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Robert. Manuel

University of Windsor

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INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM AND PROLETARIANIZATION

IN A SMALL FISHING COMMUNITY

by

Robert Manuel

A Thesis
submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the Department of Sociology & Anthropology
in Partial Fulfillment of the
requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts at the
University of Windsor

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to examine the inshore fishermen in Canso, Nova Scotia and see if they are becoming proletarianized. It was believed that competition from the capital intensive off-shore fishery continually forced these men from ownership and control over their means of production to wage labour. Historically conceptualized as petty commodity producers they are increasingly losing their middle class status because of their inability to compete within the capitalist mode of production. This argument was based upon Marxist theory. To help us gain a more indepth picture of what factors enter into the fisherman’s decision to give up fishing dependency theory was also used.

On one hand Marxist theory enabled this study to examine the fishery from an objective historical approach. Here we saw that the small scale capital of the inshore fishermen was insufficient to compete with that of the large offshore fishery. Their lack of exploitative relations within their mode of production aided in keeping their profits low thereby making it difficult to reinvest and increase production.
Dependency theory on the other hand enabled this study to look at subjective reasons why the fishermen had to give up their trade. Most of these factors dealt with their position within the market place. Poor fish prices, high supply prices and others all entered into their decision to leave fishing and sell their labour power.

Some factors studied under dependency theory affected the fishermen in opposite ways simultaneously. On the one hand factors such as fish prices and a high degree of financing created a situation where the fishermen must eventually leave fishing. On the other hand factors such as unemployment insurance and government subsidies indicated that such a dependent position is the only way these men can stay in business. The study demonstrated that without the support of unemployment insurance the inshore fishermen could not survive.

The study also indicated that proletarianization is not a new phenomenon for the inshore fishermen. In fact, this process began at the time of the rise of the dominant merchant class and capitalism, around the late eighteen hundreds. This fact was for the most part demonstrated by a significant decline in the number of inshore fishermen from the late eighteen hundreds to the present, along with a corresponding increase in processing occupations.

The results found in the study were consistent with those trends in petty commodity production for all of Canada.
In Canso as in all of Canada the future for the independent commodity producer looks bleak. Perhaps as Rinehart states, like all petty commodity producers the fishermen are in the 'last stages of destruction'.
DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to the inshore fishermen of Canso, Nova Scotia and their struggle to survive in a time when there is little appreciation for their hard work and way of life. It is also dedicated to my loving family, wife Rosemary, daughter Jessica and son Robbie. And lastly to the loving memory of my mother, Florence Maurice and mother inlaw, Clara Mae Byrne.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my deepest appreciation to all who assisted me in the completion of this thesis. Professor Seymour Faber, while at times appeared relentless, demonstrated patience and gave encouragement to me. To the other members of the committee, Professor Allan Sears and Professor Tony Blair whose insightful comments and suggestions helped greatly, I am indebted.

I would especially like to thank the town of Canso and the inshore fishermen there. Their efforts to help me understand their struggle shall always be remembered.

Finally I would like to express my appreciation to my family, wife Rosemary, daughter Jessica and son Robbie. It was their support and encouragement that enabled me to see this project to its completion. Having their support gave this work meaning.
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

The intention of this study is to answer the question: Are the inshore fishermen in Canso, Nova Scotia becoming proletarianized? Two theoretical approaches will be used to accomplish this. Marxist theory will be used to explain the general process of proletarianization whereby the inshore fishermen are forced to leave their trade and enter wage labour. To support this approach we have relied on census data and information gathered from the Department of Fisheries.

The second approach used is dependency theory. It was felt that Marxist theory alone did not sufficiently explain the changing and impoverished conditions of those who remained in fishing. Dependency theory explains the fishermen's position in the market place and their increasing poverty, giving the reader a clearer understanding of why these men are turning to wage labour. In support of this approach focused interviews were conducted with the current fishermen.

Inshore fishing in the maritimes has been examined by researchers from a multitude of perspectives. The purpose of this study is to focus on a particular area and examine
inshore fishermen in relation to Marx's proletarianization thesis. Marx (Tucker:1978, 478-479) describes the development of the proletariat:

In proportion as the bourgeoisie, i.e. Capital, is developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class, developed, a class of labourers who live only so long as their labour increases capital. These labourers, who must sell themselves piece-meal, are a commodity, like every other article of commerce, and are consequently exposed to all vicissitudes of competition, to all fluctuations of the market.

The particular area in question is the town of Canso, Nova Scotia and the inshore fishermen of that town. Historically conceptualized as petty commodity producers, the inshore men have consistently fought the expansion of monopoly capitalism. Rinehart (1975:28) describes the independent producer in early Canada:

Recall that this was a society of small producers. Independent artisans could set the pace of work in accordance with their own inclinations. Farmers too could control the flow of work, subject, of course, to such exigencies as climate and seasons. Because of their independent status and the undeveloped market, such persons were likely to have had a task orientation rather than a time orientation. Labour was not geared to the clock. There was a certain irregularity and lack of precise scheduling of work. Activities were carried out with an eye to accomplishing what was an absolute necessity, and people often alternated between toiling steadily for several days and enjoying extended periods of idleness and leisure.
This study will investigate the inshore fishermen and see if in fact they are being forced out of their trade by the growth of monopoly capital. More specifically, it will explore whether the fishermen are becoming proletarianized and see if conditions of their existence are forcing these men from their trade as petty commodity producers to becoming wage labourers.

Marx (Tucker:1978:479-480) describes this process:

The lower strata of the middle class - the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants - all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialized skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.

Canso is one of the oldest fishing communities in North America, established in 1604. It is located on the extreme eastern mainland of Nova Scotia (figure 4) and recognized as a fishery as far back as 1504. In 1728 Governor Philips reported 250 vessels and as many as 2500 men fishing out of Canso. Reports from some older fishermen and old newspapers tell us that in 1914 there were as many as five fish plants as well as a glue factory operating in Canso. These consisted of The Maritime Fish Corporation, North Atlantic Fisheries, Matthews and Scott, A. Wilson and Son, Portland Packing Company and Robinson Glue Company.
As mentioned, Canso's fishery began around 1504 and from that time grew to great importance. Under French control for 200 years the fishery prospered and with reluctance was handed to the British in early 1700.

So important was Canso that the Governor of Nova Scotia proposed to make it the capital of the province. Even the infamous Louisburg could not rival Canso in its importance as a fishery. However, the war between Britain and the colonies had a devastating effect on Canso with many ships being sunk and as a result the fishing industry was severely damaged.

Taking a great deal of time to recover Canso came into prominence and thrived into the turn of the twentieth century. It came to be recognized by maritime fishing fleets as the most advantageous port for carrying out fishing along the Atlantic seaboard. Its excellent harbour and shelter made it the main rendezvous for the Atlantic fishing fleet for bait and supplies. Further, its proximity to the best fishing grounds in the world (figure 6) enabled Canso to compete successfully with other fishing ports. Canso also became the terminus for two Atlantic cable stations in 1880, Western Union and Commercial Cable, allowing the economy of the area greater diversity.

Canso's prominence in the fishery at that time was illuminated by this article appearing in the Canso News, June 20, 1908:

Canada Fisheries figures shows Nova Scotia far in the lead over all other
FIGURE 6

OFF SHORE FISHING BANKS
provinces in the Dominion. Guysborough is the banner county. Total value of fish taken in 1908 was $1,161,100.15. Canso alone was over $562,717.00 which is over $500,000 ahead of any other point in the county.

Because of its seclusion Canso was primarily a salt fish industry until the early nineteen hundreds, when rail became accessible. At that time the late C.H. Whitman began 'cold storage' operations. This enabled Canso to ship fresh fish to more lucrative markets, Montreal, Toronto, etc.

At this time Canso's population was twenty-five hundred and was expected to double itself, because of the fishery, within a few years. Canso's prosperity was bolstered in the Canso News, July 20, 1908. It noted the existence of three canning factories, a dog fish reduction works and a lobster hatchery as well as two Atlantic cable stations. It also noted how Canso was the first to establish a cold storage plant, which was important for the development of the fresh fish industry. Other facts reported here listed Canso as handling more fresh fish than any other town in Nova Scotia and supporting the "finest fleet of fishing vessels on the continent".

From this report we get the impression that Canso was very prosperous and the people of the town were proud of that fact. In nineteen hundred and seven the late C.H. Whitman wrote to that effect. He stated:

under present conditions it offers the best location in Nova Scotia for the
investment of capital in the fish business.

At the time of that statement large capital investment appeared healthy for Canso. This study will attempt to demonstrate that large capital investment does not occur without backlash. In this case the consequence involves the destruction of the petty commodity producer, inshore fishermen, in Canso.

Canso today is a town with a population of approximately 1300. There is currently one fish plant, Canso Sea Products, whose controlling shares are owned by H.B. Nickerson, the Maritimes second largest fish processor. So what we have witnessed in Canso is a progression from several small merchants (buyer/processor) to one large monopoly, H.B. Nickerson.

This study will examine the inshore fishermen in terms of proletarianization. To accomplish this we will first define petty commodity producer because in this study it is the petty commodity producer who is becoming proletarianized. For the purposes here, petty commodity producer will be used synonymously with the independent commodity producer, a term implying that they own and operate their own means of production and do not sell their labour but instead sell the rewards of their labour. The theory chapter will deal with these concepts in more detail and determine if they are applicable to the inshore men today.
Further, we want to look at the inshore men's conditions of existence. That is, have monopoly capitalism and state intervention so overwhelmed this sector that despite their middle class status they have had to turn to other means of subsistence, in particular wage labour? It is the argument of this thesis that because of the inshore men's conditions of existence they are becoming proletarianized. Rinehart (1975:52) describes this transformation in Canada:

In little over 100 years developments in the ownership of the means of production, the division of labour, and markets have combined to transform the nature and organization of work in Canadian society. From a rural society of small independent producers and shopkeepers in the middle of the Nineteenth Century, Canada has become a nation dominated by monopoly capital and giant enterprises. The traditional petite bourgeoisie (farmers, fishermen, entrepreneurs, independent artisans and salesmen) are no longer a significant stratum of this country. Johnson writes that "with their numbers reduced from their numerical and political dominance of the 1850s to a mere 10.9 per cent of income earners in 1968, it is clear that the whole petite bourgeoisie is reaching the last stages of destruction." The growing concentration of productive units in ever fewer hands (and the growth of government bureaucracies) means that the overwhelming majority of Canadian people are now dependent employees whose work is defined and directed by central authorities.

What this quote elucidates is that within the last one hundred years Canada has undergone a change from a society dominated by petty commodity producers, people who owned and controlled
their own means of production and sold the products of their labour, to a society dominated by giant monopolies where the worker is divorced from the means of production and free to sell only his or her labour power. It is believed that the inshore fishermen in Canso are also 'facing the last stages of destruction' and that the following chapters and data will support this argument.
Chapter II

Theoretical Orientation

The theoretical framework for this study has two aspects. The basis of this study is proletarianization so the theoretical framework will be Marxist. To help give an explanation why these men are giving up their trade and turning to wage labour, dependency theory will be used, relying on the work of Clement, Sacouman, and others. While both approaches are explanatory they do so at different levels. On the one hand Marxist theory describes the general, historical process of proletarianization. On the other hand dependency theory describes the changing and impoverished conditions of the fishermen in the market place.

