Phenomenalism in Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and nothingness.

Robert Wylie Johnson
University of Windsor

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd

Recommended Citation
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/3078

This online database contains the full-text of PhD dissertations and Masters’ theses of University of Windsor students from 1954 forward. These documents are made available for personal study and research purposes only, in accordance with the Canadian Copyright Act and the Creative Commons license—CC BY-NC-ND (Attribution, Non-Commercial, No Derivative Works). Under this license, works must always be attributed to the copyright holder (original author), cannot be used for any commercial purposes, and may not be altered. Any other use would require the permission of the copyright holder. Students may inquire about withdrawing their dissertation and/or thesis from this database. For additional inquiries, please contact the repository administrator via email (scholarship@uwindsor.ca) or by telephone at 519-253-3000 ext. 3208.
THE QUALITY OF THIS MICROFICH IS HEAVILY DEPENDENT UPON THE QUALITY OF THE ORIGINAL THESIS SUBMITTED FOR MICROFILMING. EVERY EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO ENSURE THE HIGHEST QUALITY OF REPRODUCTION POSSIBLE.

IF PAGES ARE MISSING, CONTACT THE UNIVERSITY WHICH GRANTED THE DEGREE.

SOME PAGES MAY HAVE INDISTINCT PRINT ESPECIALLY IF THE ORIGINAL PAGES WERE TYPED WITH A POOR TYPEWRITER RIBBON OR IF THE UNIVERSITY SENT US A POOR PHOTOCOPY.

PREVIOUSLY COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS (JOURNAL ARTICLES, PUBLISHED TESTS, ETC.) ARE NOT FILMED.

REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART OF THIS FILM IS GOVERNED BY THE CANADIAN COPYRIGHT ACT, R.S.C. 1970, C. C-30. PLEASE READ THE AUTHORIZATION FORMS WHICH ACCOMPANY THIS THESIS.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

OTTAWA, CANADA
K1A 0N4

NL-339 (REV. 8/50)
PHENOMENALISM IN JEAN-PAUL SARTRE'S BEING AND NOTHINGNESS

by

Robert Wylie Johnson

A Thesis Submitted to The Faculty of Graduate Studies Through the Department of Philosophy in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts The University of Windsor

WINDSOR, ONTARIO, CANADA

1981
TO

My Parents

and

Margaret Joy Anderson
ABSTRACT

This paper presents an investigation of Jean-Paul Sartre's description of the ontological relation between consciousness and its object in *Being and Nothingness*. The purpose of the investigation is to demonstrate that Sartre's explanation of our perception and knowledge of objects, the things that we see, hear, smell, touch and taste in the world, is more properly described as a type of phenomenalist theory than by any other meta-philosophical qualification. The argument to this conclusion is motivated by a diversity of opinion in the English secondary literature concerning Sartre's account of the relation and by a lack of attention, in the secondary literature, to Sartre's understanding of the distinctions between his position and those he defines as idealism and realism.

The presentation is divided into four chapters. Chapter One, "Sartre's Departure from Husserl's Phenomenology," displays Sartre's philosophical objectives in terms of his effort to avoid what he describes as insurmountable problems in idealism and realism. Sartre's criticism of Husserl's approach to objectivity and transcendence is interpreted as a rejection of phenomenological theory in so far as Sartre regards this theory to be correctly interpreted as idealism according to the dictum, "Esse est percipi." Sartre's
argument against that dictum, which he calls his ontological proof, is compared to G. E. Moore's "The Refutation of Idealism." It is this comparison which provides the foundation for the claim that there is a basic similarity between the positions of Sartre, Moore and Russell.

Chapter Two, "Three Views on How an Object Can Exist for Consciousness," contains an exposition of G. E. Moore's "The Status of Sense-data" and "Some Judgements of Perception," Bertrand Russell's "Our Knowledge of the External World," and Sartre's chapter, "Transcendence." The primary objective of this chapter is to present the materials to be compared in Chapter Three.

The third chapter, "Sartre, Moore and Russell," demonstrates that the philosophical objectives of the three men are similar in so far as they address the same philosophical problems: all three seek to avoid puzzles occasioned by the concept of the thing-in-itself; all three seek to avoid puzzles occasioned by conceiving a consciousness as a substance. A close analysis of Russell's and Sartre's positions is carried out to support the hypothesis that if Moore's and Russell's views are described as phenomenalist, then Sartre's view must be described as phenomenalist.

The final chapter returns to the opinions of Sartre's ontology expressed in the secondary literature. The ascription of phenomenalism is measured against assessments of
Sartre's ontology which characterize it as realism or idealism or a mixture of the two. Certain criticisms of Sartre's work which are based on improper meta-philosophical classification of his ontology are exposed and rejected.
Sartre's one criticism of phenomenalism is interpreted to show that his discovery of an error in phenomenalism does not undermine the characterization of his position as phenomenalist.
Leaf viii omitted in page numbering
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONE DEPARTURE FROM HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Sartré's Program Toward Phenomenological Ontology</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Contra &quot;Esse Est Percipi&quot;</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A) Husserl's Object Theory</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) Sartré's Refutation of Idealism and His Criticism of Husserl</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C) Moore's Refutation of Idealism</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D) Moore's Mind and Matter, Sartré's Transphenomenal Being</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWO THREE VIEWS ON HOW AN OBJECT CAN EXIST FOR CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Moore's View</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Russell's View</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III Sartré's &quot;Transcendence&quot;</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A) Knowledge as a Relation of the For-itself to the In-itself</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) The Determined This on the Ground of the World and Space</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C) Quality and Abstraction</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D) Permanence and Potentiality</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E) Essence, the Past of the For-itself and the Instrumental Thing</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THREE SARTRE, MOORE AND RUSSELL</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I Sartrée and Russell on Knowledge</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II Russell's Subject and Sartre's For-itself</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
III Sartre's Appearance In-itsel
and Russell's Sense-datum ............ 162

IV Sartre, Moore, Russell and
Phenomenalism ....................... 167

CONCLUSION IDEALISM, REALISM AND PHENOMENALISM .... 175

I Idealism and Realism ............... 176

II Sartre's Comment on Phenomenalism .. 192

NOTES .................................. 199

BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................... 220

VITA AUCTORIS ......................... 222
Philosophy is a subject in which we use such words as idealist and realist, a priori and empirical, necessary and contingent, universal and particular; and we are inspired by the hope (never fully realized) that we will end up by knowing what we are talking about.

Alain Wood, in Russell's My Philosophical Development
INTRODUCTION

The research presented in this paper has been motivated by a dissatisfaction with analyses of Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness which have been published in English. Disagreement with criticisms adopted in this secondary literature is restricted to issues concerning our perception and knowledge of objects—what could be called traditional epistemological questions. This paper contains an attempt to clarify some of the epistemological implications of Sartre's ontology by focusing analysis, with as much precision as possible, upon his own description of the relation between consciousness and its object, by attending closely to Sartre's philosophical objectives as he defined them, and by pointing out and justifying certain parallels between Sartre's treatment of our perception and knowledge of objects and positions considered on the same issues in the work of G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell.

Sartre's Being and Nothingness is not easily understood and interpreted. Its language has been described as vague, tangled, and repetitive. Maurice Natanson expresses an attitude toward Sartre's major work that could be called a tradition of scholarship.

It is impossible to convey to anyone who has not read L'Être et Le Néant the involved and often tangled line
of Sartre's argument and the horrifying quality of prose which is used to convey the author's ideas. In addition to the seemingly endless sentences and ambiguous repetitions, the author uses words that do not appear in any dictionary. Sartre invents a new terminology to meet the requirements of the radical ontology he presents. What emerges from this strange new language is an ontological structure of gargantuan length and complexity. There has not been a single critic, to our knowledge who has not commented on the obscurity and complexity of L'Être et Le Néant. 1

The secondary literature tends to persuade one that Sartre's style and stamina make Being and Nothingness a very difficult book, and implicitly, that its complexity and obscurity frustrate attempts to assess its character and importance as a contribution to philosophy in general. There can be little doubt that Sartre intended his ontology to state a comprehensive and systematic philosophy of existence. It is comprehensive in terms of its attention to detailed analyses of a large set of mundane human activities and themes. Hazel Barnes, translator of Being and Nothingness (referred to as BN hereafter), writes:

Before he has finished, Sartre has not only considered . . . love, hate, sex, the crises of anguish, the trap of bad faith, but he has sketched in outline an approach by which we may hope to ascertain the original choice of being by which real individuals have made themselves what they are. 2

Barnes criticizes commentators who have taken a piece-meal approach to Sartre's work and measure isolated ideas against each other to test their consistency. "What critics fail to see is that Sartre is one of the few twentieth century philosophers to present us with a total system." 3
More often than not, it seems that positive criticism, a favourable review of a philosopher's effort, employs qualifiers which are less precise in meaning than those used to present a negative picture. The idea of totality can be married to the notions of an all-inclusive subject matter and comprehensiveness, but the use of the word "system" is much more difficult to comprehend. How does one keep the total system in view while exercising the rituals of criticism? Perhaps paying homage to system in a short paragraph near the beginning will do, even if "system" is only a vague and nebulous notion at best. It should be noted that Barnes is referring to Sartre's work and not just BN:

[C]ritics of Sartre's works still tend to deal with them piece-meal, to limit themselves to sorrogy about the originality of each separate position, to weighing two isolated ideas against each other and testing them for consistency without relating them to the basic framework. But one can no more understand Sartre's view of freedom, for instance, without considering his peculiar description of consciousness than one can judge Plato's doctrine that knowledge is recollection without relating it to the theory of Ideas.

One can still press on toward heaven in spite of original sin. With a repentant spirit and a promise to avoid the evils of ill-considered judgement, the purpose of the current project is merely to interpret or describe certain parts of BN in the hope that salvation somehow resides in overcoming ambiguity, repetition, obscurity and complexity through diligence in attending to what Sartre had to say.

3
about the problem of thought and being. There will be
criticism, but for the most part, it will be criticism of
criticism of Sartre that rests its case on the results ob-
tained by interpretation according to the imperative,
"Attend to what Sartre has to say." In other words, there
is no attempt to do a thoroughgoing analysis of the supposed
faults of the secondary literature, in spite of the worthi-
ness of such a venture. But an attempt will be made to
cultivate a few doubts about the conclusions reached by
certain commentators which, as conclusions, seem to be
slightly at odds with what Sartre himself had to say about
his own ontology. There is still an outstanding debt of
homage to be paid the idea of system. In this case, the
idea of system as it applies to BN is worthy of a perfunctory
paragraph or two.

Mary Warnock characterizes BN as Sartre's "greatest
work, . . . a textbook of existentialism itself." She dis-
tinguishes two predominating features of the book: its
treatment of the concrete and particular and its treatment
of human freedom as the nature of human life. These inter-
related qualities, Warnock maintains, guarantee its
existentialist flavour. "[T]he arguments, if such they can
be called, for the existence of an extreme of human freedom
are arguments which ultimately stem from the vérité vécu
of the human being in the world." Warnock finds the
vérité vécu or the lived truth to be fundamental, with a
doubt about whether the reader is confronted with arguments. She goes on to say that Sartre's analysis of the human condition depends upon a set of ontological facts. "There are certain absolutely basic ontological facts which lie behind all the arguments and expositions in Being and Nothingness." With all due respect to Mary Warnock, one must admit that her comments only indirectly assist in trying to get at the idea of system because on the one hand she claims that certain of the so-called arguments (those concerning freedom) stem from the lived truth while, on the other hand, all the arguments and expositions in the book are founded on absolutely basic ontological facts. One might hope to approach a description of Sartre's system by listing the absolutely basic ontological facts, and express essential features of the system by defining the criteria for the facts' membership in the class of absolutely basic ontological facts. Perhaps it would be possible to display the system by describing the logical relations which hold between the facts. But then how is one to incorporate the vérité vécu which supposedly grounds the talk about freedom with the ground of the basic ontological facts? How does the lived truth of someone's enjoyment of peanut butter on salteens, chased with fine cognac, interrelate with basic ontological facts when both must be considered fundamental? Other commentators have tried to carve BN up into philosophical parts and literary parts. Albert Shalom, for
instance, with some anger and frustration, thinks

the book is anything but a clearly thought out work,
and its best parts are not the so-called "philosophical"
parts, but the more literary parts.⁷

What he is trying to get at is "the internal conceptual logic
of a piece of writing." Setting aside discussion of whether
Shalom's distinction is reliable until another time, one
could glean from Shalom's opinion the idea that revealing
the system involves uncovering its internal conceptual logic
and somehow separating this conceptual logic from the
literary parts and the vérité vécu as one separates the
skeleton from the flesh. But then one is faced with the
problem of answering the legitimate question, "What is
internal conceptual logic?". Sartre and nearly all of his
commentators have described the contents of BN as an ontology.
It does not seem possible to distinguish Sartre's ontology
from Sartre's internal conceptual logic. Describing one is
the same task as describing the other.

In his critique of Sartre's ontology, Joseph Catalano
provides a gloss on Sartre's subtitle, An Essay on Phenomeno-
logical Ontology. In part, it reads:

The term "ontology" is inherited from Christian
Wolf (1679-1754), who used it to signify a deductive
science of being, whereas it is used by Heidegger
and Sartre to mean a descriptive study. Traditionally,
the term "metaphysics" also signifies a study of being
itself. Sartre, however, distinguishes ontology from
metaphysics. Metaphysics, for Sartre, is concerned
with the question of why there is anything rather
than nothing. Sartre claims that he is interested
only in the fundamental descriptions of being, and
not in speculations about its origins.⁸
Catalano seems to be close to the truth of the matter for Sartre. The measurement of the truth of the matter in this case is carried out by looking at Sartre's view of his project: "Ontology will be the description of the phenomenon of being as it manifests itself; that is without intermediary." It is possible to conceive of a systematic description and perhaps those who use the word "system" may have a very good idea of what they are actually getting at because they arrive at qualifications of this system in Sartre's BN.

Wilfrid Desan's description of Sartre's analysis of knowledge and being-in-itself includes the following opinion about Sartre's system:

Sartre is not an idealist: the predominating trait of his system is one of extreme realism. And yet, this extreme realism is interwoven with elements of an equally extreme subjectivism. To be exact, one could consider Sartre both as a realist and as an idealist; as a realist because he accepts the "brute existent" as being independent of human intervention, and as an idealist because he charges human consciousness (For-itself), with the task of giving meaning of significance to this "brute existent."

At another point in Desan's text, Sartre's explanation of quality is described as an example of direct realist theory. Joseph Fell takes issue with this particular interpretation, prefers "to hedge his bets" and assert that Sartre's analysis of quality "only . . . represents his closest approximation to direct realism." In Fell's own criticism of BN, there is a discovery of a tension between realism and idealism:
Owing to Sartre's realism, consciousness is ineffectual; owing to Sartre's idealism the phenomenon never coincides with the actual. The irreducible paradox of Sartre's thinking is that his realism opens up to consciousness the very being from which his idealism cuts him off.12

I. M. Bochenski, in a wide ranging book, Contemporary European Philosophy, concludes a brief chapter on Sartre's BN by stating, "Sartre professes a radical phenomenalism. There is nothing but phenomena and these only, in fact, in Husserl's sense." In his very next paragraph Bochenski writes, "It may safely be said that there has never been a more extreme form of realism in the history of philosophic thought."13 Bochenski doesn't backtrack to consider the possibility of a contradiction or a synthesis. Arthur Danto assertively proclaims that Sartre is a common sense realist through his observation that Sartre does not agree with Bishop Berkeley's idealism:

If things are just appearances-to, then the world as made up of appearances must logically depend upon one's being conscious of it - which is the consequence the idealist Berkeley was delighted to draw. But this is repugnant to the prejudices of common sense, according to which things exist independently of our or anyone's consciousness of them; that there was a world before anyone was aware that there was; and that things are not annihilated the moment they fall outside the range of awareness. Realism so construed is exactly Sartre's philosophy, and it was therefore imperative that he solve the problem of appearances in order to save his view that we are conscious of real independent things.14

Klaus Hartmann suggests that Sartre's project amounts to an attempt to establish realism:

If we can attach weight to the introduction to BN, Sartre can be said to be prompted by a dis-
satisfaction with phenomenology, particularly as concerns the problem of being; he wonders how that which is given to consciousness can be saved from mere subjectivity, or, in other words, how realism, can be established.\textsuperscript{15}

Hartmann explains the basic problem of thought in Sartre's BN as a matter of conceptual contradiction; i.e., he holds that Sartre describes being-in-itself in such a way that it does not depend on consciousness while demonstrating that determinate things do depend upon consciousness, yet claiming that being-in-itself is somehow identical to determinate things. Fell and Hartmann are closely aligned in this criticism.

Hartmann writes:

Determination is not the process of thinking out the implications of being, but befalls being factually, "from outside," from its Other. The paradox that being, as logically conceived, is real and that, in view of its identity with the determinate, it cannot be indeterminate, brings us to the problem of thought and being in Sartre's philosophy.\textsuperscript{16}

Hartmann's position really describes Sartre as a failed realist. The paradox is the substance of the failure. Albert Shalom reaches a similar conclusion about Sartre's ontology, but he is more severe in his criticism. He maintains that Sartre commits a dangerous fallacy by posing a solution to the problem faced in "perceiving (and knowing) an object" which "depends upon an entirely deliberate confusion of terminology." Shalom accuses Sartre of failing to properly distinguish between existence and consciousness.
I hold . . . that because Sartre, adopting the phenomenological procedure, gives no clear analysis of the distinction between existence and consciousness, simply substantializes them under the loaded terms of "en-soi" and "pour-soi", so he constantly plays on two levels; on the one, making existence (misleadingly understood as "en-soi") basic, and interpreting consciousness as a sort of parasite on existence; on the other, making consciousness (equally misleadingly understood as "pour-soi") basic, and interpreting existence (this-time differently understood as the world of appearances) as something brought about by consciousness.17

Shalom's attack occurs in an exchange of letters with John W. Yolton. Yolton responds to Shalom's agitation about Sartre's alleged duplicity by pointing out that "Sartre's (and other phenomenalists') attitude is that [an object like] a building can only be for someone, though the complex of awareness and the building exists in some non-phenomenal way."18 Yolton charges Shalom with a "meta-philosophical bias" toward realism which nullifies his effort to grasp Sartre's meaning.

Seven views of Sartre's ontology have been mentioned. The addition of Joseph Catalano's opinion - that Sartre espouses as "strange realism"19 - will make eight. All of the meta-philosophical qualifiers can be arranged in a row just to see if there is any hope of finding a consensus or pattern above and beyond their positioning in alphabetical sequence by author:

1) Bochenski - phenomenalist and extreme realist
2) Catalano - strange realism
3) Danto - commonsense realism
4) Desan - extreme realist and extreme subjectivist; in places a direct realist; at bottom, realist and idealist
5) Fell - realist and idealist
6) Hartmann - failed realist
7) Shalom - dangerously fallacious and inconsistent
8) Yolton - phenomenalist.

If the pursuit of clarity with respect to BN can bear the slightest comparison to the pursuit of good health through the stress of persistent chest pains, and if reading the eight commentators mentioned can be compared at all to consulting eight doctors about these persistent chest pains, then just as it would seem appropriate for the sufferer of the chest pains to forgo the advice of the eight doctors who agree upon very little, study toward his own medical degree and perform the diagnosis himself, it will be appropriate for the student of Sartre's ontology to conduct his own analysis and hold the secondary literature at arms length. The analogy is weak because there is very little argument to justify the comparison of a coronary imperative with the clarity imperative. However, in spite of the frailty of similarity, it has the power to express a motivating factor of dissatisfaction with the secondary literature. Depending on one's attitude, it can be said that there is either a variety or a confusion of views expressed among the commentators and within some of the commentaries themselves. It is very difficult to use the
literature to reach any decision about the correct assessment of Sartre's ontology. It is even wise to question whether qualifiers such as realist, idealist, phenomenalist or subjectivist, etc., suffer less from facuousness than terms like "total system." Philosophers have their own special uses for these words and the assumption that a consistency in usage for application to Sartre can somehow be achieved by attending to their application throughout the secondary literature is for the most part ill-advised. But in view of the fact that - and this is a matter of record - Sartre uses words such as realist and idealist, there must be some way to apply them to his ontology and make them count as qualifiers. Sartre's qualification of his project in BN in the following way is a matter of record:

In particular the preceding reflections have permitted us to distinguish two absolutely separated regions of being: the being of the pre-reflective cogito and the being of the phenomenon. . . . We have indeed established by the examination of non-positional self-consciousness that the being of the phenomenon can on no account act upon consciousness. In this way we have ruled out a realistic conception of consciousness.

We have also shown by the spontaneity of the non-reflective cogito that consciousness can not get out of its subjectivity if the latter has been initially given, and that consciousness can not act upon transcendent being nor without contradiction admit of the passive elements necessary in order to constitute a transcendent being arising from them. Thus we have ruled out the idealist solution of the problem.20
Thus we have left "appearances" and have been led progressively to posit two types of being, the in-itself and the for-itself. . . . A multitude of questions remain unanswered. . . . If idealism and realism fail to explain the relations which in fact unite these two regions which in theory are without communication, what other solution can we find to this problem? And how can the being of the phenomenon be transphenomenal?

It is to attempt to reply to these questions that I have written the present work.21

It is to attempt to clarify the epistemological implications of Sartre's ontological solution to these problems that this paper has been written. The chief objective is correct interpretation and the secondary aim is to utilize this clarification to demonstrate that:

1) Bocheński's assertion that Sartre is a phenomenologist who characterizes phenomena as Husserl characterized them and that Sartre is an extreme realist is mistaken.

2) Catalano is incorrect in stating that Sartre's ontology amounts to a strange realism.

3) Danto's proposal that Sartre is a commonsense realist is totally wrong.

4) Desan's description of Sartre's system as a mixture of idealism and realism is incorrect and unhelpful.

5) Fell's assessment of BN as a paradoxical mixture of idealism and realism is mistaken for the same reasons that Desan's assessment is mistaken.

6) Hartmann's critique which concludes with observing a debilitating paradox in Sartre's ontology is mistaken. Sartre is not a failed realist.

7) Shalom's severe criticism, charging Sartre with a deliberate terminological inconsistency is unfounded. Sartre does not adopt the "phenomenological procedure" to pose a dangerously fallacious
solution to the problem of our perception and knowledge of objects.

Sartre claims to undertake "the study of an ontological relation which renders all experience possible and which aims at establishing how in general an object can exist for consciousness." The present inquiry focusses upon this study conducted in BN, and it is designed to support the suggestion of J. W. Yolton, that Sartre's ontology is phenomenalistic. It is not Sartre's system which this investigation seeks to qualify. Specifically, it is argued that Sartre's description of the ontological relation which renders all experience possible and his account of how an object can exist for consciousness are phenomenalistic.

The epistemological issues treated in this paper are approached from a point of view that should be explicitly disclosed in terms of how its attitude has shaped the method by which the argument is achieved. Objectives and method have been mutually determined by a view for which the author must acknowledge an indebtedness to John W. Yolton. In his *Metaphysical Analysis*, Yolton eloquently characterizes the ground rules of philosophical analyses devoted to the assessment of differing philosophical viewpoints. He calls their perspective the meta-level.

The genuine meta-level is a means of describing and characterizing different ontologies; it proceeds without any ontological biases. . . . The genuine meta-level must be able to get inside different
points of view without succumbing to those points of view. It can only do this by taking the inner-outer contrast as its focal point; it must ask of each position how it looks from inside—how one talks in that language—as well as how it looks from the outside. There is no special language for the meta-level. There is only language which is examined for its special uses. In order to talk the specific language of any particular ontology, we have to understand the conceptual attitudes which are being formulated in that language. For this sort of internal understanding, we have to shed all external prejudices.23

Every philosophical position entails two orientations, the one under consideration and the one from which the consideration is made. Philosophical understanding, and perhaps other forms of understanding (for example, anthropological or historical), can be characterized by the double play of internal and external perspectives. But the two must be kept distinct, it must be clear from which point of view any given question is answered or offered.24

The arguments to be made against Sartre's critics who mistakenly define his project as idealism, realism or both, turn on an amplification of Yolton's conception of proper philosophical criticism. Yolton's idea that "every philosophical position entails two orientations" is mainly intended to distinguish the critic's perspective from that of the philosopher the critic is considering. It can be re-interpreted or amplified to also mean that each philosophical position in and of itself involves two orientations. From the meta-level one can observe a philosopher thinking through and developing his own language to answer specific questions and solve specific problems. This is the internal perspective. This very same philosopher can also measure his position against
others. Every philosophical position can and generally does involve this external perspective. When Sartre declares that he is trying to find a solution to the problem of the relations of consciousness to its object and separates his position from others, he is adopting the external perspective - he states that he is trying to avoid the problems he finds in realism and idealism as he defines realism and idealism. Assessments issued from the external perspective by Sartre are not unbiased: they are a function of the language developed through the internal workings of his philosophy. The meta-level external perspective adopted in this paper, by contrast to Sartre's external perspective, is unbiased. The fact that Sartre defines his project in terms of his attempt to avoid the errors of idealism and realism, and the fact that more than a few of the commentators want to label his ontology realist or a mixture of idealism and realism, provides the impetus for trying a genuine meta-level analysis of his work.

The argument of this essay moves through three stages. First, Sartre's "Introduction" is explained as a declaration of objectives. These objectives involve an attack on Berkeley's proposition, "Esse est percipi," that is very similar in its result to G. E. Moore's "Refutation of Idealism." The ontological and epistemological issues which remain to be treated for Sartre are comparable to those treated in Russell's Our Knowledge of the External
World. Russell's phenomenalistic solution is stated. Secondly, Sartre's description of the relation between consciousness and its object, the views contained in his study, are explicated to prepare for their comparison with Moore and Russell's positions. Thirdly, Sartre and Russell's positions are shown to be similar in such a manner as to permit identification of a phenomenalistic bias in Sartre's account of how an object can exist for consciousness.
CHAPTER ONE

DEPARTURE FROM HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

I. Sartre's Program: Toward "Phenomenological Ontology"

In his introduction to Being and Nothingness, "The Pursuit of Being," Sartre indicates the task he wants to accomplish, defines his position relative to those of Husserl and Heidegger, and provides a description of being-in-itself as well as preliminary description of being-for-itself or consciousness. The mainspring of the work is a dissatisfaction with the phenomenology of Husserl. "Being has not been given its due." Sartre is determined to give being its due by developing an ontology that can include a description of consciousness with immediate access to reality. Ontology, according to Sartre, "will be the description of the phenomenon of being as it manifests itself; that is without intermediary." Throughout the introduction Sartre uses the idiom of "appearance" and "phenomenon." The final section contains his explicit indication that his ontology will operate in another idiom:

Thus we have left "appearances" and have been led progressively to posit two types of being, the in-itself and the for-itself concerning which we have as yet only superficial and incomplete information. It is important to follow Sartre's approach to ontology in
the language of "appearances" in order to understand how the policy adopted in the introduction is carried through with the concepts of internal and external negation and relation in the later chapters of BN. The opening sections of the introduction contain a difficult straddling of phenomenological theory and backgrounding for the analyses and polemics to come.

Sartre observes the disappearance from philosophy of three dualisms, "that dualism which in the existent opposes interior to exterior (or thing-in-itself to appearance); potency and act; appearance and essence." He seems to agree fully with a tendency in "modern thought" to reduce "the existent to the series of appearances which manifest it." He appears to subscribe to a definition of the phenomenon found in the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger. The appearance or phenomenon is a

full positivity; its essence is an 'appearing' which is no longer opposed to a being, but on the contrary is the measure of it. . . . Relative the phenomenon remains, for 'to appear' supposes in essence, someone to whom to appear. But it does not have the double relativity of Kant's Erscheinung. It does not point over its shoulder to a true being which would be for it, absolute.

In so far as the phenomenon must appear to someone, but is what it is in its own right, it is the "relative-absolute." Sartre's denial of dualism concerns that which is other than consciousness; one could say, the object terminus of the subject/object relation. The dualisms dropped from philosophical vocabulary are replaced by a monism of phenomena.
This monism ramified in the dissolution of the dualism of appearance and essence, sets up a problem whose solution Sartre uses to break with Husserl. Sartre seems to maintain, with Husserl the phenomenologist, that:

1) The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence.

2) The essence of an existent is no longer a property sunk in the cavity of this existent; it is the manifest law which presides over the succession of its appearances, it is the principle of the series.

3) Essence, as the principle of the series, is definitely only the concatenation of appearances.

4) The concatenation of appearances is itself an appearance.

Sartre praises Duheim for opposing Poincare's concept of physical reality as the sum of its various manifestations. Duheim's synthetic unity of manifestations saves phenomenology from nominalism. The essence, the synthetic in the synthetic unity, the linkage implicit in the concatenation is not a sum. But the manifest law, the principle of the series of appearances must differ from the appearance. The policy of eliminating dualism seems tenuous at best, and Sartre finds that he cannot overcome all dualism. By attending to the relativity of the phenomenon, he discovers an irreducible opposition between the finite and the infinite; every phenomenon must appear to someone who is constantly changing, and he thinks it absurd to suggest that any experienced thing would be experienced from limited points of view. If
this were the case, then "the first appearances would not have the possibility of reappearing," or all appearances of the experienced could be given at once.

Although an object may disclose itself through a single Abshattung, the sole fact of there being a subject implies the possibility of multiplying points of view on that Abshattung. This suffices to multiply to infinity the Abshattung under consideration.9

Sartre's new opposition, the finite and the infinite, seems to be a repostulation of the old dualisms and it is difficult to understand whether or not duality is restored to the object pole of the subject/object relation. The conversion of the dualisms is expressed in various ways. "This new opposition replaces the dualism of being and appearance. . . Thus the outside is opposed in a new way to the inside, and the being-which-does-not-appear, to the appearance. Similarly a certain 'potency' returns to inhabit the phenomenon. . . . The essence is finally radically severed from the individual appearance which manifests it, since on principle it is that which must be able to be manifested by an infinite series of individual manifestations."10 Sartre states that he has replaced "a variety of oppositions by a single dualism on which they are based." It seems that he considers this replacement to be compatible with the theory of Husserl and Heidegger.

