Implications of Canadian cultural policy on Canada's record and music video industry.

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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE
IMPLICATIONS OF CANADIAN CULTURAL POLICY ON CANADA'S RECORD AND MUSIC VIDEO INDUSTRY

by

Mary Ellen Carlyle

A thesis presented to the University of Windsor in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Masters of Arts in Department of Communication Studies

Windsor, Ontario, 1985
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ABSTRACT

Recently, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) through its jurisdiction over broadcasting has developed indirectly a policy with regard to music video with a view to assisting Canadian artists as well as to provide a climate for a stable music video industry within Canada. This investigation not only examines the impact of the new medium but also answers the question of whether the existing cultural policies provide an environment conducive to creativity and growth for Canadian musicians and the Canadian recording industry.

A historical/critical analysis of the development of the American and the Canadian music video industries was performed within the context of Canadian cultural once the effectiveness of these policies to test serve Canadian musicians and Canada’s music industry was determined, the policy regarding Muchmusic, Canada’s 24 hour music video service, was examined. A further analysis of the effectiveness of these policies was conducted through interviewing a panel of fifteen key players from the recording industry, the broadcasting industry, the music video industry, and the government.
One of the most encouraging points drawn from this study, was that the respondents from these various interest groups, were in agreement with the intent and process of the CRTC’s policy with respect to broadcast music. They agreed, however, that Canada’s recording industry, itself should remain unregulated. Although, there was universal agreement that the initial application of content regulations assisted the Canadian music industry, it was suggested that the content quota should either be decreased or averaged over a longer period of time until product in sufficient quantity and diversity was available to fill the 30% quota. It was agreed that in order for Canadian artists to achieve success, they needed international sales. Canada did not have the record buying population base needed to recoup recording costs particularly with the additional video expenses. Since the respondents believed that music video had assisted artists in expanding their audiences, it was agreed that Canadian musicians needed a highly competitive record as well as a well-produced video in order to compete in the world market. Therefore, the respondents agreed that the government should not be pursuing greater content regulations but it should be putting its efforts into providing incentives for furthering Canadian video/record production, education for young producers and engineers, and/or into the production of demo tapes.
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to my father for introducing me to music at an early age
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION

During the 1970's when record companies first began producing music videos, they viewed them as a promotional tool. Today, these videos are the mainstay of MTV in the United States and MuchMusic in Canada. These two specialty services, utilizing satellite cable delivery systems, receive the videos free of charge from the record companies and make them available to a mass audience on a 24-hour basis. Similarly, broadcast television stations both in Canada and the United States have introduced programs approximately 1/2 hour in length in which these videos are aired. The success of the music video has been paralleled by a resurgence in the recording industry; after it had experienced a four-year slump from 1979 to 1982. Many industry spokesmen and observers have seen a close causal connection between the two. The music video has been identified as a successful marketing tool which, by utilizing television technology, has tapped new audiences and introduced new talent.

It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the impact of the music video on the recording industry, on the introduction of new talent, and on audience record buying habits. Furthermore, because videos are made available to audiences
by means of television, the interplay between music videos and Canadian cultural policy must also be analyzed.

Since the introduction of radio in the 1930's, the Canadian federal government has articulated the goal that broadcast programming should reflect Canadian culture. Consequently, Canada's broadcasting system has been shaped so that cultural expression could be delivered to the listening and viewing public. (CBC, 1931:17) The need to preserve a Canadian system which would reflect the Canadian identity was first expressed in the Aird Commission of 1929. This need was again evident in the Broadcasting Act (1968). In the last 13 years the government has developed cultural policies which have regulated the amount of Canadian content to be broadcast on radio and television.

Music video, although produced by the recording industry, is dependent on the broadcasting system for dissemination to the mass audience. This indirectly subjects the new medium to cultural policy regulation. Although the Canadian government has not regulated Canada's recording industry, it has not done so with the country's broadcasting industry. Recently the CRTC, by means of its jurisdiction over broadcasting, has developed a policy with regard to the new medium in order to assist Canadian artists as well as produce a stable music video industry within Canada. The central question which arises is whether the existing cultural policies provide an environment conducive to creativi-
ty and growth for Canadian musicians and the Canadian recording industry.

1.1 METHODOLOGY

In order to best evaluate the video policy, which would best serve Canadian musicians and the Canadian music video industry, a historical analysis of both the American and Canadian music video industry is necessary. The emergence of the music video must then be reviewed within the historical context of Canadian Cultural policy. To determine the effect of music video and the effectiveness of the Canadian cultural policies upon Canada's music industry, a panel of key players from the recording industry, the broadcast industry, the music video industry, and the government were interviewed. Since music video is so new in Canada and the data base was not available, a quantitative approach was not chosen.

In order to study the effect of music video upon the recording industry a historical review of the Americans' experience with the new medium was conducted. As a result of a search of the literature of American music and trade magazines, it was found that the new medium not only altered the way in which Americans now experience music but also the way in which musicians were producing and disseminating their music. The new medium has also been credited with increasing the record sales of those artists who received exposure
through ATV. These conclusions then became the subject matter of the following questions which were posed to Canadian industry representatives. They addressed the question of whether this new medium of music video has had a similar effect on Canada's recording industry.

1. Do you think "over the air" music videos have created a major change in the recording industry?
2. Do you feel that any new group wants to demonstrate video potential?
3. What do you think the video impact will be on the Canadian music industry?
4. Do you feel Canadian musicians need a music video to compete in an international arena?
5. Do you think the whole music video interest will eventually fizzle out?

The next area of research dealt with the evolution of the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission's (CRTC) cultural policy. Since the Commission's policy regarding music video developed from an unregulated recording industry and a regulated broadcasting industry, both were reviewed. First, the foreign-controlled recording environment within which a Canadian musician must function was examined. Since the recording industry has gone unregulated, the industry's own incentives to support and promote Canadian talent, such as The Foundation to Aid Canadian Talent on Records, were reviewed. Second, the broadcasting in-
industry was investigated. In order to understand the music policy, a review of the Commission's previous radio and television cultural policies from which the music video policy evolved was conducted. The panel of individuals were then asked the following questions in order to determine whether the previous cultural policies had assisted Canadian musicians within their own country:

1. Do you think the Canadian recording industry should be regulated (i.e., too much foreign ownership)? If so, how would you attempt to regulate the industry?

2. Do you feel (rock) music is a dominant cultural force in today's society?

3. Do you think Canada has one of the highest per capita rates of record consumption in the world?

4. Do you think recorded music is accessible to many since it is inexpensive and highly portable?

5. Do you feel Canadian musicians are restricted in Canada's music industry? If so, why?

6. Do you think the C.R.T.C.'s cultural policy is helping the Canadian recording industry as well as Canada's musicians?

7. Do you think the C.R.T.C.'s requirements for Canadian Content Act regulations was a successful response to a situation in which the opportunities to express Canadian music were limited?
3. Do you think these regulations encouraged a tremendous volume of creativity in the Canadian music industry?

9. Do you think these regulations encouraged a growth in the number of recording studios in Canada?

10. Do you think these regulations encouraged a growth or new performing artists?

Since the effectiveness of the C.R.T.C.'s previous cultural policies cannot be determined simply by interviewing key players, the policy regarding Muchmusic was also examined. The following questions were asked in order to discover whether this policy was appropriate for the best utilization of music video by Canadian musicians and the Canadian music industry.

1. What do you think was the rationale behind the C.R.T.C.'s decision to approve a music video service and not one of public affairs or children's programming?

2. How do you feel about CITY-TV's decision to grant the Canadian music video service licence?

3. Do you think Muchmusic will be successful?

4. Do you think Muchmusic will be successful in Toronto even though there is a lot of music video programming on commercial television in that area?

5. What is your opinion of the Canadian content regulations for the new music video channel?
What is your opinion on the CRTC's regulations for the new music video channel?

Do you think the regulations will benefit Canadian musicians?

Do you feel there is enough Canadian video material to fulfill the Canadian content quota of 10% and then eventually 30%?

Do you feel that 5 years is too long to reach the quota of 30% Canadian content?

Do you think these regulations will enable new Canadian artists to reach larger audiences domestically and internationally?

Do you think the CRTC's policy for the new music video channel will ensure a marked increase in the production of Canadian videos?

Do you think the policy will ensure a marked increase in the exposure of Canadian music?

What do you think the repeat factor of Canadian videos on the twenty-four hour channel will be?

Do you think Canadian musicians may be overexposed as a result of this new channel?

Do you think all Canadian musicians who have a video will have a fair chance on MuchMusic exposing their video?

Do you think Canadian hotels as well as bars should support the new channel by redistributing MuchMusic instead of MTV?
16. Do you think the C.R.T.C.'s decision to permit the Nashville Network or the Country Music Channel will draw audiences away from MuchMusic?

17. In the past, the C.R.T.C. has been lenient with respect to enforcing Canadian content regulations; do you think this will happen with the new music video policy?

18. How would you change the Canadian music industry so that it would be beneficial to Canadian musicians?

19. How would you change the Canadian video industry so that it would be beneficial to Canadian musicians?

20. Would you change the Commission's previous cultural policies or the MuchMusic policy? If so, what would you change?

The final stage of the research sought the opinion of the music industry's key players on the future of the Canadian recording industry and music video industry. Recommendations for changes in the industries themselves as well as the Commission's cultural policies were examined.

1.1.1 The Key Players of Canada's Music Industry

In order to obtain information regarding the Canadian music industry, the effect of the new medium of music video, and the effectiveness of the C.R.T.C.'s cultural policy, a number of people within the industry were interviewed. Since the new medium involved many areas, the individuals approached were representatives of different industries.
Within the recording industry, the following people were interviewed:

4. Larry Green - Promotion, RCA Records of Canada.

Due to the demands of his time, Brian Robertson of the Canadian Independent Record Production Association (CIRPA), could not be interviewed but submitted his views and opinions in writing.

The broadcasting industry was represented by:

1. Daniel Riener - Host of CITY-TV's The New Music.
2. Ivar Hamilton - Co-ordinator of the CFNY Music Video Road Show and Disc Jockey at CFNY-FM (Toronto).
3. Ron Waters - Director of Marketing, MuchMusic.
5. Nancy Smith - Director of Public Relations and Communications, MuchMusic.

The two critics interviewed were:
1. Kirk Lapointe - Canadian correspondent for *Billboard*, the American music magazine and writer for *The Globe and Mail*.

2. Larry lesiarc - Freelance writer and consultant of the Canadian music industry.

The Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission was represented by Peter Fleming.

The music video production industry was represented by Juno Award winner, video producer/director, Robert Quarty. Due to time restraints, Quarty could not be interviewed. However, a set of questions were sent to his office and a short interview by his assistant Michael Rosen was recorded on cassette.

Dave Charles, President of Joint Communications, was also interviewed. Because his firm had researched the industry for many companies, including the American music video service, MTV, Charles' views were very helpful.
Chapter II
MUSIC VIDEO AND THE RECORDING INDUSTRY

Music video, the new medium combining music with visuals, has become a new form of mass communication for today's society. Until recently, recorded music was strictly one dimensional; you listened to the record and the rest was up to your imagination. Today, however, a great majority of American "hit" records are accompanied by an elaborate video. In 1981, the introduction of the Music Video Television Network (MTV) exposed these videos to the American mass audience. Since this introduction, it has been asserted that music video has had a great effect upon the American recording industry, the American musician, as well as the American consumer. Music video is still very new to the Canadian music industry, and its effect upon Canadians has not yet been fully determined. Therefore one must first review the effects of the new medium within the American music industry in order to determine whether similar conclusions can be drawn about the Canadian music industry.


2.1 AMERICAN INDUSTRY

2.1.1 Music Video

Music video was originally created as a form of advertising. The concept of the music video was not developed in the United States but first appeared in England in 1973. As a result of a shortage of radio stations, rock bands were forced to find other forms of exposure. (Gelman et al., 1983:98) It was easier for a musical group to receive a spot on television than it was to be heard on the radio. At the same time, the European movie industry had been in a slump for years. (Miller, 1983:80) Young directors were turning their talents into producing commercials which eventually led to the production of music videos. This trend started with the new medium accounted for the fact that British musical groups dominate the field of music videos today. (Gelman, et al., 1983:98) Currently, there are over forty companies in England that produce about 400 music videos a year. (Miller, 1983:84)

In the United States, this new medium has been described many times as "radio with pictures." Today, American viewers can see anything from an elaborate concept video production number such as Billy Joel's "Allentown" to a straightforward concert clip. Video productions are divided into two general types; concert videos and concept videos. (Miller, 1983: 86) In a concert video, a performer or group plays while the camera rolls. The concept video, however, is often a surre-
alistic, elaborate, and imaginatively: production that attempts
to portray the mood or, in some cases, the story-line of a
song through imagery. (Laurie, 1983;5-1) There are videos in
the form of comedies such as Andy Newman's I Love L.A. and
even in the form of a B-movie such as Camp Dancing by the
Kinks.

The new medium of music video has become so popular that
close to a thousand videos had been produced in 1983. (Foti, 1983:62) Record companies have been responsible for
most of these productions. Thus, when a record company de-
cided it wanted a band to make a video to accompany a single
or album, the company went through a number of steps: a
budget was set up; a freelance director, producer, and crew
were hired; a concept developed and the video produced. The
entire process took only a couple of weeks. Once the video
was completed, it became the property of the record company
which usually supplied the money for its production.

Today the average cost of a video ranges between $35,000
and $45,000 although many productions have exceeded the
$100,000 barrier such as Allentown (Billy Joel) and Let's
Dance (David Bowie). (Gelman, et al., 1983:98) This past
year, RCA Records has produced thirty video clips, Capitol
Records-EMI completed sixty and A&M Records made one for
virtually every new album.
2.1.2 **Music and Television**

In order to understand how music video emerged as a medium in itself, it is important to consider the history behind the marriage of music and videos. Rock music first appeared in the 1950s when there was an emergence of new directions in music. The new mechanical and electronic sounds had a great influence on the way music was being written. (Helm, 1970:48). In 1954, Bill Haley and his band the Comets, with two of their records, "Shake, Rattle and Roll" and "Rock Around the Clock" (released by Decca), began what we know as the Rock 'n' Roll Revolution. (Gelatt, 1977:303) As the rock revolution was gaining popularity, a technological development, which could have had a profound impact on the music industry, was just beginning.

Ironically, the rise of television created a large radio audience. As advertisers shifted their budgets from radio to television, the big radio shows went off the air because the money was no longer available for live productions. AM outlets were without programming. Instead of live shows from New York and Hollywood, listeners were offered the latest pop releases on records. Rock music's popularity was inherently suited for the new programming of radio. (Gelatt, 1977:306) Rock music was also consumed by the mass audience of television as it found its way to this new medium. Rock groups, such as The Beatles, The Rolling Stones, and The Doors appeared on the highly rated Ed Sullivan Show.
Although The Ed Sullivan Show was cancelled, American band stands continued to provide an outlet. The program gave the adolescent audience the chance to see its favourite band "lip-synching" its latest single. (Robertson, 1982a: 12)

During the early 70's, "lip-synching" was abandoned as musical bands began performing their material live on such television programs as The Midnight Special and Don Kirshner's Rock Concert. By the mid 70's, these shows began lose audiences, due to the increasing number of innovative acts. (Robertson, 1982a: 12) Today, however, the combination of music and video is stronger than ever. Approximately, 250 programs using music videos are in the United States. (Quill, 1983: D-1) Almost thirty million people, representing a broad demographic spectrum, are regular viewers of this new medium. (Quill, 1983: D-1)

2.1.3 MTV: Music Television

The cable channel, Music Television (MTV) has been credited with introducing music video to a mass audience. (Laurie, 1983a: D-1) Music Television is the extremely successful American music channel which is delivered by means of satellite to some 1850 cable systems in the United States. Its audience has expanded from 2.5 million homes in 1981 to more than 20 million homes today. (Laurie, 1983a: D-1) The initial cost of the system was approximately $30 million. MTV has been recognized as the fastest growing service in American cable. (Yarrow, 1982: C-17)
MTV is owned by Warner Amex Satellite Entertainment Corporation, a partnership between Warner Communications and the American Express Company. Founded in 1979, Warner Amex has become the largest seller of cable-television advertising. (Narrow, 1983:3-17) In addition it also distributes to cable systems The Movie Channel and Nickelodeon. MTV was developed by John A. Lack, former WABC executive vice president and Robert Pittman, WABC's current executive president.

Before MTV was aired in 1981, the Warner Amex Satellite Corporation funded a two-year market research program. (Zeichner, 1982:39) The prospective audience for MTV was exhaustively researched before a single video clip reached the air. Four separate telephone surveys were conducted to determine answers to the following questions:

1. consumer interest in such a service;
2. their program preferences;
3. cable operators' reactions to a music vehicle;
4. a name for the new channel. (Sutherland, 1981:6)

The target audience was identified as individuals between twelve and thirty-four years of age, who were the greatest spenders of leisure time dollars. (Webb, 1983:91) According to Robert S. McGroarty, senior vice president for MTV's marketing and sales, when MTV initiated its services in 1981, it already had solicited 2.1 million subscribers. (Dougherty, 1983:3-6)
Music Television (MTV) programming consists of twenty-four hours of non-stop rock 'n' roll seven days a week. The main element of programming is three to four-minute videos. Music videos are provided free to the MTV network by the record companies. Other programming consists of rock music news delivered by "veejays" (video jocks); weekly concerts; interviews with rock performers; and occasional films, such as "Quatrophenia." All of MTV's programming is transmitted in stereo, which cable subscribers can receive from their cable company through a special hook-up to their stereo system. (Bedell, 1982: 15)

Robert Pittman, MTV's executive president, modeled the style and substance of MTV's programming after the album-oriented-rock (AOR) format used by many FM radio stations. (Zeichner, 1982: 39) The format was a product of the 70's, which combined hard rock and pop melodies into packages which appealed to the widest possible audience. MTV's format of album-oriented-rock was borrowed from WPLJ and WAPP, two New York City FM radio stations. (Pollack, 1982: 6-14)

Since MTV's program format resembles that of FM radio stations, the cable system, therefore, functions similarly to a radio station. According to John Sykes, MTV's programmer:

"We operate very much like a new radio station. We show only videos we feel our audience is attuned to. We've quickly learned that a mix of new and established rock and roll best suits what MTV's all about." (Wehn, 1983: 92)
A music video has, on the average, about a fifty percent chance of being aired on MTV's schedule. (Webb, 1983:98) In the same manner as records are provided free to radio stations, these videos are given to the channel as a promotional tool. The decision to play one or these promotional videos is based on extensive research determining the audience's existing and constantly shifting tastes. (Webb, 1983:94)

Warner Amex Satellite Entertainment Corporation has conducted extensive research to determine precisely its audience's tastes, demographics, and behavior. Audience research determines what videos might be popular and, if selected, these videos would be aired up to four or five times a day. According to John Sykes, programmers do not look at record charts to decide what to air. He says:

we call up viewers to find out what they do and don't like...we're leaders, not followers and in that position, we have to use a lot of research. (Webb, 1983:94)

Music Television has also conducted extensive studies to determine who was watching its network. The audience MTV seems to attract is a combination of men and women who are looking for leisure time entertainment. (Webb, 1983:91) These people range from 12 to 34 years old. The median MTV viewer (23 years old) watches MTV one hour a day on an average weekday and 90 minutes over an average weekend. (Kaplan, 1983:222)
Although MTV is just like radio in the respect that it can be left on and listened to from a distance without much loss, research has demonstrated that the channel holds the audience's attention very well. Preliminary research of Warner Amex Corporation has indicated that most of its audience fit into the classic rock radio demographics: a group which uses television in an "ambient" way rather than by sitting down in front of the set for several hours. However, according to Les Garland, vice president of MTV, the Music Channel has not just been used for background music: people actually sit and watch it. Later WASEC's studies have found that many of MTV's audience members were highly attentive and watched for hours. (Lacey, 1983:e-1) Viewers seem to stay actively tuned for an hour at a time and tend to watch the channel in small groups. (Maslin, 1983:2b). It has also been found that members of the audience accept the new medium as part of their social milieu and were found frequently discussing certain videos with their friends. (Maslin, 1983:25) According to WASEC's president, John Schneider, MTV has become so much a part of the viewers' lives that "it went on with the light switch." (Bedell, 1982:e-15)

2.1.4 The "Miracle Tonic"

According to record companies, the new medium of music videos has been said to be the "miracle tonic" for a recording industry that has been in a four year slump (1979
through 1982) and a 40% decline in revenues. (Holstun, 1983:90) According to the Recording Industry Association of America, after decades of large profits, the American recording industry's domestic shipments fell from 726 million units or $4.1 billion in 1978, the last profitable year, to 594 million units or $3.6 billion in 1981. The recording industry which produced these music videos saw them as the most promising marketing tool to emerge in the twenty years since the introduction of FM rock stations in the 1960's. (Levine, 1983:42) During 1981, the worst year of this decline, MTV was responsible for bringing these videos to a mass audience.

