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OFFICIAL CHINESE PERCEPTIONS OF THE USA

AND

THE USER

FROM JANUARY 1968 TO DECEMBER 1969

Submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Windsor in Partial Fulfillment of the Degree of Master of Arts.

by

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ABSTRACT

The question this thesis examined was whether a significant shift in the official Chinese perceptions of the USA and the USSR as enemies occurred during the period covering January 1968 to December 1969. While the examination of the area of perceptions can often prove nebulous, it was decided that content analysis would be a viable approach in researching the above question.

Categories of hostile symbols consistently applied by the Chinese in their reference to the two superpowers were drawn up and an enumeration thereof taken in a random sample of 52 issues of the Peking Review during the period under examination.

An historical review of the various periods through which China has passed since before her liberation in 1949 to 1968 (the point at which the content analysis began) was also included. Although the results of the content analysis are in themselves interesting, it was my opinion that an understanding of China's historical environment and perceptions could only prove to be a positive factor.

The major finding of the research was that a significant shift in China's official perceptions of the USA and the USSR did in fact occur during the period from January 1969 to December 1969. From January 1968 to August 1968, the USA was perceived as the primary antagonist by the Chinese. The position of "honour", however, was transferred to the USSR for most of the period from September 1968 to September 1969, except for the three months December 1968, January and February 1969, with it reverting back to the USA for the last
three months of the study. Other findings, such as the role the use of terms like "social imperialist" in reference to the USSR plays in reflecting the perceptions of the Chinese were also included.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The task of choosing a particular research problem from the general area of Chinese foreign policy was painstaking and arduous. The lack of scientific research conducted within this study area came to occupy a greater sphere of my attention. The job of conducting the actual symbol analysis, as well as gleaning information from secondary sources, has taught me a great deal about Chinese perceptions, and made me aware that there is even a greater deal still to learn. It is my only hope that it shall provide the same function for the reader.

I must thank those who have helped me wade through this project, in particular Professors Bruce Burton and Walter Soderlund. Their encouragement, guidance and frankness have proved invaluable. Thanks must also be extended to Mr. Wayne Gray who undertook the arduous task of translating my rough graph figures into clean, neat and professional-looking representations. Nevertheless, any shortcomings within this paper must be claimed as personal.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

While political research on the People's Republic of China has proved difficult insofar as the Chinese information and communications system have been closed, a widespread growth of political research on China has taken place in the last decade. A general case in point is the increase in studies dealing with Chinese foreign relations, resulting from the recognition, implicit or explicit, by the majority of nation-states that China must be dealt with in terms of being a major power. This realization, coupled with the "opening-up" of China in the post-Cultural Revolution period, is perpetuating a significant growth of China studies. Nevertheless, there is still a large gap between international relations theory and the study of Chinese foreign policy. It is with the goal of closing the gap between these two areas of study in mind, that research reported in this thesis - a study of Chinese perceptions of the two superpowers, the USA and the USSR, as enemies during the period January 1968 to December 1969, is carried out.

Before discussing why the area of Chinese perceptions has been chosen as the topic of study, however, attention will be directed towards perception as an area of study in itself.
On the most elementary level, perception is a reference to what is observed or comprehended by means of our bodily senses. Naturally one takes this level into account when examining national perceptions, as the nation-state is in fact just a conglomerate of individuals acting according to what they perceive their situation to be. The definition of perception put forth by Stoessinger in *Nations in Darkness* is accepted as valid for the purposes of this paper.

"Perception in world politics may be defined as the total cognitive view a nation holds of itself and others in the world. As such, it includes, of course, both reality and distortion." 1

The combination of reality and distortion which compose one's national image has been extensively explored by Kenneth Boulding. A nation-state's image of the external enemy or threat is just an extension or outgrowth of one's national identity. In his article "National Images and International Systems," Boulding states his finding that:

"Nations are divided up into 'good' and 'bad' - the enemy is all bad, one's own nation is of spotless virtue." 2

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This point is corroborated by David Finlay's statement:

"Our idea of the enemy depends to a large extent upon how we, consciously or unconsciously, view ourselves, for the image of the self often shapes the image of the other."

A great majority of the studies which deal with perceptual problems of the 'enemy' in fact tend to concentrate more narrowly on the phenomenon of national perceptions of threat from other nation-states. In this paper, however, the term 'enemy' is used within the broader context set out by Finlay, Holsti and Fagan, characterized as being an "active threat, strong, proximate and ego-relevant." To this list I would add the criteria of hostile, because it is particularly relevant in the case of China. As Ross Stagner has pointed out, hostility is an outgrowth of fear of another nation, and results in the dehumanization, and projection and displacement of one's own negative traits onto that nation.

Returning to the original topic then, Chinese perceptions of her major enemies are important on a number of grounds. First, if one accepts as a 'given' that research in the area of Chinese foreign policy is important to the study of foreign policy theory, then

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4 Ibid., p. 2.

it follows that understanding the Chinese decision-making process is imperative. Regardless of whether one adopts the rational, non-rational, bureaucratic or organizational model of decision-making, one can agree that policy decisions are based to some degree on the respective decision-maker's perception of the environment within which he operates.

Secondly, given their crucial roles in World War II and particularly in the pre-1949 Liberation period in China, and in the light of their contemporary position in international relations, the selection of the USA and the USSR as the focal point of an examination of China's perceptions is amply justified.

Finally, the period, January 1968 to December 1969, is significant in terms of both the internal and external environments in which Chinese foreign policy decisions were made. This period was essentially transitional stage in Chinese foreign policy, marked by the winding down of the Cultural Revolution and the resultant transition to what can be termed 'normal' external relations. Two notable trends during this changeover, discussed in greater detail later in the paper, were the deepening of the Sino-Soviet split, and, the beginning of détente or quasi-détente with the USA.

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Specifically, in this thesis we hope to examine the official Chinese perceptions of both the USA and the USSR as enemies during the period January 1968 to December 1969 and to determine the magnitude as well as the direction of any shifts in these perceptions.
CHAPTER II
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The research methodology used to examine this problem is a content analysis of symbols contained in the Peking Review. The study was limited to a specific time-span and environment. The environment being described is clearly the psychological.

The main consideration of this research is how the Chinese perceive their global environment, particularly the USA's and the USSR's role therein, and how these perceptions are reflected in terms or symbols applicable only to an enemy.

The time-span under consideration, January 1968 to December 1969, was chosen as the point of focus for a number of reasons. First, due to the ending of the Cultural Revolution, China was undergoing a transition in her foreign policy. This was reflected by her efforts not only to re-establish her pre-Cultural Revolutionary status within the sphere of foreign relations, but to extend and redefine her status within the international system, particularly her place vis-à-vis the two superpowers. Second, the Cultural Revolutionary trends towards isolationism and against revisionism tended to emphasize the Sino-Soviet split. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 verified all the worst Chinese suspicions that the Soviets were "vile revisionists" who would stop at virtually nothing to expand their power. The
clashes on the Sino-Soviet border, both in March and June of 1969, translated within the framework of the 'Maoist' ideology, only reinforced this perception of the Soviet Union as 'social imperialist traitors.' Third, there were continued attempts by the USA during this period to re-open the Warsaw negotiations, which culminated in the December 12, 1969 announcement that the USA and China had held secret meetings earlier in the month.

There was also a general improvement in Sino-American relations, particularly within the commercial sphere with the US easing of trade and travel restrictions to China in July and December 1969. Fourth, the termination point of the study is December 26, 1969, a full eight months after the conclusion of the Ninth Party Congress. Thus we should be able to detect whether or not the new foreign policy objectives discussed at the congress were in fact implemented, and the consequent effects, if any, on Chinese perceptions.

For purposes of analysis, the time-span was divided into three separate periods: 1) January 3, 1968 to August 23, 1968, a time period marking the winding down of the Cultural Revolution; 2) September 6, 1968 to April 30, 1969, the period following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; and 3) May 5, 1969 to December 26, 1969, the period after the Ninth Party Congress.

The issue-area dealt with in relation to the Chinese perceptions is the ideological. The idea of the 'enemy,' as reflected by
the continued use of hostile symbols in the Peking Review is based upon Maoist/Communist ideology. Whether or not one accepts this ideology is not important, as long as one realizes that all actions of the Chinese government are publicly rationalized in these terms. The Peking Review, a weekly periodical, is considered a valid and reliable indicator of these ideological rationalizations or 'correct' Party apologetics, insofar as: a) it is published within China; a controlled communist system, with sanction of the governmental authorities; b) it is edited by loyal Party-followers; c) it is the official publication circulated specifically for foreign consumption; and d) includes translations of major policy statements and editorials.

Despite its shortcomings, especially with regard to inference, the decision was reached that content analysis was the best approach for the scientific examination of the official perceptions of the Chinese. Although content analysis has been used with increasing frequency throughout this century, it wasn't until the 1930s with Lasswell's studies on propaganda and public opinion, as well as Lazarsfeld's analysis of radio broadcasts, that the field was really opened up and given a political complexion.

In recent years names like Lasswell, North, Holsti and

Merritt have come to be associated with definitive works within the field of content analysis. Holsti, in *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities* has defined the approach as follows:

> "Content analysis is any technique for making inferences by objectivity and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages."

One argument which is often leveled by the qualitative content analyst against those who chose quantitative methods is that:

> "a single appearance - or omission - of an attribute in a document may be of more significance than the relative frequency of other characteristics."

This type of argument seems to have the same flavor as the behaviorist-traditionalist debate, which, in this author's opinion, is a sham. Both quantitative and qualitative facets of research have their place in content analysis. Quantitative techniques are used in the actual process of coding, counting frequencies and the presentation of the findings: while qualitative functions come into play in choosing the problem for examination and the interpretation of the findings. One of the great advantages of content analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, is that various trends of history become discernible by the omission or presence of certain characteristics within the communication process. As Bernard Berelson,

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3 Ibid, p. 10.
who perhaps can be considered as one of the 'grandfathers' of content analysis has pointed out:

"The classification into a single set of categories of similar samples of communication content taken at different times provided a concise description of content trends, in terms of relative frequencies of occurrence. Such descriptions of trends are often useful in themselves; in addition, they provide data which can be correlated with corresponding changes on the part of the communicator or audience." 4

Harold Lasswell has simplified the system network of the communication process, explaining it as "who says what to whom and with what effect." In content analysis, the primary focus is centered upon the "what." The study conducted herein has translated this "what" into a list of categories of symbols (refer to Appendix A), used by the Chinese media in reference to both the USA and the USSR. Robert North in discussing the development of these types of categories for a content analysis had the following to say on the subject:

"A perception of hostility is defined as the sense of enmity and negative affect which one participant expresses for another. It indicates the basic attitude of obstructionism vis a vis the objectives of another participant." 6


5 Harold Lasswell as cited in Richard Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1971), p. 64.

The Merritt study on symbols of American Community in the colonial press during the years from 1735 to 1755 was very useful at this point in the research, as it provided a model of symbols which would have to be drawn up before the actual process of content could begin. In anticipation of criticism of the categories of hostile symbols, I refer the reader to Ithiel de Sola Pool's observation that:

"A social scientist may define the meaning of a symbol to a given person as the sum of the contexts in which that person will use that symbol. The usage need not be consistent or 'proper,' but insofar as the usages occur in the predictable contexts, the symbol has meaning for the man who uses it, and that meaning is an important fact to the social scientist."

The above criteria are met by the categories, albeit they are being applied by a collective, rather than a single person. Nevertheless, the categories are consistent within the context which they are used. This was established by means of a pretest, which also solved the problem of inter-coder reliability, as the average was consistently above .90%.

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9 A pre-test was constructed on a random sample of eight weekly publications on the Peking Review. Inter-coder reliability was tested with three persons, the results always being above .90%.
As symbol analysis assumes that the words a person uses in communicating are indicative of, or symbolize, his perspectives, a frequency count of the hostile symbols used in the *Peking Review* in reference to the USA and the USSR, is considered to be a valid and reliable indicator of official Chinese perceptions. If a significant shift in the use of hostile symbols occurred, whether it be an increase or a decrease, then the conclusion would be that parallel changes had also taken place within the realm of Chinese perceptions. The major results of the frequency counts are presented on bar graphs, the advantage being that such visual comparison makes differences or similarities of Chinese perceptions more dramatic and obvious.

We must of course be careful in making inferences about Chinese policies or motives from the symbol frequency counts. The temptation to make statements like, "The official Chinese perceptions changed because of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia," must be scrupulously avoided. It must be understood that only statements like, "The official perceptions of China of the USA and the USSR shifted following the invasion of Czechoslovakia," are empirically permissible, the inference being, that if indeed the shift was great enough, that the invasion was a possible or even probable determinant of this change.

Another problem concerned the counting of the various symbols on the category list (see Appendix A) as they appeared in the *Peking Review*. Frequently the use of more than one negative
symbol would occur within one phrase, for example, "Soviet revisionist social imperialist renegade clique," or, "American imperialist reactionary bandits." When such a case arose each separate symbol was counted, in order that the study be kept objective and that the total output of symbols be analysed. It should be pointed out that a symbol was never counted unless there was a direct reference to either the USA or the USSR connected to its use. For example, there are numerous references to "revisionist cliques" or "imperialist aggressors," but unless the term was tagged or identified with either of the two nation-states, they were not included in the count for the reasons cited above.