This study will argue that the inshore fishing sector of petty commodity producers is becoming proletarianized. These producers are becoming proletarianized because of their position in the market place and because their small scale capital cannot compete with industrial capital and their specialized skills are incompatible with new technological advancements in the capitalist mode of production.
For Marx, in order for capitalism to expand certain prerequisites must be met. One of these is the proletarianization of the petty commodity producer. As Marx (Tucker, 1978:432) notes:

In themselves money and commodities are no more capital than are the means of production and of subsistence. They want transforming into capital. But this transformation itself can only take place under certain circumstances that centre in this, viz., that two very different kinds of commodity-possessors must come face to face and into contact; on the one hand, the owners of money, means of production, means of subsistence, who are eager to increase the sum of values they possess, by buying other people's labour-power; on the other hand, free labourers, the sellers of their own labour-power, and therefore the sellers of labour. Free labourers, in the double sense that neither they themselves form part and parcel of the means of production, as in the case of slaves, bondsmen, &c., nor do the means of production belong to them, as in the case of peasant-proprietors; they are, therefore, free from, unencumbered by, any means of production of their own. With this polarisation of the market for commodities, the fundamental conditions of capitalist production are given. The capitalist system pre-supposes the complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means by which they can realise their labour. As soon as capitalist production is on its own legs, it not only maintains this separation, but reproduces it on a continually extending scale. The process, therefore, that clears the way for the capitalist system, can be none other than the process which takes away from the labourer the possession of his means of production; a process that transforms, on the one hand, the social means of subsistence and production into capital, on the other, the immediate producers
into wage-labourers. The so-called primitive accumulation, therefore, is nothing else than the historical process of divorcing the producer from the means of production. It appears as primitive, because it forms the pre-historic stage of capital and of the mode of production corresponding with it.

This is the process taking place in Canso in the inshore fishery. As capitalism expands, in this case the giant fish processors, it divorces the inshore fishermen from their means of 'realising his labour'. In this process they are giving up their trade and turning to the sale of their labour power.

In order to fully understand proletarianization, the concept of petty commodity production or independent commodity production must be examined.

Independent commodity production, often synonymous with petty commodity production has been examined in Sociology for some time. The purpose of this chapter is to look at current definitions of commodity production and especially how they relate to the inshore fishermen in the Maritime provinces, and in particular the town of Canso, Nova Scotia. It will be argued that the term "independent commodity producer" while synonymous with "petty commodity production" may not apply to the fishermen in regards to their position in the market place. In the market they may be better defined as dependent commodity producers. On the other hand, their objective position in society, their ownership and control of the means of production, makes them independent or petty commodity
producers, as Marx defines them. Dependent producer is used in this study for the purpose of understanding what factors enter into the fishermen’s decision to abandon their trade for wage labour. It is not of great importance to this study whether or not we label the inshore fishermen as independent or dependent producers. What is important is the fact that they are not wage labourers, their relations of production differ from that of both the labourer and capitalist, and while they may want to remain petty producers their position in the market place and inadequate capital are forcing them into wage labour.

Dependent commodity production in used in this study to describe a situation where economic control is lost to capital while ownership rests with the producer. Here free market availability is non-existent and any profit earned is lost through interest payments to banks, government loan boards, and the processing companies. Profit is also lost to the processing companies through high bait and gear prices.

Transfer payments as well help stabilize the inshore fishermen as dependent producers, dependent upon the state for survival. While it may be politically astute to aid the inshore fishermen, it is not viewed as a deliberate attempt to keep these men in a dependent position. Another factor added to this argument is licensing. Strict government control has transformed the fisheries from common property to state property. In other words, where at one time the sea was open
to anyone who wanted to try fishing, strict control over who can receive a license and control over fishing territory has led to greater dependence upon the state for permission to enter fishing as an occupation. These factors will be discussed in detail later on in this chapter.

In this chapter it will be argued that dependent commodity production is a "near" stable form of semi-proletarianization. Their position of dependency on the state as well as large scale capital is slowing down the process of proletarianization. Sacouman (1978,1980) and Clement (1984) describe a situation where the producer maintains formal legal ownership while his income and mode of production are determined by capital, economic control is lost.

As a starting point we will rely on Marx’s definition of petty commodity production. In Capital (1,1967:716) he notes:

In political economy there is a confusion between two very different kinds of private property, one which is based upon the producer’s own labour whilst the other is based upon the exploitation of the labour of others.

To further our understanding of Marx’s description of petty production we must first look at its opposite, capitalist production. In capitalist production we see a production based on wage labour for the specific purpose of enhancing capital; simply stated, for increased production, not sustenance. Looking further we see a relationship where labour power is totally divorced from the ownership of the means of
production. People sell their labour power to those who own and/or control the means of production and profit is created largely by the exploitation of the workers. As well, the owners are divorced from the production process.

The petty producer according to Marx, and in this case the inshore fishermen, demonstrates substantially different characteristics. While tied to capitalist forces, as will be discussed later, the petty producer sells his product for sustenance and maintenance of his means of production. He does not maintain capitalist relations of production, therefore he is not a capitalist; but he is also not a worker, because he is not forced to sell labour power. He sells the rewards of his labour, in this case, fish. His labour power is not divorced from the means of production and ownership rests with the producer. He not only produces but controls how it is produced. To summarize this distinction we have been discussing, the petty commodity producer is free to sell the rewards of his labour while the proletariat is free to sell only his labour power.

Much of the work on petty commodity production in Canada has focused on the forces exerted by capitalist production. Researchers such as Hedley, Clement, Sacouman and others look at how the petty producer has been forced to change methods of production, increase capital investment and struggle to survive as a mode of production and way of life. Ultimately however, many do not survive, but suffer proletarianization.
Briefly, this is a process whereby the petty producer is forced to give up his methods of production, at least in part, and sell his labour to the capitalist, a situation compelled by such pressures as increased capital, greater technology, and increased production. Where he cannot conform to these pressures he is forced to sell his labour power and seek employment elsewhere, as a wage labourer. This is by no means a situation where you are either a proletarian or petty producer. The process is slow and there are stages of ever increasing dependence upon state and capital. Furthermore, we are not totally convinced that the process is in continuous motion. Some dependency theorists, such as Clement, believe that petty commodity production may be more beneficial to capital and therefore encouraged to remain somewhat stable.

Canadian farmers indeed suffer the same plight as Maritime fishermen. In the prairies the major form of production is domestic: ownership and control over the means of production belong to the producer. In order for domestic production to survive, change is a prerequisite: technology and production must increase. Hedley, for example, looks at Prairie farmers. He states (1976:415):

> Continuous changes in the organization of production are structural prerequisites for the survival of this class, conditions which increase production and output of labour.

Thus we see more capital-intensive farms created by the need to compete with large capital.
Now we see much the same thing in the Maritime fishing industry with perhaps even greater outside capital pressures. Increased production methods such as fish finders, depth sounders and sonar, as well as larger boats, are some examples of this effect. Also, where there once existed many smaller fish merchants enabling the fisherman to sell his catch to whomever he saw fit, there now exist such monopolies as National Sea Products. So in many cases the fishermen’s options are reduced to no options at all. In short, sell their fish to National Sea or do not fish. The only available markets open to the fishermen are those dictated by capital.

Wallace Clement (1986) distinguishes five categories of production. We will briefly outline each and try to establish where we would situate the inshore fishermen.

The first type is subsistence production. This of course is not new; Marx dealt with it himself. Simply stated, it is production based upon consumption and not exchange, a production of use value only. Not long ago there was a degree of subsistence production in the fishery. The prime example was the salting of cod for direct personal use. Very little subsistence production is carried on today.

The next type Clement mentions—-but not the next in historical order—is capitalist production. There is no need to repeat what we have already discussed. An example here would be the dragger or offshore fishermen. In this situation men are divorced from the means of production, paid a wage and
are subordinate to a boss, in this case the captain. As well there exists a task division of labour. In the case of the inshore fishermen capitalist production is the last phase of the proletarianization process. Many of these offshore workers were full-time inshore men but now must resort to wage labour to survive.

Clement's third category is independent commodity production. While he sees in this category the common characteristic of direct involvement in the labour process, differences do occur in his analysis as compared to those of Hedley, Marx and others. While Hedley (1981:74) sees farmers as employing exploitive labour, as does the capitalist, he maintains that they are still petty producers because they own, control and work the means of production. Clement, (1986:63) on the other hand, views petty production as employing non-exploitive labour, for example the family.

A key concept in this description is free market availability. Clement states (1984:8):

Independent commodity production links the producer with capital through the mechanisms of the open market. There is a unity between the direct producers and their means of realizing their labour. Production is a unity of formal ownership, economic ownership and production with a non-exploitive labour relationship. Examples include some salmon trollers on the West coast and some small-scale lobster fishermen on the East coast, if they have free market access and are free of contractual obligations to capital.
Given the dominance over the market by monopolies it is clear that free market availability is non-existent in Canso, or the Maritimes in general, at this time. Furthermore it is questionable whether there was free market availability in the early nineteen hundreds given the dominance and exploitive nature of the merchant class. From this description we could generalize and say that the concept of independent commodity production does not apply to the inshore fishermen. Let us visualize this by looking at the town of Canso, Nova Scotia. Where there once existed as many as five fish merchants, and at one time a co-op, there now exists one company, Canso Sea Products. In this particular case it represents severe limitations to accessible markets for the fishermen. However, the fact remains that the inshore fishermen in Canso do own and control their means of production, which according to Marx is a fundamental characteristic of petty commodity production. Furthermore Marx's description does not negate the fact that loss of market control is one factor contributing to the proletarianization of the inshore men.

This in turn leads us to the fourth classification. Here Clement depicts a situation where free market availability does not exist. The producer in this case maintains formal ownership but loses economic control. This he labels dependent commodity production. Following this description many of the inshore fishermen appear to fit this category. He explains (1986:62-63) that:
direct producers are forced to enter a contract or monopoly relation with capital. Forced appears to be a rather strong word but the reality in Canso is that Canso Sea Products which is owned by the H.B. Nickerson chain, is the only company where these fishermen can sell their fish. There are other processing plants along the coast, Queensport for example, but they too are controlled by the same monopoly. Theoretically the fishermen can refuse to sell their fish to Canso Sea Products but in doing so may lose their livelihood. They can refuse to go to work, they may starve but they have the option. So while the fishermen or petty producers may own and control the means of production they have no real control over the sale or distribution of what is produced.

The final type of production Clement discusses is cooperative commodity production. This mode of production is best exemplified by the once prominent co-op movement. Co-ops exist today but to a much smaller extent. Here the independent producer (fishermen) and processor cooperate in the selling of the product. As once existed in many parts of the Maritimes the fishermen held shares in a cooperative which allowed them greater economic control. While final control was still held by the market, cooperatives allowed the fishermen some say in the pricing and distribution of their fish.

Though it has been argued that the growth of capitalism necessitates the demise of independent producers and causes
proletarianization Clement’s analysis is interesting because it describes a form of semi-proletarianization. This is a stage where men are neither wage labourers nor independent producers, a sort of “in between” stage. In Struggle to Organize (1986:62) he notes:

subordination may occur yet leave the appearance of petty bourgeoisie relations of production.

This according to Clement is an advantageous position for the capitalist. There is very little risk involved because there is no direct investment. They need not own the means of production to exert control. This is accomplished through contracts with the producer along with market domination. He says (1986:63):

the form of petite bourgeoisie may remain while the content (in the sense of economic ownership) may have been captured by capital. To experience proletarianization means that direct producers can retain possession of the means of production yet lose economic control.

What Clement is discussing here are market relations as opposed to production relations. The fishermen may very well be losing control in the market but in regards to production relations there is no wage relation, they maintain control of production, own the product of their labour and can determine the methods used in production, providing they rest within legal limits. Perhaps this analysis can help explain why we have not witnessed a total demise of petty bourgeois production. This is largely due to the fact that the inshore
fishermen's relations of production give them a sense of controlling their livelihood.

In summary, when we review the work of Hedley, Clement, Jones, Sacouman and others we can see differences in their description of petty commodity production. However, certain important characteristics remain fundamental. First we see that petty production involves ownership (if only legal) and control over the means of production. Furthermore and most important, the owner is not divorced from the actual labour process. The difference that becomes apparent between Marxist theory and Clement's dependency theory is that the former deals with relations of production while the latter deals with relations within the market. It follows then, if we are discussing class and class relations, the inshore fishermen would be classified as petty commodity producers because this concept is based on relations in production.