Many believe that the cable channel has given the record industry a new way to expose music. For the record companies, it has been the ultimate in free advertising. The song accompanied by a video with a credit at the beginning and at the end of each song, stating the name of the band, the song and the label, ran free on television. According to Steve Kann, the head of RCA Records' audio-visual department, the new medium of videos was going to "save the recording industry."

Today, the medium of music video is delivered to the public in various ways. Whether it is broadcast on television or screened in art galleries or music clubs, the medium's overall function is to motivate a mass audience to purchase albums. Prior to this, three ways existed to promote consum-
ers to purchase records: radio, advertising, and publicity. Music videos have expanded the promotional tool to include such technologies as cable, satellite, videodiscs, and videocassettes. Record company executives begin their promotional efforts by producing the video; MTV then broadcasts it thus providing free advertising for the music; viewers watch the video, like it, and purchase the record. Record companies believe that by implanting a "tremendously hot image on the kid's brains, the video could tangibly focus on the song's message and motivate the record consumer to buy." (Jerome, 1983: 103)

Society's economic upturn and the collapse of the video game boom must also be considered important factors in the resurgence of the recording industry. Although music videos could be said to have a strong influence on record sales, one must also look at today's economy and compare it to what it was during the four years of the decline. Over the past few years there has been an upturn not only in the recording industry but also within certain regions of the American economy. Past studies have demonstrated that the American youth, who two years ago were spending their money on video games, began to use that money to buy record albums. (Rothbart, 1983: 19) Another factor that needs to be considered is the introduction of new music as well as new groups.
2.1.5 Does MTV Exposure Increase Record Sales?

Regardless of whether the turn around in the American recording industry can be credited to talent, the marketing of records, the upturn of the economy, or the collapse of the video game craze, MTV and the music videos broadcast on that channel has been a powerful influence in promoting new releases. The National Director of Capitol Records' artist department, Michele Peacock, explained that exact measurements of the impact of music videos on record sales were not available. Sales, however, had increased in certain markets where MTV was on the local cable systems. Peacock suspected that MTV was responsible for 90% of the resurgence. (Rothbart, 1983:17)

It has been reported that bands exposed on MTV have experienced an increase in their album sales. (Dale, 1982:77) It is not surprising, therefore, that several of the other music video programs on both cable and commercial networks, were broadcast on Friday nights, the day before the traditionally biggest day of the week in terms of record sales. (Rothbart, 1983:17) In some age groups, especially young teens, these music videos could have a bigger impact on sales than radio, which had been the primary medium of promoting records. The young teens who watched music video programming were definitely also purchasing records. (Rothbart, 1983:17) Artists, who have been exposed on MTV, have experienced an increase of between 8% and 30% in their album sales. (Dale, 1982:77)
Earlier research studies done by the Warner Amex Satellite Entertainment Corporation, strongly suggested that music videos seen on MTV sold records and tapes. (McMul- 

laugh, 1981:1) Bands that had never been played on the radio were chalking up huge sales. MTV's research demonstrated that up to 65% of the viewers used the network to decide which albums to buy. According to this research, MTV had a bigger influence on viewers' record-buying choices than radio, concerts, or any other sources. The research also showed that MTV viewers bought more records than non-MTV viewers.

Duran Duran's experience with the new medium perhaps is the best example of how effectively sight could sell sound. When Duran Duran released its first album, Planet Earth in the United States, in 1981, the record "went nowhere." One of the group's videos, Girl on Film, which did not receive any airplay on MTV due to the amount of nudity it contained, was exhibited in dance clubs around the United States. Duran Duran realized the success of that video and planned its next album with MTV in mind. (LaRue, 1983a:9-1) The group recorded Rio and produced a video clip to accompany its single Hungry Like a Wolf. The video was a smash success on MTV. Duran Duran's second album, Rio, climbed steadily to No. 14 while the single, Hungry Like a Wolf, reached No. 3 on the record charts. (Welsh, 1983:96) Market research demonstrated that, in Dallas, where about half the city was
wired for cable television, and sold extremely well in record stores in the wired areas and not very well in the rest of the city. (Gelman et al., 1983:98)

A national survey conducted by Billboard magazine elicited a great deal of evidence suggesting that MTV had a strong and positive effect on recording sales, especially those of a new artist. (McCullough, 1981:1) A spot check of record retailers in cities around the country, which had a relatively high cable MTV penetration, indicated that music videos had an impact on album purchases. New artists seemed to be affected most but major established groups were also said to be influenced.

One Billboard survey (1981) found that many retailers credited MTV for their increased record sales. The retailer of Tulsa’s Record Town claimed that MTV was responsible for generating an additional $300 to $500 in revenue every week. In Lubbock, Texas, buyer Carl Keel of Flipside said that Joan Cougar sold better after he was exposed on MTV, even though he was already an established star. At Music Express in Omaha, owner Marvin Kirke gave MTV credit for increasing his sales by at least 5% after the service was broadcast in his area for eight months. John Salem of Argus Records and Tapes in Wichita believed that there was a strong correlation between MTV and record sales. Salem believed that the music channel allowed the record buying public to become more familiar with certain artists. Once the audiences felt
they knew that artist, he assumed, they would be inclined to buy the album. No concrete proof that music videos stimulate record sales exists, but many incidents lead one to believe they have had a strong impact. Most executives in and out of the recording industry have agreed that its resurgence has been due in part to the advent of the music video as a promotional tool. (Rothbard, 1983:17)

2.1.6 **Music Video's Impact On The American Recording Industry**

Since music videos have altered the way society experiences music, many wonder whether these videos affected the way in which music is produced. "Video changed the way I approached making an album, the way I wrote songs," said Grammy award winner Kim Carnes, "As we’re recording we’re thinking in terms of what’s going on visually." (Gelman et al., 1983:97) John Oates of Hall and Oates also stated that me and Daryl Hall used videos to enhance the image of the song:

But we don’t want to limit people’s imagination by telling them image by image what goes on in the song. I think videos are the best thing to happen to music in years. An artist can show aspects of his personality which enables the audience to see that he acts like a person. It’s another step in eliminating the bad performers and enhancing the good. (Burluck, 1983:6)

Today, it is becoming standard practice for a group, especially a new group, to release not only a single but a video of the single as well. (Robertsod, 1982a:12). Record
company representatives believe that with these videos, new groups as well as established groups, can be easily introduced to buyers at trade conventions and to a mass audience on both commercial television and cable networks. Not only has music video changed the way musicians write but it has also affected the way in which recording contracts are being negotiated.

Any new group wanting a recording contract in the U.S. should demonstrate video potential in addition to musical talent. Since it has become automatic for record companies to demand a video, managers such as David Sonenberg has stated that he would not take on a client who was not visually oriented. (Jerome, 1983:102) Of course, some acts have been found to be more suited to videos than others. For example, Michael Jackson's videos have made him the most videogenic performer where most heavy metal concert bands appear lifeless. (Gelman et al., 1983:96) The problem posed by bands with very little camera appeal was solved by the creation of the concept video, the pure fantasy format.

For the record company the video has been an invaluable aid in establishing the identity of an artist. This visual identification has proven to be necessary in the careers of many new rock artists. If an unknown artist has a good video, he has a greater chance of becoming a star. Exposure on MTV has helped to sell these performers to audiences. Video clips of new artists make up 30 to 40% of MTV's program
schedule... (McCullagh, 1981:1) Artists, such as Flock of Seagulls, Men at Work, The Human League, Bow Wow Wow, Adam and The Ants and the Stray Cats, have been identified as the main beneficiaries of the new medium of music video and their exposure on MTV. (Foti et al., 1982:3)

A Long Island trio, the Stray Cats, provide the best example of the music video's ability to be an image-building medium. Because the group could not find an audience in the United States, it moved to England at a time when rock and roll music was making a comeback in that country. (Chronicle-Herald, 1983:33) At the beginning of 1982, Capitol Records-EMI decided to introduce the band to North America with the release of the Stray Cats' album, Built For Speed, a collection of the band's British records. Canadian and American radio stations would not play the album. (Chronicle-Herald, 1983:33) Instead, the Stray Cats were first heard in the United States via their video aired on MTV. According to Jane Rodgers, former National Press and Publicity Manager at Capitol Records, as soon as their single's video, Stray Cat's Strut was shown on MTV, radio airplay quickly followed. The Stray Cats projected an image based on their video and their American debut album, Built For Speed, sold two million copies. (Goldman et al., 1983:90)

As a result of the introduction of music video, today's record buying public does not attend as many live concerts. (Miller, 1983:23) The video has done what tours used to do;
it puts the artists in front of an audience. In many cases, the money once spent on tours now goes towards video production. Even with an average production cost of $35,000 to $45,000 per song, videos are considerably less expensive to record companies than a national tour and the cost of publicity to promote that tour. (Quill, 1983:6-1)

In the early 70's, the artist was promoted by going on the road, touring from city to city. Today, however, even under the best circumstances, the number of people who can be reached by personal appearance is a fraction of what can be reached through MTV in a shorter period of time. (Wolmuti, 1983:98) A tour which tried to reach the various key markets might have taken years while a single spot on MTV could establish the identity of a group. With MTV, a band could tour the whole country at once since the Music Channel was wired into 1550 cable systems. (Gelman et al., 1983:97). Videos, whether they are seen on MTV or in music clubs across the country, are now the closest one can get to seeing new bands, established bands, or bands that do not tour.

Although the belief exists that videos may replace touring, the record companies do not feel tours will become obsolete. According to Bob Krasnow, chairmen of Elektra/Asylum, eventually the audience must become a part of the event. (Gelain et al., 1983:97) Even though tours are more expensive than a video production, those artists who had become successful as a result of their video exposure would be
able to make substantial money on the road. (Gelman et al., 1983:97)

2.1.7 Conclusions

In terms of the United States, a number of conclusions emerge regarding the effects of music video. The new medium has the capacity to expose music to a mass audience. The public can now experience music in a two-dimensional form; they are now listening and viewing music. Since music video is establishing new artists more quickly than radio and the general public is not attending as many live concerts, musicians are no longer touring as much to promote their music. Musicians are achieving this goal through music videos since a video can be produced and exposed to a greater audience through MTV than a cross-country tour.

Not only is the new medium introducing the artist more quickly than radio or live concerts, it is also motivating the consumer into buying albums. The exposure of music video has increased record sales. The new medium is credited as being the "miracle tonic" to the American recording industry. As a result of this, musicians are now writing their music with video in mind and their recording contracts are being altered to accommodate this medium.

Since music video is still very new in Canada, its impact upon the recording industry, Canada's musicians, and the Canadian consumer, has not yet been fully discovered. There-
fore, one must go to those people directly involved in the music industry in order first, to determine the impact of music video on Canada's music industry, and second, to discover whether the same conclusions found in the United States can be found in Canada.

2.2 CANADIAN INDUSTRY

2.2.1 History of Music Video In Canada

Because of the popularity and success of music video, it was inevitable that Canada would seek to develop its own music video industry. Canada's music industry believes that the music video programming for a mass audience was introduced in Canada and not in the United States. According to Daniel Richler, host of The New Music and Jane Hodgson, former National Press and Publicity Manager of Capitol Records-EMI of Canada, CITY-TV in Toronto was the first television station to broadcast music video programming within Canada or the United States. CITY-TV's The New Music, a syndicated program broadcast in 12 cities from Calgary to St. John's, began in 1978, three years before MTV was launched in the United States. Richler stated:

MTV was recognized as being a prime mover, actually a couple of years before that The New Music had been on the air, making people think about it (video). They had to import many videos from England, which was at the avant-garde...Local bands then began to avalanche, it became clear that this was a very cheap way of programming television because the record companies gave the videos away free.
The people at The New Music granted exposure to artists who produced their own videos. In 1983, according to Aichler, The New Music broadcast a dozen videos by local Toronto bands. Without this program, the majority of these bands would never have had the chance to be aired on television.

The New Music was more than a program which contained a collection of video clips introduced by a VJ. In addition to the music videos, it presented information about the players in the music industry, what was new in music, and what was available. Since The New Music only broadcast three of the top ten music videos a week, Top 40 music video programming which aired only "hit" videos was introduced. As early as 1980 Vince Alexander, a producer at CFMT-TV in Toronto, established the program MuchMusic which presented only music video clips and was hosted by Samantha Taylor. Next, Alexander worked on Cauck The Security Guard, another CFMT-TV program which was basically an all-night VJ style show. Then in September, 1983, Video Singles, which is still aired today, made its debut. Video Singles was a countdown video program which broadcast the Top 40 "hit" videos from number 40 to number 1, daily, Monday to Friday. Alexander stated that this program was aimed at the afterschool audience which was composed of about 100,000 viewers a day. In order to decide which videos to air, Alexander looked at the charts of the successful MTV music network. Most recently, Alexander created an alternative program to Video Singles.
entitled *Flipside*. *Flipside* allowed for the exposure of those videos which were not considered to be "Top 40" or "heavy metal" but were "dance" or "light" music videos.

*CITY-TV* and *CBC* also currently have hit-oriented video programs. *CITY-TV* produces *CHUM's Top 30* and a daily show aimed at the afterschool audience, *Toronto Rocks*. *CBC* has a similar show, entitled *Video Hits*. Hosted by Samantha Taylor, it began in 1984. *Video Hits* has an audience of five to six million people across Canada.

Music videos were not only introduced to Canadians through the medium of television but they are also played in Canadian bars and lounges as alternative entertainment to live bands. Today, new "videothéques", where a VJ uses vidéocassettes and video tape players, are found almost everywhere. Filmaker, Charles Libin was the first to place video monitors over the dance floor at the Hurran Disothque in New York City in 1980. (Zeicaner, 1982:40) In Toronto, "video bars" have been opening throughout the city. Some clubs merely transmit the MTV satellite delivered signal while others such as Domino's compile their own programs by borrowing video clips from record companies. (Laurie, 1983:3-1) In January 1982, Nuts and Bolts became the first club in Toronto to regularly feature a video set-up. It was initially a dance club which used to provide videos in between live shows. Nuts and Bolts now distributes videos non-stop every night the club is open.
Until the fall of 1984, Canadians could only view music videos in local clubs or on "over the air" video programs. Today, however, Canadians now have MuchMusic, Canada's own 24 hour music video network. On April 2nd 1984, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission approved the licence for the music video specialty service, MuchMusic. It is controlled by Alan F. Waters of CHUM Limited, who holds directly and indirectly approximately 60% of the common voting shares. (C.R.T.C., 1984:9) Moses Znaimer accepted the same responsibilities which he had held at CITY-TV, that of President and Executive Producer of MuchMusic. Canada's music video service, MuchMusic, was first made available in the fall of 1984.

2.2.2 Canadian Recording Industry

Before one can examine the impact of music video within Canada, one should first understand the country's recording industry as well as the environment in which a Canadian musician must function. In order to do this an historical perspective is necessary. Canada's first commercial recording was produced by the company entitled "E. Berliner, Montreal." (Minister of Supply & Service, 1978b:9) The company was run by Emile Berliner's (inventor of the disc phonograph) brother, Herbert. About 1900, Berliner introduced his first Canadian production of Joseph Sauzier singing "La Marseillaise." (Minister of Supply & Services, 1978b:9) Within two
years, Berliner had recorded over 2,000 titles, many of them in Montreal. (Minister of Supply & Services, 1978b:9) As early as 1946, Radio Canada International began to produce records of Canadian music and artists. Through arrangements with broadcasters in foreign countries and through Canadian embassies, some of these recordings were distributed internationally. (Department of Communications, 1982:241)

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation became active in the domestic record market in 1967. (Department of Communication, 1982:241) The C.B.C. started to make recordings in order to provide its radio producers with Canadian artists. Eventually, the C.B.C. offered these recordings to the general public through what is now known as C.B.C. Enterprises for the English network, and the Ancillary Rights Service for the French network. Since 1963, Standard Broadcasting had also been involved in the business of providing Canadian broadcasters with Canadian music by offering a service known as the Canadian Talent Library. (Department of Communications, 1982:242)

Although there was some attempt to record Canadian music, the Canadian music industry became an industry dominated by foreign ownership and foreign content. The main reason for this was the fact that Canada's recording industry was unregulated. In Canada there were only five recording label companies which also had their own manufacturing and distribution facilities. These companies consisted of three foreign
owned enterprises, CBS records Canada Ltd., Capitol Records-EMI or Canada Ltd., London Records of Canada Limited, and two Canadian-owned companies, Quality Records of Canada Ltd. and Amed Music Corporation Ltd. (Minister of Supply & Services, 1978b:16) In 1980 foreign controlled companies accounted for 85% of total revenues from the sale and lease of recordings and related recording industry activities. (Audley, 1983:152) Although, the large multinational record companies were recording in Canada, the greatest portion of the basic sales revenues came from the sales of records manufactured in Canada from master tapes imported by parent corporations from other countries. (Minister of Supply & Services, 1978b:17)

The core of the recording industry is the production of master tapes, which brings together the music's composers, its performers, and its technical staff. (Audley, 1983:143) Most of the discs and tapes which are sold by the Canadian recording companies are made from imported master tapes. In 1980, imported discs and tapes accounted for just over 11% of total sales, whereas discs and tapes manufactured in Canada from imported masters accounted for 79% of all recordings sold in Canada. (Audley, 1983:149) In the case of foreign masters, the expenditures on the master production had always been spent outside of Canada and therefore all royalty payments were made to non-Canadians. Only 10% of the total sales in Canada were disc and tapes made from Canadian

Foreign-produced content is predominant in the Canadian recording industry because it can be imported at relatively little cost and relatively little risk. Since the foreign master has already been paid for, little risk exists in promoting it in the Canadian market. Almost all foreign master tapes come into Canada valued as though they are blank tapes. This means their estimated value is about $25.00 each, thus requiring a duty of less than $4.00. (Audley, 1983:153)

The money to support a Canadian recording industry has not been available in this country. A Canadian original master tape for an album costs anywhere from $10,000 to $100,000. Once that album is completed, it then must run the considerable risk of recouping its original production costs. The record company and the artists do not know whether the album will be successful until it is exposed to the public. It has been estimated that even in the United States, only one recording in five is successful, and in Canada, the ratio of failure is significantly lower. (Audley, 1983:159) Kirk Lapointe stated that rate of failure of a Canadian album is about 85% to 90%. Paul Oresan of A&M Records, agreed with the figure.
To better understand Canada's recording industry, it is helpful to study the views of those who are indirectly and directly involved in the record industry. The respondents were most concerned with the fact that Canada's recording industry is dominated by foreign ownership and content. According to Kirk Lapointe of Billboard Magazine, Canada's industry must have the support of the American major record companies in order to survive. Even though foreign controlled companies account for 95% of total revenues, these revenues have allowed Canadian employees within these companies to establish and develop Canadian artists.

In an industry which has been dominated by foreign ownership and content, the question arises whether Canada's musicians have been prevented from achieving success within their own country. There was disagreement on the issue among the members of Canada's broadcasting industry and those in the recording industry. Vince Alexander, producer of Video Singles, Anne Howard, producer at MuchMusic, and Don Waters, Director of Marketing at MuchMusic, did not feel Canadian musicians were unduly restricted in this country's music industry. However, Jim Monaco of ECM Records, Larry Green of RCA Records, Brian Robertson, President of CIRPA, and Peter Fleming of the C.R.T.C. believed otherwise. Monaco explained:

(they are) restricted by reality, economics, history, population as well as technology...we're restricted only by the world we live in, the normal restrictions.
The classic Canadian problem of geography that was evident within the radio industry was also been apparent within Canada's music industry. In Canada, we have 25 million people scattered across a vast area of land. Larry Green commented on this problem:

There is a limit to where a musician can perform...for example, the live performance factor, the number of radio stations willing to give airplay...we don't have the same structure as the United States where one may break out of the Southwest, move into the Midwest, coast to coast but only south of the Mason Dixon line. Then a musician works his way north to Seattle. In Canada, when you're in Calgary you can't hear Edmonton, but when you're in Hartford you can hear Boston and New York. So yes, there are restrictions, not musical restrictions obviously but I think there are restrictions in terms of what a Canadian musician can do.

Due to Canada's scattered population, it is too expensive and too difficult for a Canadian artist to make his performances available to everyone. Radio airplay has not been available on a coast to coast basis. For example, an artist may have been successful in Halifax but because he has neither toured nor been given radio airplay in other parts of the country, that success would be limited to Halifax. He would not be able to achieve popularity in the other regions in Canada.

