The "third force" concept and Sino-French relations in the 1960's.

Spyros. Chionos
University of Windsor

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submitted to the Department of Political Science of the University of Windsor
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Art.

University of Windsor
Faculty of Graduate Studies
1975
Abstract

This thesis is an attempt to define the "Third Force" concept in international relations, and to apply this concept to sino-French relations in the 1960's. The two countries examined are France and China, whose foreign policies in the 1960's were relatively similar in regard to their quarrels with their respective alliance leaders, and to their thrust for world power.

The paper analyzes Third Force behavior - any attempts by China and France to organize and perhaps lead a coalition of non-superpowers, with the intent of benefiting from such a Third Force, through the undermining of superpower hegemony, and the increase of Chinese and French prestige and power in the world. The paper follows a framework composed of a) dissatisfaction regarding the international status quo, b) remedial action to correct the perceived imbalance, c) the results of such action, and d) concluding commentary.

Dissatisfaction is examined from the point of view of Chinese and French perceptions of lost power and the desire to revive it. Remedial action is examined in Chinese and French attempts to share power with their alliance leaders. These attempts were unsuccessful, resulting in Chinese and French independence movements, which led to converging paths in foreign policy best illustrated by their nuclear policies.
An examination of Chinese and French version of the Third Force notion follows, and what appeared to be the beginning of the Sino-French Third Force is examined within the context of Sino-French diplomatic recognition, which took place in 1954.

An analysis of the results of the attempts by France and China to organize and perhaps lead a Third Force, indicate that the enterprise was a failure because of contradictions between the Chinese and French Third Force notions, as well as ambiguities within each respective notion. Finally, the conclusion examines the failure from the point of view of international relations theory. The method of analysis used throughout the thesis is based on the qualitative approach in the study of international relation.
Acknowledgement

The production of a Master's Thesis is by no means an easy task. Regardless of how skilled, capable, or knowledgeable the young scholar may be, the advice and assistance offered by his superiors is indispensable and invaluable. Hence, my special gratitude goes to Professors Ralph Nelson and Bruce Burton of the Political Science department, not only for having taught me in my undergraduate years, but also, and most importantly, for having shown interest in the topic, inexhaustible patience through their frequent appraisal of various drafts, and for their comments, criticisms, and proposals throughout the preparation of this thesis. I would also like to thank Professor D. Klinck of the History department, and all those who have contributed to my formal education through the years. Finally, I thank my family for their support and encouragement to undertake and to finish the Master's programme.
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Introduction

From a panoramic perspective, the general topic of concern in this paper is the analysis of the bilateral relationship between France and China in the 1960's. However, it would be a colossal undertaking to investigate in detail all the components making up that bilateral relationship, such as government structure, domestic pressure groups, political parties, military considerations, trade and cultural variables.

Instead, the author has chosen to concentrate only on one aspect of the Sino-French bilateral relationship, and discussion of the aforementioned variables will be focused on their impact regarding this one aspect alone. The paper will treat the "Third Force" concept as a factor in Sino-French relations in the 1960's. It will be contended that during that time period, Third Force considerations were the driving force behind Chinese and French policies towards each other, and towards the rest of the world as well.

This approach was chosen primarily because of the gap in the literature on the Third Force concept in general, and on its application to the Sino-French bilateral relationship in particular. Consequently, the initial chapters of this paper will deal with the conditions which were conducive to third force orientations, such as the post WWII drift towards binolarity, and the aftereffects of this (for instance, the balance of terror).
which ushered in orientations towards greater independence from the superpowers for some states, as well as towards neutralism for others. Imperative in these chapters will be the study of the Third Force concept itself. In such a manner, the way will be prepared for the application of the concept to the foreign policy output for both China and France.

It can be useful, as part of the analysis of any bilateral relationship, to compare the general foreign policy outputs of the two states concerned, (as well as the variables determining those outputs) because these are the most available data-banks. It can be especially useful if the foreign policy outputs are relatively similar, as was the case with China and France.

Hence, the Sino-French bilateral relationship will be studied with both foreign policy similarities, as well as some foreign policy dissimilarities in mind. Indeed, there were similarities in both leadership and foreign policy output in China and in France. One only has to point out the leadership styles of Mao and deGaulle, both men relatively in firm control of power*, both of them going through national disagreements with their

*Both of them were national father figures. DeGaulle claimed to have saved France during and after WWII, while Mao was worshipped as a great Communist leader, both in action (during the revolution) and in ideology (his "thoughts" were built up as the only true Marxism-Leninism).
major allies. While de Gaulle was engaged in the Franco-American dispute which he managed on various fronts, Mao himself was also engaged in the polemics which lay behind the Sino-Soviet split.

To be sure, we must be cautious not to carry the parallel too far. Hence, we must also take into account the possibility of differences in policy, and if there are any, we must consider whether or not they are more relevant to our concern than the similarities.

A pioneering quantitative study of Chinese and French foreign policies of the 1960's by Holsti and Sullivan characterized France and China as "nonconforming allies" (within their respective alliances—the Atlantic and the Soviet one). 1

In the short run, the characterization is correct (and alliance nonconformity will be dealt with at length in later stages in the discussion). In the long run, however, this nonconformity with the behavior of the bloc leaders was guided by broader considerations stemming from third force tendencies, which at least in the case of the relationship between China and the Soviet Union, resulted in an almost complete break, not just in acts of nonconformity. In addition, unlike the historical, economic, cultural and political ties which existed between France and the Atlantic Alliance, there were no groups (of respectable strength) inside China and the Soviet Union, which were interested in preserving traditional linkages.
In quoting Brzezinski and Huntington, Holsti and Sullivan agree with the assertion that there was simply no Sino-Soviet establishment to blend the cause of unity, and to modify the increasingly immoderate language of the debate which developed during the Sino-Soviet rift. Instead, the absence of cross-cutting ties made for a lack of communication between Chinese and Soviet elites. In the final reckoning, since in each case the party line dictated the policy, once the enemy was singled out, all issue areas were affected by the polemics.

