Impression formation as a function of source credibility, locus of control and dogmatism.

Stuart K. Travis  
*University of Windsor*

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Impression Formation as a Function of Source Credibility, Locus of Control; and Dogmatism

by

Stuart K. Travis
B.A., University of Lethbridge, 1977

A Masters Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies through the Department of Psychology in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at the University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario/Canada
1974
ABSTRACT

In the area of impression formation, a new paradigm recently explored the effects of source credibility on the communication of another person's attributes. Source credibility was determined by prescaled occupational titles, while prescaled adjectives were used as stimulus attributes. Subjects rated evaluatively men described in a sentence by either a high or low credible source as having either positive or negative attributes.

The purpose of this study was the exploratory addition to this social-influence, impression-formation paradigm of the receiver personality variables of internal-external control (I-E) and dogmatism. Both the I-E and dogmatism scales were administered to undergraduate male students randomly chosen from the upper one-third (externals) and lower one-third (internals) of the I-E distribution. The impression formation paradigm, which was modified to eliminate possible artifacts, was presented to these subjects in the form of a questionnaire.

Results tended to support the hypotheses that internals would not be differentially influenced by source credibility while externals would be. No support was found for the prediction that externals would be negatively influenced by a very low credible source relative to internals. Support was found for the prediction that both externals and dogmatics would appear to rely on arbitrary reinforcement, as derived from external authority. The possible effect of demand characteristics on the impression formation paradigm, as determined by a Post-Questionnaire Survey, was discussed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

To Dr. H. Dale Woodyard, I wish to express profound gratitude for his direction, helpful suggestions, and valuable criticisms in this study. I would also like to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Henry L. Minton and Dr. Frank W. Schneider, for their helpful comments and contributions. Dr. A. Arthur Smith provided valuable help in the statistical analysis. Gratitude is expressed to Dr. Wolfgang G. Bringman, Dr. David V. Reynolds, Dr. Byron P. Rourke, Dr. Robert R. Orr, and their students for their class time used in this study. I am indebted to William Garrett, for administering the personality scales, and to both Elizabeth Havelock and Larry Coutts for judging the Post-Questionnaire Survey. Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Doreen, for her help, support and encouragement.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Background and Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Method</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Results</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV Discussion</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REFERENCES</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX C</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX D</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX E</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX F</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA AUCTORIS</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Summary of the ANOVA of mean favorability scores for internal-external control, source value, and adjective type</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mean favorability as a function of source value and adjective type</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Summary of the ANOVA of mean favorability scores for dogmatism, source value, and adjective type</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mean favorability as a function of dogmatism and adjective type</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**LIST OF FIGURES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Mean favorability as a function of</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>internal-external control, source value, and adjective type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Mean favorability as a function of</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dogmatism, source value, and adjective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>type</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I.

Background and Information

Recent research in the area of person perception has, for the most part, focused on impression formation; that is, how stimulus information about another is processed. There are three sets of general variables that can be seen as relevant to impression formation: the perceiver's characteristics, the stimulus person's attributes, and the type of interaction situation (Tagiuri, 1958). The general variable of type of interaction situation would include such specific variables as communication mediums in interaction, length of interaction time, preceding circumstances of interaction, and so on.

In the area of impression formation, Rosenbaum (1967) recently explored the variables of stimulus person's attributes and type of interaction situation. More specifically, the interaction situation variable was the source credibility of the communicator of the stimulus person's attributes. Source credibility was determined by prescaled occupational titles, while prescaled adjectives were used as stimulus person attributes. The purpose of this study was the exploratory addition to this social-influence, impression-formation paradigm of two perceiver characteristics, internal-external locus of control and dogmatism. Previous theory and research has indicated that these two personality constructs are related to social influence.

A SOCIAL INFLUENCE PARADIGM

Much of the groundwork for research on stimulus person attributes was done by Asch (1946) with his use of sets of personality-trait adjectives as descriptions of persons. Asch had subjects rate these
descriptions on favorability of impression. He found that different adjectives had different values in the forming of impressions. Since then, the variables of value, order, number, and consistency of adjectives in sets have been investigated in impression formation (Anderson, 1968). The result has been a relatively more precise and reliable use of stimulus person descriptions (Rosenbaum, 1967).

Drawing on the attitude change literature, Rosenbaum (1967) added to Asch's paradigm the variable of different communicators of the descriptions. More specifically, Rosenbaum considered the credibility of the communication source as determined by prescaled occupational titles. Men described as either positive or negative by a high, medium, or low valued source were rated on favorability by male subjects. Positive and negative descriptions each involved three prescaled adjectives. Thus, there were six sentence descriptions possible as determined by three source values and two adjective description types. These sentences, as read to subjects, were of the form: "Mr. (letters A to DD) has been described by a (source) as (adjective, adjective, adjective)."

Results indicated a significant main effect for adjective type such that positive adjective descriptions were rated more favorably than negative adjective descriptions. Also, there was a significant Source Value by Adjective Type interaction. Further analysis showed that with positive adjective descriptions, a high valued source resulted in a more favorable rating than the medium valued source, which, in turn, was more favorably rated than a low valued source. When there were negative adjective descriptions, a low valued source resulted in a less unfavorable rating than the medium valued source, which, in turn was less unfavorably rated than a high valued source. These results appear to demonstrate the
social influence effects of source credibility on impression formation; that is, source credibility is positively related to influence in impression formation.

A number of limitations of this study are evident. First of all, the sentence descriptions were read to the subjects. This could have biased results through unintentional experimenter effects of paralinguistic cues and other non-verbal behavioural cues (Rosenthal, 1966). Secondly, by the reading of sentence descriptions to groups of subjects, possible sentence order effects could have contaminated results. Finally, the purpose of the study, from the sentence descriptions, might appear obvious to subjects; that is, the artifact of demand characteristics may have been a factor in the experiment (Orne, 1967).