Canadian musicians are also believed to be restricted by the economics of the recording industry. The investment funds needed to produce Canadian records have not been available. These economic restrictions are dependent upon the policy of the company with whom the artist or band has
signed If either has signed with an independent record label such as Attic Records, Ready Records, or True North Records, the musician is hindered to a certain degree. Although the smaller record companies have promoted and marketed only their Canadian artists, these labels have not had the funds to support an artist the way he must be supported. Ivar Hamilton or CNY-FM commented on this restriction:

it depends on who you are, who's behind you and what sort of deal you've signed with the individual record company. Obviously the independent ones are going to be fairly restricted budget wise...I know some bands, The Spoons for example whose last couple of records went gold (50,000 copies in Canada). Their previous one, Aries of Symphonies, went Platinum (100,000 copies). Still they don't have an American deal. It's released in Canada and that's it.

According to Peter Fleming of the C.R.T.I.C., these independent record companies, such as The Spoons' label, Ready Records, have not had the funds nor the connections to expose the album to an international market. However, foreign-owned companies, such as WEA Records of Canada, do have those connections since its parent corporation functions within the international market.

In Canada, a musician's income cannot increase substantially unless he has had exposure outside the country. In comparison, musicians in the United States, Britain, and Australia can become very successful without foreign sales. According to Kirk Lapointe,

A Canadian musician could probably earn a good living in Canada but could not earn a lot of money until he goes elsewhere.

David Charles of Joint Communications, agreed:
Any artist will tell you that a gold selling album in Canada will barely pay for the cost of the record, the video production and their doing a token tour of this country. This country is not able to support its artists solely by radio airplay unless they are exceptional and can sell a lot of units. A Canadian artist is foolish to think only of just Canada. He will never make any kind of substantial income by doing that.

Although Canada has produced ten or eleven records which have become million sellers, one must take a look at the probability of creating a million seller in Canada. Ivor Hamilton stated that one out of every twenty-two or twenty-five people in the country must buy that record.

To order for Canadian musicians to be financially successful, they must look not only to the Canadian marketplace but also to the North American and world market. Dave Charles explained:

A musician has to think of a North American artist and a North American environment if he's really going to make any kind of return on his investment.

In order to succeed within a North American or international market, LaPointe suggested that Canadian musicians must not produce music solely representing Canadianism:

For a Canadian artist to succeed on strictly Canadian terms, singing Canadian songs, is really a long shot. He must almost have to be writing for a North American market...there has to be a universal approach, lyric, and sound to his material. Generally, the engine is driven by the United States.

With this international approach, the artist can appeal to a world market and release his album in a number of markets opposed to the one market in Canada. Larry LeBlanc, an im-
dependent consultant to the music industry, explained how this approach might work:

Number one we stop trying to cater to the Canadian industry, the Canadian public, the Canadian consumer and the C.A.T.C. Ignore them, bypass them and split, frankly, go for world markets. In a world market you don't have to worry right away about selling 100,000 records. You can sell 25 here and 25 there and add them up after a while. You get released in 5 or 6 markets. Why battle your brains out to reach 50,000 sales in Canada. The market's too small. The audience is too small.

A Canadian artist has no need to worry that his music may not be heard in his own country. LeBlanc stated that once a Canadian artist became successful within the world market, he would always receive airplay back home. For example, Cory Hart was one Canadian musician whose record received more radio airplay in Canada after the album achieved success in the United States. Two successful bands which have met success in the international market have been Saga and Helix. According to LeBlanc, Helix is currently selling more records outside of Canada than within.

The multinational record companies or the "majors", as a result of being foreign-owned, have had the connections that are needed to introduce Canadian artists to the international market. However, the major record companies have tended to only sign the most popular and marketable artists who have come up through the independent record labels. According to Peter Fleming:

what the majors tend to do is take the most marketable and popular, such as the Loverboys, the Bryan Adams, Rush, and maybe Cory Hart and whoever else might come along.
Although the "majors" did assist the independent labels through distribution agreements, this assistance was not enough. Pierre Nadeau commented on the fact that "majors" within Canada's recording industry have been interested primarily in making profits:

"Why should the majors push somebody else's artist when they have their own artist to push first? Even though they have distribution contracts more money is made when their own artist becomes successful."

Because of this business policy of the multinationals, it is questionable whether the best interest of a Canadian artist lies in being signed by a foreign-controlled company. (Lapointe) Ivar Hamilton of CFNY-FM, believed that signing with a major might not be disadvantageous to the artist:

I have found that Capitol has signed a lot of acts. VBA has signed Dark Room, Images in Motion, Desperado, and Jane Siberry. Quite a few independent artists who were really outstanding in their own right, are starting to break in Canada, doing well, selling quite a few units. Their first records have sold 12,000 to 15,000 copies. With their second album they will be looking at an international release with Electra or VBA in the U.S. I think these companies are doing a good job.

Hamilton felt that the "major" record companies have made a more conscious effort in 1983-1984 to sign and promote Canadian artists than they had in the past four or five years. Larry Green of VBA Records of Canada, explained that if a Canadian artist came up with a good and internationally competitive product, he would not be restricted within his own country's music industry.
2.2.3 Music Video in The Canadian Music Industry

Today, the music video is available to both the major and independent record companies. The video has been an excellent vehicle to expose a Canadian artist to both a domestic and an international market. For Canadian musicians, the new medium of music video has radically changed the process of breaking into the American as well as the world market. Jim Monaco of A&M Records, credited television as being a valuable promotional tool.

In Canada we have been exploiting television as a promotional tool for as long as we can remember. Because there are now more videos available, it is easier for an artist to exploit TV.

Today, video is an excellent marketing tool for record companies to expose and create an image for musicians. According to two of the respondents, Peter Fleming of the C.R.T.C. and Anne Howard of MuchMusic, video had allowed exposure for a lot of artists to the public that may not have been normally available through radio. Paul Orsarkan of A&M Records, agreed in that video has helped artists to expand their audiences. This new medium has added a new dimension to recorded music. Music video has allowed the audience to become more interested in the artist as well as permitted the musician to display visually his lyrics.

Canadian bands like Doug and the Slugs, and Saga have been successful with music video. One of Saga's videos which was aired on MTV in the United States, caught the attention of American record talent scouts. The band was subsequently
signed to a recording contract. While touring the Eastern United States in 1982, Doug and the Slugs, a band from Vancouver, was puzzled by the large crowds it drew in cities where it had not received any radio airplay. When the band looked into the situation further, it found that it had gained the fans through MTV on which the band's video, Too Bad, had been shown.

CBS Records of Canada, also through videos, has introduced Canadian acts, such as The Tenants and Allo Nova, to an American market. Bob Muir, CBS' director of new talent, would authorize a video to be made of a Canadian band if it was going to play an important role in the development of the artist in the international market. (Lacey, 1983:E-1) Muir's video budget went from zero dollars in 1982 to a substantial sum in 1983. Muir believed that his video budget in 1984 would be five times the amount it was in his previous year. (Lacey, 1983:E-1)

Whether or not to produce a video is now a major consideration with each new recording. Due to the increase in the number and popularity of music video programs in Canada, the Canadian recording industry's attitude towards music video has changed. According to Larry Green, of RCA, once the record company assumed that it had a internationally competitive album then the decision was made as to which selection would be chosen as the single and whether a video of it would be produced. There are two approaches used to deter-
nine what a single should be. The first is the executive
decision where the record executives, producers, and the
artists decide. The second approach is done by sending the
album out to various radio stations in order to receive
feedback on which selection should be the single. Once the
single is determined, the decision is made whether to
produce a video. Once a video is decided, an agreement is
reached between the record company which adds the cost of
the video production to the artist's recording budget. Green
explained:

with the number of people involved and what it
costs it you add an additional 350,000 for a vid-
eo, that artist will need twice as long to recoup
any money. A extra six months to a year is needed
to see any money back from our efforts.

Larry LeBlanc agreed with Green that an artist who wanted to
make a video would have to wait that extra time period be-
fore he would receive any profits.

Although the method of producing a video is different for
every artist, song, and record company, Larry Green ex-
plained the procedure for producing most videos.

If the feedback from the retail is strong enough
to give us solid ground to stand on, we feel se-
cure that we're going to have some sell off. Once
you determine that, you get into: what's the story
going to be? Who's going to do the storyboard?
What company are we going to choose to do the vid-
eo? What is our budget? Are we going to do one
hoping it will work for two? Can we get a deal for
two?

Video producer/director, Robert Quartly, who recently won a
Juno award for Best Video, also commented on the video mak-
ing process:
It is visualizing music with the idea of selling albums for an artist. Therefore the visual status that has already been created for that artist must be kept in mind.

Once the video is in production, the band or artist has to believe in the director's concept for combining the music with visuals. According to Green, in the case where the right chemistry exists between the director and the artist, the interpretation of the song through video will be successful. Next, the video must be marketed. Record companies expose the video through all the "over the air" video programs, MuchMusic, and through the club scene. If confidence exists that a band can be successful internationally, the record companies will take that video to MTV and other outlets throughout the world.

2.2.4 **Music Video's Impact On The Canadian Music Industry**

Since music video has been considered to be an excellent marketing tool in promoting artists by virtually every recording company in Canada, the issue arises whether Canadian contracts are being changed to accommodate the new medium. Like their American counterparts, Alexander, Charles, LesLancie, and Hodgeson believed that when a band is being considered for a recording contract, the record company will be looking for video potential within that band. According to Jane Hodgeson, formerly of Capitol Records-EMI, young people are now highly attracted to the visual appearances of bands because videos have become so popular, record compa-
hies have tried to have their bands' visual identity translated to video. Hodgeson stated that a band must now have a "video catch" as well as an "audio catch." Record contracts now contain both audio and video clauses.

Jane Hodgeson declared that artists, depending on their repertoire, must demonstrate video potential. If a pop band's music was geared towards young people, the record company might seriously consider making a video with that band. However, Hodgeson explained that an artist who appealed to the "baby boomer" market, for instance Anne Murray or Barry Manilow, might not need a video; first, because their audience might not be particularly interested in videos and secondly, because these artists were established, they did not need that video to create an image.

The video has been an invaluable aid to the record company in establishing the identity of a new artist. Hodgeson and Alexander supported this concept with evidence of two successful Canadian acts, Platinum Blond and Cory Hart. Both have used video to establish their identity. According to Alexander, CBS Records of Canada felt that Platinum Blond was a good-looking band and could be portrayed well on video. Therefore CBS created a market within Canada and England through the use of the new medium.

Cory Hart, who signed with Capitol Records-BMI, released a well-produced album and then did two videos with Canadian producer, Robert Quarly. Hodgeson explained Hart's success;
He signed with Capitol and nobody knew who he was at all. His album didn’t take off until his videos started. They were really good ones and that success got him a lot of airplay in the States.

Radio stations saw that Capitol records—EMI of Canada was willing to put support behind Cory Hart, therefore the stations felt this artist was someone about whom they should know. (Hodgeson)

Larry Green of WEA Records does look for the visual aspect a band would convey on video. Green felt that unless an artist or band could appear strong visually that artist had limited potential. A record company might have the greatest singer/songwriter or the best band in the world but if either did not look good, the potential of that artist was limited in terms of its video or visual impact. However, Green also stated that no matter how good that video might be, the song had to be strong. The best combination would be a strong song with a well produced video.

However, seven out of the fifteen respondents did not believe record companies in Canada were looking for that video potential. (Lapointe; Monaco; Robertson; Charles; Orscon; Fleming; Quarterly) These respondents also disagreed with the view that the majority of record contracts contained visual as well as audio clauses. Kirk LaRocante stated that American record companies were at the point where they were looking for video potential. He explained;

It’s that way in the United States and I was surprised even last year to see an Epic representative say Cindy Lauper may not have even been signed had the company not thought that she had
tremendous video potential. They were that uncertain about her recording abilities. Yet her music has taken off and she is one of the big success stories of the year.

LaPointé viewed Canada's recording industry as being constantly behind that of the United States. Therefore, this process of signing artists with tremendous video potential has not been instituted in Canada's industry yet. LaPointé believed that within Canada there were still a lot of bands being signed strictly for their music potential and not their video potential.

Monaco, Robertson, Charles, Orescan, Fleming and Quarty tended to agree with LaPointé. According to Jim Monaco, A&M Records of Canada had a number of prerequisites for signing new bands. However, not one of their deals with videos or video potential. Paul Orescan, also from A&M Records, agreed with Monaco that the people at A&M, first and foremost, listened to the music. They believed that no matter how incredible a video might be, if the song was not strong, radio would not even touch it. Orescan explained that an artist might have had a video shown on television and could have received some interest that way, but alone the video would not have helped the artist. He still needed that radio airplay. Peter Fleming of the C.R.T.C. also agreed that the sound of the music had to be there to some extent.

Ten out of fifteen respondents within Canada's music industry felt that a Canadian artist would need a video to compete in the international market. (Robertson; Alexander;
Charles; Richler; Howard; LaPointe; Fleming; Hodgson; Orescan; quartly) when they talked about the international market, most respondents meant the American market. At this time, Larry Green stressed again that before a Canadian artist could compete in the international market he first needed an internationally, competitive, well produced piece of recorded music. If the music had the potential then the video would be the second step.

Daniel Alcalay of The New Music, Paul Orescan of A&M Records, and Kirk LaPointe of Billboard Magazine, all agreed that, because of the strength of MTV in the United States, it was very important for a Canadian artist to have a video. The music, however, had to be strong. Orescan stated:

With the strength of MTV in America, it's very important for them to have a video. It does help them tremendously, but you must have the music. If a performer has a great song and is getting radio airplay throughout the United States, it is important to make a video.

Richler explained:

For the most part a video will definitely help in the international market. It will probably appear on MTV in the U.S. There are more Canadian artists now than there ever were on American radio. Companies like Champagne Productions produce very slick videos and are doing well in the Canadian music industry. We're also being heard abroad.

LaPointe agreed with both Orescan and Richler, however, he stressed that these videos have to be of high quality:

It is now imperative for any Canadian band which wants to break internationally to have a video. The competition is tremendous. Canadian acts have to have a good video, one that will stand along side some from the glossy productions from the United States and Britain.
One example of a Canadian artist who has a strong song and a high quality video is Cory Hart. Hart’s video was nicely produced by Robert Quartly of Champagne Productions and could compete with anything MTV could offer. According to LaPointe, since Cory Hart had a high quality video, he received high rotation on MTV. This meant he received high radio airplay resulting in high record sales. The use of video made it very easy for record companies to introduce their Canadian artists to the international market.

Two years ago, videos and video programming were credited with the resurgence of the American recording industry. Nine out of the fifteen respondents agreed that video had either been helpful or had created a major change in the recording industry in Canada. (LaPointe; Alexander; Green; Richler; Orescan; Fleming; Hamilton; Charles; Quartly) Music video programming definitely opened many new avenues for the exposure of recorded music. Record companies are supplying enormous funds for the production of videos. Robert Quartly’s assistant, Mike Rosen commented on these funds:

"Video is changing the recording industry in that it now has to spend a amount of dollars which it didn’t spend before the advent of music video." Richler also observed that companies were now supplying a great deal of money for the production of videos. Prior to this, the artist had to raise his own money. Today, however, if one examine the Top 40 charts, he will notice that almost every single on that list has a video to accompany it."
Both Jim Monaco of A&M Records and Peter Fleming of the C.A.T.C. felt the new medium created a hit-oriented environment within Canada's music industry. Monaco explained how this type of environment would benefit as well as harm Canadian musicians:

The effects will be tremendous for the people who are getting played on those shows. Because Good Rockin' Tonight and Video Hits on CBC are new shows with multiples of viewers, if you're not in the top 20, you cannot get your video on that show. That is very, very bad. New groups are disadvantaged because, until they get on the charts, very few of them are going to have their videos exposed.

This hit-oriented environment also created modifications within the recording industry. According to Fleming, since video has been known to burn out songs faster than radio, record companies are looking for artists who can produce a lot of hit records quickly. Lapointe and Green agreed that video is said to "burnout" or overexpose a song too quickly. Yet, they believed radio could take audiences which were interested in hit-oriented radio and could play a song for a long time because the interest continued to be there. As a result of this, Lapointe like Fleming, stated that record companies searched for bands that had international possibilities and would become commercially successful very quickly.
2.2.5 Music Video's Impact On Canadian Record Sales

Jim Monaco of A&M Records, and Nancy Smith, Director of Communications and Public Relations at MuchMusic, credited the increasing record sales to the new medium. Monaco explained:

"Video reinforces what we hear on the radio. Video reinforces everything. It compels people to buy. It makes it easier for people to comprehend what they're listening to. Now they can judge it on a dual sensory level. It can compel people to buy, to decide whether they like it more quickly than their having to hear the song again. It is the visual which makes it easier for audiences to make up their minds on that level."

Monaco also believed that music video had changed the perception of the music industry, which had definitely led to increased record sales in America. However, he could not say whether that same impact existed in Canada since the use of music video was still new.

Larry LeBlanc, a writer within the music industry, and Peter Fleming of the C.R.I.C. did agree with Smith and Monaco that a video did boost record sales. However, LeBlanc and Fleming felt these increases were only found with the top of the chart artists. According to LeBlanc:

"Sales are up on the top albums but not overly up. I think you'll find they are quite flat outside of five or six albums. Part of the problem is programers tend to concentrate on those top albums. In the 70's there were wider playlists on radio; there was a variety of different things. In terms of what is actually selling, there is a greater percentage of top sellers today, in terms of the upper echelon (of the Top 40). In terms of shared product, further down, no."

Fleming expressed the same viewpoints as LeBlanc."
I think it (video) boosts sales for some artists. There is a danger which has been identified by those in the record industry. At one time if you were in the Top 20 you made good money; you got high sales. Now they are finding that only the Top 5 are getting big sales and after that it really tails off.

Therefore, there was agreement that music video has had an impact on record sales but there seemed to be a discrepancy of opinion as to whether video was affecting all artists or just those at the top of the charts.

2.2.6 The Video 45 and The Video Single

Jim Monaco and Kirk Lapointe held the belief that video might even act as a substitute for record sales. Monaco believed it was natural that the music video would be available to the average consumer. Music video has found its way into the now electronics craze in the form of the video LP. The way of the future seems to be three minute video 45's. Artists are currently at work on "video singles" made possible by Sony's laser disc technology. The Sony Corporation, which led the way with compact laser discs, test marketed its own versions of the video 45, priced at about $20.00 each. (Webb, 1983:85) Although Sony has a limited line of products, "video 45's" and "video albums" from Duran Duran, Utopia, and Lionel Hampton have attempted to create a market.

As well as Sony's video 45's, music video cassettes could be rented or purchased at video shops. One music video cas-
sette can be rented for a cost of $3 to $10 a day or purchased at a price of $40. (Chronicle-Herald, 1983:33) There are three types of music video cassettes available: concert films; rock musicals as well as the music videos that were shown on MTV and other commercial networks. Packages such as Diana Ross or Elton John are available for consumers. Blondie's Eat to the Beat video has been the best seller in the United States, while in Europe, Toni Basil's World of Mouth video album has established her as a major artist. (Mic, 1983:85)

Although Lapointe and Monaco assumed the video would act as a substitute for records, they could not determine whether these videos would be accepted by the public or whether these sales would affect overall record sales. According to Monaco, at the present time the consumer's response to these video 45's and video cassettes has not been very good within the American market. However, many people have rented these music videos. Lapointe stated:

'I believe it's going to start replacing record sales but the bottom line of the industry is going to be hurt significantly. I don't see any way of turning it around because the consumer demands the video. There is no way that a record company can prevent that. It will not be able to withhold videos in order to increase record sales.'
2.2.7 *Music Video Can Be Harmful*

Five out of the fifteen respondents believed this new medium of music video also had a harmful effect on Canada's music industry. (Leblanc, Lapointe, Fleming, Monaco, Green) According to Kirk Lapointe and Larry Leblanc, due to the high expenses of video production, record companies have adapted their methods in order to survive. The cost to make an album is approximately $100,000. Now an extra $10,000 to $15,000 is added for one or two videos. The artist has to recoup an extra $15,000 before he sees any profits. The record companies have adapted to these enormous expenses by reducing the number of artists they sign. Both Larry Leblanc and Peter Fleming expressed this viewpoint.

Canadian record companies will eventually drop the rosters because there's only so much money in the artist and repertoire department. Instead of having five acts and making five videos, they will have three acts and make three videos. (Leblanc)

There is a tendency to pick fewer artists and put more resources into them. If the company makes $100,000 with one artist it is easier than making $10,000 with 10 artists. It is a lot less work for the company. If it has two artists for $100,000 then it is in a better situation. The more successful small Canadian companies concentrate on two or three artists. (Fleming)

Today, with video as a dependable marketing tool, record companies are finding it a lot less work and money to market a smaller number of artists successfully.