Once these problems had been taken into account the actual process of the content analysis began. A random sample of two weekly issues were chosen from each of twenty-four months under examination. The special editions published on a national holiday or in response to a specific event, such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia, were included within the sample bringing the total to fifty-two. (see Appendix B) The selected issues, including articles on both internal and external affairs were read in their entirety and carefully scrutinized for the hostile symbols.
CHAPTER III

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This analysis of the trends of the official Chinese perceptions of the two superpowers during the period of January 1968 to December 1969 would be incomplete if due notice was not taken of previous historical inputs. Such an examination is imperative because it is upon her national historical memory that China's perceptual images of the period under scrutiny are based. This survey of China's various historical periods is not intended to be an exhaustive historical analysis. Rather its purpose is to outline or highlight general trends, or particular events, which possibly exerted a strong influence on the manner in which China perceived the USA and the USSR during January 1968 to December 1969, as detected by the Peking Review's use of hostile symbols.

PRE-1949

Chinese culture is perhaps one of the oldest and well established known to mankind. China, as the nation-state known as the People's Republic of China, is a relatively new phenomenon. Due to the unique circumstances out of which this republic was born, attention will be directed to her pre-1949 Liberation period. Of particular interest, is the unusual fact that the leader of the
successful revolutionary movement, and the effective leader of the new republic for over twenty-five years, has been one and the same individual, Mao Tse-tung. Therefore, an understanding of the revolutionary environment and personality of Mao is essential to the overall comprehension of the ultimate Chinese perceptual framework.

This "discovery" of the importance of understanding the complexities of Mao's personality cannot be claimed as personal. Many China specialists or "watchers" have pointed this out previously. One of the most notable representatives of the "Mao school" is Stuart Schram, who purports that it is possible to explain both internal and external policies of China as projections of Mao's thoughts and actions. This thesis, albeit modified to meet the needs of the individual scholar, is agreed to by a number of writers, such as Ishwar Ojha, and Tang Tsou and Morton Halperin who note:

"The key to understanding Communist China's foreign policy lies, accordingly, in Mao's revolutionary strategy and its projection abroad."


Therefore, an understanding of the environment in which young Mao operated and formulated his ideas on the development of the ideal Chinese nation-state is undeniably essential. As Davis Bobrow has pointed out:

"Whether or not men in positions of responsibility differ from others, subjective history can help us to predict the policies of governments. In essence, history does not repeat itself, but it does repeat itself in the 'reality world' of the mind."

The point being that:

"the subjective past of the Chinese communist leaders provided them with a view of international conflicts which categorizes the participants into a small number of roles and generated anticipation about the behavior of actors in these roles and about the evolution and outcome of wars. Unless we can understand these limitations and anticipations, we cannot accurately estimate Chinese interpretations of American policy statements and military actions."

Ishwer Ojha, in discussing Chinese foreign policy, refers to its policies as those born out of "cultural despair." By this term he is referring to the condition brought on by China's inability to deal with the Western world on Western terms, which eventually resulted in her having to adopt a foreign culture as a measure to guarantee national survival. Traditional Chinese culture, whose

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perceptual framework placed China as the "Middle Kingdom," was in no way equipped to deal with, let alone destroy or "syncretize," the technically advanced capitalist nations of the West who travelled to her shores for the purposes of trade and commerce, or more crassly put, the exploitation of China's resources. Therefore, the only viable option open to China was to modernize in terms of Western technology, and more importantly, to move politically from culturism to nationalism.

The stresses created by this meeting with the Western world resulted in the designation of a semi-colonial status to China, due to her inability to deal with the European and American states on an equal footing, founded on the sharing of mutual values. This situation of an all-pervasive cultural despair was also reflected in the internal developments of China, for example the Taiping Rebellion. Although this rebellion proved unsuccessful, it marked the realization by the peasantry that a new order had to be created—one which would restore China to a position of national power and pride. This movement marked the

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"Culturism" is a term used by Ishwer Ojha to denote a "nonterritorial concept defined as a preoccupation with the survival of a national culture" (p. 8); while "culturism" can tolerate both foreigners and territorial concessions, it cannot permit the importation of foreign cultural models. Hence, China had to move from "culturism" to "nationalism" (p. 12).
beginning of a genuine Chinese nationalist feeling, apparently so ardent that it is still cited today as one of the positive examples which the masses should attempt to imitate.

Ojha cites the events of World War I as responsible for the last push in China towards "polarization of the psychological conflict generated by the nationalism of cultural despair... Japan's Twenty-One Demands in 1915, the exclusion of China from the application of Wilson's Fourteen Points, and the perfunctory treatment of Chinese nationalism at the Paris Peace Conference destroyed hopes of Chinese eclectics. These events also confirmed their opinion that the age of imperialism was not yet over, a fact that made a permanent impression upon the young Mao Tse-tung." 6

It was this environment which gave rise to Mao's total disenchantment with Western styled values, typified by "Mr. Science" and "Mr. Democracy."

Sun Yat-sen was one of the more successful leaders of the populist movements which began to gain popularity during the second decade of the twentieth century. His movement was a concious strike or move towards Chinese nationalism, as well as a movement against Western imperialism. Nevertheless, it did contain elements of thought contrary to the traditional Chinese philosophy, of placidly accepting one's lot in life. Even though by the early 1920s nationalism had become a popular feeling amongst the Chinese people, opinion on how to translate this fervor into effective

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6 Ojha, Op Cit, p. 36.
action remained as varied as the many sectors comprising Chinese society. One of the more active groups, albeit sporadic, were the students who formed the May Fourth Movement of 1919. The reason why this specific movement is mentioned is because it contained the nucleus of Chinese nationalists who eventually won China's liberation, some of whom still govern the state they helped found.

However, the road between 1919 and 1949 was far from smooth. China was divided into opposing political/ideological factions. The Nationalists and CCP put aside their differences from 1924 to 1927 to form a governing coalition. In 1927, both the Canton Massacre, which deeply affected Mao's beliefs on the role of power and violence and the value of following foreign examples of revolutionary tactics, and Chiang Kai-shek's breach with the Comintern occurred, and the coalition was dissolved.

Ojha has noted that, "the claim of historical continuity is a necessary prerequisite for psychological security." The CCP, who adopted the Marxist philosophy, could re-interpret Chinese national history in such a fashion that it filled this essential need of the Chinese people, particularly the intellectuals. It has been

argued among academics whether or not Mao, as leader of the
CCP, nationalized or sinicized Marxism. It is in my opinion an
irrelevant argument, especially in the light of Mao's further de-
velopment of this philosophy to an internationalist scale. The
important issue is that he offered the masses a reconstructed
history which they could embrace and be proud of - a revolu-
tionary history which forced the Chinese nation to "stand up."
The "anti-Western Westernism" enabled China to adopt the
Western technology necessary for her development as a world
power, without having to imbibe Western ideology, per se.

The innumerable hardships which Mao and his comrades
suffered during the Long March served to strengthen not only
his, but the Chinese masses' devotion to and belief in the re-
volutionary tradition and ideology of their nation. The split with
the Kuomintang and their eventual expulsion to the island of
Taiwan served as proof that the Marxist ideological model pro-
vided the unique and single answer to China's problems. It is
this very personal experience of Mao which leads to his hearty
endorsement of the positive aspects of revolution and the need for
a continuous revolutionary experience to inspire the masses.

During the pre-World War II period, or more specifically
before the CCP gained effective control of the state, the USA

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maintained a semi-colonial policy towards China, termed "Open Door". Introduced by US Secretary of State, John Hay, in September 1899, at about the same time as the Boxer Rising, the Open Door policy was "officially" supposed to promote trade with China on an equal basis but essentially involved sharing in the exploitation of China's various resources.

Stoessinger, in his book *Nations in Darkness: China, Russia and America*, has clearly pinpointed the contradiction between American and Chinese perceptions of this situation.

"What is interesting for our purposes is the astounding difference between what most American leaders at the time believed the Open Door to be and what it really was. Many of those misperceptions have lived down to the present day." 9

"The Americans saw the Chinese as their wards and themselves as superior to the petty power politics of the Europeans... To China, the Americans had arrived late at the Western holdup, but just in time to share the spoils." 10

The American attitude of "be kind to the natives" was accurately perceived by the Chinese. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Chinese perceived the USA as a negative factor in their national development, and, a negative example from which the masses could learn but should studiously avoid imitating.

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9 Ibid., p. 28.
Following the Russian revolution of 1917, the USSR, under the dictatorship of Lenin and later Stalin, supported the establishment of a new Chinese nation-state. The attempted wholesale export of the revolutionary experiences of the CPSU to China proved unwise, and indeed led to a number of disastrous situations, especially during the years 1927 to 1935. Mao, while respecting Stalin as a great Marxist-Leninist, led the crusade against these mistakes. This action led to Mao's dismissal in 1927 from the CCP Politburo. Mao's position that revolution cannot be exported was already abundantly clear at this date. The position of the Comintern during this period was one of support for the Kuomintang and a general alliance of all sectors of Chinese society. Mao violently disagreed with this "incorrect line" and finally in 1935 won the leadership of the CCP on his own terms. The USSR nevertheless continued their support in one capacity or another of the Kuomintang, led by Chiang Kai-shek. It is not surprising, therefore, that the USSR as well as the USA failed to inspire the complete trust or loyalty of the CCP.

The CCP's suspicions and reservations proved not to be unfounded. The Yalta Agreement of February 1945, supposedly designed to assure Soviet participation in the Pacific War, in effect provided a guarantee of Soviet cooperation in the peaceful unification of China under the Nationalists. Insofar as the Agreement
was a tool designed to limit Soviet expansion and activity in the Far East (i.e. leaving the door open for American exploitation), the Agreement was totally unsuccessful. However, as a means of reinforcing China's suspicions of the USA's and the USSR's intentions it was abundantly successful, revealing to the CCP the total disregard by the superpowers for China's national development.

Both the USA and USSR continued after 1945 to supply the CCP with ample evidence about their real intentions in China, earning continued mistrust and hostility. The Americans were, by far, more blatant about their ambitions in the Eastern hemisphere. When faced with the inevitable choice of whether to support Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists or Mao's CCP the Truman administration chose the former. The issue of a "free" China became one of the USA's national causes. As Stoessinger has noted:

"Most Americans perceived the Nationalists and the Communists as radically antithetical movements, with Chiang Kai-shek, the Christian general, battling the Communists on behalf of the forces of freedom and righteousness." 11

By this point in time the CCP's devil image of the USA was reciprocal. As Roderick McFarquhar has pointed out, the US replaced Britain as the major Western imperialist when, following the bombing of Pearl Harbour, the US entered the Pacific. US allotments of military and economic aid to Chinese Nationalists served

11 John Stoessinger, Op Cit, p. 36.
to reinforce this image. In my opinion, it was during this pre-1949 period that antagonisms between the US and the CCP became so strongly entrenched that they remained in a virtual deadlock for the next twenty years.

The tactics adopted by the USSR in her dealings with the Kuomintang and the CCP were more subtle. Relations were conducted in such a manner that regardless of which side was eventually the victor of the civil war, Soviet national interests would be served. The Comintern repeatedly encouraged the formation of an alliance between the Nationalists and the CCP, while simultaneously offering aid and support to both (not always with the others' knowledge). The Soviet invasion of Manchuria and Northern China in order to assure itself of a major role in the World War II settlements demonstrated to Mao that the Soviet Union was not to be trusted. The resultant Soviet stance on the Yalta Agreement only reinforced this opinion that the USSR would definitely place national interests above the needs of the international communist movement.

Although this review only touches upon some of the pre-1949 factors which contributed to the formation of Chinese perceptions, it should be clear to the reader that the distrust which the CCP has demonstrated since its rise to power is founded upon

reality, not fiction. Three particular inter-related factors seem to focus as the basis of future relations with the USA and the USSR, and how they were perceived. These are territorial questions; ideological issues; and, how the adversary behaves within any given conflict situation. These experiences had a profound effect on the future policies which China would eventually adopt. Ojha goes so far as to state:

"What the great powers are actually doing today is of very little consequence. The legacy of suspicion is too strong. It is the historical experience of past injustices, real or imagined, which shapes the attitudes of the present and determines the course of the future." 13

1949 - 1953

This period, from the inception of the People's Republic of China to the end of the Korean War, has been characterized as one of consolidation, both internally and externally, coupled with a concern by China to secure her national boundaries. China's temper in approaching the many problems facing her was particularly friendly towards the USSR, and, in the spirit of internationalism. This does not infer that Mao had drifted into some utopian cloud, for his statement made on June 30, 1949 in his article "On the

13 Ishwari Ojha, Op Cit, p. 54.
People's Democratic Dictatorship", expressed very clearly his awareness of the realpolitik. McFarquhar paraphrases:

"China's experience of imperialism and the Chinese Communists' experience of American intervention in the civil war had proven to Mao the new regime had to 'lean to one side' and place itself four-square in the Soviet camp — quite apart from ideological predilections that would have encouraged such a course anyway."

Mao was anxious however, to establish friendly relations with a wide variety of nation-states, especially those on her neighbouring borders.

The position which the United States of America found itself in with the 1949 establishment of the PRC was rather precarious, due to her previous commitments. McFarquhar has claimed that "the US was clearly prepared by early 1950 for the emergence of one, united, Communist China."

While this may well have been the case personally of President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson, it is my opinion that it was not true of the nation as a whole. While Truman did make it clear on January 5, 1950, only months after the declaration of the PRC, that the USA would not defend Formosa against a full-fledged attack from the mainland, there were many internal contradictions and problems which prevented the USA's recognition and diplomatic support of the PRC.