The purpose of this study was the exploratory addition to Rosenbaum's social influence impression formation paradigm of two logically relevant variables subsumed under perceiver characteristics. Previous research using Rosenbaum's paradigm has not considered individual differences in person perception. As Shrauger and Altrocchi (1964) have stated, "It would be eminently sensible to coordinate research in individual differences in person perception with research concerning individual consistencies in cognitive or perceptual styles (p.300)." Two different variables reflecting cognitive or perceptual styles are Rotter's (1966) internal-external control of reinforcement construct and Rokeach's (1960) dogmatism construct. Both constructs have been found relevant to social influence.
INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONTROL AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE

Rotter's internal-external (I-E) construct, as developed from his social learning theory (Rotter, 1954; 1966; 1967), refers to the degree to which an individual believes he has control, through his own actions, over his own reinforcements. Internals are referred to as those who feel they are "the captain of their fate" and thus reinforcements are due to their own efforts in the environment. Externals feel that fate, chance or powerful others, and not their own efforts, determine their reinforcements. Locus of control orientation is thought of as a generalized expectancy across situations as determined by specific past reinforcement experiences.

Rotter (1966) originally suggested that, if aware of manipulation from the environment, internals would be more resistant to said manipulation than externals. Internals would resist because this pressure would run counter to their expectations of being in control of their environment. Externals would not resist since they expect control from the environment.

A number of studies have used verbal conditioning paradigms in investigating this hypothesis. Strickland (1970) found that internals who were aware of a reinforcement contingency showed significantly less learning than unaware internals or externals. Getter (1966) discovered that internals resisted extinction of learning more than externals. However, contrary to Rotter's predictions, the studies by Baron (1969) and Lichtenstein and Craine (1969) found that externals did not verbally condition better than internals. Gore (1962) used overt, covert, and no influence attempts in an experiment supposedly to provide the experimenter with information about length of stories generated by TAT cards. Internals were
found to resist the covert influence attempt and thus produced shorter stories than externals. A similar difference between internals and externals in the overt influence condition, though not expected, almost achieved significance. Because of poor methodology (e.g., missing data, ad hoc-quality of analysis), this study has recently been put into question by Biondo and MacDonald (1971). Using selective reinforcement in a sentence construction task, Doctor (1971) predicted and found that internals resist subtle forms of influence more than externals.

In the area of conformity, Odell (1959) found that internals had a greater tendency to conform than internals as measured by the Baron Independence of Judgment Scale. On the basis of Odell's findings, Crowne and Liverant (1963) predicted that externals would conform more than internals in a behavioral study of conformity. Two variants of the Asch situation were used. One variant, using a betting situation, resulted in externals conforming significantly more than internals. However, the other variant, in which there was a pay off for conforming, resulted in no significant I-E differences.

Though a study by Lefcourt (1967) was not designed to look at influence effects, it was found that externals conformed more in following directions than internals. When externals were found more willing to continue in an experiment than internals, Sandilands (1973) suggested that this was due to the social demands of pleasing the experimenter.

Pines and Julian (1972) discovered externals, compared with internals, were more responsive to both social and task requirement demands. Biondo and MacDonald (1971) presented internals and externals with a relatively neutral message which was followed by a high, low, or no influence statement regarding the message. The result was that relative to the
no influence condition, externals conformed significantly to both levels of influence. No difference was found between high and low levels of influence for externals. Relative to their control, internals under low influence did not differ while under high influence they tended to move against the influence attempt.

With respect to attitude change, Hjelle and Clouser (1970) noted that externals changed their college relevant attitudes significantly more than either middle I-E subjects or internals. Sherman (1973) recently predicted and found that counter-attitudinal essay writing resulted in significantly more attitude change for internals than externals. However, internals tended to be less influenced than externals by a persuasive message from an outside source.

Of particular relevance to the present study is the research of Ritchie and Phares (1969). This is because Ritchie and Phares presented internals and externals with identical attitude change communications which were either from a high or low prestige source. The hypotheses were confirmed. Externals showed more attitude change in the high prestige source condition than either externals in the low prestige condition or internals in the high prestige condition. Also, there was no difference between externals and internals in the low prestige source condition. In their conclusion, they suggested that perhaps internals would not respond differentially to a communication from an even more negative low prestige source than they used relative to a high prestige source. "Externals, however, might perceive change toward a negative source to be negatively reinforcing. Thus, it is conceivable that they would change less than internals, or perhaps change in the opposite direction from the communication (Ritchie and Phares, 1969, p. 442)." These suggestions of Ritchie and Phares are incorporated into the hypotheses of this study.
It would appear from these previous studies that the relationship between locus of control and social influence is more complex than originally thought by Rotter (1960); that is, this relationship is influenced by such variables as the source of the influence attempt and how subtle the influence is. There would, though, seem to be strong support in the areas of conformity and attitude change that if internals were aware of an environmental influence attempt, they would resist it, while externals would conform.

DOGMATISM AND SOCIAL INFLUENCE.

Dogmatism, as defined by Rokeach (1960), is "(a) a relatively closed cognitive organization of beliefs and disbeliefs about reality, (b) organized around a central set of beliefs about absolute authority which, in turn, (c) provides a framework for patterns of intolerance toward others (1960, p. 195)." More generally, it is a construct combining general authoritarianism and general intolerance. Nondogmatic belief-disbelief systems have "open" attitudes towards authority and thus status of an informant is less important than the informant's substantive information. Dogmatic systems, on the other hand, have "closed" attitudes towards authority such that source status is more important than the correctness of the source's information.

Since dogmatism is defined as a construct combining general authoritarianism and general intolerance (Rokeach 1960), a subset of dogmatism is the construct of authoritarianism. Rokeach (1960) has criticized the F scale measure of authoritarianism since it measures only right-wing elements of authoritarianism. That is, left-wing authoritarians do not receive high F scores. As measured by the California F Scale, authoritarianism has been found to correlate from .54 to .77 with Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale (Rokeach, 1960). In a review article on
person perception, Shrauger and Altrocchi (1964) have noted that high F scale scorers tend to describe more favorably high prestige persons than low prestige persons. "Previous research has indicated that both variables, source status and authoritarianism are related to conformity behaviour (for example Crutchfield, 1955; Lefkowitz, Blake, Mouton, 1955; Vidulich and Kaiman, 1961, p. 639)."