Another impact video production costs have had is that Canadian record companies are no longer investing in two or three albums by any one artist. According to Leblanc, Canadian musicians are now only receiving a one shot chance. In the 1960's and
1970's, the recording industry allowed the artist to develop three or four albums. LeBlanc explained that, because of the economics involved, an artist now will have to be successful with his first album or he will not produce those profits the record company looks for. If the artist's first album has been unsuccessful as well as a second album, the record company will find itself with an enormous debt incurred by recording and video production costs. Therefore, the record company's executives may decide that they no longer want to cover these particular costs and the artist will be dropped from the label.

Larry Green, Jim Monaco, and Larry LeBlanc all agreed music videos hurt Canadian musicians since the new medium was replacing live appearances. Many clubs use video as an alternative to live entertainment. Many clubs have switched to videos because it is much cheaper than hiring an artist. Larry LeBlanc commented on this problem:

Another problem is that a lot of videos get used in clubs which pick up MTV or MuchMusic by satellite. The clubs don't really need the live entertainment anymore. So what has happened to a large degree is that they are paying the bands next to nothing...those same bands for which the record companies are supplying the video. Canadian artists still have to go out and get work...from where are they going to get their experience?

Larry Green of RCA Records agreed that musicians needed that experience to develop their talent:

Clubs use video as entertainment. They have closed down live entertainment to show videos for the most part. That does not help the music industry. That does not help talent.
Jim Monaco of RCA Records agreed that music video has reduced the amount of live entertainment in Canadian clubs but he also pointed out that this new medium is also hurting other markets such as live touring. As a result of music video, fewer bands are doing cross country tours.

2.2.8 Music Video's Impact On Canadians Compared To Americans

Music video has had an impact on the American music industry. However, some people within Canada's music industry did not feel the impact of the new medium has been as great in Canada. Many of the effects of music videos which have been discovered in the United States can be found within the Canadian music industry. Like the American record companies, Canadians use the music video to promote and expose their artists. Although Canadian record companies have altered their business practices to accommodate the new medium, these changes have not been as great within Canada as in the United States. According to the majority of the respondents in the Canadian music industry, the music is still the first and most important element of a Canadian artist whereas in the United States, the video potential of the band is seriously considered. Although music video was described as the "miracle tonic" to the American recording industry, there is a discrepancy amongst representatives of Canada's music industry as to whether music video is actually increasing record sales. The main reason for this disagreement is that
many believed Canada's music video industry is still too young to determine its impact. Therefore one must understand that all the effects of such a medium on Canada's music industry have not yet been fully discovered.
Chapter III

THE CULTURAL POLICY AND THE CANADIAN MUSIC INDUSTRY

For more than forty years the need for a truly Canadian system of broadcasting has been affirmed by Royal Commissions, Parliamentary Committees, public leaders, Canadian newspapers and by the Canadian public. It was obviously the opinion of Parliament when it passed the 1966 Broadcasting Act that the need to preserve a Canadian system of broadcasting remains as great in the 1970’s as in the late 1940’s. (Minister of Supply & Services, 1970a:19)

The above excerpt clearly demonstrates the need to preserve a Canadian broadcasting system which will reflect the Canadian identity. Today, in the eighties, the need to maintain a Canadian broadcasting system is still evident. However, the necessity of preserving a Canadian identity within Canada’s other cultural industries, such as the recording industry, the publishing industry, the film industry, also existed. Over the years, there was a constant struggle to maintain a Canadian culture within an environment that continued to be dominated by foreign programming as well as foreign cultural imports. Although, the formation of cultural policy in Canada is relatively new, it must be recognized that the current situation of free international flow of culture and information has been inhibiting the development and expression of our own culture.
One of the most difficult things which the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) has had to articulate has been the definition of Canadian culture. In 1978, in The CBC Perspective, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation provided the following amorphous definition:

Culture is an amalgam of everything which makes us different from any other people on earth. (C.B.C., 1978)

In 1981, the C.B.C.'s Report on Culture, Broadcasting, and The Canadian Identity stated that the C.R.T.C. should enforce this cultural policy so that Canada's cultural industries would establish a Canadian identity, reflect and reinforce the country's values, perspectives, traditions, history and mythology. The industries which were earmarked to perform the tasks were the publishing companies, the recording companies, as well as the whole broadcasting system.

In the past, cultural policy has not been totally successful in encouraging the recording industry. One of the problems has been that Canada's recording industry has not been directly regulated in terms of the music it produces. The only incentives are ones which were developed by people within the industry. However, the broadcasting system which record companies depend on for the exposure of their music has been regulated in terms of Canadian content. Since music video has evolved from the recording industry and its distribution involves the broadcasting system, both the recording policies and the broadcast policies of Canada must be
reviewed. First, the incentives and the indirect regulation of recording industry will be examined. Secondly, the Commission's broadcast policies in regards to radio, television, and specialty services will be discussed.

3.0.9 SOUND RECORDING

Sound recording has a great potential to influence the expression of Canada's culture. Because recorded music covers a variety of interest, it appeals not only to a mass audience but also to more specialized interest groups. The Department of Communications (1982:235) has recently recognized that recorded music is a dominant cultural force in today's society. Because recorded music is relatively inexpensive and highly portable, it is accessible to many.

(1982:235) According to Canada's Federal Policy Review Committee (1982), Canada has one of the highest per capita rates of record consumption in the world. The relationship between high record sales and the moulding of a cultural identity has yet to be determined.

Many representatives of the music industry expressed the view that recorded music has been a dominant cultural force in our society. According to Daniel Michel, host of The New Music, music today is a twenty-four hour environment:

I think it's a dominant cultural force for young people. Music at one time when our parents listened to Frank Sinatra, was something for leisure time. It's now very much more a 24 hour culture. The clothes that kids wear, the language they use, and their attitudes are borrowed from record celebrities.
Jane Hodgeson, formerly of Capitol Records-EMI of Canada, agreed that music has become a part of most people's lives. She explained that music was no longer limited to radio. For example, today even Simpson's and Eaton's commercials have been geared to popular music. Dave Charles of Joint Communications also expressed the belief that music was a dominant cultural force, especially for those of the 12 to 25 age group. He stated:

Rock music especially for those in the 12-25 demographic, is a way of reflecting their pleasures, their likes and dislikes, their fears, their hopes, their ambitions, their love. Music has a way of expressing all the emotional ranges they go through. Music is poetry in that it articulates feelings, frustrations, etc. I think it is still very viable for that reason.

Ten out of the fifteen respondents agreed with the Canadian government that recorded music is very accessible because it is so inexpensive and highly portable. (Alexander; Charles; Fleming; Green; Hamilton; Hodgeson; Howard; Monaco; Waters) Because of technological innovation, radios have become extremely portable. Music can be taken almost anywhere. Ivar Hamilton of CFNY-FM reported that in a market such as Toronto, every kind of music is made available over the airwaves from the college stations to the main commercial stations, such as CHUM, Q107-FM and CFNY-FM. Daniel Richler explained how even record albums could be very portable:

It (music) certainly is highly portable. I carried my records to and from school for ten years and swapped with friends.
Larry Green of WEA Records, described how the cassette was even three times more portable than the record album:

The cassette is much higher than the album sale. It's starting to happen. It is three times more portable. It's used in walkmans, in ghetto-blasters, in cars and cassette players at home. You may have a turntable as well but its use is limited. The flexibility with cassettes is better. They're packaging them better now. They look better.

Therefore it can be concluded that the accessibility of recorded music was in part due to its portability.

There was also agreement among the music industry that this accessibility has also been due to the fact that recorded music has been relatively inexpensive. According to Larry LeBlanc, because competition within the retail industry has been so fierce, record prices have stayed under ten dollars except in cases where the record is a double or special album. The development of the cassette and its popularity has led to the easy pirating of recorded music. Dave Charles explained:

I know of record clubs in Scarborough where students are buying cheap cassette and making copies of tapes or albums. They buy one album and record the best cuts from the top albums, sell the cassette for two bucks, and make a profit.

Ivar Hamilton pointed out that the average adolescent can afford to buy a couple of albums or cassettes a week.

According to Jim Donaco, music has also become a dominant force in Canadian society because Canadian children were being introduced to recorded music at a very young age. Canada has established a children's record industry which he con-
sidered was the best in the world. Monaco commented on this industry:

we have established in this country a children's music industry, second to none in the world. It spawned not only performers but all the people who set up the shows, set up the halls, and publicise the shows, the technicians in the halls, the touring artist. This does not exist anywhere in the world except Australia where it is a different kind of thing altogether.

Therefore Canada has created a whole generation of Canadians attuned to recorded music at a very early age.

If the Canadian government as well as the Canadian music industry can agree that recorded music had a great influence on today's society, why is it that Canada's recording industry has not been regulated directly? The recording industry as a significant cultural activity has been largely overlooked by the federal government. When major support policies regarding Canada's cultural industries were being considered, the recording industry was not included. (Department of Communications, 1982:235) As a result, Canada's recording industry became an industry dominated by foreign ownership as well as foreign content.

Peter Fleming of the C.R.T.C. stated that it would be very difficult to try and regulate Canada's recording industry because it was foreign dominated. Regulation within the recording industry was viewed by a number of people in the music business as unfavourable. According to Jim Monaco, Canada's recording industry is the last vestige of the free enterprise of the arts and it should stay that way.
According to Peter Fleming the Department of Communications has been conducting a study regarding the policy of Canada's recording industry. Fleming explained:

There is no physical limitations on the number of record companies in Canada, you could have thousands of them, so there is not that implement to manage something...because there is no need to manage. Now there may be economic concerns. The government is currently conducting a big study now of the record industry. It may have a role to play in stimulating the recording industry by setting incentives. This is perhaps the best approach.

Fleming stated that there have been other approaches to regulate the industry, such as forcing Canadian record stores to stock a certain number of Canadian albums. It is very unlikely this type of regulation would be accepted by the industry or the consumer. A policy of incentives would probably be more easily accepted than direct regulation. If the Americans were to begin to produce records here and only hire American people and only foster American talent, there would be a definite need for direct government intervention. However this situation appears very unlikely.

Although the Canadian recording industry has been dominated by foreign controlled companies, Jane Hodgeson believed these multinationals were hiring Canadian people and rostering Canadian talent. According to Paul Orescan of A&M Records, although the company was an American based subsidiary, it was incorporated in Canada, and operated with Canadian input. A&M Records of Canada did not have to release everything that was released in the United States.
Canadians were making their own decisions on what should be released in this country. These American multinational record companies came into Canada, invested their money, employed Canadians, and helped Canada's recording industry to develop.

Canada's recording industry has attempted to lower production costs of recording an original master by establishing the Foundation to Assist Canadian Talent on Records (FACTOR). On May 4th, 1982, Canadian broadcasters and record companies formed an association known as the Sponsoring Organizations of the Foundation To Assist Canadian Talent on Records (1). They developed a program called FACTOR with the objectives of stimulating financially the production of Canadian recordings and providing high quality Canadian music for radio airplay. (Roman, 1983:1) As of November 4th, 1983, FACTOR invested half a million dollars in the production of over seventy records. (Canadian Independent Record Production Association, 1983b)

FACTOR provides three different programs to Canadian-controlled record labels, production companies, producers, managers and artists:

1. 1) The New Talent Award is an attempt to identify and assist new talent in obtaining a record contract or secure a first release. The maximum award is $2,500.00 and its objective is to allow the artist to produce up to four "release quality" demos which can
assist them in obtaining a record contract or generate some sales and airplay. The recipient will give FACTOR a royalty, similar to a producer's royalty. (CIRPA(a):2)

2) FACTOR loans, a maximum of $25,000, are available to professional record producers, labels, or managers of recording acts who have a proven ability to produce and release high quality records. The objective of these loans is to assist record labels and producers in upgrading the quality of their records and in obtaining major distribution deals. These loans are interest free and repayable from the earnings derived from the record. Once the loan is repaid, FACTOR will receive an ongoing royalty of 1%. In any other case, the borrower defaults on the terms of the loan agreement, the loan may be called and interest will accumulate from the day of default. (CIRPA(a):3)

3) Term Loans, which have a maximum of $25,000, assist record companies and producers in obtaining financing which may not be available from conventional sources. Repayments on these loans are on a negotiated schedule, not more than a year and not based on royalties. However, interest will be charged and there may be an assignment of royalties as a form of security FACTOR takes. (CIRPA(a):3)
All types of music are eligible for FACTOR awards and loans providing they meet the following criteria:

1. Performers must be Canadian.
2. Studios used for recording and mixing must be Canadian.
3. The producer must be Canadian (in special cases companies may use a non-Canadian co-producer).
4. Fifty percent of the music and lyrics must be Canadian (in special cases eg. classical, this provision may be waived).
5. Labels applying must commit to releasing and promoting the record.
6. Producers applying must give Canadian companies an opportunity to bid on the master.
7. Loans to complete partially finished productions and remixes will be considered. Eligibility is limited to 50% of the cost yet to be spend. Finished masters are not eligible.
8. The maximum award per project is 50% of the recording budget. (ClPA(a):7)

Although FACTOR has done a great deal for Canadian musicians, producers, and independent record companies, the Association hopes to further assist Canada's music industry by expanding the production fund and introducing a plan to provide Canadian musicians with tour support. (Roman, 1983:1)
FACTOR has been successful in creating a number of high quality Canadian records by such artists as Dan Hill, Helix, Murray McLauchlan and Martha and The Muffins. However, in order for any album to achieve success, it must first be introduced to the public. The recording industry must depend on the music industry's other component, the broadcasting system, for public exposure to an album. This is usually the first context in which the public hears or views the music. It provides the motivation for purchasing the records. With this phenomenon in mind, the Canadian government has developed a policy to expose Canadians to exposed to Canadian music and therefore encourage them to buy and support it.

The C.R.T.C. developed its cultural policy with the intent to provide Canadians with a broadcasting system which would reflect the country in which they lived. Today, the Commission has extended this policy to include music videos. The new medium involves many industries, such as the recording industry, the radio industry, the television industry, the cable industry, as well as the satellite industry. It was only inevitable, therefore, that the policy regarding Canada's new music video service would evolve from past broadcasting policies. In order to ascertain whether the cultural policy directed towards this new medium would actually benefit Canada's music industry, the effectiveness of previous policies from which it evolved must first be reviewed. Since the presentation of music can now be found on
both radio and television, the past cultural policies regarding these media will be discussed first.

3.1 AM RADIO

The first industry which the recording business looked to for support was Canada's radio system. Unlike Canada's recording industry, radio has been regulated from its inception by the federal government. The importance of using broadcasting to encourage Canada's cultural development has been a central theme of public policy for the past half century. (C.B.C., 1961:8) Since Canadians spend the largest proportion of their leisure time listening to or watching Canada's broadcasting system, broadcasting could provide Canadians with the greatest opportunity to share "a vocabulary that reflects the diverse and distinctive elements of Canadian culture." (CBC, 1931:8) Because of this influence regulation was needed to create a system which would generate a cultural environment reflective of Canadian culture and not foreign-dominated.

The Aird Report of 1929 led to the enactment of the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act in 1932. The Aird Commission recognized that signals which originated in the United States were providing Canadians with a large amount of foreign information and entertainment. The Commission also recommended a rationale for a broadcasting system that would contribute to Canadian expression. (CBC, 1981:8) The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act which followed the Aird report,
authorized the appointment of a body known as the Canadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (CBC). This forerunner of the CBC developed and operated a national network. In 1936 a new Broadcasting Act was passed to overcome some of the weaknesses of the 1932 Act. The new Act created the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), a Crown corporation which was authorized to borrow capital funds from the government and which had the power to make recommendations to the government on all licensing and related matters. (Minister of Supply & Services, 1979:2)

By 1939, new high-powered regional transmitters had been built in each of the five regions of Canada. The classic problem of geography soon became evident within the radio industry. Because of the country's size, many Canadians scattered across the country lived in sparsely populated areas. Because of this, the only radio stations which became commercially successful were those in the larger cities. (Minister of Supply and Services, 1979:2) Those radio stations, especially along the Canada-United States border, found that they could broadcast popular American programmes and recorded music very inexpensively. This concern, which was first expressed in the Aird Report, was again articulated in 1965 and 1966 in the First and Second Fowler Reports. These reports provided the policy rationale underlying new legislation.
In the Broadcasting Act of 1968, the federal government stated a number of objectives concerning Canada's broadcasting system. These objectives can be summarized as follows: the broadcasting system is to be a "single system" to be "effectively owned and controlled by Canadians" so as "to safeguard, enrich and strengthen the cultural, political, social and economic fabric of Canada." With these objectives in mind, the C.R.T.C. which was created by the Act, implemented Canadian content requirements, first in radio and later in television. These regulations were the beginnings of the Commission's cultural policy which indirectly affected Canada's music industry. Prior to this, Canadian radio stations generally used to select records for broadcasting according to American radio playlists. With the introduction of Canadian content regulations, the situation changed considerably.

The only federal government initiative that encouraged Canadian recording activity was the Commission's requirement that 30% of all musical selections played daily on AM radio should be Canadian. The C.R.T.C.'s requirement for Canadian content was in response to a situation in which the opportunities to express Canadian music were unreasonably limited.

Under the AM Canadian content policy, in order for a musical selection to be considered as Canadian, it had to meet at least two of the following criteria:

1. the instrumentation or lyrics were principally performed by a Canadian;

2. the music was composed by a Canadian;
(3) the lyrics were written by a Canadian;

(4) the live performance was wholly recorded in Canada.

Although these Canadian content regulations were enforced to encourage the exposure of Canadian music, they regulations contained loopholes which broadcasters have found. The Canadian content regulations stated that a Canadian disc or pre-recorded tape was considered to be Canadian if it contained at least one musical selection that met the above criteria. Therefore this definition allowed a long playing record which contained only one Canadian selection out of twelve to be classified as Canadian. (Audley, 1983:143)

The Department of Communications (1982) reported that these Canadian content regulations encouraged a tremendous volume of creativity within Canada's music industry especially in the popular music field. Many new recording studios emerged, new performing groups were created, and many small companies were formed which all led eventually to the development of a sound Canadian record production industry. (Department of Communications, 1982:236) As a result of the regulations, new Canadian singers and musical groups were able to reach large audiences. Once these musicians became known to Canadians, they also became known to other fans in other countries. Among these successful musicians were Anne Murray, Diane Durrell, Gordon Lightfoot, Robert Charlebois, and Bruce Cockburn. (Department of Communications, 1982:236) The Department of Communications (1982:237) also
noted that these AM regulations were credited by almost everyone in the Canadian music industry as a federal government measure that should be continued in order to allow Canadian musicians to continue to grow in a domestic as well as an international market.

There seems to be universal agreement within Canada's music industry that the advent of the Commission's Canadian Content regulations assisted Canadian musicians a great deal. Kirk LaPointe stated that, although some people were opposed to these regulations because they were a legislation of tastes, he believed the legislation has definitely worked. In defence of the implementation of radio content regulations in a country which has allowed its recording industry to go unregulated, Peter Fleming of the C.R.T.C. declared that broadcasting was regulated because of the rationale of frequency scarcity. The frequencies used by private broadcasters are identified as the public property of Canadians, therefore, the programming they transmit must be in the public interest.

The advent of the Canadian Content regulations let Canadian musicians know that the doors of opportunities were open to them. According to Dave Charles, the C.R.T.C.'s cultural policy forced a lot of radio stations which did not usually play Canadian music to do so. It gave artists an opportunity to be heard in their own country. Peter Fleming further explained:
In the late sixties, between three and six percent of the music played on Canadian radio stations was Canadian. Now it's 30% on AM and almost 20% in any format on FM. I think the fact that we have Canadian content regulations has meant that a lot of musicians make recordings and get exposure. With the addition of some supply-side stuff, a new renaissance has occurred in the industry.

The policy forced radio stations to develop a wider playlist of Canadian records. Wider playlists allowed for this "renaissance": certain artists who did not necessarily fit into the commercial requirements, now were receiving airplay.

Since these radio regulations were universal across Canada, they motivated radio stations to broadcast Canadian music and created a competitive environment amongst Canadian artists. Kirk Lapointe of Billboard Magazine commented on this motivational factor:

There were many reasonable hits long before Canadian content ever came along but they tended to stay regional. There wasn't any motivation for a radio programmer in Haliiux to play a record that was from Vancouver. Now because of the universal AM/FM regulations, everyone really has to be in the game and be listening to all the Canadian product that comes out. The reverse of that, of course is all the Canadian product that comes out gets a good shot at being played by Canadian radio.

