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Liberal and radical dimensions of political feminism: An application of the rational-empirical method of test construction.

Patricia A. T. Forrest
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Liberal and Radical Dimensions of Political Feminism: An Application of the Rational-Empirical Method of Test Construction

by

Patricia A. T. Forrest

M.A. University of Windsor, 1982

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Abstract

A review of the feminist and psychological literature provided a framework for the examination of feminism within a multidimensional context. Specifically, this framework provided support for the existence of two dimensions of feminism: Liberal Feminism and Radical Feminism.

The purpose of the present study was to construct two scales to measure Liberal and Radical Feminism, using the rational-empirical method of test construction. This method of test construction is based on substantive, structural, and external validity considerations. The substantive component refers to the construction of a priori definitions of the two constructs. These scale definitions were derived from an examination of the feminist and psychological literature. One hundred items were written to reflect each scale definition. These items were then submitted to an independent editor for evaluation. Assessment of the structural and external validity criteria was based on the responses of 251 female subjects. A sample of 94 male subjects served as a validation sample. Items meeting the structural validity criteria were identified and retained for further analysis. Further analyses resulted in two

final twenty-item scales to measure Liberal and Radical Feminism. The external validity of the final scales was assessed by examining a number of convergent and discriminant relationships between the final scales and selected measures of personality, a measure of feminism, and participants' behavior in the last year. The rational-empirical method of test construction resulted in two final scales with excellent psychometric properties and promising convergent and discriminant validity. Directions for future research and scale development were discussed and focused primarily on 1) establishing additional indices of reliability and validity with a new sample, 2) the importance of conducting a known groups analysis, and 3) the need for future research to move beyond a trait approach to develop an interactional model which would permit research questions regarding reciprocal causation.

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This dissertation is dedicated to Margaret Bury

Although only one person's name appears on this work, the truth is that many people - a small community of scholars - have invested themselves in my academic development, and thus in this dissertation. None of these people agrees with everything I have written nor should they be held responsible. Yet their suggestions helped make this a better piece of work than it otherwise would have been. And perhaps the greatest acknowledgement of all is that their influence touches each page.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In the early 1970s, social psychologists became interested in studying feminism, and that interest has persisted into the 1980s. Researchers have demonstrated that individuals can be reliably differentiated on the basis of attitudes toward various aspects of feminism (e.g., Etaugh & Gerson, 1974; Ghaffaradli-Doty & Carlson, 1979; Goldschmidt, Gergen, Quigley, & Gergen, 1981; Lott, 1973). Researchers have also examined both the demographic (e.g., Cherniss, 1972; Fox & Auerbach, 1983; Gerson, 1984; Korman, 1983; Venkatesh, 1980) and personality characteristics of feminists (e.g., Follingstad, Robinson, & Pugh, 1977; Harrison, Guy, & Lupfer, 1981; Joesting, 1976; Redfering, 1979; Riger, 1977) and have compared feminists with nonfeminists and antifeminists on these characteristics.

While this research contributes in part to an understanding of feminists, it is limited in its description and explanation of feminism. This limitation may be due to the fact that researchers have conceptualized feminism as a

unidimensional construct. A second limitation of this research may be the assumption that feminism can be explained on the basis of selected personality constructs.

The basis of the present study is the contention that feminism is a multidimensional construct, encompassing both person-centred and collectivist approaches to changing the status of women in society. It is argued that the dimension addressed most frequently in the psychological research reflects a person-centred or relatively individualistic view of feminism, characterized in the present study as Liberal Feminism. A second dimension, called Radical Feminism in the present study, is reflected in much of the feminist literature and emphasizes an interdependent or collectivist perspective. Theoretical and empirical evidence for the viability of the proposed dimensions is examined in the following reviews of the feminist literature and psychological research.

Contemporary Views of Feminism

Although feminists have probably existed since the human species evolved, feminism in the 1980s owes much of its character to the various feminist movements of the 1960s which have been termed collectively "the second wave of feminism." Anderson (1983) divides the second wave of

feminism in the 1960s into two forces: 1) The women's liberation movement and 2) the more radical feminist groups which rose out of the student/black/peace movements.

Betty Friedan's book, The Feminine Mystique, was important in setting the stage for the women's liberation movement in the 1960s. Inspired by Simone de Beauvoir's book, The Second Sex, Friedan articulated the experience of American women, arguing that American women were not in fact the most emancipated in the world, and that they did not escape the second class treatment that de Beauvoir's book exposed (Sarachild, 1978).

The second force in the 1960s, the student/black/peace movements, became a training ground where feminist activists sharpened their political skills in an arena of mass resistance (Cott, 1986). Unfortunately, the "liberation for all" philosophy so characteristic of the "New Left" student and peace movements did not include a recognition and/or repudiation of male domination. As a reaction to this omission, an autonomous women's movement emerged out of this new left (Miles, 1985).

Feminism: A problem of definition. Initially, the term feminism was ascribed to the emancipatory struggle of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and adopted in the 1960s only by specific groups of politically active

feminists (Delmar, 1986). Subsequently, the label has been adopted as a blanket term to cover all of women's organizing (e.g., Chafe, 1972; Delmar, 1986; Ehrenreich & English, 1979; Freeman, 1975a; Gordon, 1979; Hole & Levine, 1973; Kelly-Gadol, 1983; Klein, 1975; Rosenberg, 1982; Rossi, 1973; Tanner, 1970; Williamson, 1984).

The fact that feminism has come to stand for an ideology represented by a variety of attitudes and behaviors subsumed under "The Women's Movement" label has resulted in a rather broad and heterogeneous construct. The heterogeneity of the term is reflected in the all encompassing and often abstract definitions of feminism in the feminist literature. Ruzek (1986), for example, defines feminism as "a world view which places women at the centre of analysis and social action" (p. 184). Hughes (1982), on the other hand, defines feminism as "a vision which contemplates the metamorphosis of society" (p. 282). Similarly, Pierson and Prentice (1982) define feminism as "a movement and an ideology" (p. 104) and suggest that feminism "challenges all existing knowledge in every discipline on the grounds of possible sexist bias" (p. 109). Perhaps more reminiscent of feminism's political beginnings, Delmar (1986) defines feminism as "conscious political choice" (p. 16), while Miles (1982) conceptualizes feminism as "the

conscious political articulation of women's revolutionary interests and values" (p. 22).

Consistent with these definitions, which are representative of other definitions in the feminist literature, the term feminism has come to stand for an extremely broad range of concepts. One need only examine the feminist literature to find numerous books and articles which depict the variety of goals of feminism (e.g., Daly, 1973, 1978; Ehrenreich, 1984; Eisenstein, 1979; MacKinnon, 1983; Ruth, 1980; Schaef, 1981). Indeed, the more one examines the feminist literature, the more difficult it becomes to see any one theme or idea as pivotal. What emerges is a fragmented picture of feminism, a network of concepts that touch and overlap, but of which no one could with any certainty be identified as the focal point.

Shifting the level of analysis from abstract concepts to existing feminist groups provides some insight into the apparent lack of focus or, more positively, the multidimensionality of feminism.

Feminism: Definition by feminist groups. The diversity of goals of groups composed of black, lesbian, radical, socialist and/or Marxist feminists is striking. For example, although black feminists embrace many of the positions of the "mainstream" women's movement (e.g.,

National Organization of Women (NOW)), they see racism as a more powerful cause of their oppression than sexism (e.g., Cade, 1970; Cooper, 1971; Lewis, 1983). According to Lewis (1983), black women are members of two superordinate groups -- blacks and women. However, black feminists "demand rights as blacks first, women second" (Cade, 1970, p.10).

The feminist literature which espouses the views of lesbian feminists conceptualizes their struggle as taking place within a political arena that defines women as "mother" (e.g., Carden, 1974; Eisenstein, 1981; Ferguson, 1981; Freeman, 1975b; Newton, 1984; Rosaldo, 1980; Zimmerman, 1984). According to Eisenstein (1981), lesbianism is directly at odds with patriarchal definitions of motherhood and challenges "the political ordering that exists between public and private, male and female worlds" (p.17). One of the major goals of lesbian feminists is therefore the destruction of patriarchy, which "does not mean the destruction of motherhood, but rather the destruction of the patriarchal relations of it" (Eisenstein, 1981, p. 17). An additional characteristic of the lesbian feminist movement is the notion of separatism, which could more accurately be termed segregation, and a call for matriarchy. The separatism advocated by the lesbian feminist movement is not to be confused with the notion of

separatism advocated by radical feminist groups, which reflects a strategy of first building a strong power base for women with the ultimate goal of an integrated society (Leon, 1978). The women's movement, as represented by NOW, did not include a stand on lesbianism and consequently feminists involved in NOW were accused of having a heterosexual bias against lesbian feminists (Eisenstein, 1981). Eisenstein (1981) reports that by 1977 the lesbian feminist movement had become distinct from both the women's movement and the male gay rights movement.

Radical feminists have often been criticized for giving other feminists a bad name. As Evans (1986) reports, "where liberal angels and Marxist cadres have hesitated to tread, radical feminists have marched" (p. 112). The core issue that radical feminists appear to be concerned with is the belief that men's dominance of women precedes the emergence of class domination and is therefore the most profound condition of alienation for women (e.g., Eisenstein, 1981; Evans, 1986; Miles, 1985). According to Miles (1985), radical feminists view their struggle in much larger terms than simply fighting for women's access to equal participation in society. Rather, the views of radical feminists represent a major break with the male defined world and male defined politics. Further, radical feminists

believe that ending sexism also means the destruction of oppressive institutions and ideologies and the creation of new structures and images to take their place -- with women in the seat of power (Miles, 1985).

Initially, the views of socialist and Marxist feminists centred primarily on class oppression, particularly regarding issues of domestic production or "women's housework" under capitalism (Brown, 1970; Caulfield, 1974; Mitchell, 1966, 1971; Morgan, 1970). However, to join forces with other feminist groups required that socialist and Marxist feminists recognize and incorporate into their philosophy the oppressive nature of racism and sexism. Thus, class had to be reconceptualized in a way that would encompass its racial and gender diversity (Sacks, 1984). Marxist and socialist feminists differ somewhat on how each group views the roots of gender oppression and on how class should be redefined to incorporate gender and racial oppression. Both groups, however, appear to share a commitment to exposing the racial and patriarchal bias and subversive quality of capitalism (Eisenstein, 1981; Hunt, 1986; Maroney, 1986; O'Brien, 1982; Sacks, 1984).

Obviously the lines drawn between these groups are not always clear cut. For example, Eisenstein (1979) discusses the Combahee River Collective, a collection of black

feminist groups in the Boston area, whose members consist of black lesbian women who are committed to socialism. Thus, this collective shares common interests with black feminists, lesbian feminists, and socialist feminists. Unlike the black feminist movement, the Combahee River Collective is committed to many of the goals of the lesbian feminist movement, yet they reject the stance of lesbian separatism and view it as reactionary. Like socialist feminists, this collective views the struggle against racism as related to the struggle against capitalism, yet they do not believe that racism should be subsumed under class oppression.

Eisenstein (1981) provides a political analysis of the various factions within feminism and identifies the following types and tendencies: (p. 230):

1. Black Feminism
2. Socialist Feminism
3. Lesbian Feminism
4. Radical Feminism
5. Anarcha-Feminism
6. Progressive Liberal Feminist Tendency
7. Status Quo Liberal Feminist Tendency
8. Antifeminist Traditionalists

The Status Quo Liberal Feminist Tendency and the Progressive Liberal Feminist Tendency are identified as part of the Legitimized Liberal Sector. In other words, status quo and progressive liberal feminists view the current political and economic structures within society as quite sufficient to

accommodate equality for women. For example, although individual managers may refuse to promote qualified women, they are not regarded as representative of all men, or of society's political and economic structures, and certainly not of capitalism. Eisenstein (1981) identifies as status quo feminists those individuals who believe that women have attained equality with men and that it is up to each woman to take advantage of the opportunities available. She believes that these status quo feminists are very similar to the early feminists who defined feminism in terms of citizen rights for women, and struggled for equality of opportunity in education, the vote, and property rights. Since these formal legal equalities now exist, status quo feminists believe that women have to a great extent attained equality with men.

Based on the literature examined thus far and on Eisenstein's analysis, one important dimension of feminism which emerges consistently could be called Liberal Feminism. Liberal Feminism refers to a feminist perspective which is individualistic in its analysis of the role of women in society and is characterized by a focus on person-centred change strategies: individual responsibility and initiative. According to Liberal feminism the source of women's oppression resides within individuals instead of

institutions and is linked to socialization processes. Specific strategies therefore, focus on changes in socialization patterns with an emphasis on re-education and reform to better enable women to compete in society.

According to Eisenstein, the subversive quality of feminism can be found within radical, lesbian, black, and socialist feminism. Despite their differences, discussed previously, these groups of politically active feminists share the same need for political action directed toward powerful political and economic social systems. In addition, these groups view the struggle of the women's movement primarily in political terms, hence the phrase, "the personal is political." The idea that the personal is political was taken to its extreme by Mitchell (1966) and Morgan (1970), in which women's housework and the family structure were examined within a larger political context. Since the majority of individuals in power within these structures are males, men are seen as having a vested interest in these oppressive systems and are therefore viewed with suspicion and distrust. Thus, various groups of black, lesbian, radical, socialist and and Marxist feminists all espouse the position that both the roots of women's oppression and the key to its eradication lie in identification with and action on behalf of women as a

group. The targets of action identified by these groups are the various social, economic and political structures of society.

Based on the feminist literature and on Eisenstein's analysis, Radical Feminism in the present study refers to a feminist perspective which is collectivistic in focus and calls for action on the part of women against prevailing social and political systems in society. Thus, the source of women's oppression does not reside within individuals so much as within the various political, social, and economic systems of society. Radical feminist strategies for ending women's oppression therefore focus on system change and rely on the cooperation and commitment of women as a group, with the goal of promoting and developing a woman-centred culture free of exploitation, sexism, and discrimination.

The Roots of Contemporary Liberal Feminism and Radical Feminism

In order to understand the relationship between Liberal and Radical Feminism, it is important to examine the historical roots of political feminism and its relationship to liberalism. The contemporary relationship between these two forces is rooted in the history of emerging capitalist relations in seventeenth century England (Anderson, 1983).

This period, often referred to as the "Age of Enlightenment" or "Age of Reason," was characterized by the emphasis on the application of rational thought over passion to solve social problems. The emerging philosophy of liberal individualism (e.g., John Locke, 1632-1704; Jean Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1778) during the Enlightenment was based on the concepts of individual liberty and human rationality as bases for social change and ultimately, freedom from aristocratic rule (Eisenstein, 1981). Hogan (1975) defines individualism as the view that "societies are composed of aggregates of separate individuals, each following his or her own enlightened self-interest, and that social institutions substantially restrict individual freedom" (p. 533). Consistent with Hogan (1975), Sampson (1971) contrasts individualism with collectivism and asserts that individualism not only emphasizes a person-centred perspective but also legitimizes a person-centred orientation for personal gain and prominence. Collectivism, on the other hand, legitimizes an interdependent perspective with an emphasis on cooperation for the mutual benefit of all individuals (Sampson, 1971). According to Sampson (1971), the terms individualism and collectivism refer to the "focus of an individual's loyalties, and the two comprise broad themes within historical periods and

socioeconomic structures" (p.201). In a later article, Sampson (1977) suggests that individualism (individual freedom, self-sufficiency, pursuit of self satisfaction) can only be liberating when it is held in opposition to excessive collectivism (overdomination and overorganization of the group collective). Although Sampson (1977) did not examine these two philosophies as they emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, his analysis is consistent with the social conditions which gave rise to liberal individualism, capitalism, and Liberal Feminism. The historical context of the period was a society in transition from feudalism and aristocratic rule to the precapitalist market and the bourgeois revolution (Eisenstein, 1981). Locke's writings criticized the accepted view of political society in sixteenth and seventeenth century England -- that men and women were assigned their places in the hierarchical order of society as ordained by God (Eisenstein, 1981). Feminist writers of this period such as Abigail Adams, Harriet Martineau, Mary Wollstonecraft and later, John Stewart Mill and Harriet Taylor Mill, were highly influenced by the new rationalist philosophy and libertarian ideals.

The roots of Liberal Feminism can be traced to the writings of Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) who embraced the

tenets of eighteenth century liberalism articulated by John Locke (e.g., individual freedom, self-determination, etc.) and claimed the ideology of liberal individualism for women (Eisenstein, 1981). Based on Anderson's (1983) analysis, the concepts or ideals of liberal individualism provided the basis for the principles of equal opportunity and social reform via legislation that one finds within contemporary Liberal Feminism. Anderson (1983) states that the liberal perspective of feminism "assumes that the inequality of women stems both from their deprivation of equal rights and from their reluctance to exercise them" (p. 239). Consistent with its eighteenth century beginnings, Liberal Feminism employs a civil rights perspective to extend equal rights to women. As Anderson (1983) points out, contemporary Liberal Feminism does not "challenge the systems of capitalism and patriarchy, but it attempts to reform these systems so as to give women an equal place within them" (p.260). According to Adamson, Briskin, and McPhail (1988), the core theme of contemporary Liberal Feminism is essentially equality of opportunity, that is, "each individual in society should have an equal chance to compete for the resources of that society in order to rise within it as far as talents permit." (p. 10). Adamson et al. (1988) further state that liberal feminist strategies

concentrate on "improving educational opportunities for women in order to give them the tools to compete, on changing socialization patterns that shape a feminine personality uncomfortable with competing, and on removing legislation that actively discriminates against women" (p. 10). Clearly then, contemporary Liberal Feminism has not changed a great deal from its early beginnings and can still be characterized by an individualistic perspective with an emphasis on person-centred change strategies and legal reform.

As discussed earlier, Radical Feminism grew out of the New Left social movements of the 1960s and can be linked to feminist perspectives that have been articulated by women representing a number of feminist groups and/or movements: socialist, Marxist, black, radical, and lesbian. Although numerous differences exist among these groups, commonalities do exist which stand in contrast to Liberal Feminism. As Anderson (1983) explains, an analysis based on Radical Feminism "goes beyond the goal of including women in existing societal institutions by arguing that dominant institutions are characterized by gender, race, and class oppression" (pp. 263-264). Anderson (1983) asserts that radical feminist perspectives grew out of a "critique of Liberal Feminism and also from a dialogue with Marxist

perspectives on women's position in society" (p. 263). However, Radical Feminism is not Marxism since groups subsumed under the Radical Feminism label disagree with the Marxist idea that women's oppression is secondary to class oppression. Anderson (1983) clarifies the point of divergence between Marxism and radical perspectives of feminism by stating: "The Marxist assumption that gender would disappear with the abolition of private property too easily assumes that gender is of secondary importance in the determination of social, political, and economic relations" (p. 275). Thus, radical feminist perspectives also arose from a critique of classical Marxism by feminists who initially adopted a Marxist analysis as an alternative to Liberal Feminism. Anderson (1983) identifies two such currents within the radical perspective: socialist analysis and radical analysis. Unlike classical Marxist analysis, socialist feminist analysis argues that women's oppression cannot be reduced to capitalism alone and must also include a consideration of the economic basis of gender relations and a consideration of patriarchy (Anderson, 1983). According to Anderson (1983), the inclusion of patriarchy in a socialist analysis is a recent trend that reflects a synthesis of the socialist and radical currents. The radical current developed out of a failure of Marxist theory

to adequately account for the emergence and persistence of patriarchy (Anderson, 1983). The radical feminist current therefore views patriarchal relations as more fundamental than class relations in accounting for women's position in society. The solution to women's oppression is therefore to establish woman-centred beliefs and systems. Radical and socialist currents merging as Radical Feminism have produced a political analysis and philosophy which focuses on system blame and system change, with an emphasis on collective action by women to bring about a woman-centred culture. For some feminists (e.g., radical lesbians), a separatist ideology is advocated.