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14 Roderick McFarquhar, Op Cit, p. 61.
14a Ibid
The primary existing contradiction in the US was Truman's inability to quash or denounce the "Chiang myth". In the light of the charges being levelled at Truman by the McCarthyites of "losing China", it was nearly impossible for him to deal realistically with the China situation. Stoessinger has aptly noted this dilemma:

"American policy, burdened by the Chiang Kai-shek image of the past, found itself unable, after the Communist victory, to make realpolitik volte-face and deal pragmatically with the new rulers of China. One cannot suddenly abandon the pro-American Christian general and engage in commerce with the devil without dire portentous political consequences." 15

Another factor to be considered is the fact that the USA had interpreted Mao's term of "leaning to one side" as meaning that China was placing herself directly under the auspices of the USSR. This was no small matter, as this era in American history was riddled with the fear of a communist plot to overrun the world. This belief was reinforced by the Chinese ill treatment of US diplomats in late 1949, along with the seizure of US government property in Peking early the next year.

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea on June 25, 1950 contributed to making the bad state of affairs between the USA and China worse. The perceptions the two had of each other's intentions and actions played a critical role in the development of

15 John Stoessinger, Op Cit, p. 41.
the war.

McFarquhar has noted that for the US "an attack by one Communist nation in one place was taken as meaning a general military threat from all Communist nations, presumably under the direction of Moscow." Because of this perception of the Korean situation, Truman ordered the US Seventh Fleet, on June 27, to advance to Taiwan and insure its protection against any possible attack by communist forces. This action, in terms of Chinese perceptions, was, ipso facto, re-entry by the US into the Chinese civil war - considered strictly an internal matter in which no foreign power had a right to interfere.

The rather radical action of Truman was really unnecessary at the time of implementation. The Chinese had no real interest in the Korean conflict until late August 1950, when developments appeared to indicate that perhaps her own national security was endangered. Even then, the strongest action taken was to have Chou En-lai forward a message to the UN demanding China's inclusion on future discussions and agreements on the issue. Repeated warnings were later issued to the USA warning them against crossing the thirty-eighth parallel, the dividing line

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Roderick McFarquhar, Op Cit, p. 61.
between North and South Korea. These rather subdued tactics by the Chinese proved ineffective, as the US, under the banner of the UN "Uniting for Peace Resolution", took the irreversible step and crossed the thirty-eighth parallel on October 7, 1950 anyways.

Considering the very real and proximate threat the Chinese felt to their national security, it is my opinion that their response to this American move was exceptionally calm and controlled. When compared to the behavior exhibited by the Kennedy administration during the Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Americans felt their national security was threatened by the presence of communist forces on the offshore island, China's restraint during this phase of the Korean conflict was remarkable.

Naturally, China was anxious to avoid an open conflict with the USA or, for that matter, any breach that would antagonize the Western power to the point where it would retaliate by the use of nuclear weapons. This was a very real possibility to the Chinese government, and, at no time did they doubt that the USA if provoked far enough would resort to such measures. For this reason, China always officially maintained that her troops in Korea were there strictly on a voluntary basis. The result was the same however, when the US and Chinese finally clashed on October 26 and November 2 of 1950. The US was only all too aware that they were fighting Chinese soldiers of the new republic, loyal
to the thought of Mao Tse-tung, soldiers who up to this point had been considered by the Americans as inferior. Mao also realized the effect this show of strength had upon US morale and for China's protection ceased all battle contact with American forces for a period of three weeks, commencing November 7, 1950.

General MacArthur's November announcement of a new offensive "to end the war" prodded the North Korean/Chinese forces to launch a counter-attack. This move was effective and all troops fighting under the guise of the UN were forced back of the thirty-eighth parallel. MacArthur's "home by Christmas" plan failed and led to the eventual return of Korea to its status quo ante bellum division.

While the Korean War officially ended in March of 1953, with a treaty being signed on July 27, 1953, it marked the beginning of a new era of hostilities between the USA and China. The consequences the Korean conflict had upon US-China relations were multiple. As Stoessinger has pointed out, Korea "radically changed the American view of China and deeply affected the Chinese view of America."
He elaborates:

"the post-1950 American image of a hostile, menacing China dates from the Korean War. The events of that period also confirmed the Chinese Communists in their view of the US as an arch-enemy. These mutual perceptions, in turn, led to policy decisions of the most crucial consequences on both sides." 18

It is interesting to examine the words employed by Stoessinger in the above quote. While the Americans "date", the image of China as hostile from 1950, the Chinese view of the US as an arch-enemy was only "confirmed" by the conflict, implying this perception had been previously established. It would appear, that Stoessinger feels that this new status quo was much more traumatic for the Americans to accept than the Chinese. He writes:

"The paternalistic attitude of American leaders towards Communist China died hard. It remained extremely difficult for the US to admit that the new China was growing in power and was fiercely hostile and that this attitude was more than a passing phenomenon." 19

The realization by the Americans that the Open Door policy, which had attempted the wholesale export of the American way of life had failed, died hard. It resulted in the US developing closer ties with the Nationalist government on Taiwan, as evidenced by the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of February 1951.

Ironically, these moves by the USA only served to reinforce Mao's

18 Ibid, p. 45.
belief that US imperialism was a lethal virus to be destroyed. The fact that China had "stood up" to US aggression in Korea and survived, lent credence to the validity of this goal. Mao's statement that he would "lean to one side", the side of the Soviet Union, placed her in a favourable position for alliance with that state. This was enhanced by the fact that Stalin viewed China as a potential buffer zone and foothold in the Eastern hemisphere, from which he could exert his influence. Due to China's potential benefit to Stalin's quest for power, he accepted China as a junior alliance partner, rather than a satellite, the status ascribed to most Eastern European states. Hinton has suggested that Stalin made great concessions to Mao, accepting his revolutionary strategy as the model to be followed by the rest of Asia, in addition to granting aid, support and protection, without demanding China's total subserviance.

The two leaders met from mid-December 1949 to mid-February 1950, and while there are no published transcripts of the proceedings, it is assumed concessions were worked out, and, significantly, that Mao negotiated with Stalin on more or less equal terms. Generally, relations between the USSR and China during 1949 to 1953 could be characterized as amiable.

However, events in Korea from 1950 to 1953 affected the development of Sino-Soviet relations. In many ways both nations perceived the threat of US intervention in Korea similarly. It appears though that the USSR was more concerned with the issue in terms of how it would affect her as a world power, than China, who feared US presence in Korea for reasons of national security. As circumstances had it, the USSR, China's "good ally", used her as a proxy to fight American forces in Korea, thereby sparing herself the losses which result from any war. Given that Stalin pumped large amounts of aid in terms of technological and military support, his intention was that these resources be irrevocably depleted during the ensuing conflict and leave China in a weakened position, hence making it easier for him to negotiate treaty terms favourable to the USSR. For this reason I would not agree with Hinton's speculation that:

"it is quite possible that in effect Mao conceded Stalin the leading role in Northeast Asia and Stalin conceded Mao the leading role in Southeast Asia." 21

For while China's involvement in the Korean War would have become inevitable sooner or later, with the US plan's to unite Korea and advance through Manchuria, Soviet involvement was merely advantageous, in terms of accumulating power.

21 Ibid, p. 43.
Mao was probably aware of the reasons behind Stalin's concessions and used them to his advantage. For example, Mao religiously stuck to the claim that Chinese forces in Korea were strictly voluntary, and studiously avoided provoking the USA into a nuclear confrontation. He used the situation, while it lasted, to promote agreements with the USSR on trade and commerce (in particular the use of the Manchurian railway) favourable to China. In future relations with the Soviet Union, Mao would recall and base his decisions upon Stalin's attempt of exploitation of China's men and resources.

When China entered the global arena as a new nation, although she brought her previous perceptions of the world order, she presented herself to the world as friendly and willing to establish relations with almost any nation. However, as a result of US intervention in Korea, China was condemned as an "aggressor" by the United Nations—supposedly a peaceful organization representative of global opinion. It is of little wonder, therefore, that China's suspicions of the USA and disbelief in the effectiveness of the UN grew and were reinforced over time.
This period of time in Chinese foreign relations has often carried the label of the "Spirit of Bandung", referring to the conference of Third World nations held in Bandung, Indonesia in April 1955. Having established herself internationally as the permanent legal government of China, and having dealt with the immediate problems facing any nation after revolutionary upheaval, China was prepared to broaden her horizons and seek out a status within the international community, befitting a nation of her size and power. This project was approached in a peaceful manner and in the spirit of internationalism. The realization by China that she must be ready and willing to establish working relationships with those who deviated or completely disagreed with her ideology was apparent, as demonstrated internally by the Hundred Flowers Campaign and externally by her overwhelming success at the Bandung Conference. The crowning glory of the Conference was its acceptance, as maneuvered by the skilled diplomacy of Chou En-lai, of a distillation of part of China's foreign policy—the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, which entailed: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence. The acceptance of these principles
represented a coup for China in her efforts to establish herself as leader of the Asian community, especially when considering that this policy has since been maintained. It is also noteworthy that President Nixon, during his 1972 visit, also agreed to these principles as proper conduct of foreign relations.

While the general trend of China's foreign relations during this period were 'peaceful', it would not be correct to say this was the general tone of her relations with either the USA or the USSR.

With the election of General Eisenhower as President of the United States in November 1952, and the subsequent appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State, the US-China policy became hard line. Apart from the complex issues involved in any negotiations between any two nations, it was clear, as Morton Halperin has pointed out, that both Eisenhower and Dulles "had strong personal feelings of animosity toward Communist China and [that they] eagerly reinforced the policy of containment and isolation."

The question of the Nationalist government established on Taiwan continued to be an issue of critical importance to both

powers during this period. The myth of Chian Kai-shek, the crusader for freedom, was once again allowed to flourish. Fear arising out of French losses in Indochina led to the promotion of the US "domino theory" and the formation of SEATO in September 1954. This paranoia over "losing" the East also exhibited itself in an increase in tension over the status of the offshore island of Quemoy in the Formosa Straits.

The US Seventh Fleet had previously been ordered to defend only Formosa, but this policy was now re-examined. The result was the Mutual Defense Treaty of December 2, 1954. Taiwan and the US, which committed the US to the defense of only Taiwan and the Pescadores, again leaving the question of the offshore islands open. McFarquhar surmises:

"To demonstrate national solidarity, President Eisenhower sought and obtained a Congressional resolution - it became known as the 'Formosa Resolution' - which authorized him to use his discretion in deciding what other islands to help defend in the interests of protection of Formosa." 23

The issue was so inflammatory and basic to US foreign policy that Eisenhower went so far as to threaten the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the Chinese if a conflict situation should arise again in this area.

Formal Sino-American ambassadorial talks, engineered by Nehru, began in August 1955 in Geneva, but were unproductive.

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23 Roderick McFarquhar, Op Cit, p. 103.
primarily due to the two nations inability to reach a compromise on the issue of Taiwan. China made efforts at appeasement, most notably the offer extended to the USA in August 1956 that it would issue fifteen American newsmen visas to visit China. The US rejected this conciliatory action, and by the time they realized the value of the Chinese proposal, the latter had adopted a hard line attitude and withdrawn the offer. China was also willing during this period to make piecemeal agreements with the US on matters concerning trade and commerce. The US, however, also rejected these types of proposals maintaining an all or nothing attitude. Ishwer Ojha has pointed out:

"From 1955 to 1957 the biggest stumbling block facing Chinese gradualism was the American insistence that no improvement in Sino-American relations was possible until China signed an agreement renouncing the use of force in solving international problems."

The Americans had definitely abandoned any benevolent feelings that they may have previously claimed towards the Chinese people. Openings created by the Chinese which could have been interpreted by the Americans as a possible vehicle for establishing friendly relations were misinterpreted, ignored or spurned.

Relations between the USSR and China also deteriorated during this period. When Stalin died in 1953, the ensuing struggle

24 Ishwer Ojha, Op Cit, p. 95.
for control of the party, in particular by Khrushchev who coveted Mao's support, led to extensive promises of trade and technological aid. The promises proved empty, and betrayal of the CCP was evidenced by Khrushchev's now famous "secret speech" made at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February 1956. This betrayal marked the turning point in Sino-Soviet relations. It also coincided with the official realization by China (a general realization reached by Mao as early as the 1927 Canton Massacre) that Stalin's model of five-year plans were not suited to the needs of the Chinese mass development. The position was formally announced at the September 1956 CCP Eight Party Congress. Hence, when the Chinese received the rebuff from Khrushchev they did not slink away like a "faithful running dog", but "stood up" and retaliated by dismissing the Soviet model of socialism as inadequate and inapplicable to the Chinese state. This step by the Chinese illustrated their self-perception as equals to the Soviets, rather than as the subordinates the USSR wished them to be. This rather bold stance was perceived by the Soviets as a threat to their supremacy in Eastern Europe.

This irritant to the USSR was further intensified by China's expanding influence in the Third World. As Smith points out:
"The Bandung Conference represented a significant attempt by the Chinese government to project a positive influence in the Third World, especially Asia and Africa. The Soviet Union was not invited to the conference, indicating China agreed the USSR was not an Asian - and hardly an African power."

This exclusion of the USSR from Bandung, left the Soviets feeling their interests were being undermined, and that they were becoming the recipients of subtle racial discriminatory tactics. Chou's exceptional diplomatic maneuvering at the Conference directed towards establishing a strong united front with many Third World nations, including many neutrals, demonstrated China's ability not only to function without Soviet support, but to effectively beat the USSR at their own game, so to speak. Ojha purports that these dealing with nations on a purely practical basis is significant. He states:

"In short, still leaving ideology aside, another category has been added to the list of Sino-Soviet antagonisms: rivalry."