Let us understand indeed that our theory of the phenomenon has replaced the reality of the thing by the objectivity of the phenomenon and that it
has based this on an appeal to infinity. The reality of that cup is that it is there and that it is not me. We shall interpret this by saying that the series of its appearances is bound by a principle which does not depend on my whim.\textsuperscript{11}

From this point on, the first section of Sartre's introduction is not very clear. He maintains that the infinite series of appearances is bound by a principle which does not depend on his whim and he maintains that "the subject himself must transcend the appearance toward the total series, of which it is a member. He must seize \textbf{Red} through his impression of red. By \textbf{Red} is meant the principle of the series."\textsuperscript{12} The objectivity of the phenomenon is based on the subject's appeal to infinity; i.e., "[T]he appearance which is \textit{finite} indicates itself in its finitude, but in order to be grasped as an appearance-of-that-which-appears, it requires that it be surpassed toward infinity."

There is this incredible sentence in the first section of the introduction: 
"[I]f the transcendence of the object is based on the necessity of causing the appearance to be always transcended, the result is that on principle an object posits the series of its appearances as infinite."\textsuperscript{13}

One can ask how it is possible for an object to \textit{posit} when its reality reduced to its objectivity or objectness is dependent on a subject's transcending one appearance toward an infinity of appearances. If "transcendence" in the incredible sentence is read to mean objectivity, which seems reasonable, then referring to an object as something which
can posit strikes one as absurd. Sartre has this to say about objects:

What appears in fact is only an aspect of the object, and the object is altogether in that aspect and altogether outside of it. . . . It shows itself as the structure of the appearance, which is at the same time the principle of the series.  

In this text there seems to be a distinction between the appearance and the structure of that single appearance as the principle which does not depend on or require an infinitude of appearances. The result expressed in the second part of the incredible sentence seems to mean that a principle, an essence of structure is prior to the subject's transcending or surpassing. Either "transcendence" should not be read to mean objectivity or the "necessity of causing the appearance to be always transcended" should not be read to mean dependence of the infinitude upon the subject. Either Sartre is setting up phenomenology for a failing, a shortcoming, or his description of issues is confused beyond repair.

In his analysis of the first section of the introduction, Klaus Hartmann finds Sartre to be outlining the accepted phenomenological approach to objectivity and at the same time, wondering whether transcendence can be founded on the possibility to go indefinitely within a series of phenomena. Hartmann understands that for Sartre transcendence is to be defined "as a reality of its own in space and time."  

He further understands that Sartre is
accordingly dissatisfied with transcendence based on an infinite series of appearances.

Sartre rejects such transcendence in the sense of mere objectivity. Objectivity would be based on the series: but since the series is never closed, objectivity would always remain an unfulfilled claim.16

Hartmann is trying to follow Sartre's line of reasoning from phenomenology to ontology. Knowing that Sartre is immediately going to introduce the notion of the being of phenomena in the next section, he concludes that Sartre has dispensed with an exclusive reliance on phenomena (the established phenomenological view) and departed toward a being of phenomena (not the established phenomenological view) to satisfy a requirement for transcendence as a reality of its own in space and time. But there is a problem with Hartmann's interpretation.

Nowhere in the first section of the introduction does Sartre explicitly define transcendence in terms of a reality of its own in space and time. One might think that Sartre's explanation of the objectivity of the phenomenon as a cup's being there and not being Sartre means that the cup is a reality of its own in space and time, but this is not necessarily the case. Objectivity might mean this but transcendence doesn't have to mean objectivity. There are more subtleties of argument to be noted than Hartmann brings to light. There is strong evidence in the text that the only dualism which Sartre is really concerned to abandon

24
is the Kantian distinction between the phenomenon and the noumenon. Sartre himself sees this as the upshot of his new opposition in his concluding remarks: "For the moment, the first consequence of 'the theory of the phenomenon' is that the appearance does not refer to being as Kant's phenomenon refers to the noumenon." This dualism seems to be the foremost target among those attacked; perhaps the only real target because all the others are revamped and not completely eliminated. Sartre does recast the dualism of being and appearance. Under the new opposition of finite and infinite one finds the "being-which-does-not-appear" and the appearance, but the former is not a thing-in-itself (not even a Sartrean thing in space and time which can appear). It is more like a being-which-is-not-appearing-but-can-appear where being is analogous to the whale (in 'the whale is a mammal') and not analogous to the whale (in 'the whale sank the ship'). Sartre's ambivalence in locating the origin of the principle of the series of appearances - i.e., either it is subject dependent or in the object as structure prior to the subject's surpassing the single appearance - lends further plausibility to this view. Locating it in the object departs the least distance from the Kantian noumenon and moves away from the phenomenological position which he is setting up for a shortcoming, and making it clearly subject dependent doesn't properly represent the problem within that phenomenological position from which
he is preparing to depart. All this is very, very confusing. Hartmann is correct when he says that everything here depends on the meaning of the word "transcendence." What really takes place in the first part of the introduction of BN is a severance of objectivity from transcendence. Hartmann observes this distinction, but fails to explain Sartre's real reason for the separation.

Sartre only uses the word "transcendence" in reference to the subject's involvement with actual appearances and the subject's surpassing or transcending the actual appearances to get an objectivity, a "that-which-appears." The monism which Sartre describes and apparently approves of can be termed phenomenological. Phenomenology reduces the thing to the connected series of its manifestations, i.e., the essence of the thing appears, the essence is the principle of the series of appearances and appears, the essence as the structure of the appearance appears, the essence as the concatenation of appearances appears. Everything which is not the subject appears or is on the level of the phenomenon. The reality of the thing is replaced by the objectivity of the phenomenon, an objectivity which is based upon an infinite series of appearances and appears. Kant's noumenon must go because it doesn't appear. Sartre wants to guarantee the subject's access to reality, immediate access to reality, i.e., the cup is there and it is not him, and it doesn't depend on his whim. But how can
one avoid determining the reality of the thing without invoking a thing-in-itself, a being behind appearances and opposed to them? Objectivity alone does not guarantee the object's independence, that the object is not the subject. Sartre seems to adopt phenomenological theory through to its conception of objectivity. Beyond this point he poses his fundamental question and departs from phenomenology to give being its due; to secure transcendence and show the demand for an ontology. Sartre's last phenomenological stand:

Since there is nothing behind the appearance, and since it indicates itself (and the total series of appearances), it cannot be supported by any other being than its own. The appearance cannot be the thin film of nothingness which separates the being-of-the-subject from the absolute being. If the essence of the appearance is an 'appearing' which is no longer opposed to any being, there arises a legitimate problem concerning the being of this appearing.19

The appearance is not supported by any existent different from itself; it has its own being. The first being which we meet in our ontological inquiry is the being of the appearance. Is it itself an appearance?20

According to Sartre, the phenomenologists cannot properly answer this question. He maintains that Husserl and Heidegger are quite capable of moving beyond the concrete phenomenon toward its essence; Husserl by eidetic reduction and Heidegger by recognizing that human reality is ontic/ontological, can claim to go beyond a particular existent toward its being to reach a phenomenon of being. Sartre
claims that both men can only pass from homogenous to homogenous, that is, the phenomenological reliance upon phenomena (phenomenological monism) prevents escape from phenomena. Sartre insists that the being of the appearance, the being of the phenomenon is not identical to the phenomenon of being.

Sartre says there is a phenomenon of being, "since we can speak of it and have a certain comprehension of it." He puts the question in three different forms:

1) Is the being of the appearance itself an appearance?

2) Is the being of phenomena identical with the phenomenon of being?

3) Is the being which discloses itself to me, of the same nature as the being of existents which appear?

"Appearance" and "phenomenon" have been used interchangeably throughout. Adherence to monism would allow the question to be put in the form: "Is the being of essence, the being of meaning itself, an appearance?" But the third question above (a correct quotation of Sartre's own words), seems to take "existents" to the phenomenal level. Sartre is about to explain how the phenomenon of being is not identical to the being of existents, or phenomena, or appearances.

His argument to show the distinction consists of premises which demonstrate the inadequacy of phenomenology, i.e., the movement from phenomena toward their being is not like the passage beyond a particular appearance of red.
toward the essence Red.

1) Essence is not in the object, it is the meaning of the object, the principle of the series of appearances which disclose it.

2) Being is neither one of the object's qualities nor a meaning of the object.

3) The object does not possess being and its existence is not a participation in being, nor any other kind of relation. It is.

4) The object does not hide being.

5) The object does not reveal being.

6) The existent is a phenomenon. . . . It designates itself as an organized totality of qualities. It designates itself and not its being.

Conclusion: Being is simply the condition of all revelation. It is being for revealing and not revealed being. 22

Contemplation of an existent will not yield the being of the phenomenon, but the phenomenon of being. The existent, the object, the essence of the object, appearances, the principle of the series of appearances, red and Red are all on the level of the phenomenon, neither revealing nor hiding being, the being upon which they are all founded.

The importance of this distinction between the being of the phenomenon as the FOUNDATION, as the CONDITION of all revelation and the phenomenon of being should not be underrated. Klaus Hartmann thinks that Sartre is on the trail of transcendence in terms of reality in space and time. 23 This thought is highly questionable when one concentrates on being as foundation or condition of reality or revelation
precisely because of Sartre's explicit prohibition of interpreting his introductory musings with a thing-in-itself in the background. Musing is not a horrible way to generalize about what he is doing here. J. W. Yolton just points to the fact that Sartre's whole ontology is geared to show that existents are revealed and existents exist "in some non-phenomenal way." Yolton's safe and innocent comment appreciates Sartre's own description of this distinction between being and its appearance as an intuition. For all the argument of the first sections of the introduction Sartre's "revealing intuition of the phenomenon of being" is on the same level of intuiting or just knowing when to take the eggs off the stove at the right time (i.e., without an egg timer) to have the yoke boiled to taste. With no disrespect intended, this really seems to be the case; this distinction at this time in Sartre's progress toward ontology amounts to no more than somehow, in some way, one can intuit that the intuition of being is not identical to being. Sartre puts it this way:

If the being of phenomena is not resolved in a phenomenon of being and if nevertheless we cannot say anything about being without considering this phenomenon of being, then the exact relationship which unites the phenomenon of being to the being must be established first of all. We can do this more easily if we consider that the whole of the preceding remarks has been directly inspired by the revealing intuition of the phenomenon of being.

What is, implied by the preceding considerations is that the being of the phenomenon although co-
extensive with the phenomenon, cannot be subject
to the phenomenal condition - which is to exist
in so far as it reveals itself - and that conse-
quently it surpasses the knowledge we have of it
and provides the basis for such knowledge. 25

In a word, the phenomenon of being is "ontological"
in the sense that we speak of the ontological proof
of St. Anselm and Descartes. It is an appeal to
being; it requires as phenomenon, a foundation which
is transphenomenal. 26

Sartre has a preliminary hold on a transphenomenal being.
His next move is to achieve more than a tenuous grasp. He
wonders, since reality is restricted to the phenomenon,
whether it is correct to assert that this transphenomenal
being of appearing is just this same appearing.

Why not . . . say that the being of the appearance
is its appearing? This is simply a way of choosing
new words to clothe the old "Esse est percipi" of
Berkeley. And it is in fact just what Husserl and
his followers are doing when, after having effected
the phenomenological reduction, they treat the
noema as unreal and declare that its esse is
percipi. 27

Comprehension of Sartre's attack on what he believes to be
the idealistic bottom line of the theory advanced by
"Husserl and his followers" requires some comprehension of
Husserl's theory, especially when the burden of explanation
involves a claim that Sartre departs from phenomenology.
In the very least, one has to know what a noema is.
Accordingly, before attention is devoted to Sartre's
criticism, a brief gloss of Husserl's phenomenological
treatment of our perception and knowledge of objects is
provided. The rewards outweigh the initial aversion to
philosophical potluck; potluck can have a theme; contra "Esse est percipi" is this theme.

II. Contra "Esse est percipi"

A) Husserl's Object Theory

Husserl's phenomenological analyses of sensation and the perception of what are naturally regarded as familiar objects, the mundane things of everyday life, employ the unfamiliar concepts of hyle, noesis and noema. Sartre's criticism of these analyses are based primarily on Husserl's theory as expressed in the book Ideas, and involve these unfamiliar concepts. Because Husserl often makes reference to other of his written works, the following explication deals with a broader selection of materials than is contained in Ideas.

Husserl distinguishes the act of perception and its constituents from the perceived object. Those constituents which make up the subjective side of the act are called real constituents, and those which make up the objective side are called intentional constituents. The real constituents are further categorized into the perceptual apprehension and its sensuous contents; in Ideas, Husserl uses the terms noesis in the place of perceptual apprehension, and hyletic data in the place of sensuous contents. In the Logical Investigations Husserl discusses the con-
founding of the object's objective colouring and the colour-sensations involved in the act of perceiving it. He observes an equivocation commonly exercised in the use of the word "appearance," i.e., its use for both "the experience in which the object's appearing consists," and "the object which appears as such." He justifies the distinction between the appearing of a thing, the experience, and the thing which appears by pointing out the paucity of exposure the object receives in the experience of its appearing. "The appearing of the thing does not itself appear to us, we live through it."30 The words "experience" and "perceive" assume a more precise meaning:

Sensations, and the acts 'interpreting' them or 'perceiving' them are alike experiences but they do not appear as objects: they are not seen, heard or perceived by any sense. Objects on the other hand, appear and are perceived, but they are not experienced.31

The appearing of a thing, a type of experience which Husserl seems to refer to as a sensation in the above context is also called a sense-aspect. "The sense-aspect of colour . . . is as much an 'experienced' or 'conscious' content as is the character of perceiving, or the full perceptual appearing of the coloured object."32 In Husserl, there is an ambiguity concerning hyletic data; it seems hyletic data can be experiences or the content of experiences. M. J. Larrabee separates hyletic data from "classical types of sense-data" by pointing out the former's lived through
feature, and the latter's existence external to the subject.

Hyletic data are the 'contents' of sensation; they are 'what' the senses sense, 'what' the eyes see, 'what!' the nose smells. . . . The 'content' and 'what' of hyletic data must not be taken in the sense of an object, for hyletic data are not objects of sensation, just as they are not the objects of the conscious acts in which they function as hyletic data.33

Husserl's hyletic data are not easily understood.

The term hyle, with its adjectival form "hyletic" is rooted in the Greek ὑλή meaning wood or matter. Husserl's first use of the term occurs in the lectures on internal time consciousness (delivered 1905-10) published in The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness.34 Husserl remarks upon the importance of this concept in Ideas:

At all events, in the whole phenomenological domain (in the whole, that is, within the stage of constituted temporality, as must always be born in mind), this remarkable duality and unity of sensile ὑλή (hyle - matter), and intentional μορφή (morphe - form, shape), plays a dominant part. . . . Sensory data offer themselves as material for intentional informings of bestowals of meaning at different levels.35

The hyle or sensory data that function as the matter or contents in the perception of objects are pre-objectively constituted by an immanent time consciousness.

The data of sensation which play their role in the constitution of a transcendent object are themselves constituted unities in a temporal flow. . . . The apprehension is the "animation" . . . of the datum of sensation which must be constituted before the animating apprehension can begin.36

The pre-objective constitution of hyle occurs on at least two levels. At the level of associative genesis, hyle are
temporally informed, i.e., they assume the characteristic of temporal positioning in the form of "now," "no longer," and "not yet" through "homogeneity" and "heterogeneity." The lowest level of constitution is receptivity, characterized by the ego's turning toward what is given to it through the affecting stimuli. The ego's turning is also referred to as the "being awake of the ego."

The ego consents to what is coming and takes it in. Thus under the term "perception" for example, we distinguish, on the one hand, the simple having-in-consciousness of the original appearances ... in which an entire field of perception is set before us - already in pure passivity - and on the other hand, active perception, the active apprehension of objects which come to prominence within a field of perception which extends beyond them.

Husserl thus distinguishes passive and active elements in the ego's perception of objects, receiving (the ego is affected by stimuli) and apprehending (the ego temporally informs its affectation to yield hyle, to bestow meaning to yield objects). The real constituents of perception, noesis and hyle, have their active and passive moments or levels. The passive side of the noesis is its affectation; the ego experiences the hyle or lives through them. The active feature of the noesis amounts to its animation of constituted hyle, the contents of consciousness, to bestow meaning and yield the object, the intentional constituent, the noema.

Perception is intentional. It has its intentional object, its objective meaning. Perceiving means having
something in mind. That which is in the mind qua intentional object is not - Husserl is emphatic on this point - an image or a representation or a copy of an object outside the mind. "The main point lies here, that in ascribing a representative function to perception and consequently to every experience, we unavoidably bring in an endless regress."40 Rather than suffer the problems of confronting a real object, the perceived thing of nature with the real constituents of an immanent experience, Husserl chooses to "abide by what is given in pure experience. . . . The 'real' object is 'bracketed.'"41 He carries out a phenomenological reduction which suspends or brackets every transcendent setting with regard to perception.

What it comes to is this: we suffer all these perceptions, judgements and so forth, but only on the condition that they be regarded and described as the essences which they are in themselves. . . . We allow no judgement that makes any use of the affirmation that posits a "real" thing or "transcendent" nature.

So then we ask generally, keeping to the clear meaning of these suspensions, what is it "lies" self-evidently before us in the whole "reduced" phenomenon? Now in perception there lies also this, that it has neomantic meaning, its "perceived as such," "this tree blossoming out there in space."42

In the phenomenologically reduced perception, the pure experience, can be found the perceived as such, the noema under the name of material thing, or plant, or tree, etc. The thing in nature is absolutely distinct from the noema. The perceived tree cannot burn away or be blown away by the wind. "The meaning of this perception, something that
belongs necessarily to its essence . . . cannot burn away; it has no chemical elements, no forces, no real properties."^43 Logically the noema is an object,

but one that is wholly dependent. Its esse consists exclusively in its percipi, except that the meaning of this statement is as about as far removed as it can be from that of Berkeley, since here the percipi does not contain the esse as a real . . . constituent.^44

The noema is dependent in so far as its constitution results from a real act of consciousness, the noetic animation of the real matter of sensation, hyletic data. Yet, Husserl says, the noema, the

transcendently constituted product, shaped 'on the basis' of the material experiences, and 'through' the noetic functions, is indeed something 'given' . . . something self-evidently given . . . standing over against consciousness itself as in principle other, irreal, transcendent. ^45

This report of Husserl's position is not intended to provide any sort of comprehensive detailing of his thought; a host of subtleties are left unexamined. It is included to display points concerning hyle, noesis and noema to which Sartre will offer counterpoints throughout his arguments against Berkeley's dictum, "Esse est percipi."

Generally speaking, Sartre attacks the dictum and through the attack one has to observe that he departs from phenomenological description of our perception of objects as Husserl handled it, to reach a ground for his own theory.
B) Sartre's Refutation of Idealism and His Criticism of Husserl

Sartre ignores Husserl's admonition that his bracketing of existence and his definition of the object for consciousness as an unreal noema whose esse is percipi not be interpreted as a return to Berkeley's theory. Sartre claims that Berkeley's dictum is unsatisfactory for two reasons, "one concerning the nature of the percipi, the other that of the percipere." He deals with the percipere first to arrive at a display of consciousness which will function in the premises of his arguments against the idealist treatment of the percipi.

Idealism, Sartre maintains, even if it reduces being to the knowledge which we have of it, must at least provide some basis in being for knowledge. The being of knowledge cannot reduce to the knowledge we have of it, its percipi. "[T]he foundation-of-being . . . for the percipere and the percipi cannot itself be subject to the percipi; it must be transphenomenal." Sartre observes this principle in Husserl's thought through Husserl's determining the noesis, experience qua act, to be real. There is a subject dimension of being which is transphenomenal. Here, Sartre invokes the intentionality thesis for the first time:

All consciousness . . . is consciousness of something. This means that there is no consciousness which is not a positing of a transcendent object, or . . . that consciousness has no content.47
Neutral givens which can occur either in the mind or the world depending on the system of reference chosen must be renounced. Sartre will later identify Husserl's hyle as a neutral given. "A table is not in consciousness - not even in the capacity of a representation. A table is in space."\(^{48}\) Intention is a directedness toward what is outside of consciousness. To further clarify the transphenomenal character of consciousness, Sartre introduces the notion of the pre-reflective cogito. All consciousness constitutes itself as consciousness of being conscious of its object. "[T]he necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be conscious of itself as being that knowledge."\(^{49}\) Every positional consciousness of an object is a non-positional consciousness of consciousness of something. This self-consciousness is one with the positional consciousness of its object, and thus consciousness of something is not an object for another consciousness as an object like the table might be. It is the pre-reflective cogito which sharply distinguishes consciousness from every other type of existent which might be called a thing. Consciousness is not a thing.\(^{50}\) Consciousness is not any sort of "substance supporting its qualities like particles of being, but a being which is existence through and through."\(^{51}\) Abandonment of the primacy of knowledge permits the discovery of the being of the knower, an absolute of existence.
Consciousness can be considered as the absolute because "it is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside it); it is pure appearance, an identity of appearance and existence." Sartre's description of the percipere provides a basis for his consideration of the being of the percipi. He poses a series of questions to which his reply will be negative:

We find ourselves at present on the ground of the phenomenology of Husserl, although Husserl himself has not always been faithful to his first principle. Are we satisfied? We have encountered a trans-phenomenal being, but is it actually the being to which the phenomenon of being refers? In other words is consciousness sufficient to provide the foundation for the appearance qua appearance?

Sartre's description of the percipi, the "to be perceived," focusses on features derived from its grammatical characteristics - passivity and relativity. The being of the table, a thing perceived as perceived has a being which cannot be reduced to a synthesis of subjective impressions. The relativity of the perceived table does not logically entail that its being is immanent to consciousness. The table is before knowledge; even though the table is revealed to consciousness as a synthesis of impressions, its being does not consist in this synthesis.

It is reasonable to regard the percipi as a passive being. For Sartre, passivity always implies activity. Passivity is a doubly relative phenomenon; "relative to
the activity of the one who acts and to the existence of the one who suffers.\textsuperscript{55} The passivity of the percipi cannot be used as a feature of the perceptum to infer that the percipere affects the being of the perceptum because it would have to already exist in order to be so affected. The being of the perceptum cannot be a creation of the percipere because the created perceptum could never be distinguished from its creator. The perceptum must exist independently in order to be properly grasped in its passive mode of being. Furthermore, if consciousness gave being to its object, then it could never have "even an illusion of getting out of its subjectivity";\textsuperscript{56} consciousness would be caught in an egocentric predicament.

Sartre raises another point against the idealist position based on the passivity/activity distinction. In so far as the active agent must be passive to be in relation with a passive patient, the \textit{esse est percipi} implies a passive feature of consciousness. This is impossible, Sartre says, because no element of passivity can be assigned to perception or knowledge. "They are all activity, all spontaneity. It is precisely because it is pure spontaneity, because nothing can get a grip on it that consciousness cannot act on anything."\textsuperscript{57}

The perceived being is before consciousness; consciousness can not reach it, and it can not enter into consciousness. . . . The transphenomenal being of consciousness can not provide a basis for the transphenomenal being of the phenomenon.\textsuperscript{58}
Sartre's specific attack on Husserl's theory of perception occurs in his text between his prohibition of a passive element in consciousness and his conclusion stated immediately above. Generally, it can be said that Sartre's concept of transcendence is completely at odds with Husserl's. Sartre is trying to demonstrate a transcendence understood as transphenomenal being. His whole argument against Husserl involves the latter's theory after the phenomenological reduction. Sartre seems to focus on the irreality of the noema which Husserl called a "transcendentally constituted product... standing over against consciousness itself as in principle other, irreal, transcendent." Sartre terms this product "a transcendent nothingness," upon which consciousness would have to bestow being.

"[T]he esse est percipi would require that consciousness, pure spontaneity which can not act on anything, give being to a transcendent nothingness, at the same time keeping it in its state of nothingness. So much nonsense! Husserl has attempted to overcome these objections by introducing passivity into the noesis; this is the hyle or pure flux of experience and the matter of the passive synthesis."

It is true that Husserl distinguishes passive from active elements in the noetic phases of consciousness. It is also true that the hyle has what he terms a lived-through aspect which Larrabee pointed out to distinguish hyletic data from classical sense-data; the former did not exist externally to the subject and were not proper objects of perception. Sartre draws attention to the ambiguous nature of hyle.
Husserl, he says, has introduced in fact those neutral givens. . . . The hyle in fact could not be consciousness, for it would disappear in translucency and could not offer that resisting basis of impressions which must be surpassed toward the object. But if it does not belong to consciousness, where does it derive its being and its opacity? How can it preserve at once the opaque resistance of things and the subjectivity of thought? Its esse can not come to it from percipi, since it is not even perceived.

Hyle as a real element of Husserl's act of perception is not perceived, it is experienced; a ramification of its lived-through feature.

. . . . for consciousness transcends it toward the objects. But if hyle derives its being from itself alone, we meet once again the insoluble problem of the connection of consciousness with existents independent of it. . . . In giving to the hyle both the characteristics of a thing and the characteristics of consciousness, Husserl believed that he facilitated the passage from one to the other, but he succeeded in creating only a hybrid being which consciousness rejects and which can not be a part of the world.61

According to the brief search through Husserl's work, this comment of Sartre's has weight, i.e., the hyle is presented as lived-through matter in consciousness. Sartre's characterization of consciousness rejects "contents" in consciousness, and it should be mentioned that Sartre also laboured against Husserl's concept of the transcendental ego long before the publication of BN, at a point in his career when he was an avid defender of phenomenology and its method. Robert Kirkpatrick and Forrest Williams, translators of Sartre's monograph, The Transcendence of the
Ego, maintain that Sartre's disagreement with Husserl over the existence of the ego in consciousness resembles more a "family quarrel within phenomenology" than a radical alienation of views. Sartre put his thesis in the following way:

For most philosophers the ego is an "inhabitant" of consciousness. . . . We should like to show here that the ego is neither formally nor materially in consciousness: it is outside in the world. It is a being of the world, like the ego of another.62

In their introduction to The Transcendence of the Ego, Kirkpatrick and Williams try to show "how this disagreement with Husserl seems to have facilitated the transition from phenomenology to the existentialist doctrines of L'Etre et le Neant."63 This transition amounts to a departure from phenomenology. For Sartre, the truth concerning the relation between consciousness and its object is exactly opposite to the idealistic explanation he finds in Husserl. Rather than the object (the noema in Husserl's theory) depending upon consciousness for its existence, it is consciousness which depends for its being upon the independent being of the object. This is exactly what Sartre's ontological argument is intended to show. Sartre's argument is very simply stated:

Consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself.64

The thesis of intentionality can be interpreted in two ways
according to Sartre. Husserl interprets it the wrong way. Either consciousness is by its very nature a relation to an object which is transcendent in its being, or consciousness constitutes the being of its object, as Husserl implies in his explanation of perception after the phenomenological reduction.

On Sartre's reading, Husserl's interpretation destroys itself. He claims that Husserl can justifiably consider the appearance of an object as a subjective impression but that he cannot posit this subjective impression as a quality of the transcendent object.

“Consciousness is a real subjectivity and the impression is a subjective plenitude. But this subjectivity cannot go out of itself to posit a transcendent object in such a way as to endow it with a plenitude of impressions.”

Husserl has to distinguish the object from consciousness by pointing to its absence rather than its presence. Sartre returns to the finite/infinite distinction mentioned earlier and maintains that the idealistic interpretation results in a transcendence for the object which consists in a non-given infinite series of appearances. Sartre equates the absent infinite with a nothingness or non-being to charge that Husserl can only separate consciousness, a being, from its objects by the latter's non-being. The irreality of Husserl's transcendent noema is rendered as non-being in Sartre's criticism. The transcendence of the object cannot be based upon an empty objectifying intention (a noetic
function in Husserl's idiom) aimed at an expected plenitude of impressions.

It is true that things give themselves in profile. And it is true that each appearance refers to other appearances. But each of them is already itself alone a transcendent being, not a subjective material of impressions—a plenitude of being, not a lack—a presence, not an absence.  

This is the heart of Sartre's argument against idealism. Every appearance must be considered as a being which exists independently of consciousness and not merely a content of consciousness, a subjective impression.

The ontological argument shows that consciousness requires a being other than itself in order to be conscious of something or consciousness cannot exist. Sartre explains that "A revealing intuition implies something revealed; immanence can be defined only within the apprehension of a transcendent." In other words:

To say that consciousness is consciousness of something is to say that it must produce itself as a revealed-revelation of a being which is not it and which gives itself as already existing when consciousness reveals it.  

Sartre's arguments against idealism in general and Husserl's doctrine in particular bear striking resemblance to the arguments in G. E. Moore's "Refutation of Idealism." Moore attempts to show that Berkeley's dictum is false when interpreted in its only philosophically interesting sense: "The object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject." Moore maintains that all idealists either
interpret "esse est percipi" to be equivalent in meaning with this proposition, or they employ it as a premise in arguments to show that the dictum is true. Moore argues that "what makes a thing real cannot be its presence as an inseparable aspect of sentient experience." His characterization of consciousness closely approaches that of Sartre and his insistence that awareness of something has its parallel in Sartre's interpretation of intentionality.

C) Moore's "Refutation of Idealism"

Moore's article begins with a painstaking clarification of exactly what he means not to prove. After framing the proposition he does want to attack, his argument moves in two phases. He first challenges the idealist conception of sensation by pointing out what he considers to be its notion of what consciousness is. The second phase demonstrates the necessity of the correct description in overcoming absurd conclusions concerning self awareness and other minds, which follow from the idealist interpretation.