Moreover, within pluralistic societies (under which label France could be classified) where talented individuals can advance without total political conformity, and where alternative governments exist (at least theoretically in opposition parties), any significant changes in foreign policy are likely to be openly challenged, and to require considerable

*Except for a relatively few and recurring crises which receive the spotlight, by and large, international relations are relatively peaceful and stable, despite the "state of nature" theories. Witness the countless transactions which take place in the international arena, be they matters of trade or otherwise. This is so because certain conventions, linkages, and protocols have been established, thus making up an international society akin to internal societies, with a fabric which works in like manner. Hence, there are economic, cultural, political, and military links between states both on the governmental and private level, much like what Marvin E. Olsen terms as overlapping membership, functional interdependence and interlocking relationships accepted procedures and widespread mass communications, which keep the fabric of a domestic society (the so-called establishment) intact. See Marvin E. Olsen "Social Pluralism as a Basis for Democracy" in Marvin E. Olsen ed. Power in Societies, London; Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1957, p. 185.
discussion. However, in totalitarian societies (under which China could be classified) where frequent purges occur, and strict adherence to the party line is demanded, it is difficult to put forward challenges to the official policy.

Hence, the freedom from domestic constraints gave the Chinese leaders freedom of movement, and permitted them to pursue a more aggressive (anti-Soviet) foreign policy than France could toward the U.S.* Thus, the (non-Soviet) rift was more severe than its Franco-American counterpart.

Furthermore, there were differences in the nature of the alliances to which France and China belonged. For example, model monolithic alliances of the sort China was in, when contrasted with pluralistic alliances (to which France belonged), are more hierarchical, and thus more in need of consensus and of a dominant leadership, which results in repression and conformity. In addition, dissent is regarded as a challenge to the alliance leader who will often react violently. The opposite holds true for pluralistic alliances (such as the Atlantic one) where conforming members display predictable patterns both in intra- and inter-alliance policies.

The differences in the decisionmaking process of China and France, and the differences in the alliances

*Despite all the commotion, French foreign policy was not too anti-Western, neither was it too pro-Communist.
to which they belonged, made the French behaviour less threatening to the Western camp than was the Chinese behaviour to the Socialist camp. China was consistently critical of the U.S.S.R. on all issue areas, and even though France was critical on quite a number of issues, she was displaying her criticism on the broad issue areas of security and status.

In spite of these dissimilarities, there were deep and important similarities in leadership, in political culture and foreign policy output between France and China, and these similarities should be given priority when we compare the foreign policies of these two countries. Both Mao and de Gaulle were intellectuals, leaders of great personal stature, intensely nationalistic, and both...were convinced that their vision of history...gave them better insight than their allies, into the features of the politically relevant future.

As a parallel to de Gaulle's frustrations with the Anglo-Saxons, we can put Mao and the half-hearted Soviet support for the revolution in China before and during WWII, and through the subsequent civil war.

In addition, Holsti and Sullivan contend that only leaders relatively secure from internal dissent are likely to undertake external policies which violate important bloc norms.

This was true of both countries. There were no viable alternatives to de Gaulle in France, and the U.S. had to deal with his policies.

In China, this lack of viable alternative leaders was
even more evident. The leadership in the 1960's was manned by Mao's lieutenants in the revolution. In short, the party struggles for the "correct line" which were waged from the 1920's through to the revolution, were continued in the 1950's. The purges of Kao Kang (1954) and P'eng Teh-huai (1959) were succeeded in the 1960's by the purges of the cultural revolution. Nevertheless, Mao and his "line" always prevailed, and Mao's leadership was seldom in grave danger.

As for France, de Gaulle himself believed that "politics is will, and what his will is, master of event. A political act is possible and correct because he willed it". Frequently, he equated himself with France, as he did in the June 18, 1940 London broadcast, or when he deemed it his duty to lead France or to "hold the reins". On other occasions, he stressed the mandate that the people had given him, and the lack of other capable leaders to carry the burden. On still other occasions, he claimed to have guaranteed the unity of France, and he placed the responsibility for the destiny of France on his own shoulders.

Consequently, one major element for third force politics, namely strong leadership, existed in both China and France. What is more, the influential leadership in both of these countries held the people of the other country in high esteem. Chairman Mao, for instance, admired the French revolutionary tradition, and in his formative years (1912) he had read a number of French political theorists such
as Rousseau and Montesquieu.

In addition, Mao's mentor Li Ta-chao, who had a considerable influence on Mao's philosophical development, had a special interest in Condorcet* and his concept of continuous progress, which was irreversible and forward moving towards the betterment of mankind. This could be the root of Mao's philosophy on the inevitability of communism, on contradiction,** and on progress.

In addition, Mao's peers went to Paris, and they were immersed in the revolutionary spirit*** which Mao himself admired by his claim that proletarian risings along the lines of the famous Paris commune of 1871 are the wave of the future in the West.10

The frequent prophetic tendencies displayed by deGaulle, such as his assertion that he always knew he would return to power, were not lacking in Mao either. The Chairman

*For a deeper understanding of the development of Mao's political thought beginning with his formative years, see Stuart R. Schram The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung, New York; Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

**Even though there will inevitably be obstacles and opposition (contradictions) to progress (communism), actually nothing can stop the course of progress which will win in the end. The parentheses indicate Mao's philosophy. For a summary of Condorcet's philosophy on progress see Etienne Gilson et al. Modern Philosophy Descartes to Kant, New York; Random House, 1963, pp. 385-393.