Adamson et al. (1988) describe the contrasts between Liberal and Radical Feminism. One goal of Liberal Feminism is the power and opportunity that men have; thus Liberal Feminism demands a redistribution of opportunity so that women can share equally in that power. On the other hand, Radical Feminism "validates the differences between women and men and in fact argues that we need an anti-militaristic, nonhierarchical cooperative society organized on the female values of life-giving and nurturance" (p. 11). The authors further assert that Radical Feminism has been responsible to a great extent for the development of a woman-centred culture outside of mainstream institutions and

cultures, e.g., alternative businesses, women's health centres, art, music, living arrangements.

The following section examines feminism from an empirical research perspective. This perspective involves the delineation of demographic and personality correlates of feminism and the development of instruments to measure feminism.

Feminism: Personality and Measurement

Researchers have employed two methods in their attempt to gain some insight into the nature of feminism. First, they have examined the demographic and personality characteristics of individuals who either support or participate in the women's movement. The second approach to understanding feminism has been through attempts to measure the construct itself. These two approaches are referred to as descriptive and measurement models of feminism, respectively. These two models are not independent since one approach within the descriptive model is measurement-based. That is, researchers utilize measures of feminism to classify groups. However, the emphasis in the descriptive approach is on testing hypotheses with little concern for measurement issues. A detailed review of the literature on descriptive models of feminism is presented in Appendix A. What follows is a summary of that literature.

Descriptive models. Descriptive models of feminism have taken several forms. While most descriptive models involve the comparison of groups defined as feminist with groups defined as nonfeminist, antifeminist, or some combination of both, they differ on how these groups are defined and classified. Descriptive models consist of three approaches: Known Groups Approach, Known Group/Unknown Comparison Group Approach, and the Measurement-based Approach.

In the Known Groups approach, researchers select individuals from known feminist and known antifeminist organizations (e.g., Baker, 1972; Dempewolff, 1974) for comparison on a variety of demographic and personality variables. Here it is assumed that group membership reflects one's personal position or attitude regarding the support or non-support of feminist issues.

The more common variation of this approach, which could be called the Known Group/Unknown Comparison Group method, involves the selection of individuals from known feminist organizations for inclusion in the feminist group. This group is then compared with a "control" group comprised of individuals from the community or university who report that they are not involved in the Women's Movement (e.g., Cherniss, 1972; Follingstad, Robinson, & Pugh, 1977; Riger, 1977).

In the third, Measurement-based approach, feminist and comparison subjects are selected on the basis of scores obtained on a measure of feminism (e.g., Ghaffaradli-Doty & Carlson, 1979; Goldschmidt, Gergen, Quigley, & Gergen, 1981; Redfering, 1979). Criteria for inclusion in feminist or nonfeminist groups vary from a simple median split to a comparison of only those individuals in the top and bottom quarters of the distribution.

Researchers have used these three approaches to examine such demographic variables as age, social status, religion, and political attitudes. Briefly, it has been found that feminists are more likely than comparison group members to be well educated, middle-class, politically active, Jewish or not affiliated with an organized religion, and to have liberal, politically active parents. The results have been less consistent for the variables of age, parental education, and income. Finally, marital status has not differentiated feminists from nonfeminists or antifeminists in the majority of studies.

Some of the personality variables that have been examined include autonomy, achievement, locus of control, and authoritarianism. This research suggests that feminists are non-authoritarian, are more open-minded, independent, achievement oriented, and have more self-confidence and

feelings of self-worth than nonfeminist or antifeminist women. No significant differences have been found between feminist and comparison groups on measures of aggression and dominance.

While these findings contribute somewhat to our knowledge of the feminist personality, the literature reveals a number of inconsistencies. Though many factors undoubtedly contribute to these inconsistencies, it is argued that one source is the way in which "feminist" and comparison groups have been chosen and defined. For example, participants in the known feminist group (e.g., Arnott, 1973; Dempewolff, 1974; Pawlicki & Almquist, 1973; Riger, 1977) might consist of a combination of group members, some of whom espouse an individual-oriented liberal feminism, while others reflect a more collectivist, action-oriented radical feminism. Although the research was intended to differentiate feminist from "other" groups, not feminist from feminist groups, the presence of feminists who espouse a liberal or radical view or both in the "feminist" samples of different studies could account for some of the inconsistencies found in the literature. The research on religious affiliation is a good example. Someone with a radical feminist orientation would view religious institutions as oppressive systems in society which serve to

maintain the domination of women by men as divine right (e.g., Daly, 1973). Someone with a liberal feminist orientation, on the other hand, would view the inferior status of women in society in less global terms and thus might be very religious. The presence of feminists who espouse a radical or liberal orientation in a sample could account for the broad range of religious affiliations encountered in some studies, and the contradictions between other studies (Appendix A).

The comparison groups in these studies are: 1) nonfeminists -- either self-defined or defined in terms of their non-membership in feminist groups and/or 2) antifeminists -- usually identified in terms of their membership in antifeminist groups. Unfortunately, it is not clear in most studies using this approach whether the comparison group is "pure" nonfeminist, "pure" antifeminist or a mixture of both. This failure of researchers to differentiate between nonfeminist and antifeminist groups has definite implications for the interpretation of results, particularly since members of both feminist and antifeminist groups are probably more active than uncommitted nonfeminists. Indeed, nonfeminists may in fact be either "genuine" nonfeminists or liberal feminists, as defined in the present study. For example, both politically feminist

and antifeminist groups have marches and hold demonstrations. Thus, although feminists and antifeminists differ dramatically in the philosophy that they espouse (Arnott, 1973; Caplan, 1985), behaviorally, factions within each group may be considered activist. However, the inclusion of both antifeminists and nonfeminists in a comparison group serves to obscure any comparisons and renders conclusions questionable.

Similar definitional problems exist in the case of the measurement-based approach in which groups are selected on the basis of scores obtained on various measures of feminism. Although groups are selected on the basis of high versus low scores on these measures, what is meant by high or low is not always clear. It is also important to note that in contrast to known/unknown comparison group approaches, the extent to which one is actively involved in the women's movement is deemed of little importance in the measurement-based approach. It seems reasonable to suppose, however, that women who are active in the movement may differ in important ways from women who support the movement but who have never been active in that movement. Various studies reviewed provide tangential support for this position. Goldschmidt et al. (1981), for example, provide some support for the notion that active feminists may be more aggressive than nonactive feminists, i.e., women who

support the women's movement but who are not active members of that movement. At the least, this finding provides evidence which suggests that feminists may be differentiated from other feminists on the basis of certain personality characteristics. A distinction between Liberal and Radical Feminism in terms of activism is also supported by the work of Ghaffaradli-Doty and Carlson (1979). These authors reported that women who scored high on a measure of feminism were not behaviorally active in the women's movement. This finding suggests that some women who hold nontraditional views of the role of women in society do not espouse an action oriented perspective. On the other hand, evidence obtained from studies of active feminists indicates that some feminists do in fact blame the larger social system for women's oppression (Cherniss, 1972; Riger, 1977). Thus, it is not surprising to find that active feminists score higher than a group of university women on a measure of political radicalism (Fowler, Fowler, & Van De Riet, 1973). Therefore, the measurement-based approach to the classification of feminist and nonfeminist groups may obscure important distinctions that exist within the feminist group.

A related problem concerns the kinds of measures of feminism that have been used to classify feminist and

comparison groups in the research reviewed. For example, of the 19 studies which examined demographic variables (Appendix A), 11 employed measures of feminism developed specifically for that study. Similarly, with regard to the personality research, researchers developed their own measures of feminism in 11 of the 19 studies reviewed (Appendix A). Consequently, the reliability and validity of the instruments used was not known prior to hypothesis testing.

Measurement models. Researchers using standardized measures have relied on the six instruments listed in Table 1 as a means of classifying subjects into feminist and comparison groups.

Kirkpatrick's (1936) *Belief Pattern Scale for Measuring Attitudes Toward Feminism* is the oldest scale measuring various aspects of feminism and has served as the basis for the development of numerous other scales. These include the *Fem Scale* (Smith, Ferree, & Miller, 1975), the *Feminism II Scale* (Dempewolff, 1974), and the *Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS)* (Spence & Helmreich, 1972).

One of the assumptions that has guided the development of current measures of feminism is that the construct is unidimensional in nature. This assumption is in contrast to the assumptions of Kirkpatrick (1936) who defined feminism

Table 1

Summary of Measures of Feminism

Study	Scale	Scale Characteristics: No. of Items	Items Per pole Pro/Con	Scoring
Kirkpatrick (1936)	Belief Pattern Scale for Measuring Attitudes Toward Feminism	80	40/40	Checklist
Smith, Ferree & Miller (1975)	The Fem Scale	20	4/16	Summed 5-Pt. Scale
Dempewolff (1974)	Feminism II Scale	56	28/28	Summed 4-Pt. Scale
Spence & Helmreich (1972)	Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS)	55	27/28	Summed 4-Pt. Scale
Spence, Helmreich & Stapp (1973)	Attitudes Toward Women - Short Form (AWS-25)	25	12/13	Summed 4-Pt. Scale
Sarup (1976)	Attitudes Toward Feminism	13	9/9	Summed 5-Pt. Scale

Note: The 4-point scales include: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree. The 5-point scales include an "undecided" option.

in terms of four dimensions. Perhaps the greatest divergence of views, partly explained by the four decades that separate them, is that between Kirkpatrick (1936) and Dempewolff (1974). Kirkpatrick's method of item construction was based on a conceptual analysis of the literature, a method that was popular before Thurstone and others made factor analysis a viable alternative. Based on Kirkpatrick's analysis, feminism was defined by the following dimensions: Economic, Domestic, Political-Legal, and Conduct and Social Status. Subsequently, ten feminism and ten antifeminism items were constructed to reflect each category. Dempewolff (1974) revised, dropped, and wrote additional items for Kirkpatrick's scale, resulting in an initial item pool of 80 items. Subsequent factor analyses led to a final scale consisting of 56 items, with 28 positive and 28 negative items. Not surprisingly, this final scale was unidimensional. Essentially, Dempewolff reduced the variability in the correlation matrix by dropping items with low correlations. Due to the small variance in correlations among items, it becomes impossible to obtain a number of factors by the analysis of such a matrix. Yet Dempewolff (1974) concluded: "It may be that the attitude configuration of today is not as clearcut as it was in 1936, and that the issues involved with the women's movement have become more unidimensional" (p. 656).

This unidimensional perspective is also reflected in the most popular current measure of feminism, the AWS. Although the AWS has been used by many researchers as a global measure of feminism (e.g., Follingstad et al., 1977; Redfering, 1979), it was designed to tap only one aspect of feminism, i.e., "major areas of activity in which men and women were, in principle, capable of being granted equal rights" (Spence & Helmreich, 1972, p. 3). For example, one item is: "Women earning as much as their dates should bear equally the expense when they go out." Contrasted with the proposed collectivistic perspective, where the emphasis would be on system change in terms of equal rights, this item, and indeed the entire scale, reflects a person-centred view of equal rights where the emphasis is on individual change. For example, "strongly Liberal" feminists might endorse the item on the basis that men and women should pay equally, if they want to be treated equally. However, "strongly Radical" feminists might disagree with the item, on the basis that the "system" still pays men more than women for equal work. They might also argue that such an item constructs an artificial situation that bears little resemblance to women's actual economic position in society. Such arguments are consistent with the proposed definition of Radical Feminism, where even personal and social relationships are viewed within a political context.

Another item in the AWS, "Women should assume their rightful place in business and all the professions along with men" taps a politically relevant component, but is presented in a liberal context.

The methods of test construction used to develop the measures listed in Table 1 include the factor analytic approach (Dempewolff, 1974; Smith, Ferree, & Miller, 1975; Spence & Helmreich, 1972), and the criterion-oriented approach (Kirkpatrick, 1936; Sarup, 1976; Spence, Helmreich & Stapp, 1973). In the factor analytic approach, items are selected for the final scale on the basis of their factor loadings. This approach is best exemplified by the development of the Fem_Scale (Smith et al., 1975). The authors selected a pool of 27 items, based largely on Kirkpatrick (1936), and subjected them to a factor analysis. From this analysis one factor emerged and was labeled "Feminism." The selection of the final 20 item scale involved dropping the items that had loadings below .4 on the factor.

As mentioned previously with regard to Dempewolff's scale, there are a number of problems with this approach to test construction. First, the factors that emerge are not based on a priori theoretical considerations. Second, unless "the number of subjects is at least ten times the

number of items, factor analysis can take great advantage of chance" (Nunnally, 1967, p. 257). In the case of the Fem Scale, at least 270 subjects would have been required to ensure that the factor was not an artifact due to sampling error. In fact, however, Smith et al. (1975) administered the 27 item scale to 39 subjects. This suggested rule of a minimum of 10 subjects per item was also not adhered to by either Dempewolff (1974) or Spence and Helmreich (1972).

In the criterion-oriented approach, items are selected for the final scale on the basis of their power to discriminate between two groups. This approach is best illustrated in the development of the AWS-Short Form (Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp, 1973). The scores on the long form of the AWS (Spence & Helmreich, 1972) were used to divide participants into feminist (criterion) and nonfeminist (control) groups. The items which best discriminated between these two groups were selected for the final scale.

According to Nunnally (1967), this method of test construction tends to result in relatively heterogeneous tests, including items that correlate well with a criterion (i.e., group), but not with each other or with the total score. In such instances, the items may be measuring different aspects of a very complex construct. Indeed, when items that cover a broad range of topics are summed, the

contributions and inter-relationships of specific content issues are inevitably obscured. Nunnally (1967) advocates the construction of homogeneous tests that are based on solid theoretical considerations. In the case of the AWS-Short Form, it is clear that the 25 items met the statistical requirements, but why they did is not clear, and their factorial composition remains unknown.

The emphasis in the literature appears to be either on scale construction or on testing hypotheses with instruments that have been developed for the purpose of the study. In neither case has the research been guided by theory. Researchers who are concerned with testing a specific hypothesis may minimize the importance of first establishing the stability of the measure upon which their hypothesis test ultimately rests. More important, the absence of a priori definitions of the constructs these researchers are measuring precludes any attempt to assess whether or not these constructs are representative of the domain of feminism. Consequently, one cannot assess the validity of these measures when the constructs they are supposed to be tapping are undefined or poorly defined.

A theoretical approach to the development of instruments to measure various dimensions of feminism is essential. Thus far, no theoretical basis has been employed

in the development of instruments to measure feminism, nor have any of the studies reviewed attempted to differentiate among different underlying theoretical constructs related to feminism. With regard to the measurement of feminism, it is the emphasis on purely statistical techniques which Nunnally (1967) referred to as "blind empiricism." Yet as Anastasi (1986) argued, "Empiricism need not be blind" (p.6). Echoing the arguments of Nunnally (1967), Anastasi (1986) called for an integration of theoretical and empirical approaches to test construction. Currently, the only method which fulfills this requirement is Jackson's (1974) rational-empirical method of test construction. The rational-empirical method is the most recently developed approach and represents a shift from statistically driven and thus empirically derived measures of constructs to measures which are theory driven, and thus theoretically relevant. Anastasi further stated that theoretical considerations of varying degrees of abstraction should facilitate an understanding of psychometric data. More important, however, a firm theoretical rationale should be presented prior to the test construction process rather than being introduced during the last stages of test development.

A noticeable weakness in the measurement literature has been the lack of a clear definition and description of the

dimensions of feminism. The feminist literature, reviewed earlier, indicates that two important dimensions of feminism, which are manifested in the attitudes and behaviors of feminists, are Liberal (individualistic) Feminism and Radical (collectivistic) Feminism. While measures of various aspects of Liberal Feminism have been encountered in the psychological literature, these instruments suffer from a lack of theoretical consideration which may account, in part, for some of the inconsistencies previously mentioned. Surprisingly, empirical research on feminism has ignored a consideration of Radical Feminism. This is surprising since Radical Feminism represents a dimension which is both theoretically interesting and socially relevant. An analysis of Radical Feminism is likely to contribute in a significant way to our understanding of feminism in general, and to an understanding of various theories of activism which suffer from a lack of empirical underpinnings.

Liberal and Radical Feminism

For the present study, Liberal and Radical Feminism constructs have been derived from both the psychological and feminist literature. The definitions of these constructs are as follows:

Liberal Feminism

Focus is on an individual approach to ending women's unequal status in society; believes that women should develop strategies to end their own oppression; supports the goals of the women's movement insofar as they relate to personal experience; wants to become involved in the women's movement yet remains behaviorally uncommitted for a variety of reasons; harbors a sense of personal responsibility for ending one's own oppression; believes that men and women can work together to end sexism; socially appropriate in the expression of feminist ideas; is not inclined to express offence at sexist jokes from male or female friends; does not view all men as the enemy in the struggle for equality.

Radical Feminism

Central focus is not on the individual but on woman-kind, thereby directing energy toward changing prevailing systems that are deemed to be unjust; dominated by a need to take action against those systems which support in theory or deed, social, economic, or political inequality for women; for the politically radical feminist the personal is political; characterized by a high degree of behavioral commitment to the women's movement including involvement in the organization of and participation in the following: march, rally, demonstration, committee; easily upset and troubled by the persistence of perceived injustice against women in society; sensitive to even the most subtle antifeminist sentiment which can evoke strong emotional reactions; distrustful of males in general and advocates the development of a woman-centred culture based on female values; involved in a multiplicity of social relations, all with a concentrated interest in feminist issues; close friendships are usually limited to individuals perceived as being similarly committed.

Although each of these constructs is assumed to be unidimensional, each includes distinct components which may be conceptualized as either criterial or derivative. In the present study, criterial components refer to aspects of the definition which are central to the construct. Derivative components refer, by definition, to aspects of the definition which have been deduced from criterial components, and thus reflect more peripheral aspects of the construct which may or may not be exclusive. With regard to Liberal Feminism, some criterial components and their associated definitional representations include:

Individualistic Focus

> supports the goals of the women's movement inasmuch as they relate to personal experience.

Individual Change

> believes that women should develop strategies to end their own oppression.

Pro Humankind vs. Pro Gender

> believes that men and women can work together to end sexism.

Derivative components include:

Social Relations

> socially appropriate in the expression of feminist ideas.

In terms of Radical Feminism, some criterial components and their definitional representations include:

System Blame

> Central focus is not on the individual but on womankind, thereby directing energy toward changing prevailing systems that are deemed to be unjust.

Strong Behavioral Commitment

> characterized by a high degree of behavioral commitment to the women's movement including involvement in the organization of and participation in the following: march, rally, demonstration, committee.

Action Oriented

> dominated by a need to take action against those systems which support in theory or deed, social, economic, or political inequality for women:

The derivative components include:

Sensitivity to Perceived Antifeminist Sentiment

> sensitive to even the most subtle antifeminist sentiment which can evoke strong emotional reactions.

Social Relationships

> close friendships are usually limited to individuals perceived as being similarly committed.

In the present research, the proposed constructs of Liberal and Radical Feminism are defined as independent or orthogonal dimensions. Thus, in theory at least, individuals could demonstrate adherence to both dimensions simultaneously. Consider, for example, the perceptions of the source of women's oppression and the strategies for

ending oppression. Four possible scenarios emerge: 1) high Liberal Feminism - low Radical Feminism, 2) low Liberal Feminism - high Radical Feminism, 3) high Liberal Feminism - high Radical Feminism, and 4) low Liberal Feminism - low Radical Feminism.