Considering the fact that Sino-Soviet controversies had previously centered around ideological issues, this development certainly marked a turning point. Obvious Soviet disapproval of internal Chinese policies such as the Hundred Flowers Campaign and the Great Leap Forward, did not influence Mao's implementation thereof.

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one way or the other. He successfully ignored and overcame alleged Soviet-backed plots to overthrow him and destroy his "cult". Furthermore, he succeeded in obtaining further Soviet promises of aid in the development of nuclear power for China, albeit the USSR later reneged on this pledge.

Therefore, while China enjoyed a period during which her relations with Third World nations blossomed, her relations with the USA and the USSR became increasingly hostile, with negotiations between China and the two superpowers becoming more strained.

1957 - 1961

The friction between China and both the USA and the USSR, which lent heavily to the establishment of the Chinese perception of having to deal with a "dual adversary," becomes quite evident during this period. One of the major issues during this time span was the deepening of the Sino-Soviet split, or as Hinton puts it the beginning of the "Sino-Soviet Polemic".

The central issue in Chinese-American relations remained the status of Taiwan, as illustrated by events in the Taiwan Straits during 1958.

In keeping with the Magist ideological dictum for continuing

27 Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, Op Cit.
revolution, one can trace a transition during this period from the open "Bandung Spirit" to a rather Hard Line approach, particularly in reference to the superpowers. The possible explanations for this change in policy are numerous. One explanation is, that Mao embarrassed by the many criticisms levelled against his policies during the Hundred Flowers Campaign and subsequent accusations that he had lost touch with the true feeling of the Chinese masses, was plagued by the fear that his power as leader of China was threatened.

An ancillary factor was that the last of the Soviet-backed Five Year Plans was coming to an end and Mao feared that it would not measure up to anticipated results. Whatever the motivation, in late 1957 the public witnessed the return of a rejuvenated more militant Mao Tse-tung. This stance is illustrated by his statements of November 1957 that while "the principle of Soviet leadership must be respected..." that the 'East Wind has prevailed over the West Wind', meaning that as a result of Soviet technological achievements and political leadership, the overall balance of power was shifting in favor of "socialism" and against "imperialism".

A general Chinese consensus seems to have emerged on the unreliability of Soviet aid, be it technological or military, for

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28 Ibid, p. 87.
example, within the realm of nuclear development. This situation coupled with genuine basic differences on the interpretation of "correct" Marxist-Leninist ideology, contributed to the occurrence of what to this point in time appears to be a permanent breakdown in friendly Sino-Soviet relations. Particularly objectionable to the Chinese, apart from Khrushchev's attack on Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, were his statements (officially embodied in the Moscow Declaration) that it was possible to avoid war during an era of imperialism, in addition to, his proposal that peaceful transition, within existing governmental structures, to socialism was feasible, thus downgrading the role of revolution and the importance of the revolutionary experience for the masses. Smith has pointed out that:

"The Chinese consider Khrushchev's departure from Marxism-Leninism on these issues - among others - prime examples of modern revisionism." 29

The Chinese maintain that there, have been three major debates within the international communist movement in this century; the first between Lenin and the forces of rightist opportunism, the second between Stalin and Trotsky; and the third between what the Chinese call the modern revisionists, led by the USSR, and the forces of Marxism-Leninism, including China. The

Chinese who had sinicized Marxism-Lenism after importing it, found intolerable the growth of what they regarded to be modern revisionism in both theory and practice in the USSR, coupled with the refusal of the CPSU to respond in true Leninist fashion to CCP criticism of the aforementioned.

These Chinese accusations that Khrushchev had adopted a rightist revisionist position and was selling out Marxism-Leninism were verified, at least to the satisfaction of the Chinese, by the events of the period, particularly the Soviet withdrawal of technical assistance.

Continued violations by the "North Koreans" of the Korean armistice restriction on the upgrading of arms frustrated the US to such a point that in January 1958 they threatened to introduce tactical nuclear weapon systems into South Korea. China immediately demanded the USSR transfer similar weaponry to Chinese territory, only to be rebuffed and given the scant assurance that the Soviet nuclear umbrella would render sufficient protection. It is at this point that Mao's suspicions were confirmed that the Soviets had no intention in truly aiding China in becoming a nuclear power, let alone becoming a power of equal strength.

The political/ideological issues involved in the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958 emphasized the importance of political leaders' personalities and their interpretation of their roles. A high-level conference was held in Peking from May 27 to July 22, 1958 by
the Military Committee of the CCP's Central Committee during which the nation's 'hard line' approach to international relations was discussed. While it can be maintained that the Chinese shelling of Quemoy and the sabotage of shipping around the isle of Matsu area were hostile actions aimed at destroying Chiang's potential to invade the mainland and the US backing of this territorial claim, it can also be maintained that the hostilities also affected Moscow.

As soon as the high-level military conference was over in Peking, a high pressure propaganda campaign was launched for the liberation of Taiwan. Not an unusual tactic, the Chinese elites believed that concentration on the external 'enemy' would produce internal cohesion and help minimize the hardships faced by the masses during the Great Leap Forward. These tactics were frowned upon by Khrushchev who was in the process of trying to promote some semblance of detente with the US and hence did not care for any of his underlings "rocking the boat". Proof of this contention lies in Khrushchev and Malinovsky's unexpected and rather unsuccessful visit to Peking from July 31 to August 3, 1958, to discuss these matters with the ruling elites. China was heartily displeased with the relatively neutral stance Moscow had adopted in reference to the Middle East situation and rather obliquely ignored Khrushchev's recommendations that she cancel any planned activities in the Taiwan Straits. The extent
of Chinese displeasure with Khrushchev's revisionist policies was illustrated by the fact they began the shelling of Quemoy on the anniversary of the Hitler-Stalin pact, which was considered to be a previous Soviet sell-out to the imperialists. Ojha has remarked:

"The most surprising thing about the Taiwan crisis of 1958 was that Washington, Moscow, and Peking all understood the limits of the flare-up. All of them made every effort to avoid direct confrontations. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union used or even threatened force, until it was clear that direct negotiations, then temporarily suspended, would be resumed." 31

This seems to have been particularly in the case of the USA. Dulles is renowned for his sense of 'the enemy' and the need to destroy communism. The day the Chinese began shelling, the Secretary wrote the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the subject of defending Taiwan if necessary. However, no further action was taken until September 14th, when China declared a twelve mile limit, thereby intimidating American ships transporting supplies to Quemoy. This claim was immediately rejected by the US, and Dulles issued a warning to the effect that bombardment of the offshore islands would be considered tantamount to an effort to regain Taiwan, and in such a case the US would be forced to retaliate under the terms of the "Formosa resolution".

31 Ishwer Ojha, Op Cit, p. 97.
China-US ambassadorial talks had been broken off in early 1958 when US representative Alexis Johnson had left Czechoslovakia for a new post in Bangkok. However, on September 6th, two days after Dulles' statement, Chou En-lai suggested the resumption of the Sino-American talks, still maintaining China's right to liberate Taiwan but also clarifying China's desire to avoid war with the American people. The talks resumed on September 15th in Warsaw. Despite the many difficulties which have plagued the "on-again, off-again" nature of these negotiations, they have provided a valuable listening post for both parties involved.

Khrushchev, who kept amazingly silent throughout the period of extreme tension between the USA and China, came out on September 7th and again on the 19th, condemning the US for its actions in the Taiwan Straits. While these outpourings may have been taken seriously by Washington, China was in no way fooled into thinking that the Soviet Union would have backed her on a full-fledged offensive. This suspicion was verified by the October 5th Tass report that the Soviet Union did not propose to take any action if a similar crisis arose over the liberation of Taiwan. Ojha has further elaborated on the Crisis:

"In some ways the Chinese achieved the goals that motivated their attitude toward the Crisis. Specifically they discovered the definite limits of the Sino-Soviet alliance." 32

32 Ibid, p. 97.
The physical tension created by the Crisis could be said to have passed by mid-October of 1958, as illustrated by only odd day bombing of Quemoy. Insofar as polemics and ideological tirades were concerned, however, the war waged on. "Imperialists and all Reactionaries are Paper Tigers", a collection of Mao's statements on the U.S., was published in late October. The theory expounded was essentially that while the U.S. was militarily strong, in essence it was a "paper tiger" and would eventually be destroyed by the "revolutionary people of the world." Hence, although China was not presently in a position to confront the superpower on a military basis, she would cultivate revolutionary potential and fervour throughout the world to such an extent that they would all rise up united and slay the "imperialist monster".

The resignation of Dulles in 1959 had little effect on the "hard line" foreign policy approach adopted by both China and the U.S. Although the new U.S. Secretary of State, Christian Herter supposedly encouraged initiatives and reciprocal exchanges of newsmen (China objected because of the method by which admission of their correspondents would be arranged), the events in Laos proved that U.S. policy was as hard-nosed as under Dulles. The rather bold stance adopted by the Chinese, notably in the Laotian crisis in 1960, were viable indicators of the continuing militant mood of Mao, and his opinions on the ability of the
Chinese to deal with "paper tigers". The issue of Taiwan was injected into all negotiations between the two nations and unfortunately, "as a result (of this hard line), from the one hundredth ambassadorial meeting on September 6, 1960, according to the historian Young of Sino-American negotiations, the talks changed from "the diplomacy of negotiations to that of stalemate"."

The Chinese 'hard line' foreign policy was not exclusively applied against the Americans. As McFarquhar has noted:

"At some point in late 1959 or early 1960, the Chinese made a decision to struggle against Khrushchev's foreign policy, especially the manner in which he worked for peaceful coexistence with America. Thereafter, China's attitude on its own negotiations with the US also hardened." 34

If the US had ever felt unduly attacked by Mao's expose 'Imperialists and all Reactionaries are Paper Tigers', they could find solace in the April 1960 Maoist publication 'Long Live Leninism'. Disgusted with Khrushchev's revisionist policies and his conciliatory attitude in approaching the Big Four Paris Summit Conference of May 1960, the Chinese took the opportunity of the celebration of the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birth to publish this tirade. Basically, the publication

33 Roderick McFarquhar, Op Cit, p. 158.

34 Ibid, p. 158.
elaborated the Maoist point of view on the "correct" line in combating "imperialism". It opened up, without specifically mentioning Khrushchev or the USSR, the entire range of questions under dispute between the two nations. The Chinese contended that "imperialism" was not something to be compromised with but to be struggled against and destroyed. War is the inevitable result of this struggle and should not be avoided or skulked away from. If nothing else, this publication brought the Sino-Soviet dispute right out into the open.

Khrushchev was left with little choice except to retaliate, which he did at a congress meeting of the Rumanian Communist Party. In July of 1960, he played his trump card in punishing the CCP for their outspoken stand. Soviet economic aid to China was terminated and some 1,390 Soviet scientists and technicians essential to China's industrialization were recalled. Military aid was cancelled shortly thereafter. If the Soviet leader had intended these measures to result in bringing a repentant China back into the fold he was sadly mistaken. In fact the effect was quite the opposite. The previously moderate and even pro-Soviet Chinese leaders aligned themselves with Mao in a more determined anti-Soviet policy, as demonstrated by Liu Shao-chieh's delegation to the Conference of 81 Communist Parties held in Moscow from November to December in 1960.
1962 - 1965

Examination of this time-span illustrates, once again, that the general Chinese line in foreign policy is not always identical to their stance towards the USA and the USSR. Characterized as the 'Third World period', this period witnessed an expansion of the Chinese philosophy on foreign relations. In early March 1963 the CCP elaborated upon those nations lying between the clearly defined "socialist" and "imperialist" states. This gap was identified as the "intermediate zones", a concept developed by Mao during 1946, the implication being that these states could attack the USA and the USSR, the "dual adversary", with equal venom. The first intermediate zone included Asia, Africa and Latin America; the second intermediate zone is composed of Europe, Oceania and Canada. While the former were believed by the Chinese to have greater revolutionary potential than the latter, the developed nations were not to be ignored in light of the material goods they could contribute to the cause. Hinton has asserted that:

"the main purpose of the distinction (between the zones) was apparently to rationalize Peking's policy of trade and friendly relations with advanced capitalist countries, notably France at that time".

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Harold Hinton, *China's Turbulent Quest* Op Cit, p. 121.
Smith, however, elaborates the purpose of the intermediate zones somewhat differently:

"By reducing the grip of the superpowers in these intermediate zones and indeed within the respective blocks themselves, the Chinese believe that imperialism and revisionism will become weakened as country after country becomes more independent of outside control." 36

Hence, while it can be advanced that China's general foreign policy during this period took on a friendlier tone, this is not particularly true when referring to her relations with the USA and USSR. Although this time period is rather short, less than three years, it contained many specific events which reflected or contributed to China's perception of the superpowers. For example the Sino-Indian Border War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and the Vietnam War all contributed to the formation or confirmation of her perceptions, although China herself was not directly involved in all cases.

