and crafts, painting, traditional and folkloric artifacts; whereas, educational resources constitute schools, a literate informed populace, skilled and trained manpower, state of technology (technological advancement). Among religious resources we would include things like ecclesiastical institutions (churches, monasteries), a sound belief in the deity. The resources of mass communication would be language, music, newspapers, radio and television.

Concerning legitimacy symbols there is the matter of legitimation structures emanating from the integrated subsystem and directed toward the government. The legitimation structures defined in terms of the national flag, elements that encompass the national spirit (nationalism), national interest (patriotism), national identity, national pride of a people or community, and the preservation as well as the promotion of a group’s traditional norms - all these symbols of legitimacy serve as a reservoir of diffuse support for the government. The government, in turn, ensures that every member living in the particular community has his or her civic membership protected and that the roles and status of
members in the community are adequately secured and fairly distributed throughout the wide spectrum of available opportunities and realizable aspirations. Finally, the psychological and social support provided by the integrative subsystem to the government serve as crucial factors in the determination of the degree of stability for any government. A government that cannot depend on its integrative subsystem (culture, religion, education, mass communication) for psychological and social support is rendered vulnerable to external influences and inimical pressures, thus making it unstable and weak.

The relationship between pattern maintenance and integrative subsystems defines the process of social integration. The sphere of pattern-maintenance comprises households, families and individuals. The interaction between the two subsystems produces several inputs and outputs into and out of the integrative and pattern maintenance subsystems, some of which include: (1) patterns of cooperation and motivation (integrative output to pattern maintenance); (2) commitment of psychic and social expectation (faith) - pattern maintenance output directed toward the integrative subsystem; (3) symbols and images of identity and role (pattern maintenance input from integrative subsystem); (4) support as believers or audience (integrative input from pattern-maintenance subsystem). The interaction between the pattern maintenance and integrative subsystems defines the relation between actors or persons and the normative
structures (dealing with traditional norms) of their community. Thus, such personal interaction does not pertain to parts of social systems but deals directly with human, social relations divorced of systematic objectification, and free of the steering mechanisms and technical control characterizing systems. It is within this realm of human interaction that personal intercourse takes the form of communicative and emancipatory actions (Habermas’ use of the term) that the process of social integration comes to be defined. While, on the other hand, within the context of the interaction of the parts of a system (i.e., social system) wherein steering mechanisms and technical control obtain, we talk of the process of system integration manifested through the behavioural system of instrumental action. In turn instrumental action is guided by a constituent technical cognitive interest which is dependent on technical rules (technical recommendations) and strategies geared toward "problem-solving" of technical problems as well as means and end causal relationships.
FOOTNOTES


2. Ibid., p. 17.

3. Ibid., p. 17.


7. Ibid., pp. 103-35.

8. Ibid., p. 122.


10. Ibid., p. 108.


12. Ibid., p. 334.

13. Ibid., p. 334.


15. Ibid., p. 335.


17. Ibid., p. 337.

18. Ibid., p. 337.

165

23. Ibid., p. 245.


25. Ibid., p. 121.


27. Ibid., p. 9.

28. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

29. Ibid., p. 45.

30. Ibid., pp. 45-46.

31. Ibid., p. 47.


34. Ibid., p. 24.

35. Ibid., p. 24.

36. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

37. Ibid., p. 25.

38. Ibid., p. 25.
39. Ibid., p. 25.
40. Ibid., p. 35.
41. Ibid., p. 35.
42. Ibid., p. 37.
43. Ibid., p. 37.
44. Ibid., p. 77.
45. Jacob and Tuscany, op. cit., p. 131.
46. Ibid., p. 131.
CONCLUSION