In the first scenario (high Liberal Feminism - low Radical Feminism), some women may view the source of women's oppression as residing within specific individuals (e.g., the manager who will not promote a woman). Strategies for ending women's oppression would be equally individualistic in that the focus of energy would be on the individual to gather knowledge and take appropriate action in the pursuit of personal goals and needs. In this scenario there is no political reference or framework for judging women's oppression or the oppression of other minority groups such as lesbians, homosexuals, or blacks.

A second scenario (low Liberal Feminism - high Radical Feminism) would be a view by some feminists that women's oppression resides completely within the political, economic, and social systems. Even inequalities between husband and wife would not be viewed as a personal problem between a couple but as a problem of patriarchal society. Strategies for ending women's oppression would be directed exclusively toward system change. In other words,

strategies such as assertiveness training which focus on personal change would be viewed as treating the symptoms of oppression rather than its cause. Wine (1982), for example, argues that strategies which focus on personal change are representative of the "blame-the-victim fallacy." Of assertiveness training she argues that "the fallacy is that the power imbalance between men and women is a result of individual women's lack of assertiveness" (p. 76).

The third scenario (high Liberal Feminism - high Radical Feminism) is perhaps the most difficult to visualize, since it posits the existence of feminists who view the source of women's oppression as existing at both individual and systemic levels (e.g., from one's lack of assertiveness to the larger political and economic systems). Consequently, strategies designed to end oppression would involve system change as well as personal change or change in relationships with others.

Finally, the fourth scenario (low Liberal Feminism - low Radical Feminism) would consist of individuals who are low on both Liberal and Radical Feminism. These individuals may be nonfeminists or antifeminists. Nonfeminists may not be aware of the issues concerning the feminist movement while antifeminists may be very aware of these issues but view the feminist movement itself as oppressive.

The main purpose of the present study is to devise self-report scales of Liberal and Radical Feminism based on a priori definitions of these constructs. These definitions were extracted from a consideration of both the feminist literature and psychological research. The method of test construction used to develop the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales is Jackson's (1974) rational-empirical method. This method is based on the view that the construction of a valid measure requires multiple procedures which are employed sequentially at different stages of the test development process (Anastasi, 1986). Validity is therefore conceptualized as being built into the measure from the outset rather than being limited to the final stages of test construction as in the more traditional factor analytic and criterion-oriented approaches. The test construction procedures and criteria employed in the present are discussed in detail in Chapter II.

Based on substantive considerations regarding the existence of Liberal and Radical Feminism, a number of predictions can be made regarding the structural and external validity components of the method of test construction employed.

Structurally, the two final scales are expected to possess a high degree of homogeneity while encompassing both

criterial and derivative aspects of their definitions. In addition, items within each scale are expected to possess moderate endorsement proportions and correlate higher with their own scale than with a selected content irrelevant scale and a measure of social desirability. The extent to which these criteria are met will provide evidence as to whether or not the final scales possess a high degree of reliability and discriminatory power and whether the scales are confounded by a socially desirable response style.

A number of predictions can also be made regarding the external validity component of the rational-empirical method of test construction. These procedural aspects of test construction dictate that measures of similar constructs will correlate highly and measures of dissimilar constructs will correlate poorly. Since current measures of feminism contain numerous assumptions associated with liberalism, one would expect the Liberal Feminism scale to correlate positively with such a measure, yet no such prediction would be made for the Radical scale.

Based on substantive considerations, it is expected that radical feminists would be more active in the women's movement than liberal feminists. Thus, the Liberal Feminism scale should correlate negatively with a measure of feminist activism while the Radical Feminism scale should correlate

positively with such a measure. These discriminant and convergent relationships would provide evidence that the two scales are measuring what they were intended to measure. Indeed, the establishment of a relationship between the final scales and actual behavior would provide strong support for the construct validity of the final scales. Furthermore, substantive considerations would also predict that the two scales would be independent, that is, that the two scales measure different aspects of Feminism.

It is also predicted that the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales will be differentiated on the basis of selected personality traits. Predictions based on the review of the psychological literature are difficult to make because of the methodological problems associated with the research, and the fact that the feminist groups discussed in the literature have been treated as homogeneous groups. However, a few predictions can be made based on the relative consistency of some personality traits. For example, both liberal and radical feminists should score high on measures of autonomy and achievement, yet radical feminists might be expected to score higher than liberal feminists on measures of dominance and aggression (e.g., Arnott, 1973; Dempewolff, 1974; Cherniss, 1972; Lipman-Blumen, 1972). On the other hand, liberal feminists might be expected to score

relatively higher than radical feminists on measures of nurturance, social recognition and abasement by comparison (Goldschmidt et al. 1981; Harrison et al. 1981; Joesting, 1976; Redfering, 1972) In addition, a number of relationships will be explored between the Liberal and Radical scale and the personality traits of Understanding, Endurance, Cognitive Structure, Change, Sentience, Order, Harmavoidance, Impulsivity, Succorance, Defendence, Affiliation, and Exhibition. Finally, if the two scales are measuring what they were intended to measure, clear distinctions are expected to emerge between female and male samples on these personality traits.

CHAPTER II

METHOD

Subjects

The primary sample consisted of 251 females and served as the test construction sample. The majority of these subjects were from the University of Windsor with approximately 2.4% (n=6) from women's groups in southwestern Ontario. The six subjects from various women's groups represented an attempt to obtain a known feminist sample. Eighty-four questionnaires were mailed out to contacts in London, Waterloo, and Toronto, Ontario. The six questionnaires that were returned were combined with the University sample. A secondary sample of 94 male University of Windsor students was used to assess the external validity of the two scales. Participation in the study was voluntary, and those subjects who were undergraduate behavioral science students received an extra course credit. Individuals who indicated an interest received a short summary of the study.

Procedure

In accordance with the rational-empirical method of test construction, a large pool of multipoint items was written to reflect the definitions of Liberal and Radical Feminism (100 items per scale). These items were then submitted to an independent editor, who was familiar with the rational-empirical method of test construction, to be evaluated for clarity and the relation of the items to the constructs they defined. This procedure resulted in the preliminary Liberal and Radical Feminism scales, each consisting of a pool of 50 items (Appendix B).

Subjects were tested either individually or in groups. Each subject received an experimental package (Appendix B) containing, in the order in which they were completed: Instruction Sheet, Informed Consent Form, Personal Data Sheet, preliminary Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales, Personality Research Form (PRF) (Jackson, 1974), Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS) (Spence & Helmreich, 1972), and a Feminist Behavior Checklist (FBC) constructed by the author.

Instruments

Personal Data Sheet. The Personal Data Sheet (Appendix B) was developed by the author for the purpose of the present research and includes questions on age, religion,

education, gender, and political preferences. These variables have been explored in previous research on feminism (Appendix A) and were also deemed to be relevant to the proposed dimensions of Liberal and Radical Feminism.

Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales. The preliminary Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales each consisted of a pool of 50 items to which subjects responded on 6-point Likert-type scales (Appendix B). Jackson's (1974) rational-empirical method of test construction was used to develop the scales. This method of test development is based in part on Loevinger's (1957) three stage validation process of establishing **substantive**, **structural**, and **external** validity. The substantive component refers to the extent to which the scale items reflect, on theoretical grounds, the Liberal and Radical Feminism dimensions. The substantive validation process involves the a priori formulation of definitions to reflect Liberal Feminism and Radical Feminism. These construct definitions were derived from psychological and feminist theory and research and appear in Chapter I (pp. 28-30).

The definition of Liberal Feminism reflects both criterial and derivative components of the proposed dimension. Components of Liberal Feminism which may be considered criterial include an Individualistic Focus,

Individual Change, Status Quo Orientation, Apolitical, and Pro Humankind vs. Pro Gender or Race. Derivative statements are those which reflect Social Relationships. Below are two examples of items taken from the Liberal Feminism scale. The first item is criterial and the second item is derivative. (The number to the left of each statement indicates the item number in Appendix B.)

50. The feminist movement unfairly condemns all men. (Pro Humankind vs. Pro Gender)

36. I prefer not to discuss feminist issues with my male friends because they make fun of me. (Social Relationships)

Criterial components of Radical Feminism include System Blame, System Change, Political Framework, Strong Behavioral Commitment, Collective vs. Individual Focus, Action Oriented, and a Separatist Orientation. Derivative or more peripheral components of Radical Feminism include Sensitivity to Perceived Injustice/Antifeminist Sentiment and Social Relationships. The two Radical Feminism items below are examples of criterial and derivative statements respectively.

29. Radical feminist activism is the only way to create a world where there are no more victims. (Action Oriented)

90. I need to meet regularly with other feminists in order to keep my sanity. (Social Relationships)

One could argue that the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales should contain only those items defined a priori as tapping criterial components of both dimensions, since

derivative components may not, by definition, contribute significantly to the discriminatory power of the scales. However, given the exploratory nature of the proposed study, and the possibility that a priori definitions of centrality might not be completely accurate, the decision was made to include items reflecting both criterial and derivative components of the scales.

The structural and external validity components of the rational method refer to the extent to which item and scale characteristics meet specified criteria. The structural validation criteria are presented in Table 2. Essentially, the structural validation process represents criteria that each item must meet in order to be considered for inclusion in the final scales. For example, at the scale level, the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales are expected to exhibit a high degree of within-scale homogeneity. This would indicate that each scale is measuring some common underlying attribute. At the item level, items are expected to have a higher correlation with their own scale than with other criterion scales. As illustrated in Table 2, items are also expected to have a higher correlation with their own scale than with a content irrelevant scale and a response style scale. The subscale Play from the Personality Research Form (PRF) served as the

Table 2

Structural Validation Criteria

	Criteria
Scale Properties	
Homogeneity (coefficient alpha)	High
Item Properties	
Endorsement proportion (> .10 and < .90)	Moderate
Item-scale remainder correlation	High
Item-content irrelevant scale correlation (PRF-Play)	Low
Item-response style scale correlation (PRF-Social Desirability)	Low

content irrelevant scale and PRF-Social Desirability served as the response style scale. Finally, items are expected to possess moderate endorsement proportions. Endorsement proportions simply reflect the percentages of individuals who respond in a particular direction to each item. These safeguards are built into the rational method to ensure that the resulting scales possess a high degree of reliability and discriminatory power and are not confounded by response style (i.e., Social Desirability).

The external validity component of the rational method refers to the expectation that different measures of similar constructs will correlate highly (convergent validity) and different measures of different constructs will correlate poorly (discriminant validity). The PRF, the Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS), and the Feminist Behavior Checklist (FBC) were used to assess the external validity of the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales. The relationships that were expected to emerge are presented in Table 3

Subjects' responses to each item were scored on a six point scale: (1) Strongly Disagree (2) Moderately Disagree (3) Slightly Disagree (4) Slightly Agree (5) Moderately Agree (6) Strongly Agree. The decision to use a 6-point scale was based on a number of considerations. According to Nunnally (1967), as the number of scale steps is increased

Table 3

Validation Criteria: Expected and Exploratory Relationships

Scales	Liberal Feminism	Radical Feminism
PRF scales		
Abasement	+	-
Achievement	+	+
Aggression	-	+
Autonomy	+	+
Dominance	0	+
Nurturance	+	0
Social Recognition	+	0
Exploratory Relationships		
Affiliation		
Change		
Cognitive Structure		
Defendence		
Endurance		
Exhibition		
Harmavoidance		
Impulsivity		
Order		
Sentience		
Succorance		
Understanding		
Additional Measures		
AW	+	0
Feminist Behavior Checklist	-	+
Radical Feminism	0	

Note: PRF-Play was not included here since this scale served as the content irrelevant scale criterion.
Scales for which no prediction was made represent an exploratory analysis.

from 2, there are corresponding increases in both reliability and error variance. However, reliability increases at a much more rapid rate than error variance and levels off at about 7 steps. Thus, beyond 7 steps there is little to be gained by increasing the number of scale points. In addition, Nunnally (1967) states that there is a clear advantage to using an even number of steps (no neutral option) instead of an odd number (a neutral option) since a neutral option introduces additional error variance due to individual response style differences. Responses to the Liberal and Radical Feminism items were summed yielding a score for Liberal Feminism and a score for Radical Feminism for each subject.

The Liberal and Radical Feminism Scale items were randomly mixed and combined in one questionnaire. The rationale for combining both sets of scale items was to avoid sensitizing subjects to the specific content areas. It should be noted that the questionnaire given to subjects was titled "The Personal Attitude Scale" for the same reasons (Appendix B).

Personality Research Form (PRF): Form E. The PRF (Jackson, 1974) consists of 20 16-item scales for the assessment of normal personality. The PRF scales were administered in order to assess the structural validity of

the preliminary Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales (See Table 2 on page 49). The PRF scales were also used to assess the external validity of the final Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales (see Table 3 on page 51). The PRF scale descriptors are presented in Appendix B.

Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS). The AWS, developed by Spence & Helmreich (1972), consists of 55 items which are scored on a 4 point scale. The AWS was developed to assess attitudes toward the rights and roles of women in society. Due to its wide popularity and established reliability, the AWS was used to assess the external validity (convergent and discriminant validity) of the Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales (see Table 3 on page 51). The AWS is presented in Appendix B.

Feminist Behavior Checklist (FBC). The Feminist Behavior Checklist was developed by the author to assess the external validity of the final Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales (see Table 3 on page 51). Two active feminist women were asked to make a list of "behaviors a feminist might engage in." The lists were evaluated and combined. Subjects were requested to indicate which behaviors they had ever performed and which behaviors they had performed in the past year. A final question on the checklist asked subjects whether or not they considered themselves to be feminists.

For subjects, the FBC was called the Personal Activities Scale. A copy of the Feminist Behavior Checklist is presented in Appendix B.

CHAPTER III

RESULTS

Subjects

The subject pool consisted of 251 females and 94 males. The female sample served as the test construction sample. The male sample served as the discriminant validity sample.

The female sample consisted of 53% Roman Catholic, 30% Protestant, 4% atheist, 2% Jewish, and 12% who designated themselves as "other." Two-thirds of the female sample (66%) reported that they participated in the religion of their choice while 34% were not religiously active. Of the Roman Catholic subjects, 41% were active in their church. Of the Protestant subjects, 17% were religiously active. The remaining 8% who reported that they were religiously active were Jewish (1%) and those who designated themselves as other (7%). With regard to race, 94% were white, 3% were black, 1% were Asian and 3% designated themselves as "other." Forty percent of the female sample indicated that they were feminists while 60% reported that they were not feminists. In terms of political preference, 21% reported

that they were conservative, 68% reported that they were liberal, and 10% reported that they were politically radical. Subjects ranged in age from 17 to 55 years. Eighty-eight percent of the subject pool were in first year of University and 84% were single.

Preliminary Item Analysis

Structural properties. A preliminary item analysis was performed on the 50-item Liberal and 50-item Radical Feminism scales. As indicated in Table 4, results of this preliminary analysis were quite promising.

The large standard deviation coupled with the high degree of homogeneity for both scales suggested that they were discriminating individuals on some underlying attribute. Not surprisingly, since attitudes toward feminism in general tend to be negatively skewed in a university female population, the mean scores for both preliminary scales were greater than the mid-point of the range of scores (i.e., 125). The Liberal Feminism scale was negatively skewed with a mean of 206, a standard deviation of 23 and a coefficient alpha of .94. Most promising was the Radical Feminism scale with a coefficient alpha of .92, a mean of 182 and a standard deviation of 30. These preliminary scale statistics indicate that the Liberal and

Table 4

Scale Statistics for Preliminary and Final Scales

	Preliminary[a]				Final[b]			
Scale	Mean	S.D.	Alpha	Mean DRI	Mean	S.D.	Alpha	Mean DRI
Liberal Feminism	206	23	.84	.31	84	1[illegible]	.84	.40
Radical Feminism	181	30	.92	.[illegible]1	77	15	.89	.51

[a] Number of items=50
[b] Number of items=20

Radical Feminism scales did discriminate individuals on two homogeneous dimensions.

Item statistics were computed for each of the two preliminary 50-item scales. These involved calculating the correlation between each item and: 1) the remainder of its own scale (r_{IR}), 2) the irrelevant content scale criterion (PRF-Play) (r_{IC}), and 3) the response style scale (PRF-Social Desirability) (r_{DES}).

In addition, endorsement proportions and Jackson's (1974) Differential Reliability Index (DRI) were computed for each item. Endorsement proportions reflect the percentage of individuals who respond in a particular direction. Because the items were scored on a 6-point scale, the endorsement proportions reflect the percentage of respondents who were in agreement with a particular item (i.e., endorsed a 4, 5, or 6 on the 6-point scale). The DRI is a measure of the item variance with the variance the item shares with a content irrelevant scale removed. Thus,

$$DRI = \sqrt{r^2_{IR} - r^2_{DES}}$$

Preliminary item statistics for the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales appear in Tables 5 and 6 respectively.

Selection of items for the final scales. Based on the rational-empirical method of test construction, a number of

criteria had to be met in order for an item to be included in the final scale. First, items selected for the final scales were expected to have moderate endorsement proportions (i.e., > .10 and < .90). An extreme endorsement proportion meant that 90% or more of the respondents either agreed or disagreed with an item, and thus the item did not discriminate well. Therefore, items with extreme endorsement proportions were eliminated from further analysis. Eight items from the Liberal scale and two items from the Radical scale were eliminated for this reason. Second, items were expected to have a higher correlation with their own scale than with the content irrelevant scale (PRF-Play). Application of this criterion resulted in a loss of three items from the Liberal scale. Third, items were expected to have a higher correlation with their own scale than with the response style scale (PRF-Social Desirability).

Table 5

Items Selected for the Final Liberal Feminism Scale

Item	Item #	EP	Preliminary Scale r_{IR}	Preliminary Scale r_{DES}	Preliminary Scale r_{ICS}	Final Scale DRI	Final Scale r_{IR}
1. Any woman who wants to can make as much money as a man. (C)	5	.37	.38	-.03	.18	.26	.39
2. The views of politically active feminists are too radical. (C)	9	.56	.46	-.01	.09	.46	.47
3. Getting involved in the feminist movement would require too much of my time. (C)	16	.60	.32	-.09	.11	.31	.32
4. Women are oppressed by a few individuals and groups. (C)	18	.66	.42	-.07	.21	.42	.42
5. Staying home to take care of younger children is a personal choice, not a political issue. (C)	19	.87	.45	-.00	.27	.45	.45
6. Making work within the home a political issue is just too extreme. (C)	22	.71	.38	.05	.10	.37	.45
7. Today, women have the same educational opportunities as men. (C)	24	.85	.52	-.03	.22	.53	.54
8. A sexist joke is a form of bad humour rather than a personal insult. (C)	31	.70	.35	-.06	.09	.34	.39
9. If each woman worked toward ending her own oppression we wouldn't need a women's movement. (C)	37	.64	.38	-.03	.09	.38	.42

..table continues

Table 5 (continued)

Item	Item #	EP	Preliminary Scale r_{IR}	Preliminary Scale r_{DES}	Preliminary Scale r_{ICS}	Final Scale DRI	Final Scale r_{IR}
10. Some feminists are too sensitive when it comes to sexist comments. (C)	39	.80	.47	.03	.10	.47	.54
11. The problem for women is one of non-representation within the political system, not oppression by that system. (C)	42	.68	.33	-.04	.15	.33	.35
12. The feminist movement unfairly condemns all men. (C)	50	.59	.34	.00	.04	.34	.42
13. Some of the methods used by radical feminists give the women's movement a bad name. (C)	55	.84	.43	.04	.04	.43	.43
14. The goals of feminism can be achieved without angry demonstrations. (C)	63	.78	.51	-.03	.11	.52	.52
15. Calling God a "she" reflects feminist humour rather than a feminist issue or concern. (C)	75	.60	.33	-.02	.05	.32	.28
16. Today, most women can make it up the corporate ladder if they want to. (C)	78	.80	.56	-.03	.24	.56	.59
17. The goals of feminism can be summed up under the word "education". (C)	85	.69	.34	-.06	.15	.33	.22

..table continues

Table 5 (continued)

Item	Item #	EP	Preliminary Scales r_{IR}	Preliminary Scales r_{DES}	Preliminary Scales r_{ICS}	Final Scale DRI	Final Scale r_{IR}
18. The anger and aggression that some feminists display actually hurts the cause of feminism. (C)	87	.83	.42	-.12	.10	.40	.40
19. Women do not need to take power, they simply need to be included in the present power structure. (C)	92	.88	.42	.06	.02	.41	.40
20. Feminist criticisms of religion as oppressive institutions are not valid. (C)	95	.48	.34	.02	.15	.34	.35

NOTE: Abbreviations: EP = Endorsement Proportion; r_{IR} = Item Remainder correlation; r_{DES} = Item - PRF Desirability correlation; r_{ICS} = Item - Content Irrelevant Criterion Scale correlation (PRF-PLAY); DRI = Differential Reliability Index; C=Criterial Component.