It is the argument of this chapter however that these factors alone are not enough to maintain the inshore fishermen in Canso as petty commodity producers. Other factors, some of which are explained in dependency theory, such as loss of market control, loss of profits through interest payments, greater access to markets, transfer payments¹ and others have

¹Transfer payments appear to have two almost opposing functions. On one hand it is often the only way in which the petty producer can remain in operation. On the other hand it increases the fishermen's dependence on the state further eroding their middle class status as independent producers.
helped create a situation where the inshore fisherman is forced to give up petty commodity production and sell his labour power. Furthermore it is argued that many of these factors have been exerting pressure on the inshore fishermen and contributing to proletarianization since the rise of the merchant class, around the late eighteen or early nineteen hundreds.

Now that we have reviewed the concept of commodity production in its various forms, dependent, petty, capitalist, etc., we will now make a closer examination of the inshore fishery in Nova Scotia. In particular we will attempt to narrow the point of focus to Canso, a small fishing community located on the extreme eastern mainland of Nova Scotia.

Canso could historically be conceptualized as a fishing community consisting of small merchants, small fish processors, on the one hand, while on the other, the petty commodity producers or inshore fishermen. Note that we have used the term petty commodity producer in a historical sense. The focus of this section of the chapter is to demonstrate that Marx's theory on proletarianization is historically applicable to the inshore fishermen in Nova Scotia and in particular Canso. We will also argue, as Clement does, that the inshore fishermen have lost a significant amount of market control and that dependency theory will assist in explaining why proletarianization is occurring.
If we follow Clement’s analysis we can demonstrate some possible contributing factors to proletarianization. That is, while they may still own the means of production, market control is lost to capital. As previously mentioned it is not so important to this study whether the inshore fishermen are dependent or petty commodity producers. What is important are the factors leading up to and causing proletarianization among the inshore fishermen. In this chapter other possible factors such as profit and who controls it, family labour versus paid labour, transfer payments and more will be discussed. First we must look at historical changes, if any, to see if things were different or if they have remained constant. For example, have the fishermen ever had any real economic or market control? We will try to demonstrate when changes occurred, if any, regarding this factor and others.

The first issue is economic control. The inshore fishermen have lost control in the market which they had, at least to some degree, in the early stages of capitalist development. Economic control for the inshore fishermen in Canso is lost to capital; banks, loan boards and the fish processing company. Marketing of their products is controlled by the processing company and any possible surplus profit left for reinvestment is lost due to increasing debt.

An important aspect in Marx’s theory which Clement ignores is the direction of production itself. This aspect of independent commodity production is still within the hands of
the inshore fishermen. They decide the type of gear to be used, nets, jigs, etc., as well as boat size, manpower and more. This in no way undermines the importance of the loss of market control. This fact enters in the decision of the fishermen to give up their trade. Now if we look at this over time we see that changes have occurred. In Newfoundland prior to confederation a situation existed between classes where cash was not involved, a type of exchange between two merchant classes. This was common practice in Canso and much of the Maritimes during this period as well. While it may not have possessed the inherent inequalities that exist between classes today, it was nevertheless exploitative. As Bickerton elaborates (1982), the inshore fishermen were exploited by the merchant class by means of cost-price differentials in the purchase of fish and the sale of goods. Furthermore, any possible surplus left for reinvestment was negated by high bait and supply prices and low fish prices to the fishermen.

What appeared to be standard practice at that time was this: the merchant would supply the fishermen and his family with the basic staples throughout the year and during the fishing season the merchant would debit their account from the price paid for fish. So in the course of the year there was very little money exchanged. Initially then it appeared as though Canso as well as other fishing communities employed a system of barter or exchange. As the literature reveals however, it was not an equal exchange.
Given the exploitative nature of this type of relationship between the fishermen and merchant we can in part answer our question. That is, at least in this time frame, the inshore fishermen appeared to have no more economic control over their product then they do now. Bickerton (1982:194) notes:

In the fishery, the merchant/small producer form of production kept productivity low. Dependence on extensive exploitation of abundant cheap labour, made possible by the maintenance of low fish prices, the chief means of "squeezing" profits. As a result most fishing communities lived a self reliant, "hand-to-mouth" existence.

As capitalism developed and changed so did this relationship with the merchant. The fishermen lost even more economic control. Fish merchants grew into fish processing companies and the price paid to the fishermen for fish 'resembled' a wage. This is of course stated simplistically but as Sacouman (1978:15) notes:

The semi-proletarianization of the petty fisheries has, except in the most advantageous of petty fisheries such as Cape Sable Island in Nova Scotia, taken away any reality of 'independence'. Monopolistic control by finance capitalist fish companies allows such companies to treat the price of fish paid to petty producers as a mere wage. And yet these same companies maintain the petty fisheries.

The price the fishermen receive for their fish is not a wage. Wages are paid on the sale of labour power whereas prices paid to the fishermen are for the products of labour, namely fish,
though the price levels are largely determined by the market. However, control over the price received does resemble a wage in that they have little or no control over them. The fishermen must take what the company offers or not fish.

With the growth of capital the fishermen made attempts to hold onto some economic control. This took form in the development of cooperatives and unionization. And while they were marginally successful, it was their attempt to have some input into the sale and marketing of their product.

Canso in particular followed this pattern of development. In the earlier part of the nineteen hundreds Canso supported as many as five fish plants. Included in this was the cooperative or union plant as it was called. Others included such names as The Maritime Fish Corporation and North Atlantic Fisheries. In 1907 the late C.H. Whitman (Canso library historical notes) noted:

Under present conditions it offers the best location in Nova Scotia for the investment of capital in the fish business.

At that time his statement appeared insightful at least in terms of the rise and dominance by the merchant class.

The significance of five fish plants including a co-op was that it allowed the fishermen more freedom of choice in the disposal of their product. They could sell their fish to the company which offered the highest price. Cooperatives gave further control by allowing the fishermen to invest in
that co-op thereby receiving investment returns. In a report prepared by Lois Saunders (1978) for the Fishermen of Nova Scotia she stated the position of the United Maritime Fishermen (UMF) in regards to cooperatives:

UMF states that just as important for fishermen to own their own boats and gear, so it is important to own their own processing and marketing facilities. It is only thus, they say, that individual fishermen can have any real control over his livelihood. He is secure in the knowledge that there is a market for his catch, that market will return to him the best price obtainable and that the total market price less operating expenses will be his.

Rick Williams (1978:18) looked at the maritime fishermen in their attempt to unionize in an effort to gain more control over their economic existence, he stated:

they frequently move in and out of the wage labour market, are regularly unemployed and have very unstable incomes. Most have experienced extended periods of very low income and of marginal status as producers. While they have often had substantial work experience outside of the fishing industry altogether, they have also experienced a wide range of production relations within the industry.

The range of production relations Williams referred to involved those that existed on the trawlers and in the fish processing plants. These are capitalist relations though in the past it had been argued that trawler fishermen are 'coadventures' in that they received a share of the total catch.
This is true of Canso today. Many of the inshore fishermen seek employment in the fish plant or draggers during the off-season, especially the men with smaller boats. Their season is shorter given the relative limitations of their boats. They are not equipped to withstand the rigors of winter, icy conditions, strong winds, etc. Consequently they have more time to give to outside employment. The point is that under these conditions they have no alternative but to try and unionize. In other words, if the fishermen had a strong unified union they would possess greater economic control over their work enabling them to remain within their own work sphere.

Bickerton, (1982) described the development of social movements. He believed that some were a result of capitalist underdevelopment while others resulted from greater exploitation within petty commodity production. Nevertheless they resulted from the fishermen trying to gain or maintain some degree of control over their environment. The Nova Scotia Fishermen’s strike of 1970-71 is a clear example of this struggle. Centred in Canso it demonstrated the fishermen’s fight to gain economic control and resistance to exploitation. This was a strike by all fishermen; inshore, dragger, and fish plant workers. It was a fight against low fish prices, poor working conditions, unfair shares for the dragger workers and more. On the part of the inshore men this strike can be viewed as resistance to semi-proletarianization
or the pressures exerted by the proletarianization process. As mentioned, semi-proletarianization is caused in part by the loss of economic ownership and this strike is an attempt on the part of the inshore fishermen to regain this ownership. As one Canso fishermen noted (Cameron: 1977):

When you have no union, you stand alone. And when you’re goin’ in for fish prices or bait prices, trying to get your bait price cut down a little bit and fish prices raised – goin’ in there speakin’ alone, they’re just laughin’ in your face.

In concluding this point on economic control we can say with reasonable certainty that the inshore fishermen of Canso have lost some degree of control within the market. This can be demonstrated by the loss of numerous small processing plants, loss of the cooperative, and subsequent domination by a monopoly. However in the time frame we are discussing, nineteen hundred to the present, it appears as though there was little control to begin with, given the dominant nature of merchant capitalism. So it really only amounts to the degree of control lost, relative control lost instead of absolute control.

In terms of our analysis this does not imply that loss of market control proletarianizes the inshore fishermen. It is just one more factor adding to the impoverishment and discontent of the fishermen. It helps to instill the feelings that they cannot survive in fishing and must consider wage labour.
We will now turn to the issue of profit and who controls it. What we mean by profit here is that amount of money remaining over and above the cost of producing a commodity. In the case of the inshore fishermen, the amount of fish left over to exchange for goods or cash after wages, expenses, etc. are paid, in short, profit.

Here again changes have occurred since the early nineteen hundreds. The degree to which the fishermen’s profits were ‘gouged’ by institutions or people other than the fishermen has increased. The fishermen, in the case of the fathers, did not rely on banks, loan boards or transfer payments, relative to today, to help them sustain their business. So any profit generated by the fishermen would not be lost through interest payments to these institutions. However, any possible profit was lost to the merchant class. This was accomplished through exaggerated pricing of goods and staples, not to mention bait and supplies which the fishermen had to acquire from the merchant. In Sacouman’s analysis of domestic commodity production in the Maritimes he states (1980:237):

In the Maritimes, the petty commercial inshore fisheries segment of the domestic mode of farming-fishing-woodworking moved from predominantly indirect to predominantly direct capitalist underdevelopment around the 1900’s. Prior to this period, merchant capital’s mechanisms of unequal exchange had kept the petty fisheries in absolute and increasing dependence and impoverishment.
So in the end, any money expropriated from fishing was lost through exaggerated pricing on the part of the merchant.

Today gouging is still occurring in the inshore fishery but from different sources. Fishermen in Canso today rely more on bank financing, loan board support, government subsidies\(^2\) and quite often loans direct from National Sea Products. Except for government subsidies, interest rates serve as a method of decreasing the fishermen's profits. In other words the fishermen do not make sufficient returns on their fish to enable them to re-invest their profit. Therefore, it becomes necessary to borrow or finance operations creating a 'perpetual' or ever-increasing debt. Peter Sinclair (1984:34-47) discusses the Newfoundland inshore fisheries and its dependence on extraneous institutions. He states:

> the domestic commodity producer becomes dependent for his survival on goods manufactured by capitalist enterprises; the effort to remain competitive through the purchase of such technical aids is usually accompanied by indebtedness to the manufacturers, banks, merchants, or the state.

While these factors can be viewed as the 'cost of doing business' it may be a 'healthy' business if in fact the

\[^2\text{Government subsidies are viewed by many as a method of controlling the fishery because of the conditions placed upon those receiving a subsidy. For example you have to keep the boat for a specified time period depending on the age of the boat and amount of subsidy. Some also maintain that subsidies artificially inflate the price of boats. Just as important is the fact that while a particular fishermen may hold this view, at the same time he cannot afford to buy a boat without this subsidy.}\]
fishermen were receiving a fair return for their fish. In other words, if the fishermen received a fair return they may well be able to compete in the fishery, pay off debts and succeed on their own without this high dependence on state and capital.

On this issue of profit gouging we are again discussing relative change not absolute. The degree to which profit is gouged by extraneous institutions is relative not absolute. In other words it is not a new phenomenon, it has merely increased in the time frame we are discussing.

Transfer payments or unemployment insurance were introduced as a benefit to fishermen in 1957. We will not discuss why it was introduced but as Sinclair (1984:34-47) noted it made life more comfortable and aided in the survival of the inshore fisheries. In the "off" season transfer payments enable the inshore fishermen to tend to other fish business, net mending, trap repairs, etc. If not for these payments many would have to seek employment elsewhere leaving little time for these necessary tasks.