Paul Orscean of A&M records believed that Canadian artists had a good chance at receiving radio airplay but he stated, this airplay was not automatic. Each musician had to compete for this airplay:

The regulation helped in the early days to give the Canadian artists a shot. Now there is competition amongst Canadian artists. Getting on radio does not usually mean success in this country; it means that you do have a percentage. For example, if we are talking about radio airplay, you do have
a percentage of their time slot and you have the potential to get there, but you are also competing with all the other Canadian bands.

Not only has the cultural policy given Canadian musicians an opportunity to receive airplay, it also has created a ripple effect throughout the industry. According to Kirk Lapointe and Dave Charles, the Canadian content regulations also gave the new independent record companies, such as Ready Records and Solid Gold, the chance to evolve. Lapointe explained:

The regulation has been the catalyst to get record companies involved. Independent labels have developed because they knew that a quality product would be reasonably guaranteed airplay. Radio is a lever for all record sales. As long as an independent entrepreneur acknowledged this he had that foot in the door in radio.

As long as the assumption existed that their records would receive the airplay needed for record sales, the independent record companies were motivated to produce quality records.

There have been many ways in which the cultural policy assisted the Canadian music industry and its musicians. Dave Charles believed these regulations not only gave artists, such as Bryan Adams and Rush, the opportunity to receive radio airplay but also the chance to become major artists. According to Peter Fleming, these regulations increased the amount of Canadian music played on radio which, in turn, quadrupled the amount of royalty payments received by composers and artists. Fleming believed the policy created an increase in the number of Canadian musicians making Billboard Magazine's Top 100.
Peter Fleming agreed with the Department of Communications that these Canadian content regulations had some impact on the development of creativity among Canadian artists. He believed the cultural policy created a second level of artists, which is now trying to get top ranking. However, Jim Monaco of A&M records disputed this.

I think creativity starts with the artist, not with the C.R.T.C. The regulations do not inspire anybody to create but become effective after the creation is done. These regulations let them know the doors were open a little bit more.

Larry Green of WB3 Records, said that Canada had successful musicians long before the Canadian Content rules came into effect. He stated that artists still needed a record that was solid and was able to compete with anything international in order to make the record charts on key radio stations.

3.2 FM RADIO

The development of FM radio provided Canadian musicians with another outlet for their music. In order to ensure that the new radio service would be totally different from the existing AM services, the Commission implemented a FM radio policy. Throughout the development of this policy, the C.R.T.C. again attempted to meet the objectives of the Broadcasting Act (1988). The Commission also structured the regulations so that the FM radio service would reflect Canadian culture. To ensure that FM radio programming would be different than AM, FM broadcasters were required to devote a
segment of their schedules to thematic programs which would express a greater amount of preparation than was generally used on AM radio. (CRTC, 1963-64:13) These forms of programs were known as the Foreground or Mosaic formats.

The maximum repeat factor (MRF) was also created by the Commission to ensure that FM radio would provide a completely different service than AM radio. Since AM radio stations have generally been characterized by a high degree of repetition in their scheduling of recorded music, the Commission has imposed the MRF in FM radio. Many applicants especially those operating in the popular format, proposed that the Commission remove this condition. However, the CRTC was reluctant to approve applications that state a maximum repeat factor exceeding 18. (CRTC, 1963-64, 1963:11) The primary reason for this was that the Commission felt that a high degree of repetition in musical programming did not lead to musical diversity. However in order to attempt to guarantee a greater outlet for Canadian artists, Canadian music was exempted from the MRF condition unless the music had already achieved "hit" status. In other words, Canadian music which had not been listed in a "Top 20" chart could be broadcast on a FM radio station as many times as the broadcaster desired.

The major element of FM policy was the introduction of the "promise or performance." Within each FM broadcaster's licence, a promise of performance which became a condition
of the licence, was required. (CRTC, 1983-84:4) Each applicant was instructed to provide a detailed, comprehensive description of the programming that would be broadcast. The promise of performance would include the amount of time devoted to various content categories, the amount of Canadian content, the different forms of programming as well as a detailed description of how these plans would be carried out. (CRTC, 1983-84:4)

As it did with AM radio the Commission again expressed the concern that FM broadcasting should encourage Canadian culture. Therefore, the C.R.T.C. implemented a Canadian Content definition identical to that of AM. (CRTC, 1983-84:24) The Canadian Content quota varied for each FM licensee. The percentage of Canadian Product each FM broadcaster was required to play depended on the station's programming format. Each licensee would state which format he wished to provide in his promise of performance.

In March 1982, the C.R.T.C. announced that it was going to review the policy of FM radio. In this announcement, the Commission stated, first "that FM policy is a necessary and desirable statement of principles to ensure that FM radio programming plays a major role in the provision of a varied and comprehensive broadcasting service" and, second, that the C.R.T.C. "wished to review some areas of its regulations and administrative practices relating to FM radio so as to improve and simplify the regulatory details of implementa-
tion." (CRTC, 1963-84:2) The Commission emphasized that its intent was to streamline the FM regulations so as to ensure more flexibility while maintaining the objectives of FM policy.

In March 1983, the CRTC released the first results of its review of FM radio. In its policy statement, the Commission proposed a substantial reduction in the amount of information required for the license of Performance, that is, the conditions placed on the license. It also proposed to reduce the number of popular music formats from eight to four and to amend the definition of station formats. (Gazette, 1983:506)

FM radio broadcasters asked the Commission to reduce the Canadian Content quota. A review of the Canadian Content requirement is predicated on an understanding of the different types of FM programming formats available. In order to reflect the recent changes in the different classes of popular music, the Commission proposed four general formats in its Policy Statement on the Review of Radio. (1983:8-9) The following were proposed:

Group I - 70% of their popular music programming would be from the 'soft rock area' (softer music ranging from instrumental to middle of the road)

Group II - 70% of their popular music programming would be from the rock and hard rock area

Group III - 70% of their popular music programming would be from the country and country-oriented category

Group IV - stations that fell into this group would outline specific musical programming plans with
direct references to the various popular music categories. (CRTC, 1983-84:8-9)

Each of these groups had individual guidelines with respect to Canadian Content regulations. Stations that fell under Group I were required to devote 15% of their music to Canadian content. Group II was required to devote 20% of its music programming to Canadian music and Group III had to play at least 30%. Applicants for the Group IV format were required to outline their specific musical programming plans and the percentage of Canadian content they would provide.

The definition of a Canadian musical selection found in both AM and FM radio policy was also reviewed. The C.R.T.C. decided to keep this definition for both the AM and FM regulations. It would however be amended. (CRTC, 1983-18:24) Under the AM regulations, instrumental compositions which were written by a Canadian and recorded by a non-Canadian outside of Canada did not qualify as Canadian content where as the same selections with a vocal arrangement did qualify. The Commission proposed to allow Canadian-composed instrumental compositions or instrumental versions of Canadian composition to qualify as Canadian content. (CRTC, 1983-84:24)

As with AM radio, members of the music industry agreed that these Canadian Content regulations as well as the existing FM radio policy had been successful in meeting the initial objectives of Canada's broadcasting system. Ivar Hamilton of CFNY-FM saw radio regulation in a positive manner:
I think that regulation of content in one particular radio station is better than the regulated environment in the United States where there is a lot of repetition in a market. The station just repeats hits 24 hours a day, seven days a week, nothing else; all computerized. I think the foreground format programming and the requirements of Canadian Content are quite good. In Canada we have our reggae show, our rhythm and blues, our trench show, the lapor show, the gospel show, a jazz show, and our talent search, which is looking for independent artists with their demo tapes. This would disappear in a deregulated industry.

Respondents within Canada's music industry expressed the view that the development of the C.R.C.'s cultural policy has ensured the reflection of Canadian culture. According to Jim Monaco of A&M Records, the Canadian Content regulations were definitely necessary and successful. Others saw them as detrimental. According to Dave Charles of Joint Communications, the policy had restricted the growth of the Canadian music industry. Instead of allowing Canadian music to compete with the international product, the regulations impeded artists from obtaining international release. Consequently, Canadian music had been confined to a country which could not subsidize or even pay for the success of its best artists. Vince Alexander and Larry LeBlanc agreed with Charles that radio stations had to go back into the "gold" reserve of records which had been hits in order to fulfill that Canadian Content percentage. Charles explained:

It has been necessary to play old hits repeatedly. These are records that have been overexposed. We almost killed Gordon Lightfoot, Anne Murray, Neil Young, The Guess Who, B. C. These artists have achieved popularity and achieved good quality recordings which have been played to death. The Canadian radio stations responded to the regulation
by playing artists they knew could compete with international artists. As a result the more inferior Canadian productions never were heard. They were carried on some radio stations and never played on others.

In response to the 30% Canadian Content regulation, radio stations were playing a lot of the same acts over and over again.

Dave Charles and Vince Alexander both felt the C.R.T.C.'s cultural policy had created the belief within the international market that a Canadian record which had achieved the Number One position on the charts had done so because of the greater exposure and airplay it had received. According to Alexander and Charles, Canadian music was actually being forced on the Canadian public. Whether that record achieved its popularity because of high quality did not really matter. Even though a Canadian record may have been a legitimate hit, there was always a stigma attached to it.

Larry LeBlanc, an independent writer on the music industry, felt the Commission's cultural policy was ineffective:

"I'm very much opposed to the C.R.T.C. because I don't believe that hits can be legislated. The record industry is about hits and the C.R.T.C. is about culture. They are two different things. The C.R.T.C. regulations have resulted in fewer rather than more releases per year during the past ten years. There have been fewer successes as well. The C.R.T.C. created a huge domestic market in publishing because all radio stations had to play that material. The last two years have been the worst two years for Canadian music in terms of the numbers of albums coming out. I think only one or two have met with success."
According to Kirk Lapointe of Billboard Magazine, there were only two artists in Canada last year, Rush and Platinum Blond, who had albums which sold more than 100,000 copies. LeBlanc also stated that in the international market, it was unimportant whether Helix, Bryan Adams, Loverboy, or Neil Young were Canadian. Therefore that large body of culture was not coming across. Dave Charles agreed that the C.R.T.C. could not legislate culture; culture was something that had to evolve.

The broadcasting industry representatives did not feel these regulations should be abolished altogether. They believed, however, that the cultural policy needed revision. According to Jim Monaco of A&R Records;

The broadcast regulations in Canada may not be effective. They may be outdated. It is questionable how they might mesh with the new technology.

Also four of the fifteen respondents expressed the belief that these Canadian Content regulations have been overestimated. (Charles; Green; Hamilton; Howard) Dave Charles commented on the complaint:

They are bad thing because they overestimated the amount that should be played on the Canadian airwaves. Thirty percent is too high. Last week (October 8th to 12th 1984) in three different formats, top 40, pop adult, and country, we had less than 4% current Canadian product to consider. You subtract that from 30% and that 26% Canadian Content has to be picked up on an on a weekly basis.

Ivar Hamilton, disc jockey at CFNY-FM, said that he, at times, found it very difficult to program 30%. He felt that
al lot of Canadian producers were not producing material that was up to the quality of the international music product.

3.3 TELEVISION

Because of the development of music video, record companies have begun to utilize television to a greater degree in order to expose their artists' music. Music video has changed the way in which people experience music. One can listen to music as well as view it. As with radio, the C.R.T.C. established a cultural policy with regards to television. The policy has recently been adapted to include music video. Due to the fact that music video has evolved from the recording industry, which depended heavily on the country's radio airwaves, the C.R.T.C.'s cultural policy on music video programming very much resembles Canada's radio regulations. Although the music video policy is similar to that of radio, music video is delivered to the public by television. Therefore, an analysis of the C.R.T.C.'s music video policy is dependent on an understanding of the C.R.T.C.'s cultural policy with respect to television.

Thirty years after the first radio licence was issued, the federal government announced an interim television policy which was finalized in 1952. (Minister of Supply and Services, 1978a:2) That same year, television stations were opened in Montreal and Toronto. The main motive for launching television in Canada was to provide a Canadian alterna-
tive to American programs. Television policy was similar to radio policy in that a CBC-owned station and production centre was established in each region of Canada. (Minister of Supply & Service 1978a:4) Private television stations were also allowed but they were to be affiliated with the CBC. In 1958, Parliament created a new broadcasting act which allowed several areas across Canada to be serviced by a second station. These stations eventually formed the CTV Television Network which officially started broadcasting in October 1961. With this new act, Parliament established the Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG). This board was later replaced by the CRTC in 1968. Once established, the Commission quickly implemented policies in such areas as multiple and foreign ownership of stations, advertising regulations as well as Canadian Content requirements in programming. (Minister of Supply & Service, 1978a:9)

Ironically the very technologies that have made it possible for Canada to establish a national television system have also been used to bring in foreign programming (mostly American), which has threatened the country's culture. The "spillover" phenomenon existed in Canada even before Canadian television started in 1952. (CBC, 1981:7) Canadians who lived close to the American border were able to receive U.S. stations directly. Almost from the beginning, of Canadian television, American programs were considered to be a necessity. (CBC, 1981:7) Only a few months after the first Cana-
Canadian television stations began broadcasting, microwave connections were established with the American city, Buffalo, making it possible to carry an American network on the Canadian system. (CBC, 1981:7)

Since American programs could be bought at a fraction of the cost of producing original Canadian programs, it was inevitable that the economics of the broadcasting system would encourage the use of foreign programming. Consequently, the foreign product began to have an important cultural impact on Canadians. As this medium developed, the amount of foreign content transmitted on television stations was controlled either by the broadcasters themselves or by regulation.

In 1960, the Board of Broadcast Governors (BBG) implemented the first Canadian content requirements for television. At this time, the BBG announced that 55% of all broadcast time must be Canadian in content as well as character. (Department of Communications, 1982:236) At first the averaging period was one week, but because of the protest of private broadcasters, the averaging period was altered to four weeks and no prime time quota was imposed. The full requirement of 55% was to be effective by 1962.

In 1960 a "Canadian production" was defined the following way:

1) any program produced by a licensee and to be broadcast by the licensee;
2) news and news commentaries;
3) broadcast of events taking place outside of Canada in which Canadians were participating;
4) broadcasts of programs featuring "special events" outside of Canada and of general interest to Canadians (e.g., the funeral of Sir Winston Churchill and of President J.F. Kennedy, the World Series, etc.);

5) half of programs produced in Commonwealth countries or in the French language;

6) programs, films, or other productions made in Canada. (Department of Communications, 1982:286-287)

By May 1962, the prime time quota was reduced to 40% and during the summer months, the quota was waived altogether.

In 1963 progress was made in the development of the Canadian Content regulations. New regulations, which aimed at controlling foreign content were established in 1970. These requirements stressed a 50% quota of Canadian programs for both the whole day and for the 6:30 pm to 11:30 pm period. This was averaged on a calendar quarter. A proposal was made which restricted the maximum amount of programming from any one foreign country to 30%. This proposal eliminated the special treatment of French language, Commonwealth countries and "special" feature programs. (Department of Communications, 1982:287)

The C.R.T.C.'s proposals were questioned by Canadian broadcasters who brought their complaints to the Canadian government as well as the Commission itself. (Department of Communications, 1982:287). The C.R.T.C. amended its approach. In 1971, it redefined prime time as 6:00 pm to midnight; raised the single foreign country limit on programming to 40%; and changed the averaging period to a full
year. Again in 1972, the Commission relaxed the restrictions even further by reducing the private broadcasters' Canadian content requirement to 30% in prime time and by abolishing all restrictions against foreign programming from any one country. (Department of Communications, 1982:237)

The loose Canadian content regulations which have evolved over the past twenty years demonstrate that this method of regulating foreign content do not meet the objectives of the Broadcasting Act. In its Special Report on Broadcasting the CRTC concluded that these Canadian content regulations had not been effective in achieving the scheduling of Canadian programming in the peak viewing hours, 8:00 PM to 10:30 PM. (Audley, 1983:250) Most of the private Canadian networks and stations scheduled more popular non-Canadian programming at this time. Television broadcasters could satisfy most of their 50% quota between 8:00 PM and midnight with news and sports programming. (Audley, 1983:259) These Canadian content requirements were not providing Canadians with programs that expressed Canadian culture, nor did they encourage the production of Canadian television programming other than news and sports.

Therefore again in December 1979, the CRTC announced that it would review the Canadian content television regulations. (CRTC 83-18, 1983:1) The Commission was concerned with whether these existing regulations had the ability to achieve the objective of providing a wide range of high
quality Canadian programs which would appeal to a large number of viewers in all broadcasting hours, including prime time. The Commission noted that there had been some successes under the current content regulations, such as sports, news, and information programming. However, the Commission expressed the concern that there was a lack of drama, variety, and children's programming. (CaTC, 19-10:2,4). The Commission demonstrated that there was a definite need for high quality Canadian programs which reflected the Canadian experience and the social, visual, and linguistic fabric of Canada. These programs should have universal theme and wide appeal, be able to compete both aesthetically and internationally, be able to entertain and attract, and finally be able to inform, educate, and enrich our cultural experience. (CaTC, 1963-10:3) The CRTC believed that the need for Canadian programs which contain the above qualities were no longer a matter of desirability but a necessity.

Because the previous content regulations provided a very vague definition of what constituted a "Canadian Program" and because the Commission had the wish for uniformity among government departments, the CRTC proposed in March 1984 to adopt the Capital Cost Allowance (CCA) point system. (CaTC, 1984-94:1) The point system was being used by the Canadian Film and Video Tape Certification Office of the Department of Communications (CFVCO). The system was used as a basis for the CFVCO's definition of a Canadian program within
Canada's feature film industry. In this system, the Commission would recognize as a Canadian program, a live, videotaped, or film production of any length that met the following:

1. Producer(s) must be Canadian. Additionally, all individuals fulfilling producer-related functions must be Canadian.

2. The Point System—A production must earn a minimum of six points based on the following key creative functions being performed by Canadians: Director-2; Writer-2; Leading Performer-1; Second Leading Performer-1; Head of Art Department-1; Director of Photography-1; Music Composer-1; Editor-1.

3. At least one of the director or writer and at least one of the two leading performers must be Canadian.

4. Productions that have only leading performers who are non-Canadians will not be accepted as Canadian even though the minor roles are filled by Canadians.

5. The Commission will recognize a production as a Canadian program if the positions of director and writer or both leading performers are non-Canadian as long as all other key creative functions are filled by Canadians.

6. At least 75% of total remuneration must be paid to Canadians for their services and at least 75% of processing, and final preparation costs must also be paid in Canada for services provided. (CRTC, 1984-94)
In reviewing the existing Canadian content television regulations, the Commission had to deal with the new phenomenon of music videos. As a result of the growing success and popularity of music videos, Canadian producers began to develop programming on commercial television which consisted of only music videos. Therefore, within their proposal, the Commission recognized the new medium and added a section regarding music video and music video programming. (CRTC, 1984-2413) A program which consisted predominately of music video clips would be considered Canadian if the program included a minimum of 30% Canadian music videos. However, the personnel who produced the program, such as the producer, the director, the technical crew, had to be Canadian. The Commission would award Canadian recognition to any music video that adhered to the following regulations:

1) at least two of the audio requirements 1) through 4) are met:
   a) instrumentation or lyrics are principally performed by a Canadian;
   b) music is composed by a Canadian;
   c) lyrics are written by a Canadian;
   d) performance is in Canada;
   e) video director or production company is Canadian;
   f) video facilities are located in Canada. (CRTC, 1984-2413)

As of January 1, 1986, the music video would also be required to meet at least one of the two video requirements c) or f).
The representatives of the music industry, when questioned about the C.B.I.B.'s cultural policy with respect to the music video industry, provided only limited response. This may have been due to the fact that the music video is still very new to Canada's recording industry. Therefore the record companies are still very much dependent on radio as the medium to expose Canadian artists.

Vince Alexander and Daniel Richler, both of whom have been involved with music video programming, disagreed about the music video policy. Vince Alexander, producer of Video Singles and Flipside, felt the Canadian content regulations directed towards music video programming were too high. Daniel Richler, host of The New Music, on the other hand, felt the producers of his program had no problem in reaching the 30%. Video Singles and The New Music, however, very tremendously in their program format. Alexander found it was difficult to fulfill the 30% since his program was geared to the top of the chart video hits. Alexander explained:

"When the new definition came out we tried to achieve at least 30% in one of the shows each day. If a show is playing six videos, two have to be Canadian. We tried that from the day the policy was announced until the middle of August. I was burning out the Canadian artists, so I reduced the quota. Now we're down to 10 to 15%. One show is Canadian on Monday and another show is Canadian on Thursday just so we can get that Canadian content into our program schedule.