According to Moore, a correct view of sensation involves distinguishing two elements: 1) the 'object' or that in which one sensation differs from another, and 2) 'consciousness' or that which all have in common - that which makes them sensations or mental facts. The question arises whether just one or both exist. Idealists
hold that the sensation or idea forms a whole in which two inseparable aspects are to be distinguished - content and existence. They treat, for example, the sensation of blue as an organic whole and assert that blue is merely the content of the sensation of blue just as they would treat a thing like a blue flower and hold that blue is a part of a blue flower. The analysis of sensation involving this notion of content requires that the sensation of blue be treated as any other thing and its qualities; to say that a thing exists is also to say that its qualities exist. "The relation of the blue to consciousness is conceived to be exactly the same as that of the blue to the glass or hair in the blue bead or the blue beard: it is in all these cases the quality of a thing." 71

Moore concerns himself with the existence of blue. He seems to point out two ways in which it is possible to incorrectly equate the proposition "blue exists" with the proposition "the sensation of blue exists." First, one can regard consciousness as a thing and take blue as a quality of consciousness. Involved in the sensation of blue, consciousness would be regarded as an existing substance; and blue would exist as a quality or the substance. A second way would be to point out that every sensation of blue involves a mental image as a thing in the mind and to regard the blue as the determining quality of the mental image. Moore moves to the attack by making two points:
1) That we have no reason for supposing there are mental images at all - for supposing that blue is part of the content of the sensation of blue, and

2) That even if there are mental images, no mental image and no sensation or idea is merely a thing of this kind.72

A true conception of sensation recognizes that consciousness is a distinct element of every sensation, that consciousness is a reality which has a perfectly distinct and unique relation to blue, a relation which is not that of a thing or substance to content, nor content to another part of content. Sensations are examples of knowing or being aware of or experiencing something. In knowing blue the mind is not possessed of a thing or image of which blue is the content. Awareness is an awareness of something, and to be aware or the sensation of blue is not to be aware of a mental image - of a "thing" of which 'blue' and some other element are constituent parts in the same sense in which blue and glass are constituents of a blue bead. It is to be aware of an awareness of blue; awareness being used in both cases, in exactly the same sense.73

The content theory does not account for this unique relation between blue and consciousness. The misconception, according to Moore, is a result of the difficulty in defining exactly what consciousness is:

[Though philosophers have recognized that something distinct is meant by consciousness, they have never had a clear conception of what that something is. . . . [The moment we try to fix our attention on consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness. When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous.74

49
The essential point in Moore's analysis is one that he is quite certain of: whether some version of the content theory holds or not, he is convinced that any and every sensation in a class similar to those of blue are indeed of blue. Awareness "has to blue the simple and unique relation the existence of which alone justifies us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the thing known, indeed in distinguishing mind from matter." 75

Moore believes that his assessment of sensation with its stress on the notion of object has shown that to have sensation or an idea is to be aware of something which is not an inseparable aspect of consciousness or experience. The second phase of his argument focusses on contradictions germain to the idealistic content theory in its application to self awareness and the awareness of other minds.

Idealists must admit that there are "some things . . ." which are not inseparable aspects of their experience, even if they be inseparable aspects of some experience." 76 Moore maintains they must confess an awareness of other minds. 77 The idealistic content theory cannot yield any premise which permits inference to the existence of any other consciousness. 78 For Moore the absurd predicament of holding to the truth of "esse est percipi" is that any idealist cannot be sure about his own existence. "The fact is, on his own theory, that himself and that other person are in reality mere contents of an awareness, which is aware of nothing
whatever." He main point here is that, at best, the idealist must be content with an untenable solipsism or carry his thesis to its logical conclusion resulting in a confusion about his own existence.

Moore summarizes his refutation of idealism with a generalization about every experience:

If . . . we clearly recognize the nature of that particular relation which I have called "awareness of anything," if we see that this is involved equally in the analysis of every experience . . . and that this is in fact the only essential element in an experience - the only thing that is both common and peculiar to all experiences - the only fact which gives us reason to call any fact mental; if, further, we recognize that this awareness is and must be in all cases of such a nature that its object, when we are aware of it, is precisely what it would be if we were not aware: then it becomes plain that the existence of a table in space is related to my experience of it in precisely the same way as the existence of my own experience is related to my experience of that. Of both we are merely aware: if we are aware that the one exists, we are aware in precisely the same way that the other exists; and if it is true that my experience can exist, even when I do not happen to be aware of its existence, we have exactly the same reason for supposing that the table can do so also.80

D) Moore's Mind and Matter and Sartre's Transphenomenal Being

Both Moore and Sartre rely heavily upon the concept of intentionality as the pivotal idea in their arguments against idealism. In Moore the sensation of blue always involves an awareness of blue and in Sartre, all consciousness self-consciousness of something. Moore's relation called the "awareness of anything ... is involved equally
in the analysis of every experience." Both interpret this thesis to mean necessarily that the "of" implies a being of consciousness and a being of objects other than consciousness. This "other than" means that the existence of the objects cannot be reduced to the existence of consciousness.

Awareness or consciousness cannot be regarded as a thing or substance. Sartre's description of consciousness as a total emptiness, an identity of appearance and existence, a pure spontaneity figures in his arguments as a principle used to distinguish consciousness and its object. The intentionality thesis on Sartre's interpretation, divides consciousness as "a being whose existence posits its essence" and the object "whose essence implies its existence." Moore explains the mistaken idealist belief about the inseparability of awareness and its object, understood as a content of awareness, in terms of mistaken assumptions about consciousness. Consciousness is not a thing which can have qualities of contents referred to as mental images and identified as objects. Sartre rejects the notions of contents in consciousness and representations of reality in consciousness. Even though Moore is less certain about his characterizations of consciousness than Sartre is about his, the characteristics of non-substantiality and emptiness feature prominently in Moore's arguments. Sartre's attack on Husserl's noema as a correlate of the real noesis is parallel to Moore's attack on the
notion of inseparability. "The sensation of blue exists" is not equal in meaning to "blue exists."

Moore and Sartre take advantage, in similar fashion, of what they believe to be the weakest part of idealist reasoning. Sartre begins his dispute by emphasizing the necessity of a guarantor for the being of knowledge. He interprets the idealist position to have reduced being to the knowledge of being and points to the problem of an infinite regress in establishing the existence of knowledge. This is the force of his reference to Spinoza's knowledge of knowledge, which faces the problem of interpreting self-consciousness as knowledge of knowledge of knowledge, etc., and the reason for Sartre's distinguishing the pre-reflective cogito from the reflective cogito (non-positional consciousness from positional consciousness). Sartre notes that Husserl took this into consideration but failed to properly account for the nature of consciousness; it cannot function as the origin or producer of the things of which it is aware. Simply put, Sartre's position amounts to this: Look, we can know about knowledge even if our knowledge about the existence of objects which we claim to know about is in question. We can see that reducing the existence of our knowledge to knowledge is absurd. We at least have a hope of correctly describing the existence of knowing or consciousness and if we do it properly we can see that consciousness cannot create beings of which it is aware. Moore's
approach: "if it is true that my experience can exist even when I do not happen to be aware of its existence, we have exactly the same reason for supposing that the table can do so also." The emptiness of consciousness does not figure into Moore's argument in the way it does in Sartre's, but there is a parallel exposure of a supposed muddle in idealism about the existence of consciousness. The difference between Moore and Sartre's arguments can be attached to Sartre's handling of self-consciousness. The ontological proof is "derived not from the reflective cogito but from the pre-reflective being of the percipient." Consciousness qua revealing intuition (pre-reflective, non-positional consciousness of consciousness of something) must be qualified; immanence, absolute subjectivity demands its transcendent counterpart. Moore is quite content to point out that the unique relation of awareness to objects, "ofness" permits us to draw our quite reasonable distinction between mind and matter.

The preceding analyses of Sartre's introduction and Husserl's object theory is carried out to show that Sartre's intention in working through his ontology is philosophically and diametrically opposed to the philosophical intention and result of Husserl's phenomenological procedure, with the important proviso, that a distinction is drawn with regard to the difference in their analyses of how an object exists for consciousness. On this issue Sartre is not a phenomeno-
logist; he rejects the phenomenological reduction and pain
have been taken to bear in mind that it is Husserl's theory
after the reduction that Sartre does not accept.

The result of his attack against the dictum "esse est
percipi," is similar enough to Moore's result in "Refutation
of Idealism" to ground an interpretative framework that will
be exploited throughout the remainder of this paper. All
this means is that observation of this similarity of views
about the existence of consciousness's object provokes an
explication of Sartre's description of the relationship be-
tween consciousness and its object in the light of Moore's,
and later, Russell's view concerning this relation. There
is always a fundamental problem involved in any study that
advances with an "in-light-of-imperative." It is the problem
of misleading and mistaken generalization concerning parallel
thinking which thrives on the naive optimism that one
philosopher's idiom can easily be translated into the
language of another. John Yolton, qua mentor, surfaces
here again:

Philosophical languages . . . are not entirely
characterized by reference to their technical
vocabulary: the vocabulary is merely an indication
of the special language. It is the conceptual
orientation accompanying this technical vocabulary
which transforms the vocabulary into a language.86

A verbal translation from one point of view to
another contrasting one never is fully possible,
although many apparent contrasts yield some basic
similarities upon close attention and careful
glossing. There may, in fact, be few philosophical
positions which stand so radically opposed that
there are no similarities and hence no verbal transitions. But even where the contrasts are striking and pervasive, the semantic difficulty is circumvented by the role which internal understanding plays in the entire process.\textsuperscript{87}

Yolton talks about contrasting points of view and the possibilities of translation. The asserted similarity between Sartre and Moore in their attacks on idealism is one of conceptual orientation. There are some contrasts as well; their vocabularies are different. In the materials considered throughout the next chapter there are marked differences in terminology. Sartre's terms are borrowed more from Hegel than from any other philosopher and the contrasts in their points of view is subject matter for a research effort that is not part of the current project.

Klaus Hartmann has already done a study of Sartre's ontology in light of Hegel's logic - it will be referred to again in this paper. Moore and Russell are used to get at Sartre's treatment of the perception and knowledge of objects. In other words, the difference in vocabulary is exploited to interpret Sartre. This essay is basically a matter of look and see. Chapter Two will look at Moore's "Status of Sense-data" and "Some Judgements of Perception," Russell's Our Knowledge of the External World, and Sartre's "Transcendence" in BN. Chapter Three will see both contrasts and parallels in conceptual orientation between Moore, Russell and Sartre which advise assessment of Sartre's thinking as phenomenalistic. In highfalutin' terms, the following
chapter displays Moore's and Russell's lexicons with Sartre's to prepare for a discussion of conceptual similarity and contrast - the record of these similarities and contrasts could be termed a key to translation. Careful glossing aimed at internal understanding is the next step.
CHAPTER TWO

THREE VIEWS ON HOW AN OBJECT CAN EXIST

FOR CONSCIOUSNESS

I. Moore's View

In his article "The Status of Sense-data," Moore advances two points of significance through his discussion of the relationship of the mind and sense-data or sensibles. First, the mind in seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, touching, dreaming, hallucinating, thinking, remembering, etc., is related to entities termed sense-data or sensibles by a mental act called direct apprehension. Second, a certain class of sensibles, experienced in sensations proper, exist independently of their being experienced. The mental act of direct apprehension of independently existing sensibles as described by Moore is very close to the relation of consciousness to being-in-itself described by Sartre as intuition or presence to ________. The analysis of sensation proper in Moore's article seems to be adopted by Russell in his Our Knowledge of the External World in which Russell goes further than Moore to reach a definition of the thing as opposed to sense-data. Sartre's explanation of the object as a series of manifestations is very close to Russell's definition of the thing. Although
Moore does not define the thing in this article, his speculation questioning the validity of assuming that independently existing things cause sensations of them duplicates themes in Russell and Sartre that there is neither a thing-in-itself nor a pre-determined being which causes experiences of objects.

Moore begins his discussion of sense-data by distinguishing five classes of mental events:

1) wakeful experiences of entities usually called images
2) experiences of images in dreams
3) hallucinations and certain illusory sensory experiences
4) the having of after-images or after-sensations
5) sensory experiences called sensations proper.¹

All of the mental events described in these five classes involve the fact that some entity is experienced, and the entity in question for any experience in particular must be distinguished from the experience of it. The sorts of entities Moore has in mind are patches of colour, sounds, smells; images of patches of colour, images of tastes, etc.² Concerning these entities, a further distinction can be made between those which are experienced and those which are not experienced, that is, "in speaking... of the sort of entities which are experienced in experiences of the five kinds... mentioned, we do necessarily confine ourselves to those which actually are experienced."³ Moore prefers to call the entities which are experienced in each of the five classes of events "sensibles" to avoid con-
ceptions of sense-data that he thinks are confusing. The term "sense-data" has been used to denote entities which by definition must be "given in sense"; as well he doesn't want to be restricted to talking about sense-data which are by definition experienced in sensations proper. He wants to discuss the relations which exist between sensibles and minds, and sensibles and physical objects.

"Seeing" and "hearing" are two names for the most common relation which minds have to sensibles. Seeing a black mark on a piece of paper and hearing the ticking of a clock are examples of what Moore calls the direct apprehension of sensibles. The occurrence in one's mind of a direct apprehension of a black mark must be distinguished from thinking of, or remembering a black mark. Although the relation of the mind to the black mark (a sensible), in the experience of actually seeing it, is exactly similar to the relation of the mind to the image of the black mark (a sensible) in the having of a visual image of the black mark (having a visual image of the black mark may be involved in thinking of or remembering the black mark), there is a difference of relation involved between actually seeing and thinking of or remembering it.4

I shall express this relation which I certainly do have to a sensible when I actually see or hear it, and most certainly do not have to it, when I only think of or remember it, by saying that there is in my mind a direct apprehension of it.5
The relation which the mind has to the black mark in remembering or thinking of it may be described by the term "attention." It seems clear to Moore that direct apprehension can at most, only be identical with one of the relations meant by attention because he can certainly say that he is attending to entities which he is not directly apprehending; for instance, he may attend to (think of) a sensible he saw yesterday which he is not presently seeing. Direct apprehension may always involve some degree of attention, but to attend to something doesn't always involve directly apprehending that something.

The direct apprehension of a sensible does not involve the sensible being in our minds in any way that mental acts as such take place in our minds.

[By saying that a sensible is in our minds or is ours, we mean that it is directly apprehended by us, and we must recognize that we are using the phrases "in our minds" or "ours" in quite a different sense from that in which we use them when we talk of our mental acts being "in our minds" or "ours."]

Moore holds that a certain class of sensibles exist when they are not being experienced. To suppose that there are, for instance, patches of colour which are not being experienced is not self-contradictory. The esse of all sensibles is not percipi. The class of sensibles which exist independently of experience consists of those which would (under certain conditions which actually exist) be experienced in a sensation proper, if only a living body, having a
certain constitution, existed under those conditions in a position in which no such body does actually exist. 8

Moore's reason for believing that a class of sensibles so defined exists is that he has a strong propensity to believe that visual sensibles like the black mark, mentioned previously, exist unchanged when he turns his head away or closes his eyes "provided that the physical conditions outside his body remain unchanged." 9 He attacks what he perceives to be the most weighty argument against his belief, namely, one which asserts that the existence of sensibles is doubly dependent upon physical conditions and the condition of the nervous system in such a way that "sensibles which we should have experienced if only our nervous system had been in a different condition, certainly do not exist, when it is not in that condition." 10 Moore maintains that the fallacy of this position is a confusion of our experience of sensibles and the existence of sensibles.

The fact that the experience of a given sensible depends upon the condition of our nervous system does not directly show that the existence of the sensible experienced always so depends. 11

Moore's discussion of the relation of sensibles to physical objects begins with his admission that he doesn't quite know how to define the phrase "physical object." Without intending to reach such a definition he proceeds to consider how certain propositions about physical objects which he assumes to be true are to be interpreted as true,
and how sensibles play a role in such interpretation. Moore considers a situation involving two coins, a florin and a half-crown, located obliquely to his line of vision so that the visual sensibles he directly apprehends are visibly elliptical. Moore assumes five propositions to be true.

1) He is really seeing (in the ordinary sense of "see") two coins and not experiencing hallucinations or mere images.

2) The upper surface of the coins are really approximately circular.

3) The upper side of the coins is really larger than that of the florin, though its visual sensible is smaller than the visual sensible of the upper side of the half-crown.

4) The coins have another side and an inside which he doesn't see.

5) Both the coins continue to exist when he turns his head away or shuts his eyes.\textsuperscript{12}

Moore lays down two principles which he thinks are certain and which must figure prominently in the interpretation of the five propositions. The first is that the visual sensible which he is directly apprehending in seeing the upper side of the coin is not identical with the upper side of the coin.\textsuperscript{13} He states that this principle "absolutely follows" from the fact that another person may be seeing the upper side of the coin in exactly the same sense in which he is seeing it and yet the other person's sensible is certainly different from Moore's,\textsuperscript{14} i.e., the upper side of the coin cannot be identical to two sensibles which are themselves not identical. The second principle Moore sets
down is that his knowledge of the five propositions about the coins is based on his experiences consisting in directly apprehending sensibles and in the perception of relations between directly apprehended sensibles.\textsuperscript{15}

The truth of the first principle necessitates distinguishing between different senses of the word "see"; i.e., in one sense, sense seeing means directly apprehending a sensible and in another sense seeing means seeing a physical object.\textsuperscript{16} Moore writes:

Indeed we have not only to distinguish that sense of the word "perceive" in which it is equivalent to "directly apprehend," from one sense in which we can be said to perceive a physical object, we have also to distinguish at least two different senses in which we can be said to perceive physical objects, different both from one another and from "directly apprehend." For it is obvious that though I should be said to be now seeing the half-crown, there is a narrower and more proper sense in which I can only be said to see one side of it—not its lower side or its inside, and not therefore the whole half-crown.\textsuperscript{17}

The next phase of Moore's discussion involves his setting down four differing views of the propositions about the half-crown and the florin which for the most part adhere to the principles and the resulting distinctions mentioned immediately above. The first view appears to serve as a basis for the ones which follow in so far as the latter three are suggested to overcome difficulties in those which immediately precede them.

On the first view, knowledge of the five propositions is based on experiences of sensibles according to the second
principle; that they are unequal in size and approximately circular is knowledge obtained by experiencing certain sets of sensibles as various times. The belief that the coins exist results from inference from experiences of certain sets of sensibles existing in relation to one another. The five propositions express a kind of fact that "if certain conditions were fulfilled someone should directly apprehend certain other sensibles." For instance, to say that the coins exist is really to mean that if one's body were moved in certain ways one should apprehend other sensibles which may be tactual and not apprehended directly as a consequence of the movement if the visual sensibles experienced before the movement were images or hallucinations. The problem Moore finds with this view is that the propositions expressing the conditions under which other sensibles are to be experienced involve references to physical objects, and not just sensibles. The most troublesome problem concerns the strange Pickwickian sense in which the existence of objects is to be understood. Knowing that the coins exist only means that certain elliptical patches exist presently and that if certain unrealized conditions had been realized, then one would have certain sensations.

The second view is advanced to avoid the problem of Pickwickian existence. Moore seems to distinguish knowledge by description from knowing that something existed at a particular time in a Pickwickian sense - Moore's distinction
is not at all clear. But it seems clear to Moore that the description by which we know a thing like a coin allows him to investigate the connection between the thing and sensibles as if they were two existing entities. Moore examines the possibility of a causal connection, and finds that the thing cannot be taken as the cause of the experience of sensibles due to the fact other factors seem to be as causally important, e.g., events in eyes, optic nerves, and the brain. Moore notes that this objection could be sidestepped by referring to the thing as the source of experiences that could be said to exist in a non-Pickwickian sense, although the fact that an object like a coin is circular would be true only in the Pickwickian sense that the source would play a causal role in the occurrence of circular sensibles which may be bigger or smaller than sensibles caused by other sources. 21 This second view really involves a distinction between the status of objects qua sources and their qualities, a distinction which Moore doesn't accept because he is disposed to believe that if these sources exist in a simple way then they should be circular in a simple and natural way. 22

The third possible view involves defining these sources of experiences to actually consist of sensibles, namely all of those sensibles, which anybody would, under the actual physical conditions, experience in sensations proper of which objects were the source, if their bodies were in any of the positions relatively to those coins, in which they would get sensations from them at all. 23
The upper side of the half-crown is identical to a huge collection of sensibles. This approach has merit, according to Moore, because he has a strong propensity to believe that the sensibles directly apprehended in looking at the upper surface of the coin are in the place in which the upper surface of the coin is. Moore objects to this to the degree that once again propositions about the circularity and relative size of the coins would only be true in a Pickwickian sense, though not the same Pickwickian sense as was recognized in the second view. One would also think that this analysis would violate the first principle in some way. However, it must be recalled that Moore only denied that the upper side of the coin was identical with only one sensible in his statement of the principle.

The fourth and last view of relations between sensibles and physical objects which Moore considers is similar to Locke's explanation of objects. Objects really exist in a natural sense before being perceived, and really have some of the features they appear to have, and are not composed of sensibles. Sensibles related to objects do not occupy the place in which the object is. This view distinguishes primary qualities which objects really have (shape, for example) and which resemble related sensibles, from secondary qualities (colour, for example) which objects really don't have. No directly apprehended sensibles would be parts of any object. Sensibles having the object as their source
would not exist in the same place as their source. To this view Moore has no serious objection except that a serious difficulty is encountered in establishing how sensibles have sources at all, and that the source has features like the circularity which the coin is supposed to have.

Throughout "The Status of Sense-data," Moore poses a problem which he confesses he cannot satisfactorily solve. Simply put: If we say that directly apprehended sensibles exist independently of our apprehension of them, and by inference from their existence we believe that physical objects exist, then how are sensibles and physical objects related? The problem arises for him because he is sure that he perceives physical objects in a different way than he directly apprehends sensibles. He seems to assume that there should be no distinction between the existence of objects and the existence of sensibles (neither should exist in some Pickwickian sense while the other exists in some simple and natural way). The assumption disallows reducing the existence of objects to the existence of sensibles. He will not accept the physical objects as the cause or the source of sensibles. He will not accept Locke's explanation. Moore approaches the problem again in his article "Some Judgements of Perception."

In "Some Judgements of Perception," Moore considers statements of the form "This is a so-and-so" or "That is a
so-and-so." Such judgements, Moore thinks, are "commonly and rightly" taken to be judgements, the truth of which involves the existence of material things or physical objects. To be correct in judging at some particular time that "this is a chair" means that there is at least one chair in the universe, and that if there is a chair in the universe then there is at least one material thing or physical object in it. All of the judgements of the sort Moore is talking about are judgements about things which are perceived. In every case in which one sees or feels with one's eyes or fingers, that the something is a so-and-so, then one is making a judgement of perception.

Moore is not sure what conditions must be satisfied in order that he may be truly be said to be perceiving, by sight or by touch, that one thing is a door and another a finger, and not inferring them. He concedes that in the ordinary sense in which we use the word "perceive" correctly, some element of inference may be involved, but, that inference may be involved in the perception of doors and fingers does not invalidate the truth of assertions that we perceive something to be so-and-so. Any questions as to whether one can know such things as "this is a chair" at the moment one touches a chair, and whether there are any material things, need not be taken seriously. The question which Moore thinks does merit asking is what does one know when one knows that "this is a finger" or "this is an inkstand."
Every judgement of perception involves an assumption according to Moore, which most treatments of the subject do not make explicit:

[I]t is the assumption that, in all cases in which I make a judgement of this sort, I have no difficulty whatever in picking out a thing, which is, quite plainly, in a sense in which nothing else is, the thing about which I am making my judgement; and that yet, though this thing is the thing about which I am judging, I am, quite certainly, not, in general, judging with regard to it, that it is a thing of that kind for which the term, which seems to express the predicate of my judgement, is a name.28

In the judgement "this is a chair" the assumption has the following implications: At any time we can select from our field of presentation, as Moore calls it, an object which is definitely the object about which the judgement is being made, but it is quite certain for Moore that we are not judging of this object that it is a whole chair. He uses the term "in general" in his expression of the assumption to allow room for certain judgements that do seem to involve the whole thing; e.g., marks on paper, soap-bubbles, drops of water. The object, the presented object, involved in judgements of perception is a sense-datum, the sort of thing which seems to be the real or ultimate subject of all such judgements.29 (There is nothing in the definition of sense-datum in this article to distinguish the sense-datum from the sensible involved in sensations proper in "The Status of Sense-data."

According to Moore, sense-data play an intermediary role in the perception of whole objects, i.e., a sense-datum
mediates his perception of an object such as an inkstand in so far as the perception of an inkstand depends upon a presented object, a sense-datum. He holds that "if there is anything which is this inkstand, then, in perceiving that thing, he is knowing it only as the thing which stands in a certain relation to this sense-datum."\(^{30}\) The inkstand can be known as the only thing which stands in a certain relation to a certain sense-datum. The inkstand is not given in the same sense in which the sense-datum is given. The inkstand is known by description as Russell defined the phrase, "and the description by which it is known is that of being the thing which stands to this sense-datum in a certain relation."\(^{31}\) Any judgement about the inkstand is also, in another sense, a judgement about the sense-datum.

Judgments about objects such as inkstands involve judgements about the sense-data which mediate perception of inkstands in a different sense in so far as the presented object, the sense-datum, is not a whole inkstand. Moore maintains that what he is judging of the presented object is that it is part of the surface of an inkstand. He writes:

When I judge "That inkstand is a good big one" I shall in effect be judging; "There is one and only one inkstand of which this is part of the surface, and the inkstand of which this is true is a good big one." It would be quite clear that the part of the surface of the inkstand was given to me in a sense in which the whole was not, just as it is in fact clear that I do now see this part of the surface of this inkstand in a sense in which I do not "see" the whole.\(^{32}\)
The this, the presented object, the sense-datum is part of the surface of an object in just the same way the trunk is part of a tree, or a finger is part of a hand and a hand a part of a body. This view thus implies that the sense-datum as part of the surface of a material object is itself a material object, and that everything which is true of the part of the material object seen or touched is true of the sense-datum.

Moore presents and criticizes what he considers to be the strongest argument against the view that sense-data are identical to the surfaces of material objects. It is plausible for an observer to judge "This is the same part of the same thing as I was seeing or touching just now," without excluding the possibility that the part in question may have changed during the interval in shape and/or size and/or quality. The parts of surfaces seen at one time can be perceptibly different when seen at another; they can also be perceptibly identical. In the case of seeing the surface of a coin, the corresponding presented object may be perceptibly smaller and more approximately circular than at another time when it is perceptibly larger and elliptical in shape, and we are not prepared to judge that the surface is perceptibly different than it was. It seems impossible that the surface seen at the later time should be identical with the object presented, and the surface seen earlier identical with the object presented then because, in so far
as we cannot judge that the surface seen later is in any way different from that seen earlier, it seems that the later sense-datum is perceptibly different from the one seen earlier. 35

Moore claims that this argument is inconclusive because it rests on the assumption that the presented objects seen at the different times are perceptibly different. He challenges the assumption by drawing a distinction between perceiving a sense-datum to be so-and-so and perceiving a sense-datum to seem so-and-so:

What now seems to me to be possible is that the sense-datum which corresponds to a tree, which I am seeing, when I am a mile off, may not really be perceived to be smaller than the one, which corresponds to the same tree, when I see it from a distance of only a hundred yards, but that it is only perceived to seem smaller; that the sense-datum which corresponds to a penny, which I am seeing obliquely, is not really perceived to be different in shape from that which corresponded to the penny, when I was straight in front of it, but is only perceived to seem different - that all that is perceived is that the one seems elliptical and the other circular. 36

Moore admits that this distinction between being and seeming involves an additional type of ultimate or non-analysable psychological relation which cannot be identified with the relation involved in perceiving or judging that something is so-and-so due to the fact that presented objects in their seeming to be so-and-so can neither be perceived nor judged to be so-and-so. 37

Moore mentions some alternatives to the view identifying sense-data and the surfaces of material objects. One
involves asserting that only the surfaces are known by
description and not the whole material object. Instead of
saying that "There is a thing which stands to this in a
certain relation and which is an inkstand" one would have
to say "There is one thing and only one which stands to
this in this relation and which is part of the surface of
an inkstand." According to Moore, analysing the judgement
in this manner suffers the hardship of properly explaining
the relation by which one and only one thing stands in it
to the presented object in question. Philosophers who take
the view that the objects judged about are sensations might
describe the relation as a causal one, and assert that the
cause is part of the surface of an inkstand. Their judg-
ment would take the form: "This presented object has one
and only one cause, and that cause is part of the surface
of an inkstand." Moore rejects this option for very much
the same reasons that he expressed against causal analyses
in "The Status of Sense-data," i.e., sense-data cannot
have just one cause. A second way of defining the relation
results in a judgement of the form "There is one and only
one thing of which this presented object is a manifestation,
and that thing is part of the surface of an inkstand," but
Moore cannot find any way of confirming that he is aware of
any such relation as "being a manifestation of."38

Moore concludes his article on judgements of perception
admitting doubts about the validity of holding that there is
any relation which permits one to say "There is one and only one thing which stands to this object in this relation." Although he favours the view that identifies the presented object with a part of the surface of a physical object or material thing, he is inclined to believe that the only plausible alternative is one that denies the relation he is trying to describe. Views of the Mill-Russell type, Moore writes,

are distinguished from those which I have hitherto considered, by the fact that, according to them, there is nothing whatever in the Universe of which it could truly be predicated that it is this part of this surface of this inkstand, or indeed that it is a part of the surface of an inkstand, or an inkstand, at all. They hold, in short, that though there are plenty of material things in the Universe, there is nothing in it of which it could truly be asserted that it is a material thing; that, though I assert "This is an inkstand," my assertion is true, and is such that it follows from it that there is in the Universe at least one inkstand, and, therefore, at least one material thing, yet it does not follow from it that there is anything which is a material thing. When I judge "This is an inkstand," I am judging this presented object to possess a certain property, which is such that, if there are things, which possess that property, there are inkstands and material things, but which is such that nothing which possesses it is itself a material thing; so that in judging that there are material things, we are really judging of some other property which is not that of being a material thing, that there are things which possess it. 40

One of Russell's formulations of what Moore has called the Mill-Russell view is contained in Our Knowledge of the External World. In the chapter headed by the same title, Russell presents a position designed to avoid the problems Moore encountered with troublesome distinctions between
the seeming-so and being-so of sense-data. Russell approaches the issue of our perception and knowledge of objects in such a way that the problem of relating sense-data to material objects does not arise.

II. Russell's View

In his essay, "Our Knowledge of the External World," Bertrand Russell intends to provide a logically unobjectionable interpretation of the facts of common sense and physical science. He believes that his tentative and hypothetical construction of the world accomplishes a reconciliation of psychology and physics. Throughout the essay Russell is trying to answer the question: "Can the existence of anything other than our hard data be inferred from the existence of those data?" Put another way, the question may be expressed in terms of whether "we can know that objects of sense, or any other objects . . . exist at times when we are not perceiving them." This formulation of the question involves two distinct problems:

First, can we know that objects of sense, or very similar objects, exist at times when we are not perceiving them. Secondly, if this cannot be known, can we know that other objects, inferable from objects of sense but not necessarily resembling them, exist either when we are perceiving the objects of sense or at any other time? The latter problem arises in philosophy as the problem of the "thing in itself" and in science as the problem of matter as assumed in physics.