This period was witness to the continuation of the dispute between China and the USSR, particularly the official "split" between the two in 1963. Renewed border clashes between China and India, as well as the Cuban Missile crisis, in 1962 have been cited by both Hinton and Smith as contributory causes to the final split. 37


Smith purports that the USSR betrayed China in the first instance by sending jets to India; and in the second,

"China criticized the USSR on two grounds: first, it was "adventurism" to place missiles there (Cuba) in the first place; second, it was "capitulation" to remove them once they were there." 38

Hinton interprets the circumstances of the two situations rather differently:

"In essence, Peking gave initial support to Moscow's Cuban policy, and Moscow gave initial support to Peking's policy towards the Sino-Indian border. Mao's dislike of Khrushchev and his distrust of Khrushchev's tendencies in foreign policy, however, were too great to enable this tacit understanding to survive the strains of the two simultaneous crises for long. Early in November, when it became clear that Khrushchev proposed to ignore Castro's strenuous objections to his agreement with President Kennedy to withdraw Soviet offensive missiles and bombers from Cuba, Peking began to curry favour with Castro and score points against Khrushchev by accusing the latter exaggeratedly of having engineered "another Munich". Khrushchev promptly reverted to a stance of pro-Indian, rather than pro-Chinese, neutrality on the Sino-Indian border dispute and went on to make the equally exaggerated counter-charge that the CPR had been trying to incite thermonuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union over the Cuban issue." 39

The existing tension between China and the USSR was intensified during early March 1963 when China, in response to Soviet charges of Chinese imperialism in regards to maintaining

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38 Jack Smith, Op Cit, p. 16.
39 Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, Op Cit, p. 115.
Hong Kong and Macao, began a review of the "tsarist" border treaties the USSR had contracted with her. The question of when a follow-up conference to the November 1960 Communist Parties Conference would take place was also a bone of contention between the two. Although delegations from Central Committees of the CCP and the CPSU met during July 1963, no solution was arrived at, as neither Party was willing to concede to the other.

When the USSR became a signatory, along with the US and Britain, to the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the break between the Soviet Union and China became complete. China perceived this action as a ploy, designed to exclude her from the "nuclear club" and entrench the imperialists' power. The CCP launched an attack on this Soviet action, in the form of a series of nine articles published during September of the same year in the People's Daily and the Red Flag. The articles particularly mentioned Khrushchev, denounced his deviations from true communism, and warned against the perils of letting these methods gain a foothold in China.

Rather than heeding Chinese warnings, or at least ignoring them, the USSR continued her pattern of provocation. In his

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Ibid., p. 123.
recounting of the Sino-Soviet split Smith has pointed out that during mid-1964,

"Soviet troops conducted massive war games in the USSR's far eastern section, the object being to thwart a mock Chinese invasion. The purpose was to intimidate China. The Chinese did not consider such "games" entertaining." 41

It is hypothesized that it was this type of "adventurist" tactics which contributed to Khrushchev's downfall. Hinton concurs, stating:

"it seems highly probable that his [Khrushchev] increasingly bellicose and inept China policy was a major if not decisive count in the indictment against him." 42

The replacement of Khrushchev on the 16th. of October, 1964 by the Kosygin/Brezhnev clique did little to alter the status of Sino-Soviet relations. Although the CCP sent congratulations the following day, it soon became apparent to them that Soviet policy would remain basically the same. The Chinese tagged Soviet policy "Khrushchevism without Khrushchev", the polemical debate continuing to date.

This period clearly illustrates the escalation of the Sino-Soviet dispute into an open cleft, based on the pursuance of actual policy decisions. However, China has been scrupulously careful to avoid alienating herself from the entire communist community, for as Ojha points out: "The Chinese leadership

41 Jack Smith, Op Cit, p. 18.
42 Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, Op Cit, p. 126.
calculates that influence from a fringe position is better than no influence at all." 43

Chinese relations with the USA showed no marked improvement during this period, and, probably even deteriorated somewhat due to the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam.

Although the 1962 Kennedy Administration's statement that it would not support a Nationalist invasion of Formosa and China was met with a favourable response, this single "friendly" gesture could not possibly erase the increasingly negative image the Chinese had of the American government. This image was based upon the rapidly expanding US involvement in Vietnam from October 1961, as well as US economic/military support of India. These two situations, not to mention the Cuban Crisis, hampered China's foreign policy of becoming the leader of the Third World.

The previously mentioned Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of August 1963, also contributed heavily to the adversary image of the USA. Mao retaliated against this action by launching a series of eight personal statements of anti-American tone, particularly condemning racism and the oppression of the black Americans. This theme of US imperialism's oppression of blacks within their own country is still discernible today within the

43 Ishwer Ojha, Op Cit, p. 133.
Chinese press.

Kennedy had favoured a "Two Chinas" policy, a fact which irked China to no end. While, as McFarquhar has pointed out:

"The Sino-Soviet dispute forced American policy-makers finally to discard the old hypothesis of one united enemy called Communism," this in no way deterred them from becoming increasingly involved in the Vietnam conflict, particularly in 1964-65. As the US had feared having enemies stationed close to her border in the case of Cuba, China was similarly distraught over the American presence in Indochina and lived in the fear that the war would be expanded to the point of an American invasion of China. Hinton dismisses this possibility, alleging:

"Peking's fears for its own security were apparently eased somewhat, although not entirely, when the United States resumed bombing North Vietnam in late January 1966, after a "bombing pause," without escalating the war, and a few months later an informal understanding appears to have been reached at Warsaw to the effect that as long as China did not interfere in Vietnam it would not be attacked, and vice versa." As Hinton does not list the sources on which he bases the above statement, it can be neither proved or disproved. However, it does seem feasible that this type of 'blackmail' politics

44 Roderick McFarquhar, Op Cit, p. 186.
45 Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, Op Cit, p. 269.
did and continues to play a role between the USA and China. The recognition of the fact of such "dirty politics" though would appear merely to confirm the Chinese fear that the Americans would have no qualms about crossing into Chinese territory. This position is reinforced by the recognition by other authors that the Chinese perceived the Vietnam situation to be a repeat of Korea.

China detonated her first nuclear bomb on October 16, 1964. At the following Chinese - American ambassadorial talks in Warsaw on November 25th, China proposed a "no-first-use" agreement between the two nations. This was the first occasion China had ever offered to negotiate any agreement before concluding a settlement on the status of Taiwan. However, she was rebuffed by the USA and, by the time the States was aware of the importance of this move, China has reverted to a hard-line position and was in the throes of her Cultural Revolution.

1965 - 1968

The foreign relations of China during the period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) can best be

John Stoessinger, Op Cit; Roderick McFarquhar, Op Cit.
described in terms of their erracticism, or by the negative connotation China's radical actions often had.

The GPCR was launched by Mao in late 1965, escalating from one level of intensity to another rapidly, reaching a crescendo with the Red Guard diplomacy in August 1967 and declining throughout the autumn until early 1968, the point at which our content analysis begins. The major reason motivating Mao to undertake this rather radical action, was his fear that rightist revisionist tendencies, similar to those practiced in the Soviet Union, were taking root within his own ruling clique. He feared that after his death, China would revert entirely to these revisionist practices and that the benefits of the revolution would be lost. The importance of personally experiencing the upheaval of a revolution holds a high priority in Mao's value system. Hence, his decision to create a revolutionary situation in order to awaken the masses, and particularly the youth of China, was not only a political decision but a highly personal one.

By the end of 1966 most of China's ambassador's had been recalled to Peking, and embassies abroad were closed. Similarly, during this period the majority of diplomatic missions stationed in Peking departed. This situation was not rectified until May 1969, when Chinese diplomats slowly and cautiously began to return to their posts. The one external issue which remained constantly
paramount in China's dealings with the USSR and the USA, was the ongoing conflict in Vietnam.

Due to the very nature of the CR - the fact that its very essence was aimed at eliminating the type of rightist revisionism which China believed to be rampant in the USSR, I contend that the events of the CR had a greater effect upon Sino-Soviet relations than upon China's relations with the Americans. Certainly this period witnessed a hardening of the cleft which separated these two communist nations. Of particular importance was the role Vietnam came to play between the two, with the increasing expansion of Soviet technical and military aid to the North.

Soon after gaining power, Brezhnev made it clear to China that Soviet aid to China would be resumed if, and only if, she tacitly agreed to allow Moscow to pursue her policy aims in Asia without interference, and, that China halt all efforts at forming anti-Soviet splinter groups as well as cease campaigns against "Khrushchev revisionism without Khrushchev". Mao, who considered himself the ideological leader of the communist community, had no intention of allowing himself to be bullied into such suppliance.

Although the Soviet Union attempted to continue its program of assistance to Vietnam, while merely ignoring China, this stance became increasing difficult as these shipments had to pass
through Chinese territory. Therefore, Moscow was forced to request on February 25, 1966 that China agree to provide the necessary rail facilities for these shipments. The Chinese response came on March 4th, in the form of a protest against Soviet policy toward the U.S. and Vietnam, and a counter-demand that the long-promised Conference of Communist Parties be convened. The Soviet Union allowed the preparatory conference to take place—the result being disastrous insofar as formulating unified policy statements due to absenteeism and the fact that many of the parties present, for reasons of political expediency, felt compelled to play both the Soviet and Chinese sides of the fence. The Soviet Union boasted the Chinese on the issue of rail transit facilities at Vietnam, by utilizing the ploy of calling for "united action" by the communist world, naturally under the leadership of the Great Bear. Once the USSR had obtained a promise from the Chinese on the issue of rail transit, they pushed the matter further. On April 3, 1966 Moscow proposed a top-level conference between themselves and the Chinese and the North Vietnamese. This occasion was used to request Chinese grants of air transit rights for Soviet military equipment bound for North Vietnam, as well as the right for the Soviets to establish one or two air bases in Southwest China. For obvious reasons Peking refused: although she supported the liberation of Vietnam, she had also maintained that the impetus for the revolution
must come from within, and certainly, she was not willing to sacrifice her own territorial sovereignty and integrity to the USSR, whose motives were considered far from sacrosanct. Hinton, despite his obvious pro-American leanings, is able to understand the Chinese motives behind this decision, and lists them as twofold:

"There were probably two main reasons for the Chinese attitude: a fear of possible American air action against the proposed bases and against Chinese territory and a belief that the agreement would lead to an undesirable degree of Soviet political influence not only on North Vietnam but on China itself, more so than would the comparatively inconspicuous and innocuous procedure of shipping equipment by rail." 47

Mao's highly personalized campaign against all forms of Soviet-styled revisionism both at home (as illustrated by the purging of Chief of Staff Lo Ju-i-ching in 1966) and abroad (demonstrated by China's efforts to exclude the USSR from the projected Afro-Asian Conference to be held in Algiers 1965) agitated the Soviets greatly. There have been unconfirmed reports that the Soviets were so irritated that they were contemplating some form of military intervention so as to oust the Chairman. Hinton reports scanty details of a "February plot" 48 aimed at this goal. The only other substantial proof is that

47 Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, Op Cit, p. 132.
48 Ibid, p. 133.
ambassadors were withdrawn from each other's country shortly thereafter, and in late March 1966 China refused to attend the CPSU's Twenty-Third Congress. This type of secret Soviet intervention seems to have been halted in late spring 1966, as China entered the depths of the CR and became increasingly isolationist and closed. Tension along the Sino-Soviet border flourished during this period, as well as propaganda campaigns against the USSR and vice versa - for example, the USSR condemning China for their obstructionist attitudes towards aiding North Vietnam, and China registering protest against Soviet meetings with the "imperialist American chieftains".

As previously noted, the US role in the Vietnam civil war continued to colour all Chinese dealings with and Chinese perceptions of the USA during the years 1965 to 1968. Mao had not expected the US to escalate its commitment to the war significantly and when the US began her bombing missions over North Vietnam on February 7, 1965, it was a shock to most of the Chinese ruling elite. In view of the fact that this research is concerned with the manner in which the Chinese press reveals the officials' perceptions of the outside world, it is interesting to note that this US action was met by absolute silence. Within the Chinese milieu, silence is often as significant as any barrage of words, and, can be used to denote severe condemnation. The same tactic was employed in the
case of the death of Che Guevara - a one-time close friend of the masses, later considered a deviant from the true Marxist-Leninist philosophy. His death went unreported for over six months, then only to be reported in a casual manner in the discussion of another news item. A conclusion can be drawn, albeit on tenous ground, that some things are considered by the Chinese to be too horrendous and despicable, such as the US bombings, that silence is the only fashion in which one can truly express oneself.

Internally, the new situation created by the US escalation of the war, set off debate on the position China should now adopt. Four main issues were central: how should the objective of defeating imperialism be approached; what strategy should be adopted in regards to Chinese intervention, if any; how should the Chinese define their role in this conflict; and, what should be China's position on the Soviet role in intervening? The publication of Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of People's War" on September 3, 1965 seemed to encapsulate the Maoist point of view on these questions. Although Lin has since been denounced and his work removed from circulation, basically I think it is fair to state that this piece of literature would still hold today as the basic Maoist view on the matter of

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Ibid, p. 142.
"people's wars". By the various levels of escalation, the US had completed the same sequence it had gone through in Korea and China was now in a position she had not expected to be exposed to again. Once again they were threatened by enemies on their doorstep who were capable of destroying them in one 'fell swipe'. Hence, China had no real alternative, except to rely on the strategy of "people's war". Lin's point was clear: if the US attacked China, then China would be free to decide how and where the war should be fought. Quite simply, all the people of the "countryside" (this implicitly includes the first intermediate zone) would rise up and encircle the city (i.e., the imperialists), strangling it and thus defeating it. At this point the Chinese definitely conceived of a "dual adversary" to be combatted. As Hinton states:

"Logically, the point was clear: it would make no sense to seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union for the purpose of warding off an American invasion if Moscow was planning a similar invasion." 50

The official Johnson policy towards China during this time-span was "containment without isolation". This phraseology of a policy-approach was first put forward by Dean A. Barnett during the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on China in March 1966. These hearings were an obvious

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50 Ibid., p. 144.