Because Canadian musicians may not be in the Top 10 or even the Top 30 during a particular week Alexander found that he had to create a little feature segment on a Canadian artist.
However, *The New Music* was geared to a much more innovative approach to programming. Since much of *The New Music's* emphasis is on local musicians, the producers have never found it difficult to fill that Canadian content percentage.

Since the Aird Commission (1929), the CRTC expressed the concern that the product of Canada's broadcasting system should reflect the Canadian culture. This concern led to the development of the cultural policy to include each new medium. As technology progressed, new media continued to be introduced. Technology's newest development, the marriage between cable and satellite, created Canada's new music video specialty service, MuchMusic. One would expect that the CRTC would once again see this new music video service as a vehicle for reflecting Canadian culture.
Chapter IV

MUCHMUSIC

Music video provides programming for not only the commercial networks but as a result of cable and satellite technology, the new medium also provided a twenty-four hour specialty service within Canada. As it did with each new technological development in Canada's broadcasting system, the government continued to develop its cultural policy. In the fall of 1984, MUCHmusic began to deliver a 24 hour music video channel to Canadian cable systems. Because MUCHmusic relied upon the music industry for content, the CRTC became concerned with whether or not this service would have an impact on Canada's culture. The policy which emerged attempted to balance the interest in encouraging the Canadian recording industry with the recognition that the new music channel should be able to compete with all the existing broadcasting signals and cable services.

4.1 CABLE AND SATELLITES

An understanding of the CRTC's cultural policy with respect to MUCHmusic hinges upon an examination of the cable environment into which the new music video service has been thrust. The introduction of cable has extended and increased
both the size of Canada's television audience and the alternatives available to it. Today, all major broadcasting signals may be delivered to almost every significant population centre within Canada. Approximately 60% of all households in Canada have easy access to a cable television connection in the sense that cable "passes" near their homes. (Department of Communications, 1982:391) Canadians in highly populated areas may have access to as many as twenty-five channels. Cable development has made the Canadian government even more aware of television's ability to transmit cultural values. (Minister of Supply and Services, 1976:9)

During the period in which cable was developing, Canada was planning a domestic satellite system. The marriage of satellite and cable technology provided an alternative delivery system for entertainment programming. This new technology permitted the development of a series of specialty services which gave Canadians another opportunity to express their identity and culture.

The specialty services encouraged the creation of programs which would never have been produced within a broadcast system dominated by mass appeal programming. These new services were meant to attract a large audience share which was interested in a particular programming theme. (CSC, 1981:18) The specialty services gave each member of the audience control over his/her viewing choices. (CSC, 1981:18) Many of these new services tended to concentrate on a par-
ticular kind of program content, such as sports, news, music video and children's programming. The C.R.T.C., recently, articulated policy with respect to specialty services and consequently introduced a music video service and a sports network.

4.2 APPLICATIONS FOR CANADIAN SPECIALTY SERVICES

On May 4, 1983, the C.R.T.C. issued a call for applications to provide specialty narrowcast television services which would be distributed by licensed cable systems on a discretionary basis. (Gazette, 1983:511) The commission stated three requirements for each new specialty service which echoed past broadcast policy. The new services should:

1) contribute to the realization of the objectives set out in the Broadcasting Act and strengthen the Canadian broadcasting system;

2) increase the diversity of programming available to Canadians and;

3) make available high-quality Canadian programming for new programming sources by providing new opportunities and revenue sources for Canadian producers currently unable to gain access to the broadcasting system. (CRTC, 1984-81:1)

These new services should also be offered "on a discretionary basis" at the option of the subscriber and should be complementary to existing services.

In response to the C.R.T.C.'s call for applications to provide specialized services, a total of forty-one applications were received. These applications proposed a wide variety of specialized services such as sports programming,
music, news, public affairs, and children's programming. However, many of these applications did not meet the terms of the Commission's call. Some proposed the distribution of foreign rather than Canadian services. (CRTC, 1984-91:2)

Once again, as with all previous technological developments in the broadcasting system, the Commission was faced with the standard problem of the invasion of American content.

As with previous policy, the Commission allowed cable systems to carry foreign content by permitting the broadcasting of certain non-Canadian specialty services. The Commission believed that these foreign services would add diversity to the overall combination of specialty services available. Foreign services would be allowed as long as they "contributed to, and did not adversely affect, the development of the Canadian broadcasting system." (CRTC, 1984-91:2)

Cable operators would be allowed to distribute a maximum of five non-Canadian specialty services chosen from a list published by the Commission (which excluded non-Canadian superstations or premium pay services). Because a cable licensee could carry a non-Canadian specialty service, he had to sign his affiliation agreements with Canada's specialty services. (CRTC, 1984-91:10) For an initial period of two years, these non-Canadian services had to be "credited with a minimum of one Canadian pay television or specialty service." In the future a Canadian service was developed which competed with an authorized non-Canadian service, the Commission would
have the authority to order the cable licensee to replace the latter service with the new Canadian service.

The Commission expected that the new specialty services would add to the variety of programming available as well as complement rather than duplicate existing television or pay television services. Hopes were expressed that these services would stimulate the Canadian independent production industry. To ensure that these would compete successfully, the Commission refused to license an undercapitalized enterprises which lacked the certification of continuing funds for the first few years of operation. (CRTC, 1984-91:6) In response to this condition, two applicants withdrew their proposals and four more were adjourned at the request of the applicants. (CRTC, 1984-61:6) The remaining eleven applications proposed specialty services in such areas as music video, sports, arts and public affairs, video publishing and a third language programming. Out of the eleven applicants, the CRTC granted one licence to CHUM Limited for a new Canadian music video service and a second one to Action Canada for a sports specialty service. (CRTC, 1984-51:21)

4.3: CRTC'S RATIONALE FOR A MUSIC VIDEO SPECIALTY SERVICE

The main rationale for the Commission's decision to issue a licence for a music video service may have been the extremely successful music television network (MTV) in the United States as well as the evolution of music video in the international market. A licence holder stated:
There was a perceived need and also a perceived willingness on the part of the broadcasters to try such an undertaking. I think the C.R.T.C. looked very carefully at the MTV experience and saw once it got rolling and once was disseminated, people wanted MTV more and more.

The fact that Canadians wanted MTV was evident by the number of satellite dishes which were delivering the system in Canada. Sensing this demand for music video, the Commission wanted to grant a licence to a Canadian who was financially able to provide such a service.

The C.R.T.C.'s decision to license a music video service was based on the financial stability of the applicant. Peter Fleming of the C.R.T.C. stated:

'It wasn't a choice between a music video or public affairs, we could have had licensed music video and sports, which we did, and we could have licensed public affairs and children's or whatever, but we just didn't have the applications.

The Commission did not receive any credible proposals for other types or specialty services and it did not want to license anymore failures similar to Pay TV's C-Channel. Fleming explained:

'We certainly don't want to have to cause cable companies to reserve frequencies or reserve channels for Canadian specialty services which never got off the ground. We want to have a more stable industry.

The Commission reviewed a number of issues before it decided who should receive Canada's specialty service licences. The context for the hearing was the recent developments in the pay television industry. When pay television was first licensed, it promised to be a high profit venture mak-
ing available larger amounts of money for Canadian production. These services were believed to be the impetus for a whole new industry with "new bodies and new blood." (Fleming) However, at the time of the hearings, the "C" channel had already failed. Starchannel in Halifax was in big trouble. First Choice and Superchannel were having trouble growing. Secondly, the Commission was offering pay and specialty services on a discretionary rather than a universal basis. Applicants, therefore, had to be able to sell the service and carry it financially until it could generate revenue.

4.4 CHUM/CITY-TV—THE BEST APPLICANT

The Commission approved the application by CHUM/CITY-TV for a licence to carry a music video network on April 2, 1984. (CRTC, 1984-336) The service would consist a discretionary national, 24-hour-a-day, specialty music format which would be distributed by satellite to cable television affiliates. The ownership and financial stability of CHUM/CITY-TV as well as its extensive experience in broadcasting persuaded the Commission of its viability. The CRTC was also impressed with the applicant's musical expertise and his ongoing support of Canadian musical talent. (CRTC, 1984-336)

CHUM/CITY-TV, controlled by Alan F. Waters and Moses Zaiarz, proposed that the new service would be on the highest standards in picture and stereo sound. The new music specialty service would provide;
The best of Canadian and international videos, surrounded and supported by music-related information, features, interviews, big ticket attractions, the latest experience in video art, music in genres other than rock, videos and video culture from around the world. (CRTC, 1994–1994)

The format was to consist of a six hour program segment to be produced daily at the CITY-TV studio facilities, repeated four times. Although some of the programming would rely extensively on the use of music video clips, interviews with artists as well as the occasional concert would be included.

From the beginning the CHUM/CITY Limited application was viable and had the best chance of being granted Canada’s first music video service license. According to Peter Fleury,

CHUM owned radio stations from Vancouver to St. John’s. It had the ability to cross promote and use the local radio station to promote the video service.

While crossownership has frequently been cited as a threat to market competition, the Commission decided that it was not as serious as the fear that this service might not succeed within its first year. (Fleury)

CHUM/CITY Limited’s proposal to the CRTC demonstrated the business sense needed to run such a service. LaPointe believed the proposal was much more realistic than those of the other applicants. He felt CHUM/CITY Limited understood the finances involved in that it knew how much Canadians are willing to pay for the service and how long it would take before the specialty service could begin to make a profit.
Charles and Ricaler agreed that programming four identical six-hour blocks a day would allow the to run on a small budget. Other respondents, such as Green, Monaco, and Orescan, felt that CTV-TV was prepared in that it had both adequate facilities and the technical capacity as well as a library consisting of several hours of video programming.

According to Daniel Richler, host of *The New Music*:

"CHUM was the largest video library certainly in Canada, and one of the largest in North America. The tapes included live footage of a number of bands some of whom went on to success and some into oblivion. CHUM/CITY needed five million dollars to make a music video service work in Canada. (Richler) CITY-TV has been a very successful television station which has a great deal of experience in music video programming. Therefore the C.R.T.C. was easily convinced that the owners of CHUM/CITY were the best applicants."

CHUM Limited was recognized as a longtime participant in the music business. Six out of the fifteen respondents stated CITY-TV was the first to produce music video programming long before MTV was established in the United States. (Hodgeson; Fleissing; LaPointe; Ricaler; Water; Smith) The people at CITY-TV have been producing music video programming for the last six years, according to Jane Hodgeson:

"CHUM/CITY has been in the music business for a long time. CITY-TV is a pop TV station. Their news is very pop, it's very youth oriented and very downtown and so I think it was natural that they were licenced. What they've done with music videos in terms of programming has been really good so I think that they will do well with the spe-"
cialty service because they've had a lot of experience with pre-teen media.

Ron Waters believed that although other applicants made very good presentations before the C.R.T.C., they lacked the experience in both music and television that Alan Waters and Moses Znanie demonstrated. Alan, executive producer of CITY-TV, was creative and had proved himself as a pioneer broadcaster. Alan Waters, controller of the CHUM/CITY limited, was credited for his involvement encouraging the Canadian recording and broadcasting industries, such as his affiliation with FACTOR.

Two of the respondents, Dave Charles and Ivan Hamilton, did not feel the Commission made a wise decision in granting CHUM/CITY the licence for Canada's music video service. Hamilton's disagreement stemmed from the fact that he worked for Selkirk Communications which also applied for the service. Dave Charles felt that CHUM/CITY owned enough already. Charles felt the CHUM/CITY proposal did not provide a unique Canadian music video channel. Instead, it was just a clone of the American MTV.

Vince Alexander and Nick Lapointe felt that the Rogers Cable System was a very strong opponent in the C.R.T.C.'s specialty hearings. Lapointe stated that Rogers had a good solid proposal which seemed to be much more ambitious than CHUM's. Alexander stated,

Rogers does have the expertise and the facilities to provide such a service. I think Rogers should have received the licence because I think they're more professional and open-minded with respect to producing music video programming.
Although Rogers was a viable contender for the music video service and would probably have invested more money than CUM/CITY into the Canadian video production industry, LaPointe believed that CUM/CITY had a historical right to that licence:

CUM/CITY claimed to be the licence by being in the business for 6 years before anyone thought it was financially viable to license a network. It may not have been that CUM/CITY won the licence as much as it was that CUM/CITY didn't lose the licence at the hearing.

Peter Fleming disagreed with this in that he found that problems existed with the Rogers Cable application which was a joint application with Molson's Breweries. Although Rogers had extensive holdings in Canadian cable, it was unclear as who was going to control the specialty service. Peter Fleming made the observation that during the hearings this application's ownership structure was heavily questioned. First, Rogers Cable was going to control full ownership, then in mid-hearing, it looked like Molson's would have control. This ownership again changed back to Rogers. The CRTC could not determine which company was actually going to control the new specialty service. Therefore Rogers Cable Systems was ruled out and the CUM/CITY Limited was granted the licence. CUM/CITY received the licence for the music video service because it convinced the Commission that it could produce a successful service.

Although Muchmusic is still very new, a dispute has already arisen among the respondents as to whether it can be
successful. Jim Monaco did not feel that Music TV would be as successful as first believed. Rather than creating a demand for its service, Music TV looked at the American experience of ATV and its own music video programming and concluded that the interest was there. (Monaco) Monaco said it did not consider the effect of Canada's small population base on the number of subscribers that could be solicited.

Music TV will probably never be able to generate the number of subscribers ATV has because many areas of Canada do not have access to cable television. According to some, cable television has been spoiled by free television and therefore may not be willing to pay the extra money for music video. He stated:

'We have one of the best cable systems anywhere in the world. We put a large number of channels into our homes. To put cable seven for one more channel may not be realistic. As a rule, a Canadian cable subscriber will say, 'That's pretty well going to cost me $25 for one more channel. Why should I do it?'

Therefore, in order to persuade an average Canadian consumer to subscribe to Music TV, the service would have to provide a very exciting channel to watch.

Jane Hodgson, formerly of Bell-Capitol Records of Canada, addressed the question of whether people would actually have the money or would want to put their money into a music video channel. Although Hodgson did not know exactly how much disposable income was available today, she did not feel there was as much as there might have been a few years ago. She felt that teens today would rather spend whatever disposal-
sable income they had on other things or save that income for a concert. Hodgson did not believe they would spend money on a music video pay channel when they could already receive much of the same video programming on conventional free television.

The music video programs on conventional television were appealing to the same market as MuchMusic. (LaPointe) Hamilton, Hodgson and Lapointe confirmed that the programming which was available on MuchMusic could be obtained on normal television with the programs such as Video Singles, Toronto Rocks, The New Music, Video Hits, and CITY's all night weekend music programming. MuchMusic's success might depend on whether people would want music video programming continually and without interruption. (Hodgson)

In order for MuchMusic to create an interest within Canada's market, it would have to air new programming which no one else used. (LaPointe; Howard) An approach to programming more innovative than that of conventional television would have to be developed. This might mean a wider playlist, concert productions, and interviews with musicians. According to Kirk Lapointe,

Subscribers are going to demand more than just back to back, wall to wall video. They're going to want information about the whole music business. Who is making the new records, who is performing the concerts, and where they are being held, who is producing albums for which record companies.
Subscribers then would have information not only about the music videos but also about the artists and their labels.

The issue of whether Muchmusic could be successful in an environment in which the audience could receive free music video programming on conventional television was addressed at the CRTC specialty services hearings. (Fleising) In a sense CHUM limited was competing with itself since CITY-TV produced and broadcasted Top Twenty Rock and The New Music. However, the Commission felt that people would consume Muchmusic's service with a totally different behavioural pattern than the "over the air" video programming on conventional television.

Because Muchmusic was a 24 hour service, it could be available to an audience on Demand. Five of the respondents observed that a person could turn on music videos at any hour of the day and enjoy as long as he wanted it. (Lapointe, Saito, Michel, Howard) With Muchmusic one did not have to be at home at five o'clock in the afternoon to see a certain music video program; viewing could occur at un-traditional hours. 'Early bird' commented on Muchmusic's availability.

I think because Muchmusic has the repeat factor which nobody else has, it will enable the service to catch the audience that the other programs miss.

Muchmusic provides an alternative to conventional music video programming. People may like the opportunity to use videos like they use at radio. According to Peter Fleising, Mu-
Music viewing would be much more ancient. Richler believed the audience would not view it conventionally in that it would not sit down in front of the television and watch an hour's worth of programming. Both Richler and Fleming agreed that teens would probably watch MuchMusic while doing their homework or having dinner. This concept represented a whole different approach to viewing music videos in Canada, behaviour patterns which Moses Richler perceived right from the very beginning. (Richler)

Dave Charles and Vince Alexander believed that MuchMusic's success would only come with time. Alexander believed that MuchMusic would have to pioneer its services on conventional television in order to attract viewers. During September 1984 and January 31, 1985, CITY-TV broadcast MuchMusic all night, Fridays and Saturdays, to introduce the new service to the Toronto audience. Charles, however, felt that MuchMusic would only become successful when the service abandoned its "dreary" format. MuchMusic would have to provide wee-jays, who could inspire, inform, and entertain. The service would also have to produce alternative programming.

Peter Fleming's assessment of MuchMusic's prospects for success was altogether different. He believed that the service was going to exceed its owners' expectations at the time of their licence application. Fleming explained:

Because the music specialty service is being marketed as a package with other services, it is getting into the homes served by cable. Although I don't know the details of the financial arrangement between MuchMusic and the cablecaster, the
fact that its getting exposure is important. MuchMusic can reuse material that they've obtained from elsewhere. Because they already have programming, production studio costs are low. Therefore they can provide a reasonably good service at a fairly attractive price and, therefore, attract a fair number of subscribers.

Anne Howard, producer at MuchMusic, also predicted that the service would be very successful. However, Howard's reasons for success differed from Fleming's. She believed there were a lot of Canadians who would buy anything that was new and therefore probably already subscribed to MuchMusic. Howard also suspected that those people, who had been deprived of an abundance of music video, would purchase MuchMusic because it would be perceived as a new and exciting service.

In reality, however, the number of subscribers which MuchMusic has signed has demonstrated that it is already successful. According to Ron Lutes, Director of Marketing at MuchMusic, Nancy Smith, Director of Public Relations and Communications at MuchMusic, and Daniel Alcalde, host of The New Music, MuchMusic has already reached the 500,000 subscriber mark. The number they were projecting to reach by the end of their third year of operation. It is too early to determine whether MuchMusic will continue to be successful.
4.5 MuchMusic's Canadian Content Commitment

With respect to the programming on MuchMusic, the CRTC again expressed the concern that it must reflect Canadian culture. Therefore, the CRTC's broadcasting policy regarding MuchMusic was developed so that the service gave Canadian artists needed exposure. Because the Canadian recording industry had not yet produced an extensive range of music videos, the new service would be established in such a way that it would stimulate increased activity in the Canadian production industry. Once again the CRTC demanded a Canadian content requirement. One of the conditions of the new service's license was that a minimum of 10% of all the music video clips broadcast on a daily basis be Canadian. This ten percent requirement would increase to 20% in the beginning of the third year of operation. (CRTC, 1984-338:7) By the beginning of the fourth year of operation there would be another increase of 5% and another increase of 5% during the fifth year. (CRTC, 1984-338:7) The new music service would be required to fulfill the same Canadian music content requirements as radio broadcasters by its fifth year of operation. These requirements, according to the Commission, would depend a great deal on the availability of Canadian videos. (CRTC, 1984-338:7)

Although the "over the air" music video program had a 20% Canadian content quota, the Commission felt that 10% was sufficient because MuchMusic was offered on a discretionary
basis. Peter Fleming explained that the Commission did not want to enforce this high percentage of Canadian content in the beginning for a number of reasons. First, there was not enough Canadian video product to fulfill a 30% requirement. Secondly, Muchmusic was being introduced into an environment which competed with "over the air" programs and the clones, which distributed MTV.

Peter Fleming explained the reason why Muchmusic's Canadian content requirement is lower than that Canadian radio stations. Radio stations which must meet the 30% quota do not have the same competition which the music video service has. When radio stations were licensed, they were only competing with each other. Muchmusic, however, has a variety of competitors with which to deal.

The quota of Canadian content required for Canada's music video service was determined by the CRTC on the recommendation of the Canadian Independent Record Producers Association (CIRPA) as well as the CICA/ICA Alliance. CIRPA recommended that the Canadian content should increase from 15% to 20% over three years and to 30% over five years. Fleming felt that this quota was sufficient since CIRPA had the cost to gain from Canadian video exposure. Its members would be lobbying for a full percentage. Muchmusic also recommended 10%. The CICA/ICA Alliance looked at its library of 2500 video tapes and concluded that it had enough Canadian videos to meet that percentage easily. (Smith)
agreement among industry sectors, the Canadian content regulation was not an issue during the hearings.