Transfer payments possess two opposing functions. On one hand it is often the only means by which the domestic producer can sustain his business while on the other hand it helps create and maintain a dependent form of production, dependent on the fact that without transfer payments the fishermen could not remain in business. It helps create and maintain a "highly exploitable surplus population". That is, because so many rely
on transfer payments in the Maritimes, this population becomes very much at the 'mercy' of state and capital. On the one hand if you are collecting unemployment benefits you are obliged to accept employment, if offered. If you are offered employment and refuse, you are 'cut off' from benefits. On the other hand, this fact and the fact that there are so many dependent upon unemployment insurance that this gives the companies the power to exploit this population in terms of low wages and threats of benefit loss if one refuses to accept what the company offers. This paper agrees with Sacouman (1980:242) that this is an area which requires further research. He looks at the impact of transfer payments (1980:242):

In many rural areas, the domestic mode of petty production has been truncated not through semi-proletarianization per se but through 'subsistenceization', that is by welfare and other dependency payments; these areas have become even more socially atomized.

So in part transfer payments have succeeded in temporarily easing the financial burden experienced by many inshore fishermen and helped them remain in fishing. On the other hand it has created greater dependence upon the state.

Turning now to the relations of production within petty commodity production we want to investigate the division of labour, if any, method of payment (shares or hourly wage) and whether the men hired are family, relatives or friends.
In this area changes have occurred as well. The classic description of domestic commodity producers involved the use of family labour. This for some is a key feature in determining independent commodity production as well. As mentioned previously, Clement argues that in order for domestic production to remain independent it must in part use family labour. Where non-family members are used and shares paid, a form of dependent commodity production is created because this relationship is exploitative.

Canso did fit this family-labour scenario earlier in our time frame. However, as capitalism developed we witnessed a decline in recruitment to the inshore fishery. Many sons of fishermen were turning to wage labour instead of fishing with their fathers. This would lead to the use of more distant relatives and friends rather than immediate family members. And, as is common practice in the Maritimes, these men were paid an equal share of the catch. Normally there was a share taken for every member of the crew including the captain and an equal share for the boat. Statistics were not available as to the number of sons who turned to wage labour. However, in discussions with the inshore men it became apparent that many of the sons did not view inshore fishing as a viable means of existence and family enterprise.

We can say that this form of labour is exploitative because the owner of the means of production extracts surplus, partly from the use of paid labour, in the sense that the
skipper is the boss (by fact of ownership) and the other fishermen do receive pay. However, it is by no means comparable to the exploitative nature of the relations of production within a capitalist framework. We do not see a task division of labour and subordination is non-existent, relative to the subordination that exists on the trawlers and in the processing plants. The reason the skipper was there is the same reason the crew members are there, to meet the immediate needs of family survival. The skipper, as well as the crew is not there for self-aggrandizement but for control over his livelihood.

While it is argued here that this type of relationship does not lessen the petty status of the inshore fishermen this fact alone does very little towards stabilizing these men as petty commodity producers.

One final factor in the argument supporting proletarianization is licensing and the degree to which it is controlled. A license is required for nearly every species of fish as well as lobster and other shellfish. This strict regulation has been in existence for a relatively short period. Prior to the sixties the only real special license was for lobster. Furthermore it is very difficult to obtain new licenses, normally the licenses are accompanied by a boat. So you either have to buy the boat that the licenses are registered to or inherit them. The licenses as Clement argues (1984:31);
take on a value of their own and become private property. Licensing is a result of state policy for the use of what is incorrectly called a "common property resource". The sea has been transformed from common to private property by the state, first establishing its claim (state property), then granting individuals/corporations licenses to take fish (private property).

He continues to argue that the fisheries were common property but have been transformed into state property. We need not elaborate any further on the ramifications of this control. Suffice it to say that this regulation does indeed lend itself to the proletarianization of the inshore fishermen, simply by controlling who can or cannot enter into the occupation of fishing.

We can now address the question as to whether or not the inshore fishermen of Canso have always been so highly dependent upon the state and capital and if this is accompanied by increasing proletarianization? To answer this question we will summarize our previous discussion.

Our argument centres on the fact that the inshore fishermen of the Maritimes and in particular Canso, Nova Scotia, are undergoing a process of proletarianization. As mentioned this is a slow process and certainly not an 'all or nothing' situation. It is argued that these petty commodity producers are very dependent upon the state and capital and have been in this position since the early nineteen hundreds. Furthermore, this state of dependency as well as pressures
exerted by monopoly capitalism have contributed to the process of proletarianization.

The first of these factors began emerging approximately between the time of confederation and the early nineteen hundreds. This was the rise of the dominant merchant class where 'gouging' existed in the form of unequal exchange; a high dependence on this class for supplies, food and other basic necessities. The gouging presented itself in the form of low fish prices and high supply prices. This argument is substantiated in the Maritimes in general by researchers such as Bickerton, Hedley, Williams, and others.

Another factor which supports this argument is the control of profits. That is, any profit generated by the inshore fishermen was lost to the merchant class in the form of higher prices for goods. This type of gouging continues today only in the form of interest payments to the banks, the loan board and the processing companies.

Proletarianization was further enhanced by the introduction of transfer payments. While these payments have slowed the process down, Sacouman (1980) and others document the fact that unemployment insurance and other welfare payments helped create and maintain an exploitable surplus population as well as maintaining the domestic producer in a state of dependency.

An important factor in this process was family labour. During the initial interviews it was discovered that very few
sons had the desire to enter this occupation. Now it is not so much that the use of non-family labour proletarianizes the inshore men but due more to the fact that the sons were turning to other means of subsistence such as paid labour. Consequently there was no one to replace the aging inshore fishermen. Such is the case in Canso.

We need not discuss other factors in this process for they have previously been mentioned. What we were trying to establish was the time frame in which this process began. All the information for Canso and the Maritimes in general appears to indicate around the time of the rise of the dominant merchant class, approximately from confederation to the present. This is when the inshore fishing sector of the petty commodity producers began the process of proletarianization.
2.1 Conclusion:

In light of the previous discussion we can now test our argument with results obtained from this study. Following Marx’s proletarianization thesis and Clement’s dependency model we will hopefully prove with certainty that the inshore fishermen of the Maritimes and in particular Canso, Nova Scotia have been undergoing the process of proletarianization. This was a condition brought about by many factors, some of which were based upon the petty commodity producers relation with the capitalist while others were based upon consumption within the market.

Under Marx’s theory, proletarianization occurs because of the inability of the petty commodity producer to compete with large scale capital. Their technology is insufficient compared to that of the capitalist. Furthermore, in order for capitalism to fully develop it must remove all forms of ownership of the means of production from the producer. Therefore what this study is describing is nothing more than an historical process in the development of capitalism. To this end the following chapters will investigate the growth of the processing occupation, the inshore fishermen’s use of technology, and the declining numbers of petty commodity producers, specifically in Canso and in general for the province.
Under the dependency model the move towards proletarianization is enhanced by the fishermen's position within the market place. To this end factors pertaining to prices paid to the fishermen for fish, union affiliation, profit gouging, and others will be investigated. The factors investigated will be done so over time, from father to son in order to obtain an historical perspective.

As to whether or not the inshore men become fully proletarianized we really can not answer that question yet, though it is believed that the data will support a move towards proletarianization, because without question the number of petty commodity producers in Canada has declined dramatically alongside of ever expanding monopoly capitalism. It is suggested by the dependency model that capital benefits from dependent commodity production, one reason being a source of exploitable labour, another being the fact that there is no direct investment required on the part of capital. In any event the process of proletarianization is slow and the answer will only come after more time and study. If the trend in Canso continues, however, where very few sons are entering the fishing occupation, we could see total proletarianization in the future.

In one final note we must ask, why do men still fish, given all the negative conditions mentioned above? And, under these conditions, one would suspect a decline in the number of inshore fishermen. In northwest Newfoundland the number
of fishermen increased from 1,400 in 1965 to 2,737 by 1982, (Sinclair, 1984:42). This was due in part to high returns, relative to the economy of the area, and in part to state intervention.

Thiessen and Davis (1988:603-626), look at recruitment to small boat fishing, they state:

For many in Atlantic Canada the income returns from commercial fishing are insufficient relative to participation and household costs. Yet tens of thousands continue to enter and pursue fishing as their primary occupation.

We must ask why this influx occurs? The answer that they put forth is primarily, "the sense of control". Despite the external conditions of his reality the inshore men still feel a sense of control over their environment and their lives. What appears real to them may be subjective but in any event this does add to the continuation of that form of petty commodity production. When asked what he preferred, offshore or inshore fishing, one fishermen in this study answered:

Oh ya, I like inshore better. At least you know what your gonna do. Get up in the morning, if its fit to go you go, if its not you stay home. There is no one to tell you what to do.

This simple statement says a lot. Even though the fisherman face adversity, the idea of being one's own boss still plays very much in the minds of these people. Despite these feelings, monopoly capitalism, as predicted by Marx, appears to be over-powering the petty commodity producer in Canso.
Chapter III

METHODOLOGY

The methods employed in this study took several forms. One method used was the 'focused interview', (Merton & Kendall 1945-46 541-557). This method was employed for several reasons. One reason is the fact that this method allows for 'unintended' findings because of the ability to probe deeper into issues while the interviewee has the freedom to respond in depth and detail. Another reason is that the factors or issues being researched are usually items which can be tested repeatedly, in this case factors such as years in fishing, union affiliation, and method of financing. These and many others are facts which could be tested in different studies at any time.

The second method involved administering a structured questionnaire, where time would not allow lengthy interviews. In the first phase of the study the questionnaires were administered by the researcher, along with the focused interviews. A population of twelve owner/operators was chosen from a list of inshore men obtained from the office of National Sea Products. From this list and information obtained
from the 1971 census it was determined that the population of owner/operators was twelve. Eight were subjected to the focused interview and the remaining four were administered questionnaires. In actual fact eleven of these men were full time fishermen, while the remaining one was for the most part retired and fished less frequently than the others. So what we were dealing with in this study was a total population and not a sample.

The greatest difficulty in this area was defining who was a full time fishermen and who was not. The Maritime Fishermen's Union Newsletter (1979:2) describes three levels of inshore fishermen. The first, they argue, make up ten to fifteen percent of the total inshore fishermen in Nova Scotia. These were described as highly capitalized, with hundreds of thousands of dollars invested in boats and equipment. Their boats were all-weather long liners or inshore draggers quite often employing wage labourers. The Canso inshore fishermen did not fall under this category.

The second group consisted of fifty percent of Nova Scotia's inshore fleet. The Newsletter states:

Approximately 50% of the inshore fishermen are full-time or part-time fishermen who are not able to accumulate enough capital to make it into the small businessman's club. Because of their numbers, this group produces the largest share of the inshore catch, but still they are individually mired in a cost-price squeeze that prevents them from developing their productivity....
For the most part the inshore fishermen of Canso did fit this description and the full time ones were the only concerns of this study.

The third level the Newsletter describes were part-time and occasional fishermen. These were the people with multiple incomes and fishing merely serves as a means to 'pocket' a little extra cash. These were men who may possess one license for a particular species, lobster for example. The point to be made here is that trying to define an inshore fishermen for study purposes can be difficult.

There were many inshore boats in Canso but most of these were used only occasionally by part time fishermen or sportsmen. Many men who used to fish and may now be working in the fish plant may have kept their boat for part time or summer use. The procedure then, involved determining as closely as possible from the census data the number of fishermen who listed themselves as full time self employed fishermen. Next, a comparison was made with a list of names obtained from the office of National Sea Products. From this list men were asked if they considered this their full time occupation. The end result was a total population of eleven full time and one recently or near retired.

The focused interview not only lends itself to the gathering of objective information but to subjective qualitative data as well. As expected, this method led to lengthy interviews, since these men did not show any
resistance to being interviewed. In fact, all subjects were more than willing to answer questions and give their account of conditions within the fishing industry. In fact, one interview lasted as long as three hours.