51 Ibid., p. 213.
indication of the American public's (or at least the lobbies') dissatisfaction with the Administration's China policy. Although this could have been an encouraging sign to the Chinese, they were still preoccupied with the CR, with its internal pressures and demands, and hence continued to verbally do battle with the USA.

Despite a statement issued by Secretary of State Rusk on April 17, 1966 to the effect that the US had no intention of attacking China, the latter went ahead on the 3rd. of the following month with her third nuclear test. This test was the first experimenting with thermonuclear material and was an indicator that China still suspected that the US might launch a pre-emptive attack. However, the Chinese were not completely implacable. Once again, on May 10th., Chou issued China's now eighteen month old proposal for a Sino-American agreement on a "no-first-use" in regards to nuclear weapons. The US declined, issuing a counter-proposal that China sign a partial test-ban treaty in exchange for a "no-first-use" pledge. Due to the massive differences in the status of each country's nuclear development, naturally China was forced to decline.

A further call by Johnson on July 12, 1966 for "reconciliation and cooperation" was rejected by China because of the escalating US involvement in Vietnam, as well as the fact
that the domestic situation restricted any such possibility. This situation remained the constant until the end of the Cultural Revolution.

There have been accusations that the Cultural Revolution contributed nothing to the establishment of either internal or external stable policy. Hinton's statement that:

"The Cultural Revolution, by Maoist standards or any others, seemed increasingly a failure," is one with which I would not agree. The concentration on the American involvement in Vietnam, for example, was a tremendous aid in promoting internal cohesion. This programme of "war preparedness" which every individual underwent contributed to the desired atmosphere of revolution, and, the need for the masses to join in a "united front". Smith, usually representative of the official CCP line, agrees with this opinion only to a certain extent. He states:

"The Cultural Revolution .... was a highly positive achievement internally, but contained some negative aspects in external policy. China entered a period of extreme diplomatic isolation and tended at times to adopt a dogmatic and sectarian line."

52 Ibid, p. 141.

Halpern however, disagrees with Hinton completely, with a stance which is in close keeping with my opinion. He writes:

"No substantial damage, either long-term or short-term, to PRC interests can be shown to have resulted (from the CR) ... On the contrary ... when Peking reached the point of redefining its views and adopting different behavior, it was unusually free of prior commitments. It could reappraise its strategy from a virtual tabula rasa position and move in the directions and at the pace it would determine for itself - subject, of course, to environmental developments."

Recapping, we have reviewed the various trends of China's relations with the USA and the USSR since before her liberation to 1968. The various historical factors which contribute to the Chinese perception of the two superpowers as hostile have been highlighted. Both the American insistence on a "Two Chinas" policy and the Sino-Soviet split have played major roles in the development of Chinese perceptions.

It is these types of historical experiences and memories which have gone into the formation of China's perceptions of the global environment. This is the historical framework which must be taken into account in interpreting the results on the content analysis.

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CHAPTER IV

MAJOR FINDINGS

The implications of the major findings will be spelled out in the light of the historical background just presented. As mentioned in Chapter I, it is the direction and magnitude of any shift in the official Chinese perceptions which are of the foremost interest.

Figure 1 shows the shift which occurred in the official Chinese perceptions of the USA and the USSR as enemies between Periods 1, 2 and 3.
Figure 1: Aggregate Period Totals of Hostile Symbols - Comparison between the USA & the USSR

Period 2: September 6, 1968 - April 30, 1969
Period 3: May 5, 1969 - December 26, 1969
The shift in the official Chinese perceptions of the USSR from Period 1 to 2, indicated by a jump of 906 to 3038 hostile symbols used, is indeed great enough to be termed 'significant'. The change in the perceptions of the USA is not quite as dramatic, dropping from 2289 to 1596, between the two periods. The Period 3 figures for the USA remain relatively constant, declining only minutely from 1596 to 1542. Although the decline from Period 2 to 3 for the USSR was more emphatic - 3038 to 2048, the USSR still far outstretched the USA in terms of being the recipient of hostile outputs from China. Greater significance is gained though, when comparison between the two superpowers is examined for the purpose of determining who is perceived by the Chinese as the "primary enemy". As Laswell has pointed out in "Keys, Symbols, Signs and Icons":

"It is apparent that changes in the spread of frequency of exposure to key symbols is an exceedingly significant indicator of social processes."

This seems to have been the case in the change in the Chinese perceptions of the two superpowers.

The importance of this major finding, indicative of a shift in Chinese perceptions between the periods, cannot be fully appreciated unless an explanation of the various time spans is included.

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Hence, a short chronology of the respective periods will be introduced so that the reader will have a more thorough knowledge of what events and issues were taking place, thereby understanding the implications and pressures they could have placed on China's perceptions of the environment within which she operates. It is during this chronology that further introduction of a monthly breakdown of the periods becomes crucial.

It should also be noted that the interpretation of the reasons why a shift took place in the official Chinese perceptions can be approached from two different points of view. The first is the Chinese one, which rationalizes all political matters, whether they be perceptions or policy, in terms of the Marxist - Leninist - Maoist ideology or the "correct" Party line. The second is an American point of view, very pragmatic, best represented by Harold Hinton, which holds that perceptions and resultant policy are based upon a realistic evaluation of internal and external needs and the various ways in which national goals can best be achieved. Both points of view will be taken into account in attempting an explanation of the possible basis and implications of the shifts in official Chinese perceptions.

A clarification, by means of example, of these differing viewpoints is illustrated by the manner in which determinants of Chinese foreign policy are presented. Harold Hinton lists three basic determinant of Chinese foreign policy: 1) a combination of national and ideological traits corresponding to the Chinese
ambition to become a major Asian power; 2) the need for safe and secure borders, especially in light of the dual nuclear threat; 3) the cultivation of nationalism through concentration of hostile propaganda on external or negative examples; i.e., in this case the "social imperialist" USSR's intervention in Mongolia and the "imperialist" USA's intervention in Taiwan. Hence, Hinton sees China major considerations in the formulation of foreign policy as quite cut and dried. Foreign policy must lead to internal mobilization, security and international prestige. Before entering into the ramifications of Hinton's arguments and how they relate to Chinese perceptions, it would be interesting to hold up in comparison the manner in which the Chinese bureaucracy rationalizes its foreign policy.

A typical rationalization of a change in Chinese foreign policy is presented by Jack Smith in his pamphlet, *Unite the Many, Defeat the Few*. The presentation is radically different from Hinton's insofar as it is not only rationalized but couched in ideological jargon:

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"By early 1969, as a result of the continuing development of modern revisionism in the USSR, increasing collusion between Moscow and Washington, the border crisis, threat of aggression from the USSR and other factors, combined with the conclusion of the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government began to inaugurate a dramatically new foreign posture which led to the restoration of its rights in the UN, the Nixon visit and greatly expanded influence in international affairs."

PERIOD 1

This period incorporates the months of January through August 1968, albeit the invasion of Czechoslovakia took place on August 21st. The ideological pattern this period seems to represent is the CCP pronouncement in late 1963 of the four main global contradictions: 1) the contradiction between the imperialist camp and the Socialist camp; 2) the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries; 3) the contradiction between the oppressed nations and imperialism; and 4) the contradiction among the imperialist countries and among the monopoly capitalist groups in the imperialist countries. A modification of this stance was put forth by Lin Piao in 1965 in his piece Long Live the Victory of the People's War!, in which he states:

"The contradiction between the revolutionary peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America and the imperialists headed by the United States is the principal contradiction in the contemporary world."

The finding that the only pattern which clearly emerged during this period is that the USA is perceived as the primary imperialist nation, and therefore as the "greater enemy", would appear to be in keeping with the above CCP dictum. However, in view of the fact of the militant anti-Soviet revisionist tendencies practiced throughout the Cultural Revolution, it is particularly interesting to note that the US maintained the position of the "primary contradiction", as reflected by the fact that she consistently scored higher on hostile symbol output during these eight months, as illustrated by Figure 2.

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Figure 2: Aggregate Monthly Totals of Hostile Symbols for the USA and the USSR for Period 1

Number of Hostile Symbols

USA

USSR

JAN  FEB  MAR  APR  MAY  JUN  JUL  AUG
1968
Thematic issues appear to play a greater role in determining Chinese perceptions than specific events during this period. The one issue constantly harped upon is regards to the USSR is the baseness of their revisionist tendencies. The USA, on the other hand, is perceived as a representative of a number of undesirable characteristics, the first and foremost being their continued war of aggression in Vietnam. This is followed closely by their imperialist activities in Japan, their continued exploitation of Afro-Americans, and their support of Israel's aggressive tendencies.

Events which occurred during this period include the January 23, 1968, USS Pueblo incident, which this author incorrectly expected would result in a "peak output" of hostile symbols. The following months of February and March were relatively quiet. Martin Luther King was assassinated on April 4, 1968. This tragedy was met by a barrage of hostile symbols in the Peking Review, the purpose being the condemnation of the US imperialists' treatment of their black citizens. This event, coupled with a series of articles criticizing US involvement in Vietnam made April 1968 the second highest "peak" within Period 1.

May 10th marked the opening of the Paris Peace Talks between Vietnam and the USA. The Chinese, due to their
ideological belief that there is no such thing as peaceful transition to communism and that revolution is necessary, coupled with the fact of their disbelief that nations sit down to talk peace while they are still engaged in armed combat, led to their labelling of the Talks as a fraud. The Chinese also decided in May to cancel their own scheduled meeting with the Americans at Warsaw, pending the outcome of the US general election. These particular events, in addition to the previously mentioned thematic issues, resulted in May 1968 having the greatest number of hostile symbols in Period 1. This was followed in the next month, June, by a radical decline in the use of hostile symbols.

The levels of hostile symbol output in reference to the USSR was fairly constant, rising and falling in moderate proportions to that of the USA. The two "peak" months for the USSR, are May and August 1968. When conducting their attacks upon the USA in May, the Peking Review also included a series of seven articles specifically directed at the perils of Soviet revisionism. The "peak" in August resulted from the immediate outpouring of condemnatory statements from Peking over the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Thus we find in Period 1, no unexpected or great deviations from the official ideological pronouncements.
This period covers the months from September 1968 through to April 1969. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 was chosen as the logical turning point to this period, as there was a distinct shift in the official perceptions of the Chinese of the USA\(^6\) and the USSR, as enemies, after this watershed date in history. The change which occurred within the realm of Chinese perceptions of the superpowers has been amply displayed by Figure 1, and is clarified even further by Figure 3.
Figure 3: Aggregate Monthly Totals of Hostile Symbols for the USA and the USSR for Period 2
Figure 1 illustrates that not only did the USSR surpass the USA as the perceived "major enemy", in Period 2, but the Soviet Union was the recipient of over three times as many hostile symbols as the United States. The results presented in Figure 3 reinforce this finding. Whereas, during Period 1, the USA constantly towers above the USSR as "public enemy number one", the position is totally reversed for five of the eight months in this period.
Figure 4: Aggregate Period 2 Totals for Significant Symbols for the USA and the USSR

Number of Hostile Symbols

* Of those symbols listed in Appendix A, only the symbols listed here had frequency totals high enough to be termed significant.
Figure 4 is not very explicit in demonstrating this rather dramatic change. In fact the USSR has higher totals only in reference to four of the hostile terms: criminal/renegade; counter-revolutionary; neo-colonialist and fascist. The total for the term criminal/renegade is overwhelming for the USSR during this period. This was accounted for by the increased references to the Soviet "crimes" committed during the Sino-Soviet border clashes.

Although one could assert that both the USA and the USSR are held at equally low levels of esteem, there have been indications, both in the results of the symbol analysis conducted herein and in Chinese pronouncements, that in fact the Soviet Union occupied the position of the "major threat" or "enemy" within the sphere of Chinese perceptions. Perhaps the most important indication of this is the alleged fact (as the meeting was closed this information cannot be verified) that Chairman Mao himself described the USSR as China's "major enemy" at the CCP's Eighth Central Committee's Twelfth Plenary Session, held from October 13th to 31st, 1968. The extraordinarily high total of hostile symbol output for the month of November 1968 (see Figure 3), immediately following this alleged pronouncement is perhaps proof of its accuracy. Other indications are also supplied by Jack Smith. Although the publication he writes for, The Guardian, is American, it is overtly sympathetic to the thought of Mao and can be considered as representative
of official CCP apologetics. There are two particular statements of Smith's which are indicative of the Chinese perceptions of the USSR as the major antagonist. First,

"Before discussing Chinese policies from 1969 to today, it is necessary to examine some of the major theoretical differences between the CCP and the CPSU, since these have a profound influence on present Chinese policies."

Secondly,

"Soviet...social imperialism...is even more deceitful than...old-line imperialist countries and therefore more dangerous."

It is my opinion, that two specific events played the primary role leading to this shift leaving the USSR as the "primary enemy", namely the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968 and the border clashes on Chennao Island in the Ussuri River on March 2nd, 14th, and 15th, 1969. It is also held that the decrease in the Chinese perception of the USA as an "enemy" was directly related to the above. Therefore this area will be entered into after an explanation of the Chinese-Soviet relationship has been completed.