Table 6

Items Selected for the Final Radical Feminism Scale

Item	Item #	EP	Preliminary Scale r_{IR}	Preliminary Scale r_{DES}	Preliminary Scale r_{ICS}	Final Scale DRI	Final Scale r_{IR}
1. Every woman should become active in the women's movement. (C)	7	.54	.51	-.06	-.09	.50	.49
2. Women will only find self-affirmation by overthrowing the male political, economic, and legal systems. (C)	14	.29	.52	-.08	-.06	.52	.52
3. Political and economic theories are based on the sexual division of labour. (C)	20	.71	.49	.04	-.09	.49	.50
4. The present economic system only works because women provide unpaid domestic labour. (C)	23	.42	.51	-.06	-.13	.51	.50
5. The over-valuation of work outside the home and the under-valuation of work inside the home is a male invention designed to keep women oppressed. (C)	28	.57	.56	-.08	-.09	.55	.54
6. Radical feminist activism is the only way to create a world where there are no more victims. (C)	29	.35	.47	-.08	-.03	.46	.47
7. Male domination of women is enforced through the political and economic systems. (C)	32	.78	.55	-.07	-.08	.55	.53

..table continues

Table 6 (continued)

Item	Item #	EP	Preliminary Scale r_{IR}	Preliminary Scale r_{DES}	Preliminary Scale r_{ICS}	Final Scale DRI	Final Scale r_{IR}
8. I am frustrated by women who don't seem to understand that we live in a male dominated society. (D)	34	.46	.54	-.05	-.12	.54	.51
9. Women must act to reshape the systems that exert influences over every woman's life. (C)	38	.85	.47	-.02	-.19	.49	.51
10. The economic system must be redefined by women to account for paid and unpaid work in both public and private spheres. (C)	51	.69	.47	-.06	-.12	.46	.49
11. Feminism must wrest ideological control from men by redefining politics. (C)	57	.56	.55	-.05	-.07	.55	.53
12. Feminists need to be more radical because as women become free to work outside the home, men still remain free from work within the home. (C)	59	.58	.54	-.03	-.05	.53	.54
13. I get very angry when I see programs on TV which reinforce sexist stereotypes. (D)	61	.81	.47	.00	-.13	.48	.46
14. I become furious when I hear antifeminist comments. (D)	64	.54	.55	-.07	-.08	.55	.53
15. Women must develop their own strategies to overturn the male-dominated political system. (C)	65	.74	.47	-.11	-.09	.46	.47

..table continues

Table 6 (continued)

Item	Item #	EP	Preliminary Scale r_{IR}	Preliminary Scale r_{DES}	Preliminary Scale r_{ICS}	Final Scale DRI	Final Scale r_{IR}
16. It is the responsibility of every woman to become active in the feminist movement.(C)	72	.28	.62	-.09	-.14	.62	.63
17. Women should unite and act together to create a new world. (C)	79	.53	.53	.02	-.05	.54	.53
18. Feminist organization and theory are essential in order to develop a specifically female view of the world. (C)	88	.67	.52	-.06	-.13	.51	.49
19. I need to meet regularly with other feminists in order to keep my sanity. (D)	90	.13	.54	-.11	-.23	.53	.53
20. Women do not realize how much their lives are controlled by strategies developed by men. (C)	94	.80	.51	-.04	-.05	.51	.51

NOTE: Abbreviations: EP = Endorsement Proportion; r_{IR} = Item Remainder correlation; r_{DES} = Item - PRF Desirability correlation; r_{ICS} = Item - Content Irrelevant Criterion Scale correlation (PRF-PLAY); DRI = Differential Reliability Index; C = Criterial Component; D = Derivative Component.

Application of this criterion resulted in a loss of one item from the Liberal scale and one item from the Radical scale. Since the goal was to reduce the preliminary 50-item scales to final 20-item scales with good psychometric properties, the Differential Reliability Index (DRI) was computed for the remaining items. The items were then ranked within each scale on the basis of the magnitude of their DRIs. The best 20 items for each scale were then selected to form the final Liberal and Radical Feminism scales (Table 5 on page 59 and Table 6 on page 62 respectively).

Final Item Analysis: Structural Properties of the Final Scales

An item analysis was performed on the two final scales. As Table 4 on page 57 indicates, both of the final scales improved in their ability to discriminate as evidenced by the size of the standard deviations relative to the means when compared with the preliminary scale statistics. In addition, the means for the final scales are much closer to the mid-point of the range of possible scores (i.e., 50) than the means for the preliminary scales. Furthermore, the standard deviations for both final scales approximate 1/6 of the range of all possible scores (i.e., 16).

Table 4 on page 57 also presents the mean DRIs for the preliminary and final scales. The mean DRI for the Liberal Feminism scale was .40 and the mean DRI for the Radical Feminism scale was .51. The DRIs computed for the Liberal and Radical scale items appear in Table 5 on page 59 and Table 6 on page 62 respectively. For the Liberal scale the DRIs ranged from .31 to .55. For the Radical scale the DRIs ranged from .46 to .62.

The reliabilities of the final scales as measured by coefficient alpha are impressive. It is particularly noteworthy that the reduction in scale length by more than 50% did not substantially reduce alpha. For the Liberal scale, coefficient alpha remained at .84, which reflects a more than acceptable level of internal consistency. Coefficient alpha for the Radical scale decreased slightly from .92 to .89. These results suggest that the preliminary scales contained a certain amount of measurement error and thus the final scales exhibit an improvement in relevant content over the preliminary scales.

Dimensionality of the Final Scales

Criterial and derivative aspects of the final scales. Homogeneity in the sense of internal consistency is manifested in the average correlations among items and is

measured by coefficient alpha. The criteria dictated by the rational method of test construction are designed to yield final scales of high homogeneity as evidenced by alpha. In attempting to maximize homogeneity, one runs the risk of obtaining final scales that are limited in generality and scope when compared to the original definition of the construct. An ideal final scale would be one which contains a high degree of homogeneity without sacrificing the content validity or criterial aspects of the definition of the construct. All of the criterial components reflecting the Liberal Feminism construct were represented in the final scale (see Table 5 on page 59). Items reflecting the derivative component of Social Relationships failed to meet the criteria for inclusion in the final scale. The criterial components of Status Quo Orientation (6 items), Individualistic Focus (5 items), and Apolitical (6 items) accounted for most of the items in the final scale. Two items reflected Individual Change and one item reflected Pro Humankind vs. Pro Gender.

An examination of the Radical scale in Table 6 on page 62 reveals that all criterial and derivative components of the definition were represented in the final scale. Of the 20 items in the final scale, five represented the criterial component of System Blame, with three items representing the

component of Action Oriented and the derivative component Sensitivity to Perceived Antifeminist Sentiment. The components of Separatist Ideology, System Change, and Collective Oriented each contained two items. The remaining criterial components of Political Framework, Strong Behavioral Commitment, and the derivative component of Social Relations were each represented by one item. Many items reflected more than one component, as in the case of item 6 which reflects elements of Action Oriented, Collective Ideology, and System Blame. The one item which reflects the derivative component of Social Relations (Item 19) also contains elements of the criterial component of Collective Oriented. The notion of a collective may be important in terms of political strategy and political power, but it may also meet the personal and social needs of individuals within the collective.

Factor-analytic evidence of dimensionality. In order to determine empirically the dimensionality of the final Liberal and Radical Feminism scales, a nonlinear principal components analysis (NLPCA) was performed separately on each scale using the computer program PRINCALS (Gifi, 1995). PRINCALS is a statistical software package for conducting either a principal components analysis (PCA) or a NLPCA on a data matrix that contains nominal variables or categorical

variables which are characterized by ordinal relationships. The decision to use NLPCA instead of classical PCA was based on the fact that the analyses were performed on the scale items. The items were scored on 6-point scales representing the ordinal categories of 1=Strongly Disagree to 6=Strongly Agree. Since it could not be assumed that the item points represented equal intervals, a nonlinear transformation of the data matrix was deemed appropriate. A classical PCA of the scales would not only be inappropriate but very misleading (de Leeuw, 1984). A NLPCA is a generalized form of classical PCA in which the raw data matrix is quantified, i.e., the categories are scaled in an alternating least squares way similar to homogeneity analysis (HOMALS) with the addition of order restrictions (Rijckevorsel & Walter, 1983).

The NLPCA resulted in the extraction of one factor for each scale, indicating that the final Liberal and Radical Feminism scales are unidimensional in nature. These results indicate that the final scales, while possessing a high degree of homogeneity, did not sacrifice the criterial components central to the definition of each construct. The resulting factor patterns from each analysis are presented in Table 7.

Table 7

Component Loadings for Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales

Item No.	Liberal Scale Component Loadings	Radical Scale Component Loadings
1	.65	.55
2	.64	.54
3	.45	.65
4	.64	.61
5	.56	.59
6	.63	.48
7	.73	.62
8	.48	.52
9	.56	.62
10	.56	.61
11	.64	.66
12	.58	.60
13	.42	.56
14	.60	.60
15	.47	.59
16	.73	.67
17	.59	.66
18	.41	.60
19	.60	.67
20	.64	.62
% Variance Explained	.34	.37

Note: The item numbers refer to the Liberal and Radical scale items respectively.

External Validity of the Final Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales

The final Liberal and Radical Feminism scales were correlated with the AWS, FBC, and the PRF in order to assess the discriminant and convergent predictions presented in Table 3 on page 51. These correlations are presented in Table 8.

Contrary to prediction, a significant negative correlation was found between the Liberal Feminism scale and the AWS, such that high scores on the Liberal scale were associated with low scores on the AWS. In spite of the fact that the two scales tap quite different content, the present study predicted a positive relationship between the AWS and the Liberal scale. The AWS focuses largely on gender roles within the family and dating situations. Thus, high scores on the AWS reflect nontraditional attitudes while low scores reflect traditional attitudes toward the role of women in society. Accordingly, positive attitudes toward Liberal Feminism, i.e., attitudes that advocate a status quo and apolitical orientation, were associated with a conservative view of women's role in society.

As predicted, the Radical Feminism scale was not related to the AWS and thus provides support for the discriminant validity of the scale in particular, and

Table 8

Correlations Between Final Scales and AWS, FBC, and PRF

Scales	Liberal Feminism	Radical Feminism
PRF Scales		
Abasement	18**	-02
Achievement	-12	-18**
Aggression	-00	-00
Autonomy	-09	06
Dominance	-09	06
Nurturance	11	-03
Social Recognition	22***	00
Exploratory Relationships		
Affiliation	09	00
Change	-03	14**
Cognitive Structure	-00	12
Defendence	02	09
Endurance	-05	07
Exhibition	-00	-03
Harmavoidance	-11	06
Impulsivity	12*	-14**
Order	-03	15**
Sentience	06	12*
Succorance	09	-02
Understanding	-21***	14*
Additional Measures		
AWS	-16**	09
FBC	-35***	29***
Radical Feminism	-41***	

Note: Decimals omitted.

* p < .05
** p < .01
*** p < .001

evidence for the multidimensionality of feminism in general. The Radical Feminism scale appears to tap a component of feminism that has not been previously measured.

A significant negative correlation was expected between the FBC and the Liberal scale. In addition, attitudes toward Radical Feminism were expected to correlate positively with participants' actual behavior in the past year as measured by the FBC. As predicted, the FBC correlated negatively with the Liberal scale and positively with the Radical scale. These findings support both the discriminant and convergent predictions and contribute to the external validity of the scales.

Self-defined feminists and nonfeminists were expected to differ in terms of the kind or type of behaviors endorsed on the FBC. Table 9 presents the frequency of endorsements on the FBC by individuals who defined themselves as feminist versus nonfeminist. Individuals who define themselves as feminists appear to differ from individuals who define themselves as nonfeminists in terms of the type of behavior endorsed on the FBC. For example, self-defined feminists in the sample appear to be involved in the women's movement at an organizational level, presumably reflecting a strong sense of commitment and responsibility (Items 8, 13, 17, 19). Self-defined

Table 9

Feminist Behavior Checklist: Feminists and Nonfeminists

Item	Frequency	
	Feminists n=101	Nonfeminists n=51
1. Used the term Ms. instead of Mrs. or Miss in speech or correspondence.	71	73
2. Sent a donation to a feminist organization.	9	1
3. Attended a feminist conference.	11	14
4. Pursued a traditionally male sport.	42	59
5. Enrolled in a male dominated educational program.	11	4
6. Subscribed to a feminist magazine, newsletter, or journal.	42	59
7. Contributed articles to a feminist magazine, newsletter, or journal.	17	29
8. Helped to organize a feminist magazine, newsletter, or journal.	11	2
9. Written letters opposing anti-feminist legislation.	3	0
10. Written letters to TV or newspapers objecting to material which exploits women.	7	1

Table 9 (continued)

Item	Feminist	Nonfeminist
11. Distributed pamphlets which explain a feminist issue.	6	1
12. Signed a petition for a feminist cause.	18	17
13. Helped organize a petition for a feminist cause.	7	0
14. Voted for a feminist political candidate.	9	1
15. Lobbied for a feminist political candidate.	3	1
16. Joined a feminist discussion group.	7	1
17. Helped organize a feminist discussion group.	3	0
18. Joined a feminist group that provides a service to women (e.g., crisis centre).	9	3
19. Helped organize a feminist group that provides a service to women.	5	0
20. Carried a picket sign at a women's rally.	1	0
21. Spoken at a women's rally.	0	1
22. Helped organize a women's rally.	0	1

Table 9 (continued)

	Feminist	Nonfeminist
23. Helped organize a picket against a business or group for a feminist cause.	0	0
24. Fought for the right to be employed in a male dominated occupation.	9	6
Total Number of Behaviors	307	273

feminists also seem to be more involved in the development of and participation in feminist discussion groups (Item 16, 17, 18). On the other hand, self-defined nonfeminists appear to engage in behaviors which reflect short term commitments (Item nos. 3, 12), or less commitment in terms of time allocation (Items 1, 6) or behaviors which reflect a dual purpose (Items 3, 4, 7). In addition, a single factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on both the Liberal and Radical scale scores. Both analyses were significant [Liberal F (1,243)=10.72, p < .001] and [Radical F (1,243)=10.11, p < .001], and an examination of the means indicated that self-defined feminists scored lower than self-defined nonfeminists on the Liberal Feminism scale (Ms=31 and 47 respectively) and higher on the Radical Feminism scale (Ms=74 and 68 respectively). While these results are interesting, additional research is required with a sample other than the test construction sample. In addition, this research should make finer distinctions within the feminist group that would permit an examination of behavioral frequencies for self defined liberal and radical feminists.

Another prediction was in terms of the relationship between the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales. These scales were expected to be independent. However, the

results indicated a significant negative correlation (r=.41). This result may not be too surprising. Although the constructs were defined as independent, certain criterial components of both scales may be considered bipolar. That is, one might not expect participants to endorse items reflecting an apolitical orientation (Liberal Feminism scale) and also expect them to endorse a political framework (Radical Feminism scale).

In terms of personality, a number of predictions were made on the basis of psychological research (see Table 3). These findings will be presented first. In addition, the relationship between a number of other personality traits, as measured by the PRF, and the Liberal and Radical scales were explored. Consistent with stated expectations, attitudes toward Liberal Feminism appear to be positively related to PRF-Abasement, PRF-Social Recognition and PRF-Nurturance. However, only the relationships between PRF-Abasement and Social Recognition and the Liberal scale were significant. Contrary to prediction, PRF-Achievement and Autonomy did not correlate with the Liberal scale. With regard to the exploratory analyses, two other PRF scales correlated significantly with the Liberal scale. PRF-Impulsivity correlated positively and PRF-Understanding correlated negatively. With regard to the scale

descriptors, attitudes toward Liberal Feminism appear to be associated with such traits as self-critical, resigned (PRF-Abasement), seeking recognition and respectability (PRF Social Recognition), uninhibited, impatient (PRF-Impulsivity), and not scrutinizing or desiring to understand many areas of knowledge (PRF-Understanding). These defining traits are not inconsistent with the criterial components of Status Quo Orientation, Individualistic Focus/Change, and Apolitical Orientation. Thus, a liberal feminist might be self-critical and impatient with the lack of progress in the achievement of social recognition within the public sector.

Consistent with the predictions based on psychological research, the Radical Feminism scale correlated positively with PRF-Autonomy, Dominance, and Endurance. However, these results were not statistically significant. Contrary to prediction, the Radical scale correlated negatively with PRF-Achievement. In terms of the exploratory analyses, the Radical scale correlated positively with PRF-Change, Order, Sentience, and Understanding and correlated negatively with PRF-Impulsivity. Thus, in terms of the scale descriptors, attitudes toward radical feminism appear to be associated with a desire for knowledge (PRF-Understanding), a preference for new ideas (PRF-Change), a dislike of confusion and lack of organization (PRF-Order), and a

sensitivity and acceptance of many forms of experience (PRF-Sentience). The negative correlation between PRF-Achievement and the Radical Feminism scale suggests that attitudes toward radical feminism are also associated with an unwillingness to work hard to accomplish difficult tasks or work toward distant goals.

In order to further examine the relationship between the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales and the PRF, the scale scores were intercorrelated separately for each of the final scales and factored using the principal components method. This method resulted in the extraction of six factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0 for each analysis. These six factors were then rotated to orthogonal simple structure by Kaiser's (1958) varimax method. The rotated factor patterns are the same and are consistent with previous analyses conducted on the PRF. The rotated factor patterns for each analysis are presented in Appendix D.

An attempt was made to interpret both factors upon which the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales loaded. A factor loading was considered salient if a scale loaded > .49 on one factor and < .49 on all other factors. The rotated factor pattern for the Liberal Feminism scale and the PRF indicates that the Liberal Feminism scale loaded the highest on Factor IV (see Appendix D).