***The French political culture endorses opposition to the establishment by mistrust, by disagreement, and by individualism. This is portrayed in the "we" and "them" polarization. There is also the Left-leaning intelligencia and the popularity of Socialism.
claims that he always knew the peasants would seize power in China.

In return for Chinese compliments, de Gaulle claimed on January 31, 1954, that China was "very big, very old, very amused" and (as far as the U.S.S.R. and the common border with China was concerned, while the Russian interest was to "conserve and maintain") China needed to "grow and to take," possibly taking note of Chinese attitudes in the matter.

Indeed, the mutual praise was not unfounded. There were considerable similarities between French and Chinese politics and foreign policies. Another aspect of their identical politics was the similarity in political cultures, in that both countries were identified with the revolutionary tradition.

French political culture* in the relevant time period was that which has been traditionally identified with France. The revolution of 1789 supposedly split society into two camps, the Right and the Left.

On the right, one finds: conservatism, economic liberalism and nationalism, on the Left: communism, democratic socialism, political liberalism, and anti-clericalism.12

The Revolution also taught the Frenchman to distrust big

*The term 'political culture' refers to the specifically political orientations—attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system." See Gabriel A Almond and Sidney Verba The Civic Culture. Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, Boston; Little, Brown, and Co., 1965, p. 12.
government:

a Frenchman seldom feels that laws are created
by "his" government for "his" benefit, but in-
stead, by "them" for "their" personal interests. 13

School examinations and competitive life make him fiercely
individualistic, and he guards this individualism through
rigid ideology.

But in general, there is, in France, this revolutionary
myth, this

mystic attraction for the left...from a com-
plex of psychological attitude stretching
back to the Revolution of 1789. To vote left
is to defend the Republic; thus democracy, and
thus equality, against those who have never
accepted the spirit of the Revolution. 14

Similarly in China, the Revolutionary tradition of the
people is stressed by the ruling elites, who contend that
it was only the gentry who espoused Confucianism, while
the oppressed "people" were always revolutionary. 15 This
may not in fact have been the case, but it still remains
that "revolution" is an important component of Chinese

*Lucian Pye contends that both imperial and communist
Chinese politics have rested on "legitimizing high office,
and on the manipulation of political power" through "the
belief in authorities' rights to arrogance" (something
completely different than the French counterpart). Pye
also asserts that the "bureaucratic hierarchy and ideol-
ogical conformity (which) . . . governed every dimension of
traditional Chinese political culture" was carried over
to the communist status quo through the communist party
and the all-pervasive ideology of Marxism-Leninism.
Lucian Pye The Spirit of Chinese Politics, A Psychological
Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development,
political life.15

Dealing with another aspect of political culture, both Chineses and French politics showed a fierce nationalism. The Chinese emphasized their cultural superiority as setting them apart from the barbarism outside, and the French, in their turn, promoted their perceived cultural superiority and language, their way of life, and their mission civilatrice.

Both China and France were historically "great powers", yet both of them had experienced political instability during the interwar period. In France, the fundamental weakness of the Third Republic culminated in the collapse of France in 1940. In China, the conflict between the Communists and the Kuomintang had resulted since the 1920's in lack of authority to mobilize resources for development and modernization. On top of the internal difficulties, this interwar instability was accompanied in both countries by foreign invasion and humiliating defeat. Hence, both countries shared a similar fate during WWII, and both required foreign assistance to get back into the conflict.

Afterwards, neither power was invited to the great, crucial conferences* even though they were both in the

*Chiang Kai-shek was present at the Cairo conference, but the big three met alone, especially at Yalta, which raised the ire of General de Gaulle.
"big five" club. Both were still considered great powers, but in reality they were only junior partners, both heavily dependent on their allies, being the penetrated political systems that they were.*

The seeds of discord began to sprout to full bloom. France rejected the E.D.C. in 1954, and China, in similar fashion, rejected Soviet attempts at military integration of Soviet and Chinese forces in the late 50's.

In the wider international sphere, just as deGaulle's Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals meant the end of the European phase of the cold war, so Lin Piao's cities and countryside metaphor** implied crucial changes in the membership of international alliances, and in the superpower dominated international environment. Furthermore, just as deGaulle used the U.S. as the antagonist, or bête noire, for his foreign policies, so the Chinese used anti-Soviet symbols as "a major part of political rhetoric in Chinese political processes". Thus there do exist significant similarities in policy output from China and

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*Rosenau categorizes political systems as either penetrated or non-penetrated. In a penetrated political system, individuals apart from and outside of that community (non-members) are influential in its decision-making process. In non-penetrated political systems, non-members are not influential in the system's decision-making process. See James N. Rosenau "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry Parrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965, pp. 60-66.

**An allegory of the projected worldwide communist victory on the Chinese prototype. This line was developed by Lin Piao in an article in the Peking Review on Sept. 3, 1965, under the title "Long Live the Victory of People's War".
France. These similarities make it more feasible for the researcher to probe for and to pursue foreign policy patterns which will allow him to analyze policies from the third force perspective.

However, before discussing in detail Chinese and French foreign policy outputs, we must first analyze the changes in the international environment, which made third force policies feasible, and then trace the development of the third force concept itself.
II. The Operational Environment:

The Roots of Third Force Politics

At the close of WWII, the bipolar* opposition of East and West had not yet crystallized, and there even were traces of a three power system, with Great Britain as the quasi-super power. France and China were weak: (China was torn by civil war, France was just liberated from occupation). They were only nominally victors. The Third World had not yet emerged, because decolonization had not yet begun, although there were pressures for independence (for instance, in Malaya, Indochina, and Indonesia).