Prior to conducting the actual interviews much time was spent at the docks where these men would work on their boats or equipment. The reasoning for this was to let these men become more familiar with me, to observe them at their work and to get a feeling or sense of the general atmosphere within the fishery. A good portion of qualitative information was obtained from these informal conversations. A total of four weeks was spent in Canso collecting information and conducting interviews.

For the eight fishermen that received the focused interview a tape recorder was used and a format following that of the questionnaire was used. This was done to achieve uniformity and allow for comparison of data between interviews and questionnaires. Questionnaires were used exclusively in situations where time did not permit an extended taped interview. These questionnaires were administered by the interviewer.

Further information was collected from various sources: census data, local Fisheries Officers, the Canso library and towns people who were in some way connected to the fishery. Census data was valuable because it allowed for the comparison of numbers of fishermen over time where interviews could not.
In order to assess the proletarianization thesis, the foundation of this study, an historical approach has been taken. That is, in order to assess the current state of the inshore men the past must be examined to see whether changes, if any, have been evolutionary, or are recent phenomena. To this effect questions were asked pertaining to the fathers of these men. Similar questions were then asked of the current fishermen.

As mentioned the fishery in the maritimes has been examined by many researchers, Sacouman, Clement, Antler, and others. Antler (1977), argues that the inshore fishery in Newfoundland was capitalist from the beginning. That is, dependence on capital and lack of control over their product constitute these as capitalist relations of production. Rick Williams (1978), looks at the inshore men in terms of mobilization and unionization in their struggle against underdevelopment. He argues that since 1977 large numbers have moved towards unionization and are dealing more effectively with problems of survival within that industry. Thiessin and Davis (1988) look at the inshore fishermen in terms of recruitment. Their study focuses on why people stay in fishing and why young people turn to fishing as a career. The position taken here is that none of these arguments apply to Canso’s inshore fishery. These and other arguments will be dealt with in greater detail in the following chapters.
Once again, this study will look at the inshore fishermen as petty commodity producers, in terms of Marx's proletarianization thesis, and from a dependency theory perspective as well, to see if and why they are declining in numbers and turning to wage labour as a means of survival. The following chapter will be devoted to an analysis of the data collected for this study.
Chapter IV

Data

This chapter will be devoted to a review and explanation of the research findings. First, information gathered from Statistics Canada will be reviewed and then statistics collected during this study will be examined to see if similar patterns emerge. Much of the data collected during the study involved a comparison between fathers and sons, to help develop an historical picture.

A fundamental question to be answered when looking at proletarianization is: "are the number of inshore fishermen declining?" Reviewing provincial trends (Table 1), will help answer this. Because census categories can differ from period to period it can be difficult to make comparisons. However, remaining in the category of fishing and trapping for the county of Guysborough, where Canso is located, some census years are comparable (see Table 2). In 1961 the number of males engaged in fishing was 709. By 1981 the number had

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3Because this is a male dominated occupation and the number of females engaged in this work is so small this study will concern itself with the male population.
declined to 455. For the town of Canso the number of males engaged in primary occupations\(^4\) was 179 in 1941. In 1951 the number decreased to 126 and by 1961 the number had fallen to 75. By 1971 the number of fishermen had further declined to 15. To better understand what these figures mean Table 3 will compare the number of fishermen against the number of males involved in fish processing for the town of Canso.

What is demonstrated in these tables is a steady decline in the number of inshore fishermen not only for the town of Canso but for the entire province of Nova Scotia as well as the county of Guysborough. For the province this represents a decline of 37 percent for the years 1931 to 1981. For the county of Guysborough the fishing population declined from 709 in 1961 to 455 in 1971, a total appreciable drop of 36 percent.

For the town of Canso the numbers are more dramatic. From 1941 the number of fishermen declined from 43 percent of the total work force to 5.3 percent in 1971. This represents a total percentage drop of 92 percent for Canso. The vast difference for the town relative to the county and province can possibly be explained by the large concentration of capital in Canso and the subsequent competition fishermen are faced with. While these figures would indicate a process of

\(^4\)Primary occupations involved farming, horticulture, animal husbandry occupations, fishing, logging, mining, quarries, oil and gas. Very few of these except fishing are carried out in Canso or Guysborough.
proletarianization they alone do not prove this conclusively. However, a review of the data obtained in this current study will substantiate the previous census data and the proletarianization theory.

The central argument of proletarianization is supported largely by the decrease in numbers of fishermen. Tables 1 and 3 demonstrate this decrease for the entire province as well as the town of Canso. This decrease accompanied on a corresponding increase in the processing occupation, also shown on Table 3, indicates that the fishermen are turning to wage labour rather than fishing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Fishing and Trapping</th>
<th>Percentage Distribution*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>11,398</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>10,688</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>10,007</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>7,587</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>7,231</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>7,015</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from 1971 census, Table 1-5 vol.3 part 2 and 1981 census data. *percentage of population

§ "Fishing" refers to inshore fishing unless otherwise specified, relative to offshore or dragger fishing.
Table 2
Fishing and Trapping Trends for the County of Guysborough

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fishing and Trapping</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As reported by Census Canada.

Table 3
Fishing and Processing Trends for Canso

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>fishermen</th>
<th>%dist.*</th>
<th>processing</th>
<th>%dist.*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* percentage of all male wage earners for Canso

This fact is further supported by the lack of new entries into the fishing occupation, indicating an aging workforce with no new entries to replace them. This can be demonstrated by the average number of years the sons interviewed have been fishing. Of those interviewed the average was 39 years engaged in fishing. The lowest number of years involved in fishing was 9, indicating no new entries into this field. This fact is highlighted by one fisherman who replied in the following manner to the question, "Do you have any family going into fishing?" His reply was:
No and I hope they never think about it. If there was any future in it I would encourage them, but there is no future. The fishin here has gone down. The fishin here is gone and there is only a handful of old fellers at it now. And when they die off there will be no fellers to take their place because there is no future in it for any young fellers. It's just a hard struggle from one day to another. You get a shit kickin from everybody, the company, department of fisheries or anyone connected to fishing.

This is consistent with Canada-wide trends as reported by Rinehart (1975:85), where the petty commodity sectors of fishing, logging and mining declined from 4.1 percent in 1901 to 1.8 percent in 1971. Similar trends are reported for the farming sector in Nova Scotia. Table 4 demonstrates this.

**Table 4**

N.S. Provincial Trends for Farming

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farmers</th>
<th>% distribution*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>42,429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>38,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>22,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>11,951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5,149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

adapted from 1971 census, Table 1-5 vol.3 part 2
* percentage of population

Data found in this study appear to be consistent with census data and data reported by other researchers. Canso's petty bourgeoisie has declined from a significant percentage
of the work force to a rather small percentage, while at the same time there is a corresponding rise in processing. Marx (Tucker, 1978:492-493) describes the rise and fall of this class.

In countries where modern civilisation has fully developed, a new class of petty bourgeoisie has been formed, fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society. The individual members of this class however are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced, in manufactures, agriculture, and commerce, by overlookers, bailiffs and shopmen.

It appears that unless a drastic change occurs in the pattern of development in capitalist Canada, Marx’s prediction will prove to be quite accurate since the petty bourgeoisie in this country appears very close to extinction.

One important question is, where are these men going if they are no longer in fishing? For the entire province the numbers involved in fish processing increased from 3590 in 1971 to 6475 in 1981 (Table 5) while the number of fishermen had declined (see Table 1). If we were to use 1971 as an example the data show that only 5.3 percent of the male working population in Canso had remained in fishing while the number involved in processing increased from 7.6 percent in 1941 to 26 percent of the male working population in 1971.
From this we can infer that the fishermen leaving their trade, in Canso, were to a large degree absorbed by the processing companies.

**Table 5**

*Processing Trends for Nova Scotia*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>fish processing</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>6475</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Census Canada

In Canso the only gainful employment other than fishing is the processing factory. Furthermore, while there has been a drop in the number of fishermen, the total male labour force has increased from 255 in 1961 to 335 in 1986, or 22 percent of the population in 1961 to 27 percent in 1986, (Table 6). From these statistics several factors can be deduced. First, of those entering the work force for the first time very few are going into fishing. Secondly, since the work force itself has increased, especially in the processing occupation, while fishing has decreased, it can be concluded that these people are entering a waged occupation as opposed to fishing.

**Table 6**

*Labour Force Participation for Canso*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>labour force</th>
<th>% of the population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Another aspect of proletarianization is the number of fishermen who participate in work outside their trade. The following tables demonstrate this. The question asked, "What did you and your father do after the fishing season", the second part asked, "Why"?

What these figures demonstrate is that a large percentage of both fathers and sons needed extra income to survive, income from working elsewhere or transfer payments. A greater percentage of the fathers working elsewhere can be partly explained by the introduction of unemployment insurance in 1957. Because this was not available until then many of these men had no choice but to work elsewhere, consequently 42 percent of the fathers worked outside their trade. In contrast, 83 percent of the sons questioned collected unemployment insurance instead of working elsewhere. What remains important is the high percentage of both father and sons who needed income from another source in order to survive.

The factor which supports a move towards proletarianization is the 25 percent increase in the need for extra income between these two groups. This suggests that increasingly fishermen are not making enough money from fishing to survive. However, as the data demonstrate, this need for extra income is not a new phenomena, as 58 percent of the fathers needed it to survive as well. When asked
whether his father could have made it without going aboard the trawlers one fishermen answered:

They are forced to go aboard the trawlers in order to get by. Back then there was no credit, not too much. Store keepers couldn’t keep you all winter so you were forced to go elsewhere to make a few dollars to carry you over.

The importance of unemployment insurance in the livelihood of the current fishermen is borne out in the question; “Could you succeed without unemployment?” Of the 12 people interviewed, 8, or 67 percent, answered: they could not, (see Table 9). Furthermore it appears as though it may be more beneficial for the fishermen to remain on unemployment rather than take a winter position in the plant. Aside from the time needed to work on nets and other equipment there are other considerations. This fishermen notes:

Once you get snarled up with this company down here, I don’t care, your workin a’shore, a fishin, or what ever your doin. They’ll call you in if there is no work just to keep you from gettin unemployment insurance and they done it time and time again.

That the price fishermen receive for their fish is insufficient relative to the rising costs of their operation is also demonstrated by the number of men who must collect unemployment insurance or work outside their trade. Tables 7 and 8 demonstrate that 42 percent of the fathers worked outside their trade and 58 percent of these stated that they needed to do this to survive.
On the other hand only 17 percent of the sons worked outside of fishing. However, 83 percent collected unemployment insurance and 83 percent of these said they needed to do so in order to survive. The 25 percent increase from father to son clearly demonstrates the need for extra income on the part of the inshore fishermen. The fact that many of the fathers needed to work outside of their trade also demonstrates that the process of proletarianization had already begun and has progressed for the sons.

Table 7

Activities other than Fishing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>work elsewhere</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.I.C.</td>
<td>2 (16%)</td>
<td>10 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other*</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = fishing related activities; work on equipment or boats, etc.

---

6."Survive" means the ability to stay in business for themselves.
Table 8

Reasons for Activities other than Fishing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>needed the money</td>
<td>7 (58%)</td>
<td>10 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other*</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = to keep busy, fill in the time.

Table 9

Possibility of Succeeding Without U.I., Sons Only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>succeed</td>
<td>4 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not succeed</td>
<td>8 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arguments in the previous chapter, using the dependency theory, centred on the idea that this section of petty commodity producers has been in a dependent position since the beginning of this century. That is, the fathers of the current fishermen were in a state of dependency at the outset and today's fishermen have only demonstrated a relative loss of control, compared to the fathers.

Union affiliation is an indication of workers attempting to maintain or gain control over their work (see Table 10). Their belief in numbers as a bargaining tool is demonstrated by the 1970-71 strike by unionized fishermen in Canso. This
strike is a good example of workers attempting to gain control over bait and fish prices, as well as to improve working conditions for the trawler fishermen.