Factor IV

PRF Achievement	.68
PRF Understanding	.75
PRF Endurance	.57
Liberal Feminism	-.50

Factor IV has been interpreted as an achievement factor and is primarily defined by the high loadings of PRF-Achievement, Understanding, and Endurance. The direction of the loading for the Liberal Feminism scale contradicts the expected positive relationship between attitudes toward liberal feminism and PRF-Achievement. In this particular instance, attitudes toward political feminism reflecting a liberal ideological view were not associated with achievement via endurance or understanding. Thus, attitudes toward a liberal feminist ideology appear to be associated with a noncompetitive, and impatient personality structure.

As presented in Appendix D, the Radical Feminism scale loaded the highest on Factor V.

Factor V

PRF Cognitive Structure	.60
PRF Order	.72
Radical Feminism	.56
PRF Impulsivity	-.68

Factor V appears to be a methodological factor both in thought processes and in behavior as defined by PRF-Cognitive Structure and Order respectively. This description is further supported by the high negative

loading of PRF-Impulsivity. Thus, attitudes toward political feminism which reflect a radical ideology appear to be associated with a personality structure suggesting a need for discipline, organization, and certainty of thought and behavior.

Another prediction of the present study was that attitudes toward liberal and radical feminism would differ between female and male samples. A convenient way to examine these differences was in terms of the PRF structure. As a first step the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales were correlated with the PRF using the male sample (n=94). These correlations are presented in Table 10.

As indicated in Table 10, the Liberal Feminism scale correlated significantly with PRF-Sentience. The next highest correlation was between PRF-Dominance and the Liberal scale ($r = -.16$, $p < .10$). The Radical Feminism scale did not correlate significantly with any of the PRF scales. The highest correlation was between PRF-Impulsivity and the Radical scale ($r = .17$, $p < .08$). This analysis suggests that attitudes toward liberal and radical feminism differ in terms of their relationship to personality for male and female samples. Indeed, responses to both final scales by the male sample appear to be independent of Jackson's personality traits. While the PRF structure

Table 10

Correlations Between the Final Scales and the PRF: Male Sample

Scales	Liberal Feminism	Radical Feminism
PRF Scales		
Abasement	-08	06
Achievement	-06	-06
Affiliation	-10	15
Aggression	-01	05
Autonomy	09	02
Change	-01	09
Cognitive Structure	04	-13
Defendence	-14	03
Dominance	-16	06
Endurance	-09	12
Exhibition	-06	-02
Harmavoidance	08	-09
Impulsivity	08	17
Nurturance	04	01
Order	14	-12
Sentience	21*	-12
Social Recognition	-04	-01
Succorance	05	-01
Understanding	06	01

Note: Decimals omitted

* $p < .05$

provides an interesting context in which differences between male and female samples may be examined, more research with a new sample is required in order to tease out these relationships.

CHAPTER IV

DISCUSSION

As stated in the Introduction, there are a number of instruments available that purport to measure feminism or attitudes toward feminism. An examination of these instruments revealed that they were inadequate on theoretical and statistical grounds. Although these instruments possess dubious psychometric properties, a perusal of the literature suggested that the validity of these measures has been accepted without question. Consequently a number of measurement issues were identified, including: 1) assumptions of unidimensionality which underlie the construction of these instruments, 2) the failure of researchers to provide an unambiguous definition of the construct they were measuring, and 3) a predominantly atheoretical approach to the development of these measures. This latter point is particularly important since an examination of the theoretical literature on feminism strongly suggests that feminism is a socially relevant movement that takes place within a political arena. That

feminism is first and foremost a political movement with important implications for social theory and research is a possibility that has been ignored in the psychometric literature. This gap in the psychometric literature provided the focus for the present study -- the examination of feminism within a political context. A review of psychometric and feminist conceptions of feminism indicated the need for a multidimensional approach to understand the political nature of feminism. Specifically, this review provided evidence for the existence of two broad dimensions of political feminism, labelled Liberal Feminism and Radical Feminism in the present study. The specific task of the present study was to construct two scales, using the rational-empirical method of test construction, to measure these two constructs.

Properties of the Final Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales

The method of test construction employed in the present research is predicated on substantive, structural, and external validity considerations and resulted in the development of two new measures designed to tap the posited dimensions of Liberal and Radical Feminism. The final scale properties provide encouraging support for the two hypothesized dimensions. The near normal distribution of

scores for both scales provides evidence for the discriminatory power of the final Liberal and Radical Feminism scales. Specifically, an examination of the preliminary and final scale properties of both scales reflects an improvement in the ability of both scales to discriminate among individuals. That responses to both scales tend to be normally distributed provides confidence that the two scales are able to discriminate individuals on the underlying dimensions.

The relationship between Coefficient Alpha and scale length has been well documented by Nunnally (1967): as scale length increases, Coefficient Alpha increases. Nunnally suggests, as a general guide, that an acceptable alpha level of .80 might be achieved with a scale length of 30 items. He further states that researchers may have to write additional items in order to obtain an acceptable level of internal consistency. Although the final scales in the present study were composed of only 20 items each, measures of internal consistency were very impressive. The internal consistency of the final scales as measured by Coefficient Alpha was high for both the Liberal (.84) and Radical (.89) Feminism scales. The high degree of homogeneity for both scales indicate that the items comprising each scale share a common underlying attribute, namely, the two constructs that items were written to reflect.

Components of Liberal and Radical Feminism as Measured by the Final Scales

The criteria dictated by the rational-empirical method of test construction, such as moderate endorsement proportions and higher item-remainder correlations relative to item-content irrelevant scale correlations, are designed to construct scales of high homogeneity. However, when the constructs being measured represent rather broad or heterogeneous components, as in the present study, factor analytic procedures may indicate that the final scales are actually composed of several dimensions or factors. In such instances, Nunnally (1967) strongly suggests the construction of several shorter scales that are scored separately, since the calculation of total scores by additive procedures would be inappropriate. Factor analytic results obtained in the present study indicated that the final Liberal and Radical Feminism scales are unidimensional and provide additional support for the structural validity of the scales. (See Table 2 for structural validity criteria.)

Given the high degree of homogeneity exhibited by the final scales, concern then shifts to their breadth or generality. Since the rational-empirical method is designed to yield homogeneous scales one runs the risk of obtaining

final scales that are substantively restricted when compared with the original definition of the constructs. An examination of both final scales indicated that all criterial components were represented. The final scale items for the Liberal Feminism scale represented only the criterial components of the definition. However, all criterial and derivative components of the definition of Radical feminism were represented by the final scale items. Thus, Liberal feminism, as measured here, reflects an individualistic and strongly status quo oriented approach to women's issues which emphasizes individual initiative and change strategies for males and females. Radical feminism, as measured here, reflects a system oriented collectivistic approach to women's issues which requires a strong behavioral commitment stressing political analysis and action on the part of women, for women.

Liberal and Radical Feminism: Aspects of External Validity

A number of convergent and discriminant relationships were predicted in the present study (See Table 3). These predictions concerned the relationship between the two final scales and the Attitudes Toward Woman Scale (AWS), the Feminist Behavior Checklist (FBC), and the Personality Research Form (PRF).

The hypothesis that the AWS would be positively related to Liberal feminism was not supported. The Liberal scale correlated negatively with the AWS. However, such a finding may not be too surprising. The AWS is a bipolar scale with high scores reflecting nontraditional attitudes regarding the role of women in society. Low scores on the AWS reflect traditional attitudes toward women's role. It is important to note that the majority of items on the AWS concern gender relationships for single and married women. Thus, the finding that high scores on the Liberal scale are associated with traditional attitudes and values concerning female/male relationships may not be unexpected since 60% of the respondents reported that they considered themselves to be nonfeminists. However, sample and item interaction may also account for this finding. For example, an examination of the Liberal scale items reveals that some subjects may endorse the item in a positive direction, for very different reasons. Item number 12 for example (from Table 5), states, "The feminist movement unfairly condemns all men." While liberal feminists are pro feminist movement, they might agree strongly with this item because they believe that both men and women have a role to play in eliminating sexism within society. However, antifeminists might strongly agree with this particular item as well. Similar problems exist with a few other items in the Liberal scale (See Table 5).

If a sufficient number of antifeminists were in the sample, one might expect high scores on the Liberal scale to be associated with low AWS scores. This finding suggests a problem with the rational-empirical method of test construction. Items are written to reflect the definition of the construct with little regard for differentiating among potential groups. As predicted, the AWS was not significantly related to the Radical scale, supporting the hypothesis that the Radical scale represents a dimension of Feminism not measured by the AWS.

Perhaps the most exciting predictions concern the relationships between the Feminist Behavior Checklist (FBC) and the final scales. As noted in Chapter II, the FBC is composed of behaviors that a feminist might engage in. The definition of Liberal feminism contains few behavioral referents; therefore, one might expect a negative relationship with the FBC. Since the definition of Radical feminism includes a strong behavioral component and commitment to action, one would expect a positive relationship between the FBC and Radical feminism. These hypotheses were supported. The Liberal Feminism scale correlated negatively with the FBC indicating that high scores on the Liberal scale were associated with low FBC frequencies. However, within the context of the problem identified with some of the Liberal scale items, this

finding is consistent with the interpretation that some of the items may also be measuring antifeminist or conservative attitudes. Since the FBC does not contain behavioral referents that an antifeminist would endorse one would expect low FBC scores. High scores on the Radical Feminism scale were associated with high scores on the FBC. That the Radical scale correlated positively with the participants' actual behavior in the past year provides support for the construct validity of the Radical Feminism scale.

Furthermore, self-defined feminists and nonfeminists differed qualitatively in the kind of behaviors endorsed on the FBC. For example, self-defined feminists were more likely than nonfeminists to engage in behavior of an organizational nature, including the organization of feminist magazines/newspapers/journals, petitions, and discussion groups, and activities requiring a long-term commitment. Self-defined nonfeminists tended to endorse behaviors which reflected a short-term commitment, such as signing petitions, attending a feminist conference, and using the term Ms. It is also important to note that although self-defined feminists engaged in more behaviors (Total=307) than nonfeminists (Total=273), feminists represented a much smaller group (40%) than nonfeminists (60%).

The hypothesis that the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales would be independent was not supported. Rather, a negative relationship emerged such that high scores on the Liberal Feminism scale were associated with low scores on the Radical Feminism scale. Such a finding is not necessarily inconsistent with the definition of the constructs. That is, some criterial components of Liberal feminism (e.g., individual change, pro status quo) and Radical feminism (e.g., collective action, system change) may be bipolar. For example, some individuals may see collective action as essential for changing sexist social institutions, and, at the same time, view individual change as misplaced blame. Such individuals may argue that individual change only permits one to cope with or avoid sexist institutions, thereby supporting their continued existence in society. Such an instance would correspond to the second of the four scenarios presented in Chapter I: Low Liberal-High Radical. On the other hand, some individuals may argue that women must acquire skills not only to compete with men but also to handle sexism, either socially or in the workplace. Such individuals support the status quo and argue that women should become more assertive and take advantage of the many opportunities available. These individuals may view notions of collective action and system

change as extreme attitudes. In addition, these individuals may view the emphasis on a "female collective" or a "separatist" position as too anti-male. That is, some individuals may believe that it is inappropriate to exclude the other half of the human race from participation in eliminating sexism in society. If a sufficient number of individuals respond with a similar rationale, as in the present study, the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales will be negatively correlated. That high scores on the Liberal Feminism scale were associated with low Radical Feminism scale scores reflects the above scenario and corresponds to the first of four possible scenarios in Chapter I: High Liberal-Low Radical. The most likely explanation for this finding has to do with the rather homogeneous nature of the sample. The majority of female participants in this study were white (94%) and politically liberal (68%). In addition, 60% defined themselves as nonfeminists. Such a sample composition is not unusual when participants are selected from a university population. Initial attempts at obtaining a known feminist sample proved to be fruitless as only six questionnaires were returned out of eighty-four. However, these six responses were interesting as the total scale scores on the Liberal and Radical Feminism scales were extreme for each individual -- High Radical and low Liberal

scores -- suggesting polarized attitudes. Thus, attitudes toward liberal and radical feminism may be more polarized in a known feminist group when compared to a university sample. Obviously, such a sample is too small and no conclusions can be drawn. Future research could examine and compare behavioral endorsement frequencies on the FBC between known groups of self-defined radical feminists, liberal feminists, and nonfeminists in order to confirm the above findings.

Liberal and Radical Feminism: Aspects of Personality

Both final scales were examined for their relationship to personality traits measured by the PRF. Within the context of the factor structure of the PRF, Liberal feminism was defined primarily by Jackson's (1974) Achievement factor (PRF-Achievement, Understanding, and Endurance). However, the negative loading on this factor contradicted the relationship that was expected to emerge. It is important to note, however, that the relationship between achievement and feminism or the feminist personality is inconsistent within and across the approaches that researchers have employed (Known feminist vs. unknown comparison group; measurement-based approach). On the basis of previous research (Chernis, 1972; Fowler & Van de Riet, 1972; Lipman-Blumen, 1972; Redfering, 1979), feminists are just as likely to score high as they are to score low on Achievement.

Lipman-Blumen (1972) did note a significant difference between feminist and comparison group subjects on how their need for achievement would be fulfilled; feminists reported fulfillment through their own efforts while comparison subjects reported fulfillment through their spouses.

As reported, the Radical Feminism scale loaded positively on the factor defined by PRF-Cognitive Structure and Order with a negative loading for Impulsivity. The trait descriptions for these scales suggests a need for discipline, organization, and a preference for making decisions based on definite knowledge.

At the level of individual correlations, the positive relationship between the Liberal Feminism scale and PRF-Social Recognition and Abasement suggests that high liberal feminists might be socially sensitive and obliging, seek recognition, respectability and be concerned about their reputation. Such trait descriptions are consistent with the definition of liberal feminism and are essential qualities to possess given a status quo oriented approach. The fact that the positive correlation between PRF-Abasement and the Liberal scale was significant also supports the interpretation that the Liberal scale might be tapping conservative attitudes toward political feminism. With regard to radical feminism, the positive relationship

between this scale and PRF-Change. Order and Understanding appears to be consistent with the definition of the construct. However, the negative relationship between PRF-Achievement and the Radical scale is difficult to explain, particularly in view of the positive relationship with PRF-Understanding.

A final prediction in the present study was that males and females would differ in their attitudes toward liberal and radical feminism. Given the nature of liberal and in particular radical feminism as defined here, one would expect differences if these scales were actually measuring what they were intended to measure. Since the stability of the PRF factor structure has been well documented, it provided a convenient framework in which to assess these differences. As predicted, at the level of individual correlations, male attitudes toward liberal and radical feminism were very different from those of the female sample. For the male sample, attitudes toward liberal and radical feminism were independent of the PRF personality traits.

Summary and Future Directions

The results of the present study provide good support for the hypothesized construct of Radical feminism.

Evidence of the validity of the proposed dimension of feminism has been provided by the reported scale and item properties and the scale intercorrelations. Both scales possess a high degree of homogeneity and acceptable convergent and discriminant validity. However, as indicated earlier, the Liberal scale, while in addition to measuring attitudes toward liberal feminism, may also be tapping conservative and perhaps antifeminist attitudes. Thus, the liberal scale requires further refinement in terms of the selection of additional items and the elimination of items which measure more than one aspect of feminist attitudes in general. Within the rather broad framework of feminism, the present study indicates the importance of maintaining a distinction between different dimensions of feminism. Future research would do well to further refine these scales and establish additional indices of reliability and validity. In addition, the relationship between the final scales and other measures of feminism should be examined. As stated previously, a known groups analysis employing groups of liberal feminists, radical feminists and nonfeminists and examining the relationship between group membership and feminist behavior would be useful. Perhaps the most interesting research would be to examine further the relationship between liberal and radical feminism and

activism. As a first step, the established relationship between the Radical Feminism scale and actual behavior, as measured by the Feminist Behavior Checklist, should be replicated. Future research plans could also include an examination of liberal and radical feminism and measures of political conservatism and radicalism.

Future research focusing on the development of additional indices of reliability and validity is important, yet represents only a first step toward predicting, explaining, and understanding feminism in general, and political feminist behavior in particular. The area of test construction relies heavily on a trait or individual differences model. However, once instruments have been developed and a sufficient degree of reliability and validity has been achieved, the continued reliance on a trait approach may seriously limit future research. As noted in Chapter I, feminism is a complex construct which is deeply rooted in social conditions. Thus, further research must extend beyond the trait approach to an interactional model which would permit the exploration of research questions regarding reciprocal causation. A dynamic interactional model would be appropriate for future research on radical feminism permitting research questions regarding the identification of factors, and their reciprocal effects, which contribute to feminist activism.

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APPENDIX A

Demographic and Personality Characteristics of Feminists

Demographic Variables

Researchers have assessed a variety of demographic variables in an attempt to ascertain the ways in which feminists might differ from nonfeminists or antifeminists. The more frequently examined variables are summarized in Table 11. These include: Age, Income, Education, Marital Status, Religion, Occupation, and Parental Attitude.

Obviously this list is not an exhaustive one. For example, some studies have examined such variables as: the most critical parent, the most frustrated parent (Lipman-Blumen, 1972), the subject's perception of the creativity of child rearing and its value to society (Lott, 1973), the subject's own creativity, risk taking and originality (Joesting, 1971), preferences for mass media usage (Lull, Mulac, & Rosen, 1983), the size of the subject's city or town, the subject's favorite childhood play activity, historical figures most admired, the first experience of an injustice or the subject's chores at home as a child (Cherniss, 1972). In most cases, however, these variables were examined in only one study. For this reason, the list in Table 11 and the present discussion focus on variables "typically" found in survey research which have appeared in more than one study of feminism.

Table 11

Summary of Demographic Characteristics by Approach

Classification of Groups / Study	AGE	INC	ED	OCC	REL	PAT	ATP	POL	MS
Known groups									
Arnott (1973)	-		+	+	-				
Baker (1972)	+	+	+	+	0				-*
Dempewolff (1974)			0		-				
Known feminist/Unknown comparison group									
Cherniss (1972)							-		
Fowler, Fowler, & Van De Riet (1973)								+	
Pawlicki & Almquist (1973)	+	0	+					+	
Riger (1977)	0	0		0					0
Sanger & Alker (1972)	0	0	0	0	0				0
Measurement based approach									
Etaugh & Gerson (1974)			+						
Fox & Auerbach (1983)		+	+	+					
Gerson (1984)					-		-		
Ghaffaradli-Doty & Carlson (1979)						+			

Table 11 (continued)

Classification of Groups Study	AGE	INC	ED	OCC	REL	PAT	ATP	POL	MS
Measurement based approach (continued)									
Goldschmidt, Gergen, Quigley & Gergen (1981)		0	+		-	+		+	0
Korman (1983)			0		-	+			
Lipman-Blumen (1972)			+	0	-		-		
Lott (1973)							-		
Stoloff (1973)		+	0	0	-	+		+	
Venkatesh (1980)	-	0	+		-				0

Note. INC = income, ED = education, OCC = occupation, REL = religion, PAT = parental attitudes toward feminism, ATP = attitudes toward parents, POL = political attitudes and political activity. Symbols in the table refer to the feminist group, in comparison to the nonfeminist or antifeminist group, with the exception of the variable ATP which refers only to the feminist group. + = refers to positive, more than, greater than or higher than depending upon the context provided by the demographic variable. - = refers to negative, less than or lower than, depending upon the context provided by the demographic variable. 0 = refers to no significant differences between feminist and comparison groups.

*Significantly fewer feminists were married.

Age. Research investigating age differences between feminist and comparison groups is inconclusive. Feminist subjects were significantly older than comparison subjects in the Pawlicki and Almquist (1973) and Baker (1972) studies, and significantly younger than comparison subjects in other studies (Arnott, 1973; Venkatesh, 1980). In other studies, when feminist and comparison subjects were selected from a student population, no significant age differences emerged (Sanger & Alker, 1972; Riger, 1977).