In time, the wartime alliance started to disintegrate. Disputes, such as those over Poland, over the Balkans and Iran, as well as the civil war in Greece, ushered in the U.S. led policy of containment, best illustrated by the Truman Doctrine. The German problem was dramatized by the Berlin crises, and it revealed the territorial and political division of Europe. The war in Korea and its so-called settlement was an Asian parallel to the European division, and the recently signed NATO alliance (1949) found its counterpart in the Warsaw Pact (1955).**

Such a bipolar world was extensive as well as intensive.

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*The clustering of states around the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

**For a revisionist account of the development of the Cold War, see David Horowitz From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War, Great Britain: Penguin Books, 1967, pp. 31-90.
on account of the scramble for allies, of the cohesiveness of the existing alliances, and of the sensitivity to defections (in fear that changes might threaten the balance of power).\(^{21}\) The principal U.S. led alliance was NATO. The success of NATO prompted the U.S. to set up other alliances, such as ANZUS and SEATO.

Once the bipolar state system was in effect, there appeared what Rosenau calls "penetrated political systems"\(^*\) in both the Eastern and the Western blocs. Because of dependence on the United States for practically everything, U.S. officials were very influential in European countries.\(^{22}\) In turn, the Soviet control of Eastern Europe ranged from economic and military domination to the presence of the secret police, and the domineering role of Soviet ambassadors.\(^{23}\)

China and the U.S.S.R. saw the U.S. and its allies as the "encircling world capitalism". In contrast, the West saw China and the U.S.S.R. as a monolithic conspiracy against freedom. This bipolarity bred its own undoing.

\(^*\) As opposed to non-penetrated political systems referred to a few pages back, in penetrated political systems, "... non-members of an national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members in either the allocation of its values, or the mobilization of support in behalf of its goals". See James N. Rosenau "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy" in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Evanston, Ill.; Northwestern University Press, 1965, pp. 57-66.
Nuclear arms reached the stage where total war would have been suicidal. The strategies of deterrence* thus came to the fore, and the superpowers switched their tactics, now fighting their battles in the safer competition for the favours of the newly independent countries (which made the most of their in-between position). In turn, the third world, in order to avoid polarization, sought shelter in the U.N. and in "preventive diplomacy".**

Hence, with the tacit realization that peaceful coexistence was of utmost importance, the superpower relationship changed, from one of total hostility, to that of "limited antagonies" (with conflict and cooperation at the same time).  

Because of the balance of terror the lesser states regained a measure of freedom, independence, and maneuverability. True, there was intense penetration of subordinate international systems*** by the superpowers. But there

*The "Balance of Terror" (i.e. the ability to inflict unacceptable losses on the opponent) switched the arms race towards defensive strategies, concentrating on the "diplomacy of violence" that is, on retaliation, and not on using the nuclear arsenal at one's disposal, but on the threat of using it. The best strategy was not concerned with how to win a war once it broke out, but on not having to fight a war at all.

**This means quelling local problems, possibly by U.N. action, before the superpowers had a chance to enter the conflict and be directly confronted in the dispute.

***This means the "regional system(s) of which the state under analysis is a member". Michael Brecher, et al, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior" in Journal of Conflict Resolution, March 1969, p. 83.
was reverse penetration of the dominant* system as well (for instance, the influence that Nehru, Tito, and Nasser could exert on the superpowers). In addition, there were the countries with nuclear potentialities, such as Japan and Canada, who would sooner or later develop their own independent foreign policies, and possibly their own defenses. Moreover, the sight of Third World countries who possessed nuclear capabilities promoted between the superpowers a fear of nuclear proliferation, and induced them to sign a test ban treaty in 1963.

The new states did appear collectively for the first time at the Bandung Conference of 1955,** but they failed to act as a bloc afterwards. In spite of this, the impact of decolonization was to have great effect on the world balance. With Britain's withdrawal from "East of Suez" and the granting by France of independence to her African colonies, there appeared, especially after 1960, a plethora of new states, which vastly increased the member-

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*A dominant bilateral system refers to the total pattern of interactions between any state and a superpower or preeminent actor in the global system. Brecher, loc. cit.

**This was the first time they were referred to as the Third World. "The 'third' group of nations, the neutralist countries, which belonged neither to the Western World, nor to the Socialist camp..." constituted a "Third World" among the two blocs. See Paul Robert "Le Tiers Monde" in Dictionnaire Alphabetique et Analogique de la Langue Francaise, Paris, 1964, quoting G. Balandier in Le "Tiers Monde", P.U.F. Travaux et Documents, 1956, p. 369.
China and vote patterns in the U.N., dramatically reducing the voting majority long enjoyed by the U.S. 27

Gradually, there was a change from bipolarity to something less polarized, which served to lessen the overt conflicts of the superpowers. Some departures from bipolarity were: a) the growing diffusion of nuclear capability, for instance the French force de frappe, b) the rise of China, c) the growing independence within the two blocs, manifested by the policies of France and China, and d) the switch from military confrontation to economic, diplomatic, ideological and political competition. 28 All of these developments interacted with, and contributed to, the change from tight to loose bipolarity.*

The superpower stalemate ushered in what one might call bipolarcentrism**, which coincided with a renewed European confidence. It was now recognized that NATO unity and alliance harmony had rested on an unequal relationship, for

*The principal alignments remain, but in such a situation there is an emphasis on the avoidance of war, on negotiation, on the tolerance of neutrals, and the reliance on mediators or balancers. See Morton A. Kaplan "Varieties on Six Models of the International System" in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy. A Reader in Research and Theory, New York; The Free Press, 1969, pp. 296-298.

**The principal division lines and alliance still existed, but now there were other centres of power as well, such as France and China. See John Spanier Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics, New York; Prager Publishers, 1972, p. 86.
in the face of the superpowers, the smaller states were insignificant.