Ten out of the fifteen respondents within the music industry agreed that the C.R.T.C.'s 10% Canadian content quota was very fair. (Alexander; Charles; Howard; Green; LaPointe; Hodgson; Waters; Sinclair; Smith; Quartly) While Vince Alexander, producer of Video Singles, did not agree with the Commission's quota for broadcasting music video programs, he believed that the C.R.T.C. was correct when it assigned 10% to suchmusic. Ivan Hamilton of CFTV-FM, agreed that the C.R.T.C. considered carefully the fact that Canada has neither the population base of the United States nor record companies with the range of video productions that American labels had.

4.6 Availability of Canadian Music Videos

According to Ron Waters, the Commission understood that suchmusic's commitment of Canadian content was not an issue. The problem was the insufficient number of music videos being produced in Canada. Charles, Hodgson, Waters and Sinclair, all agreed that the Canadian content quota assigned to suchmusic reflected the number of Canadian videos available. More stringent requirements would result in an incredible repeat factor for Canadian videos. Daniel Sinclair believed that this ten percent would allow suchmusic to start off with a hit-oriented service which would attract an initial audience.
Since the CRTC approved a sliding scale which increased the amount of Canadian content from 10% to 30% over a period of five years, the question arose whether five years was too long before MuchMusic should provide 30% Canadian videos. Five out of the fifteen respondents felt that five years was a sufficient amount of time. Today there are not a lot of Canadian videos; hopefully within five years this trend will change. As new producers and videos emerge, MuchMusic will be able to fulfill that 30% very easily.

Other respondents questioned the 30% requirement. Anne Howard, producer at MuchMusic, felt this percentage might kill the service. She believed the high level of rotation which the quota would demand would overkill the group. Vince Alexander, producer of Video Singles, felt Canadian musicians did not need this content percentage. They could stand on their own two feet. 'Anybody in music video programming would support Canadian artists because their videos could stand along side any foreign product.'

There were some people within the music industry, such as Lapointe, Monaco, and Charles, who believed that too few of the Canadian videos were of the same quality as American or European videos. Kirk Lapointe credited MuchMusic with exceeding the 10% Canadian content requirement but he believes that the quality of the videos being produced by this country did not meet the same standards as the 50% foreign product. Jim Monaco felt that Canada did not have enough good
quality videos to fulfill 10% on a 24-hour basis but enough to fulfill MuchMusic's six-hour four times a day rotation. Monaco stated, however, that this service would eventually have to revise this format if it was going to survive. Dave Charles, joint communications, blamed the lack of quality of Canadian videos on limited budgets which could not cover the high production costs that come with music videos.

However, six of the respondents agreed with Alexander, in that they believed enough good quality Canadian videos have been produced to meet both the present 10% requirement and the eventual 30% requirement (Sicher, Waters, Howard, Hamilton, Orescan, Fleming).

The question of quality raised another problematic issue. Peter Fleming believed quality was a matter of personal opinion. No consensus existed to the quality level of Canadian videos. According to Ivar Hamilton of CFNY-FM, a sufficient amount of good quality Canadian videos were available. Hamilton stated that he has seen some independent videos produced for $1,000 or $2,000 which were just as innovative as the videos being made for $30,000 or $40,000. Therefore, although MuchMusic could and were fulfilling their requirement of 10%, a number of quality videos were available which MuchMusic had not even touched.

Anne Howard, producer at MuchMusic, also agreed that the percentage could be easily fulfilled but there was still a problem. Although new videos were being released a problem
existed with a lack of "back-up" videos. For example, a band like the Spoons, which had a very good video that supported an extended play, that is, an extended single with five to six songs which is used as a tool to promote a forthcoming album. They did not have a second video to expose to the public an additional selection from the album. Although the video would receive hija rotation, the question arose whether the video would be strong enough to support both an EP and an album. Howard explained,

Canadian bands aren't given the money that the American bands are, consequently they have only one video. They are not going to have a back-up video in a month because nobody's paying for that back-up video. Thus, the one video is played repeatedly.

Because of the lack of Canadian videos available today, the fear was expressed that the existing ones would be saturated and overexposed. Flemingly Green and Waters noted that videos burn out a song very fast. Ivar Hamilton agreed;

Audiences hear a record for six months straight. Even though they may tire of it at the time, a couple of months later when it is heard again its interest is revived. A video ages much more quickly. The audience loses interest in it.

According to Larry Green, a video which is too fancy or too slick has a burnout factor. A dull video burns out even more quickly. A person could not watch a video as frequently as one could listen to a song and still experience some sort of satisfaction.

Many felt that any top hit record would be overexposed whether it was played on radio or aired on MTV or MuchMusic.
According to Jim Monaco, any band which had a hit record might be overexposed even before it produced a video. Monaco hoped that this would change as more videos were produced. Whether a Canadian band’s video would be overexposed depended on the level of rotation MuchMusic assigned to the video and how many weeks the video was scheduled to be aired. One must understand, however, that overexposure was not just experienced by Canadian bands but also by international bands.

Waters, Smith, and Green disagreed because they believed that Canadian bands aired on MuchMusic would not be saturated at all. According to Ron Waters, if a Canadian video was worth playing, airing it four times a day was not too frequent. He believed that the artists would benefit from the exposure because the six hour blocks were aired at different times of the day, different people were watching each segment, and audiences would not be watching twenty-four hours a day. (Waters; Green) Because MuchMusic is not a top 40 hit-oriented service, Nancy Smith, Director of Public Relations and Communications at MuchMusic, felt Canadian videos would not be overexposed.

According to Kirk Lapointe, a year before MuchMusic was licensed, all the record companies were saying that if they had network access they would produce more videos. The advent of MuchMusic promised to challenge this assertion. The CRTC’s Canadian content requirements gave the video production industry the incentive to produce videos. A guarantee now exists that its videos will probably be aired.
The Commission's video policy is meant to stimulate increased activity within the Canadian video production industry. The CRTC attached the condition to Muchmusic's licence that it was required to contribute 2.4% of its gross revenues of $100,000 per year, whichever was the greatest, to a video production incentive fund. (CRTC, 1984-338:5) This incentive fund would be administered by an independent advisory board entitled, "Foundation to Aid Canadian Talent on Video" (VIDEFACT). The board would consist of two representatives from the Muchmusic network, two from "various other disciplines inside the music business," and three other members. (CRTC, 1984-338:5) The VIDEFACT would be under the Chairmanship of Bernie Pinklestein. The Commission hoped to increase the amount of Muchmusic's contributions as revenues permitted. (CRTC, 84-338, 1984:6).

Eleven out of the fifteen respondents believed that the Commission's policy would stimulate the video production industry within Canada. (Brescan; Howard; Fleming; Alexander; Smith; Lapointe; Hamilton; Levers; Richler; Monaco) Daniel Richler believed that the people at Muchmusic were concerned with reflecting Canadian rather than American culture. As Muchmusic expands, production would not only come out of Toronto but also from other parts of Canada. (Richler) Fleming foresaw an increase in the number of new artists, as well as those artists not formerly considered capable of producing hit-oriented material.
Lapointe, Howard and Fleming credited VIDEOPACT in that it had already assisted in music video production. According to Peter Fleming, VIDEOPACT has already funded about eight or ten videos, perhaps even more than that. This represents a jump in production which would not otherwise have occurred.

Jane Hodgeson stated VIDEOPACT would encourage struggling bands which had not been signed with a label. She also believed that smaller record companies, such as Current or Sony records, would now have a chance to participate in the video marketplace. Kirk Lapointe of WHIRLPOOL agreed with Hodgeson in that, no one recognized, three to four of the people who received the second round of VIDEOPACT grants. The remainder were either not signed with any record company or were with extremely small independent record labels.

4.7 MUCHMUSIC'S OPEN ACCESS POLICY

In order to fulfill another objective of the Commission's cultural policy, MUCHMUSIC in its application assured the CRTC that it would maintain a policy of open access. The Commission did not want the service to devote its programming exclusively to the presentation of music videos by established Canadian artists, who might have the funds to produce elaborate videos. (CRTC, 1984-338:10) The new music service was expected to offer equal access to new bands and artists whose videos met the licensee's minimum standards of acceptability.
also in order to fulfill the objective of diversity and the need to represent all aspects of Canadian culture, the C.R.I.C. required that MuchMusic would have to broadcast some music videos in the French language. Only a small number of French-language video clips are currently available in Canada. Approximately 10 of all the network's videos broadcasted would be in French. (CRTC, 1984-338:5) However, the commission expected the network to make every effort to increase the exposure of French-speaking Canadian artists on its service and to use whatever French-language videos were available.

Five of the respondents felt that MuchMusic would have no problem in fulfilling this objective since the programmers were hungry for the Canadian video product. (Hodgeson; Donaco; Green; Fleming; Charles) Jim Donaco, stated that as a result of the shortage of Canadian product, MuchMusic would play anything that met a very low quality standard. In order to provide equal access to all artists MuchMusic would also be attracted to videos which were not "hit-oriented" but were similar to that of an album cut or a FM-radio type format. (Hodgeson)

There was a general feeling throughout the music industry that the people working at MuchMusic would give every Canadian artist a fair chance at having their video aired on the channel. (Orens; LaPointe; Fleming; Charles; Kichler) On the average a music video had about a fifty percent chance
or being aired on ATV's schedule. (Bell, 1983:93) However, CITY-TV's programming practices illustrated that it had been fairly adventurous in what it would play. (Pleasing) This was attributable to the people who worked at CITY-TV and who worked for MuchMusic. Mark Lapointe commented on MuchMusic's staff,

I think the culture of their people is extremely good. They're highly motivated and satisfied people. They believe that they have a wider market of talent from which to choose. They enjoy going to the local clubs, seeing all the concerts, listening to all the available radio, absorbing all the records. Because they are committed to music, the opportunities for a Canadian musician probably are well served.

Daniel Richler agreed with Lapointe in that the employees at CITY-TV and MuchMusic were committed to their music and were very open minded with respect to new talent.

According to Lapointe, the system of programming at MuchMusic was very similar to the programming of radio. For instance, when rock'n'roll began in the fifties, an artist was able to bring a record into a radio station one morning and have it on the air that afternoon. The same could be true at MuchMusic. MuchMusic's programming was set up so that the channel could act quickly and could react immediately to developments within the industry. Richler and Charles agreed with Lapointe in that an artist could essentially go to John Martin, producer at MuchMusic, with a video and know within the next couple of days Martin would view it. If the video met MuchMusic's standards, the chances of
the video being aired were very high. Canadian artists were encouraged when CHUMUSIC Limited obtained the licence. Their approach was not the clinical one which some of the competing applicants might have used.

Six out of the thirteen respondents believed that the technical standards represented the only restriction which Mucamusic would place upon a Canadian video. (Waters; Orescan; Smith; Hogson; Fleming; Charles) Mucamusic is very supportive of Canadian bands and plays a lot of "street videos," that is non professional videos. Therefore, the artists were not required to have a recording contract. (Orescan; Smith) Both Jim Monaco, AX Records, and Larry Green, AV Records, both pointed out that, because the channel was still very new, this open access policy might disappear.

4.8 MUCAMUSIC'S LICENCE TO BE REVIEWED IN 1986

Monaco and Green questioned whether the CRTC would enforce the policy of Canadian content, diversity of programming, and open and equal access when the Mucamusic licence is reviewed in 1986. Monaco, Alexander, and Howard believed the Commission would be very lenient with Mucamusic's policy for the fear that the channel would be unsuccessful. Because music video was a new industry in Canada, the CRTC could do as much as it could to keep the service on the air. However, others, Hamilton and Green, for example, disagreed. Because Mucamusic was a new industry
and the first music video channel in Canada, the Commission could be expected to enforce the policy to its fullest. Nancy Smith and Ron Waters, both employees at MuchMusic did not think enforcement would be an issue because MuchMusic would have no problem fulfilling any of the regulations in the future. Daniel Richler, host of The New Music, and Jane Hodgson, formerly of MCA-Capitol Records, also believed that Canadian content would not be an issue because they viewed the CRTC as ineffective. Hodgson felt that the people within the Commission did not understand the recording industry. Richler stated that if MuchMusic was not financially successful and was not fulfilling its policy within two years, the people involved with MuchMusic should not be in the business at all.

Peter Fleming believed that the Commission would be flexible in its approach at the time of the two year review. Fleming explained,

It will really depend on why they’re not successful...we don’t want to see them go down the tubes. You won’t get blood from a stone, you won’t get 100% Canadian content if it isn’t there. If it means not going up to 30% after two years, it’s something the Commission will consider.
4.9 CONCERNS REGARDING THE SPECIALTY SERVICE POLICY

4.9.1 Carriage of Foreign Specialty Services

Two concerns were expressed by Canada's music industry regarding MuchMusic's policy. One was the fact that the Commission was allowing cable companies, who carried MuchMusic or Canada's sports network, TSN, to distribute the Nashville Channel and the Country Music Channel, two American country music channels. This decision created the concern that these channels would draw the audience away from MuchMusic. Don Waters, Director of Marketing at MuchMusic, stated,

"We were very disappointed that the CRTC permitted these two services. We told the Commission when we applied that we would play country and western. We would play all types of music and we're doing that. We didn't feel it was necessary to offer another music service. The problem which exists is how to categorize country/western and rock. There's a line line at which the two types of music begin to converge. It's just the definition of country and western and we really don't need any competition.

Waters felt it was hard enough to sell a discretionary service: MuchMusic did not need the competition of another music channel.

Peter Fleming, Jase Hodgeson and Paul Orescan did not feel the Nashville Network would be directly competing with MuchMusic. They believed that, since these channels were geared to a key market, they had different audiences. According to Peter Fleming, the Nashville Network was not a video channel in the same way MuchMusic was. Although the Network did air country and western videos, it was similar
to a regular broadcasting channel in that it also showed second run cowboy movies and news type programs. Therefore with this in mind, the C.A.T.C. did not see the channel as particularly competitive with MuchMusic.

4.9.2 Satellite Distribution of MTV in Canada

The second concern expressed by the staff at MuchMusic was the fact that satellite dish owners, such as bars and hotels, were still distributing MTV. Since the regulations regarding satellite dishes were the jurisdiction of the Department of Communications, the C.A.T.C. could not force these people to distribute MuchMusic. The respondents addressed the question of whether regulation which attempted to preserve Canadian identity as a whole should be allowed to infringe upon individual rights. While in theory it would be best to ban MTV to support MuchMusic, one man, Green, Alexander and others felt that MuchMusic had no choice; it was up to the individual to decide which signal he would like to receive.

Hodgeson and Howard disagreed in that they felt MTV should be banned. If Canada had the initiative to produce a music-video channel of its own, then the country should also develop the support systems the specialty service would need to survive. According to Hodgeson, it was easier were going to pipe in a music-video service than they should be pumping in MuchMusic. Four of the fifteen respondents agreed but
owners should support the new music service. Rather than achieving this end through regulation, incentives should be provided to cable owners to distribute MuchMusic. (Monaco, Waters, Smith, LaPointe) A bar audience was a captive one in that it could not change the channel. Only the owner had control over that dial. It would be very doubtful that his patrons would demand MuchMusic instead of MTV. (Monaco) Therefore, MuchMusic started to provide incentives to bar owners to drop MTV and pick up MuchMusic.

Both cable companies and MuchMusic were enticing many owners the music video service free since they saw this as free advertising. The bar clientele exposed to MuchMusic would order the service from their cable companies. According to Waters, if cable companies did not charge the bar owners for that service, then MuchMusic would not charge that cable company. MuchMusic would also make available coasters, matches, and signs with the service's logo to any bar owner who distributed the channel. (Waters) Another incentive was that MuchMusic would provide national advertising for the bar owner. MuchMusic would send out producers and cameras to actually film and produce a short clip about the bar which in turn would be broadcasted on the service.

This new specialty service may give the Canadian music industry the opportunity it needs. In order for this service to work in the best interest of both Canadian musicians and
Canada's recording industry, the CRTC must ensure that the incentive fund for Canadian music video production as well as the Canadian content regulations continue. Although the regulation of MuchMusic represented just a small portion of the Commission's overall cultural policy, there seems to be a general feeling within the music industry that the policy may give Canadian musicians a small yet extra opportunity to express and sell their music in an already foreign-dominated industry. The final issue which the CRTC must address is the illegal reception of the American Music Network especially in areas where the MuchMusic Network is available. If the Canadian public continues to be allowed to receive MTV at no cost, Canada's new music video service will have a more difficult time competing with MTV.
Chapter V
FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN MUSIC INDUSTRY

5.1 WILL MUSIC VIDEOS SURVIVE?

A consideration of the future of music videos must begin with the question of whether this interest in the new medium will eventually fizzle out. One can predict that the basic three minute video will probably survive as a promotional vehicle. The main reason for this, according to Daniel Kier-
chier, is that Canadians are spending more time watching television and motion pictures than any other time in history. Jane Housson agreed that the market most record companies were trying to reach were very MTV-oriented. Audiences liked to see what they were hearing. Record companies, however, would probably not produce as many videos. Instead of every hit single having a video, they might produce only one or two videos to accompany songs from a certain album.

According to Dave Charles of Joint Communications, Canada has only experienced the "tip of the iceberg" within its music industry. He explained:

Now you're seeing only one or two music channels. An analogy must be made to radio stations. As the marketplace grows lower budget, more innovative, more basement type services will emerge which will probably service the cable channels, local community channels. I think music video will develop a following similar to that of FM.
The U.S. experience provides an interesting example. MTV was, at first, the only music video service. Then the Nashville Network and the Country Music Channel emerged as two alternative music video services. Robert Quarty (video producer/director) said that there would be about 3 major twenty-four hour cable music networks within the United States by the end of 1985. This prediction may be somewhat unrealistic. For example, Ted Turner in Los Angeles, tried to create an alternative to MTV. However, MTV eventually bought out Turner in order to prevent competition in the field.

Most respondents believed that the music video carried as a specialty service would find a permanent place in the music environment. Peter Fleming of the CBC, Paul Crescenzi of MCA Records, and Anne Howard of MuchMusic, agreed that since music video was a young industry, people viewed it as new and exciting. They believed, however, that this interest would level off. Crescenzi commented:

I think like anything that's new and exciting after the peak things level out. A plateau will be reached with videos. I don't believe, however, that they will fizzle out. There will always be room for it.

Fleming agreed:

I don't think people will loose interest in it completely. But I don't think it will be as high an interest as it is right now. People get burnt out on videos very quickly.

Kirk LaPointe of Billboard Magazine referred to studies done by MTV in the United States, which demonstrated MTV's audience interest. LaPointe stated:
I think the interest is leveling off already. I think the studies that MTV is doing in the United States about the audience that it’s reaching shows that audience attention has pretty well tapered off. I think the average is somewhere around forty-five minutes a day of watching. And I don’t think it’s going to go much beyond that.

Seven out of the fifteen respondents believed that in order to maintain the consumer’s interest, music video would have to change. (Alexander; Quarty; Lurie; Mayer; Waters; Smith; Hamilton) Lurie, related music to the history of rock music.

It’s not unlike what happened to rock music when it first started. It was lively and very fresh for awhile and then it went through a tremendously stagnant period. It took something to shake it up and I don’t know what’s going to shake up video. Many people say that one of the things that may shake it up is the cost of videos. Things that are really mass level style and charge much the same way that punk shook up rock music in the late ’70s.

Vincent Alexander explained that some kind of purpose must be developed for watching music videos. Because music has changed over the last years, radio did not lose its audience’s interest. For example, music which fell into the category of rock’n’roll 30 years ago, such as the Beatles, was now classified as middle of the road (M-O-R) music. New forms of music are now called rock’n’roll.
5.2 NEW FORMS OF MUSIC VIDEO

Some respondents thought that there was a glut of video clip programs and suggested that music video programming would have to develop into other areas in order to maintain audience interest. (Hamilton, Alexander, Richer, Waters, LaPointe, Smith) Although Robert Quairly agreed that music video programming must develop, he stated that the music video clip would always appeal to the younger audience. He explained:

I think we are going to see new forms of music video. I think you have to understand the demographics to which music video is appealing. Change is necessary for the market of those over thirty because their interest in video is likely to wane. The people who are consuming music video, are 25 years old and younger. They are watching music video not just as an entertainment form but from a special point of view. For example, they teach one how to dress. The power of video goes beyond just entertainment. So in that respect maybe it will fizzle out in its present form for people over 25. The need for new conventions and new ways of expressing visual music is certainly present. But for the younger demographics, the clip is here for awhile.