When Russell speaks of the facts of common sense or common knowledge he means our acquaintance with objects we
confront in daily life - chairs, tables, houses, towns, other people, as well as knowledge of things outside of personal experience gained through history, geography, and newspapers, etc. He refers to the systematisation of this mundane knowledge as physical science. The bulk of common knowledge can be categorized into two classes, derivative and primitive knowledge. There are some beliefs which arise by inference in some sense from other beliefs, while those that are primitive are believed without the support of any other beliefs or evidence. Primitive and derivative beliefs may be classified further. Psychologically derivative beliefs are those which are caused "by one or more other beliefs, or by some fact of sense which is simply not what the belief asserts." Logically derivative beliefs are those which result from logical deduction. A belief is logically primitive when it is not the result of inference. Certain logically primitive beliefs may be psychologically derivative. Russell maintains that the belief that physical objects such as tables continue to exist when we are no longer seeing them is an example of the kind of belief which is psychologically derivative and logically primitive.

Russell calls matters of common knowledge, data, and distinguishes between hard and soft data. Hard data generally resist any doubts about their truth and include among their number the particular facts of sense and the general truths
of logic. Soft data are always questionable and involve derivative knowledge and parts of our logically primitive knowledge, i.e., those which are psychologically derivative. The hard data involved in Russell's question are those he calls the facts of sense or our own sense-data. Sensible objects or sense-data are defined in much the same way Moore defined them. A patch of colour momentarily seen when one looks at a table, that particular hardness felt when the table is pressed with a hand, and that sound which is heard when the table is rapped are all examples of objects of sense. Sensations and sensible objects are distinguished as mental events consisting in our being aware of sensible objects, and that of which we are aware respectively.

Russell criticizes the notion of the thing in itself and the physicist's notion of matter as causes of sensations and sense-data. These opinions are based on the belief that something which persists independently of our consciousness makes itself known in sensation and the fact that our sensations often change in ways which depend on the observer. We believe unreflectingiy that things are as they seem to be, and remain as they seemed to be when we no longer see them. It is true that an object like a table presents a different appearance when seen from one position than it does when viewed from another. But what is known by experience when one walks around a table and suspends the assumption that a real table, a persistent something
really exists, is that certain muscular and other bodily
sensations are correlated with visual sensations. The
visual sensations change in a continuous way such that
certain patches of colour are replaced by certain other
patches of colour nearly insensibly different than those
that preceded. Other factors can account for changes in
the appearances of tables; the observer can shut one eye,
put on blue spectacles or look at the table through a micro-
scope. The intervening medium can also alter appearances.
The moon appears to be different when looked at through a
fog, than it does when looked at on a clear evening.
Physiological changes in the observer can account for
changes in appearances. Russell provides an argument to show
that the changes in appearances due to states in the inter-
vening medium do force the conclusion that persistent or
real objects cause these changes. Persistent and real
objects as Russell refers to them seem to be indistinguish-
able (at this point in his essay) from Moore's "whole thing,"
as Moore used this phrase in "Some Judgements of Perception."

According to Russell, we can put blue spectacles on and
notice that the objects in our field of vision take on a
blue appearance. We know that the glass is between us and
the objects seen through it by correlating the sense-data
of vision and touch. One account of the blueness of the
objects seen through them may seem, according to common-
sense beliefs, to require the assumption that the spectacles
exist when we are not touching them. This rather natural assumption is not really necessary. It is possible that "the object of which we become aware when we touch the spectacles continues to have effects afterwards, though perhaps it no longer exists."49 The assumed continued existence of sense-data after they have ceased to be sensible will be a mistaken inference from the fact that they still have effects, a mere prejudice. The experienced facts concerning the blue spectacles can be given without reliance on prejudice and doubtful inferences, by assuming nothing beyond the existence of sensible objects at the times they are sensed. Russell's analysis involves un-analysed notions of place and space.

Sometimes, namely in the case of transparent things, we find that there is a tangible object in the corresponding sight-place. But is such a case as that of the blue spectacles, we find that whatever object is visible beyond the empty sight-place in the same line of sight has a different colour from what it has when there is no tangible object in the intervening touch-place; as we move the tangible object in touch-space, the blue patch moves in sight-space. If we now find a blue patch moving in this way in sight-space, when we have no sensible experience of an intervening tangible object, we nevertheless infer that, if we put our hand in a certain place in touch-space, we should experience a certain touch sensation.50

This explanation of the facts of experience regarding the change in appearances of things relative to our seeing them with blue spectacles without reference to non-sensible objects is part and parcel of Russell's general view that the verification of the facts of common sense and physics
consist in the occurrence of expected sense-data. The assumption that sensible objects persist when they are no longer sensed "may be replaced by the statement that the effects of sensible objects persist." This statement is not easily understood when it is recalled that Russell's criticism of efforts to find non-sensible causes for sensations and sense-data in things in themselves did not exclude consideration of the objects of sense as the causes of sensations. It is difficult to distinguish a sense-datum from its effect if the effect is not a sensation, and just as clearly, the proper definition of effect is unclear. It is unclear because the view argued through the example involving the blue spectacles neither permits his apparent generalization about all sense-data nor limits the occurrence of sense-data to which it applies. There may indeed be a class of sense-data whose members have effects which persist when one is no longer aware of these data or when they have ceased to exist, but the criteria for membership in this class have not been stated.

The belief that Russell is very concerned to challenge, with its metaphysical and epistemological implications, is in his own words,

the theory that what exists at times when are are not perceiving a given sensible object is something quite unlike that object, something which, together with us and our sense-organs, causes our sensations, but is never itself given in sensation.

He wants to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the commonsense
supposition that a thing in itself, like a table, "causes our sense-data of sight and touch, but must, since these are altered by the point of view and the intervening medium, be quite different from the sense-data to which it gives rise."

He proposes an alternative which accounts for the factors of point of view and intervening medium, redefines the notion of a thing, eliminating any causal function and the problem of the thing's relation to sense-data. His alternative clarifies the terms "place" and "space" used in the spectacles example. The argument requires the truth of at least three premises:

1) The objects of sense are real or exist, at least momentarily.
2) Other minds exist.
3) There are no illusions of sense.

The first premise is indubitable, a matter of primitive knowledge. The second is a tenable, psychologically derivative hypothesis, and the third, Russell could say, logically derives from statements which define sense-datum and reality. Russell actually says that there are no illusions of sense and explains himself in the following way:

Objects of sense even when they occur in dreams are the most indubitably real objects known to us.

Objects of sense are called "real" when they have the kind of connection with other objects of sense which experience has led us to regard as normal; when they fail in this they are called "illusions."

But what is illusory is only the inferences to which they give rise; in themselves, they are every bit as real as the objects of waking life.
Each mind looks out upon the world from a unique point of view. No two minds can simultaneously see anything in common. Two people who claim to see the same thing are each actually seeing different, immediate sensible objects which differ only slightly. The three-dimensional worlds seen by two minds share no place in common.

We may suppose, in spite of the differences between the two worlds, that each exists entirely exactly as it is perceived and might be exactly as it is even if it were not perceived. We may further suppose that there are an infinite number of such worlds which are in fact unperceived.56

When a third man joins two others in a room and sits between them, a new world begins to be perceived. This new world, conditioned by the sense-organs, nerves and brain of the third man cannot be supposed to have existed before his arrival, however, "we can suppose that some aspect of the universe existed from that point of view, though no one was perceiving it."57 Two men who say they are perceiving the same thing, perceive similar perspectives. It is possible to establish a correlation by similarity between things in one perspective and things in another. A close similarity indicates that the two points of view are very near together in space,

but the space in which they are near together is totally different from the space inside the two perspectives. It is a relation between the perspectives, and is not in either of them; no one can perceive it, and if it is to be known it can only be known by inference.58

All of the views of the universe, perceived and unperceived, constitute the system of perspectives:
Between any two perceived perspectives which are similar, we can imagine a whole series of perspectives, some at least unperceived, and such that between any two, however similar, there are others still more similar. In this way the space which consists of relations between perspectives can be rendered continuous, and (if we choose) three-dimensional. 59

The momentary commonsense thing may be defined as a logical construction consisting of a system of real aspects, a correlation of sense-data from neighbouring perspectives. "Thus an aspect of a 'thing' is a member of the system of aspects which is the 'thing' at that moment." 60

In lectures published three years after the publication of "Our Knowledge of the External World," "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," Russell tries to make it clear that he is not denying the existence of anything, but is at the same time refusing to affirm the existence of anything for which there is no evidence. He writes:

You find that a certain thing which has been set up as a metaphysical entity can either be assumed dogmatically to be real, and then you will have no possible argument either for its reality or against its reality; or, instead of doing that, you can construct a logical fiction having the same formal properties, or rather having formally analogous formal properties to those of the supposed metaphysical entity and itself composed of empirically given things, and that logical fiction can be substituted for your supposed metaphysical entity and will fulfill all the scientific purposes anybody can desire. . . . In the case of matter, you can start from what is empirically given, what one sees and hears and smells and so forth, all the ordinary data of sense, or you can start with some definite ordinary object, say this desk. . . . What is the empirical reason that makes you call a number of appearances, appearances of the same desk? What makes you say on successive occasions, I am seeing
the same desk? The first thing to notice is this, that it does not matter what is the answer, so long as you have realized that the answer consists in something empirical and not in a recognized metaphysical identity of substance. ... What I can know is that there are a certain series of appearances linked together, and the series of those appearances I shall define as being a desk. In that way the desk is reduced to being a logical fiction, because a series is a logical fiction. In that way all the ordinary objects of daily life are extruded from the world of what there is, and in their place as what there is you find a number of passing particulars of the kind that one is immediately conscious of in sense.61

Not only does Russell refuse to accept the notion of the thing-in-itself, he refuses to accept any notion of substance to explain the reality of the object.

He explains space as the system of points of view of private spaces, or the system of private spaces. Private spaces are elements of the one perspective space and are ordered by means of their similarities. In a particular private space the appearances of an object commonly referred to as a penny will be circular. A series of perspectives containing a graduated series of aspects of varying sizes can be formed by moving toward the penny or away from it. Circular aspects of the penny will lie on a straight line in perspective space and will be ordered according to their size. The perspectives in which the penny will be said to look large will be nearer to the penny than those in which it looks small. By forming straight lines of perspectives in which the penny looks elliptical, and straight lines of perspectives in which it looks like a straight line of a
certain thickness, one can define the place in perspective space where the penny is at the intersection of these various straight lines of series of perspectives. "Here" may be defined as the place in perspective space "which is occupied by our private world . . . part of the place where our head is." 62

It will be observed that two places in perspective space are associated with every aspect of a thing, namely, the place where a thing is, and the place which is the perspective of which the aspect in question forms part. Every aspect of a thing is a member of two different classes of aspects, namely: (1) the various aspects of the thing, of which at most one appears in any given perspective; (2) the perspective of which the given aspect is a member, i.e., that in which the thing has the given aspect. The physicist naturally classifies aspects in the first way, the psychologist in the second. The two places associated with a single aspect correspond to the two ways of classifying it. 63

The dualistic feature of every aspect permits an explanation of the effects of an intervening medium on the perception of a thing in terms of given aspects. The aspects of a thing spread outward from the place where the thing is and differ as they get further away from this place. As well, differences in aspects can be accounted for by observing data that are near or at the place from which the aspects in question appear. Russell's definition of the thing, his explanation of place and space through employing the concept of perspective, and his treatment of illusions, as illusions of inference (rather than illusions of sense), avoid the problem of explaining the relations of material things to sense-data and Moore's corollary problem of
properly distinguishing between perceiving sensible objects to be so-and-so and perceiving them to seem so-and-so as an ultimate and unanalysable psychological relation.

Russell's definition of "the momentary common sense 'thing,' as opposed to its momentary appearances, a mere logical construction" susceptible to description as a system of real aspects, a series of appearances, recalls Sartre's agreement with what he termed modern thought's reduction of the existent "to the series of appearances which manifest it." This position concerning things, apparently adopted in the introduction to BN and expressed in the idiom of appearances and phenomena, will be kept in mind along with its apparent congruence with Russell's, as Sartre conducts his ontological analysis of the relation of consciousness to its object and knowledge of the world throughout his chapter "Transcendence," in the idiom of external and internal negation. An important burden of the following explication of Sartre's "Transcendence" is to show how Sartre's detailed description of knowledge and the known does not depart from the initial policy expressed in the introduction.

III. Sartre's "Transcendence"

Two themes determine the format of this presentation of Sartre's "Transcendence." His thought is examined in such a way as to expose Sartre's own scheme regarding consciousness
of something. Secondly, Sartre's own scheme is probed in such a way as to provide a basis for future comparison with Moore and Russell's views. Together, these themes are developed by moving through the exposition with Sartre under five headings which approximate his division of the material - A) Knowledge as a Relation of the For-itself to the In-itself; B) The Determined This on the Ground of the World, and Space; C) Quality and Abstraction; D) Permanence and Potentiality; and E) Essence, the Past of the For-itself and the Instrumental Thing - and by probing conceptual linkages through idiomatically neutral hypotheses that indicate comparison with Moore and Russell.

Sartre defines his task as an investigation of relations that hold between "two absolutely separated regions of being; the being of the pre-reflective cogito and the being of the phenomenon." The being of the phenomenon, being-in-itself, understood as the being of the existent, has the "primary characteristic" of never revealing itself completely to consciousness. Sartre's distinction between the finite appearance and the infinite series of appearances of which the former is a member, is a preliminary adumbration of this primary characteristic. Sartre's discussion of being-in-itself in his introduction after its description as the condition of all revelation falls out according to the conceptual demands of the primary characteristic in such a way that proper grasp of his theory in "Transcendence" depends upon a familiarity with his
earliest characterization of being-in-itself. He concentrates his display of being-in-itself into three formulae: "being is itself or in-itself"; "being is what it is"; and "Being-in-itself is." 66

The formula, "being is itself," condenses several features of Sartre's concept of the in-itself. It contains his rejection of ontologies which explain being as a creation:

[B]eing is uncreated . . . [I]t is neither passivity nor activity. Both these notions are human and designate human conduct or the instruments of human conduct . . .

Being is equally beyond negation as beyond affirmation. 67

The in-itself is exactly opposite to that which affirms or negates through an act distinguishing the affirmed or negated from itself. The in-itself is incapable of this distinction. Sartre remarks that the conventions of language tend to blur a proper conceptualization of being in so far as "self" enters the phrase "in-itself."

The second formula, "being is what it is," indicates that at bottom, being is beyond the self. In one manner of speaking, being-in-itself is collapsed into itself as identity. It is opaque, solid. It has no within which is opposed to a without. 68 Sartre writes:

Transition, becoming, anything which permits us to say that being is not yet what it will be and that it is already what it is not - all that is forbidden on principle. For being is the being of becoming and due to this fact it is beyond becoming. It is what it is . . . [I]t can encompass no negation. It is full positivity. It knows no-otherness . . . It can support no connection with the other. . . .

It is not subject to temporality. 69
The third formula, "being-in-itself is," emphasizes the fact that being is in its own right. "Being can neither be derived from the possible nor reduced to the necessary. An existing phenomenon can never be derived from another existent qua existent."70 In anthropomorphic terms, being-in-itself is superfluous (de trop). Sartre's being-in-itself is very similar, if not equivalent, to Parmenides' being. Klaus Hartmann briefly comments on their affinity:

This characterization of being reminds us, down to the details of Parmenides' account of being. Parmenidean being is identical and solid, without origin, not subject to necessity, without deficiency, and thus non-referential. Its continuity corresponds to Sartre's thesis that being is "everywhere."71

Joseph P. Fell comments that Sartre's task in BN closely parallels Plontinus' effort to understand the nature of the relation between Parmenides' "Way of Truth" and "Way of Seeming."

The way of truth, which mortals walk only with divine aid, reveals the truth of the cosmos; as an undifferentiated and self-identical plentitude, one can only say that "it is." The parallel with Sartre's characterization of being-in-itself strikes us at once.72

Sartre begins his chapter, "Transcendence," with references back to his introduction. "In the Introduction we encountered a problem, . . . which we have wished to resolve: what is the original relation of human reality to the being of phenomena or being-in-itself? In the Introduction . . . we were obliged to reject both the realist solution and the idealist solution."73 In a nutshell,
realism and idealism are cast as those theories which hold respectively that transcendent being can act upon consciousness and that consciousness can construct the transcendent by objectivizing elements borrowed from its subjectivity. By contrast, Sartre describes his position as one which demonstrates that "the concrete is revealed to us as the synthetic totality of which consciousness, like the phenomenon, constitutes only the articulations." ⁷⁴

Sartre is emphatic in his stress on the idea that consciousness does not in any way contribute to the being of the in-itself. The constant theme of his chapter on transcendence is the positive expression and employment of the notion that consciousness through its relation to the in-itself is constitutive of itself.

[Consciousness considered in isolation is an abstraction, and although phenomena— even the phenomenon of being— are similarly abstract in so far as they cannot exist as phenomena without appearing to a consciousness, nevertheless the being of phenomena is an in-itself which is what it is [and] can not be considered as an abstraction. Therefore while the relation of the for-itself to the in-itself is originally constitutive of the very being which is put into the relation, we should not understand that this relation is constitutive of the in-itself but rather of the for-itself.⁷⁵

The description of the fundamental relation between the for-itself and being-in-itself, according to Sartre, necessitates looking to the for-itself alone. "It is to the for-itself alone that we must look for the key to that relation to being which we call... knowing." ⁷⁶ Sartre's claim that it is impossible to isolate the in-itself as an abstraction,
in tandem with the emphasis on the direction of this looking, preview conclusions stated in the final chapter of BN; "that the for-itself makes itself other in relation to the in-itself but that the in-itself is in no way other than the for-itself in its being." In other words, the for-itself arises as and in a one-way relation to the in-itself which is absolutely unrelated in its being simply what it is. Here, Sartre refers to his treatment of the intentionality thesis in his introduction. He now emphasizes the fact that he is dealing generally with self-consciousness of something. At this point, in "Transcendence" he will work on the ontological level in the perspective of being-for-itself. He explains that he is "undertaking the study of an ontological relation which renders all experience possible and which aims at establishing how in general an object can exist for consciousness."  

A) **Knowledge as a Relation of the For-itself to the In-itself**

Sartre maintains that there is only intuitive knowledge. Intuition is defined as "the presence of consciousness to the thing." All other types of so-called knowledge are "only instruments" which point to intuition. Reason and argument are merely "indicating signs," and intuitions previously achieved are referred to as percepts similar to "memories of ideas" in Descartes. This position recalls Moore's concept of direct apprehension and Russell's dis-
tinction between primitive and derivative knowledge. The derivative compares to Sartre's reason and argument, whereas the primitive parallels Sartre's intuition. Sartre's sub-

ordination of reason and argument to intuition explained in terms of their leading to or pointing to intuition beyond reach, is similar to Russell's view that the verification of the facts of common sense and physics consist in the occurrence of expected sense-data.

Expanding on the notion of intentionality, Sartre describes consciousness as a phantom dyad, the reflection-reflecting, which requires something other than itself, not only to define and qualify, but to support its being. Sartre is following through on the implications of his ontological proof. It is necessary that the ensemble, reflection-reflecting, reflect something to prevent it from dissolving into nothing. "What defines the reflection for the reflecting is always that to which it is presence... Non-being is an essential structure of presence." Not being the thing to which one is present seems to be the simplest way to express this essential structure which Sartre is going to ramify at great length. Sartre holds that every theory of knowledge presupposes non-being as an a priori:

Actually neither the connection of representation, nor the necessity of certain subjective ensembles, nor temporal irreversibility, nor an appeal to infinity could serve to constitute the object as such... if this negation were not given first and if it were not the a priori foundation of all experience.
The thing, before all comparison, before all construction, is that which is present to consciousness as not being consciousness. In his introduction, Sartre promised that his ontology would demonstrate that "The reality of that cup is that it is there and that it is not me." At this juncture of his text the reader will discover that the "not me" has more to do with the "is there" than one could anticipate.

Negation arises in the world through the for-itself. It is not a type of judgement posterior to the existence of consciousness conceived of as a substance. Consciousness is not a substance. It is through its original negation described as presence that the for-itself constitutes itself as not being the thing. "The thing is what it is in the absolute indifference of identity, it can not be the thing which is posited as not being the for-itself." Knowledge is a mode of being; "the very being of the for-itself in so far as this is a presence to." Knowledge is not just a relation brought about after the fact of two beings having come to be, not an activity of one of the beings, not a quality, property or virtue. To be consciousness of something means that the "reflected causes itself to be qualified outside next to a certain being as not being that being."

Sartre distinguishes two types of negation; internal and external. External negation involves a purely external relatedness established by a witness. To simply say that a cup is not an inkwell, or that an inkwell is not a table is
to express an external negation. These objects can only be what they are and they do not condition in any way the fact expressed in the form "A is not B." The negation is a "categorical and ideal connection" established by the observer without "modifying, enriching or impoverishing them in the slightest way." Internal negation, which can be expressed in the same fashion, "A is not B," is a relatedness such that one of the beings involved is what it is (to the degree that any being can be said to be what it is) by virtue of its relation to the second being. In Sartre's words it is such a relation between two beings, "that the one which is denied to the other qualifies the other at the heart of its essence - by absence." The son is not his parent. The son is the son in so far as the son is related to at least one parent. This trivial example seems to express a reasonable extension of Sartre's conception of internal negation.

Internal negation cannot be applied to being-in-itself. "By nature it belongs to the for-itself. Only the for-itself can be determined in its being by a being which it is not." The appearance of internal negation in the world depends wholly upon the for-itself, as does negation in general. That a pearl is false, that a fruit is not ripe are examples of internal negations which Sartre alludes to as typical of those to be found in the world.
In the context of explicating internal negation as an ontological feature of the for-itself qua knowledge (as a mode of Being), Sartre makes a statement which is very difficult to interpret:

Knowing belongs to the for-itself alone, for the reason that the for-itself can appear to itself as not being what it knows. And as here appearance and being are one - since the for-itself has to be its appearance - we must conclude that the for-itself includes within its being the being of the object which it is not inasmuch as the for-itself puts its own being into question as not being the being of the object.86

The difficulty arises when one recalls Sartre's anti-idealistic tendency. On the one hand, the for-itself seems to be presented as the foundation of the being of the object in an active sense - "includes within its being the being of the object" (emphasis added). The qualifier after "inasmuch" does little to dispel the aura of activity. On the other hand, the reader has already been exposed to and reminded of the fact that the for-itself in no way contributes to the being of things or objects. The thread of consistency through interpretation does not eliminate the element of activity in the for-itself (the for-itself is all activity), but demands observation of the element of necessity in a grammatically inopportune position. "Must conclude" displaces the necessity which it seems should be expressed in terms of the for-itself's requirement of the being of the object, i.e., the for-itself needs the being of the object within it to exist as for-itself. The being of the object --
being-in-itself which is beyond activity and passivity—founds or conditions the being of the active for-itself.

In point-counter-point fashion, Sartre plays on the apparent ambiguity:

Is it not possible then... for me to have any experience of an object until I constitute it as an object. On the contrary, what makes all experience possible is an a priori upsurge of the object for the subject—or since the upsurge is the original fact of the for-itself, an original upsurge of the for-itself as presence to the object which it is not.87

Sartre describes the internal negation by the for-itself of being-in-itself as a concrete bond, a negation "within and upon the being" which is not the for-itself. The concreteness of this bond is spelled out in terms of the lack of distance between the for-itself and the being to which it is presence. Presence is the concrete ontological bond within and upon the in-itself, and presence is the for-itself. "In this sense it is necessary to see the denied qualities as a constitutive factor of the being of the for-itself... it must be they in order to deny that it is they."88

Sartre describes the in-itself as the term of origin of the internal negation and the term of origin of the thing which is there through the internal negation of the for-itself as presence. Knowledge understood as a bond of being involves a nothingness distinguished from the thing by a pure negation "for which the thing furnishes the very content." The knower is nothingness, and as a being can only

97
encounter the known, the being which is perpetually there.

The knower is not; he is not apprehensible. He is nothing other than that which brings it about that there is a being—there on the part of the known, a presence—forcing itself upon the known is neither present nor absent; it simply is.⁸⁹

Sartre brings the first section of the chapter, "Transcendence," to a conclusion by using an analogy to explain presence which is very similar to one used by William James in his essay, "Does Consciousness Exist?".⁹⁰ The for-itself and the in-itself are two tangential curves. Covering their lengths except for the point at which they touch shows the lack of distinction between consciousness and its object, while uncovering their lengths displays their separate existence. "Every revelation of a positive characteristic of being is the counterpart of an ontological determination as pure negativity in the being of the for-itself."⁹¹ Sartre summarizes this aspect of the interrelation between knowing and being by employing the word "realize," and emphasizing what could be called its dual significance. "Realize" has a double ontological and gnostic meaning. "To know is to realize in both senses of the term. It is to cause being 'to be there' while having to be the reflected negation of this being. The real is realization." He then defines transcendence "as that inner and realizing negation which reveals the in-itself while determining the being of the for-itself."⁹² This two-fold significance of realization sets Sartre's problematic for
the next two sections in the chapter where he deals with
determination as negation and later, quantity, potentiality
and instrumentality in terms of their fundamental negativity.

B) The Determined This on the Ground
of the World, and Space

Sartre approaches his explanation of determination as
negation by asking "to what being is the for-itself pre-
sence?". Because being is what it is and cannot support
within itself the distinction "this one," the question only
has significance if it is posed in a world. The for-itself
is not present to a particular, previously distinguished
being. It cannot be present to a this or a that because
it is the for-itself which causes the this and the that to
exist, as this and that. This policy fits squarely with
Sartre's rejection of substantialist explanations typified
by Cartesian realism. In other words, "Negativity as
original transcendence is not determined in terms of a this;
it causes a this to exist." The for-itself must simultan-
eously be presence to the whole of being, conceived as the
world and presence to the particular this. The world has
an ambiguous character in terms of its revelation "as a
synthetic totality and as a purely additive collection of
the 'thises'". Sartre accounts for this ambiguity by
describing determination as an external negation that is
correlative with the radical and ekstatic internal negation
which is the for-itself.

99
The appearance of the this on the all is correlative with a certain way which the for-itself has of being the negation of itself. There is a this because I am no longer my past negations. The revelation of the this presupposes that the "accent is put" on a certain negation accompanied by the withdrawal of the others in the syncretic disappearance into ground. . . . In this sense the "this" is revealed as "this" by a "withdrawal into ground of the world" on the part of the other "thises." Its determination, which is the origin of all determination, is a negation.95

The this and its ground, the world, arise simultaneously through the for-itself's denial that it is being-in-itself. The ground of the world for the this is not purely the in-itself, i.e., the world and the in-itself are not equivalent. The in-itself is the ontological ground of the for-itself which, through its internal negation of the in-itself, causes the thises and the world to be there in their mutual interdependence. "[T]he presence of the for-itself to the world can be realized only by its presence to one or several particular things, and conversely its presence to a particular thing can be realized only on the ground of a presence to the world."96 The in-itself, the this and the world are absolutely equivalent in terms of their being, i.e., simultaneously the this and the world are the revealed/negated in-itself.

[T]he world appears always ready to open like a box to allow the appearance of one or several "thises" which already were (there in the heart of the undifferentiation of the ground) what they are now as differentiated figure. . . . Thus the world, as the correlate of a detotalized totality, appears as an evanescent totality in the sense that it is never a real synthesis but an ideal limitation - by nothing - of a collection of thises.97
The notions of totality and ideal limitation are more complex than the current consideration allows. In lieu of having more of Sartre on display at a later time in this chapter, these concepts await enriched inspection. For now, the analytical flow will spill into space.

Sartre describes space as a moving relation between things which are unrelated. Space is neither a being nor a "form imposed on phenomena by the a priori structure of our sensibility," but the for-itself is the being by which space comes to the world. In so far as the for-itself is a temporal being it spatializes space in losing itself to realize being. Space can be called the place of the this in so far as the this is related in exteriority to the ground of the world. It continuously collapses into a multiplicity of external relations with other thises. Space cannot be concretely intuited because it is not. Space is a nothing which is not the for-itself. "It is a unique way in which beings can be revealed as having no relation, can be thus revealed to the being through which relation comes into the world."

It is difficult to avoid interpreting Sartre's space as an a priori structure of sensibility, in a manner similar to Kant's "subjective condition of sensibility." Temporality has been discussed in depth by Sartre as a structure of the pre-reflective cogito in the previous chapter of BN. If space somehow depends on a temporal structure of conscious-
ness, then there is a strong temptation to regard space as
at least a concomitant structure of sensibility which in-
forms presence to ______; especially when Sartre uses the
transitive verb "to spatialize."

As for the For-itself, if it is not space, this is
because it apprehends itself precisely as not
being-in-itself in so far as the in-itself is re-
vealed to it in the mode of exteriority. It is
precisely by denying exteriority in itself and
apprehending itself as ekstatic that the For-itself
spatializes, space. 100

Sartre's emphasis on the theme of exteriority in his account
of space has to be regarded as a hedge against any Kantian
misreading of his position. He separates the for-itself
and external negation as thoroughly as possible.

External negation is detached from both the for-
itself and the in-itself. External negation by "its very
exteriority requires that it remain 'in the air' exterior
to the For-itself as well as the In-itself." 101 A thing
like a book would have to be an ekstatic being like the for-
itself in order to deny concerning itself that it is the
newspaper upon which it rests. The for-itself cannot be
external negation because it is pure internal negation.
Without the for-itself it is not the case that the book is
not the newspaper. External negation " - seen from the
point of view of the 'this' - is wholly ideal." 102

In this sense we can modify the famous statement
of Spinoza, "Omnis determinatio est negatio,"
which Hegel believed to possess infinite riches;
and we will claim rather that every determination
is an ideal negation. . . .

102
Thus determination is a nothing which does not belong as an internal structure to the thing or to consciousness, but its being is to-be-summoned by the For-itself across a system of internal negations in which the in-itself is revealed in all its indifference to all that is not itself.103

Having established preliminary conceptual markers concerning the this and space through observing the negative in every determination, in every distinction, Sartre moves to consider in more depth "how the presence of the for-itself to being reveals being as a thing."104 The this and spatiality are referred to as structures of the thing that are on the same level of priority as the thing's permanence, essence and potentialities which he now intends to explain. He points out that the order of his exposition does not in any way indicate the genesis of any one of these structures from the others. "[T]he upsurge of the for-itself causes the thing to be revealed with the totality of its structures. Furthermore, there is not one of these structures which does not imply all the others."105 Sartre's analysis of quality has implications which will be highlighted in such a way that a plausible interpretation of his thought about perception and the thing can emerge in a form that permits comparison with Moore's and Russell's views.