Moreover,
it had always been only a matter of time before Europe would rebel. It was in the nature of an alliance of very unequal power relationships that the weaker members would again seek to play a major role as they regained their pre-war status. 29

Another reason for rebellion was the fear that the U.S. would not risk its own destruction to defend Europe as it had done in the past, on account of the new realities: the all embracing aspects of sophisticated nuclear warfare.

As for France, the resurgence of West Germany upstaged France's position as an important U.S. ally. Hence, France pursued European unity under a Franco-German reconciliation, based on opposition to U.S. domination. 30 The severe strains in the Western alliance began to show after the Franco-British attack on Suez, followed by French disaffection with NATO, by the inauguration of the Common Market in 1959, and by the growing doubts about the danger of a Soviet threat in the 1960's.

Within the Communist bloc itself, even before the overt manifestations of global bipolarity, and before the military buildups, there occurred a schism, in the form of Titoism. All elements adhering to this heresy were purged from Communist parties. Tito's Yugoslavia expressed the anti-Soviet feelings in Eastern Europe, which were brought about by subordination to the U.S.S.R. during the Stalin years. With Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalinism during
the 20th party Congress (1956), the few concessions which were granted in Eastern Europe, led to more demands for freedom, and hence to the Polish and Hungarian suppressions. 31

Needless to say,

As the extensive and intensive bipolarity began to erode, some of the satellites became more independent of Soviet controls, especially in the domestic arena. Until then, however, the controls at the party and governmental levels were relatively easy to apply. All Eastern European states were penetrated systems. 32

China had closely supported the U.S.S.R. in foreign policy, for instance, in Poland and Hungary. But by and large, her good relations with the U.S.S.R. were based on Anti-Americanism, and on the belief that the U.S., now that it feared nuclear war, could be forced to retreat from many spots by the combined pressure of socialist countries.

However, with the introduction of Khrushchev's "peaceful coexistence", China became increasingly discontented with the exaggerated emphasis on peace overtures by the Soviet Union, so much so, that the Chinese began to fear that the Soviet "revisionists" might make a deal with the U.S. at China's expense. The seeds of discontent planted in the 1950's bloomed to fruition in the late 60's and early 70's when China decided to improve her relations with the U.S., in hopes of undercutting the U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationship, and of curbing the Soviets. 33 China appeared to be in the "grip of a new form of the Middle Kingdom*;

* A position which China held in imperial days, when China was recognized as the supreme power in East Asia by all the peoples in that area.
syndrome. The Chinese obsession with pre-war humiliations, incursions in their great empire, was revived once more, along with the desire to become great again and to redress her grievances. John Spanier contends that...

...the new China considered itself the Soviet Union's equal, and potentially one of the world's great powers...Like Yugoslavia, it possesses a party and an army independent of Russia. China could hardly be transformed into a satellite.34

Thus, Chinese, French both exemplified the shift away from bipolarity, towards binolycentrism. It must be stressed that multipolarity had not yet arrived, but the system was still characterized by a more restrained state of behaviour. One reason for this... (was) ... that the greater number of actors... (permitted) ... a large number of interactions between states.35

In both the Sino-Soviet and the Franco-American cases, intra-alliance conflict was exploited by the other alliance. In turn, the secondary powers used these conflicts to strengthen their own leverage. Indeed, the main focus of discussion in the paper will actually be on this increased freedom of maneuverability for the lesser states. However, we must not hasten to that stage in the agenda. Now that we have accounted for the background which was conducive to the rise of Third Force movements, the next concern is to trace the development of the third force concept itself.
III. Toward a Definition of the Third Force

The purposes of the following inquiry will be to trace the development of the Third Force concept, and to search for elements of the concept in each interpretation of the third force about to follow. Finally, a refined definition will be sought, by looking at the common denominator among all of these interpretations. This, with the intent to devise not only an operational definition of the Third Force, but also a model (a workable framework) for the application of the Third Force concept to sino-French relations.

In general, by its own title alone, the Third Force implies an entity in relation to other entities. For example, in measurement there is the third dimension, in labour relations there is the arbitrator (settling disputes), and in all aspects of life there are "matchmakers", "brokers", and a variety of "go-betweens".

In national politics, if the political system is two-party dominant, often there arise "third parties" and third party movements.* In international politics, we may call the third force "force C" and the other two forces, the two superpowers in this case, forces "A" and "B". Strauss-Hupé contends that "C"'s actions are actually

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reactions to the attitudes between A and B. The third power will be related to A and B depending on whether or not A and B are friendly or hostile, and whether or not C is a powerful state.

For example, if A and B are hostile, C may be a provocateur (encouraging the hostilities in order to increase his own power and prestige, and to decrease that of A and B), or he may be a neutral, in order to stay on the good side of the two great powers so that he may manipulate them for his own advantage (witness Egypt and the Aswan Project). Also, C may be a balancer, striving for the prevention of war, or he may enter a temporary alliance for the same end as well as for the purposes of making peace, or further still, he may be a mediator and an arbiter.

On the contrary, if A and B are friendly, then force C may be neutral, to promote the friendship and reap some advantages once again. In the event of an alliance between C and either A or B, the balance may possibly shift, and either A or B may replace C as a third force.

Some more concrete examples of the third force, as this paper will treat it, may respectively be a new superpower, or something resembling it (real or imagined). The Third Force may also refer to neutralism and the neutralist bloc,* the British Commonwealth, or better still, a united

*For a time, after WWII, Russian propaganda proposed the formation of a "third force" of Scandinavian and Eastern European countries, (continued on next page)
Europe. All of these concepts imply that the purpose of the participants is to benefit themselves, or to set up an alternative to the existing status quo.