Having traced Habermas' intellectual and philosophical "roots" to the concept of "critical theory," the cornerstone of the Frankfurt School, we have sought to establish in this thesis that Habermas conceives the important task for "critical theory" to be the development of a comprehensive view of science which defines life-activity as a unity of three dimensions, namely, knowledge, interest and action. According to Habermas, the first dimension of life-activity constitutes of three forms of cognition or knowledge: the empirical-analytic sciences (natural sciences, economics, sociology, political science); the historical-hermeneutic sciences (history, linguistics, law); and the critical sciences (philosophy, psychoanalysis). Reality within the framework of the empirical-analytic sciences is defined strictly in terms of technical control over nature and objectified processes. The pursuit of knowledge in this category is geared toward the reduction of environmental complexities in the physical universe. Moreover, empirical theorists labour under the influence or compulsion of a perspective which by definition conceives knowledge in terms of means and end relationship, causality, natural laws, and the mastery of the scientific method of empirical analysis patterned along the lines of observation, explanation and prediction. Knowledge from the standpoint of the empirical-analytic sciences is measured according
to its success in the sphere of scientific experimentation and specialization (division of labour). The specialization of tasks very often is not perceived as necessarily interrelated or interdependent, that is, the specialized tasks are not necessarily seen to be connected to each other. These tasks (e.g. chemistry, economics, physics, etc.) are seen as specialized, separate independent entities or disciplines within the larger framework of things—this viewpoint, according to Habermas, facilitates the separation of "theory" from "practice".

On the other hand, knowledge conceived from the standpoint of historical-hermenetic sciences is defined in terms of intersubjective mutual understanding between speaking and acting persons who share life-experiences by communicating in the medium of a dialogue or ordinary language communication—persons participating in communicative experience. Under the circumstances, the historical-hermenetic sciences are seen to be necessarily oriented toward the achievement of this intersubjective mutual understanding or symbolic interaction whereby the likelihood of persons doing what they say and saying what they do becomes possible since statements will necessarily be converted into action and action transformed into statements at one and the same time—theory and practice become one. Habermas argues that the appropriate application of the two forms of knowledge (empirical-analytical sciences
and historical-hermeneutic sciences) would facilitate the correct emergence and application of the third form, that is, the critical sciences or the emancipatory knowledge (critical philosophy, psychoanalysis). The critical sciences are seen to be oriented toward the achievement of self-understanding brought about by self-reflection. Self reflection is generated by psychoanalysis in the realm of the critical sciences making possible the realization or achievement of the unity of knowledge, interest and action - here too theory and practice become one.

The second dimension of life-activity is that of interest. Habermas contends that behind each form of knowledge is to be found a knowledge constitutive interest; for instance, accompanying the use or application of the empirical-analytical sciences is the a priori technical cognitive interest which is necessarily geared toward technical control of nature and objectified processes; whereas, implicit in the use of the historical-hermeneutic sciences is the existence of a practical cognitive interest which in turn becomes oriented toward intersubjective mutual understanding of speaking and acting persons. While, on the other hand, the employment of the critical sciences necessarily entail the existence of emancipatory cognitive interest. The third dimension of life-activity as conceived by Habermas is that of action. For example, in the domain
of the empirical analytic sciences the behavioural system of instrumental action obtains; whereas in the realm of the historical-hermenenetic sciences it is the communicative action of speaking persons which prevails; and finally, the critical sciences manifest themselves through emancipatory action mediated by power or authority. Habermas' argument is that these three dimensions should be seen to be as well as made to be necessarily connected with one another, that is, in order for human beings to reach self-understanding of themselves as well as others it is necessary to merge knowledge, interest and action into one. But so far Habermas' contention remains at face value a mere proposal rather than a thoroughgoing, well-tested theory which can be put into practical use in practical politics. Moreover, according to Habermas, the emancipatory interest is both dependent upon (for its emergence) and makes possible the realization of the other two interests (technical interest, communicative interest), but the achievement of this complicated process is not explained or the precise operations of the trickle-down effect are, to say the least, in dire need of clarification - they are quite far from clarity, indeed.
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