C) Quality and Abstraction

Sartre's discussion of quality draws explanatory leverage from a criticism of subjectivist doctrine, and the
concept of substance:

Quality has been conceived as a simple subjective determination and its quality of being has been confused with the subjectivity of the psychic. The problem has then appeared to be especially to explain the constitution of an object pole conceived as the transcedent unity of qualities. We have shown that this problem is insoluble. 106

His effort to "put in relief the thing in the world," involves explicit condemnation of the idea of a substantial form as a "principle of unity to stand behind the modes of appearances of the phenomenon; everything is given at one stroke without any primacy." 107 This attitude has already been observed in Sartre's introduction.

Sartre defines quality as, the being of the this conceived in isolation from all external relation with the world. It is not an external aspect of being nor an addition to being, "except the fact that being is there as this." Yet for there to be quality there must be a being for a nothingness which by nature is not being. Being is not itself a quality. This point repeats in micro-ontological fashion what was noted earlier 108 about the relation of being-in-itself to the world on a macro-ontological level. Quality is the being of the this, but being-in-itself is not the this or quality. Being-in-itself, internally negated and thereby constitutive of the being of the for-itself, is quality. In other words, being and being there have nothing to distinguish them except a "being for a nothingness which by nature is not being." Quality is the whole of being
revealing itself within the limits of the 'there is'."^109

An object pole beyond and supportive of qualities is prohibited. The object, for example, a lemon,
is extended throughout each of the others. It is
the sourness of the lemon which is yellow, it is
the yellow of the lemon which is sour. . . . Husserl
is wrong in believing that a synthetic necessity un-
conditionally unites colour and form; it is the form
which is colour and light.^110

In his account of the perception of qualities, Sartre
stresses the feature of immediacy already treated in the
initial explanation of presence; "the relation of quality
to us is that of absolute proximity." He observes that
proximity implies distance and he defines this distance
as consciousness's discovery of its own emptiness of that
to which it is proximate. Perception of white consists in
the for-itself's incapacity to exist as white. In this way,
not only is being not distinguished from its
qualities but even the whole apprehension of quality
is the apprehension of a this. Quality whatever
it may be is revealed to us as a being. The odour
which I suddenly breathe with my eyes closed, even
before I have referred to it as an odourous object,
is already an odour-being and not a subjective im-
pression. The light which strikes my eyes in the
morning through my closed eyelids is already a
light-being.^111

It is important to note the language Sartre uses here. The
more general terms, "apprehension" and "this," are in-
stantiated in the examples "breathe" and "odour" respectively.
He does not use the word "smell" as a noun in the place of
the word "odour." Furthermore, there is an explicit dis-
tinction between breathing an odour and referring to an
odourous object which implicitly seems to justify a
distinction between an odour-being that is breathed, and
an odourous object that is referred to. The example of
the "light-being" appears to force the idea that "odour-
beings" and "light-beings" exist unapprehended; very
definitely these are not subjective contents that one could
refer to as sensations. Sartre's mention of "odour-being"
and "odourous object" portend his discussion of the rela-
tions obtaining between the this, quality and the thing.

There is little in Sartre's text to dissuade his
reader from regarding the "this" as a general term used to
denote any being which is other than the for-itself. "This"
may denote a quality, a shape, an odour, a mountain, light
or an electron.

If someone should ask how it happens that the
"this" can have qualities we should reply that the
this is released as a totality on the ground of the
world and that it is given as a undifferentiated
unity.

This this seems to occur as a thing, something like the
"whole thing" Moore talked about. The next this is not a
thing; it is a quality.

It is the for-itself which can deny itself from
various points of view when confronting the this
and which reveals the quality as a new this on the
ground of the thing.112

The indeterminacy of the term this noted here parallels the
lack of distinction in meaning noted earlier in Sartre's
introduction between phenomenon, object, appearance,
existent, etc., as he separated the phenomenon of being
and the being of the phenomenon. At this point in his text, Sartre's display of quality as a this on the ground of the thing involves further definition of the quality as a profile.

For each negating act by which the freedom of the For-itself spontaneously constitutes its being, there is a corresponding total revelation of being "in profile." This profile is nothing but a relation of the thing to the For-itself, a relation realized by the For-itself. It is the absolute determination. 113

Absolute determination is distinguished from determination in general by isolating it from the relation of the this to the world. Sartre writes:

While I cannot make this orange peel cease being green, it is I who am responsible for apprehending it as a rough green or a green roughness. But the relation figure-ground here is rather different from that of the this to the world. For instead of the figure's appearing on an undifferentiated ground; it holds the ground within it as its own undifferentiated density. I apprehend the peel as green; its "brightness-roughness" is revealed as an inner undifferentiated ground and plenitude of being for the green. 114

It appears that the absolute determination of the this as quality and profile of the thing is such that revealing reaches its limit. One must note the limit of presence to Presence to the this qua quality runs up against the ontological intuition and the being of the phenomenon qua ground, as Sartre referred to being in his introduction. This interpretation derives further support through consideration of Sartre's position regarding abstraction. Abstraction is a phenomenon of presence to being, and
abstract being preserves its transcendence. Breathing an
odour-being is absolutely determining and involves ab-
straction.

[T]he realization of being conditions the abstraction,
for the abstraction is not the apprehension of a
quality "in mid air" but of a this-quality where the
undifferentiation of the inner ground tends toward
absolute equilibrium. The green abstracted does
not lose its density of being - otherwise it would
be nothing more than a subjective mode of the for-
itself - but the brightness, the shape, the roughness,
etc., which are given across it dissolve in the
nihilating equilibrium of pure and simple massive-
ness.115

In this particular instance, Sartre is dealing with a piece
of orange peel: a bright, rough, green orange peel of un-
specified shape. He is not talking about the relation of
the this to the world, but about the green in particular
and how to talk about this green. One does not abstract
qualities one from the other in a manner criticized by
Bishop George Berkeley, in his introduction to The Principles
of Human Knowledge.116 Abstraction is not the act of
stripping qualities from thing as if they were subjective
film between consciousness and the real thing. Abstraction
is intimately bound up with apprehension and the apprehension
of qualities as profiles of things seems to be what one
might call focused attention: focused presence to

This is an attending to a specific about which the for-itself
can be no more specific than to have a collision with
massiveness, the plenitude of being - two of the predicates
Sartre uses to explain being-in-itself. The green of the
orange peel is green; abstraction is not a mental act which peels the green from its peel to deprive it of its being, it does not lose its density. Sartre's description of perception "as the original contact with being," fuses the constitution of the this and the act of abstraction, at least to the degree that neither has priority over the other. The abstract is correlative with the for-itself's present concrete negation. The this must include its own abstractions, or it will be impossible for them to be derived from it afterward. "[I]t is the very constitution of the this as this that the abstraction operates as the revelation in profile of my future," 117 Sartre says. "What does all this mean?" the reader asks.

The correlation of the act of abstraction and the for-itself's present concrete negation is a theme which is not unique, although Sartre's idiom of negativity may be a unique mode of its expression. Wilfrid Sellars is idiomatically close to Sartre in his consideration of Kant's view on perception. There is no allusion to a symmetry between Kant and Sartre's positions here; however, Sellars's criticism of Kant's doctrine of representation raises an issue using terms that facilitate understanding Sartre. Sellars writes:

[T]he individual represented in perception is never represented as a mere this, but always, to use the classical schema, a this-such. . . . . Kant's thesis, like the Aristotelian, clearly requires the existence of perceptual this-suches which are limited in their content to what is 'perceptible' in a very tough sense of the term (the 'proper sensibles').
requires the existence of completely determinate 'basic' perceptual this-suches. 118

Sartre is not espousing a theory of perception that one could call representational and Sartre may not require what Kant requires, but Sartre's fusion of the constitution of the this and abstraction as the revelation in profile of his future is similar to Sellars' demand that "the individual represented in perception is . . . always . . . a this-such." Superficially, Sartre's fusion is dissimilar in the sense that Sartre observes no distinction which needs to be expressed through attaching a hyphen and a "such" to the "this." Sartre's absolutely determined this is a quality and profile of the thing as not easily compared to Sellars' "completely determinate 'basic' perceptual this-such," but the idea of absolute determination provokes consideration along these lines.

According to Sartre, the for-itself's presence to one this presupposes the simultaneous existence of other undifferentiated thises in the world. "In the world" is not synonymous with "in the in-itself." The other thises "constitute the ground on which the this is raised in relief." 119 Each this is separated or distinguished from all the others by an external negation. "That appears as not being this. And the external negation is revealed to the For-itself as a transcendent; it is outside, it is in-itself." 120 It is important to take note of Sartre's italicizing the phrase "in-itself" in this particular context.
To explain external negation revealed to the for-itself as a transcendent, Sartre develops the notion of presence as ground. The distinction between being-in-itself and the world has been mentioned previously. At this juncture Sartre is ramifying the difference by focusing on what he has emphasized before as that feature of external negation termed "in the air" - "in the air" exterior to the For-itself as well as the In-itself. The italicized, lower case "in-itself" is a less metaphorical expression of "in the air." On the ground of presence to being, the appearance of the this-that occurs as totality:

The For-itself is determined en bloc to not be "this-that" on the ground of the world. The "this-that" is my whole room in so far as I am present to it. On the ground of presence and by means of this presence, being effects the appearance of its indifferent exteriority. This exteriority is revealed to me in the fact that the negation which I am is a unity-multiplicity rather than an undifferentiated totality.

The ground of presence and the "for-itself's negative upsurge into being" are synonymous ontological concepts which may be further qualified in terms of a complex of independent negations (multiplicity) that the for-itself (unity) has to be. Sartre's continuation of this theme has implications which clarify his position regarding the relation of things to consciousness:

My negative upsurge into being is parcelled out into independent negations which have no connection other than that . . . they derive their inner unity from me and not from being. I am present to that table, to those chairs and as such I constitute myself as a polyvalent negation.
In light of Sartre's earlier remarks concerning absolute determination, the this, quality and the thing, this passage (hereafter referred to as (A)) is very suggestive. Premises previously discussed can be restated as follows:

1) "[T]he 'this' . . . , its determination, which is the origin of all determination, is negation."

2) "[T]he whole apprehension of quality is the apprehension of a this."

3) "Quality whatever it may be is revealed to us as a being."
   3a) "The odour which I suddenly breathe with my eyes closed, even before I have referred to it as an 'odourous object, is already an odour-being."

4) "It is the for-itself . . . confronting the this which reveals the quality as a new this on the ground of the thing."

5) "The constitution of the 'this' and the act of abstraction are . . . not distinct."

6) "For each negating act . . . there is a corresponding total revelation of being 'in profile'."

7) "This profile is nothing but a relation of the thing to the For-itself."

8) "Absolute determination is . . . the determination of quality as a profile of the this."

9) "[E]xternal negation - seen from the point of view of the 'this' - is wholly ideal."

10) "[T]he external negation is revealed to the For-itself as a transcendent; it is outside, it is 'in-itself'."

Passage (A)' can be interpreted as follows: On the ground of the for-itself's presence to being, independent determinations occur (premise 1). These determinations have no connection other than that the for-itself unites them. Through each independent determination involved in
the for-itself's presence to an object, the object is revealed in profile (premises 6 & 7). Each profile of the object may be considered as a quality of the object (premises 4 & 6). Each profile of the object, qua quality, is a being which is independent and external to all other qualities or profiles ("in-itself" on the ground of presence per premise 10) except for the fact that the for-itself unites it with others (premises 3, 3a & 8). This interpretation suggests two hypotheses to condition further inquiry into the relation between consciousness and objects.

**First Hypothesis:** The for-itself is present to an object only in so far as the for-itself unites the multiple "in-itself" profiles of the object to determine itself as self-consciousness of the object.

**Corollary to the First Hypothesis:** The object considered as a this, in light of the inseparability of the constitution of the this and the act of abstraction (premise 5), and considered from the point of view of the for-itself, seems to be a sort of product, a constituted object resulting from the for-itself's unifying activity. One wonders if this particular use of the term "constitution" can be clarified by turning to "reference" as Sartre used this term in premise 3a) - his breathing an odour-being distinguished from referring to an odourous object. It is reasonable to assume that Sartre had such notions in mind when he indicated his purpose early in the chapter on
transcendence through pointing out that "the concrete is revealed to us as the synthetic totality of which consciousness, like the phenomenon, constitutes only the articulations."

**Second Hypothesis:** Recalling Sellars' hypothesis of a requirement in Kant's theory for proper sensibles, Sartre's quality as a being, an "in-itself," seems to be similar to a "completely determinate 'basic' perceptual this-such . . . in a very tough sense of the term (the 'proper sensible')."

The first hypothesis could be called a conceptual scratching of the surface for a clue to the significance of a variety of terms used by Sartre throughout BN. He uses the terms "synthetic unity" (to describe the series of appearances equated with the object in the introduction to BN), "synthetic totality" (in "Transcendence"), "constitution" and "reference." The first hypothesis really approaches a generalization about the role of the for-itself in its perception of objects which indulges an interpretative inclination, a suspicion that Sartre's object closely resembles Bertrand Russell's logical construction. The second hypothesis approaches a generalization about the character of that which consciousness is actually present to in perceiving an object, which indulges an interpretative inclination, a suspicion that Sartre's quality as a profile of the thing resembles Moore's and Russell's sense-datum. Sartre did say
in his introduction that each appearance in itself, alone, is a transcendent being. But it must be stressed that both these hypotheses are merely hypotheses which only approach generalizations. They are crude markers to indicate the direction in which interpretation is headed. Close examination of Sartre's work will show that they are both correct and both incorrect. Devotion to the subtleties of his handling of perception will bear this out. His description of consciousness's self-constitution as a polyvalent negation, to further explain unity and multiplicity, demonstrates the crudity of the second hypothesis.

Consciousness's self-constitution as a polyvalent negation is described as a "purely inner negation, in so far as it is, a negation of being is paralyzed with zones of nothingness." Sartre is dealing with a visual field; he is sitting in his room and pondering presence to the whole room. The negation of being is infused with other negations, i.e., in and by his presence to the table he realizes the indifference of the chair which he also must not be. The this and the that appear beside each other in a total revelation as that which is impossible to use in determining himself "to not be 'this'." The total revelation is such that it contributes nothing to consciousness's self-constitution as a not-this, but it announces the exteriority of being, absolute "outsideness" (to coin a phrase).
Thus cleavage comes from being, but there is cleavage only through the presence of the For-itself to all of being. The negation of the unity of negations in so far as it is a revelation of the indifference of the "this", is a revelation of the original relation of the thises in an external negation. This external negation within the unity of a totality capable of disintegration is expressed by the word "and". "This is not that" is written "this and that". The external negation has the double character of being in-itself and of being pure ideality.127

This duplicity of external negation does not involve, in any way, duplicity in being-in-itself. The for-itself's discovery of the indifference of being (nil negation, nil determination, nil differentiation) occurs as a discovery of exteriority, "outsideness" through "the absolute interiority of its own negation." The for-itself denies that it is the unity of its negations: sitting in a room and looking around involves not being the table, not being the chair, not being the typewriter, not being the coffee cup, and it involves not being the table and the chair and the typewriter and the coffee cup. Presence to, perceiving, a room involves polyvalent negation. Sartre says that the "and the" between table, chair, typewriter, and coffee cup doesn't contribute to consciousness's self-constitution, but merely indicates the exteriority of being. In so far as the external negation is external it is grounded in being-in-itself; this is the meaning of the phrase "cleavage comes from being." This doesn't rule out that cleavage can come from somewhere else, i.e., have another foundation, be
doubly founded. In so far as cleavage is there, negation is involved and it can be termed ideal. The for-itself's not being the "and" exposes the undifferentiation, massive-ness, absolute identity of being-in-itself prior to and in-separably enveloped in the concept of exteriority.

This information permits more detailed evaluation of the second hypothesis: "Sartre's quality as a being, an 'in-itself,'" seems to be similar to a "completely determinate 'basic' perceptual this-such . . . in a very tough sense of the term (the 'propersensible')." The existence of a quality, say an odour-being, is indifferent, undifferentiated, massive, absolutely dense, identical with itself and a plenitude. This is one-half of the complete story: odour-being has odour. What about odour? Shortly, in his dis-cussion of essence, Sartre will say, "The existent does not possess its essence as a present quality. It is even the negation of essence: the green never is green."128 The existence of the odour-being can only be basic in terms of its perception by the for-itself, the for-itself's presence, i.e., on the ground of presence. The "absolute" in absolute determination may only mean that the odour-being is more fundamental in terms of perception of the odourous-object, i.e., the for-itself confronts quality as the thing in pro-file. Sartre does treat perception as "the original contact with being."129 In other words, if Sellars' very tough sense of this-such means that proper sensibles exist in
determined form prior to the presence of consciousness, then "basic," qua tough-sense-proper-sensible does not apply to Sartre. Assuming or even declaring that Sellars' tough-sense-proper-sensible means determination prior to the presence of consciousness (i.e., that it is something akin to a little Kantian in-itself), then it is still possible to use Sellars' terms to state a guarded position concerning Sartre: An odour-being exists as a completely determinate "basic" perceptual this-such in a soft sense of the term "proper sensible." There is this idea of the ground of presence in Sartre's ontology which must at all costs be accounted for, because it is fundamental to his conception of perceiving and his conception of the object distinguished from being-in-itself.

As yet, only the preliminaries have been touched upon. Sartre gets at both the thing and perception through his discussion of other features of the object: permanence, potentiality and instrumentality. Keeping the two hypotheses in mind throughout, the following analysis is devoted to understanding the distinction between the given and the non-given in perception, to understanding how, as Sartre puts it in his introduction, the object is both inside and outside of its appearance.

D) Permanence and Potentiality

Sartre approaches the permanence and potentiality of the object by attending to the ekstatic dimension of the
future in the for-itself. More precisely, he further explains the structures of the object in terms of the for-itself's temporalization:

... the negation which the For-itself made itself be in the presence of being has as ekstatic dimension of the future; it is in so far as I am not what I am (an ekstatic relation to my own possibilities) that I have not to be being-in-itself as the revealing realization of the this. 130

The word "ekstasis" is used by Sartre in the original Greek sense of "standing out from." The primary dimension of the for-itself's separation from itself is temporal where "the For-itself nihilates or negates the In-itself (to which in one sense it still belongs) in the three dimensions of past, present and future (the three temporal ekstases)." 131 Sartre features the for-itself as the being which is always beyond what it is, about to come to itself. The this to which the for-itself is present is therefore surpassed toward the for-itself to come. Recall that Sartre's abstract "is revealed as the meaning which quality has to be as co-present to the presence of the for-itself to come." 132 The abstract, concerning quality, is the "meaning to come of the concrete this." Sartre says that "the perceived is originally the surpassed." In so far as the for-itself is the negation of the this, it "flees" (Sartre's expression) this negation toward a complementary negation. This complementary negation is negation-presence as the for-itself's own possibility; "that is, the for-itself has to be it as a non-thetic self-consciousness and as a thetic consciousness of being-beyond
being."\textsuperscript{133} Intuition, presence to the thing, has to have an element of the future within it. The present is not the entire temporal story of perceiving. It is the for-itself's possibility, where Sartre begins to explain the object's permanence as a correlate of the for-itself's future.

In so far as the for-itself denies itself in the future, the this concerning which it makes itself a negation is revealed as coming to itself from the future. The possibility that consciousness exists non-thetically as consciousness (of) being able not to not-be this is revealed as the potentiality of the this of being what it is. The first potentiality of the object as the correlate of the engagement, an ontological structure of the negation, is permanence, which perpetually comes to it on the ground of the future. The revelation of the table as table requires a permanence of the table which comes to it from the future and which is not a pure established given, but a potentiality.\textsuperscript{134}

Sartre draws a distinction between permanence and what he calls "the purely established given." This notion of the given must be elucidated further. The obscurity of the concept can be significantly reduced by reviewing an earlier chapter of BN, "Immediate Structures of the For-itself," where Sartre discusses consciousness's surpassing the given in the idiom of lack. Lack is reintroduced into his arguments in the texts from "Transcendence" currently under consideration. Sartre writes in "Transcendence":

When we speak of the meaning-to-come of the negation, we refer to that which the negation of the for-itself lacks in order to become a negation in-itself. In this sense the negation is, in the future, the precision of the present negation.\textsuperscript{135}
In "Immediate Structures of the For-itself," Sartre is trying to demonstrate the fundamental negativity of the for-itself and the essential connections to be drawn between this negativity and transcendence.

The concrete, real in-itself is wholly present to the heart of consciousness as that which consciousness determines itself not to be. Of course the fact of the presence will be the very transcendence of the for-itself. But it is precisely the nihilation [read negation] which is the origin of transcendence conceived as the original bond between the for-itself and the in-itself. Thus we catch a glimpse of a way of getting out of the cogito.136

The main theme of this particular text, important to the present concern with the given, is the display of the for-itself as a lack of being. After asserting that lack comes into the world through the for-itself, Sartre displays the triadic feature of lack. All lacking involves:

1) "that which is missing or the 'lacking'"

2) "that which misses what is lacking or the existing"

3) "a totality which has been broken by the lacking and which would be restored by the synthesis of 'the lacking' and 'the existing' - this is the 'lacked'."137

The first point Sartre makes is corollary to the primary characteristic of the being of an existent (never to reveal itself completely to consciousness). "The being which is released to the intuition of human reality is always that to which some thing is lacking."137 The purely given, "what is released to intuition is an in-itself which
by itself is neither complete nor incomplete but which simply is what it is without relation with other beings. Sartre uses the example of the crescent moon to demonstrate its appearance to consciousness. "The crescent moon is given or released in a full intuition, and as such it is the "existing." For the judgement that the moon is not full, that one-quarter is missing, to be possible at all, it must be based upon this full intuition of the existing and a surpassing of this given toward the disk of the full moon with a return toward the given to constitute it as the crescent moon."

It is the full moon which confers on the crescent moon its being as crescent; what-is-not determines what is. It is in the being of the existing, as the correlate of human transcendence, to lead outside itself to the being which it is not - as to its meaning.

Perception of the crescent moon seems to amount to a triadic ontological process, ontological because each movement fundamentally involves negation. First, the purely given is fully intuited. Second, the purely given is surpassed, i.e., the "existing" is surpassed toward a "lacking" in-itself which, because it is lacking, is "what-is-not." Third, a return to the "existing" yields an existing-lacking, or the "lacked": the crescent moon, in one sense, is a synthetic totality and not purely the given "existing."

The bond which unites the "existing" with the "lacking" is not one of simple contiguity, because the "existing" and the "lacking" are apprehended in one moment and surpassed
as a single totality. It is important to realize that the "lacking" and the "existing" are apprehended as about to be negated in the unity of the totality which is the "lacked."

"Everything which is lacking is lacking to ______ for ______."\(^{142}\) Returning to "Transcendence," one can see Sartre connecting the object to this bond in terms of an ideal fusion:

The ideal fusion of the lacking with the one which lacks what is lacking is an unrealizable totality which haunts the for-itself and constitutes its very being as a nothingness of being. . . . If our conclusions are accurate, this perpetual indication of the unrealizable fusion must not appear as a structure of the unreflective consciousness but as a transcendent indication of an ideal structure of the object.\(^{143}\)

Sartre reintroduces the crescent moon example in "Transcendence": "In so far as the for-itself is beyond the crescent moon, next to a being-beyond-being which is the future full moon, the full moon becomes the potentiality of the crescent moon."\(^{144}\) This being-beyond-being is what Sartre refers to in the earlier chapter as "what-is-not," that which determines the "existing." In so far as this being-beyond-being is not present it is what-is-not; it is negative. One can recall Sartre saying that the complementary negation involving the future is the precision of the present negation, negation-presence as the for-itself's own possibility.\(^{145}\) This negative feature of being-beyond-being relative to the non-negative "existing" is worthy of further investigation. In his chapter, "The Origin of Negation," Sartre considers
the function of negation and the structure of the object:

The function of negation varies according to the nature of the object considered. Between wholly positive realities (which however retain negation as the condition of the sharpness of their outlines, as that which fixes them as what they are) and those in which the positivity is only as appearance concealing a hole of nothingness, all gradations are possible.

One can explain the negativity of the being-beyond-being, at least partially, by opposing it to the "wholly positive reality" from the above text. Through synthesizing materials from other portions of the text the wholly positive reality can be described as an absolutely determined this for consciousness which is intuited or purely given on the ground of presence as an in-itself, an existent that is what it is through consciousness's surpassing it toward its meaning to come (a being-beyond-being to come) on the ground of the future. There is little, if anything, to distinguish this wholly positive reality from the odour-being previously discussed in Sellars' terminology as a completely determinate 'basic' perceptual this such in a soft sense of the term 'proper sensible.' A tentative description of perception can be attempted in a way that supports the first hypothesis, namely that the for-itself is present to an object only in so far as the for-itself unites the multiple "in-itself" profiles of the object. The example of an odour-being can be used.

Perception of a red rose can be described in the following way. One can be present to an odour-being, i.e.,
one smells an odour being. This particular odour-being is a rose odour-being and as such it can be understood as a quality, a profile of a thing called a rose. This "as such" involves the odour-being's presence to consciousness (it is a pure given) and its negation involves its being surpassed toward a non-being or a being-beyond-being called a rose (this being-beyond-being can be called a rose because it is capable of some description just as the absent moon was at least full), and consciousness's return to the rose-odour-being. The rose being-beyond-being has qualities or profiles one could cite as the red colour of its petals, the green of the stem and leaves and the prickliness of its thorns. Sartre states that "to the extent that the for-itself has to be its being beyond its present, it is the revelation of a qualified being-beyond-being." All of the potential profiles capable of being intuited through every mode of sense constitute the rose. Sartre writes:

In fact while that which the for-itself lacks is the ideal presence to a being-beyond-being, the being-beyond-being is originally apprehended as the lacking-to-being. Thus the world is revealed as haunted by absences to be realized, and each this appears with a cortège of absences which point to it and determine it... Since each absence is being-beyond-being - i.e., an absent in-itself - each this points toward another state of its being or toward other beings.  

This passage coheres closely with the first two sections of Sartre's introduction where he attacks the classical distinction between being and appearance, and applauds modern thought for its reduction of the "existent to the series of
appearances which manifest it." He also states that "the appearances which manifest the existent . . . are all equal, they all refer to other appearances and none is privileged." In the text above "each this points toward another state of its being or toward other beings." In his introduction, "The appearance refers to the total series of appearances. This question could be put just as well by asking how it is that the for-itself in having to be its being beyond being is the revelation of a qualified being-beyond-being. Not only does the appearance refer to, or point toward the total series, it has to point toward the total series:

[T]he appearance which is finite, indicates itself in its finitude, but at the same time in order to be grasped as an appearance-of-that-which-appears, it requires that it be surpassed toward infinity. This infinite has its equivalent in Sartre's chapter on transcendence. Appearances undergo a terminological transition into "phantom in-itselfs" and the past of the for-itself is indicated as an essential temporal element of perception:

In so far as the For-itself "was" what it is, the thing appears to it as having been there already. The For-itself can be presence to the this only as a presence which was; all perception is in-itself, and without any "operation" it is recollection. And as each moment of the past is a "having-been-Present," this isolation is pursued to the very interior of the Past. Consequently the unchangeable this is revealed across a flickering and infinite parcelling out of phantom in-itselfs, This is how that glass or that table is revealed to me.

Temporality as a structuralizing feature of perception has been previously discussed in terms of the present and the
future. Perceiving, grasped as a moment, has three facets - recalling the triadic feature of lack. Intuition occurs on the ground of presence and involves a surpassing on the ground of the future to coincide with the potentiality of the object, and here Sartre emphasizes the temporal feature of the past. Intuition involves a return to the given, a unifying return on the negative temporal ground of the past. The for-itself's negative upsurge into being "is parcelled out into negations which have no connection other than that they derive their unity from me and not from being,"\(^\text{153}\) and "[T]he existing and the lacking are at the same stroke apprehended and surpassed in the unity of a single totality."\(^\text{154}\)

Thus if one opens one's eyes, the rose revealed in profile could manifest its south-west surfaces and hide its north-east surfaces. But the south-west surfaces are only south-west by virtue of the for-itself's surpassing the given in-itself toward the phantom north-east in-itself and then returning to and uniting them with the south-west given. All of this happens in a single stroke; the red rose is there in the unity of a single totality, the perpetual indication of an unrealizable fusion which is a transcendent indication of an ideal structure of the object.\(^\text{155}\) The fusion is unrealizable, ideal and perpetually, only indicated, because the appearances or phantom in-itselfs are infinite in number, a detotalized totality, an infinite series that cannot appear all at once.
Due to its ekstatic mode of being the for-itself can be present to the thing; its temporalizing negativity has every thing to do with how the thing is revealed. Presence implies the present, the temporal present. The notions of past and future are fundamentally implicated in Sartre's notion of the present, and vice versa. One could say that every instant is past, present and future. The thing is revealed on the ground of the world and space "depends on temporality and appears in temporality since it can come into the world only through a being whose mode of being is temporalization." Understanding how one appearance refers to the total series of appearances, how the principle of the infinite series of appearances is also the structure of each appearance in the series, how the infinite is in the finite, involves understanding how Sartre's ontology regards the object and its structure as a correlate of consciousness and its negative, temporalizing structure, its ekstatic being.

It is this interrelatedness of the structure of consciousness and the structures of the object that has caused so much of the confusion in the secondary literature. Commentators claim that Sartre is both a realist and an idealist. Albert Shalom complains that Sartre has bungled distinguishing between the "that" and the "what" of the object. Shalom writes:

In my opinion, the distinction between the what and the that of "this chair" is precisely what is missing
in Sartre: it is not the distinction between the "pour-soi" and the "en-soi"; it is a distinction in that area within which Sartre simply bundles, without any clarification whatsoever, the existing world as "appearance" (and a series of sense-impressions), and the existing world as a fact independent of you and me.157

It is true that Sartre is quite often unclear. It is also possible to forgive complaints about Sartre's bundling the existing world as appearance and the existing world as an independent fact. But the charge that a distinction between the "what" and "that" is completely missing is not true. It is difficult to get it clearly stated. In his introduction Sartre claims that the principle of the series of appearances does not depend upon his whim. Shalom's criticism can be taken to mean that Sartre does not follow through on his claim, at least, that he fails to follow through properly. The balance of the current analysis of Sartre's "Transcendence" will focus on his treatment of the essence or principle of the series of appearances in terms of how the object and the "what" of the object exist independently of consciousness's whim. This consideration will necessitate clarification of the thing's revelation within, what Sartre calls, consciousness's circuit of self-consciousness to be an instrumental thing.