A manifestation of this was the neutralist thesis. Scamperio contends that most "neutralists...liking...to consider themselves a third force, holding a position that...(could)...save the world from self destruction" because they perceived that their position would prevent war, on account of the balance of power.** The bipolarity of the early sixties, they contended, was most dangerous and tension prone, as the system tended to "polarize" around the two most powerful states. The balancer or "third force" could side with the weaker pole, in order to redress the imbalance. The post-WWII bipolarity has raised discussion about its parallels with the pre-WWI two alliance system, and for the need of a third force. William C. Rogers, for example, is optimistic in the "efforts of the new nations to act as some sort of 'third force' in the international system".

*(cont.) as a neutral buffer zone for the Soviet frontiers, but nothing became of it. See Arthur Spenser "Soviet Pressure on Scandinavia" in Foreign Affairs, July 1952, p. 655. The mutual collaboration of the Marshall Plan has also been referred to as a third force, which would also encompass the desire to obtain the cooperation of Eastern Europe. See Carlo Sforza "Italy, the Marshall Plan and the Third Force" in Foreign Affairs, April 1948, pp. 454-455.

**The Third Force would presumably be the balancer between the two superpowers.
The relevant international relations theory on such a situation is the bipolarity—multipolarity debate. Deutsch and Singer contend that as the world moves from bipolarity to multipolarity, the result is a diminished state of tension or war. This is on account of the number of actors in the international system. The rationale is that an increase in interactive dyads strengthens pluralism, and decreases the attention given to any one particular international actor by another; that is, the more actors there are, the more chances there are for increased interactions with different actors, and the less preoccupation with any particular actor or dispute.

Similarly, advocates favour multipolarity on the grounds that cross-cutting loyalties* and more patterns of attention to different states, might promote stability. However, the problem with multipolarity is the difficulty in accommodating more actors, the more numerous chances for nuclear proliferation, and finally, the instability which may result from a plurality of actors and initiatives.

Nevertheless, it is not the primary intention of this paper to present the benefits and disadvantages of multipolarity, of neutralism, or of European unity. As was stated previously, the intent is to trace the development of the third force idea, by searching for traces of the third force concept in the pro arguments of such:

*Of the sort referred to in Chapter I.
movements, and use the concept as an instrument in the
analysis of Sino-French relations.

Thus, to the delight of those who thrive in paradox, the
two superpowers, even though they are extremely powerful,
(and this can be constantly felt around the globe) because
of the Balance of Terror, that is, the ability of both to
inflict unacceptable damages to each other, cannot actually
use their nuclear arsenals. They can only threaten to use
it. Third force elements in such a predicament can thrive,
because "when great powers are at a stalemate, lesser states
acquire an increased freedom of movement". 43

In this manner, the multilateral system can replace the
bilateral one, and the proponents of multipolarity believe
that this would make for peace, because of the aforementioned
merits of multipolarity, namely, the diminished preoccupation
with any particular actor, and thus, the fewer chances for
intense relations.

In any event, should war ever occur, the neutralists
could not seriously believe that their stand would prevent
their involvement, although popular hopes could support
that stand. Such hopes stemmed from a desire to become a
communications channel between the two blocs and as an
arbiter who could provide ideas and institutions—such as
international conferences or the U.N. forum—for compromise.
By playing "bridgemanship", that is, by bridging the gap
between the communist powers and the West, by being in the
middle, the neutralists thought that they could offer
channels of communication."

The proponents of neutralism also contended that their stand sought to prevent conflict by way of eliminating the causes of conflict, and by setting a good example, by practicing goodwill, at the same time that they preached it.

At the opening of the 1955 Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Sukarno contended that "we have heavy responsibilities to ourselves and to the yet unborn generations", and he conceded that Asia and Africa had little physical, economic, and diplomatic strength (which prevented the Afro-Asian countries from indulging in power politics). But he asserted that the Afro-Asian countries could "...mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace."  

A more common notion of the neutralist "third role" was the view that neutralists were creators and supporters of areas of disengagement from Cold War struggles—areas of disengagement is Mr. Nehru's favourite description of these disengaged regions.  

Hence, by refusing to take sides, neutralists claimed that they could slow down the drift towards bipolarity.

Most of the neutralist viewpoints just mentioned were very much in vogue in the cold war dominated 1950's, when the threat of nuclear catastrophe hung like the sword of Damocles over the international community of nations. Under such circumstances, statesmen groaned for ways out of such a dilemma, and as is the case in most situations where
avoidance of, or noninvolvement in conflict is pursued, neutrality was the best ideology to hold on to.

Latent in that ideology were the underlying desires for neutralist unity and influence. These desires came to the fore in the 1950's, and a somewhat more aggressive version of the third force came into being, a version closer to the one portrayed in sino-French relations, and which can be viewed from the perspective of "power".

Their rationale was that despite the weakness of the component of the "third force", this collectivity could be a method for developing influence and power in the international field. Indeed, the bait of power and influence could be irresistible to leaders just emerging from a subversive status, or from colonialism, and who were also ambitious. In this sense, the third force concentrated on common nationalist hopes, and on defense against, and opposition to, superpower domination in foreign policy, economics, and in defense, in addition to anti-foreign exploitation of natural resources. For example, the advocates of the third force in East Asia and the Third World attempted to encourage societies from diverse background, which nevertheless faced the same problems of timing and development, and to exploit those problems, which included poverty and the desire to eliminate it, colonialism, and the contempt for it, or independence and the desire to increase it in

*I refer to the leaders of revolutionary movements which resulted in independence.
the face of superpower displeasure.