Two studies using the Dogmatism Scale (Form E) are directly important to the present study. In a study of experimenter expectancy effects, Laszlo and Rosenthal (1970) found that low dogmatics were significantly less susceptible to the subtle influence of biased high status experimenters than high dogmatics. In fact, it appeared that low dogmatics resisted this influence attempt. The variables of source status and dogmatism were also used in the classic study by Vidulich and Kaiman (1961). Using the autokinetic phenomena, high status confederates produced significantly more conformity in dogmatic subjects than low status confederates. To a lesser degree, on one of the two dependent measures, nondogmatics conformed in the opposite direction. That is, nondogmatics were significantly more influenced by the low status than the high status source.

These two studies, along with the research on authoritarianism, strongly support the notion that dogmatics are influenced by source status. However, nondogmatics tend to ignore or "go against the grain" of an informant's status.

LOCUS OF CONTROL, DOGMATISM AND HYPOTHESES

Baron (1968) found no relationship between authoritarianism, a subset of dogmatism, and locus of control. However, Rotter, Seeman and Liverant (1962) reported a significant, positive relationship between external
control and authoritarianism. Similarly, Closer and Hjelle (1970) found a significant positive relationship between external control and dogmatism. There appears to be a weak but significant relationship between locus of control and dogmatism.

In social influence, an "... aspect of dogmatism which appears theoretically similar to an external orientation is the dogmatic's reliance on arbitrary reinforcement derived from an external authority (Closer and Hjelle, 1970, p. 1006)." This is especially evident within the previously mentioned research both by Ritchie and Phares (1969) on locus of control and by Vidulich and Kaiman (1961) on dogmatism. In summary, both externals and dogmatics were more highly influenced by a high prestige source compared with a low prestige source. Internals and nondogmatics did not appear influenced by the prestige of the communication's source. In the low prestige source condition, dogmatics were significantly negatively influenced compared with nondogmatics on both of Vidulich and Kaiman's dependent measures. Although a trend was apparent, this difference was not found by Ritchie and Phares with externals compared to internals.

They suggested the relationship would be significant if a more negative low prestige source was used.

The present study was an attempt to investigate the suggestion of Ritchie and Phares (1969) within the more precise framework of Rosenbaum's (1967) paradigm. Ritchie and Phares thought that internals would not respond differentially to a communication from an even more negative low prestige source than they used. Externals, however, would possibly change in the opposite direction of the communication when presented by a relatively negative source.
Previous research has indicated that if aware of an environmental influence attempt, internals will resist this influence attempt from the environment while externals will not (Biondo & MacDonald, 1971; Crowne & Liverant, 1963; Doctor, 1971; Getter, 1966; Gore, 1962; Hjelle & Clouser, 1970; Lefcourt, 1967; Odell, 1959; Pines & Julian, 1972; Ritchie & Phares, 1969; Sandilands, 1973; Sherman, 1973; and Strickland, 1970).

Similar results have been theorized and found with respect to dogmatism. Laszlo and Rosenthal (1970) found that low dogmatics resisted the influence attempts of a high status experimenter. Vidulich and Kaiman (1961) found dogmatics to be highly influenced by a high status person compared with a low status person. Non-dogmatics did not appear influenced by status or were slightly influenced in the opposite direction of that of dogmatics.

In view of the more precise differentiation of source status used in Rosenbaum's paradigm (1967) and the theory and research with regard to the constructs locus of control and dogmatism, a number of hypotheses can be made.

1) Positively described persons will be more favorably rated than negatively described persons.

2) A person described by a high credible source as positive will be rated more favorably than a person described by a low credible source as positive, while a low credible source's negative description will be rated more favorably than a high credible source's negative description.

3) Internals will not be differentially influenced by source credibility, while externals will be differentially influenced by a
high and low credible source

Corollary 1. Internals will not be differentially influenced by source credibility.

Corollary 2. Externals will be influenced more by a high than a low credible source.

Corollary 3. Externals will be influenced more by a high credible source than interns.

Corollary 4. Externals will be influenced less by a low credible source than interns.

4) Nondogmatics will not be differentially influenced by source credibility, while dogmatics will be differentially influenced by a high and low credible source.

Corollary 1. Nondogmatics will not be differentially influenced by source credibility.

Corollary 2. Dogmatics will be influenced more by a high than a low credible source.

Corollary 3. Dogmatics will be influenced more by a high credible source than nondogmatics.

Corollary 4. Dogmatics will be influenced less by a low credible source than nondogmatics.
CHAPTER II
Method

SUBJECTS

Subjects were twenty-eight University of Windsor male students enrolled in an undergraduate introductory, educational, or abnormal psychology course during summer session. These subjects were selected from 199 students (79 males and 120 females) who were administered both the Internal-External Control (I-E) Scale and the Dogmatism Scale (Form E). Half of the twenty-eight male subjects scored in the upper one-third (externals) and the other half in the lower one-third (internals) of the classes' distribution of the I-E scores.

MATERIALS

Materials consisted of the Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control (I-E) Scale (Rotter, 1966), Rokeach's (1960) Dogmatism Scale (Form E), a seventeen-page Impression Formation Questionnaire, and a one-page Post-Questionnaire Survey.

The Internal-External Control Scale: The I-E Scale is a forced choice, paper and pencil scale with twenty-nine items, of which six are filler items. The scale, when administered, was identified as the Social Reaction Inventory (See Appendix A). Rotter (1966) has reported reliability measures (e.g., split-half, test-retest) from .49 to .83 for the I-E Scale. The validity of the scale has been supported by research such as that previously mentioned.
The Dogmatism Scale: The Dogmatism Scale (Form E), identified as the Personal Opinion Inventory, is a forty-item paper and pencil scale. Each item is rated from I agree very much (+3) to I disagree very much (-3) with intermediate points designated as I agree or disagree on the whole or a little. Agreement is always scored as close minded while disagreement indicates open minded (See Appendix B). Rokeach (1960) reported reliability measures (e.g., split-half, test-retest) from .68 to .93. The validity of this scale is supported by research such as that previously mentioned.