E) Essence, the Past of the For-itself and the Instrumental Thing

It is through human reality that lack comes to things in the form of "potency," of "incompletion," of "suspension," of "potentiality."
Nevertheless the transcendent being of lack can not have the nature of ekstatic lack in immanence. The in-itself does not have to be its own potentiality in the mode of the not-yet. The revelation of the in-itself is originally a revelation of the self-identity of indifference. The in-itself is what it is without any ekstatic dispersion of its being. It does not have to be its permanence or its essence or that which it lacks as I have to be my future. My upsurge into the world causes potentialities to arise correlatively. 158

Sartre has used the concept of lack to explain the revelation of the thing. The lacking being-beyond-being of the full moon which determines the purely given as the crescent moon can not be just an immanent lack, a subjective lack, it must be a transcendent lack. On the other hand:

The existent does not possess its essence as a present quality. It is even the negation of essence; the green never is green. But the essence comes from the ground of the future to the existent as a meaning which is never given and which forever haunts it. It is the pure correlate of the pure ideality of my negation. In this sense there is no such thing as an operation of abstraction if we mean by that a psychological affirmative act of selection effected by a constituted mind. Far from abstracting certain qualities in terms of things, we must on the contrary view abstraction as the original mode of being of the for-itself, necessary in order that there may be, in general, things and a world. The abstract is the structure of the world and is necessary for the upsurge of the concrete; the concrete is concrete only in so far as it leans in the direction of its abstraction, that it makes itself known by the abstraction which it is. The being of the for-itself is a revealing-abstractive. We see from this point of view that permanence and the abstract are only one. If the table has qua table a potentiality of permanence, this is to the exact degree that it has to be table. Permanence is the pure possibility for a this to be consistent with its essence. 159

The abstract as a structure of the world is permanence revealed in the world as the pure possibility for a thing or
a quality to be consistent with its essence. This structure is a correlate of the relation between the possible which the for-itself is and the present which it is fleeing, just as the lacking is related to the one which lacks what is lacking. The ideal which Sartre refers to as the haunting in-itself-for-itself or value, constitutive of the for-itself's nothingness of being (in Chapter II of BN) on the pre-reflective level, occurs on the thetic or reflective level as a condition of being, a transcendent indication of an ideal structure of the object.

This structure can be easily revealed; correlative with the indication of a fusion of the polymorphic negation with the abstract negation which is its meaning, there is to be revealed a transcendent and ideal indication - that of a fusion of the existing this with its essence to come. . . . The concrete "flesh and blood" existence must be the essence, and the essence itself be produced as a total concretion. . . . Or if you prefer, the form must be to itself - and totally - its own matter. And conversely the matter must be produced as absolute form.160

The unattainable fusion of essence and existence, that feature of perceiving a thing to be there as a particular thing, a what that out there, depends on the past of the for-itself.

This perpetually indicated but impossible fusion of essence and existence does not belong either to the present or the future, it indicates rather the fusion of the past, present and future, and it presents itself as a synthesis to be effected of temporal totality.161

The past, as a moment in the ekstatic unity of the for-itself, characterized as unrecognizable empirical knowledge (an unthematized, ekstatic moment), conditions the for-
itself's making known to itself what it is in the future. For any particular negation the for-itself has been, the for-itself exists in the mode of not being any longer and of not being yet. Sartre poses the question: "How does it happen that I am not a barren, indefinitely repeated negation of the this as pure this?"

In order to answer this question we must recall that the for-itself is not purely and simply a future which comes to the present. It has to be also its past in the form of "was." Therefore the negation which I am and which reveals the "this" has to be in the mode of the "was." This pure negation which as simple presence is not, has its being behind it, as past or facticity. As such we must remember that it is never a negation without roots. On the contrary it is a qualified negation - if by that we understand that it drags its qualification behind it as the being which it has not to be in the form of the "was." The present negation of the this can only occur as a nonthetic negation of the past. It is nonthetic in so far as the for-itself determines itself (internally negates, denies) by making itself a thetic negation of the this. It negates the this in order to escape the past which it is toward the future. The negation which the for-itself is, is effected in the form of reflection-reflecting. The "being for" of the for-itself is doubly negative - not being any longer and not being yet. In its presence to being it negates a this to escape the past toward the future. Sartre calls this the point of view which the for-itself has on the world. In the past the for-itself is fixed in the in-itself:

It is not in the future that I recover my presence since the future releases the world to me as cor-
relative with a consciousness to-come. Rather my
being appears to me in the past, although non-
thematically, within the compass of being-in-
itself; that is, in relief in the midst of the
world.164

In the for-itself's flight from the past which it is in the
mode of the was," "the future is prefigured in relation to
the past at the same time that it confers on the past all
its meaning."165

In his discussion under the heading "The Dynamic of
Temporality" in the chapter "Temporality," Sartre examines
"the reapprehension of the For-itself by Being."

That deep fissure which the For-itself has to be is
filled up; the Nothingness which must "be-made-to-be"
ceases to be, is expelled with the result that Being-
For-itself, made past, becomes a quality of the In-
itself. . . . [T]he extrâ-mundane For-itself is com-
pleted behind itself as a thing in the world. . . .
In the past the world surrounds me and I lose myself
in the universal determinism.166

Being-For-itself made past becomes a quality of the In-itself
and thus simple presence is a negation with roots, a qualified
negation,167 a determination. Again, from "Temporality":

[I]f we proceed from an adequate comprehension of
the for-itself, it is no longer change that needs
explaining but rather permanence. . . . The
ekstatic character of temporal being would not
change anything here since this character is found
in the past, not as constitutive of the for-itself
but as a quality supported by the in-itself.168

There are obvious linkages between Sartre's treatment
of the temporality of the for-itself and universal time or
the objective time of the world in "Transcendence." The
subsection entitled "the Past" contains implicit, material
connections with ideas set out in "Temporality." The this, considered as an object (for example, an inkwell) exists in the three temporal dimensions the moment it is perceived. In so far as the for-itself apprehends it as permanent, i.e., as essence, it is already in the future and, by the same token, it cannot be apprehended except as already having been in the world. The for-itself is that original negation which it has "to be in the mode of not-yet and of already, beside the being which is what it is." Permanence, which appears "as the pure slipping by of in-itself instants," is a compromise between non-temporal identity and the ekstatic unity of temporalization." An identical being is revealed across the ekstatic unity of Past and Present:

In so far as the For-itself "was" what it is, the instrument or thing appears to it as having been already there. The For-itself can be presence to the this only as a presence which was; all perception is in-itself, and without any "operation" it is a recollection.

There is no operation in the sense that Russell and Moore speculate about the point that inference may be involved as an essential element of perception. In Sartre's ontology, potentiality is a structure of perception in so far as temporality is a structure of the for-itself. Sartre would view this operation as reflective. Perception qua in-itself-recollection occurs in the unreflective mode. Hence [t]emporality is only a tool of vision. Yet this it which is the "this" already was. Thus the this
appears as having a past...; the past is isolated in a phantom of Selbständigkeit... Consequently the unchangeable this is revealed across a flickering and infinite parcelling out of phantom in-itselfs.172

Things such as pipes and pencils are entirely released in each one of their profiles.173 The object is in the aspect which manifests it. The permanence of the object is wholly indifferent to the multiplicity of its profiles.174 The object is outside of its aspect because the multiplicity is infinite, the infinite series of appearances itself will never appear.

The "thing" exists straightway as a "form" that is, a whole which is not affected by any of the superficial parasitic variations which we can see on it. Each "this" is revealed with a law of being which determines its threshold, its level of change where it will cease to be what it is in order simply not to be. This law of being, which expresses "permanence," is an immediately revealed structure of the "this."175

Permanence and the abstract are only one. The concrete "flesh and blood" existence must be the essence, and matter and form are mutually contained.

This contradictory nature could appear only on the double foundation of the For-itself and the In-itself.176

The essence, the principle of the series of appearances, the structure of the object does not depend on the for-itself's whim. Essence is the doubly founded law of being expressed as permanence. The contradiction amounts to holding the view that to be is not to be perceived and to be a thing is to be perceived. Being-in-itself is not the thing and the thing exists in-itself.
Sartre's effort to show how the presence of the for-itself to being-in-itself reveals being as a thing reaches a contradictory nature. The thing is doubly founded in the In-itself and the For-itself. The function of the for-itself is not one of "contemplative intuition," although the world "appears inside the circuit of selfness." The for-itself is still an emptiness, a lack separated from the in-itself. Human reality makes known to itself what it is through its relation to the in-itself, a relation to the in-itself which is the world.

This project toward self on the part of the for-itself, which constitutes selfness is in no way a contemplative repose. It is a lack, as we have said, but not a given lack. It is a lack which has to be to itself its own lack. This means that lack can be to itself its own lack only as a refused lack: the only truly inner connection between that which lacks _____ and that which is lacking is the refusal. In fact to the extent that the being which lacks _____ is not what it lacks, we apprehend in it a negation. But if this negation is not to slip away in pure exteriority . . . its foundation must be in the necessity for the being which lacks _____ to be that which it lacks. Thus the foundation of the negation is the negation of negation. But this negation-foundation is no more a given than the lack of which it is an essential moment; it is a having to be.

The for-itself does not choose to project or not to project. The project is not the product of a contemplative repose, nor a contemplative repose itself. The for-itself has to be its negation-foundation. The for-itself must be presently in flight from its past, fixed in the in-itself, toward its future. The for-itself does not grasp it-self
as lack in a thetic manner. It does not appear to the impure accessory reflection "which apprehends it as a psychic object - i.e., as a drive or a feeling. It is accessible only to the purifying reflection."178

What is given first in daily life is impure or constituent reflection. . . . But pure reflection can be attained only as a result of a modification which it effects on itself and which is in the form of a katharsis.179

Impure reflection is an abortive effort on the part of the for-itself to be another while remaining itself. The transcendent object which appeared behind the for-itself-reflected-on is the only being of which the reflective can say - in this sense - that it is not it. . . . Thus reflection is impure when it gives itself as an "intuition of the for-itself in the in-itself."180

These passages from the third section of Sartre's chapter, "Temporality," align at 180 degrees with his description of the for-itself's point of view on the world, as the for-itself fixed in the in-itself. Human reality is in the world, it is engaged. The cup is there and it is not human reality. The cup's being there and the cup's not being human reality is experienced in temporal flow, the uninterrupted fizz of active consciousness, impure or constituent reflection. Experience cannot be distinguished from what is given in daily life. Experience occurs without reflection on the ontological facts concerning the for-itself and the in-itself or attention to the relation which renders all experience possible. Sartre tries to get at this in BN; the book is a purifying reflection about this relation.
The absences which appear behind things do not appear as absences to be made present by things. Neither can we say that they are revealed as to be realized by me since the "me" is a transcendent structure of the psyche and appears only to the reflective consciousness. They are pure demands which rise as "voids to be filled" in the middle of the circuit of selfness. Their character as "voids to be filled by the for-itself" is manifested to the unreflective consciousness by a direct and personal urgency which is lived or thematized. . . . They are tasks and this world is a world of tasks.181

In so far as these tasks indicate the this; one can refer to the this as the this of these tasks; "that is, the unique in-itself which is determined by them and which they indicate as being able to fulfil them." Thus the thing,

in so far as it rests in the quiet beatitude of indifference and yet points beyond it to tasks to be performed which make known to it what it has to be, is an instrument or utensil. The original relation between things, that which appears on the quantitative relation of the thises is the relation of instrumentality. This instrumentality is not subsequent to or subordinate to the structures already indicated; in one sense it presupposes them; in another it is presupposed by them.182

Human life, the mundane day-to-day, proceeds on the level of impure or constituent reflection. "The absences which appear behind things . . . are pure demands . . . as voids to be filled . . . by a direct and personal urgency which is lived or thematized." That the thing is revealed within the circuit of selfness is no glib slogan. It is a concept that is cultivated to the fullest extent in BN. Five hundred pages after the chapter on transcendence in the third section of the chapter "Doing and Having," Sartre is urging that comprehension of the human condition involves a psycho-
analysis of things - "What we must do is to attempt a 
psychoanalysis of things." Sartre closes the third 
section of "Transcendence" with:

Thus my presence to being which determines it as a 
this is a negation of the "this" in so far as 
I am also a qualified lack beside the "this." To 
the extent that my possible is a possible presence to 
being-beyond-being, the qualification of my 
possible reveals a being-beyond-being as the being 
whose co-presence is a co-presence strictly linked 
with a repletion to come. . . . The glass of water 
appears as about to be drunk; that is, as the cor-
relate of a thirst grasped non-thetically and its 
very being as about to be satisfied. It is interesting that Sartre has italicized the preposition 
"in so far as." The current treatment of his "Transcendence" 
is strewn with prepositions - "in so far as," "qua," and 
"that is" are rife. A preposition is "a word placed before 
a noun or pronoun expressing various abstract relations, 
those of case, and of time and space." Little scratching 
of the head is required to understand why Sartre referred 
to the reflective cogito as positional consciousness. 
"Transcendence" deals with the relations that hold between 
consciousness and being. Each discernable structure of the 
negative for-itself has its structural counterpart in the 
world. Proliferous prepositions are the inevitable grammatical 
indication of the form and content of Sartre's description of 
reality.

The approach taken toward Sartre's description of 
reality, thus far, is more of a presentation of his view 
than an interpretation. Sartre has been presented in his
own words to reduce the possibility of mistaken conclusions that come to be made through mistakes in the mere communication of his position. On the other hand, interpretation of his position concerning knowledge focused through the lenses of Moore's and Russell's positions has conditioned the selection of materials for presentation and two hypotheses have been used to establish direction. An interpretative claim was made and restated in Sartre's idiom.

To be is not to be perceived and to be a thing is to be perceived.

Being-in-itself is not the thing and the thing exists in-itself.

This claim is advanced as an interpretative conviction concerning Sartre's claim that realization involves a contradictory nature. Yolton points out, for Shalom's benefit, that "Sartre's (and other phenomenalists') attitude is that a building can only be for someone, though the complex of awareness and the building exists in some non-phenomenal way." If these claims are true of Sartre's position, the two hypotheses and the claims should mutually imply each other when the concepts of perceiving and knowing, as Moore and Russell treated them, are imposed or dropped like anchors into Sartre's BN. In the next chapter this imposition, this anchorage is examined in detail for its effectiveness as a foundation for arguments to show that Sartre's study of how an object can exist for consciousness is phenomenalistic.
CHAPTER THREE

SARTRE, MOORE AND RUSSELL

In his Heidegger and Sartre, J. P. Fell formulates five tendencies of modern thought which Sartre confronts throughout BN. Two of these tendencies bear directly on issues concerning knowledge and perception of objects and can be used to serve as a basis to establish preliminary generalizations regarding the comparison of Sartre, Moore and Russell. Fell writes:

1. There exists in modern thought a dualism between two kinds of Being: the Being of the subject and the Being of the object. This dualism is problematic insofar as the subject and object are antithetically defined and cannot enter into real relations with each other.

2. There exists in post-Lockian thought a dualism between two modes of Being of the thing - the thing-in-itself (pure externality) and the thing-for-us (phenomenon). Only the latter is held to be knowable. This dualism is problematic insofar as man has a legitimate desire for access to reality in either ordinary experience, the sciences, or both. ¹

Preliminary generalizations regarding the comparison of Sartre, Moore and Russell involve the polemical aspects of their views.

Sartre confronts the first tendency through his arguments and declarations against realism. His main target seems to be Cartesian realism, but throughout BN practically
every type of realist doctrine is faulted and explicitly abandoned. Naive realism is linked with Cartesian—substantialist—realism and discredited in his discussion of reflection qua knowledge under the heading of "Original Temporality and Psychic Temporality: Reflection," in section III of the chapter entitled "Temporality." Representative realist theory which generally holds that representations of independently existing things are in consciousness or the mind and are termed percepts, or sensations, or contents of consciousness, is ruled out. "A table is not in consciousness - not even in the capacity of a representation. A table is in space, beside the window, etc." Sartre explicitly defines what seems to be the Cartesian type in his discussion of appropriation, the internal ontological bond between possessed and possessor. The bond cannot be explained by a "realistic" theory of appropriation. If we are right in defining realism as a doctrine which makes subject and object two independent substances possessing existence for themselves and by themselves, then a realistic theory can no more account for appropriation than it can for knowledge, which is one of the forms of appropriation; both remain external relations uniting temporarily subject and object.

In "Transcendence" the realist solution to the problem of relations between being and consciousness in general, and knowledge in particular are announced and denounced in one stroke. Sartre maintains that "transcendent being could not act on consciousness. . . . [T]he original relation
of being could not be an external relation which would unite two substances originally isolated. 5 This veto of any activity on the part of being can be interpreted to overrule any notion of a causal connection between being and consciousness. Being cannot act; being cannot cause. One cannot find in BN any arguments that support causal theory in such a form that external objects produce or cause sensations in consciousness.

In his "Status of Sense-data" and "Some Judgements of Perception," Moore rejects three formulations of causal explanation. 1) He rejects the notion of the thing as the cause of sensibles because if causal explanations are considered at all, he can distinguish other causes, some in the subject. 2) He rejects a distinction between a physical object's existence as a cause-like-source of sensibles and sensibles' existence as qualities of the physical object. 3) He rejects John Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities because it creates an artificial distinction between the physical object and directly apprehended sensibles that would not be considered to exist in the same place as their source, the physical object. Moore does not philosophize with a principle of substance to demonstrate the reality of the object pole of experience. Although there is no detailed analysis of matter in his "Refutation of Idealism," it's separation from consciousness does not rely upon assumptions which could be described as substantialist.
Russell explicitly confronts issues pertaining to the subject-object dualism conceived in terms of substance. He declares against any recognition of a metaphysical identity of substance. In *Logical Atomism*:

What makes you say on successive occasions, I am seeing the same desk? . . . [I]t does not matter what is the answer, so long as you have realized that the answer consists in something empirical and not in a recognized metaphysical identity of substance.6

His anti-substantialist attack focusses on the object pole of experience. Sartre echoes Russell's position in other terms. There is "no substantial form, . . . no principle of unity to stand behind the modes of appearance of the phenomenon; everything is given at one stroke without any primacy."7 That everything is given implies that nothing is hidden. There is no reality hidden behind the phenomenon to ground the unity of the modes of appearance to be identified as substance or substantial form.

Moore and Sartre share similar tendencies to de-substantialize thought about consciousness. Moore's "Refutation of Idealism" contains a complaint about philosophy's difficulty in defining consciousness which is central to the attack upon idealist doctrine.

[T]he moment we try to fix our attention on consciousness and to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish; it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness . . . as if it were diaphanous.8

Moore's lament about consciousness is part and parcel of his criticism of theory which regards consciousness as a
thing. It is not a sort of substantial thing that can have contents to be identified with things or their qualities called sensations, percepts or ideas. Moore's complaint occurs as a principle of ontological description in BN:

Our description of the for-itself has shown us how this . . . is removed as far as possible from a substance and from the in-itself; we have seen that it is its own nothingness. 9

Consciousness is nothing substantial, it is pure "appearance" . . . Consciousness is pure appearance because it is total emptiness (since the entire world is outside of it). 10

In "Our Knowledge of the External World" Russell wonders if the self exists at all:

Among many other things which we may mean by the Self, two may be selected as specially important, namely, (1) the bare subject which thinks and is aware of objects; (2) the whole assemblage of things that would necessarily cease to exist if our lives came to an end. The bare subject, if it exists at all, is not part of the data. . . . The second meaning is difficult to make precise, since we hardly know what things depend on our lives for their existence. 11

Russell's consideration of this issue of dependence results in his distinguishing between "(1) our sensation as a mental event consisting of our being aware of a sensible object, and (2) the sensible object of which we are aware in sensation," 12 along the same lines that Moore distinguished the sensible and sensation in the occurrence of sensations proper. 13 Russell's speculation about the existence of the bare subject and the dependence of things upon our lives will be a topic for closer scrutiny at a later point in this paper. Currently, it is sufficient to note that Russell
does not define the bare subject in a manner one could oppose to Sartre's concept of consciousness as a non-substantial emptiness. The bare subject which is aware of a sensible in no way contributes to the content of data; "it is not part of the data."

Sartre's ontology is aimed at overcoming a dualism of antithetically defined subject and object which disallows their entering into real relations with each other. The for-itself, consciousness in its very being depends upon the being of its object, being-in-itself, to exist as consciousness of something. Consciousness as a nothingness, an emptiness, defined in terms of and in opposition to being-in-itself involves no principle of substance to hide from it the reality of the object. Consciousness is transparent in its presence. Russell says that the bare subject is not part of the data.

Being-in-itself does not act in any way to cause in consciousness an effect that would have to be distinguished from the revelation of that very same being. Moore professes to be unable to find any residue to call consciousness or awareness when he examines the awareness of blue. In the awareness of blue he finds blue. The awareness of blue as a quality of a thing called consciousness. He can find no container to justify the idea that blue is a content of consciousness. Moore, Russell and Sartre seem to share the same disqualification of a causal relation between.
subject and object. Russell and Sartre align closely on their disqualification of substance as a concept to explain the reality of the object pole of experience.

J. P. Fell's statement of the second tendency describes a problem of post-Lockean thought as a dualism of two modes of being. The thing-for-us, the phenomenon is held to be knowable, while the thing-in-itself, the external reality is unknowable. Mind cannot reach the real thing.

Moore contends that questions asking whether one can know such things as "this is a chair" at the moment one touches a chair, and whether there are material things, should not be taken seriously. This is a position he adopts for the sake of argument or analysis in "Some Judgements of Perception." The truth of judgements in the form of "this is a so-and-so," "involves the existence of material things or physical objects." In the "Status of Sense-data," Moore had committed himself to the idea that the perceiver is immediately aware of or directly apprehends sensibles and not whole things per se. The substance of the earlier article had been the discussion of the relation of independently existing sensibles and physical objects which, according to Moore in the later article, seem to exist independently of awareness or in-themselves. "Some Judgements of Perception" contains a fresh approach to the problem of the later relation, sensibles to material objects. Moore is not concerned whether perception of whole objects
necessarily involves inference from the sensibles to the whole thing. He speculates at much greater length about whether sensibles or sense-data can be identified with the surfaces of physical objects and it seems, he pursues this line of thinking in such a way that one could say that he is trying to overcome a puzzle that can be expressed as Fell expresses the second ontological tendency confronting Sartre. Moore wants to see if it is possible to properly define the relation between the physical object and the sense-data he directly apprehends.

Moore summarizes the view that he examines in "Some Judgements of Perception" by determining the relation as ground for the judgement that a presented object, a sense-datum, is itself identical with a part of the surface of a physical object. He is uneasy with the whole idea of there being such a relation and differentiates the view from the Mill-Russell type which is an appealing alternative. The type of view he means is

the view that Mill suggests, when he explains what he means by saying that Matter is a Permanent Possibility of Sensation, and also the view or views that Mr. Russell seems to suggest in his "Our Knowledge of the External World." The real distinction between the position Moore supports and these others which he deems are supportable (meaning they can furnish acceptable answers to his question "what are we judging about when we say 'this is a so-and-so')" is that "they hold, in short, that though there are plenty
of material things in the Universe, there is nothing in it of which it could truly be asserted it is material thing."

What unsettles Moore about the view he supports would seem to be assumptions about the existence of sensibles and the existence of material things. He wonders whether there is any relation at all. Mill and Russell, Moore understands, discredit assumptions about the existence of material things. Moore dearly wants to say something to the effect that material things exist independently of our awareness of them. But he holds that what we are actually aware of in sensation is sensibles or sense-data which are not whole material things. The problem of the relation arises. He has to hold that material things are not immediately known as sensibles are known, that sensibles mediate our knowledge of material things. "If there be a thing which is this inkstand at all, it is certainly only known to me as the thing which stands in a certain relation to this sense-datum."

Moore continues, "It is not given to me, in the sense in which this sense-datum is given." Moore does not define the thing as a system of its aspects as Russell does. He does not take the step of reducing the existent to the connected series of its appearances as Sartre does.

It could be said that Sartre's ontology contains an implicit criticism of Moore's formulation of the problem concerning the relation of the sense-datum to the material thing. Sartre claims that "Precisely because knowledge is
not an absence but a presence, there is nothing which separates the knower from the known.¹⁹ Furthermore, the immediacy of the known to the knower demands the "absence of any mediator; that is obvious, for otherwise the mediator alone would be known and not what is mediated."²⁰ Sartre maintains from the very first pages of BN and throughout that philosophical explanations of reality which assume the existence of things-in-themselves, in the mode of the Kantian noumenon, are doomed to confront insoluble problems. One of Sartre's main priorities in the first two sections of his introduction was to draw as thick and heavy a line as possible between his conception of the being of the phenomenon and Kant's thing-in-itself. No attempt will be made here to perfect the idea that Moore's "whole thing" is a perfect instance of Kant's noumenon, but in contrast to Sartre's thick and heavy line between the being of the phenomenon and the noumenon, only a thin and light line could separate Moore's material thing and the thing-in-itself. Thus Moore notes, with respect to the view he tries to support:

If such a view is to be possible we shall have ... to maintain that kind of experience which I have expressed by saying one seems different from the other ... involves an ultimate not further analysable, kind of psychological relation to be identified either with that involved in being "perceived" to be so-and-so, or with that involved in being "judged" to be so-and-so.²¹

Moore confronts the problem of the thing-for-us and the thing-in-itself on the level of an ultimate, unanalysable psychological relation.
Near the conclusion of his "Some Judgements of Perception," Moore states and dismisses an option he thinks is more dissimilar to the Mill-Russell view than it really is. It is possible, he says, that a suitable formulation of the relation between sense-data and material could be: "There is one and only one thing of which this presented object sense-datum is a manifestation, and that thing is part of the surface of a material object." He cannot find any way of confirming that he is aware of any such relation as "being a manifestation of." Sartre might say, if dialogue with Moore can be imagined, that rejection of this option which is closest to the truth of the matter might not have been as swift if Moore had rejected the idea of existing material things with their noumenal flavour, and conducted research with an empty consciousness as a principle. Moore's trouble, Sartre might say, in finding any such relation as "being a manifestation of" is part and parcel of his failing to see that consciousness is this very relation. "The identity of the being of the For-itself and of Knowledge comes from the fact that... the For-itself in its being is a relation to being." The rejection of the thing-in-itself is vital to Sartre's ontology in his attempt to demonstrate consciousness's contact with being.

Consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcendence is the constitutive structure of consciousness, that consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself.
Consciousness is a being such that in its being its being is in question in so far as this being implies a being other than itself.

We must understand that this being is no other than the transphenomenal being of the phenomenon and not a noumenal being which is hidden behind them. It is the being of this table, of this package of tobacco, of the lamp, more generally the being of the world which is implied by consciousness.24

Moore's phrasing of the view he rejects in terms of the relation of being a manifestation of one and only one thing implies its proximity to Sartre's thesis that the for-itself is qualified through its negation of "an individual and particular in-itself and not of being in general." Consciousness is a "precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of something."

[T]he For-itself and the In-itself are reunited by a synthetic connection which is nothing other than the For-itself. . . . The For-itself is like a tiny nihilation which has its origin at the heart of Being; and this nihilation is sufficient to cause a total upheaval to happen to the In-itself. This upheaval is the world. The For-itself has no reality save that of being the nihilation of being. Its sole qualification comes to it from the fact that it is the nihilation of an individual and particular In-itself and not of being in general. . . . For consciousness there is no being except for this precise obligation to be a revealing intuition of something.25

The distance of the view Moore rejects from Sartre's position can only be expressed in terms of the distinction between the whole thing and Sartre's being-in-itself, and in this distance is the reason for suggesting that Sartre would reject Moore's problem of the relation. For Sartre the thing is in its appearance. The appearance is an
aspect of the thing, i.e., the principle of the series of appearances (which is the thing) is the structure of each of the appearances in the series.

With a different perspective on Moore's material thing it is possible to narrow the distance between Sartre's and Moore's positions, even the position he defends in "Some Judgements of Perception." One can say that Moore does not advance any view of the material thing or physical object that necessitates its characterization as a thing-in-itself in the Kantian sense. Kant's noumenon is unknowable and can be distinguished from Moore's material thing in so far as Moore professed to know it through the mediation of sense-data. Sartre and Moore agree that to be is not to be perceived is a faulty doctrine, and perhaps it is reasonable to see some similarity in their views by noting that Sartre's thing exists in-itself for consciousness, just as Moore's material thing exists in itself. On this interpretation one could only distinguish their views by noting Sartre's strong opposition to any notion of mediacy in perceptual knowing and by noting that Sartre defines the thing as a series of appearances while Moore does not. One could point out that Moore drives no distinction between the existence of the sense-datum and the existence of the material thing. In Sartre's BN, the being of the appearance and the being of the thing is the being of the phenomenon. The thing, the existent and the appearance are both phenomenal.
and share the same being as the condition of their revelation. After all is said and done, it must be remembered that Sartre formulated the primary characteristic of the being of the existent in terms of its never revealing itself completely to consciousness; the series of the thing's appearances is infinite. Sartre claims that there is nothing of reality which is hidden, nothing that cannot be revealed. Moore doesn't hold a position which provides for hidden reality. Add to this the fact that Moore does not disagree fundamentally with Russell's position in "Our Knowledge of the External World" and the fact that he regards it as the likeliest alternative to the one he defends, and it can be argued that Sartre's position really overlaps both Moore and Russell's.

Russell's attack on the thing-in-itself in "Our Knowledge of the External World," starts with a negative treatment of causal theories of perception and finishes with a philosophical alternative, a hypothetical reconstruction of the world of sense and a redefinition of the thing as opposed to its momentary appearances. "By a similarity of neighbouring perspectives many objects in the one can be correlated with objects in the other, namely with similar objects." Objects in this context refer to sensible objects "of which we are aware in sensation," and which are distinct from things such as tables and chairs.