Venkatesh (1980) employed the largest sample (n=333) with an age range of 18 to 45. Using a measurement-based approach, Venkatesh (1980) classified subjects into three groups based on their scores on a measure of feminism: feminist group, moderately feminist group, and comparison group. The author reported that 74% of the feminist group (n=113) and 64% of the moderately feminist group (n=109) were in the 18 to 30 age range, while 54% of the comparison group (n=111) were in the 31 to 45 age range. Pawlicki and Almquist (1973), who compared a known feminist nonstudent group with a group of student nonfeminists or antifeminists, did not report the age range of their sample. The differences between these two studies, however, may be sample dependent. In this case, sample dependent refers to the fact that students are younger than nonstudents,

regardless of how they may be assigned. In both studies, university students were compared with nonstudents and, in both studies, the students (Venkatesh's feminist group and Pawlicki and Almquist's comparison group), not surprisingly, turned out to be younger than the nonstudents. Similarly, Arnott (1973) compared a known feminist group with a known antifeminist group and found the feminist group members, who were mostly students, to be significantly younger than the nonstudent antifeminist group. Interestingly, Arnott (1973) and Pawlicki and Almquist (1973) both obtained their feminist samples from the National Organization of Women (NOW). This fact alone suggests that the feminist members of NOW vary considerably in age. Consistent with this view are the findings of Baker (1972), who also selected her feminist group from NOW. The age range for Baker's feminist group was from under 20 to 54 years, whereas the age range of her antifeminist group was between 20 and 34 years. Moreover, an examination of Baker's summary table reveals that 31% of the feminist group were over the age of 35, while all subjects in the antifeminist group were under the age of 35.

A consideration of only the feminist samples in the Pawlicki and Almquist (1973), Arnott (1973), Baker (1972), and Venkatesh (1980) studies suggests that feminists may be of college age or significantly older than college students.

Thus, it would be interesting to determine the extent to which positive attitudes toward feminism exist in non-university working women under the age of twenty or in a high school population.

The relationship between age and feminism needs to be addressed in a more systematic way. A research design which allows for a comparison of a feminist group with "other" groups tends to ignore a variety of relevant research questions. For example, does commitment to a feminist ideology differ as a function of age? Perhaps younger feminists are less committed, while older feminists are more committed because they have had the opportunity to be involved in and to win, in the last decade, a number of political battles. This possibility suggests another question related to attitude commitment. Are feminists who are older, more active in the women's movement than younger feminists? In other words, who are the activists? Are they older professional women who have already carved out a career, or are they younger women who are currently fighting politically to ensure for themselves and for all women a broader choice of career opportunities. Thus, future research needs to focus less on the comparison of feminist groups with "other" groups and more on how feminist groups differ with regard to the variable of age and specifically

age in terms of feminist ideology and behavioral commitment to the women's movement.

Social status: Income, education, and occupation. Similar inconsistencies exist for the variables of Income, Education, and Occupation. Taken together, these variables represent a general measure of social status. For example, income differentiates feminists from antifeminists in the Baker (1972) study, but does not differentiate feminists from comparison groups in other studies (Goldschmidt et al., 1981; Pawlicki & Almquist, 1973; Riger, 1977; Sanger & Alker, 1972; Venkatesh, 1980). Baker (1972) reported that 20% of her feminist group were in the "over $25,000" income level compared to only 2% of the antifeminist group.

Since the Fox and Auerbach (1983) and Stoloff (1973) samples were comprised of students, these authors examined the income level of families rather than the income level of group members. Stoloff (1973) reported that the parents of the feminist group were in a significantly higher income bracket than the comparison group parents. Fox and Auerbach (1983) found the family income of their feminist group to be higher than the family income of the comparison group. The Fox and Auerbach (1983) study differs from other studies in that the authors selected subjects from two universities that represented opposite ends of the social class spectrum.

The authors were interested in testing the hypothesis that feminism was a function of social class and thus they expected students from the upper class ivy league women's college to express more positive attitudes toward feminism than students from their own co-ed state university. Social class was defined by subjects' responses to questions concerning educational level, occupational level (professional, managerial, blue-collar) and income level of their parents. The authors reported that their hypothesis was supported, that is, more subjects from the upper class college responded favourably to feminism relative to the responses of subjects from the large co-ed university. However, the authors also reported that there were almost equal numbers of positive and negative responses at the upper class women's college. In an analysis of the negative responses from both universities, the authors found evidence to suggest that subjects who responded negatively toward feminism were simply not aware of feminist issues. That is, what the authors initially believed to be antifeminist attitudes on the part of their sample turned out to be a lack of information on a variety of feminist issues. For example, many of the subjects who responded negatively could not translate the acronym NOW. The authors concluded that, for their sample, "It appears that one's position on an

issue is directly related to how much information one has, and that rejection (of feminism) is strongly correlated with ignorance" (p. 360). Thus, the samples in Fox and Auerbach's (1983) study could appropriately be considered feminist and nonfeminist rather than feminist and antifeminist. In addition, the authors neglected to consider the confounding effects of single-sex versus co-educational institutions on attitudes toward feminism.

Somewhat more consistent were the findings for the variable of education. With the exception of Sanger and Alker (1972) researchers have found feminists to be more educated (Arnott, 1973; Baker, 1972; Lipman-Blumen, 1972; Pawlicki & Almquist, 1973; Venkatesh, 1980) and to have higher career expectations (Goldschmidt et al., 1981) than comparison groups. Other than Fox and Auerbach (1983), most researchers have found that the educational level of parents does not differentiate feminist groups from comparison groups (Dempewolff, 1974; Goldschmidt et al., 1981; Korman, 1983; Lipman-Blumen, 1972; Stoloff, 1973). However, Dempewolff (1974) reported that male supporters of feminism were more likely to have mothers who had completed college, while males who opposed feminism were more likely to have mothers who completed only high school.

Finally, while parental education did not differentiate feminist and comparison groups in the Goldschmidt et al. (1981) study, it will be noted that one of the weaknesses discussed in the introduction was the failure to differentiate between active and nonactive feminists. This distinction might be an important one, and in fact Goldschmidt et al. (1981) found that parental education did emerge as a good predictor of active versus nonactive feminists. Parents of active feminists were more likely to have had graduate training than parents of nonactive feminists. In other words, parental education appears to be one of a constellation of variables that differentiates feminists (who are not actively involved in the feminist movement) from active feminists. Other variables reported by Goldschmidt et al. (1981) that emerged as good predictors of activism but not of feminism per se were academic marks and choice of college major. According to the authors, active feminists had the highest grade-point averages and preferred the Social Sciences while nonactive feminists preferred Education. With regard to grades, nonactive feminists did not differ from nonfeminists.

Thus far, in the studies reviewed, researchers have compared feminist and antifeminist (or nonfeminist) groups on the highest level of educational attainment. Also, in

cases where feminist and comparison groups were drawn from a university population, researchers have, appropriately, compared the educational level of the parents of their feminist and comparison subjects. However, there is research to suggest that positive attitudes toward feminism may also be related to the number of years in university (Etaugh & Gerson, 1974). Etaugh and Gerson (1974) selected 370 students who were enrolled in first year courses through senior graduate level courses. Although the Etaugh and Gerson (1974) study was primarily concerned with sex differences and thus differed in purpose from the other studies reviewed here, the authors reported that positive attitudes toward feminism were associated with increased years at university. As the authors suggested, such a finding may be due to increased exposure to a liberal university atmosphere or may reflect a differential drop-out rate. Obviously, more research is needed. One possible study could address the question of whether positive attitudes toward the women's movement develop as a result of increased exposure to a liberal university atmosphere or whether these attitudes exist in some individuals prior to their university experience.

The Etaugh and Gerson (1974) study raises an interesting point that needs to be considered. In the

studies reviewed in which the samples were university students, the number of years in university may represent a potential source of variation in attitudes toward feminism. For example, in the Fox and Auerbach (1983) study, it was unclear if positive attitudes toward feminism were a function of higher social class or of the number of years in university. That is, in addition to the confounding effects of single sex versus co-ed institutions, perhaps the students at the upper class university were mostly seniors while most of the state university students were juniors.

With regard to the variable of occupation, Baker (1972) and Arnott (1973) found significant differences in occupational level between feminist and antifeminist groups. Baker (1972) reported that 91% of her antifeminist sample were housewives compared to 11% for the feminist sample. In addition, 61% of Baker's feminist group were in supervisory or professional occupations compared to only 6% of the antifeminist group. In the Arnott (1973) study, occupational level was defined by the percentage of women in each group who were married to professional men. The author reported that significantly more feminists (88%) than antifeminists (12%) were married to professionals.

Other researchers have examined the occupational level of the parents of feminist and comparison subjects. Fox and Auerbach (1983) reported that the parents of their feminist

and comparison subjects differed significantly in occupational level. For the feminist group, parents' occupations were chiefly professional-managerial, whereas comparison group parents' occupations were largely clerical-blue collar. On the other hand, Stoloff (1973) reported no differences in occupational level for parents of her feminist and comparison subjects, although parents of the feminist group were more likely to be employed in occupations that were "intellectual or professional in nature" (p. 330).

In terms of social class, it would seem that the variables of education and occupation consistently differentiate feminist groups from comparison groups. Feminist groups in the studies reviewed tend to be more educated and tend to have higher career expectations than nonfeminists or antifeminists. In addition, within university populations, there is reason to believe that positive attitudes toward feminism are associated with an increased number of years in university. There is also support for the notion that parental education may be an important determinant of feminist activism rather than of general feminism. Consistent with these views, feminists in the studies reviewed are also in a higher occupational level (professional) than comparison groups. Given these

findings, how does one account for the lack of discriminatory power for the variable of income? The answer to this question may have more to do with the social economic structure than with positive attitudes toward feminism. A specific example could be that both feminist and comparison groups in the studies reviewed live in a society where a garbage collector can make as much income, if not more, than a number of highly educated professionals. Thus, the variable of income as a determinant of social class may no longer be a relevant variable in psychological research.

Religion. With regard to the variable of religion, there is considerable variation in the religion reported by feminist and comparison groups in the studies reviewed. Based on their scores on a measure of feminism, Venkatesh (1980) classified subjects into three groups: feminist, moderately feminist and nonfeminist. The author reported that more Jewish women were classified as feminist (16%) than as moderate (4%) or nonfeminist (2%). However, the author found significantly more Catholics in the comparison group (50%) than in the moderate (36%) or feminist (26%) groups, while an approximately equal number of Protestants appeared in all three groups (30-40%). Using a similar approach to classify groups, Korman (1983) also found

feminist ideology to vary with religious preference. Of the strongly feminist subjects who reported a religious preference, more were Catholic (39%) than either Protestant (25%) or Jewish (33%). However, when the author combined the strongly and moderately feminist groups, those who espoused Judaism (76%) had the highest representation. Catholics (66%) had the next highest representation and Protestants the least (60%). It is important to note, however, that 66% of the subjects in Korman's sample reported no religious preference. Of these, the author reported that 54% were feminists and only 12% were either nonfeminists or antifeminists.

Korman (1983) also compared her feminist and comparison groups on religious participation. The author found that 26% of the comparison group and 10% of the feminist group reported that they "always" or "almost always" attended a church or synagogue. In addition 55% of the comparison group and 83% of the feminist group reported "seldom" or "never" attending.

In a similar study, Lipman-Blumen (1972) classified 1,012 respondents into feminist (73%) and comparison (27%) groups. The author reported that the feminist group tended toward atheism, Judaism, Eastern religions or no formal religion, while the comparison group tended to be Protestant

or Catholic. In an examination of religious conversion, the author reported that feminist converts moved away from Christianity more than converts in the comparison group. In addition, feminists were more likely to convert from their childhood religion than comparison subjects.

In other studies using a measurement-based approach, research indicated that the feminist samples were largely Jewish or Protestant (Stoloff, 1973) or unaffiliated (Goldschmidt et al., 1981). Stoloff (1973) reported that the feminists in her sample were "of Jewish or nonformalistically Protestant background, and came from homes in which religion was not emphasized" (p. 330). Stoloff did not indicate the religious preference of her comparison group other than to report that the families of origin of the feminist group subjects were significantly less religious than the families of the comparison group.

In an examination of family background, Goldschmidt et al. (1981) also found that mothers' religion contributed significantly to feminist ideology, that is, in their sample, the authors found that parents who were Catholic or Jewish were the least likely to have liberated offspring. With regard to activism within the feminist group, the authors reported that the offspring of nonreligious parents were more likely to become active in the feminist movement.

In contrast to studies using a measurement-based approach, Dempewolff (1974), Arnott (1973) and Baker (1972) examined the religious preferences of known feminist and known antifeminist groups. Dempewolff (1974) reported that feminists in her sample were more often atheist, agnostic, Jewish or Unitarian (51%), while the antifeminist group tended to be Protestant or Catholic (85%). The author also reported that feminists had parents who were Jewish, atheist, or agnostic, while antifeminists reported that their parents were Protestant or Catholic. Arnott (1973) compared her feminist and antifeminist groups on expressed interest in religion in general. The author reported that the feminist group expressed significantly less interest in religion (20%) than the antifeminist group (52%). Although Baker (1972) found no significant differences between feminist and antifeminist groups on religious preferences, an examination of her data revealed a pattern consistent with studies reviewed. In the feminist group, 42% espoused an atheist or Unitarian preference compared to 17% in the antifeminist group. On the other hand, 69% of the antifeminist group indicated a preference for Catholicism compared with 16% for the feminist group.

Finally, in the context of a larger study which examined attitudes toward parenthood, Gerson (1984)

correlated Dempewolff's (1974) Feminism II scale with a measure of familial religious affiliation and present identification with an organized religion. Gerson reported that feminism was significantly related to the latter but not the former variable. Unfortunately, she did not indicate the type of religion that was most likely related to feminism, and a discrepancy existed in the direction of the relationship between her text and her table of correlations. However, based on the research reviewed, it would not be surprising to find that feminism was negatively correlated with present identification with an organized religion.

There appears to be a discernible pattern in the religious preferences expressed by feminist and comparison groups, with feminists tending to be less conventionally religious. A clearer pattern might emerge if finer distinctions were made and more information requested so as to build upon existing research. Few attempts have been made to make these finer distinctions, that is, to distinguish between childhood versus present religion, or to assess the extent to which subjects actually participate in the religious community of their choice.

Parental attitudes: Group differences and parental attitudes toward feminism. Regarding mothers' attitudes

toward feminism, as perceived by their feminist daughters, some researchers have found evidence for a modeling effect (Ghaffaradli-Doty & Carlson, 1979; Goldschmidt et al., 1981; Korman, 1983; Stoloff, 1973). In each of these studies more feminists reported their mothers to be liberated than nonfeminists. However, the assumption that a liberated attitude is passed from mother to daughter requires investigation. Conceivably, the reverse could also be the case.

In most instances, feminists reported feeling close to both parents though there were exceptions. Gerson (1984) and Cherniss (1972) both reported that feminists were neutral with regard to fathers, but very critical of mothers. An unhappy early family life and insufficient parental warmth were characteristic of the perceptions of mothers by feminists in the Gerson (1984) study. The perceptions of mothers by feminists in the Cherniss (1972) study were similar but more colorful; their mothers were described as dominant, controlling, overprotective, intrusive. On the other hand, Lott (1973) reported that feminist and "antiliberation" groups did not differ on adjective ratings of their mothers, which were positive. They did, however, differ on ratings of their fathers, with the feminist group rating their fathers more negatively.

Lipman-Blumen (1972) reports yet another finding. Mothers in her sample who were the most dissatisfied with life were more likely to raise feminist daughters. In addition, members of the feminist group were more likely to report that they did not admire either parent. Thus, in general, the mothers of the feminists in Lipman-Blumen's (1972) sample were unhappy with their own lives and their feminist daughters did not admire them or their fathers.

In a related study, Johnson, Stockard, Rothhart, and Friedman (1981) examined differences in parental perceptions between lesbian feminists and heterosexual feminists. They reported that both groups perceived their mothers to be supportive, respectful, and affectionate, but groups differed significantly with regard to their perception of their fathers. The lesbian feminist group reported a lack of support and solidarity with their fathers while the heterosexual feminists reported more affectionate fathers who encouraged them in the expression of anger. Thus, with regard to perceived parental attitudes, women's perceptions of their fathers, in particular, may represent yet another variable, along with parental education and religion, upon which some feminists might differ from other feminists. These findings suggest that feminists may not be as homogeneous a group as some researchers would have us believe.

Political attitudes: Group differences and familial political beliefs. Other variables upon which feminist and comparison groups have been found to differ include political attitudes and political behavior (Fowler, Fowler, & Van De Riet, 1973; Goldschmidt et al., 1981; Pawlicki & Almquist, 1973; Stoloff, 1973).

Fowler et al. (1973) compared a feminist group with a group of their university peers on a measure of conservatism-radicalism. The authors reported that the comparison group scored significantly higher than the feminist group on political conservatism. In other words, the feminist group tended toward political radicalism while the comparison group was characterized as politically conservative. The authors also correlated Kirkpatrick's (1936) feminism scale with the measure of conservatism-radicalism and found a high feminism score to be significantly related to a low political conservatism score. In an examination of political party preferences, the authors found more Democrats among the feminist group, while comparison group subjects tended to be Republican. These results are consistent with those of Pawlicki and Almquist (1973), who found the feminist group to be significantly more liberal in its political attitudes than the comparison group.

In another study, Stoloff (1973) examined feminist and comparison groups for differences in political activity. She (1973) reported that the feminist group regarded political action as more important than the nonfeminist group. The feminist group in Stoloff's sample was also more active politically and more knowledgeable about current political issues than comparison subjects. In her examination of familial political attitudes, Stoloff (1973) found group differences in parents' political beliefs and the degree of expression of those beliefs. Parents of the feminist group were more active politically, mostly liberal, and expressed political beliefs more openly than the more conservative parents of comparison group subjects. Stoloff's findings are consistent with those reported by Goldschmidt et al. (1981), who found the parents of feminists to be significantly more liberal in their political attitudes than the parents of comparison subjects.

Marital status. The last demographic variable to be considered is marital status. With the exception of Baker (1972), feminist and nonfeminist groups or their parents do not appear to differ in marital status (Goldschmidt et al., 1981; Riger, 1977; Sanger & Alker, 1972; Venkatesh, 1980). Baker (1972) compared a known feminist group with a known antifeminist group on marital status as well as on duration

of marriage. With regard to marital status, 97% of Baker's antifeminist group reported being married compared to only 38% of the feminist group. In addition, 22% of the feminist group were single and 31% were separated or divorced. By contrast, the author reported that no subjects in the antifeminist group were single, separated or divorced. In terms of duration of marriage, 87.7% of the antifeminist group had been married for four or more years compared with 57.8% for the feminist group. Conversely, 14.3% of the antifeminist group had been married less than three years compared to only 4.4% for the feminist group.

Summary

A number of possible explanations may account for some of the inconsistencies in the demographic literature. It was mentioned earlier that the responses of active and nonactive feminists might be characterized by two distinct attitude dimensions. Of the 19 studies presented in Table 11 on page 120, eight employed active feminists as research participants (Arnott, 1973; Baker, 1972; Cherniss, 1972; Dempewolff, 1974; Fowler et al., 1973; Pawlicki & Almquist, 1973; Riger, 1977; Sanger & Alker, 1972). The remaining ten studies used high scores on various attitude measures to define their feminist groups. Consequently there is no way

to determine how active the feminists were in this latter cluster of studies. Although the inconsistencies in Table 11 on page 120 cannot be explained solely by reference to the use of these two different sampling techniques, an examination of each cluster of studies separately reveals some interesting possibilities.