The Impression Formation Questionnaire: The Impression Formation Questionnaire is, for the purpose of eliminating previously mentioned possible artifacts, a modified version of Rosenbaum's (1967) materials. These modifications involve giving subjects the instructions and the sentence descriptions of men to read instead of having the experimenter read them to the subjects. Thus, the first page consists of instructions asking subjects to carefully read on the following sixteen pages the one sentence descriptions of different men. Also, subjects are told that these men are to be rated on how favorable an impression the subjects have of each of them. On the following pages, below each sentence description, is a series of eight boxes which are labeled in the following or reversed order: highly favorable; considerably favorable; moderately favorable; slightly favorable; slightly unfavorable; moderately unfavorable; considerably unfavorable; and highly unfavorable (See Appendix C).

All of the sixteen sentence descriptions are of the form: "Mr. (letters from A to P) has been described by a (source) as (adjective, adjective, adjective)." In all of these sentence descriptions, the sources were occupational titles randomly selected from a list scaled on a seven-
point value as an informant scale by Rosenbaum (1967). Four sources of high value (H) were randomly selected from those with a scale value of four or more while those of low value (L) were four randomly selected from those equal to or below the scaled value of two. The H sources were physician, clergyman, attorney, and psychiatrist, while L sources were street cleaner, dog catcher, dishwasher, and parking-lot attendant. Eight medium value sources of a scaled value between two and four were also randomly selected for filler items. The purpose of the filler items was to minimize possible demand characteristics resulting from the use of only extreme source values. These sources were gunsmith, composer, scientist, musician, sailor, dentist, wholesaler, and druggist.

Adjectives for all sentence descriptions were chosen from a list by Anderson (1968b) in which all adjectives were scaled on a seven-point scale of likability. Of the 555 adjectives scaled, twenty-four were randomly chosen from the thirty-six highest and twenty-four from the thirty-six lowest. These adjectives were randomly grouped into sets of three, each set being all positive (P) or negative (N).

In the experimental sentence descriptions, two randomly selected high valued (H) sources, physician and clergyman, were each paired with one randomly chosen set of positive (P) adjectives. The other two high valued (H) sources, attorney and psychiatrist, were each paired with one randomly chosen set of negative (N) adjectives. In the same fashion, the low valued (L) sources, street cleaner and dog catcher, each were paired with a set of positive (P) adjectives, while dishwasher and parking-lot attendant were each paired with a set of negative (N) adjectives. The remaining eight sets of adjectives, four positive and four negative, were randomly paired to the filler medium value sources.
A second form of the Impression Formation Questionnaire was constructed for the purpose of counterbalancing source value and adjective type. The only difference in this second form was that all experimental sources were paired with the opposite adjective type of the first form. For example, in the first form, physician was paired with a positive (P) adjective set while in the second form, physician was paired with a negative (N) adjective set. Thus, in both forms, there were eight filler sentence descriptions, four positive and four negative, and eight sentence descriptions of which two of each were HP, HN, LP, and LN.

The Post-Questionnaire Survey: The Post-Questionnaire Survey was designed for the purpose of determining the extent of possible demand characteristics. This survey consisted of three questions which were to be answered on the same sheet of paper. The first question simply asked for comments of a general nature. The last two questions, involving experimenter predictions and expected results of the study, were aimed at exposing possible demand characteristics (See Appendix D).

PROCEDURE

Both the I-E Scale and Rokeach Dogmatism Scale (Form E), in that order, were administered in class to 199 undergraduate psychology students (79 males and 120 females) by a student other than the experimenter. Before administering the scales, students were told that the purpose of their responding to the inventories was to determine norms for University of Windsor students. Also, subjects were asked to answer all information requested (e.g., name, phone number, sex) and assured that their answers would be held confidential. Upon completion of the
inventories, subjects were thanked for their help. About one
to two weeks later, randomly chosen males in the lower (internals)
and upper (externals) one-third of the I-E distribution were phoned
and asked to volunteer to participate in an impression formation study.
Those subjects accepting were run one to four persons at a time.

When first meeting the subject, the experimenter was blind as
to whether the subject was an internal or external so as to prevent
possible experimenter bias. This was accomplished by having another
person mark the I-E Scales and supplying the experimenter with two
groups of subject names and their phone numbers. Thus, the experimenter
was blind as to which group was internal and which group was external.
The experimenter randomly assigned half of the subjects in both of
these groups to receive one form of the Impression Formation Questionnaire
and the other half to receive the other form.

Upon receiving the Impression Formation Questionnaire, subjects
were told that the questionnaire instructions were self-explanatory,
but to please ask if there were any further questions on what to do.
Having finished, subjects were then given the Post-Questionnaire Survey
with the same verbal instructions as the Impression Formation Questionnaire.
After finishing the survey, subjects were thanked and asked not to discuss
the questionnaire and survey for at least three weeks since other students
would be filling them out. (See Appendix E for experimenter instructions
and debriefing.) An explanation of the experiment and its results was
mailed to all subjects who self-addressed one of the envelopes provided.
(See Appendix F for letter of experimental results.)
CHAPTER III

Results

A Pearson Product-Moment correlation was computed between all dogmatism scores and external locus of control scores. The resulting positive correlation was found significant by a Fisher z transformation (r = .16, N = 199, p < .05).

For each subject's Impression Formation Questionnaire, the two ratings of each of the four source value by adjective type combinations were summed. To test the hypotheses not involving dogmatism, an analysis of variance was performed on the dependent measure favorability. The factors of the analysis of variance were internal-external control (I-E), source value, and adjective type. The last two factors were repeated measures. Internals were defined as those scoring six or less and externals as scoring eleven or more on the I-E Scale; that is, the respective lower and upper one-third of all the classes' I-E score distribution. The summary of the analysis of variance is shown in Table 1.