**Table 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Affiliation</th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>6 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While this table demonstrates a substantial rise in sons' union affiliation, of equal importance is the fishermen's belief in its effectiveness. Table 11 demonstrates their response. Of the 12 men interviewed, 10 or 83 percent answered no, that is was not effective. This lack of belief in the union's effectiveness indicates that despite the growth of union affiliation in Canso, little has changed for the fishermen in terms of control over their working environment.

**Table 11**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>effective</th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>10 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It was argued in the previous chapter that the existence of co-ops and the greater number of fish processing plants
offered the fishermen some degree of control, especially in the area of fish and bait prices. To investigate this hypothesis, the question was asked, "Did your father or do you have any control over the price of fish?" Table 12 demonstrates the results.

Table 12

Control Over Prices Received for Fish

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>control</th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>11 (100%)</td>
<td>10 (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>11 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table appears to refute our previous argument, in that despite the existence of co-ops and more processing plants, the fathers did not feel that they had more control over the price of fish relative to the sons. To a small degree the opposite was true, where the sons felt that they possessed more control in this area compared to the fathers. In their feelings of control over the price of fish, 100 percent of fathers and 83 percent of the sons felt they had no control in this area. One fisherman noted that today's fishermen are still getting whatever the plant offers. He notes:

They get a better price on the western end (of the province) because of competition, more buyers. We have H.B. Nickerson and National Sea, and they are both controlled by Nickerson, one big monopoly, wherever you sell to, you're still selling to the same person.
This increase (17 percent) in belief in control corresponds to the 17 percent belief in the union’s effectiveness, on the part of the sons. This feeling of no control corresponds to a 50 percent increase in union affiliation among the inshore men in Canso. The Fishermen’s Union Newsletter elaborates this point (1979:1):

While supposedly being independent businessmen, inshore fishermen are finding that they have little or no control over the prices they can get for their fish, and very limited choice as to whom to sell the fish. That is why, increasingly, inshore fishermen attempt to band together to negotiate fish prices and other conditions, whether it be through their local associations, the regional Associations, or the Maritimes Fishermen’s Union. The demand for collective bargaining is a logical and inevitable response by fishermen to the emerging monopoly conditions in the industry.

Economic or market control is influenced by several factors, one of which is licensing. In this area the current fishermen have lost a significant amount of control. The following Table demonstrates this. The questions asked, "Was it difficult to obtain a license?" and "Are there special categories of fish?"

What these tables demonstrate is an erosion of the fishermen's economic independence by government intervention and government's attempt to control the fishery. On this topic of licensing and control one fishermen says:
In the spring you have to send to Halifax for two licenses in order to go down to the plant to get a trip license. The fisheries will control itself because the good fishermen will be at it, the poor ones (in terms of being bad fishermen) will be gettin out.

In other words this fisherman believes that government intervention is not necessary in that only the good fishermen will survive and in that they are capable of policing themselves.

**Table 13**

**Difficulty in Obtaining Licenses**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>difficulty</th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 14**

**Special License Categories**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>special categories</th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no *</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* = one special category for lobster

7 "Good fishermen" in this case does not mean only the best but rather the more responsible as well, in terms of caring about the whole fishery and not just about themselves.
Another aspect investigated was the appropriation of fishermen's profits by the banks, loan board and fish companies through interest rate payments. This was demonstrated by the indebtedness to various institutions for the purchase of their boats or the equipment on those boats. The question asked how they and their fathers acquired their boats. Three choices were offered: built themselves, paid cash or financed. Eight out of 12 or 67 percent of the fathers paid cash while the remaining 4 or 33 percent financed their boats. By contrast 4 out of 12 or 33 percent of the sons paid cash and the remaining 8 or 67 percent financed theirs. Table 15 summarizes these statistics. In Canso the reliance on financial institutions for the acquisition of boats has doubled, demonstrating a greater dependence on capital for survival.

This study has demonstrated (see Table 15) that profit 'gouging' existed to a significant degree for the fathers and increasingly so for the sons. One change which occurred was the type of institution 'gouging' the profits. This factor was measured by the amount of financing required for boats and equipment.

Here again both father and son indicated a substantial dependence on financial institutions for the acquisition of their boats. In the case of the fathers, the merchant class was the major source of appropriation. Of the fathers, 33
percent financed their boats whereas 67 percent of the sons financed theirs.

Financing came from several sources. For the fathers the main source was the merchants. This was especially true for 'gear' and supplies. One of the local union reps noted the importance of merchant capitalism for the fishery. He states:

Merchant capitalism played an important role before the co-op movement. In Canso there were 6 fish merchants. The merchants owned the men. There was no money, but a credit system. The merchant sold the gear, supplies, etc. to the inshore men. Their average wage was 250 dollars a year. All the profits went to the merchant.

Other sources of financing for the fathers included banks and the loan board, though to a much lesser degree. For the sons, financial backing rests with the banks, loan boards, and the fish processing companies. Besides supplying the fishermen with bait and gear, the processing companies often supply loans for the purchase of inshore boats. What remains important here is not so much who supplied the financing, but rather the 34 percent increase from father to son of the need to finance.

Here again, as with other factors such as 'working elsewhere' because of financial necessity, the evidence supports the contention that proletarianization had already started in the fathers' time, but has increased substantially for the sons.
Table 15

Method of Purchasing Boats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>paid cash</td>
<td>8 (67%)</td>
<td>4 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>financed</td>
<td>4 (33%)</td>
<td>8 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An aspect of proletarianization involves the petty producers’ inability to compete with large scale capital. One area is their inability to compete with large off-shore draggers for fish. The government, in its control of fishing grounds, plays an important role in this situation. Particular fishing grounds are crucial to the survival of the inshore fleet and one fisherman felt that a major reason for inshore decline was the opening of these areas to the draggers. He states:

We always figured as long as they kept middle ground and what we call the Whitehead hole closed, was feedin our ground here for fish. So just before the election they come along with the great idea to open middle ground for the big draggers. They put a quota on them but that don’t mean anything today with the big companies, they proved it time and time again, that quotas don’t mean a thing. From the first day the draggers struck middle ground the inshore fleet went down and down and catches went down. When draggers clean up middle ground the inshore fleet is finished. They came down from 5,000, 6,000 to 1500 lbs. It’s not feasible to operate on that amount of fish: operating expenses are too high. The whole thing on our shore is big
draggers doing a lot of hurt and the Department of Fisheries being too dumb to open up these closed banks. They holler about the 200 mile limit and that stocks are comin back so fast. I read all this in the paper. Every time I read it I turn around and eat the paper. I get so Jesus' contrary cause the fishermen know the stocks are not comin back. Still and all this biologist and department of fisheries are trying to make the general public believe it has some effect on it. It hasn't got a bit of effect.

In an attempt to compensate for the decline in inshore stocks, the fishermen use more sophisticated equipment and technology. Where they cannot employ this new technology they are forced out of their trade. Accordingly, the question was asked, "What type of equipment was used, manual or electronic?" The results are shown in the following table.

"Electronic" referred to equipment other than engines or compasses, such as hydraulic winches, depth sounders, fish finders and radar. Of the 12 surveyed, 100 percent of the fathers used manual gear only: compass, hand winches, etc. For the sons, 7, or 58 percent, used manual gear while the remaining 5, or 42 percent, used more modern electronic equipment. So we can see a significant increase in the use of higher technology.
Table 16
Type of Equipment Used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>type of equipment</th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>manual</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>7 (58%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>electronic</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 (42%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N =
|        | 12 (100%) | 12 (100%) |

The question now becomes, does this increase in the use of modern technology also create a corresponding indebtedness? To obtain the answer, the question was asked, "How was the equipment purchased, financed, or cash?" Table 17 gives the responses to this question.

Of those questioned 100 percent of the sons responded that their equipment was financed. On this point then we can conclude that the fishermen's need to be competitive led to the use of greater technology. This in turn led to even greater dependence on large scale capital, which led to greater profit appropriation on the part of capital and state, in the form of interest payments. It should be noted, however, that the fathers as well relied heavily on financing for the purchase of their equipment. Even though there was less equipment utilized by the fathers as compared to the sons, they still demonstrated a similarly high degree of dependence on financing. In the final analysis then it would appear that while use of technology as well as the amount of indebtedness has increased between fathers and sons, the need to finance
has been high for both groups.

**Table 17**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th>Son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>financed</td>
<td>10 (83%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cash</td>
<td>2 (17%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lack of economic control manifests itself quite clearly then in the fishermen's necessity to increase capital investment and increase technology. Because of competition from large capital this is an inescapable factor over which these men have no control. They expand their use of technology or face ruin.

Prior to the advent of large scale fishing operations inshore fishermen were not threatened with depleted fish stocks. This afforded them the option of remaining at whatever level of development they preferred. In competition with large capital, however, they were forced to compete for an ever-diminishing resource, hence the incorporation of larger boats and newer technologies such as fish finders, depth sounders and sonar. A report in the Maritime Fishermen's Union Newsletter noted (1979:1):

*First of all, the last twenty five years has seen a transformation of the structure of the fishing industry. Numerous small processors and marketing agents have been displaced by a few gigantic corporations that catch fish with their offshore fleets, process them*
in their new centralized plants, and market them through their own marketing systems. The offshore fleet is catching more than two thirds of the total landings in direct competition with the inshore fishermen.

Figures 72 and 73 demonstrate the distribution of wealth and share of the catch generated from inshore fishing and company offshore fishing. Our study demonstrated a 42 percent increase in the use of more advanced technologies, from father to son in an effort to compete for this unequal share, as shown in these figures.

While our data demonstrate an increase in the use of more advanced technology, they merely suggest a higher debt load and not a significantly greater need to finance. As previously noted in Table 17, of the 12 men interviewed, 83 percent of the fathers stated that their equipment was financed, compared to 100 percent for the sons. Though the use of higher technology increased by 42 percent from father to son, the need to finance equipment increased by only 17 percent. For the fathers this took the form of maintaining an account with the merchant for supplies such as hooks, lines and nets. This form of financing is consistent with what we noted in the previous chapter—that this type of perpetual indebtedness was commonplace within the maritime fishery. Rinehart (1975:25) discusses this indebtedness in regard to farmers. He states:

As the 19th Century progressed, more and more farmers who relied on the adverse terms of credit advanced by merchants
Figure 23: Shares of Catch in the Atlantic Fisheries

Source: Annual Statistical Review of the Canadian Fisheries

Thousands of Metric Tons - All Species

- Offshore
- Inshore
were reduced to indebtedness. Many were ultimately forced to sell their land.

Under capitalist relations of production reinvestment is a pre-requisite for survival. Constant expansion must occur to avoid facing inevitable ruin. This is also true for petty producers when they operate within a capitalist framework. They must expand or increase methods of production to compete with large scale capital. Hence the use of sonar, depth sounders, fish finders, etc. In order for such reinvestment to occur however there must be profit left for reinvestment. To investigate this requirement, the question was asked: "Where did most of the money go, immediate needs (food, clothing, etc.), reinvestment or other?" Table 18 summarizes the answers.

The lack of monies left for reinvestment in part explains the constant indebtedness to the merchant, in the fathers' case, and to financial institutions--government or capitalist--in the case of the sons. It also partly explains the decrease in the number of petty fishermen. Without profit for expansion they cannot survive as petty commodity producers and are consequently forced into wage labour.
Table 18
Direction of Money Spent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>immediate needs</td>
<td>11 (92%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reinvestment</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>1 (8%)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
<td>12 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the changes that have occurred in the fishery we might expect changes in the relations of production among the inshore fishermen, such as the method of payment and whether family members are still involved in the production process. Table 19 demonstrates who was used in the production process. For the fathers, 73 percent used family and or relatives. Similarly for the sons, where 66 percent used family and or relatives. In Canso the trend appears to be the use of relatives other than nuclear family members, as indicated by lack of sons entering this field.