Given an object in one perspective, from the system of all the objects correlated with it in all the
perspectives; that system may be identified with the momentary common-sense "thing." Thus an aspect of a "thing" is a member of the system of aspects which is the "thing", at that moment... All the aspects of the thing are real, whereas the thing is a mere logical construction.26

In his introduction to BN, Sartre comments on the validity of Duhem's definition of physical reality:

To the nominalism of Poincare, defining a physical reality... as the sum of its various manifestations, Duhem rightly opposed his own theory which makes of the concept the synthetic unity of these manifestations.27

On principle the object posits the series of its appearances as infinite.28

What appears in fact is only an aspect of the object and the object is altogether in that aspect and altogether outside of it.29

Synthetic unity must be understood in terms of the principle of the infinite series of appearances: The unity, the essence of the thing, is synthetic in so far as it is made to be:

The essence of the inkwell is made-to-be as a correlate of the possible negation of the for-itself, but it is not the inkwell and it is not being. In so far as this essence is in-itself it is a negation hypothasized and reified; that is a nothing, it belongs to the shell of nothingness which encases the world.30

In Russell's Logical Atomism a certain series of appearances linked together may be defined as a desk and "the desk is reduced to being a logical fiction."31 In so far as an aspect of a thing is a member of a system of aspects which is the thing it can be said that Russell's "thing" is in its aspect just Sartre's object is in its aspect. Russell's
thing is outside of its aspect in a manner similar to Sartre's explanation of this "outsideness"; the aspect is real and distinguished from the logical construction or logical fiction. Just as "the existent . . . cannot be reduced to a finite series of manifestations, since each one of them is a relation to a subject constantly changing," in BN, Russell advances an infinity grounded in the subject. In that each mind looks upon the world from a unique point of view it can be supposed that

\[
\text{in spite of the differences between the different worlds . . . each exists entire exactly as it is even if it were not perceived. We may further suppose that there are an infinite number of such worlds which are in fact unexperienced.}^{32}
\]

In Sartre the subject "constantly changes" and in Russell the issue of the thing-in-itself is set up by examining what actually happens when the subject walks around a table. The whole notion of perspective has its roots in this simple walk.

Sartre's introduction contains the initial development of infinity as follows:

Although an object may disclose itself through a single Abschattung, the sole fact of there being a subject implies the possibility of multiplying points of view on that Abschattung. This suffices to multiply to infinity the Abschattung under consideration.\(^{33}\)

Abschattung can be treated as a profile of a thing or a thing in perspective. In-finite multiplicity is grounded in the subject in both Russell and Sartre. Sartre takes
this grounding all the way back to temporality. The for-itself confronts multiplicity in the world because it is a temporal or an ekstatic being; temporality is a structure of the for-itself, "a tool of vision." Because the for-itself temporalizes being-it spatialized space as well. One might go so far as to say that while Sartre's for-itself spatializes, Russell's subject perspectivizes. To assess the validity of such a claim requires careful comparison of what Sartre and Russell conceive the subject to be and comparison of what they conceive knowledge to be.

I. Sartre and Russell on Knowledge

In "Our Knowledge of the External World," Russell distinguishes, by degree, hard and soft data, and in the idiom of belief, he distinguishes primitive and derivative knowledge. He categorizes the latter two into logical and psychological types. Hard data are evidence for logically and psychologically derivative beliefs and for that class of beliefs which are both logically primitive and psychologically derivative. Among the hard data are the facts of our own sense-data and the laws of logic. One can suppose that to express a fact of one's own sense-data would amount to expressing a psychologically primitive belief, which would depend upon our sensing something. Russell distinguishes sensations as mental events and sensible objects or sense-data of which we are aware in sensation. A momentarily seen
patch of colour and a hardness felt when we press against a surface are examples of sensible objects which exist independently of our sensing them, at least at the time we sense them.

Sartre maintains in the first section of "Transcendence" that there is only intuitive knowledge. Other forms of knowledge, deductive and discursive argument for instance, are only instruments which lead to intuition. They are indicating signs that point to an intuition beyond reach. Intuition is the presence of the thing to consciousness or the presence of consciousness to the thing and once intuition is reached, deduction and argument are effaced; being no longer necessary.

Russell claims that "in so far as physics or common sense are verifiable, it must be capable of interpretation in terms of sense-data alone." Sartre says that all forms of knowledge or so-called knowledge point toward intuition beyond reach. Russell's and Sartre's views seem to vibrate in empirical sympathy if not synonymously. One can ask if there is enough sympathy to say that Russell's awareness of a sensible object is synonymous with Sartre's intuition or conscious presence to a thing? A proper answer to this question requires a close comparison of Russell's subject and Sartre's for-itself beside a comparison of their concepts of the thing to find a sense-datum in Sartre.
II. Russell's Subject and Sartre's For-itself

On the surface, Russell's subject and Sartre's for-itself seem to be equivalent notions. Russell draws a bare distinction between sensation and the sensible. The distinction is termed bare in so far as the sensation is defined in terms of the sensible (sensation is awareness of a sensible object) while the sensible object is defined extensionally, without reference to awareness (defined extensionally by providing examples of members in the class of entities to which the term applies, e.g., a particular hardness, a patch of colour, a sound). Thus awareness of a sensible does not involve any notion of self as a given datum or part of the data. "The bare subject, if it exists at all is an inference and not part of the data." Sensation, or awareness of a sensible is nakedly distinct from a sensible, Sartre would agree up to this point. The "me" he says, is a transcendent structure of the psyche and can only appear to the reflective consciousness or reflective cogito. The "me" does not make the absences behind things present. To this point Russell's awareness and Sartre's consciousness are equivalently empty.

But on the other hand, Russell seems to do too thorough a job of emptying; his bare subject seems to be bare of any structure. Sartre's consciousness has a characteristic which one could call unity in duality. All consciousness constitutes itself as consciousness of being.
consciousness of its object. "[T]he necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be knowledge of its object, is that it be conscious of itself as being that knowledge."\(^{36}\) Every positional consciousness of an object is a non-positional consciousness of itself as consciousness of the object. This non-positional consciousness does not involve the duality of subject and object found in the knowing relation. Sartre's intuition involves self-consciousness of something, while Russell's awareness does not seem to require self-awareness of a sensible object. Sartre's notion of the pre-reflective cogito is vital to his explanation of the world; the world appears within the circuit of selfness and the circuit is a structure of consciousness.

Russell's bare subject does not constitute itself as does Sartre's for-itself and therefore it seems that Sartre's intuition and Russell's awareness or sensation are not just different expressions of the same relation. However, Russell, in an unreflective fashion, does permit his subject the capacity of correlating muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual sensations to allow perception of a table.

A table viewed from one place presents a different appearance from that which it presents from another place. This is the language of common sense, but this language already assumes that there is a real table of which we see the appearances. Let us try to see what is known in terms of sensible objects alone, without any element of hypothesis. We find that as we walk round the table, we perceive a series of gradually changing visible objects. But in
speaking of "walking round the table," we have
still retained the hypothesis that there is a single
table connected with all the appearances. What we
ought to say is that, while we have those muscular
and other sensations which make us say we are walking,
our visual sensations change in a continuous way, so
that, for example, a striking patch of colour is not
replaced by something wholly different, but is re-
placed by an insensible gradation of slightly
different colours with slightly different shapes.
This is what we really know by experience, when we
have freed our minds from the assumption of permanent
"things" with changing appearances. What is really
known is a correlation of muscular and other bodily
sensations with changes in visual sensations.37

This is the walk round the table which is at the root of
Russell's notion of perspective. It is difficult to believe
that Russell really means to say that what is really known
is sensations or correlations of sensations because this
sounds so much like the Berkelian idealism he declares he is
concerned to avoid at the very beginning of his article.38
It is more consistent to interpret his position here to
mean that what he is really knowing is correlations of
sensible objects of which we have been aware and are aware.
One could assume that bodily sensations can undergo the same
characterization as other sensations in terms of their being
an awareness of sensible objects of a sort. But all of
this only focusses attention upon a feature of Russell's
thought concerning the perception of objects and how it
seems that even he cannot escape some reference to the self.
One can wonder if there might not be some iron law of
philosophy to the effect that "He who throws out the thing-in-itself with his skepticism must contend himself with the

161
task of self-reference in the 'something' of which he is aware such that this 'something' does not trouble his mind for being just of his mind." In Russell's "Our Knowledge" there is a difference between "correlation of muscular and other bodily sensations with changes in visual sensations" and mere awareness of sensible objects or sensation, and this distinction seems susceptible to comparison with Sartre's display of the pre-reflective and reflective consciousness. But Russell is not aware that his picture of perception of things might involve a duality in a unified subject and therefore no further support of such a fragile equivalence with Sartre will be attempted for this very reason.

III. Sartre's Appearance In Itself and Russell's Sense-datum

Sartre ramifies his ontological argument in contrast to Husserl's view by asserting:

It is true that things give themselves in profile, that is simply by appearance. But each one of them is already in itself alone a transcendent being, not a subjective material of impressions.\(^{39}\)

In "Transcendence" he writes:

In so far as the For-itself "was" what it is, the ... thing appears to it as having been there already. The For-itself can be presence to the this only as a presence which was ... Consequently the unchangeable this is revealed across a flickering and infinite parcelling out of phantom in-itself's. This is how that glass or that table are revealed to me.\(^{40}\)
Just as things give themselves in profile by appearances in Sartre's view, Russell's subject is given a sensible object, an aspect of the thing in perspective. Russell claims that the sensible object is real, that is, it exists independently of the perceiver just as appearances are transcendent beings or in-itself's. These in-itself's are fleeting or flickering or phantom in the same way Russell's sense-data are momentary; phantom and momentary to the for-itself and subject respectively. In so far as Sartre's appearance can be termed a this, it arises simultaneously with and on the ground of the world. Russell's sensible object is given in a perspective which is in effect the perceived world.

Russell maintains that "all the aspects of the thing are real, whereas the thing is a mere logical construction," and in this distinction there may be a divergence of views. Sartre does not drive for the same distinction. In the chapter "The Origin of Negation," he does distinguish wholly positive realities (as those regarding the least amount of the negative to determine the sharpness of their outlines) from those in which positivity is only an appearance. All objects are real. The negativity within them is as real as the positivity. Nothingness is real and found in the world. Sartre does not separate the appearance as an aspect of the thing from the thing along the lines of reality and unreality respectively, as Russell seems to do.
But then again, Russell does not say in "Our Knowledge of the External World" that the mereness of the logical construction equals its unreality either. It can be argued that Russell classifies sense-data and the laws of logic as hard data. The mereness of the logical construction is a feature which might be employed to distinguish the thing's non-given aspects from the given aspects while maintaining they are all aspects of the thing. Sartre makes a distinction between appearance and the thing by pointing out the fact that the thing is both in its appearance or its aspect and outside of its appearing aspect. Perhaps the simplest way to overcome idiomatic differences is to note that what is given to consciousness is an appearance or an aspect of the object, while what is not given in the same way (simultaneously in the same way) is the other aspects of the thing and this lack of givenness in no way alludes to a thing-in-itself or a reality hidden behind the appearance.

In the previous analysis of Sartre's "Transcendence," the this as quality and profile of the thing was alluded to, and was shown to be susceptible to interpretation as a completely determinate 'basic' perceptual this-such in a soft sense of the term 'proper sensible' on the basis of what Sartre had to say about abstraction and the constitution of the this. Russell's sense-datum exhibits these features; it is just as proper as sensibles which Moore
believes he directly apprehends to exist independently of his apprehension in sensation proper. But the softness attributed to Sartre's this as an absolutely determined quality and profile of the thing, based on his insistence that all determination is fundamentally negative, is not so easily attributed to Russell's datum. Russell's sensible object seems to be a completely determinate 'basic' perceptual this-such in the tough sense of the term 'proper sensible' just as Sellars thinks it is required to unpack Kant's theory of representation.

Perhaps the differences here can be attributed to Sartre's concept of the in-itself. Sartre's being-in-itself is indeterminate, it has no negation in it. Russell doesn't philosophize with a notion of being-in-itself. Russell doesn't say that he knows that unperceived or unexperienced perspectives exist; he supposes that they do. He writes: "We may suppose, in spite of the differences between different worlds, that each exists entirely as it is perceived, and might be exactly as it is even if it were not perceived." Some philosophers tip their hat to transcendence, some stop to exchange the time of day, while others get married to the idea. Russell is somewhere between tipping the hat and exchanging the time of day. Sartre gets married. Being-in-itself just does not occur as a concept, as the condition of all revelation in Russell's explanations of the world. There is no ontological argument
in Russell to the conclusion that consciousness depends for its being upon a being which is not itself. But there is this supposition that sense-data exist independently of his awareness of them, and there are two ways to see some similarity between Sartre and Russell in and through this difference—shades of Hegelian mediation in precise interpretation.

If one applies Sartre's concept, the ground of presence, to the whole of Russell's "Our Knowledge of the External World," then Sartre's appearance, the aspect, the this as a quality and a profile of the thing, are equivalent expressions for Russell's sense datum. If this application rankles, there is an interpretative alternate which uses Russell to illustrate Sartre. In Russell the existence of the sense datum is distinguishable from the subject. What exists and is not a subject is sense-data. We can be sure of this according to Russell, at least when we are aware of them. In this way one could refer to all sense-data, perceived and unperceived as a region of being. Sartre refers to being-in-itself as a region of being. At one point in his introduction he writes: "In particular the preceding reflections have permitted us to distinguish two regions of being: the being of the pre-reflective cogito and the being of the phenomenon." The word "phenomenon" is used in the introduction to denote that which is not consciousness and has the same kind of indeterminacy that was discovered in
the *this* in "Transcendence." In the chapter, "The Origin of Negation," Sartre says, "The relation of the regions of being is an original emergence." With this reading of Sartre inspired by Russell, with its heavy emphasis on the idea of region, one could still appease the impact of predicates applied to being-in-itself by pointing out that any particular phenomenon (thing, appearance, *this*, *that*) to observe that the being of that appearance of that thing does not contain any negation within it, that the being of that inkwell is solid and massive, a plenitude.

On the basis of the above comparisons there is some security in asserting that Russell's sense-datum and Sartre's appearance in itself are equivalent entities. One can affirm that awareness of a sense-datum closely parallels presence to the thing, or intuition as long as explicit differences between Sartre's concept of consciousness and Russell's concept of the subject are kept in view to qualify implicit similarities.

IV. Sartre, Moore, Russell and Phenomenalism

Sartre's investigation of the "ontological relation which renders all experience possible, and how, in general, an object can exist for consciousness" has been interpreted in light of the phenomenalistic theories of Moore and Russell, and in the process, the phenomenalistic theories of Moore and Russell have been interpreted in terms of
Sartre's investigation. Such is the inevitable result of interpretation through comparison. The burden of all this interpretation is to display Sartre's investigation as a form of phenomenalistic theory. It has to be admitted that the technique of interpretation, comparison, runs the risk of begging the question, of assuming the burden is born before the bearing is achieved. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to avoid the risk, but it is possible to minimize the negative consequences of succumbing to the risk. Minimization of negative consequences in this instance is attempted by stating the fundamental features of Moore's and Russell's views by using terms that can be described as approximately neutral with respect to those used by Sartre, Moore and Russell. The complete elimination of negative consequences is a dream because a totally neutral set of terms is a dream. In reality, the fundamental features of Moore's and Russell's positions can be expressed in the following way by employing approximately neutral terms:

1. The subject exists, minds exist, and the subject or mind is related to objects which exist.

2. This relation between the subject and the object can be called awareness of, or direct apprehension of that which exists.

3. That which exists and which the subject is aware of must not be identified with the existence of the subject.

4. The "that" in "that of which the subject is aware" is not to be distinguished from the "that" in "that which exists of which the subject is aware," and can be called a sensible object, sense-datum or sensible.
5. The existence of the subject in so far as the subject is an awareness of thaths and awarenesses of that can be termed experience.

6. The "that" in the experience understood as "awarenesses of that which exists" can be termed a thing.

7. The "thaths" in the experience understood as "awareness of thaths" can be termed appearances of the thing.

8. There is a distinction between that termed an appearance of the thing and the that termed a thing.

9. The existence of that termed a thing and the existence of that termed an appearance of a thing are not distinct.

10. The experience of that termed a thing involves awarenesses while the experience of that termed an appearance involves an awareness.

This is a rough display of both Moore's and Russell's positions. Russell's position in "Our Knowledge of the External World," differs from the position Moore defends in "Some Judgements of Perception." The positions differ in so far as Moore and Russell follow through on the implications of features numbered nine and ten in different ways. Moore suggests that Russell's view entails "that though there are plenty of material things in the Universe there is nothing in it of which it could truly be asserted that it is a material thing."\(^{43}\)

For Russell the lack of distinction between the existence of that termed a thing and thaths termed appearances of the thing must be understood in terms of a reduction of the existence of the thing to the existence of the thaths.
termed appearances of the thing. The thing, now termed a mere logical construction, is a formed system of real aspects of the thing. In so far as it is a formed system it is dependent on the subject's forming it through correlating real aspects in their perspectives. Experience has something "correlating" about it; that is the thing (not the existence of the thing) seems to depend upon the awareness of aspects of the thing. Objectivity, "thingness" seems to depend upon the subject.

Moore, throughout his defense of the position taken in "Some Judgements of Perception," operates on the lack of distinction expressed in feature number nine in a manner requiring that he explain how the awarenesses of the existing that termed a thing is related to the single awareness of the existing that termed an appearance. Moore wants to say that the existing that termed an appearance of the existing that termed a thing is part of the existing that termed a thing or part of the existing that termed a surface of the existing that termed a thing. Awareness of the thing involves awarenesses of appearances and objectivity, "thingness," should not depend on the subject but should be grounded in the existing thing. Moore must describe knowledge of the thing as mediated by sense-data.

The fundamental features of Sartre's position can be expressed by using his terms in annotations to the propositions featuring Moore's and Russell's position.
1. The subject exists, minds exist, and the subject or mind is related to objects which exist.

S. Consciousness is consciousness of something. This means that transcéndence is the constitutive structure of consciousness; that is, consciousness is born supported by a being which is not itself.

2. This relation between the subject and the object can be called awareness of, or direct apprehension of that which exists.

S. Intuition is the presence of consciousness to the thing.

3. That which exists, and which the subject is aware of, must not be identified with the existence of the subject.

S. The reality of that cup is that it is there and it is not me.

4. The "that" in "that of which the subject is aware" is not to be distinguished from the "that" in "that which exists of which the subject is aware," and can be called a sensible object, sense-datum or sensible.

S. The appearance or phenomenon is the relative-absolute. The appearance is not supported by any existent different from itself; it has its own being.

5. The existence of the subject in so far as the subject is an awareness of thats and awarenesses of that can be termed experience.

S. All consciousness is positional in that it transcends itself in order to reach an object, and it exhausts itself in reaching that object.

6. The "that" in the experience understood as "awarenesses of that which exists" can be termed a thing.

S. The reality of that cup is that it is there and it is not me. We shall interpret this by saying that the series of its appearances is bound by a principle that does not depend on my whim.

7. The "thats" in the experience understood as "awareness of thats" can be termed appearances of the thing.
S. The For-itself can be presence to the this only as a presence which was. . . . Consequently the unchangeable this is revealed across a flickering and infinite parcelling out of phantom in-itselfs. This is how that glass or that table are revealed to me.

8. There is a distinction between that termed an appearance of the thing and that termed a thing.

S. That which appears in fact is only an aspect of the object, and the object is altogether in that aspect and altogether outside of it. . . . It is altogether outside for the series of appearances itself will never appear nor can it appear.

9. The existence of that termed a thing and the existence of that termed an appearance of a thing are not distinct.

S. Being is simply the condition of all revelation.

10. The experience of that termed a thing involves awarenesses while the experience of that termed an appearance involves an awareness.

S. Each this appears with a cortège of absences which point to it and determine it. . . . Since each absence is a being-beyond-being - i.e., an absent in-itself - each this points toward another state of its being or toward other beings.

Sartre's position, grasped as a phenomenology, ontologically and epistemologically cuts across both Russell's position and the position Moore defends in "Some Judgements of Perception" in lieu of an alternate to Russell's view. Sartre's being of phenomena as the condition of all revelation permits him to say that the being of the appearance (the manifestation of the thing) and the being of the thing manifested through the appearances are indistinct. With Moore he can say that the thing exists on the ground of
the for-itself's presence to being and the for-itself's presence does not contribute to or ground the existence of the thing. With Russell he can say that the thing is the series of its appearances and that without the for-itself there would be no thing, no object. Before the presence of the for-itself there is only being. But this is to say too much; for the for-itself causes the there in "there is." It is better to say: before the presence of the for-itself there is only being.

In the display of Sartre's "Introduction," a severance of objectivity and transcendence was indicated. Sartre's dissatisfaction with phenomenology was discovered to be rooted in its conception of objectivity as transcendence. In the display of Sartre's "Transcendence," the implications of this dissatisfaction were discovered in Sartre's theory, to involve grasping reality as a contradictory nature. The concrete "flesh and blood" existence must be the essence, matter and form being mutually contained.

The "thing" exists straightway as a "form" that is, a whole which is not affected by any of the superficial parasitic variations which we can see on it.

This contradictory nature could appear only on the double foundation of the For-itself and the In-itself. 44

Analysis of Sartre's ontology reached the conclusion:

To be is not to be perceived and to be a thing is to be perceived. Being-in-itself is not the thing and the thing exists in-itself. 45
Yolton pointed out that "Sartre's (and other phenomenlists') attitude is that the building can only be for someone, though the complex of awareness and the building exists in some non-phenomenal way."\(^{46}\)

With Russell the thing known is the series of its appearances and with Moore the thing exists in-itself. With and beyond Russell, the thing arises on the double foundation of the for-itself and the in-itself. With and beyond Moore, being-in-itself is the being of the existing thing and its existing appearances such that knowledge of the thing is unmediated. The objectivity of appearances, things and the world appears in and through the for-itself's relation to being-in-itself. The for-itself is this relation and for its being it depends upon the being of the phenomenon as the transcendent condition of all revelation. The for-itself's revelation of itself, the for-itself's temporalizing and spatializing revelation of itself, is revelation of the world in time and space. The phenomenon is the relative-absolute. Reality is relative and absolute; being-in-itself is its being.

One last question: Is Sartre's investigation, with and beyond Moore and Russell, beyond phenomenalism?
CONCLUSION

IDEALISM, REALISM AND PHENOMENALISM

The ontological and epistemological issues treated in this paper have been treated from a point of view called the meta-level. According to imperatives formulated by J. W. Yo-nton, the assessment of Sartre's position has aspired to a neutrality, a non-evaluative stance which seeks to describe rather than render judgement. In a non-biased way, the goal of analysis has been to explain Sartre's view in light of Moore's and Russell's views. On the other hand, a criticism of criticisms was promised. The whole project has been motivated by a diversity of views about Sartre in the literature, and the time has come to measure the analysis in terms of what Sartre had to say about Sartre's ontology.

In his "Introduction," Sartre claims to "have ruled out the a realistic conception of consciousness" and "ruled out the idealist solution of the problem" of transcendence.¹ Copious notes have been taken and published to confirm that Sartre strives mightily to "go between the norms of idealism and realism" to achieve a result that contains both in "uneasy coexistence."² Joseph Catalano finds "strange realism" in Sartre's "Transcendence."³ Arthur Danto thinks that because Sartre condemns Bishop Berkeley's
idealism, his ontology voices disdain for all thought "repugnant to the realistic prejudices of common sense." "That there was a world before anyone was aware that there was" is a dictum that Danto feels contributes to defining Sartre's realism. He writes, "Realism so construed is exactly Sartre's philosophy." One discovers in Wilfrid Desan's critique an ascription of "extreme realism" and "extreme subjectivism." He feels compelled to be accurate and decides that "one could consider Sartre both as a realist and an idealist." This list can be extended and it was already partially recited in the introduction to this paper. There is obviously a dissonance between Sartre's opinion of his own view and the opinions of others.

Throughout BN Sartre provides ample opportunity to grasp his meaning by relating himself to and distinguishing his thought from other philosophical positions. One of the most obvious of these opportunities is presented in his concluding remarks to the chapter on transcendence. He makes one concession to idealism and one concession to realism, but it seems impossible to assess his remarks in any way which allows description of his ontology as a version of realism or idealism, or even a mixture of the two.

I. Idealism and Realism

We shall grant to idealism that the being of the For-itself is knowledge of being, but we must add that this knowledge has being. The identity of the being of the For-itself and of knowledge does
not come from the fact that knowledge is the measure of being but from the fact that the For-itself makes known to itself what it is, through the In-itself, that is, from the fact that in its being it is a relation to being.6

According to Sartre, what is fundamentally wrong with idealism is that it regards the identity of knowledge and the being of consciousness to mean that knowledge is the measure of being. Idealism confuses the ecstatic being of the For-itself and the ecstatic being of knowledge. This is wrong in so far as it means that consciousness exists in order to know.

The For-itself does not exist in order subsequently to know; neither can we say that it exists only in so far as it knows or is known, for this would be to make being vanish into an infinity regulated by bits of knowledge.7

Sartre considers himself to have reversed the idealist position. His position, he insists, shows that knowledge is "reabsorbed in being"; i.e., in the Past the For-itself is fixed in the In-itself; perception is in-itself and without any operation it is recollection. Thus from this point of view it appears necessary to abandon the idealist position entirely, and in particular it becomes possible to hold that the relation of the For-itself to the In-itself is a fundamental ontological relation.8

Sartre abandons idealism. He defines his own position in the light of his rejection of idealism. His ontology holds that "the relation of the For-itself to the In-itself is a fundamental ontological relation" which idealist positions do not hold. This author is not aware of an idealist view
which involves Sartre's notion of the In-itself. The conclusion, with Sartre, that his ontology is not idealism in any way, shape or form, is not a matter of being duped or taken in by a Sartrean error about his own position. His granting a point to idealism does not commit him to an idealism. It merely indicates his own understanding of his position from his external perspective.

Sartre's concession to realism:

To realism on the other hand, we shall grant that it is being which is present to consciousness in knowledge and that the For-itself adds nothing to the In-itself except the very fact that there is In-itself: that is the affirmative negation. The affirmative negation amounts to there is being-in-itself. The "there is" means that the For-itself discovers itself, constitutes itself in relation to Being-in-itself and the world is revealed within the circuit of selfness construed as a polymorphic negation - founded polymeaningful negation.

Indeed we have undertaken the task of showing that the world and the instrumental thing, space and quantity, and universal time are hypostasized nothingnesses which in no way modify the pure being which is revealed through them. In this sense everything is present to me without distance and in its complete reality. Nothing of what I see comes from me; there is nothing outside what I see or could see.

These declarations do not commit Sartre to the proposition "that there was a world before anyone was aware that there was." Sartre is not confirming Arthur Danto's vision of common sense realism or direct or naive realism. Far from it, Sartre is saying that his ontology renders Being-In-itself
an absolute upon which consciousness depends for its existence. Peculiar as it may seem, he is saying that the world is in-itself and that consciousness adds nothing, and he is saying that the In-itself is not the world, neither before nor after awareness. There is also a difference, in the passage immediately above, between "nothing" (in italics) and "hypostasized nothingnesses." "Nothing" in italics indicates the null set, zero, nil, not a thing. There exists no thing beyond consciousness's actual and possible presence, no thing-in-itself behind the appearance, no unseen substance in the object or grounding the objectivity of the object. The point that Danto misses in and through labelling Sartre a realist is precisely that the world is in-itself and the In-itself is not the world. Sartre's own measure of his ontology with realism determines his concession. That he might perceive realism to mean that (contra idealism) nothing of what he sees comes from himself does not entail Danto's dictum. In Sartre's ontology it does mean that the series of appearances qua thing does not depend upon his whim; that the being of the appearance does not depend upon consciousness. Everything is given and can be given. This does not involve any notion of representation of the real within consciousness.

Being is everywhere around me; it seems that I can touch it, grasp it; representation as a psychic event is a pure invention of the philosophers. But from this being which "invests me" on every side and from which nothing separates me I am separated precisely by nothing; and this nothing because it is
impossible. "There is" being because I am the negation of being, and worldliness, spatiality, quantity, instrumentality, temporality - all come into being only because I am the negation of being.11

Instances of Sartre's other disqualifications of representative realism have been noted elsewhere, as have his comments on naive realism and causal theory and substantialist realism.12 Imposing the label of realism upon Sartre's ontology without coming to grips with his explicit declarations against realism in its various forms is to miss essential features of his ontology. This author has yet to find the commentator who is both secure in his discovery of realism in Sartre's ontology and has cleared the hurdle of explaining this discovery in light of Sartre's own explicit qualification of his objectives contra realism.

It is not surprising to find in Albert Shalom's attack on Sartre's BN a betrayal, a blatant self-betrayal through a debilitating attitude toward criticism. Shalom writes:

I think two things must be clearly distinguished here: firstly, the actual problem we are faced with in "perceiving (and knowing) an object"; secondly, Sartre's solution to this problem. What I am saying is that Sartre's solution is, in my opinion, not merely false, but dangerously false because it depends upon an entirely deliberate confusion of terminology. (When I say "deliberate" I don't mean that he was intellectually dishonest - though he infuriates me so much that I am sometimes tempted to think so - but that he was probably so carried away by the internal conceptual logic of his own system that he succeeded in pulling the wool over his own eyes.)

When Sartre holds that the world of appearances is both a series of sense-impressions and more than this, what "more" means is that these sense-impressions
are simply "there." Of course, one mustn't say "sense-impressions" since it would be perfectly absurd to say that these subjectively grounded phenomena are simply "there"; what we must say is that the phenomenal world, the world of appearances, of chairs, tables, etc., has this characteristic of being simply "there." This simply illustrates, in my opinion, the kind of playing on two levels which is so characteristic of this work.13

The complete self-betrayal is in Shalom's brackets:

(I'm not, of course, concerned with the, to me, uninteresting question of whether Sartre was clearly aware of what he was saying. Personally, I tend to doubt this; the book is anything but a clearly thought out work, and its best parts are not the so-called "philosophical" parts, but the more literary parts. What I am trying to get at is the internal conceptual logic of a piece of writing.)14

The brackets contain the worst sort of what can only be termed "philosophical myopia." Every philosophical position involves the internal and the external orientations. They are not mutually exclusive. One does not learn to do philosophy in the manner one learned one's mother tongue. First language and philosophical languages can be distinguished along the lines of a distinction between learning the first language and learning the second. Understanding the grammatical structure of one's first language is somewhat similar to that type of understanding described as external in this paper. Second languages are taught in formal educational settings. Philosophical languages are taught in formal educational settings. The student who, as a child, learned to speak English at home and on the playground is capable of mastering Latin because that student's educational experience cultivated an external perspective; an awareness
of correct grammatical structure, etc., with respect to English. Similarly, the student attending a course on Medieval Philosophy who has taken a course in Plato's epistemology can understand Peter Abélard's attacks on William of Champeaux concerning universals and particulars because Plato had a lot to say about forms. Grasping Plato's concept of the form facilitates an understanding of William of Champeaux's concept of the universal, i.e., an understanding of the form. In the very least, a wise professor could advance his cause by pointing out certain similarities and differences between the two concepts. Sartre defines his project and works through his ontology by distinguishing his view from other views. Sartre defines his project by indicating that he wants to avoid the problems of realism and idealism. He separates himself from Husserl's phenomenological method. These remarks are not intended to advise that criticism must limit its generalizations about a particular philosopher's position to strictures determined by that philosopher's biased external perspective as it grows up through the internal workings of that position. The analogy between learning a second language and the study of philosophy urges that the generalizations, assessments and evaluations which are part and parcel of good criticism must take into account the thinker's polemics regarding other views. Genuine criticism without bias - meta-level analysis - of Sartre's ontology must take this aspect
of his position into account or risk complete misinterpretation of his work.