The erratic jump from August's 211 to September 504 hostile Chinese symbols describing the USSR, reflected China's opinion on what a deplorable action that nation had undertaken in

5 Jack Smith, Op Cit, p. 20.

6 Peking Review, October 6, 1972, as cited by Jack Smith, Op Cit, p. 4.
invading Czechoslovakia. This stance was also evidenced by
the introduction of two hostile symbols, used only in reference
to the USSR - ie. "social imperialist" and "social fascist".
Two other events also contributed to the high USSR total in
September. On the 12th., Albania, China's loyal comrade-
in-arms and loyal defender, withdrew from the Warsaw Pact.
This action was taken to indicate Albania's displeasure with the
USSR for their intervention in a member state of the Warsaw
Pact's internal affairs. On the 16th., Peking reported that
the Soviets were making over flights over Manchurian territory
claimed as Chinese. Both events brought about a further torrent
of bad press defiling the "Soviet revisionist bandits ''. 

The long-standing issues behind the Sino-Soviet split
have been significantly deepened with the increasing restoration
of capitalism in the USSR, coupled with the CPSU abandonment
of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" for the "state of the whole
people". This rather untenable position became even more un-
bearable with the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the
consequent Brezhnev Doctrine, which asserted the USSR's
right to intervene forcibly or otherwise, in any "socialist"
country if "socialism" as defined by Moscow was judged to be
endangered. This event verified the Chinese suspicions that

7 Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest (London:
the Soviets were vile revisionists who would stop at virtually nothing to expand their power. The profound effect this had upon the Chinese leadership was evident with the introduction of the term "social imperialist", in reference to the USSR, by Chou En-lai on August 23, 1968, only two days after the fact. Contrary to Hinton's contention that the term was first used during the 1969 Ussuri River clashes, it was during this time that the phrase received increased frequency and venom. Therefore, I would tend to disagree with Hinton's statement:

"It was not until November 1968 Peking, although perturbed by the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine, claimed to see no reason why either of these developments...required steps to improve China's diplomatic position and thereby gain support against a possible threat."

The following figures amply illustrates this point.

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9 Harold Hinton, The Bear at the Gate, Op Cit, p. 42.

10 Ibid, p. 31
Figure 5: Period Totals for Social Imperialist

Number of Hostile Symbols

0  25  50  75  100  125  150  175  200  225

ONE  TWO  THREE

Figure 6: Monthly Totals for Social Imperialist for Period 2

Number of Hostile Symbols

0  25  50  75  100

SEP  OCT  NOV  DEC  JAN  FEB  MAR  APR

1968  1969
The fact that the term "social imperialist" was used so soon after the invasion, by Chou during his address to the Rumanian National Day celebration, reflected the realization by the Chinese that this doctrine of "limited sovereignty" could be used not only against members of the Warsaw Pact, but also against them and their upcoming Ninth Party Congress. Therefore, it is hypothesized that although the perception of Moscow as a threat and "enemy" was most clear, it was bureaucratically in-fighting and internal dissension between the two main lines which prevented immediate adoption of a specific plan of action. Chou En-lai proposed the re-establishment of relations with some countries, along with the re-opening of negotiations with the USA, in hopes of gaining a counter-balance to the USSR. Lin Biao argued that the Maoist dual adversary strategy should be maintained. It was the latter which was accepted by Mao, at least temporarily. Therefore, although the post-Cultural Revolution period began in November 1968, following the Twelfth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP, this by no means heralded the formation of a unified foreign policy to which she would adhere. The aggregate monthly totals presented on Figure 3 for the months just discussed would seem to indicate that there is a very close relationship between the international events and China's perceptions.
The CCP's Central Committee Twelfth Plenary Session occupied most of the month of October, specifically the 13th to the 31st. It has been alleged that it was at this Session that Mao described the Soviet Union as China's "major enemy". The greater portion of the Session was concerned with internal matters, in particular the ending of the Cultural Revolution.

Hence, during October 1969, the press dealt mainly with internal issues, leading to subsequent declines in the hostility totals of both the USA and the USSR. The total of hostile symbol output towards the USSR is almost double that of the USA for November. On November 25th, Peking proposed the renewal of the Warsaw Talks with the US, at the ambassadorial level, on February 20, 1969. This proposal came at a time when Mao was absent from public view, supposedly due to illness. This could explain the rise in hostile symbol output towards the USSR, and the proposal to the USA, which originated from Premier Chou's office, as Mao despised any "official" contact with the Americans. No event of special significance took place in December, although the total hostile output towards the USA continued to rise. This trend continued and peaked in January 1969, the reason being an anti-Nixon campaign by the Chinese press, which culminated on February 19th, with the announcement that the pre-scheduled Sino-American talks for the next day were cancelled.
The second major event which appears to have played a role in the increased Chinese perception of the USSR as the "enemy" is the Sino-Soviet border clashes. In March 1969, the USSR again entered the limelight, this time at the highest hostility-perceived level for both nations, for all three periods. The primary event was the Sino-Soviet clashes on Chenpao Island in the Ussuri River on March 2nd, 14th, and 15th. Many political analysts have claimed that these incidents are the closest the USSR and China have ever come to open warfare. On March 17th, Brezhnev denounced the Chinese for their aggression at a Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest.

On March 21st, Kosygin attempted to telephone Peking directly, in hopes of easing the crisis, only to be rebuffed a day later by receiving Chinese directions to use the normal diplomatic channels. The Soviet government rejected the Chinese position of renegotiating unequal treaties on March 22nd, and demanded "consultations" on the border question. Even if one is not familiar with Chinese foreign policy studies, it is not hard to envision the effects such a situation would have upon China's perceptions, in terms of defining exactly who is "the enemy". The majority of attention during this month was directed towards the USSR, while the hostility rating for the USA declined.

Once again, it is interesting to see the striking differences in accounts given of these clashes by Hinton and Smith. Smi...
attributes the clashes to acts of pure Soviet aggression against the Chinese people — "the Soviet Union sent armed soldiers to flagrantly intrude into Chenpao Island... and killed and wounded frontier guards of the Chinese PLA". Meanwhile, Hinton alleges that the first incident was staged by Lin Piao, a miscalculation which later contributed to his downfall. The March 15th retaliation by the Soviets was so decisive that it resulted in a delay in the opening of the Ninth Party Congress.

Whichever explanation one accepts it is again clear that the events of March 1969 resulted in the highest peak in the Chinese perception of the USSR as the "enemy" throughout the entire twenty-four period under consideration.

The CCP Ninth Party Congress, already postponed because of the Sino-Soviet clashes, took place from April 1st to 24th, 1969. The Congress dealt mostly with internal matters, Lin Piao did make it clear during this time that Peking did not actually expect the return of territories ceded under previous "unequal treaties". This stance made it much easier for the Chinese to accept the April 26th proposal by Moscow of Khabarovsk as the site for river border negotiations, which she eventually did on May 11th, only to later withdraw again on


May 24th. The Congress led to scanty coverage by the Peking Review of either antagonist in April. Insofar as foreign policy was concerned, the Congress: 1) put forth the thesis that social imperialism was equal to US imperialism; 2) changed the order of priorities in listing the contradictions – giving primary weight to the struggle of oppressed nations; and 3) eliminated references to the socialist and imperialist "camps." The listing of the four major contradictions reads as follows:

"The contradiction between the oppressed nations on the one hand and the imperialism and social imperialism on the other; the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist and revisionist countries; the contradiction between imperialist and social-imperialist countries and among the imperialist countries; and the contradiction between socialist countries on the one hand and imperialism and social imperialism on the other." 14

Hence, we are able to see that the shifts apparent in Figures 1 and 3 are in keeping to some degree with the ideological pronouncements of the Chinese leadership.

13 Jack Smith, Op Cit, p. 5.
14 Ibid.
PERIOD 3

This period consists of eight months, May to December 1969, immediately following the closing of the Ninth Party Congress. The purpose in examining press output during this period is to determine whether or not the policies verbalized during the Congress were implemented and what trends were established.

The declared foreign policy outcome of the Ninth Party Congress, held from April 1st to 28th, 1969 was basically a re-statement of the dual adversary strategy of struggle against the superpowers, and the formation of a united front with the small and medium sized states, in addition to continued theoretical support of revolutionary movements. Hinton objects, stating that:

"Peking has really subordinated her support of revolution to its cultivation of other governments with a primary anti-Soviet purpose. In fact, though not in theory or propaganda, Peking had begun to tilt in the direction of the US as the best potentially available counterweight to the Soviet Union."

This statement would seem to be borne out by the fact that despite the dual adversary struggle adopted by the Chinese in April, their perception of the USSR as the greater of the two enemies continued to rise throughout the months of May to September 1969, as seen in Figure 7.

15

Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, Op Cit, p. 287.
Figure 7: Aggregate Monthly Totals of Hostile Symbols for the USA and the USSR for Period 3
Eventually, when the hostile output towards the USSR dropped, it did not fall to a level equal to the USA. This fact would seem to support the thesis that hostility output towards the USSR and the USA was never perfectly equal. While both may have been on the Chinese "black list," it appears that concentration upon the "primary contradiction" shifted between the two alternately.

This time-span, Period 3, is distinctly peculiar when compared to the previous two. Although the USSR's total of hostile symbol output is higher than that of the USA by some 506 symbols, this would not appear to justify a singular distinguishing trend for the entire period. The eight-month span could easily be divided into two sub-periods, one covering from May to the end of September, and the other from October to the end of December. During the first phase of this period the USSR towers above the USA as the perceived "major enemy," while this position is reversed throughout the second phase, with the total output for both countries down by almost half.

As soon as the Ninth Party Congress was adjourned, China began an extensive programme of re-opening and expanding her foreign relations. Ambassadors began to be re-appointed and returned to their diplomatic missions abroad during May. Between May and July 1969, seventeen such appointments were made,
most of them to areas of crucial importance to China's foreign relations programme, such as Sweden where China-Canada diplomatic recognition negotiations were under way. Notably, an ambassador was not sent to the USSR, and the press renewed its campaign against Soviet revisionism, which lasted from May until September. This resulted in the USSR having a total output for the month of May which was more than double that of the USA - a situation which persisted throughout June and July.

Press coverage of the issues which contributed to the Sino-Soviet split was fairly high during June of 1969. Two specific events contributed to the hostile output towards the USSR during this month. First, Brezhnev made a proposal for a system of collective security in Asia, the purpose being to establish the Great Bear as "protector" of this area. This was met by a hostile response from China, who saw this as yet another scheme to try and contain and encircle her. The Soviets also issued a three month ultimatum on June 13th to the Chinese on the settlement of the border dispute. This resulted in a media concentration on the atrocities which had been committed by the "Soviet revisionists" against the Chinese people during the border clashes on Chenpao, and strong urgings that the administration not compromise with such bandits.

The US easement on the trade and commerce with China
was announced during July. Thus, it seems the US was held in relatively good stead during the summer months, her hostile symbol output totals remaining practically constant. August was a quiet month insofar as Chinese foreign relations were concerned, the media concentrating primarily upon internal matters. The August 1st. publication of the Peking Review is devoted to the celebration of Army Day, and hence most articles dealt with issues of concern to the military. Articles which do mention foreign activities do so in a rather peripheral manner, for example "Soviet Working People Hate the New Tsars." Hence total references to both state's under consideration fell proportionately during this month. This position was totally reversed for the month of September. Although the US remained at the same level of esteem, the Chinese were furious over the eleventh hour meeting on the border question held between Chou and Kosygin on the 11th. of September at Peking airport. They were upset over the forced compromise with the Soviets and a campaign of "war preparedness" against the Soviet Union was introduced with renewed vigor. Strangely enough, little reference was made to US "imperialism" and "aggression" in the September 7th. issue commemorating the death of Ho Chi-minh on the 4th, of that month. The tone of the publication was strictly one of polite, but controlled condolences.

October seems to indicate an almost complete reversal of
this hard-nosed stance against the Soviet Union. Sino-Soviet talks on the border dispute commenced on October 20th, and have been held intermittently at the Deputy Minister level in Peking ever since. However, this reversal can be interpreted as an anti-American trend rather than a pro-Soviet one. The changes apparent in the total outputs could be seen as a belated response to Ho's death or the Nixon Doctrine exposed in July 1969. While pleased with the trade easements, the Chinese pronouncements against the USA could be viewed as a reminder to that state that China was not a nation to be "contained" or "decontained" by anyone. The National Day (October 1st) issue contained articles mainly on internal issues, although they were strewn with references and comparisons to American "imperialism" and "aggression." Halpern has noted:

"The Chinese position, as defined in October 1969 (Peking Review #41 p. 3-4), was to seek better state relations without compromising "ideological" positions, i.e. retaining freedom to make anti-Soviet political moves outside the context of bilateral relations."

16

If one could project, it is suspected that January and February 1970 would perhaps witness a decrease in US hostile symbol output totals, as a response to further openings of trade between the two during December, as well as the announcement on the 12th. of that month that the two had held negotiations in Warsaw earlier.

The symbol counts presented on the following figures are indicative of the trend of this period.
Figure 8: Aggregate Period 3 Totals for Significant Symbols for the USA and the USSR
No one nation has greater totals for all the terms, the split being about even. While the USA is seen as the greater "aggressor", a reference to her activities in Southeast Asia, the USSR is the greater "criminal", "oppressor" and "fascist", a reference to her internal tactics as well as those on the Sino-Soviet border. Both are seen as equally counter-revolutionary, both as hampering just movements throughout the world.

One factor which further substantiates the argument that there was a shift in Chinese perceptions is the Chinese use of the symbols "imperialist" and "revisionist". The USA is seldom, if ever, referred to in the Peking Review as just the USA. The tag "imperialist" is attached in the majority of references. The same situation holds true for the USSR and their respective tag "revisionist". There have been random cases where the USA was referred to as "revisionist" and the USSR as "imperialist". However, it is my opinion that a comparison of the frequency with which the Chinese used these terms during the time-span under consideration would provide further proof in identifying the official Chinese perceptions. This supposition is illustrated by Figure 9.
Figure 9: Aggregate Period Totals for Terms "Imperialism" and "Revisionism."