Hypothesis 1 was confirmed. A main effect for adjective type indicated that a positively described person was more favorably rated than a negatively described person (F = 104.62, df = 1/26, p < .001). With respect to hypothesis 2, a Source Value by Adjective Type interaction was found (F = 10.18, df = 1/26, p < .01). Table 2 contains the means that were compared for simple effects. In support of hypothesis 2, a person described positively by a high credible source was rated more favorably than a low credible source's positive descriptions (F = 11.28, df = 1/26, p < .01). However, a low credible source's negative description only tended to be rated more favorably than a
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<td>1.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x subj w. groups</td>
<td>47.36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.82</td>
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<td>C x subj w. groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>BC</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>10.18</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABC</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>7.00</td>
<td>2.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC x subj w. groups</td>
<td>71.50</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.75</td>
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TABLE 2
MEAN FAVORABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF SOURCE VALUE AND ADJECTIVE TYPE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adjective Type</th>
<th>Source Value</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>12.04</td>
<td>11.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>6.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>2.05</td>
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</table>
high credible source's negative description ($F = 2.53$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .15$). The analysis of variance also indicated a main effect for internal-external control such that the described person was more favorably rated by internals than externals ($F = 7.11$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .05$).

In testing hypothesis 3, relevant means, as graphically presented in Figure 1, were compared. Simple effects analysis supported Corollary 1, hypothesis 3. That is, internals were not differentially influenced by source credibility. With positive descriptions, the difference between high ($M = 13.07$) and low ($M = 11.86$) source values was not quite significant for internals ($F = 3.75$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .10$) while with negative descriptions, the difference between high ($M = 7.36$) and low ($M = 7.14$) source values did not approach significance.

Corollary 2 of hypothesis 3 was also supported: that is, externals were more influenced by a high than a low credible source. With positive descriptions, externals were more favorably influenced by a high ($M = 13.00$) than a low ($M = 11.50$) valued source ($F = 5.73$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .05$). Negative descriptions resulted in externals being more unfavorably influenced by a high ($M = 5.29$) than a low ($M = 6.78$) valued source ($F = 5.73$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .05$). Corollary 3, that externals would be more influenced by a high credible source than internals, was partly confirmed. Support was not found with positive descriptions but was found with negative descriptions where externals were more unfavorably influenced by a high valued source than internals ($F = 10.92$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .01$). Corollary 4, that externals would be less influenced by a low credible source than internals, was not supported either by positive or negative descriptions.
FIGURE 1
MEAN FAVORABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF
INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONTROL, SOURCE
VALUE, AND ADJECTIVE TYPE
To test hypothesis 4, a median split on the basis of all dogmatism scores was performed on subjects administered the Impression Formation Questionnaire. Thus, those scoring less than -18 were defined as nondogmatists and those scoring more than -18 were defined as dogmatists. This resulted in fourteen nondogmatists (nine internals and five externals) and fourteen dogmatists (nine externals and five internals). An analysis of variance, with repeated measures on the last two factors, was performed on the factors dogmatism, source value and adjective type. Table 3 summarizes the analysis of variance results.

The significant adjective type main effect and Source Value by Adjective Type interaction were the same as was found in the analysis of variance involving I-E. These results were expected since they are independent of the personality factors. Consistent with the previously mentioned significant main effect for I-E is the significant main effect for dogmatism ($F = 5.48$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .05$). Nondogmatists rated the described persons more favorably than dogmatists. An interaction of Dogmatism by Adjective Type was also indicated ($F = 5.56$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .05$). A comparison of means (See Table 4) indicates positive descriptions were rated more favorably than negative descriptions by nondogmatists ($F = 38.21$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .001$) and dogmatists ($F = 90.57$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .001$). Also, nondogmatists rated negative descriptions more favorably than dogmatists ($F = 10.13$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .01$). This interaction, along with the main effects for I-E and dogmatism, was not predicted.

Relative to the actual findings concerning hypothesis 3, nondogmatists behaved as did internals and dogmatists as did externals (see Figure 2). That is, hypothesis 4 was confirmed. As were the results with internals regarding Corollary 1 of hypothesis 3, the difference between high ($M = 12.71$) and low ($M = 11.43$) valued sources giving positive
### TABLE 3

**SUMMARY OF THE ANOVA OF MEAN FAVORABILITY**

**SCORES FOR DOGMATISM, SOURCE VALUE, AND ADJECTIVE TYPE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Variation</th>
<th>SS</th>
<th>df</th>
<th>MS</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>p</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Between subjects</strong></td>
<td>66.50</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>A (dogmatism)</td>
<td>11.57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11.57</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subj w. groups</td>
<td>54.93</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Within subjects</strong></td>
<td>1309.50</td>
<td>84</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B (source value)</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.96</td>
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<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B x subj w. groups</td>
<td>47.36</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C (adjective type)</td>
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<td>&lt;.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>C x subj w. groups</td>
<td>192.93</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9.92</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
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<tr>
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<td>5.14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5.14</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BC x subj w. groups</td>
<td>73.36</td>
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<td>2.82</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjective Type</td>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>Non-Dogmatic</td>
<td>Dogmatic</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Positive Mean</td>
<td>12.07</td>
<td>12.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>7.07</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative Mean</td>
<td>7.57</td>
<td>5.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.D.</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 2

MEAN FAVORABILITY AS A FUNCTION OF

DOGMATISM, SOURCE VALUE, AND

ADJECTIVE TYPE
descriptions was not quite significant for nondogmatics ($F = 4.10$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .10$). Similarly with negative descriptions the difference between high ($M = 7.64$) and low ($M = 7.50$) source values did not approach significance for nondogmatics. Dogmatics behaved as did externals with regards to Corollary 2 of hypothesis 3. With positive descriptions, dogmatics were more favorably influenced by a high ($M = 13.36$) than a low ($M = 11.93$) valued source ($F = 5.06$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .05$). Negative descriptions resulted in dogmatics being more unfavorably influenced by a high ($M = 5.00$) than a low ($M = 6.43$) valued source ($F = 5.06$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .05$). The relationship between dogmatics and nondogmatics was as between externals and internals with regards to Corollary 3 and 4 of hypothesis 3. With negative descriptions, dogmatics were more unfavorably influenced by a high valued source than nondogmatics ($F = 17.33$, $df = 1/26$, $p < .001$). No other significant differences were found between nondogmatics and dogmatics.