Table 19
People Used in the Production Process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>people used</th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>family, relatives</td>
<td>8 (73%)</td>
<td>6 (66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>friends</td>
<td>3 (27%)</td>
<td>3 (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>11 (100%)</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Method of payment has also resisted change, as demonstrated in Table 20. One hundred percent of both father
and son stated that anyone working with them received an equal share. While some may argue that a share is no different from a wage, this paper argues that it does not possess the exploitative qualities that exist within wage labour. One reason is, both the skipper and crew share in the risk of not catching any fish: there is no minimum wage as in trawler fishing. Because the skipper receives his share as well as the boat share it can be argued that the relationship is exploitative, because the boat share is derived from the labour of the fishermen who work for the skipper. However, surplus value is not expropriated from these men as in wage labour. The skipper’s labour is also involved, and other than the boat share the value created by these men belongs to them.

Table 20

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>method of payment</th>
<th>father</th>
<th>son</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>shares</td>
<td>11 (100%)*</td>
<td>9 (100%)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hourly wages</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>11 (100%)</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* note: for the fathers, 1 fishermen worked alone and for the sons 3 fishermen worked alone.

Another area which is an historical characteristic of this section of petty commodity production is the absence of

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Surplus value as described by Marx is that amount of value left over after a worker has produced enough to pay his own value. For example, if he works 2 hours, out of an 8 hour day to pay for those 8 hours labour, the remaining 6 hours are surplus value, which belongs to the capitalist.
a task division of labour. To look at this area two questions were asked, of the sons only. The first was, "Were there specialized tasks aboard your boat?" and the second was, "Are people paid according to task?" Table 21 gives their responses to both questions. Of the nine interviewed (sons only) 100 percent answered no to both questions.

Table 21

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Division of Labour Sons Only</th>
<th>paid according to task</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>yes</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

note: this question did not pertain to the three fishermen who worked alone.

So while certain changes have occurred, some aspects which are fundamental to petty commodity production and to inshore fishing in particular, have remained constant, giving a partial explanation for the continuance of the inshore fishery. Ownership and control over the means of production, no task division of labour, method of payment, etc., all contribute to the belief these fishermen have that they are their own boss and to feelings of reward from this belief.

One final area of interest that was studied was the number of hours worked per week. The average calculated for the sons was 73. The average yearly household income in the Atlantic Provinces fishing communities was $5,600 in 1971.
Breaking this figure down to weekly and then hourly we see the average hourly rate was a $1.47, far below minimum wage which was approximately $1.75/hour in 1971. This figure is supported by a report in the Maritime Fishermen’s Union Newsletter stating that "incomes on longliners in Eastern Nova Scotia showed fishermen - skippers and crew - to be earning less than one dollar per hour for actual preparation and fishing time". This can explain the lack of money left for reinvestment and the need for unemployment among the fishermen of Canso.

The basic premise of this thesis is that the inshore fishermen in Canso are undergoing a process of proletarianization, a process whereby the petty producer is being divorced from his means of production and forced into wage labour. It is further argued that those men who have not fully reached the stage of proletarianization, while still petty commodity producers, are so dependent upon the state and capital that being owners of their own means of production may not be a strong enough factor to ensure the survival of this class. It is also argued that they have been undergoing this historical process since the rise of the dominant merchant class, around 1900, which corresponds to the rise of capitalism in Canada.

The data previously analyzed do support the proletarianization argument. It is supported in general by the large decline of fishermen for the province in general and for the town of Canso in particular. The corresponding rise of the
processing occupation also indicates that the fishermen are increasingly turning to wage labour for their livelihood.

One of the main distinguishing attributes of petty commodity production is private ownership of the means of production, both legal and economic. Marx (Tucker, 1978: 436) describes the importance of private property for the petty producer:

The private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry, whether agriculture, manufacturing, or both; petty industry, again is an essential condition for the development of social production and of the free individuality of the labourer himself. But it flourishes, it lets loose its whole energy, it attains its adequate classical form only where the labourer is the private owner of his means of labour set in action by himself.

While ownership still rests with the fishermen in Canso, this study demonstrates that ownership alone does not and has not insured their survival as petty commodity producers.

The Marxian aspect of this study was supported, first by the decline in numbers precipitated by the inability to compete with large scale capitalism. This was demonstrated here by increasing use of modern technology which in turn led to a greater dependence upon financing because returns for the product were so low that reinvestment of profits was impossible. Insufficient returns on their product has been demonstrated by the fishermen’s need to obtain extra money, either from working elsewhere, in the case of the fathers, or
by collecting unemployment insurance, in the case of the sons. It was demonstrated quite clearly that today's fishermen could not remain in business without unemployment benefits.

What was significant here was the fact that both father and son needed extra income to survive. Furthermore the 25 percent increase in this need for extra income between the two groups indicates that fishermen were becoming increasingly impoverished and unable to 'make it' from fishing alone.

The fishermen's position within the market played an important role in determining whether or not these men remained in fishing. Their increasing indebtedness to the state and capital and lack of control over the price received for fish served to foster the feeling of hopelessness and a desire to give up their trade.

Another factor which demonstrated increasing loss of control was the growing number of fish licensing categories, which had increased by 100 percent for the sons relative to the fathers. As well, the degree of difficulty in acquiring the licenses had increased by 100 percent. This indicated that the government was exercising greater control over who fished and who did not.

Further support of the loss of market control was demonstrated by the degree to which profit was 'gouged' by capital through interest rates and government subsidies, which tended to artificially inflate the price of boats. The boat builders viewed the subsidies as a chance to raise the price
of a boat because it was the government who was paying for the increase and not the fishermen. Increasingly the fishermen had to finance the ever-growing high cost of their operation. This further depleted any profit that was remaining after operating costs. As the data demonstrated however, the fathers as well had profits 'gouged', by the merchants who financed a large portion of their gear and supplies, not only for fishing but for household goods as well. Greater need to compete for scarce resources had forced the fishermen to increase capital expenditure, in return increasing their indebtedness to capital.

While this study has investigated the loss of profits, it must be pointed that there must at first be profits in order for them to be lost. In this study, the profit left for reinvestment was found to be non-existent--other than the share taken for the boat (which covered the payment for the boat as well as basic day to day operating costs such as gas and food). Neither the fathers nor the sons made profits. Since most of the money earned went to meet immediate needs such as food, clothing and shelter, little was left for investment in the fishermen's businesses. This fact helped demonstrate why the fishermen were so dependent upon the government and banks, as well as on the fish companies themselves. Furthermore, while dependence had increased, this study indicated that the fathers were also very much dependent
upon capital for survival, once again representing a relative increase, not an absolute one.

One area did display results contrary to the argument. The existence of co-ops and more fish plants afforded the fishermen some degree of greater control over fish and bait prices. A small percentage of sons demonstrated a slight increase in control over these areas relative to the fathers. This finding can possibly be explained by the increase in union affiliation among the sons. However, both groups demonstrated a very low feeling of control in the area of fish and bait prices.

Areas that indicated no change were relations of production and methods of payment. In these areas the study demonstrated that the inshore fishery still maintained certain characteristics associated with independent commodity production. As reported, there was no task division of labour and no cases were reported where one was paid according to task. These characteristics appeared to be consistent from the 1900's to present.

While certain factors such as the ones mentioned above characterize the inshore men in Canso as petty commodity producers, the majority of indicators studied in this thesis do support the proletarianization thesis and the position that this area of petty commodity production is becoming proletarianized.
In the methodology chapter it was noted how the focused interview can lead to unintended findings. Two findings which emerged in this study were the amount of 'in-fighting' that developed among the fishermen and the move to 'de-capitalization' on the part of some fishermen.

In the struggle to compete, some fishermen began to use 'gill nets', a method of fishing which was less labour intense but resulted in more waste and poorer fish quality. They were opposed by those using more traditional methods such as seining, jiggling, etc. which are far more labour intensive. The fishermen became split. One fishermen noted the rivalry between those two groups. In a response to the question, "Was it a good idea to ban gill nets?" he stated:

One of the best things that ever happened. Gill netters wouldn't talk because they were shovin the little fellers around, shovin them off the grounds and taken over. They just figured they didn't have to talk to the little

---

9 This method involved setting the nets in a particular location and leaving them set for extended periods, two or three days. In this process any fish attempting to pass through the nets would be caught by the gills and because they were not hauled in immediately the fish would die. The end result was a poorer quality fish, because they were not as fresh, and many undersized and undesired fish lost.

10 Seining is a method whereby the net is towed behind the boat in a sweeping motion. The size of the mesh determines the size of the fish and once it is full it is hauled aboard the boat. The larger the net, the more men and/or equipment is needed to perform the task.

11 Jigging is one of the oldest methods of fishing. This is a very simple but strenuous method because it involves 'handlining'. The jig is tossed overboard and hauled in by hand.
feller, the little fellers with the 30 footers. So we had to try something and try and get them banned. That's what we did last year... We either had to get the gill nets banned or tie up. It got so bad at the end of it, well my son he used to go in the boat with me once in a while, I wouldn't even take him with me cause I didn't know if I was goin out and not comin in. A lot of bad feelins around here now, a lot of bad feelins. I'm hopin everyone will get back on even keel and work together, cause I think if we all get together and work together we can come back a lot better than when we were split up and dog eat dog. This competition and fightin among ourselves, the company loves to see it.

Gill netting was eventually banned by the government but at the time of this study ill feelings still existed between the two groups.

The second aspect which emerged in this study was the move by some fishermen to 'de-capitalization'. While they had made an attempt to expand, the trend, at least for a few fishermen, was to scale down their operation, abandon new methods, and return to cheaper methods with less manpower, smaller boat size, and overall lower costs. As one respondent noted, scaling down meant less yearly income but proved to be more desirable in the long run. Perhaps this approach involved less pressure because of decreased dependence on capital. Further research in this area may indicate scaling down to be an alternative to increase capital in the need to compete.
The following chapter will be devoted to a summary of the study and to its significance, both socially and theoretically.
Chapter V

SUMMARY and CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary

This chapter will summarize the findings of the study. It will also describe the social and theoretical significance of the results in the hope of better understanding the historical changes which have occurred in Canada's East coast inshore fishery.

The most significant indicator of proletarianization that we found was the decline in the number of petty commodity producers in conjunction with the rise of wage labour. In Canso there was a marked decrease in the number of inshore fishermen in the time span considered. Corresponding to this there was a significant rise in wage labour, specifically in the processing occupations. The correlation existed in the fact that the fish processing occupations were and are the only other significant employment in Canso. Furthermore, the work force in Canso had also increased indicating that the men were not leaving town but instead turning to wage labour as opposed to inshore fishing. Another factor supporting this argument was the average number of years the men interviewed
had been fishing. The average found in this study was high with no new entries indicated.

While less dramatic than Canso, the figures for Guysborough County, the province and the country also demonstrated a significant decline. A similar decline was also found in other forms of petty commodity production, for example farming.

An important factor in the fishermen’s decision to leave fishing and enter wage labour was their position within the market place. This was indicated by the fishermen’s need to gather extra income during the off-seasons. For the fathers this involved working elsewhere and for the sons, collecting unemployment insurance. This difference occurred because of the introduction of this benefit in the late nineteen fifties. The need to earn extra money was found to be high for the fathers in this study but had increased significantly for the sons, indicating that more and more the fishermen were losing control in the market place. The study also demonstrated that increasingly Canso’s inshore fishermen could not succeed without extra money from other sources.

Union affiliation increased dramatically from father to son in this study. While they maintained a strong belief in the union’s ineffectiveness, union affiliation was an indication of the fishermen trying to gain some control over fish and bait prices, among other things. Despite the growth in union affiliation in Canso’s inshore fishery, control over
the price paid for bait and prices received for fish had increased very little from father to son. This finding was contrary to the belief that union affiliation, co-ops, and more fish plants offered the fishermen more control in this area.

Government intervention increased substantially from father to son. There was increased control over licenses and greater difficulty in obtaining them. Species categories had also increased dramatically. It was argued in the study that government control over fish stocks, fishing methods, categories of fish, and licenses all served to erode the fishermen's independence within the marketplace. The paradox, however, is that today's fishermen could not survive without government intervention in the form of transfer payments.

Proletarianization was caused largely by the petty producers' inability to compete. In trying to compete, technology had to be upgraded in order to keep pace with the capitalist mode of production. On this point a marked increase in the use of modern equipment, depth sounders, fish finders, etc. was discovered between father and son. The increase in technology, however, brought a corresponding increase in the need to finance their operations.