One possible explanation for the variations in findings may have to do with a problem mentioned earlier, that is, the failure of researchers to make a distinction between nonfeminists and antifeminists. Indeed, of the eight studies which used active feminists, only three employed antifeminist subjects as the comparison group (Arnott, 1973; Baker, 1972; Dempewolff, 1974). In the remaining five studies (Cherniss, 1972; Fowler et al., 1973; Pawlicki & Almquist, 1973; Riger, 1977; Sanger & Alker, 1972), it is impossible to determine whether the feminist group was being compared with nonfeminists, antifeminists, or a mixture of both.

In the remaining ten studies, sampling problems were difficult to disentangle from measurement issues. First, in the measurement-based approach, as in the unknown comparison group approach, it is difficult to determine whether feminists are being compared with nonfeminists, antifeminists or both. Second, it is impossible to

determine whether the feminist group consisted of active feminists or nonactive feminists. Third, in six of the ten studies, researchers developed their own measures of feminism for the purpose of the research study. Consequently, the reliability and validity of the instrument, upon which their hypothesis test rests, was unknown prior to hypothesis testing. In other words, if a measure of religious preferences does not correlate with a measure of feminism, does the author conclude that religious preferences are not related to feminism or that the measure of feminism is not a valid test? Finally, the comparability of measures of feminism across these studies is unknown.

While feminists and nonfeminists or antifeminists appear to differ on a number of demographic variables, such as education, religion, and parental attitudes, it is necessary to recognize that feminists also differ. The ways in which feminists differ from other feminists may be more critical than differences between feminist and "other" groups in providing a reliable portrait of the feminist or in providing an understanding of feminism in general. Feminists appear to differ with regard to the variables of parental education and religion in terms of activism, and in their perceptions of their fathers in terms of sexual preference. Therefore, the assumption of homogeneity of feminist groups may have outlived its usefulness.

The Feminist Personality

The personality research on feminism spans a period of 15 years, and much of this research seems to have been motivated by curiosity rather than by a formal theory. In an examination of how personality research has neglected "feminine psychology," Carlson (1972) argued that existing theories of personality do not account for "feminine deviations from universal principles" (p.29). What Carlson seems to be referring to, at the measurement level, are the responses of female feminists on various personality measures that deviate from the established norms for those measures. These established norms reflect sex differences such that the scores of men relative to women are usually higher on measures of independence, dominance, aggression, or achievement. Consequently, deviations from the norm for females (or males) may be interpreted as undesirable personality attributes, e.g., the aggressive domineering woman or the submissive, spineless man. Thus some researchers were interested in testing the popular stereotype of feminists as a militant group of masculine women who hate men, are antimotherhood, pro-abortion, and most likely gay (e.g., Decter, 1972; Lawrenson, 1971; Mailer, 1971). Sobran (1986) for example, argues that feminism has "attacked everything the human race had always

held normal, instead of finding roots in the shared sense of normality" (p.9A).

By examining both the personality correlates of feminism and the personality differences between feminist and "other" groups, researchers were in a position to either support or refute the popularized images of the feminist. In a general sense, researchers reap what they sow, that is, research exists which both supports and refutes these images.

As with the selection of demographic variables, the personality variables examined here are those that are "typically" found in several studies of feminism. These variables are summarized in Table 12 by study and method of group classification.

Table 12

Personality Characteristics by Approach and Study

Classification of Groups / Study	AUT	ACH	SIE	LOC	ATH	AGG
Known groups						
Arnott (1973)	+					
Baker (1972)	-*				0	0
Dempewolff (1974)	+					
Feminist group/Unknown comparison group						
Cherniss (1972)	+	+	+			
Fowler & Van De Riet (1972)	+	0	+			
O'Neil et al. (1975)	+					
Pawlicki & Almquist (1973)				0	-	
Riger (1977)				+		
Sanger & Alker (1972)				+		
Measurement based approach						
Centers (1963)					-	
Follingstad et al. (1977)			+			
Ghaffaradli-Doty & Carlson (1979)				0		

Table 12 (continued)

Classification of Groups / Study	AUT	ACH	S--E	LOC	ATH	AGG
Measurement based approach						
Goldschmidt et al. (1981)						+
Harrison et al. (1981)			+	0		
Hjelle & Butterfield (1974)			+			
Joesting (1976)	+					0
Lipman-Blumen (1972)		+				
Redfering (1979)		0			-	
Ryckman et al. (1972)				+		
Sarup (1976)					-	

Note. AUT = autonomy, ACH = achievement, S--E = self-esteem, LOC = locus of control, ATH = authoritarianism, AGG = aggression. Symbols in the body of the table are in reference to the feminist group in comparison to the non-feminist or antifeminist group. + = refers to feminists having more of an attribute. - = refers to feminists having less of an attribute. 0 = refers to no differences between feminist and comparison groups.

*Autonomy was indirectly measured in this study.

Autonomy. The variable of Independence or Autonomy represents the most widely studied feminist personality attribute. In most studies reviewed, feminist groups emerged as more independent and autonomous than nonfeminist or antifeminist groups (Arnott, 1973; Cherniss, 1972; Dempewolff, 1974; Fowler & Van De Riet, 1972; Joesting, 1976; O'Neil, Teague, Lushene & Davenport, 1975). What lends a degree of credence to these findings is that they emerge consistently across a variety of selection procedures and methods. For example, both Arnott (1973) and Dempewolff (1974) selected known feminist and known antifeminist groups for comparison, while Joesting (1976) used scores on a measure of feminism to classify her groups. Fowler and Van De Riet (1972) and O'Neil et al. (1975) compared known feminist groups with groups of students who reported no involvement in the women's movement. Similarly, Cherniss (1972) compared known feminists with a group of uninvolved students, deriving findings from unstructured and nondirective interviews. Measures of autonomy also varied across studies and included the psychopathic deviate scale from the MMPI (O'Neil et al., 1975) and the autonomy scales from the California Psychological Inventory (Joesting, 1976) and The Adjective Checklist (Fowler & Van De Riet, 1972). Dempewolff (1974) selected somewhat more elaborate measures

of autonomy: The Social Distance Scale (Triandis & Triandis, 1960), which measures the extent to which an individual views "others" as autonomous or as members of out-groups; The Independence of Judgement Scale (Barron, 1963), which measures autonomy within one's peer group; The Modernism II Scale (Kahl, 1968), which measures a general sense of control or efficacy in terms of acceptance versus perceived threat of changes in one's immediate social environment.

The exception to the finding that feminists are more autonomous than antifeminists is provided by Baker (1972). However, the Baker (1972) study differs from other studies reviewed in several respects. First, Baker (1972) hypothesized that members of her feminist group might be more frustrated by a perceived lack of autonomy in their lives than antifeminists. Second, rather than using a direct measure of autonomy, Baker (1972) administered Siegel's Manifest Hostility Scale (1956), and Rotter's Locus of Control scale. Her rationale for the use of the latter scale was that "Erikson's concept of autonomy has been operationally defined most successfully by Rotter's Internality-Externality scale" (p.66). The feminist group scored significantly higher than the antifeminist group on hostility and externality, and Baker concluded that "the need for a sense of Autonomy, as operationally defined by

the variables of Hostility and Externality, is a genuine motivating force in the personality dynamics of women who are active in the Women's Liberation movement" (p. 94). Baker's study may be challenged on a number of grounds. First, although locus of control may be an aspect of autonomous functioning, there is little support in the personality literature to indicate that hostility represents an operational definition of autonomy. Second, despite the study's weaknesses, Baker (1972), may have been attempting to measure one possible consequence of a lack of autonomy, namely hostility. If this is the case, and it seems likely, the author should have first established that a need for autonomy existed on the part of the feminist group.

To summarize, whether studies used known groups, unknown comparison groups, or a measurement-based approach, the research suggests that feminists who support, or feminists who are active in, the women's movement are more independent and autonomous than their noninvolved counterparts. It should be noted, however, that in studies using the measurement based approach, high scoring subjects were not asked whether or not they were active in the feminist movement. Therefore, caution should be exercised when making generalizations from measurement-based studies.

Achievement. Researchers were also interested in testing the hypothesis that feminists are higher in need for achievement or achievement strivings than their more traditional counterparts. Although Fowler and Van De Riet (1972) and later Redfering (1979) did not find significant differences between feminist and comparison groups on need for achievement, Cherniss (1972) found his feminist group to be considerably higher in achievement needs than the comparison group. On the other hand, Lipman-Blumen (1972) found that feminists differed from nonfeminists not so much in need for achievement as in their view of how they could fulfill this need. The author reported that feminists felt they had to satisfy their achievement needs primarily through their own efforts while the comparison subjects felt they could fulfill their need for achievement through the accomplishments of their husbands. Interestingly, members of the feminist group aspired to graduate study while the comparison group did not plan to seek a degree beyond the bachelor's level.

Lipman-Blumen (1972) concluded that the relation between "female role ideology" and educational aspiration is "contingent on the way a woman has been socialized to meet her achievement needs outside the home" (p. 37). According to Lipmen-Bluman, little girls are socialized in childhood

to satisfy their achievement needs passively through identification with the accomplishments of their fathers or brothers. When they marry, they transfer this vicarious mode of achievement to their husbands. Given that women may not be born "feminists," the Lipman-Blumen study raises an interesting question. Specifically, the amount of influence participation in the feminist movement may have on a socialization process that is presumably well developed at adulthood. Of course explanations other than the influence of women's groups are available. For example, the steadily increasing divorce rate has resulted in a generation of little girls raised by "working mothers" who have had to leave the home and achieve financial independence or lose their children. Thus, the influence of women's groups may not alter the socialization process; rather, certain socialization processes may not take place.

Self-esteem. Researchers have also been interested in examining differences between feminist and nonfeminist or antifeminist groups on measures of self-esteem (Cherniss, 1972; Follingstad et al., 1977; Fowler & Van De Riet, 1972; Harrison, Guy, & Lupfer, 1981; Hjelle & Butterfield, 1974). Cherniss (1972) found that feminist subjects had a higher sense of self-esteem and self-acceptance than comparison subjects. The author reported that the passive and

nonassertive style characteristic of comparison subjects was related to a low self-image and a poor sense of self. He further asserted that the higher self-esteem scores among feminists may have been due, in part, to their participation in women's groups. In an examination of this issue, Follingstad et al. (1977) examined the temporal generalization of self-esteem scores for three time periods (pretest, posttest, and follow-up) for two different consciousness raising group formats (8-week time-spaced and 16-hour marathon) using a "no treatment" control group. At posttest, the authors found that the control subjects experienced a loss of self-esteem whereas subjects in group formats experienced an increase in self-esteem. An examination of mean scores provided by the authors reveals that the increase in self-esteem scores was due to increases in scores for timespaced group participants. At follow-up, both the marathon and control group scores returned to their pretest range while the self-esteem scores for the time-spaced group continued to shift in a positive direction. Follingstad and her co-workers concluded that the time-spaced group format may foster an increase in self-esteem because subjects received more feedback and support from the group environment over time.

In another study, Harrison, Guy, and Lupfer (1981) examined self-esteem as a correlate of a measure of feminism. They reported that women high in self-esteem were more likely to hold positive attitudes toward feminism than women low in self-esteem. In a related study, Hjelle and Butterfield (1974) used a measurement-based approach to compare student feminist and comparison groups on a measure of self-actualization. The authors reported that the feminist group exhibited a significantly higher level of personal growth, were more accepting of their own self-concept, and were more convinced of their self-worth as persons than their peer counterparts. In addition, the authors found that, unlike comparison subjects, feminist subjects perceived themselves as relying more confidently upon their own internal norms without seeking constant support from others for self-validation.

Finally, Fowler and Van De Riet (1972) examined differences between feminist and comparison groups on feelings of self-competence. Although groups did not differ significantly, the feminist group reported higher feelings of competence than the control group.

Locus of control. Thus far, the research suggests that feminists may be more achievement oriented, independent, and possess a greater sense of self-worth than nonfeminists.

These findings support the notions echoed throughout the feminist literature which emphasize the strength and ability within all women to set and to achieve goals in spite of societal pressures against the attainment of those goals (e.g., Elshtain, 1982; Firestone, 1970; Friedan, 1963; Morgan, 1970; Starhawk, 1982; Tanner, 1970; Thompson, 1970). Consistent with the view that feminists are more likely to satisfy their need for achievement through their own efforts than through the accomplishments of significant others, some researchers have hypothesized that feminists may be more internal relative to nonfeminists on a measure of locus of control.

Using a measurement-based approach, Ghaffaradli-Doty and Carlson (1979) used a measure of feminism to divide subjects into high, medium, and low scoring feminists. The authors developed a measure of "liberated behavior" and hypothesized that high scoring feminists would not only be more internally controlled, as assessed by Rotter's (1966) locus of control scale, but would also act more liberated than low scoring feminists. Their hypotheses were not supported. Women who scored in the mid range on a measure of feminism were more internally controlled than high scoring feminists. In addition, high scoring feminists who scored in the internal direction on locus of control did not

act more liberated. The authors argued that the discrepancy between attitude and behavior is not surprising since it may be difficult to act liberated in our society. There are, however, other possible explanations. The most obvious one is that very little variance in behavioral measures can be accounted for by attitude measures (e.g., Wicker, 1969). Other explanations have more to do with the sample and the specificity of the items in the behavioral measure. As previously noted, the authors used a measure of feminism to classify their groups. Thus, high scoring feminists may personally support the women's movement, but they may not be active participants in that movement. Such a possibility is supported in part by Ryckman, Martens, Rodda and Sherman (1972). This study differs from other research reviewed in that the authors examined the relationship between locus of control and the willingness of student subjects to participate in social action designed to end discrimination against women. Three weeks after the authors administered Rotter's locus of control scale to a class, a confederate entered the class and asked students to fill out a form which measured the degree of interest in immediately joining various activities related to women's liberation. The authors reported that neither males nor females perceived commitment to women's liberation activities as desirable

behaviors. However, internal female subjects expressed greater commitment to women's liberation activities than external female subjects, while no relationship was found for male subjects. In another study, Harrison et al. (1981) administered Rotter's locus of control scale and a measure of feminism to a sample of women who worked in a variety of organizations that represented both poles of the traditional-nontraditional continuum. The authors reported no relationship between locus of control and attitudes toward feminism. The authors also examined the relationship between locus of control and self-esteem, as measured by Eagly's (1967) Feelings of Inadequacy Scale, and traditional-nontraditional sources of satisfaction as evidenced by career- versus family-oriented rankings. The authors hypothesized that women who were internal and high in self-esteem would rank careers as their primary source of satisfaction rather than family roles. Conversely, women tending toward externality and low self-esteem would rank family-oriented roles as their primary source of satisfaction. Contrary to the authors' expectations, women who were external and low in self-esteem were more nontraditional in role orientation than high self-esteem internals.

It may be the case that several factors, including the homogeneity of feminist groups, the conceptualization of locus of control and the role of relevant demographic variables may account in part for variations from study to study. While both active and nonactive supporters of the Women's movement may have a legitimate claim to the name "feminist," their responses on measures related to women's issues may represent distinct attitude dimensions. In addition, active and nonactive feminists may respond differentially on a measure of locus of control, as well as on other personality measures.

Sanger and Alker (1972) and Riger (1977) examined the difference between known feminist groups and comparison groups on locus of control measures. Both investigations used a multidimensional concept of locus of control: personal control and control ideology. Both researchers, however, developed their own measures. Sanger and Alker (1972), for example, combined Rotter's locus of control scale with 17 items written by the authors to reflect a feminist ideology. A factor analysis of the combined items resulted in three factors which the authors labeled personal control, control ideology, and feminist ideology. Riger (1977) used a similar procedure to develop his measures which he labeled personal control, feminist ideology and

system blame. This latter measure is similar to Sanger and Alker's control ideology factor. According to Sanger and Alker (1972), personal control refers to beliefs regarding control in one's own life whereas control ideology refers to beliefs about causation in society, often referred to as system blame.

Sanger and Alker (1972) reported that groups did not differ on personal control, but differed significantly on the control ideology factor. In other words, both groups were relatively internal personally, but feminists were more external than comparison subjects in their beliefs about causation in society. Thus, feminists believe they have control in their own lives, yet do not believe that their own efforts are responsible for their failure to obtain rewards in society. These results are consistent with the feminist contention that the failure to succeed is due largely to an oppressive social system rather than to a lack of ability. Riger (1977) questioned whether these beliefs existed prior to involvement in collective social action or are the result of action. Riger's sample therefore consisted of three groups of women: 1) 43 student feminist veterans of a women's consciousness raising group, 2) 38 new student recruits and 3) 41 noninvolved students. Since no significant differences emerged between veterans and new

recruits, Riger combined these two groups. He reported that the control group and the combined group of veterans and new recruits differed significantly on all three factors (i.e., control ideology, personal control, and feminist ideology). The author concluded that a feminist attitude exists prior to participation in a consciousness-raising group and is not altered by that participation. Riger's study supports the findings of Sanger and Alker (1972) and extends them to reveal that participation does not alter the locus of control profile.

Finally, Pawlicki and Almquist (1973) compared a known feminist noncollege group and a group of students who were not members of a women's group on Rotter's measure of locus of control. The authors also developed their own measure of feminism. The authors reported that feminist and comparison groups differed significantly on both measures. Feminists were more internally controlled than the comparison group and they scored higher on a measure of feminism. However, the authors seemed to be at a loss to explain why differences between groups on locus of control disappeared when the variable of age was used as a covariate. In addition, the hypothesis that the measure of feminism would correlate significantly with locus of control was not supported.

An examination of the locus of control literature may provide some possible explanations for the unsupported hypotheses. Research conducted both before (Schneider, 1971) and after (Phares, 1976) the Pawlicki and Almquist (1973) study, demonstrated that locus of control scores among a college population tended to be in the external direction. In addition, research suggests that locus of control scores for students have continued to shift in the external direction (Phares, 1978). In the Pawlicki and Almquist (1973) study, the significant difference obtained between the two groups on locus of control scores may have occurred because the authors were comparing a college sample with a noncollege sample. Thus, whether one is or is not a feminist is irrelevant. In addition, one of the repeatedly verified correlates of locus of control is the variable of age (Crandall, Katkovsky & Crandall, 1965; Phares, 1973; Penk, 1969). That is, as one gets older the more likely one is to score in an internal direction. Pawlicki and Almquist (1973) reported that their noncollege feminist group was significantly older than their college comparison group. Thus, both age and student status may account for the initial differences in scores on the locus of control scale. The Pawlicki and Almquist (1973) study illustrates the necessity of examining the relationship between relevant demographic variables and personality constructs.