To consider the possible effects of demand characteristics, responses to questions two and three of the Post-Questionnaire Survey were examined. Two judges agreed that none of the twenty-eight subjects explicitly stated the hypothesis for the adjective type main effect or the Source Value by Adjective Type interaction. However, with a less stringent criteria, both judges agreed that twenty-two of the subjects responded that a person's impression of another is based on the credibility (status, prestige, etc.) of the information's source. Two of the remaining six subjects, both external and dogmatic, suggested that a person's impression of another person is not based on the credibility of the information's source. The remaining four subjects' responses were in no way related to any of the hypotheses or personality scores.
CHAPTER IV
Discussion

The results of the present study may indicate that the modifications of Rosenbaum's (1967) paradigm, used to reduce possible artifacts, influenced the results. These modifications did not appear to influence the results concerning hypothesis 1 since, as predicted, positively described persons were more favorably rated than negatively described persons. It was on the basis of the results concerning hypothesis 2 that it was inferred that these modifications influenced results. That is, Rosenbaum's (1967) results, as presented in hypothesis 2, were not quite duplicated. As predicted, a person described by a high credible source as positive was rated more favorably than a person described by a low credible source as positive. However, a low credible source's negative description was not rated significantly more favorably than a high credible source's negative description.

This study tended to support the predicted results of Ritchie and Phares (1969) which were represented by the first three corollaries of hypothesis 3. Corollary 1, that internals would not be differentially influenced by source credibility, was supported. There was, however, a nonsignificant tendency for internals to be more influenced by a high than a low credible source's positive description. Corollary 2 was strongly supported; that is, externals were more influenced by a high than a low credible source. Corollary 3 of hypothesis 3 was in part supported. As predicted, with negative descriptions, externals were more influenced by a high credible source than internals. However, externals were not more influenced than internals when presented with a high credible source's positive description. It would seem that this difference was
not found because of a nonsignificant tendency, with respect to Corollary 1 of hypothesis 3, for internals to be more influenced by a high than a low credible source's positive description. This tendency, it would appear, reduced the difference between internals and externals who were given positive descriptions by a high credible source.

The last corollary of hypothesis 3, Corollary 4, was based on the suggestions of Ritchie and Phares (1969). This corollary, that externals will be less influenced by a low credible source than internals, was not supported. This could have been due to the use of the relatively not so negative low value sources and/or the modifications of Rosenbaum's paradigm.

With the exception of the last corollary, hypothesis 3 was generally supported. Internals were not differentially influenced by source credibility while externals were differentially influenced by a high and low credible source. However, externals were not differentially influenced by a low credible source relative to internals.

The significant correlation between external control scores and dogmatism scores support the findings of Clouser and Hjelle (1970). This relationship, as was also found by Clouser and Hjelle, was weak. With respect to this study's modified version of Rosenbaum's paradigm, the relationship between internals and externals was the same as between nondogmatists and dogmatists. Thus hypothesis 4, that dogmatists will behave as do externals and nondogmatists will behave as internals, was supported.

As a result of this study, it appears that Clouser and Hjelle's theorized common denominator between I-E and dogmatism is supported. That is, externals and dogmatists would appear to rely on arbitrary reinforcement as derived from external authority.
It may be argued that the close relationship between I-E and dogmatism, in this study, was a function of the overlapping of these personality variables. In other words, nine of the fourteen nondogmatics were internals while nine of the fourteen dogmatics were externals. To further examine this possible artifact, a more complex experimental analysis of variance design would be necessary. The factors of this experimental design would be I-E, dogmatism, with the two repeated measure factor's source value and adjective type.

Both the significant main effects of internal-external control (I-E) and dogmatism and the Dogmatism by Adjective Type interaction were not predicted. Regarding the I-E main effect, internals rated significantly more favorably the described person than did externals. This main effect appears to be the result of what was predicted and found with regard to Corollary 3 of hypothesis 3; that is, internals rated significantly more favorably, than externals, a person described negatively by a high valued source (See Figure 1). In a similar way, both the dogmatism main effect and Dogmatism by Adjective Type interaction appear explainable. In the dogmatism main effect, nondogmatics rated significantly more favorably, than dogmatics, the described person. The Dogmatism by Adjective Type interaction was a result of nondogmatics rating significantly more favorably, than dogmatics, a negatively described person. These results appear to be a function of what was predicted and found with regard to hypothesis 4; that is, the relationship between internals and externals was found between nondogmatics and dogmatics, respectively, in Corollary 3 of hypothesis 3. In other words, these dogmatism results appear to be a result of nondogmatics rating significantly more favorably, than dogmatics, a high valued source's
negative description (See Figure 2).

The results of the Post-Questionnaire Survey suggest the possible influence of demand characteristics. The greater majority of subjects, twenty-two out of twenty-eight, thought source credibility would influence a person's impression of a described other person. Previous research on I-E (Pines and Julian, 1972; Sandilands, 1973) and dogmatism (Laszlo and Rosenthal, 1970) suggest the results of this study could be a function of I-E and dogmatism differences in reactions to demand characteristics; that is, it appears that both externals and dogmatics conform to the demand characteristics of the experimental situation while internals and nondogmatics do not. This appears to be consistent with Clouse and Hjelle's (1970) suggested common denominator between I-E and dogmatism. Externals and dogmatics appear to rely on arbitrary reinforcement as derived from the external authority of the experimenter.