Another indication of increasing deprivation within the market was evidenced by the need to finance the fishermen's boats. The rising cost of competitiveness was not accompanied by increased fish prices to the fishermen. This factor too
followed a pattern of increase between fathers and sons. Simply stated, returns from their operations were not keeping up with the rising costs of their operations.

A factor which supported the previous argument was the amount of profit left for reinvestment. The study has demonstrated that, for both fathers and sons, there was no money left for reinvestment. Any money earned from fishing went directly to meet immediate needs of food, clothing and shelter. This further demonstrated that with no profit left for reinvestment into the business, financing was the only alternative for remaining competitive. While there was a share for the boat, this went to the finance charges for the boat as well as for the immediate needs of the boat, i.e., upkeep, rather than for reinvestment.

In this study two unexpected findings emerged. The first involved 'in-fighting' among the inshore fishermen. In their struggle to be competitive with large scale capital some fishermen tried using more efficient methods of catching fish. One method was gill netting. This caused a split between the 'gill netters' and other inshore fishermen. The men using traditional methods of jigging, seining, etc., could not fish in the same areas because any attempt to do so would cause the nets and hooks to become snarled.

The second surprising finding was the move by some fishermen to scale down the size of their operations. This involved using smaller boats where one fisherman was enough
to perform all the tasks. While the income from this method was less, so were overhead costs. We do not have any data on down-sizing, so we can only speculate that for some this method may be more profitable in the long run than expanding their operations. This may be an interesting area for further study.

The following factors relate to traditional characteristics within the inshore fishing petty mode of production. While all of the above factors have indicated change from father to son, the following have remained constant. In Canso the use of family and relatives in the production process has persisted, with only a slight increase in the use of friends by the sons. Furthermore, the method of payment remains unchanged. An equal share for the crew, skipper and boat had been the tradition. A distinguishing feature of petty commodity production is very little task division of labour. This study demonstrated absence of a task division of labour for both groups. Though the inshore fishermen in Canso were facing possible extinction, those that remained appeared to be holding on to their traditions and continuing to fit the description of petty commodity producers.

During the course of this investigation it became apparent that, in the time frame of the study the inshore men in Canso were very dependent upon the government and large scale capital. Because of this we used dependency theory to
aid in the explanation of why these men were becoming proletarianized. The use of two approaches was productive. The theory of proletarianization helped us look at petty commodity production and the pressures exerted on it by capitalist production. It analyzed the inshore fishery using an objective historical perspective. The theory of dependency, on the other hand, looked at the position of these men within the market place and their loss of control within the market. This is more of a subjective approach because it deals more with their feelings of not making it within the market. While the actual causes of proletarianization may be insufficient capital, lack of exploitative relations etc., the fishermen view their reasons for giving up as being caused by the low prices they receive for their fish.

This study found that the inshore fishing section of petty commodity production had been undergoing proletarianization from the time of merchant capitalism and the development of capitalism in Canada. Marx describes the development of capitalism and the role of petty commodity production in its development. He states (Capital, Volume 1, in Tucker, 1978:436-437):

The private property of the labourer in his means of production is the foundation of petty industry,...[I]t flourishes... only where the labourer is the private owner of his own means of labour set in action by himself:... This mode of production... excludes the concentration of these means of production, so also it excludes co-operation, division of labour within each separate process of
production, the control over, and the productive application of the forces of Nature by society,... At a certain stage of development it brings forth the material agencies for its own dissolution...[T]he transformation of the individualised and scattered means of production into socially concentrated ones,...forms the prelude to the history of capital.

What Marx was describing here was how petty commodity production got in the way of capitalist development. He described how petty commodity production provided the basis for capitalism in the ownership of private property. Capitalism, however, had to destroy petty commodity production in order to fully develop, and in doing so concentrated property and the means of production into fewer and fewer hands. In this process labour and ownership became separated. We found that this process was taking place in the inshore fishery in Canso.

The data found in this study suggest that following Confederation the inshore fishermen began the process of proletarianization. The age of the fathers of the men interviewed dated back to the late 1800s or early 1900s. Today's inshore fishermen are, in a relative sense, 'more proletarianized' compared to their fathers. We looked at similar factors between fathers and sons to see if changes had occurred between the two groups. While there were increases in many of these factors, it was very clear that the process of proletarianization did not start with the sons but
rather with the fathers. So what this study found was actually 'increasing' proletarianization, in the time period selected, demonstrated largely by the decrease in numbers of inshore fishermen accompanied by an increase in wage labour, particularly in the fish processing occupation.

A factor which indicated that this process had begun for the fathers was the amount of work these men participated in outside of their trade, which was necessary for sustenance because they could not make enough from fishing to survive. Other factors included their lack of control within the market place, involving such things as fish and bait prices, lack of profits due to 'gouging' on the part of capital, and the price paid for boats and equipment.

All the factors in this study except those pertaining to the relations of productions within the inshore fishery, method of payment, division of labour, the use of family and relatives in the production process demonstrated that between father and son there was a loss of control. Some factors, however, showed little control over them from the beginning.

What is interesting in this study is the interdependency of each of the factors. In the fishermen's need to be competitive they had to upgrade technology. However, because profits were so limited due to poor fish prices and high bait prices, they had to finance their equipment. Increased financing led to greater costs and decreased profit. With decreased profit and an increased debt load the fishermen had
to turn to 'outside' wage labour or transfer payments to subsist.

So what we have witnessed was proletarianization caused largely by the fishermen's inability to compete with large capital. Their position within the market place, however, entered into their decision to quit fishing. Their ever-increasing debt, feelings of futility, etc., all played a role in this decision. In other words, their relatively poor position within the market place, coupled with pressure to compete against large capital, had forced the inshore fishermen to increasingly turn to wage labour.

The study demonstrated that there was little in the way of financial reward or incentive for these men to stay in business. As shown, most of today's fishermen could not remain in operation without the support of unemployment insurance. In the fathers' case, they could not remain in operation without working outside their trade.

The paradox then is that the government chooses to keep this petty industry 'afloat' while at the same time in order for capitalism to flourish petty commodity production must be eliminated. The explanation must be left for other researchers to investigate. For our purposes what was important was that it was government that perpetuated this industry. Government support was the objective reason for the perpetuation of the inshore fishery. But subjectively, why do these men want to remain in fishing despite all the economic hardships faced by
them? On this question, the study indicated that the underlying factor affecting the fishermen's decision was the 'feeling of being one's own boss' or the feeling of controlling one's own life. That finding is consistent with studies mentioned earlier such as Theissin and Davis who looked at recruitment to the inshore fishery in the Western end of Nova Scotia. Their conclusion was the same: control or feelings of being your own boss was sufficient reason to remain or enter into fishing. However, the study by Theissin and Davis indicated that there appears to be more economic incentive on the Western end of Nova Scotia attracting new recruits to fishing, relative to the Eastern end. The fact remains, however, that in petty commodity production subjective feelings play an important role in the perpetuation of the inshore fishery. It may not be strong enough to overcome the economic realities, especially in Canso's inshore fishery, but it has aided in the struggle to stay within the trade.

5.2 Conclusion

This study demonstrated that proletarianization is taking place among the inshore fishermen in Canso. Though the trend in Canso follows the nation-wide trend in Canada with all petty commodity producers, we must be careful and not generalize with too much confidence that this is also happening to the rest of the Maritime inshore fishery. Other
researchers, previously mentioned have shown that there are pockets or areas where recruitment to the inshore fishery is increasing. These do appear to conflict with the general trend but do not refute the argument that petty commodity production is close to the 'last stages of destruction'.

So what is the social significance of this destruction? With this loss comes the concentration of property into fewer and fewer hands. The dream of being one's own boss is swept away and skill of the worker has lost all meaning. The ability of men to realize their full potential from skilled work will be gone. This happens through the increasing task division of labour. While the petty commodity producer carries out his task from its inception to completion, under capitalist relations of production jobs are broken into individualized tasks where the worker has no control.

Marx's work was very perceptive for it dealt with issues that are occurring today such as a global economy or world markets. More and more, then, the working class is expanding through the process of proletarianization. Not only does it expand at the expense of the petty bourgeoisie but at the expense of other capitalists as well. As an historical process capitalism does not stop at the annihilation of petty industry. According to Marx, it will destroy members of its own class and eventually itself.

Canso is ideal for sociological study because it presents a clear picture of capital in transition. Historically it had
developed from a town dominated by independent commodity producers, to merchant capitalism, to monopoly capitalism. Most recently with the announcement of the closure of Canso Sea Products we see the effects of global capitalism. In an attempt to control fish stocks, depleted not only by Canadian fisheries but foreign fisheries as well, the government has put strict quotas on fish catches. Companies such as H.B. Nickerson claim that it is not feasible to maintain certain operations, such as Canso and others and are subsequently closing many plants.

With the changes facing the fishery in Canso today further study in this area would prove valuable and interesting. With no processing plants left in Canso the future for the town looks bleak. The fishermen are now faced with the problem of where to land their fish. With the prospect of no jobs in the fish plant it will be interesting to see whether some men return to fishing or whether the inshore fishery will completely disappear in Canso.
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Williams, Rick
Appendix A

QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN THE PRESENT STUDY

1. How long have you lived in Canso?
2. Was your father an inshore fisherman? Yes No
3. How did he acquire his boat? a) build himself
   b) paid cash
   c) financed How?
4. What type of equipment was used other than engine and compass? a) manual
   b) electronic
5. How was the equipment purchased? a) financed
   b) cash
6. If the equipment was financed, who financed it? a) bank
   b) loan board
   c) merchant
7. Did they salt their own fish?
8. For what purpose? a) to keep
   b) to sell
9. Did your father have any control over the price of fish? Yes No
10. Could he sell all he caught? Yes No
11. Did your father belong to a union? Yes No
12. To your knowledge, was it effective? Yes No
13. Was it difficult to obtain a licence? Yes No
14. Were there special categories for licences? Yes No
15 Where did most of the money go? a) food and bills
   b) re-invest
   c) other

16 Did you fish with your father? Yes No

17 How were you paid? a) wage
   b) share

18 Did anyone else work with your father? Yes No

19 How were they paid? a) wage
   b) share

20 Were these people a) relatives?
   b) neighbours?
   c) friends?

21 What did your father do after the fishing season?
   a) work elsewhere
   b) unemployment insurance
   c) other (work on equipment or boats)

22 Why did he do this? a) needed the money
   b) to kill time
   c) other (explain)

23 How long have you been fishing?

24 Do you own your own boat? Yes No

25 How did you acquire it? a) build
   b) paid cash
   c) financed

26 If financed, who financed it? a) bank
   b) loan board
   c) other (company, etc.)

27 What type of equipment do you use? a) manual
   b) electronic

28 How was the equipment purchased? a) financed
   b) cash
   c) other

29 Who financed it? a) bank
   b) loan board
   c) other

30 Do you salt your own fish? Yes No
31 Why? a) to keep
    b) to sell

32 Do you belong to a union? Yes No

33 Do you believe it is effective? Yes No

34 Do you have any control over the price of fish? Yes No

35 Is it difficult to obtain a licence? Yes No

36 Are there special categories? Yes No

37 Where does most of the money go? a) food and bills
    b) re-invest
    c) other

38 Can you sell all you catch? Yes No

39 Does anyone else work with you? Yes No

40 How are they paid? a) wage
    b) share

41 Are they a) relatives
    b) neighbours
    c) friends

42 What do you do when the fishing season is over? a) U.I.C
    b) work elsewhere
    c) other

    (work on equipment or boats)

43 Why do you do this? a) need the money
    b) to kill time
    c) other

44 How many hours per week do you work on the average?

45 Are there specialized tasks aboard your boat? Yes No

46 Are people paid according to task? Yes No

47 Could you succeed without Unemployment? Yes No
Robert Manuel received a Bachelor of Arts degree from the University of Windsor in 1977 and a Master's degree in Sociology from the University of Windsor in 1990.