Music video has already developed beyond the clip, for example, the video short. Both Michael Jackson (Thriller) and David Bowie (Jazzin' With Blue Jean) produced twenty minute music videos which contained storylines, actors, dialogue as well as music. Fashion video, which introduces the latest style of clothing, his developed. Music video has also found its way into prime time television programs. One example is Miami Vice, NBC's fast moving, cops-under-cover program. According to Rolling Stone Magazine, this show was created, at least in part, with the "specific intention of
capitalizing on music video camera and editing techniques." (Turah, 1984:134) Each show has a section which is edited to music, such as Phil Collins' "In the Air Tonight."

Music video programming will probably develop into shows which have more variety than programs that are continuous video jukeboxes. According to Ivar Hamilton, these programs will need to be a bit more open. For example, they will have to give more background into what is happening with the artists and their music. In the summer of 1984, Vicie Alexander, producer of Video Sampler, began to develop a new direction in video programming. He explained:

I realized that the next step after all these clip shows was to develop program themes for videos. For example, in radio terms, there would be the production of "foreground programming," and one would take the clips and utilize them to fit a program.

Daniel Ricardor agreed with Alexander but he also projected that music video would develop further, into 3-D and "do-it-yourself" videos. Ricardor commented on these developments:

The next thing we can look forward to in the do-it-yourself videos where the videos will have multiple parts that one can join together to create his own interpretation of the video. There will be holograms. Rick Jagger will be dining in your living room in 3-D. It will be a reality by the end of the century, I promise.
5.3 **MORE FUNDS ARE NEEDED WITHIN CANADA'S MUSIC INDUSTRY**

In order to encourage the Canadian production of both music video clips and programming, more funds must be made available. Lapointe explained that it was going to take a lot more money than MuchMusic's commitment of $100,000 or 2.4% of their annual revenues. Canada aid to produce video and programming which would be able to stand alongside any international product. Lapointe pointed out that the American industry had ten times the market of Canada and, therefore, would be able to spend ten times the money in production. He believed Canada's music video producers and directors would not be able to stay in the industry much longer since they were receiving "peanuts" for what they were producing.

Canada had to find a way to start recouping some of those video production expenses. Both Larry Green and Kirk Lapointe projected that Canada's music industry was going to see record companies start charging for the use of their videos. Green explained the charges for top artists' videos:

> At WEA we have the first contract available, for instance, for clips and video pools where they're actually paying for the right to use a video. I've never given videos to clips or pools for just open use. The money comes back to the record company and we in turn pay for administration and our duplication. Any extra money would go back to the artist. The cost of producing video is high. But the cost for Canadian record companies who are bringing in American or international videos and duplicating them is also extremely high. This is because clips demand 1/2" video tape rather than the 3/4" format or the 1/2" format used by Beta and VHS. The narrower tape standards do not permit the same sound and video quality as the one-inch does. So for clips and pools, we are making 1/2" available, but my costs have escalated 60 or 70%.
record companies wishing to encourage Canadian artists by producing videos would have to either charge for their use, raise record prices, drop the number of artists, or create more markets.

Canada's recording industry evolved on an ad hoc basis without the direction created by government or industry policy. There was no set rule; what worked for one band would not work for another; and what worked one year would not work the next year. According to June Hedgeson, formerly of Capitol Records-MCA, the only rules which have been in effect have been the Canadian content regulations on radio and MuchMusic's policy. Hedgeson stated that the recording industry is just a big game of chance with a great deal of money at stake; it is a winner take all situation, played without any rules.

5.3.1 Royalties For Video Airplay

Although the Department of Communications had been developing a policy for Canada's recording industry, Canadian artists have lost millions of dollars during the years 1980 - 1983 because this framework had not yet been formulated. Jim Monaco of A&M Records, commented:

The publisher's copyright laws in Canada are 55 years old. As soon as those are straightened out, they are going to affect video too. We're trying to set up a system now whereby artists will be able to collect royalties for video airplay. The scheme does not exist at the present time.
Dave Charles agreed there should be a royalty fee paid every time a video was aired:

I think producers, and people involved in a production should be entitled to remuneration. There has to be some sort of gratuity all the way down so a video producer can see some return if his video is popular and played a lot.

Music video should be like a record in that it should receive a residual each time it was aired.

5.3.2 Funds Towards Education

Dave Charles and Larry Bellance agreed that, in order to be successful, Canada's music industry must create a world market and stop catering to the Canadian public and the C.C.I.T.C. According to Charles, Canadian records should be allowed to compete with others in that classification in the world market. However, in order to compete in these world markets, Larry Green said that Canadians must start producing compatible, competitive, international quality music which would stand alongside foreign-produced music. Again, in order to generate a quality product, more funding will be needed.

Larry Green felt the government should get involved and establish some funding for young producers and engineers. He described how this type of funding could work:

"In my view, the government would have been better spending several million dollars in sending young producers and engineers to creative centres throughout the world and teach them how to be competitive internationally. They must learn what to look for, how to produce, and how to engineer. And then have them come back."
Once these people returned to Canada and created Canadian products of international quality then, according to Green, the C.I.T.C. could impose their Canadian Content regulations without any problems. The music industry could also use government funding for touring facilities outside of Canada as well as production equipment. This would also help them compete in the world market.

5.3.3 Funding of Demo Tapes

Ron Waters of Such Music believed funding, whether it be from the government or the industry itself, should be at ground level. He would like to see assistance that would allow artists to make demo tapes which would enable them to be introduced into the major market. Waters would like see a basement band be able to go out and record a demo tape which it might never have had the chance to do without some form of funding.

5.3.4 Artist and Repertoire

Jane Hodgson believed there was a need for government funding in order to introduce Canadian artists to major as well as world markets. But she thought this funding should be given to the artist and repertoire (A&R) area of the recording industry. The A&R people are the ones who scout for new artists, sign them with the record companies and explain to them their legal and publishing rights. Since the A&R de-
participation was very important to the music business, Hodgeson felt there was a need for more people scouting for good, undiscovered talent.

Once these artists had been discovered, Hodgeson felt the music industry then had to groom them for an audience. This would include providing them with interviewing techniques and with suggestions on their style or dress. New Canadian artists do not have the resources or the ability to put together an image that would appeal to an international audience. They did not understand what it was to be successful and some did not even know how to portray themselves in an interview. Hodgeson believed this time spent with the artist would be very important and the process would demand some sort of funding. She herself was not sure whether this funding should come from FACTOA, VIDEOFACT, the record companies, or the government.

5.3.5 Fleming's Reactions

Peter Fleming reacted to these suggestions on music funding by stating, first that these requests did not fall under the jurisdiction of the C.A.T.C. and second, that a greater commitment was needed from the major record companies in developing Canadian talent. He explained:

First of all we don't control VIDEOFACT. It is controlled by a board of directors and we didn't even say in the policy that we should get access to that money. We did encourage them, however, to try and have a wide selection of artists. If you are VIDEOFACT and someone seeks funding for an artist such as Bryan Adams and you know he doesn't need
the money, you're probably not going to give it to him. So I think there's a control on that. Hodgson's suggestion on ASC might be something that's worth investigating. The C.R.T.C. does not have the money to do those kind of things. The Department of Communication might want to introduce this in their recording industry policy. It's not something the Commission has any control over at all. We're really a reactive body in most things. When somebody comes forward and suggests that they would like to do something, for example a bunch of broadcasters came forward and said they would like to put money into ASC would be a good idea. It would then become a condition of their licence. But it's not the sort of thing that we would push too much because it's getting pretty thin out of the field of broadcasting.

Fleising, however, would like to see major record companies putting some money into the development of Canadian artists. He felt the record companies had already taken a great deal of money out of the country. Jim Monaco seemed to agree with Fleising. He felt that the big record labels, such as RCA Records, CBS Records, and RCA Records, had not contributed anything to the Canadian music industry. According to Monaco, it was only during the years 1981 - 1983 that these companies had been signing any Canadian artists at all.

5.4 SUGGESTIONS TOWARDS REVISIONING THE C.R.T.C.'S CULTURAL POLICY

Although most people felt that the C.R.T.C.'s broadcasting regulations were helpful and should continue to exist, these people also felt that percentage of Canadian Content should be reviewed. Paul Desrosiers stated that since the music industry was defined as a free enterprise, there was a definite feeling that no more regulation should be introduced.
However, it was felt that the government should take its time and review the music video industry's impact on Canada's music industry to determine which problems might arise, rather than implementing a "hot" or regulation that might hamper Canadian artists.

Alexander, Green, Hamilton, Howard, Leslie and Waters felt the Canadian content percentage of 30% was too high and should be decreased. According to Larry Leslie, half of the programmers in broadcasting were spending about a quarter of their time thinking about how they could beat the CRTC by circumventing regulations. Leslie suggests that the radio industry be required by the CRTC to broadcast 15% of new Canadian content. Anne Howard of Muchmusic, suggested that the specialty service should be required to broadcast a maximum of 20% Canadian videos a day. Larry Green suggested that if 30% was to be enforced, the averaging should be done on a six-month rather than a daily basis. Green stated that Canada's recording industry could not turn out 30% content for radio and this had been demonstrated in the past few years. Green felt that a six-month period would allow the recording industry to give broadcasters more product to choose from instead of reverting back to the Gordon Lightfoot and the Joni Mitchell's. Jim Tobacco of Adult Records, did not want the CRTC to remove the Canadian content regulations altogether. However, he would have liked to have seen the Commission enforce them regularly.
Dave Charles seemed to be the only respondent who felt the C.R.I.C. should be removed from the broadcast industry altogether. He explained:

First of all abolish the C.R.I.C. give the taxpayers a lot of money and through the social insurance fund. We can't believe the licence, allow them to hold the public trust in mind. The Canadian Association of Broadcasters (CAB) through its regional groups should scrutinize the industry.

In Ontario it's the Centennial Association of Broadcasters. Coordinate policy and permit the C.A.B. to police its own system and make any public inquiries to make sure the quality and the letter of the broadcast code of ethics have been maintained. Broadcasters are business people first of all. They know if their product is offensive or inferior they will lose. If they'll lose everything at stake, I think the Commission should be allowed to exist in this country.

Under the current status with the Commission holding licences and scrutinizing every nut and bolt, we don't have an opportunity as broadcasters to truly see that level of competition. With regards to Canadian content policy on both video and audio, I think the best record deserves to get played and that the end of the issue is permitting competition. The winner of the competition is the best record and artist. Who determines the best? The music directors, the public and record sales.

Charles believed this system would allow the best record or video to be played. The best would be determined by the marketplace forces in the industry not by Canadian content.

Since the majority of the respondents within Canada's music industry feel the C.R.I.C.'s cultural policy and insisted many Canadian artists are still not so favored, one could disagree with Dave Charles that the Commission should be abolished. However, the respondents strongly recommended that the Commission that wasn't so favor to the existing...
cultural policy affecting Canada's music industry. It was suggested that the government evolve a policy to permit a Canadian artist to receive royalty payment each time his video was aired. It was also suggested that the Canadian content percentage on radio be decreased until Canadian artists could produce a quality product which could compete internationally.

The respondents strongly suggested that Canadian artists had to look beyond the domestic market to world markets. However, for an artist to compete in the international market the Canadian music industry needed funding, in order to develop the country's artists, its record industry, as well as its music video industry. The respondents did not state who should provide this funding, whether it should be the Canadian government, the record companies or outside sources.

Although Canada's music video industry is young, the respondents recommend that programmers of the new medium be aware that the success it is experiencing now will not last. Canadian music video programming must change throughout the years in order to maintain its audience's interest. All Canadian music videos must achieve high quality so that they can stand alongside any foreign product in order to best benefit Canada's artists. If a Canadian artist has a quality record and an equally competitive video to accompany it, he should have no problem achieving the success he desires in the international music market.
Chapter VI
CONCLUSIONS

At the present time the C.I.F.C.'s Canadian Content policy has provided an incentive for Canada's recording industry as well as the country's music video industry to foster Canadian music and artists. Before the Commission could formulate any policy with respect to the music industry, it first had to consider a variety of interests. The Commission had to develop a policy which was in the best interest of Canadian record and video producers, the recording and broadcasting industries, the Canadian musician as well as the Canadian public. With this in mind, the Commission did not directly regulate the recording industry in terms of the music produced but instead implemented Canadian Content regulations upon the country's broadcasting system. One of the most encouraging points drawn from this study was the fact that the respondents from various interest groups among the music industry were in agreement on certain issues regarding the C.I.F.C.'s policy with respect to Canada's music industry.

Although the respondents believed recorded music has been a dominant cultural force in our society, they all agreed that Canada's recording industry should not be directly reg-
ulated. Even Peter Froning of the C.A.T.C. suggested that direct regulation would be difficult and a policy of incentives would more likely be accepted. Since the respondents felt the recording industry was already fostering Canadian talent and providing industry incentives, such as FACTOR, there was no need for government regulation. It was believed that the recording industry needed multinational record companies in order to support Canadian music. The investment funds needed to produce Canadian records was just not available in Canada.

There was universal agreement among the respondents that the initial application of the Commission's Canadian Content regulations to radio assisted the Canadian music industry a great deal. It was believed that these regulations forced a lot of radio stations to play Canadian music. The Canadian Content rules resulted in an increase in the number of Canadian artists and gave new independent record companies a chance to evolve. The respondents, however, also agreed that today, these regulations are detrimental to a certain extent. Many felt that the Canadian Content quota of 30% was too high. As a result, a number of successful Canadian artists were being overexposed. Currently, there is just not enough Canadian product to fulfill this quota. It was also agreed that although these broadcast regulations should not be abolished, the quota should either be decreased or it should be averaged over a longer time period. This prece-
tage should be determined by the extent of Canadian quality product available.

Due to the introduction of music video programming and the new music video specialty service, the C.R.T.C.'s cultural policy had to develop in order to include this new medium. There was an agreement among the broadcast respondents that the Canadian Content quota of 30% was too high for "art-oriented" music video programs, such as Video Singles, but sufficient for more innovative video programs, such as The New Music. However, unanimity among the respondents with regard to the 10% quota implemented on MuchMusic. It was believed that this requirement was adequate since there are enough Canadian videos of good quality available. Whether there would be enough Canadian videos to fulfill the 30% quota projected for the future was doubtful. Many of the respondents believed that MuchMusic's Canadian Content requirement should never have to meet the 30% requirement for fear of overexposure of successful Canadian artists as has occurred in other areas. The music industry agreed that if there were high-quality Canadian videos available, they would be broadcast with or without regulation. Even Peter Fleming stated that the C.R.T.C. would be flexible in enforcing this 10% content quota if Canadian videos were not available.

There was also agreement among the respondents that the policy regarding MuchMusic would benefit Canadian musicians
and increase the production of Canadian videos. They felt the policy had provided incentives, such as VideoFACT, to encourage the video production industry. The policy stated that all Canadian artists should have equal access to video exposure on the new service. The respondents believed that due to this condition and MuchMusic's supportive staff, all Canadian quality videos would have an equal chance of receiving airplay on MuchMusic. There seemed to be a disagreement, however, on whether the C.R.T.C. would continue to enforce the policy with regard to MuchMusic in the future. Some respondents believed that the product would be available, therefore, there would be no need for enforcement. However, others including Peter Fleming, felt the C.R.T.C. would be fairly lenient in regulating this policy. The regulation would again be determined by the amount of Canadian content available as well as the success of MuchMusic.

Since all the respondents saw the music video as an excellent marketing tool for exposing Canadian artists and their music, they believed that the video clip and MuchMusic would survive. In order to survive, however, the respondents agreed that the medium would have to develop into other areas, such as innovative programming. Although there was disagreement as to whether music video had increased record sales, all the respondents believed the new medium had either been helpful or had created a major change in Canada's recording industry. Music video had assisted Canadian musi-
cians in expanding their domestic and international audiences. However, this assistance was accompanied by the enormous video production costs. These high video expenses might had resulted in a decrease in the investment which record companies had made in Canadian artists and Canadian music. Although, a video was not included into every Canadian record contract, a Canadian artist needed a video in order to compete in the international market.

When considering the relationship between music video and Canadian album sales, there was unanimity among the respondents from the music industry. They believed that in order to achieve success, a Canadian artist needs international sales. A Canadian artist could not achieve real success within his own country because Canada does not have the record buying population base needed to recover recording costs. Many believed that for an artist to obtain international success, he needed a highly competitive record as well as a quality produced music video to introduce his music to the world market. In order to reach this market and produce a high quality record and video, funding was a necessity. Therefore, the respondents agreed that the government should not be spending money and time developing content regulations but it should be placing that money into the funding of either Canadian record and video production, education for young producers and engineers, or the production of demo tapes. Once some funding was provided by the government and
the industry itself, an internationally competitive product would be available. The respondents believed that if this product existed, it would have no problem receiving exposure. On the basis of the study, the following conclusions may be summarized.

6.1 SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

6.1.1 Music Video's Impact

1. The impact of music video in Canada has not been as great as it has in the United States since the medium is still very new in Canada.

2. Sound is still the first and foremost element. A music video is considered only if the music has merit.

3. Canadians do use music video to promote and expose their artists.

4. There is a debate as to whether music video is actually increasing record sales within Canada.

6.1.2 Regulating Canada's Recording Industry

1. Canada's recording industry should not be directly regulated in terms of what kind of music is produced, e.g., an indigenous 'Canadian' music.

2. Canada's recording industry has already fostered Canadian talent and is providing incentives for Canadian music production.
3. The multinational record companies are needed in Canada in order to support Canadian music. An isolated Canadian market cannot support the investment in record production which would produce a product competitive against imported records.

6.1.3 Canadian Cultural Policy

1. The initial application of the content regulations upon radio assisted the Canadian music industry a great deal.

2. These regulations are now seen as detrimental in that 30% is too high and overexposing successful Canadian artists.

3. The Canadian content regulations should not be abolished but the quota should either be decreased or averaged over a longer period of time.

4. The content quota should be decreased for "hit-oriented" video programs but should remain at 30% for the more innovative video programs.

5. The 10% MuchMusic quota is justified because there are enough Canadian videos available.

6. The projected 30% for MuchMusic in the future is unrealistic.

7. The policy with regard to MuchMusic would benefit Canadian musicians and would increase the production of Canadian videos.
8. Much music and the video clip will survive. However, music video programming will have to develop into other areas such as innovative programming and the video short.

6.1.4 Canada's Music Industry

1. Music video has assisted Canadian musicians in expanding their domestic and international audiences. However, this assistance was accompanied by the high video production costs.

2. High video expenses have resulted in a decrease in the investment which record companies have made in Canadian artists and Canadian music.

3. In order to recoup production costs, record companies must either receive royalty payments on their videos, charge for the use of their videos, and/or create world markets for their artists.

4. For a Canadian artist to achieve success, he/she has to look to world markets because Canada does not have the record-buying population base needed to recoup recording and video production costs.

5. Canadian artists need to have a highly competitive record as well as a quality produced music video to introduce themselves to a world market.
6. Funding either by the government or the industry itself, is a necessity.

7. The government should not spend any more time and money on developing the content regulations but should place that money and time into the funding of either Canadian record or video production, demo tape production, education for young producers and engineers, or into the development of the artist and repertoire departments.

8. Once the Canadian product exists, then the government should review its Canadian cultural policy to ensure this Canadian product does in fact receive exposure.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to provide an appropriate environment which would be conducive to creativity and growth for Canadian musicians and the Canadian music industry, the government should take the above conclusions into consideration. Since the music industry is very much universal in nature, Canadian produced music which is a part of the industry is not necessarily expressing Canada's culture. Therefore, the government should direct its attention to preserving a Canadian record and music video industry because without the expertise and technological facilities to support competitive and exportable music product, presumably there is no basis for supporting a distributable "Canadian" music.
In order to maintain a stable music industry in Canada, the government along with the record companies must provide some sort of funding so that all Canadian musicians will have the opportunity to compete within the world market. Record companies must continue to foster Canadian talent as well as develop an industry policy to recoup video production expenses. Since the music video is an excellent marketing tool and Canadian artists utilize it to introduce their music to the public, a royalty free policy similar to that of records on radio may be more favourable than the actual charging—or each video.

If both the Canadian music industry and the government act on the above recommendations, Canadian product both on video and record will be available. Once that product exists, appropriate content regulations will assist in ensuring its exposure. Government regulation within Canada's music industry should be minimal. If funding produces a record or video of high acceptability, Canadian or not, it will be exposed to the public and will be able to compete in the international market which is still within the Canadian public interests since the industry uses predominantly Canadian talent and resources.
Chapter VII

NOTES

[1]

Sponsoring Organizations of the Foundation to Assist
Canadian Talent on Records

1. CHUM Limited
2. Molat Communications Limited
3. Rogers Radio Broadcasting Limited
4. Canadian Music Publishers Association
5. P.A.O. Canada Limited
6. Eastern Sound Studios
7. Western International Communications Limited
8. United Media Studios Limited
9. The Little Mountain Sound Studios
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