It would seem that some solution to the possible influence of demand characteristics is necessary. If externals and dogmatics do receive arbitrary reinforcement from the external authority of the experimenter, a possible solution would be to have a peer of the subjects run the experiment. It would probably also be necessary to have a deception such that the peer-experimenter would claim that it was his experiment. Thus, this would eliminate the possible influence of an authority figure on Rosenbaum's (1967) paradigm. Possibly the preceding could be combined with the use of filler items in the Impression Formation Questionnaire that would be consistent with a deception as to the purpose of said questionnaire. Hopefully, this would reduce subjects' awareness of the variable of source credibility. This awareness, as shown by the Post-Questionnaire Survey, possibly resulted in the influence of demand characteristics.
In conclusion, the validity of the personality constructs I-E and dogmatism is generally supported by the results obtained by using them in conjunction with Rosenbaum's paradigm. Furthermore, the theoretical affinity between I-E and dogmatism appears to be supported. Therefore, research on how they interact with each other should be of value. For example, externals who are also dogmatic may be more susceptible to influence attempts from the social environment than externals who are nondogmatics. It is also suggested that further research on the methodology of Rosenbaum's paradigm is needed; that is, this paradigm possibly is contaminated by demand characteristics.
References


APPENDIX A

THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL CONTROL SCALE
Social Reaction Inventory

This is a questionnaire to find out the way in which certain important events in our society affect different people. Each item consists of a pair of alternatives lettered a or b. Please select the one statement of each pair (and only one) which you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Be sure to select the one you actually believe to be more true rather than the one you think you should choose or the one you would like to be true. This is a measure of personal belief. Obviously there are no right or wrong answers.

Your answers to the items on this inventory are to be recorded on a separate answer sheet which is attached to the back of the booklet. Remove THIS ANSWER SHEET NOW. Complete all of the information requested on the answer sheet, then finish reading these directions.

Please answer these items carefully but do not spend too much time on any one item. Be sure to find an answer for every choice. Find the number of the item on the answer sheet and cross out the letter which corresponds to the statement you choose as most true.

In some instances you may discover that you believe both statements or neither one. In such cases, be sure to select the one you more strongly believe to be the case as far as you're concerned. Also try to respond to each item independently when making your choice; do not be influenced by your previous choices.

REMEMBER

Select that alternative which you personally believe to be more true.

(Note. -Items with asterisk are externally scored.)
I more strongly believe that:

1. a. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.
   b. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them.

2. a. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.
   b. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.

3. a. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.
   b. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.

4. a. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in this world.
   b. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.

5. a. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
   b. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.

6. a. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
   b. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.

7. a. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.
   b. People who can't get others to like them, don't understand how to get along with others.

8. a. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality.
   b. It is one's experiences in life which determine what they're like.

9. a. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
   b. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.

10. a. In the case of the well-prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test.
    b. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work, that studying is really useless.
I more strongly believe that:

11. a. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
   
   b.* Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

12. a. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
   
   b.* This world is run by the few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.

13. a. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
   
   b.* It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.

14. a. There are certain people who are just no good.
   
   b. There is some good in everybody

15. a. In my case, getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
   
   b.* Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.

16. a.* Who gets to be the boss often depends on who was lucky enough to be in the right place first.

   b. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability; luck has little or nothing to do with it.

17. a.* As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand nor control.

   b. By taking an active part in political and social affairs, the people can control world events.

18. a.* Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.

   b. There really is no such thing as "luck".

19. a. One should always be willing to admit his mistakes.

   b. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.

20. a.* It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes your.

   b. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.
I more strongly believe that:

21. a. *In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
   b. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.

22. a. With enough effort we can wipe out political corruption.
   b. *It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.

23. a. *Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.
   b. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.

24. a. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
   b. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.

25. a. *Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
   b. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life.

26. a. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
   b. *There's not much use in trying too hard to please people; if they like you, they like you.

27. a. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.
   b. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.

28. a. What happens to me is my own doing.
   b. *Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.

29. a. *Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.
   b. In the long run, the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a local level.
APPENDIX B

THE DOGMATISM SCALE
Personal Opinion Questionnaire

The following is a study of what the general public thinks and feels about a number of important social and personal questions. The best answer to each statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one. Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in each case.

+1: I AGREE A LITTLE
+2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE
+3: I AGREE VERY MUCH

-1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
-2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
-3: I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Please put your name and sex in the upper right hand corner before proceeding. All of your opinions will be held strictly confidential.
1. The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

2. The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

4. It is only natural that a person would have a much better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than with ideas he opposes.

5. Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

6. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lonesome place.

7. Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

8. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

9. It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful of the future.

10. There is so much to be done and so little time to do it in.

11. Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just can't stop.

12. In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

13. In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to what the others are saying.
14. It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

15. While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

16. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

17. If given the chance I would do something of great benefit to the world.

18. In the history of mankind there have probably been just a handful of really great thinkers.

19. There are a number of people I have come to hate because of the things they stand for.

20. A man who does not believe in some great cause has not really lived.

21. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

22. Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

23. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort of person.

24. To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

25. When it comes to differences of opinion in religion we must be careful not to compromise with those who believe differently from the way we do.
26. In times like these, a person must be pretty selfish if he considers primarily his own happiness.
27. The worst crime a person could commit is to attack publicly the people who believe in the same thing he does.
28. In times like these it is often necessary to be more on guard against ideas put out by people or groups in one's own camp than by those in the opposing camp.
29. A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion among its own members cannot exist for long.
30. There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.
31. My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.
32. A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is beneath contempt.
33. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.
34. In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who we can trust.
35. It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.
36. In the long run the best way to live is to pick friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs are the same as one's own.
37. The present is all too full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

38. If a man is to accomplish his mission in life it is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."

39. Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have discussed important social and moral problems don't really understand what's going on.

40. Most people just don't know what's good for them.
APPENDIX C

THE IMPRESSION FORMATION QUESTIONNAIRE
Impression Formation Questionnaire

This is a study of the way people make impressions of others who are described to them. Often we make judgments of others on the advice of others. For example, students often ask other students about a certain professor before taking a course from that professor.

On the following 16 pages you will find 16 one sentence descriptions, one per page, of different men. Each man, as designated by the letters from A to P, will be described by a different source. You are to rate these men, as described by another, on favorability. In other words, you are to rate each described man on how favorable an impression you have of him.