And even though most new African states were formally non-aligned in regard to Cold War polemics, the attraction of Pan-African ideals had frequently been exhibited in the actions and statements of some African leaders. Nevertheless, Pan-Africanism was weak, and its leadership was vague. In turn, the Arab-Asian bloc itself symbolized the relationship between the regionalism of the underdeveloped countries, and the movement towards a third force mentality. In the Far East, the rise of Asian nationalism was connected with the anti-Western experience. Generally, this perspective regarded the third force as a number of nations, recently freed, acting in concert with those which were still under colonial rule, or on the international level, with the hope that the result would produce a formidable pressure group for justice and recognition.48

As was stated in the account of the operational environment, dealing with the growth of the cold war, the 1950's were a time for solidarity and cohesion which unwittingly resulted in confrontation; hence, the neutralists undertook to be the brokers for peace. In contrast, the 1960's were a propitious time for independent action as a result of the diminished fears of the Soviet threat and because of the leeway acquired through the balance of terror. Thus, the new notion of the third force was not only an alternative to the superpowers. The third force could also be a rival as well, if it could muster the ambitious and the
collective power of its component.

Similarly, the revival of the third force in Europe was an attempt to introduce an alternative to bipolarity, to recreate a balance. In the era of the demise of empires, an alternative had to be found. In association of the six, or possibly of the former colonial powers, hopefully would keep the ties with the former colonies, with respect to both culture and economics, suggesting some sort of a Eur-africa.49

What followed was the notion that this was the age of the superpowers, and for the countries of Europe to continue as separate, sovereign states, would bring about their demise. The rise of India, China, Canada and Australia to world esteem, entitled for Europe the necessity of an integrative instrument, such as federalism.

The fear which impressed many Europeans was that American leadership might lead the world "astray".50 Therefore, Europe must become powerful, and must be able to check American policy. This realization of European weakness was most evident during the Suez crisis, when the cards were played by the superpowers. Not only did the U.S. fail to support its allies Britain and France, but worse yet, the U.S. pitied its influence against them.

In addition, Adenauer, after the United States decided to reduce its conventional firepower in Europe, and to switch to nuclear strategy (in 1956), pressed for an increase in European power. The confederate approach could
fill the void in conventional forces created by the partial U.S. pullout. He also proposed that the Western European Union (WEU) could be transformed into a streamlined defense and foreign policy arrangement.51

In order to face the superpower challenge, the European movement progressed to the signing of the treaty of Rome. In spite of opposition to the movement, the pro unity forces hoped for a Europe which could be a "Third Force", standing between the Soviet and American centres of power, and able to deal effectively with both.52

As for France, during the European Defense Community (EDC) controversy of early 1954, there arose in that country a popularity for neutralism, where proponents (largely from the Left)* hoped that in case of war, France would not participate. The neutralist elements also supported French attempts to reassert independence and power, on the ground that the world division made it prudent for France to be neutral** and to adopt a mediation role.53

Guy Mollet wrote that while the French neutralists were

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**Behind this idea was an adherence to the "plague on both your houses" position.
Soviet leaning, he cautioned that there should be no confusion between independence and neutrality. For him "independence" meant the close cooperation between Europe and the U.S., where each partner has his own international role, so that the "free nations of Europe should not be led into playing the role of satellites to any power".  

Be that as it may, as far as we are concerned, in our continuing search for, and observation of, the growth of the Third Force concept, we must not fail to notice that the basic goal even of the neutralists in Europe, was the reduction of U.S. predominance. There was also the belief that neutralism would help France build

a solid Western Alliance with Great Britain as a partner which would play the role of "third force" that France could not play alone.  

Historically, France had consistently taken positions of independence. For example, even in 1944, when France was weak, she sought to occupy parts of Germany, signed the Franco-Soviet Pact, demanded control of the Saar, and engaged in the Indochina war.*

In general, deGaulle's actions and alliances (such as the Franco-Soviet and the Franco-German Pacts), both after the war and during his second coming to power, were

*As far as occupation of German territory was concerned, deGaulle was originally demanding much more than he settled for, but after bilateral discussions with the Americans and the British, France settled for less. See A. W. De Porte DeGaulle's Foreign Policy 1944-1946, Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1958, p. 166.
built on two foundations of "balance", and culminated in attempts to create an independent European bloc, a "third force" led by France, and as it was hoped, able to affect plastic change in the world balance.

However, "a definition of what Europe exactly... (meant)... for de Gaulle is a difficult matter", 56 because sometimes he referred to it as "from the Atlantic to the Urals", sometimes as from Iceland to Istanbul, sometimes as all of it, sometimes a half of it, and sometimes with a divided Germany, while at other instances with a united one; and still of other occasions, a Europe founded on a Franco-German coalition. Europe was clearly distinct from the Anglo-Saxon countries and from Soviet Russia, although he did not exclude the European nature of "eternal Russia" under some circumstances.*

After France's economic recovery, de Gaulle's concept of Europe became clearer. France would assume leadership in, and speak of Western Europe—always assuming, of course, that France had good relations with Western Germany, and remained the dominant partner in the relationship. Hence, a brand new arrangement of states would substitute for the former rigid confrontation policy, and Western Europe would become a "third force" base on French interests and

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*"Russia", and especially Imperial Russia, has, through the ages, often taken pride in being part of Europe; and in its European character,
on French prowess, which would put France in the lead, and use the new force in world strategy and leadership. 57

DeGaulle was in a better position to pursue these ideas in the early 60's, on account of the popularity of the European unity movement, of the freedom which France had after decolonisation, and of American commitments in Vietnam. DeGaulle also played on the increasing doubts about NATO,* and the rise of China, in addition to his overtures to the U.S.S.R. Also, the French attempts to reassert France in Southeast Asia, all helped DeGaulle's positive efforts to implement the idea of a third force in Europe, led by France and supported by a powerful economic industrial complex. 58

Such was the development of the third force concept in Europe. In addition to the European third force concepts which have been mentioned thus far, intellectuals advocate a Europe as a "third way", as a synthesis of capitalism and socialism. 59 The latest hope is for a Europe as a "third voice" rather than a third force or a third way, manifested in preferential ties between Eastern and Western Europe, or between countries with common traditions such as the Balkans. 60 Another prospect is the "European way" to reconcile conflicting ideologies, leading to a purer

*These doubts arose out of the diminished fears of Soviet aggression in Europe, introducing the speculation that NATO had outlived its former usefulness, and must now be radically changed.
democratic socialism. 61

Generally speaking, Edgar Furniss, referring to André Siegfried in L'année Politique (1949) states that the reality of the third force in Europe more often...