Shalom is clearly and totally unconcerned to investigate whether Sartre "was clearly aware of what he was saying." He is totally "uninterested" in Sartre's external perspective, and wants "to get at the internal conceptual logic of a piece of writing." Immediately after Shalom delivers his refutation of philosophical self-awareness in Sartre, he proceeds to make a complete blunder. He says

[now Sartre has a certain phrase to the effect that "before consciousness one can conceive of a fullness of being." Leaving aside conceptual hole-picking regarding the phrase "before consciousness, one can . . . conceive,"

that is, forget worrying about exactly what Sartre meant by this phrase; just take it for what it is outside of the particular context called the particular internal workings of the "conceptual logic" at whatever stage of the description in progress, and assert that

part of what the sentence aims at saying is clear enough and, I believe, perfectly true: that a world was "there" before man . . . appeared on the scene.19

This is precisely what Sartre does not want to say. This statement is a gross misrepresentation of Sartre's entire effort. It amounts to Arthur Danto's reading commonsense realism into Sartre. The "fullness of being" refers only to the in-itself, Being-In-itself. Shalom interprets one of Sartre's statements to mean in part what Shalom wants it to mean and then he uses this interpretation to buttress his
conclusion that Sartre is "playing on two levels" in a dangerously fallacious manner. Moreover, Shalom prefaces another formulation of the "playing on two levels" criticism with the clause, "I hold, . . . that, because Sartre, adopting the phenomenological procedure." (italics added.)

This is the reason Shalom gives for the particular two-level charge at issue, namely that Sartre provides "no clear analysis of the distinction between existence and consciousness." Furthermore, Shalom says (and his reader must assume that Shalom's criticism means that Sartre does this due to his adopting the phenomenological procedure), that Sartre "simply substantializes" existence under the "loaded terms of 'en-soi' and 'pour-soi'." Is it possible that Shalom has given the texts careful consideration? In light of Sartre's writing:

"Since we have restricted reality to the phenomenon, we can say of the phenomenon that it is as it appears. Why not push the idea to its limit and say that the being of the appearance is its appearing? This is simply a way of choosing new words of to clothe the old "Esse est percipi" of Berkeley. And it is in fact just what Husserl and his followers are doing when, after having affected the reduction, they treat the noema as unreal and declare that its esse is percipi.

It seems that the famous formula of Berkeley cannot satisfy us - for two essential reasons, one concerning the nature of the percipi, the other that of the percipere.

One can ask: what phenomenological procedure does Sartre adopt in lieu of Sartre's declaration that the phenomenological procedure of Husserl and his followers with its reduction results in a position summarized by a repugnant
formula? Shalom's text does not contain a clue to this small mystery. What Shalom has substantialized under the loaded term "phenomenological procedure" is a mistaken reason for a mistaken assessment of Sartre's consistent, if not correct, distinction between existence and consciousness for the purpose of discrediting Sartre's entire project.

Reading Shalom provokes a saddening commentary on commentary, because Shalom is so very close to the real issue involved in coming to terms with Sartre's philosophy. Without even inquiring into the distinction between the "'philosophical' parts" and the "literary parts" of Being and Nothingness one can observe that Sartre is very aware of his real philosophical issue and Shalom was correct in stating the issue: "the actual problem we are faced with in 'perceiving (and knowing) an object'." In his concluding remarks to the chapter on "Transcendence," Sartre states the problem and summarizes his considered opinion about its solution in terms that might be called a condition of existence or reality:

Being is relative to the for-itself in its "being there" since the for-itself in its internal negation affirms what cannot be affirmed, knows being such as it is when the "such as it is" cannot belong to being. In this sense the For-itself is immediate presence to being, and yet at the same time it slips in as an infinite distance between itself and being.

The condition of existence or reality:

This is because knowing has for its ideal being-what-one knows and for its original structure not-being.
what-is-known. Worldliness, spatiality, etc., only cause this not-being to be expressed. 19

There is good commentary and bad commentary. Klaus Hartmann's *Sartre's Ontology* is an example of good commentary. Hartmann does not belittle Sartre's philosophical intention and his treatment of the implications of the "phenomenological" in Sartre's subtitle, *An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology*, involves argument instead of diatribe. Hartmann claims that his "analysis is not limited to a study of Sartre's ontology in the light of Hegel's *Logic*, but deals, from a wider perspective, with his philosophy as a union of phenomenology and Hegelian dialectic." 20

Hartmann notes that Sartre is an empiricist 21 who intends to "establish a relationship in terms of being, or a bond of being, between subject and object." Hartmann also notes that "there is open conflict between Sartre's ontological position and phenomenology where the latter makes theoretical assumptions of its own." 22 He observes that Sartre's concept of consciousness does not allow "any real elements within it such as Husserl's 'hyle' since these would not be 'for' consciousness." 23

Another item of phenomenological theory, the *noema*, which for Husserl constitutes the correlative of the *noesis*, is at least subjected to reinterpretation. Husserl's *noema* is a result of a phenomenological reduction and, as such, is ontologically problematic. (It will be remembered that Sartre, in his ontological proof, takes the opposite line and, starting from the alleged noema entity, dis-
closes the transcendent phenomenon.) So we cannot really say that the noema is abolished, except as a subjective entity. Sartre's theory cannot distinguish between the noema and the object. 24

A little further in his text, Hartmann writes:

Discounting the divergencies mentioned, we note a peculiar congruence between Husserl's phenomenology and Sartre's ontology. Phenomenology remains the school of description and the stronghold to retreat to in the face of pressing problems of theory - there can be no doubt, for example, that Sartre accepts empty intentions, though he cannot account for them - but it is subjected to far-reaching reinterpretation insofar as its theoretical assumptions are concerned. 25

Klaus Hartmann presents a view that is antithetical to the thesis of this paper. Hartmann's position on Sartre's theory involves the claim that Sartre's ontological theory manifests a peculiar congruence with Husserl's phenomenology. Neglecting Hartmann's view reduces the aspiration of this paper to an augmentation of confusion rather than a clarification of Sartre.

With Hartmann: Sartre can be described as an empiricist who intends to establish a relationship in terms of being, or a bond of being, between subject and object. There is open conflict between Sartre's ontological position and phenomenology where the latter makes use of theoretical assumptions of its own.

With Husserl: Husserl describes the method and substance of his phenomenology by stating its "controlling practical thought . . . as a matter of principle." It is a broad interpretation of the phenomenological reduction. It reads:

187
The controlling practical thought... that, as a matter of principle, not only in the sphere of the natural world but in all... eidetic spheres... should, in respect of their true Being, provide no data for the phenomenologist... Let us protect ourselves methodologically from those confusions which are too deeply rooted in us, as born dogmatists, for us to be able to avoid them otherwise.26

Husserl is saying that all what, where, who, how, and why, that all questions of meaning will be asked and answered without theoretical reference to Being. This is why Sartre's ontology conflicts with Husserl. IT HAS TO DO WITH BEING.

With Hartmann: Sartre does take the opposite line. The ontological proof demands the ontology; THOUGHT THAT HAS TO DO WITH BEING. Sartre does start from the alleged noema entity.

Against Hartmann: Sartre's argument against what he terms Berkeley's idealistic formula, "Esse est percipi," identifies the intent and the meaning of this formula with the result of Husserl's phenomenological reduction. "[A]fter having effected the phenomenological reduction, they treat the noema as unreal, and declare that its 'esse' is 'percipi'." The noema is abolished because it is an entity that Sartre absolutely refuses. The noema is exactly what is wrong with Husserl's phenomenology. Sartre does not "protect" himself as Husserl urged. He tries to deal with the "true Being" of all "eidetic spheres." His method is not Husserl's method. Sartre's theory does not have to "distinguish between the noema and the object," as Hartmann implicitly
assumes Sartre must do in Hartmann's criticism. The divergencies between Sartre's ontology and Husserl's phenomenology cannot be discounted. Sartre does not retreat to the stronghold of phenomenology in the face of any pressing problem concerning the "ontological relation which renders all experience possible." Phenomenology cannot even get this concern started. Sartre's description of "how, in general, an object can exist for consciousness" does not remain within the school of Husserl's phenomenological description, and because Sartre's problem is not Husserl's problem, Hartmann's charge that Sartre cannot account for empty intentions will not be considered any further.

Of Sartre's project, Hartmann has this to say:

If we can attach weight to the introduction to BN, Sartre can be said to be prompted by a dissatisfaction with phenomenology, particularly as concerns the problem of being; he wonders how that which is given to consciousness can be saved from mere subjectivity, or, in other words, how realism can be established.27

Hartmann's criticism of Sartre's ontology involves this formulation of the weakness of Sartre's ontological description:

Sartre's being-in-itself is separated from the phenomenon only by negation, considered as explanation; existentially, the phenomenon retains its identity with the in-itself. The subject "adds nothing." . . .

Like Kant, Sartre abstains from answering the question of what the in-itself is. But now the question is located in a Hegelian context. The reason for abstaining is not that we must not transcend appearance; we are on the level of an ontology which can speak about being-in-itself. But the in-itself is, like Hegel's being, the logical zero instance of determination. As with Hegel,
being retains its identity with the determinate, but it is not itself the determinate, the paradox that being, as logically conceived, is real and that, in view of its identity with the determinate, it cannot be indeterminate, brings us to the basic problem of thought and being in Sartre's philosophy. 28

J. P. Fell endorses this criticism:

As Klaus Hartmann acutely observes, "in view of its identity with the determinate, it being-in-itself cannot be indeterminate." In the terms in which Sartre has posed it, this dilemma is insoluble. 29

There is no basic insoluble problem in Sartre's ontology which can be described in the terms Fell and Hartmann set up the dilemma. Sartre's being-in-itself is definitely distinguished from the phenomenon only by negation, but to say that the phenomenon retains its identity with the in-itself presents the risk of misinterpretation as with Hartmann and Fell. They miss the distinction between the phenomenon of being and the being of the phenomenon. They say that Sartre's being-in-itself "retains its identity with the determinate" as with Hegel; that being-in-itself is "the logical zero instance of determination," like Hegel's being-in-itself. They do not quote Sartre on Hegel, but Sartre on Hegel reads against their view:

When Hegel writes "(Being and Nothingness) are empty abstractions, and one is as empty as the other," he forgets that emptiness is emptiness of something. Being is empty of all other determination than identity with itself, but non-being is empty of being. In a word we must recall here against Hegel that being is and that nothingness is not. 30

Sartre's being-in-itself is not Hegel's being-in-itself. Hegel's being-in-itself, Sartre claims, is indeterminate
by reason of its comparison to nothingness as an empty abstraction. Sartre's being is not the zero instance of determination like Hegel's being. Being in Sartre's BN is not, not even logically conceived to be, identical with the determinate or the real. The real is realization; the real is restricted to the phenomenon. Being in Being and Nothingness, being-in-itself, IS THE CONDITION OF ALL REVELATION, THE BEING OF THE PHENOMENON. It has no negativity within it. It is full, massive. These predicates have all been recited before. Sartre does not abstain from answering the question of what the in-itself is. Hartmann abstains from dealing with Sartre's answer, but perhaps Hartmann could not see any answer because through his interpreting Sartre's ontology in the light of Hegel's logic he imposed Hegel's logical conception (Hegel's metaphysical conception) of being on the description Sartre tried to provide. Sartre's ontology is not a failed realism because of an insoluble problem mistakenly discovered in light of Hegel's logic. The phenomenon of being is not the being of the phenomenon, the thing exists in-itself but being-in-itself is not the thing.

Sartre is not a realist. He is not an idealist. He is not a realist and an idealist. He is not a strange realist. He is not a phenomenologist who tries to establish a realism which fails. He is not a strange idealist.
II. Sartre's Comment on Phenomenalism

Any interpretation of Sartre's BN which urges phenomenalism must clear the interpretation with Sartre's one comment about phenomenalism, just as those who find realism or idealism must deal with Sartre's statements regarding these philosophical views. Immediately before his ontological argument Sartre mentions what he believes to be the phenomenalist error:

Thus the two determinations of relativity and of passivity which can concern modes of being, can on no account apply to being. The esse of the phenomenon can not be its percipi. The transphenomenal being of consciousness can not provide a basis for the transphenomenal being of the phenomenon. Here we see the error of the phenomenalists: having justifiably reduced the object to the connected series of its appearances, they believed they had reduced its being to the succession of its modes of being. That is why they have explained it by concepts which can be applied only to the modes of being, for they are pointing out the relations between a plurality of already existing beings. 31

That Sartre finds an error in phenomenalism does not entail that he is rejecting phenomenalism in the fashion he has rejected realism and idealism. He says the phenomenalists have "justifiably reduced the object to the connected series of its appearances." Sartre himself has done this in his introduction, and it seems that his theory expressed in the idiom of negation throughout "Transcendence" and other chapters of BN, does not depart from this reduction of the object. There are two ways to deal with this statement of
affinity with and criticism of phenomenalism. One can say that Sartre is a phenomenalist and that his ontology, properly clarified, implicitly supports and strengthens the phenomenalistic view, or one can say that Sartre manifests a phenomenalistic bias about existence, but that his position cannot really be called phenomenalism because he finds an error in it for which his corrective distinguishes his thought from typical phenomenalistic positions. The comparison of his thought with Moore's and Russell's phenomenalistic views will partially justify the first alternative and wholly justify the second. The following arguments attempt support for the first alternative, and deal mainly with Sartre's one critical mention (to this author's knowledge) of phenomenalism.

The first thing one has to be clear about is exactly what Sartre means by modes of being in the internal perspective, i.e., in terms of how the concept works in his ontology. It is in the context of his arguments against idealism that Sartre uses the phrase "modes of being." He writes:

Now the mode of being of the percipi is the passive. If then the being of the phenomenon resides in its percipi, this being is passivity - such are the characteristic structures of the esse in so far as this is reduced to the percipi. 32

Sartre seems to be saying here that indeed the mode of being of the percipi is the passive. He writes "If". If the being of the phenomenon resides in its percipi, it is

193
passivity. Sartre is not saying, that "the being of the phenomenon resides in its percipi" in the same voice that he makes the first assertion. The first assertion is, for Sartre, a truth about the mode of being of the percipi the second statement is a conditional, a hypothesis which he is testing and which he assigns to the Husserlian idealism he is attacking. This interpretation is supported by another passage in the section under consideration. It reads:

Let us note first that there is a being of the thing perceived - as perceived. Even if I wished to reduce this table to a synthesis of impressions, I must at least remark that it reveals itself qua table through this synthesis, that it is the transcendent limit of the synthesis, the reason for it and its end.33

This second passage has the same assertion-hypothesis feature of the first. Sartre is saying that the being of the thing perceived - as perceived -has a being, that this fact cannot be denied regardless of which philosophic position speaks of things and being, in whatever way, be it realist, idealist or phenomenalist. In the final section of his introduction, after the ontological proof, Sartre uses the phrase, "mode of being," again:

We can form a few definite conclusions about the phenomenon of being. ... There is no being which is not the being of a certain mode of being, none which cannot be apprehended through the mode of being which manifests being and veils it at the same time.34

At this point Sartre has his ontology grounded; the demand for theory has been shown and it is about to be filled.

194
Internally, the mode of being which manifests being and veils it at the same time is consciousness or the for-itself.

Continuing with the text immediately above:

Consciousness can always pass beyond the existent, not toward its being, but toward the meaning of this being. That is why we call it ontic-ontological.

The meaning of the being of the existent in so far as it is revealed to consciousness is the phenomenon of being. This meaning has itself a being, based on which it manifests itself. 35

At the conclusion of the sixth and last section of the introduction:

Thus we have left "appearances" and have been led progressively to posit two types of being, the in-itself and the for-itself, concerning which we have as yet only superficial and incomplete information. 36

Within Sartre's ontology, the phrase, "modes of being," refers to two types or modes of being. Sartre distinguishes them as being-in-itself and being for-itself. In the process of arguing toward the demand for an ontology, Sartre distinguishes the phenomenon of being and the being of phenomena. After the ontological proof the being of phenomena is being-in-itself; being in-itself is not the meaning of being. The this, the chair, the tree, the appearance of the chair, are all meanings of being. The being of this, the being of the chair and the tree and the being of the appearance of the chair is the being of the phenomenon. Being-in-itself is the condition of their revelation. Being-in-itself is not any one of these revelations or meanings of being. It cannot be active, passive, created or destroyed.

195
When the for-itself, one mode of being, is present to the in-itself, the other mode of being, the whole world arises, with chairs, tables and appearances of chairs and tables. When one talks of one mode of being one is not talking about the world. Concepts can only be applied to two modes of being in relation. Being-in-itself cannot be active, passive, affirmed or negated but phenomena of being can be active, passive, affirmed or negated. The phenomenon is percipi, "let us note first that there is a being of the thing perceived - as perceived," Sartre says. The phenomenalists' error stems from their belief that after they had correctly reduced the object to the connected series of its appearances they had "reduced its being," the being of the object, "to the succession of its modes of being." They used predicates that can only be applied to successive instances of in-itself and for-itself relatedness. Bluntly put, they didn't philosophize with a notion of being-in-itself to ground the being of the object.

Sartre's criticism may be interpreted to show that, the phenomenalists took the percipi aspect of the appearance, its relativity as the passively existing "completely determinate 'basic' perceptual this-such in a very tough sense of the term (the 'proper sensible')," as the profound ontological description of the being of appearances. The phenomenalists went as far as a phenomenon of beings and did not recognize the being of phenomena as the condition
of all revelation. They did not completely fail, as the idealists did, to give being its due. The phenomenalists just did not give quite enough due. In Sartre's "Transcendence," appearances are described as parasitic variations on the thing. In Russell's work momentary sense-data, appearances or aspects of the thing are described as the only existing realities other than consciousness. Russell gets to the thing by defining it as a formed system of aspects; the subject correlates aspects in their perspective through their similarity and difference. Sartre calls this "pointing out the relations between a plurality of already existing beings." Russell supposes that sense-data exist when he is not aware of them and Moore insists the sensible objects that he apprehends, directly apprehends, in sensations proper continue to exist when he is not apprehending them.

Sartre does not have to deal with the relation between an object and sense-data as Moore did in the position he defended as an alternative to Russell's view. His concept of being-in-itself provides an account of how the object, the "whole thing" as Moore put it, need not be called a "mere logical construct" in Russell's terms. The being of the appearance and the being of the object are equally real. Temporality as a negative structure of the for-itself provides the ontological foundation for explanations of the object's revelation as an infinite series of appearances, the object's permanence, potentiality and essence.
Sartre's focus upon the problem of being, properly interpreted, yields some insight into how one could approach a defense of phenomenalism against the traditional point raised concerning the permanence of objects, and the translation of observation statements into statements about objects. Perhaps this second claim is too optimistic, but one can see that the dialectic of Sartre's BN could in the very least be employed to show that the translation is not logically out of the question. Along this line of thought, Sartre's ontology can be regarded as a refinement of phenomenalistic thinking and perhaps more than an unintended contribution toward the solution of some of its most pressing problems regarding our perception and knowledge of objects.
INTRODUCTION


3. Ibid., p. x.

4. Ibid.


6. Ibid., p. x.


12. Ibid., pp. 80-81.

CHAPTER ONE


2. Ibid., p. 7.

3. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

4. Ibid., p. 3.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 4.

7. Ibid., p. 3.

200
(Notes cont'd. pp. 20-27)

8 Ibid., p. 5.

9 Ibid. In Husserl's Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, tr. W. R. Boyce Gibson, Collier-MacMillan Ltd., 1962, p. 119, Abschattung means perspective variation which is also equated with "an experience," but Sartre seems to equate Abschattung with phenomenon or appearance in the first instance of its use, and with perspective variation in the second. Klaus Hartmann, in Sartre's Ontology, p. 5, makes the observation that Sartre uses the term to stand for appearance or phenomenon. "Points of view on that Abschattung," Sartre's phrase, is ambiguous if interpreted in Hartmann's manner. If Abschattung is understood as perspective variant in its first use, in terms of one appearance, then it would seem that Sartre would have to use the plural Abschattungen in the third use of the term. The ambiguity on this interpretation could just as well be interpreted to have originated in Husserl in so far as "perspective variation" and "an experience" could denote one appearance or many appearances. Hartmann may or may not be correct when he attributes the ambiguity to an understanding of categorical problems treated by Husserl. Sartre may not have underrated; he may have assumed a clarity in Husserl that he does not make explicit in his discussion of Abschattung.

10 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 6.

11 Ibid., p. 5.

12 Ibid., p. 6.

13 Ibid.

14 Ibid.

15 Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology, p. 7.

16 Ibid.

17 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 6.

18 Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology, p. 8.

19 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 6-7.
Notes cont'd. pp. 27-34

20Ibid., p. 7.

21Ibid.

22Ibid., p. 8.

23Cf., p. 24.


25Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 8-9.

26Ibid.

27Ibid., p. 9.


30Husserl, Logical Investigations, p. 538.

31Ibid., p. 567.

32Ibid., p. 537.


36Husserl, The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, pp. 146-47.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 35-41):


38 Ibid., p. 79.

39 Ibid.

40 Husserl, Ideas, p. 243.

41 Ibid.  

42 Ibid., p. 244.

43 Ibid., p. 240.

44 Ibid., pp. 264-65.

45 Ibid., p. 263.

46 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 10.

47 Ibid., p. 11.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid., p. 15.

52 Ibid., p. 17.

53 Ibid., p. 18.

54 Ibid., p. 19.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., p. 20.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 41-50)

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid., p. 21.

59 Cf., p. 37.

60 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 20.

61 Ibid.


64 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 23.

65 Ibid.; p. 22.

66 Ibid., p. 23.

67 Ibid., p. 24.


69 Ibid., p. 16.

70 Ibid., p. 20.

71 Ibid., p. 22.

72 Ibid., p. 24.

73 Ibid., p. 25.

74 Ibid.

(Notes cont'd. pp. 50-61).

76Ibid.
78Ibid., pp. 28-29.
79Ibid., p. 28.
80Ibid., pp. 29-30.
81Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 24.
82Ibid., p. 12.
83Cf., p. 51.
84Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 21.
85Ibid., p. 23.
86Yolton, Metaphysical Analysis, p. 207.
87Ibid., p. 205.

CHAPTER TWO


2Ibid., p. 169.
3Ibid.
4Ibid., p. 173.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., p. 167.
7Ibid., p. 177.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 62-69)

8 Ibid., p. 181.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 183.
12 Ibid., p. 186.
13 Ibid., p. 187.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 188.
16 Ibid., p. 187.
17 Ibid., p. 188.
18 Ibid., p. 189.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., p. 190.
21 Ibid., p. 193.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., p. 194.
24 Ibid.


27 Ibid., p. 227.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 70-78)

28 Ibid., p. 229.
29 Ibid., p. 232.
30 Ibid., p. 233.
31 Ibid., p. 234.
32 Ibid., p. 237.
33 Ibid., p. 238.
34 Ibid., p. 241.
35 Ibid., p. 244.
36 Ibid., p. 245.
37 Ibid., pp. 245-46.
38 Ibid., pp. 249-50.
39 Ibid., p. 251.
40 Ibid., pp. 250-251.
42 Ibid., p. 75.
43 Ibid., p. 69.
44 Ibid., pp. 70-71.
45 Ibid., p. 76.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 79-89)

48 Ibid., p. 77.
49 Ibid., p. 79.
50 Ibid., pp. 80-81.
51 Ibid., p. 84.
52 Ibid., p. 76.
53 Ibid., p. 84.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., pp. 85-86.
56 Ibid., p. 87.
57 Ibid., p. 88.
58 Ibid,
59 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
60 Ibid., p. 89.
63 Ibid.
64 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 26.
65 Ibid., p. 24.
66 Ibid., p. 65.
67 Ibid., p. 27.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 89-97)

68 Ibid., p. 28.
69 Ibid., p. 29.
70 Ibid.
71 Hartmann, *Sartre's Ontology*, p. 35.
73 Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 258.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., p. 239.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 793.
78 Ibid., p. 244.
79 Ibid., p. 240.
80 Ibid., p. 241.
81 Ibid., p. 242.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., p. 243.
85 Ibid., p. 244.
86 Ibid., p. 244.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid., p. 245.

209
(Notes cont'd. pp. 98-104)

89Ibid., p. 246.


91Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 248.

92Ibid., p. 249.

93Ibid., p. 249.

94Ibid., p. 252.

95Ibid., pp. 252-53.

96Ibid., p. 250.

97Ibid., p. 254.

98Ibid., p. 255.


100Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 255.

101Ibid., p. 256.

102Ibid., p. 253.

103Ibid., p. 256.

104Ibid., p. 271.

105Ibid., p. 271.

106Ibid., p. 257.

107Ibid., p. 272.

108Cf., p. 83.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 105-116)


110 Ibid., p. 257.

111 Ibid., p. 259.

112 Ibid.

113 Ibid., pp. 259-60.

114 Ibid., p. 260.

115 Ibid.


120 Ibid., p. 262.

121 Cf., p. 100.

122 Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 262.

123 Ibid.


125 Ibid., p. 23.

126 Ibid., p. 262.

127 Ibid., pp. 262-63.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 117-125)

128 Ibid., pp. 266-67.
129 Ibid., p. 261.
130 Ibid., p. 264.
131 Ibid., p. 802, Hazel Barnes Appendix to Being and Nothingness.
132 Ibid., p. 260.
133 Ibid., p. 265.
134 Ibid., p. 265.
135 Ibid., p. 266.
136 Ibid., p. 134.
137 Ibid.
138 Ibid., p. 135.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid., p. 136.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid., p. 138.
143 Ibid., p. 267.
144 Ibid., p. 268.
145 Cf., p. 120.
146 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 55.
147 Ibid., p. 268.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 125-133)

149 Ibid., p. 3.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid., p. 6.
152 Ibid., p. 281.
153 Ibid., p. 262.
154 Ibid., p. 137.
155 Ibid., p. 267.
156 Ibid., p. 255.
158 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 269.
159 Ibid., p. 267.
160 Ibid., pp. 267-68.
161 Ibid., p. 268.
162 Ibid., p. 269.
163 Ibid., pp. 276-77.
164 Ibid., p. 277.
165 Ibid., p. 278.
166 Ibid., pp. 207-08.
167 Ibid., p. 277.
168 Ibid., pp. 208-09.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 134-140)

169 Ibid., p. 280.

170 Ibid., p. 281.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.

174 Ibid.

175 Ibid., pp. 281-82.

176 Ibid., p. 282.

177 Ibid., pp. 272-73.

178 Ibid., p. 272.

179 Ibid., pp. 223-24.

180 Ibid., p. 226.

181 Ibid., p. 274.

182 Ibid.

183 Ibid., p. 765.

184 Ibid., p. 279.


186 Cf., p. 135.
CHAPTER THREE

1Fell, Heidegger and Sartre, pp. 23-4.

2Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 212-13.

3Ibid., p. 11.

4Ibid., p. 750.

5Ibid., p. 239. Don Locke, in his Perception and Our Knowledge of the External World, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1967, p. 35, distinguishes three main philosophical theories of perception: 1) Realist theory sometimes called naive or direct realism which maintains that we can and usually do perceive objects of things whose existence is completely independent of perception, that is, things are what they are prior to consciousness's contact with them; 2) Causal theory, sometimes called causal realism and generally found divided into Representational and non-Representative brands depending on whether or not it is maintained that percepts resemble or represent their cause, the thing, maintains that we never perceive the thing itself; 3) Idealist theory which maintains that we never perceive external objects but percepts only, to deny that there are external objects. Sartre does not accept any one of these theories.

6Russell, Logical Atomism, pp. 272-73.

7Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 272.

8Moore, Philosophical Studies, p. 25.

9Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 139.

10Ibid., p. 17.


12Ibid., p. 76.

13Cf., p. 59.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 147-159)

14 Cf., p. 69.
16 Ibid., p. 224.
17 Ibid., p. 250.
18 Ibid., p. 234.
20 Ibid.
22 Ibid., p. 250.
24 Ibid., p. 24.
25 Ibid., pp. 785-86.
27 Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 5.
28 Ibid., p. 7.
29 Ibid., p. 6.
30 Ibid., p. 271.
33 Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, p. 5.
CONCLUSION


2Fell, Heidegger and Sartre, p. 80.

3Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness, p. 133.

4Danto, Sartre, p. 55.

5Desan, The Tragic Finale, p. 56.

6Sartre, Being and Nothingness, pp. 294-95.

7Ibid., p. 295.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 177-189)

8 Ibid.

9 Ibid., p. 296.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Cf., p. 142-43.


14 Ibid., p. 392.

15 Ibid., p. 393.

16 Ibid., p. 391.

17 Ibid.

18 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 18.

19 Ibid., pp. 296-97.

20 Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology, p. 139.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., p. 141.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., p. 142.

26 Husserl, Ideas, p. 165.

27 Hartmann, Sartre's Ontology, p. 126.
(Notes cont'd. pp. 190-198)

28 Ibid., pp. 42-43.

29 Fell, Heidegger and Sartre, p. 80.

30 Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. 48.

31 Ibid., p. 21.

32 Ibid., p. 19.

33 Ibid., p. 18.

34 Ibid., p. 24.

35 Ibid., p. 25.

36 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


---


VITA AUCTORIS

1951  Born, 28 February; St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada.

1972  Bachelor of Arts, University of Windsor; Windsor, Ontario Canada.

1974-76  Graduate Studies, University of Windsor; Windsor, Ontario, Canada.

1981  Master's Candidate, University of Windsor; Windsor, Ontario, Canada.