Authoritarianism and dogmatism. Researchers have found feminist groups to be significantly less authoritarian than groups with which they are compared (Centers, 1963; Pawlicki & Almquist, 1973; Redfering, 1979; Sarup, 1976). These findings have emerged consistently across a variety of sampling procedures. For example, Pawlicki and Almquist (1973) compared a known feminist group with a group of university students. Using a measurement-based approach, Sarup (1976) classified students and individuals from church groups and business establishments into feminist and comparison groups. Redfering (1979) also used a measurement-based approach to classify individuals from such settings as factories, church groups, social clubs, adult educational classes, leisure clubs, and secretarial pools into feminist and comparison groups. Finally, Centers (1963) selected a cross section of the adult population of a major metropolitan city. However, the demographic variables of intelligence, education, and social status in general, are all well known correlates of authoritarianism such that higher intelligence, education, (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Dillehay, 1978), and social status (MacKinnon & Centers, 1956; McDill, 1961; Srole, 1956) are all associated with low scores on authoritarianism. It will be recalled from the review of

the demographic literature that feminists were more educated and tended to come from a higher social class than groups with which they were compared. Therefore, differences in scores between feminist and comparison groups on a measure of authoritarianism may be attributable to differences in attitudes toward the women's movement or to differences on relevant demographic variables. These possibilities were addressed, in part, by Centers (1963), Pawlicki and Almquist (1973), and Sarup (1976). Centers (1963) reported that the demographic variables of age, education, race, socioeconomic status, marital status and occupation did not contribute significantly to the relationship between authoritarianism and feminism. Further, that authoritarianism was itself the only significant correlate of variations in antifeminism scores. Pawlicki and Almquist (1973) reported that their feminist group was significantly more educated than their comparison group of students. However, the authors found that the initial difference between groups on authoritarianism was maintained when education was used as a covariate. These results are consistent with those obtained by Sarup (1976). In addition to education, Sarup also found the variables of age and religion to be related to both authoritarianism and feminism. The author reported that when these variables were controlled, the relationship

between feminism and authoritarianism was maintained. It is interesting to note that Sarup (1976), who also used male subjects, reported that the most antifeminist groups in the sample were highly authoritarian males followed by highly authoritarian females. According to Sarup (1976), males who scored low on authoritarianism were moderately feminist, yet they lagged behind low authoritarian women, who were strongly profeminist.

The relationship between authoritarianism and dogmatism has been documented elsewhere (Fruchter, Rokeach, & Novak, 1958; Pyron & Lambert, 1967; Roberts, 1962; Rokeach, 1960; Rokeach & Fruchter, 1956; Sheikh, 1968). Briefly, individuals who are high in authoritarianism are also high in dogmatism. While researchers rarely provide a rationale for their selection of personality variables, there is good reason to believe that feminists would be less dogmatic than nonfeminists and antifeminists. An examination of the literature on dogmatism reveals that open-mindedness correlates significantly with helping others and taking equalitarian actions for minorities (Fischer, 1973). Second, it will be recalled from the review of the demographic literature that feminists tended to be liberal whereas nonfeminists or antifeminists tended to be more conservative. The personality research reveals that

dogmatism is significantly related to conservatism, while open-mindedness is related to liberalism (DiRenzo, 1971; Jones, 1973). In addition, Kirtley and Harkless (1969) found dogmatism to be associated with the rejection of artists, scientist leftists, physical deviants and ethnic groups. Ehrlich (1973) argues that the rejection of others is very generalized, yet it corresponds with and is deeply rooted in the norms of society. According to feminist writings, feminism poses a challenge to existing social norms, particularly those which advocate a distorted masculist image of womanhood (Ruth, 1980).

Only two studies compared feminist and antifeminist or nonfeminist groups on a measure of dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960). Baker (1972) found no significant differences between feminist and antifeminist groups on dogmatism, although antifeminists scored higher than feminists on rigidity of thought. Redfering (1979), who used Spence and Helmreich's (1972) attitudes toward women scale to classify subjects into feminist and comparison groups, found the feminist group to be significantly more open-minded than the comparison group.

Aggression and dominance. A few researchers have tried to determine whether feminists are more aggressive and dominant than nonfeminists. Fowler and Van De Riet (1972), who employed Gough and Heilbrun's (1965) measures of

aggression and dominance, found the feminist group to be more aggressive and dominant than their student counterparts, but this difference was not statistically significant.

In another study, Goldschmidt et al. (1981) found that high aggression, as measured by Edward's (1954) Personal Preference Inventory, was associated with greater participation in the women's movement. However, feminists who scored the highest and the lowest on aggression also scored the highest on a measure of feminism. The authors concluded that aggression was not a necessary condition of a liberated attitude and that active feminists were more likely to be aggressive than nonactive feminists. Finally, Joesting (1976) correlated a variety of personality measures, including dominance, with two measures of feminism. While the measure of dominance did not correlate with the measures of feminism, Joesting concluded that feminists were dominant and aggressive. What is even more puzzling about Joesting's conclusion is that the author did not employ a measure of aggression. Another interesting point about the Joesting study is that the author's stated purpose does not seem related to her conclusions. According to Joesting, the purpose of her research was to "determine the personality correlates of sexism and antisexism in

approximately ten female and 21 male community college students" (p.194). Joesting's discussion of her results, however, begins with the statement: "The relationships presented in this study help to give us a view of the personality tendencies of feminists" (p.196). The author proceeds to end her paper with a list of personality traits of feminists, many of which cannot be substantiated by her data. Aside from the fact that Joesting's sample is extremely small, the author provides no evidence to support her conclusion that she employed a feminist sample and that the subsequent relationships reflect enduring feminist personality traits. One also wonders what happened to the initial purpose of the study, unless the author would have us believe that the personality correlates of sexism and antisexism are the same as the personality traits of feminists. The weaknesses in the Joesting study raise a number of questions regarding the assumptions upon which research rests. First, can we assume, because we have females in our sample, that their responses on a measure of feminism will reflect positive attitudes toward feminist issues? Second, can we also assume that the responses of males on a measure of feminism will reflect negative attitudes toward feminist issues? This latter question is particularly interesting since males, for the most part,

have been excluded from samples in the studies reviewed. In the few studies that included male subjects, researchers analyzed their data separately.

APPENDIX B

Materials Given to Subjects

Instructions

Women in Canadian Society: An Attitude Survey

I am a doctoral candidate at the University of Windsor under the supervision of Dr. Shelagh Towson. For my Ph.D. dissertation, I am conducting a study of people's attitudes about various issues of concern to Canadian women.

The enclosed material includes an Informed Consent Form, a Personal Data Sheet and a series of questionnaires. Please read and sign the Informed Consent Form. Then complete each questionnaire in the order in which it appears. Your answers on the questionnaires will be completely anonymous and there are no right or wrong answers, so please try to answer each question as honestly as possible. Do not spend too much time on any one question, and please do not go back to a questionnaire after you have completed it.

Please note that all the questionnaires except the Personal Activities Scale have a separate computerized Answer Sheet. In order that we may use them again, please do not make any marks on the questionnaires. Also, please use a pencil to record your answers on the computer Answer Sheets.

A summary of the nature and objectives of this study is available from my advisor, Dr. Shelagh Towson (Rm. 174, WHS) or from myself (Ms. Patricia Forrest, Rm. 264, WHS). If you would like a copy of this summary and will not be able to pick it up, please write your name and mailing address in the space provided on the Informed Consent Form and a copy will be mailed to you.

Thank you very much for your help.

Sincerely,

Patricia Forrest
Doctoral Candidate
Department of Psychology
University of Windsor

Informed Consent Form

Informed Consent Form

I agree to participate in this study on attitudes about women's issues.

I understand that the information I provide will be analyzed and reported in group, numerical, or statistical form only. Therefore, the anonymity of individual participants is assured.

I also understand that I can request a summary of the nature and objectives of the study from Ms. P. Forrest or Dr. S. Towson, Department of Psychology, University of Windsor.

Signature _____

Date _____

I will not be able to pick up the research summary in person, so could you please mail a copy to:

(Print) Name _____

Address _____

City _____

Postal Code _____

NOTE: This sheet will be detached upon receipt of the materials.

Personal Data Sheet

Personal Data Sheet

Age: _____ Gender: _____

Marital Status: _____ Race: _____

Religious Preference:	Practicing? Yes	No
___Roman Catholic	---	---
___Protestant (Denomination): _____	---	---
___Jewish	---	---
___Other: _____	---	---

What was your childhood religion? _____

Sexual Orientation:

_____ heterosexual
_____ bisexual
_____ gay male/lesbian

Are you presently enroled in University?

___Yes (please indicate year) _____

___No (Highest level of education completed) _____

Would you describe yourself as politically: (please circle)

X X X X X X X
Conservative Liberal Radical

Do you belong to a political party?

_____ No

_____ Yes (Specify): _____

Preliminary Liberal and Radical Feminism Scales

Personal Attitudes Scale

INSTRUCTIONS

The Personal Attitudes Scale is designed to assess your personal attitudes about various issues relevant to women. There are no right or wrong answers and your responses are anonymous so please answer as honestly as you can. It is very important that you use a pencil to record your answers.

Read each statement and indicate in pencil on the computer answer sheet the extent to which you personally agree or disagree using the following 6-point scale:

A = Strongly Disagree
B = Moderately Disagree
C = Slightly Disagree
D = Slightly Agree
E = Moderately Agree
F = Strongly Agree

Indicate your answer by filling in the letter, in pencil, that corresponds to your choice. For example, if you Strongly Disagree with a statement, fill in the letter A. If you Moderately Disagree with a statement, fill in the letter B. Fill in the letter C if your personal opinion tends toward slight disagreement, that is, you "sort of disagree". Similarly, fill in the letter D if you "sort of agree", fill in letter E if you Moderately Agree and fill in letter F if you Strongly Agree with a statement.

Sample Question:

1. I think women should be able to become priests.

If you Strongly Disagree with the above statement, you would fill in the letter A. If you Strongly Agree with the statement, you would fill in the letter F. If your opinion is somewhere in between, fill in the letter that best reflects your personal opinion.

Please answer every statement. If you are unsure, then fill in the letter which comes closest to reflecting your personal opinion. Please do not leave blanks.

After you have completed all the items in the booklet, take out the instructions for the Social Attitudes Scale.

Please begin now

Personal Attitudes Scale

A = Strongly Disagree
B = Moderately Disagree
C = Slightly Disagree
D = Slightly Agree
E = Moderately Agree
F = Strongly Agree

1. I prefer the company of feminist friends to nonfeminist friends.
2. The central issue of feminism is equality of opportunity for women. (L)
3. Racism is not a feminist issue. (L)
4. The roots of gender inequality are in the larger political system. (R)
5. Any woman who wants to can make as much money as a man. (L)
6. Most men are sexist. (R)
7. Every woman should become active in the women's movement. (R)
8. I sometimes think about getting involved in the women's movement, but I don't think I would fit in. (L)
9. The views of politically active feminists are too radical. (L)
10. A major goal of feminism is the development of an anti-militaristic and nonhierarchical society. (R)
11. The cause of women's oppression has more to do with a few men than with all men. (L)
12. The traditional family structure serves to confine women in the role of modern domestic servant. (R)
13. Every woman has a right to opportunities that will allow her to achieve equality with men. (L)
14. Women will only find self-affirmation by overthrowing the male political, economic, and legal systems. (R)
15. Women should speak up when someone makes a sexist comment. (R)
16. Getting involved in the feminist movement would require too much of my time. (L)

A = Strongly Disagree
B = Moderately Disagree
C = Slightly Disagree
D = Slightly Agree
E = Moderately Agree
F = Strongly Agree

17. Racist and sexist attitudes have been constructed and entrenched within the social structure. (R)

18. Women are oppressed by a few individuals and groups. (L)

19. Staying home to take care of young children is a personal choice, not a political issue. (L)

20. Political and economic theories are based on the sexual division of labour. (R)

21. Personal relationships between men and women are political in nature. (R)

22. Making work within the home a political issue is just too extreme. (L)

23. The present economic system only works because women provide unpaid domestic labour. (R)

24. Today, women have the same educational opportunities as men. (L

25. The legal system reinforces the existence of the patriarchal family at the expense of battered wives, children, lesbians, and gay men. (R)

26. The universality of female subordination indicates that women are up against something so profound that it cannot be remedied by rearranging a few tasks and roles in society. (R)

27. Women have a right to become all that they are capable of becoming, on their own or in partnership with men. (L)

28. The over-valuation of work outside the home and the under-valuation of work inside the home is a male invention designed to keep women oppressed. (R)

29. Radical feminist activism is the only way to create a world where there are no more victims. (R)

30. I feel personally responsible for ending my own oppression but not the oppression of all women. (L)

A = Strongly Disagree
B = Moderately Disagree
C = Slightly Disagree
D = Slightly Agree
E = Moderately Agree
F = Strongly Agree

31. A sexist joke is a form of bad humour rather than a personal insult. (L)

32. Male domination of women is enforced through the political and economic systems. (R)

33. Most radical feminists hate men. (L)

34. I am frustrated by women who don't seem to understand that we live in a male dominated society. (R)

35. Every personal act is the creation and expression of political ideology. (R)

36. I prefer not to discuss feminist issues with my male friends because they make fun of me. (L)

37. If each woman worked toward ending her own oppression we wouldn't need a women's movement. (L)

38. Women must act to reshape the systems that exert influences over every woman's life. (R)

39. Some feminists are too sensitive when it comes to sexist comments. (L)

40. I feel energized whenever I attend a feminist meeting, march, or demonstration. (R)

41. Women should be suspicious of men who claim to be feminists. (R

42. The problem for women is one of nonrepresentation within the political system, not oppression by that system. (L)

43. A real feminist would not miss a women's march, rally, or demonstration unless she had to. (R)

44. Many men in positions of power would like to see women get ahead. (L)

45. Women's personal experiences provide political ammunition for the feminist movement. (R)

46. I have difficulty making friends with women who do not support the feminist movement. (R)

A = Strongly Disagree
B = Moderately Disagree
C = Slightly Disagree
D = Slightly Agree
E = Moderately Agree
F = Strongly Agree

47. Women who carry picket signs and shout slogans don't accomplish anything. (L)

48. Job segregation by sex serves to maintain the superiority of men over women. (R)

49. The way men and women share their decision-making power at the domestic level is also a political act. (R)

50. The feminist movement unfairly condemns all men. (L)

51. The economic system must be redefined by women to account for paid and unpaid work in both public and private spheres. (R)

52. Greater equality of opportunity between men and women can be achieved by educating men. (L)

53. Every woman should take an assertiveness training course. (R)

54. I feel negative toward women who do not want to become active in the women's movement. (R)

55. Some of the methods used by radical feminists give the women's movement a bad name. (L)

56. I would be reluctant to speak up in a restaurant if a male friend made a sexist comment to the waitress. (L)

57. Feminism must wrest ideological control from men by redefining politics. (R)

58. Men and women can work together to end gender discrimination. (L)

59. Feminists need to be more radical because as women become free to work outside the home, men still remain free from work within the home. (R)

60. Once women have obtained equal rights, most of the goals of feminism will be realized. (L)

61. I get very angry when I see programs on TV which reinforce sexist stereotypes. (R)

A = Strongly Disagree
B = Moderately Disagree
C = Slightly Disagree
D = Slightly Agree
E = Moderately Agree
F = Strongly Agree

62. Women should get involved in the political process to improve their chances of equality of opportunity. (L)

63. The goals of feminism can be achieved without angry demonstrations. (L)

64. I become furious when I hear antifeminist comments. (R)

65. Women must develop their own strategies to overturn the male-dominated political system. (R)

66. I would be concerned about being called a lesbian if I became active in the women's movement. (L)

67. Women should not put their complete trust in men. (R)

68. Men are more receptive to objections about sexist comments if women don't react with anger. (L)

69. Women's oppression has more to do with societal factors than with individual factors. (R)

70. The capitalist system is responsible for reinforcing heterosexuality as the norm. (R)

71. Women can support the feminist movement by being good role models. (L)

72. It is the responsibility of every woman to become active in the feminist movement. (R)

73. A feminist revolution is a human revolution which must be defined by women first. (R)

74. Men can be feminists. (L)

75. Calling God a "she" reflects feminist humour rather than a feminist issue or concern. (L)

76. Organized religion has done more to oppress straight women, lesbians, and gay men than any other social institution. (R)

77. There is more to feminism than simply a shift of power from men to women. (R)

A = Strongly Disagree
B = Moderately Disagree
C = Slightly Disagree
D = Slightly Agree
E = Moderately Agree
F = Strongly Agree

78. Today, most women can make it up the corporate ladder if they want to. (L)

79. Women should unite and act together to create a new world. (R)

80. More energy should be put into treating men who beat and rape their wives. (L)

81. Women must obtain positions of power within ruling institutions so they can radically transform them. (R)

82. Making a point of telling a man that you are a feminist only creates more tension between the sexes. (L)

83. The idea of getting paid for doing "housework" is totally impractical. (L)

84. Most men want equality between the sexes. (L)

85. The goals of feminism can be summed up under the word "education". (L)

86. Poverty among women is a serious feminist issue. (R)

87. The anger and aggression that some feminists display actually hurts the cause of feminism. (L)

88. Feminist organization and theory are essential in order to develop a specifically female view of the world. (R)

89. A woman can be a feminist without ever becoming active in the movement. (L)

90. I need to meet regularly with other feminists in order to keep my sanity. (R)

91. Most of women's problems would be solved if we could just get rid of the men in power. (R)

92. Women do not need to take power, they simply need to be included in the present power structure. (L)

93. A woman can be glamorous, rich, powerful, and a feminist. (L)

A = Strongly Disagree
B = Moderately Disagree
C = Slightly Disagree
D = Slightly Agree
E = Moderately Agree
F = Strongly Agree

94. Women do not realize how much their lives are controlled by strategies developed by men. (R)

95. Feminist criticisms of religion as oppressive institutions are not valid. (L)

96. It is exciting to see women working together for the benefit of all women. (R)

97. There is no need for women to look for alternatives to power outside the governmental arena. (R)

98. The best way for women to achieve social change is to educate men. (L)

99. Feminism means equal partnership with men. (L)

100. Legal reform can create equality of opportunity for women. (L)

Note: The letters L and R within brackets after each item refer to the scale the item belongs to: L=Liberal Feminism scale item. R=Radical Feminism scale item.

Feminist Behavior Checklist

Personal Activities Scale

Instructions

Below is a list of various personal activities. Put a check mark on the line in the first column next to each activity you have ever participated in, even if you only did it once or twice. In the second column, indicate if you have engaged in that activity within the past year.

	Have You Ever	In The Past Year
1. Used the term Ms. instead of Mrs. or Miss in speech or correspondence.	____	____
2. Sent a donation to a feminist organization.	____	____
3. Attended a feminist conference.	____	____
4. Pursued a traditionally male sport.	____	____
5. Enrolled in a male dominated educational program.	____	____
6. Subscribed to a feminist magazine, newsletter, or journal.	____	____
7. Contributed articles to a feminist magazine, newsletter, or journal.	____	____
8. Helped to organize a feminist magazine, newsletter, or journal.	____	____
9. Written letters opposing anti-feminist legislation.	____	____

	Have You Ever	In The Past Year
10. Written letters to TV or newspapers objecting to material which exploits women.	----	----
11. Distributed pamphlets which explain a feminist issue.	----	----
12. Signed a petition for a feminist cause.	----	----
13. Helped organize a petition for a feminist cause.	----	----
14. Voted for a feminist political candidate.	----	----
15. Lobbied for a feminist political candidate.	----	----
16. Joined a feminist discussion group.	----	----
17. Helped organize a feminist discussion group.	----	----
18. Joined a feminist group that provides a service to women (e.g., crisis centre).	----	----
19. Helped organize a feminist group that provides a service to women.	----	----
20. Carried a picket sign at a women's rally.	----	----
21. Spoken at a women's rally.	----	----
22. Helped organize a women's rally.	----	----

	Have You Ever	In The Past Year
23. Helped organize a picket against a business or group for a feminist cause.	____	____
24. Fought for the right to be employed in a male dominated occupation.	____	____
25. Other: (e.g., taught a women's studies class, sat on a male-dominated committee, etc.)		
----------	____	____
----------	____	____
----------	____	____

Do you consider yourself to be a feminist: (please check)

Yes ____ No ____