Favorability is rated by your making a check mark in one of the eight boxes as shown below. Please read each sentence description carefully before rating the described man.

1. [ ] Highly unfavorable
2. [ ] Considerably unfavorable
3. [ ] Moderately unfavorable
4. [ ] Slightly unfavorable
5. [ ] Slightly favorable
6. [ ] Moderately favorable
7. [ ] Considerably favorable
8. [ ] Highly favorable

Could you please fill in your name and student I.D. number below.

NAME_____________________________ I.D. NO.__________
Mr. A has been described by a parking-lot attendant as truthful, happy, and reasonable.

8. □ Highly favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
6. □ Moderately favorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
1. □ Highly unfavorable
Mr. P has been described by a gunsmith as educated, interesting, and considerate.

1. [ ] Highly unfavorable
2. [ ] Considerably unfavorable
3. [ ] Moderately unfavorable
4. [ ] Slightly unfavorable
5. [ ] Slightly favorable
6. [ ] Moderately favorable
7. [ ] Considerably favorable
8. [ ] Highly favorable
Mr. G has been described by a psychiatrist as gentle, warm, and mature.

1. [ ] Highly unfavorable
2. [ ] Considerably unfavorable
3. [ ] Moderately unfavorable
4. [ ] Slightly unfavorable
5. [ ] Slightly favorable
6. [ ] Moderately favorable
7. [ ] Considerably favorable
8. [ ] Highly favorable
Mr. J has been described by a physician as mean, ill-tempered, and ultra-critical.

8. □ Highly favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
6. □ Moderately favorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
1. □ Highly unfavorable
Mr. N has been described by a sailor as wise, honest, and clean.

1. [ ] Highly unfavorable
2. [ ] Considerably unfavorable
3. [ ] Moderately unfavorable
4. [ ] Slightly unfavorable
5. [ ] Slightly favorable
6. [ ] Moderately favorable
7. [ ] Considerably favorable
8. [ ] Highly favorable
Mr. M has been described by a dentist as kind, trustful, and loyal.

8. □ Highly favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
6. □ Moderately favorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
1. □ Highly unfavorable
Mr. P has been described by a wholesaler as offensive, untruthful, and selfish.

8. □ Highly favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
6. □ Moderately favorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
1. □ Highly unfavorable
Mr. C has been described by a druggist as friendly, trustworthy, and earnest.

1. □ Highly unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
6. □ Moderately favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
8. □ Highly favorable
Mr. O has been described by a scientist as rude, spiteful, and dishonorable.

1.☐ Highly unfavorable
2.☐ Considerably unfavorable
3.☐ Moderately unfavorable
4.☐ Slightly unfavorable
5.☐ Slightly favorable
6.☐ Moderately favorable
7.☐ Considerably favorable
8.☐ Highly favorable
Mr. E has been described by a street cleaner as hostile, underhanded, and greedy.

1. □ Highly unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
6. □ Moderately favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
8. □ Highly favorable
Mr. B has been described by a composer as insolent, untrustworthy, and ill-mannered.

1. [ ] Highly unfavorable
2. [ ] Considerably unfavorable
3. [ ] Moderately unfavorable
4. [ ] Slightly unfavorable
5. [ ] Slightly favorable
6. [ ] Moderately favorable
7. [ ] Considerably favorable
8. [ ] Highly favorable
Mr. D has been described by a dog catcher as malicious, unkind, and deceitful.

8. □ Highly favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
6. □ Moderately favorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
1. □ Highly unfavorable
Mr. L has been described by a dishwasher as humorous, unselfish, and well-spoken.

1. □ Highly unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
6. □ Moderately favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
8. □ Highly favorable
Mr. K has been described by a clergyman as insincere, conceited, and dislikable.

1. □ Highly unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
6. □ Moderately favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
8. □ Highly favorable
Mr. H has been described by a musician as dishonest, annoying, and disrespectful.

8. □ Highly favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
6. □ Moderately favorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
1. □ Highly unfavorable
Mr. I has been described by an attorney as honorable, broad-minded, and thoughtful.

8. □ Highly favorable
7. □ Considerably favorable
6. □ Moderately, favorable
5. □ Slightly favorable
4. □ Slightly unfavorable
3. □ Moderately unfavorable
2. □ Considerably unfavorable
1. □ Highly unfavorable
APPENDIX D

THE POST-QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY
Post-Questionnaire Survey

The purpose of this survey is to find out what you think of the Impression Formation Questionnaire. Please answer the following questions as best as you can.

1. Generally, what do you think of the questionnaire?

2. What do you think the experimenter predicted with respect to the results of the questionnaire study?

3. What do you think the actual results of the questionnaire study will indicate?

NAME______________________ ID NO.______________________
APPENDIX E

EXPERIMENTER INSTRUCTIONS
Experimenter Instructions

This study simply involves two questionnaires whose instructions are self explanatory. For the first questionnaire could you please read the first page instructions and not look further into the questionnaire. (Pass out questionnaires and wait until everyone is finished reading).

If there are any questions further on what to do, please feel free to ask. (Answer questions, if any). When you are finished the first questionnaire I will give you the second questionnaire. You may begin the task now. (Do just this, picking up each questionnaire when it is completed).

Thank you very much for taking time to participate in this study. I must ask you not to discuss these questionnaires with any other students for at least three weeks since other students will be filling out the questionnaires.

If you are interested in a further explanation of the purpose and results of this experiment, please self address one of these envelopes. In about seven weeks a letter of explanation will be mailed to you. Thank you again for participating in this study. (Pass out envelopes).
APPENDIX F

EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS LETTER
VITA AUCTORIS

1950  - Born in Edmonton, Alberta to Vance Kenneth and Louise Mary Travis.

1955-1968 - Received education at primary and secondary public schools in Calgary, Alberta.

1969  - Completed one year of Business Administration at Mount Royal College in Calgary, Alberta.

1972  - Received B.A. in Psychology from the University of Lethbridge, Lethbridge, Alberta.

1972-1973 - Registered as a full-time graduate student at the University of Windsor.