Number of Hostile Symbols

Period 2: September 6, 1968 - April 30, 1969
Period 3: May 5, 1969 - December 26, 1969
While the Chinese have never been interested in obtaining a nuclear guarantee from the USA, they undeniably desired a political relationship strong enough to give the Soviets a moment of hesitation before making China the object of their aggression. The Chinese have always held that the development of a better relationship with the USA was dependent upon their withdrawal from Indo-China. It was exactly this problem which created the "on-again, off-again" situation in regards to the Warsaw negotiations, as illustrated by Mao's cancellation of the February 20, 1969 meeting. The election of the Nixon administration, supposedly dedicated to the ending of the war in Vietnam and its eventual de-escalation made Chinese acceptance of "friendly" American gestures possible. As Hinton has realistically noted:

"Each [ie, China and the USSR] has been hampered by the fact that the other's size and power, actual or potential, are so great that there is only one adequate possible counterweight, the US, a country which tends to have an adversary relationship with both and which presents serious ideological problems for any Communist power in search of support."

The Chinese seem to realize this ideological problem, insofar as they have never dropped the image of the USA as an "enemy", but only decreased at certain intervals the intensity of their use of hostile symbols in describing it.

Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, Op Cit, p. 211.
One factor which must not be ignored in drawing conclusions from the findings of the symbolic analysis is the role which the external "enemy" plays in maintaining internal cohesion, as previously mentioned in Chapter I. Finlay has observed:

"The external image is calculated to have a deterrent effect upon the enemy and to reduce the likelihood of overt threats within the society by projecting the idea of strength."

Following the Cultural Revolution there were many burdens and sins to be shifted from the shoulders of the Chinese administration. The physical proximity of the USSR and the historical/ideological rift made it a prime target. While outright war between China and the USSR would be disadvantageous to both sides, the Chinese campaign of "war preparedness" served the purpose of uniting the people against the "enemy". This "war preparedness" which enhanced economic decentralization and local self-reliance achieved two of Mao Tse-tung's most important goals. This is not to imply that the Chinese did not in fact perceive a Soviet threat. It is only to point out that perceptions consist of factors composed of both the internal and external environment. It must be realized that China was in a very tricky position vis-à-vis keeping a balance position regarding the USA.

"While maintaining a posture of opposition to the superpowers, the Chinese had to defuse critical tensions and reduce, if they could not eliminate, potential threats to their security. It is a fair surmise that Peking's interest in direct relations with the superpowers does not go much beyond this. China achieved this much in relation to the Soviet Union toward the end of 1969."

Recapping, China during the period covering January 1968 to December 1969, underwent a change in her perceptions of the USA and the USSR as enemies. This shift was perceptible by the frequency of the use of hostile symbols towards the two respective nations in the Peking Review. The main events of this time-span were the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Soviet border clashes, the de-escalation of the war in Vietnam, and the re-establishment of diplomatic missions at home and abroad by mid-May 1969. The Chinese perceptions which were analysed were closely aligned to foreign policy output, meeting both the ideological and pragmatic requirements of the various bureaucracies. In the opinion of this writer, the trend of Chinese perceptions of the USA and the USSR established during this

A. P. Halpern, Op Cit, p. 37.
period has been continued to a certain extent. This has been reflected by the ascendency of Chou En-lai and his moderate "game plan". For example, it is Chou who has undertaken the major responsibilities involved in establishing workable relationships with the Western world, notably the United States. However, the statement is qualified by "to a certain extent", due to the fact that there have been indications, such as the 1973-1974 "anti-Confusius campaign"; Chou's periodic absences supposedly due to ill health; and, the results presented on Figure 6 which indicate a decline in the anti-Soviet stance of China. These could be possible indicators of yet another possible shift occurring in Chinese foreign policy. However, as Figure 10 indicates, the Chinese perception of the Soviet Union as a "social imperialist" did not decline commensurately in Period 3, but rather increased.
Figure 10: Monthly Totals for Social Imperialist for Period 3

Number of Hostile Symbols

May  | Jun  | Jul  | Aug  | Sep  | Oct  | Nov  | Dec  
1969
These are the major findings of the content analysis conducted on the Peking Review for the period covering January 1968 to December 1969. The results shown reinforce the theory that there was a significant shift in the official Chinese perceptions of the USA and the USSR as enemies during the period January 1968 to December 1969. This shift was perceptible by the frequency of the use of hostile symbols towards the two nations in the Peking Review. Although this finding in itself is relevant, it can be enhanced by attempting to interpret and feedback the results into the mainstream of Chinese foreign policy studies.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Inevitably, one is faced upon completion of a research problem with the question of the value of its findings. One of the criteria of worthwhile research on Chinese foreign policy studies pointed out in the Introduction of this paper, is that it relate or contribute to the formulation of international relations theory. The research conducted herein has undoubtedly established that there was a shift in the official Chinese perceptions of the USA and the USSR as enemies between January 1968 and December 1969. Possible contributory factors to this shift, such as specific events and thematic issues, have also been discussed in depth. However, studies dealing in the area of perception necessarily present the inevitable "chicken and egg" problem: ie. Did the perception of a certain situation predate the occurrence of certain events and are merely borne out by the fact at a later date; or Did the perception change after the occurrence of certain events - a response to objective facts.

A number of theoreticians have applied themselves to this particular problem. Michael Brecher purports that perception comes only after a particular act; one does not rationalize change until a change has taken place. This is just one area in which

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further research could be directed. This content analysis would appear on the surface to support Brecher's hypothesis. Official Chinese perceptions consistently changed after the fact, albeit there were different time lags involved, usually depending upon the criticalness of the situation. The change in perceptions after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was immediate, while the response to the Nixon Doctrine was rather belated. Naturally, further research in this area must be undertaken before postulates can be proven conclusive and put forward with any degree of certainty.

Another area of interest is the examination upon completion of one's research is the manner in which the findings relate to and reflect upon the current political scene. A. M. Halpern, commenting upon Chinese foreign policy since the Cultural Revolution, has stated:

"The pace of development has been more nearly comparable to that of the years of 1952-56 than other periods in the past." 2

Furthermore,

"Peking has developed a selective and highly differentiated approach in foreign relations, in sharp contrast to the rigidity and truncated scope of 1966-67." 3


3 Ibid, p. 22.
I have stated that the trend of anti-Sovietism established during the period examined has been continued "to a certain extent", as illustrated by the rise of Chou En-lai and his distinctive approach to international relations. The most obvious example of Chou's success is the US quasi-detente worked out with Henry Kissinger. Although Chou's talent at diplomatic maneuvering is recognized at home, it is not admired by all. The past year has witnessed a renewal of the revolutionary spirit, as evidenced by the "anti-Confucius campaign". This campaign has not been limited however, to mere denouncements of the ancient sage. More recent historical figures, such as Lin Piao, have also been defiled. Western news analysts of the Chinese media have also indicated that Chou, although unnamed, has also been the object of severe criticism. Western educated and the son of a rather well-established family, Chou is thought of by many of the "hard liners" as a prime candidate for selling out the Chinese masses by making compromising deals with the imperialists.

Nevertheless, it is my opinion that Mao still represents the ultimate authority in the Republic and the fact that Chou continues to direct many diplomatic negotiations is proof of the Chairman's confidence in the Premier. Hence, it must be concluded that Mao must not think that Chou's actions deviate from the planned course on which China must travel to accomplish her goals.
Although it is conceivable that fluctuations will occur in the direction the press adopts in identifying "the enemy", it is my opinion that the move towards forming a workable relationship with the USA and distrusting the USSR is permanent.

As Ishwer Ojha has pointed out:

"If Sino-American relations are based on misperceptions, the Sino-Soviet dispute is founded on real antagonism's. In this sense the quarrel with Moscow is more serious, more all-pervasive, and more meaningful than the rift with Washington."

Perhaps the most important question which arises in drawing conclusions on the research conducted herein is that of the value of content analysis as a viable method for the future study of Chinese foreign policy. It is the assertion of this paper, that this approach can be an extremely useful tool in building a comprehensive body of Chinese foreign policy studies. This method has been previously employed within this area, notably by Liao Kuang-sheng and Allen Whiting in their study "Chinese Press Perceptions of Threat: The US and India, 1962", in which the same type of hostility indicators were examined.

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Although content analysis is especially applicable to the study of a controlled press in the area of Chinese foreign policy, it can also prove amenable to the analysis of that nation's leaders' speeches and writings, as further indicators of the direction in which that nation is travelling. Hence it is my conclusion, that not only are the perceptions counted in this study reliable and valid indicators of the way in which the Chinese view and approach the world, but that on the basis of this work further research can be conducted, possibly linking these perceptions to actual decision-making and policy output models.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:


BOOKS CONTINUED:


BOOKS CONTINUED (2):


BOOKS CONTINUED (3):


PERIODICALS:


PERIODICALS CONTINUED:


REPORTS:


APPENDIX A

LIST OF HOSTILE SYMBOLS CATEGORIES

1. Revisionist: revisionism, modern revisionism/ist, revisionist clique, Khrushchov revisionists
2. Social Imperialist: social imperialism
3. New Tsars: "inherited the mantle of the old tsars", tsars, tsarist, aristocrat
4. Aggressor: aggression, aggressive
5. Criminal/Renegade: crimes, atrocities, bandits, pirates, barbarians, brigand, marauder, savage, traitor, conspirator, scoundrel, rogues, ruffians, hatchetmen
6. Class Enemy: enemy of the people, enemy of the masses
7. Paper Tiger
8. Flunky: Lackey, running dogs, scabs, vermin, parasites, degenerates, jackals
9. Reactionary
10. Counter-Revolutionary: anti-revolutionary/ist/ism
11. Neo-Colonialist: colonialist/ism, setting up colonies
12. Adventurist: adventurism, military adventure, cultural adventure
13. War Monger: war provocateur, war intimidation
15. Fascist: dictator, tyrant
16. Social Fascist
17. Other
## APPENDIX B

### ISSUES OF THE PEKING REVIEW IN RANDOM SAMPLE

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* Special Event or National Holiday
VITA AUCTORIS

Personal Background:
Born and raised in Montreal, Canadian citizen.
Participated in student government in university.
Interested in Peace Research and related activities.
Member of Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Windsor Branch.

Education:
Entered M.A., in Political Science at the University of Windsor, Windsor, Ontario, 1974.
Teaching Assistant for Dept. of Political Science's 100 level course, at the University of Windsor, 1973-74.
Guest lecturer at John Abbott College, Montreal, on the topic "Political Status of Women in Canada", 1972.
Director of an International Relations Simulation, Sir George Williams, 1971.
Received University of Windsor Graduate Scholarship, 1973-74.
Received Honours B.A., in Political Science, with distinction, from Sir George Williams University, Montreal, 1971.
Received Molson Breweries Ltd. grant to conduct Pollution Research, 1970.
Received Canadian Peace Research and Education Association scholarship to Grindstone Island Summer School in Peace Research, 1970.
Received Rolls Royce of Canada Ltd. scholarship, 1968.
Summer Experience:

June - August 1967. Rolls Royce of Canada Ltd. Worked as a junior distribution clerk in technical library. Reported to Office Manager. (Lachine, Quebec)

May - August 1969. Constance Lethbridge Rehabilitation Centre. Employed as a physio-therapy assistant. This entailed helping the patients with their exercises, and generally being available to work, walk and talk with them. Reported to the Head of Physio-therapy Dept. (Montreal).

July - August 1970. Received a research grant from Molson Breweries Ltd. Set up an information centre on literature pertaining to pollution problems in Canada. Reported to Project Co-ordinator, Dr. F. Knelman, of Sir George Williams University. (Montreal).

May - September 1974. Canada Immigration. Employed as an immigration officer at the port of Windsor. This position involves conducting secondary examination of visitors, immigrants and non-immigrants seeking entry to Canada for a variety of reasons. Reported to Officer-in-Charge.

Employment Experience:

August 1971 - May 1972. The Paper, at Sir George Williams University. Free lance features editor. This position consisted of researching and reporting upon subjects of interest to the university community as a whole. Also included the practical aspects of publishing a newspaper, such as layout, printing, proofing, etc. Reported to Editor-in-Chief. (Montreal).

February - June 1972. Catholic Community Services. Worked as a researcher-interviewer in the area of family life problems. This job entailed going out into different areas of Montreal and interviewing members of the family unit, in order to establish what were perceived to be the major problems within the family, and the barriers preventing their solution. After this step of the research has been completed, the results were gathered and interpreted within the framework of a published report. This project was funded by a grant from the federal government, the end purpose being to establish a Family Life Institute in Montreal. Reported to Project Co-ordinator, Dr. E. McCraken. (Montreal).
Employment Experience Continued:


February - June 1973. YMCA of Montreal. Employed as a researcher. This project was funded by the federal government. The purpose was to investigate the areas of cooperation and conflict between the government and private sector during the immigration of approximately five thousand Asian Ugandans to Canada, in 1972-73. This necessitated the mixture of theoretical research with a series of interviews with the representatives of the public and private agencies, and naturally the Ugandans themselves, involved in the "integration and assimilation" process. The end result was a report filed with the federal government, which will be used as the basis of information for future coordinated endeavours. Reported to the Head of the International Programme, Mr. R. Patton. (Montreal).