...lies in formulae, than in the fact that the members of the group come together, not through a sense of obligation, but because of a desire to create, if they can, a common attitude. What unites them, in addition to an ancient land, is the tradition of a tested association, perhaps, even more, the hope of escaping the communist embrace if possible, without putting themselves under too close protection by the United States. 62

Again, this brings to surface the fundamental desire for independence from the superpowers.

In relation to the above, there was also another notion of the third force, the one advocated by the German Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.) after WWII. Its foreign policy was third force oriented, in that the party hoped for the uncommitted world to cooperate and to join forces with all social democratic parties, in order to challenge both communism and capitalism, and to work jointly as a mediating and compromising agent. 63

We have thus far looked into some examples of the third force concept. What remains to be pursued is a workable definition of the concept, so that the relations between France and China can be analyzed in terms of that definition of the concept.

Before settling on an operational definition of the third force, some thought must be cast on the nature of the definition. For example, should it be a narrow, strict
Definition, or a broad one? Narrow definition, once established, can be easily applied, especially where quantitative studies are concerned, and analysis, explanation, and testing of given propositions is required. However, they run the risk of restricting the scholar to these definitions. It is not the intent of this author to dwell at length on the behaviourist-traditionalist debate, but, briefly, the researcher can be reduced to a mechanical calculator, who cannot use intuition, and who is liable to concentrate on some variables, and to omit others which might be just as important. On the one hand, he is scientific (in that he can arrive at relatively accurate conclusions, and make relatively accurate predictions); on the other hand, he does not have margins for extensive analysis, and he runs the risk of concentrating too much on "measurement" and "statistics".

But this author does not express defeat. The present study is not quantitative (behaviouralist) but qualitative (traditional). In this kind of research, one can be scientific without being burdened by behaviouralist restrictions.

*For example, one can categorize as "serious hostilities" any incidents in which there were 3,000 or more battlefield deaths, and thus proceed to count all incidents approximating that statistic, and arrive at a conclusion, proving or disproving a previously given proposition. However, another researcher might not agree with the original criterion. He might cite incidents in which less casualties were suffered, but there was more material damage, or in which the conflict lasted for a great length of time.
The scholar can present workable definitions and frameworks which can be followed, but which are not as strict as those required by a behaviouralist researcher.

This is the reason why this author has opted for a broad definition of the third force. Many renowned authorities have written volumes on yet undefined, intangible concepts in religion, politics, philosophy, and warfare. I shall neither adopt the "I know it when I come across it" attitude regarding the third force, nor will I develop a strict definition, primarily because it is lacking in the literature. Instead, I shall survey all the notions of the third force presented thus far, and arrive at a plausible definition, which embodies the essential characteristics common in all.

Some components of such a definition of the third force have already been alluded to.* For example, Clemens, in describing the policies of Third World countries, saw fit to put the headline "Toward a Third Force" in his subsection dealing with Sukarno's speech at the opening of the Bandung conference. In that speech, Sukarno proposed more unity and more independence for the countries of Africa and Asia.

*No explicit "definition" of the third force could be found. However, the basis of my argument at this point is that in associating their notions with the third force, these authorities are implicitly giving their definitions of the third force. For instance, if someone says, "a united Europe can act as a third force" it can be safely concluded that his "definition" of the third force is "a united Europe".
and the pooling of their resources, in order to turn the
moral violence of nations into real endeavors for peace.

Scalapino's contribution towards a definition of the
third force is based on the idea of the neutralist bloc,
which could play the role of balancer between the two es-
tablished blocs, or which could assume the role of mediator
and peacemaker. Scalapino proceeds to present a variation
of this notion. In contrast to the cold war clouded 1950's,
when the neutralist philosophy had developed extensively,
in the 1960's, despite evidence of confrontation (e.g. the
Berlin wall, Cuba, Southeast Asia) there was the general
belief that because of the balance of terror, there was no
immediate threat from the Soviet Union; hence, the doubts
in Europe about the further usefulness of the NATO of old.

There was an element of complacency about security issues
in the 1960's, and the third force proponents could no longer
be aggressive and ambitious. The Third Force would now
be the newly independent states, acting in concert, in
order to create a pressure group for justice and recognition.
Rogers supports this interpretation by describing the third
force as "the efforts of the new nations to act..." and to
present alternatives to the bipolar system.

Voorenthau and Thompson see the third force in European
terms as a united Europe, which would be capable of standing
up to the superpowers. Roy C. Macmillan regards the
Third Force a 'French efforts at building...a solid west-
ern alliance, with Great Britain...which would play the
role of third force, and would figure in world strategy and leadership. In addition, Europe has also been described in third force terms, as the "third way" between capitalism and socialism.

Some of these approaches are inappropriate for this study, for instance the nonpolitical "third way" or "third voice" is not concerned with power politics but it tends to center in the debate between economic philosophies. Also, the unity of the Third World has never materialized until very recently, and only on some issues. In contrast, the European unity and the neutralist bloc concepts are more appropriate since they passed the takeoff point, and since there were attempts at activating them, no matter how unsuccessful.

But there is no sense in further belabouring the point. All of these approaches—from Sukarno’s united, independent and "peace-seeking" Afro-Asia, to Scalapino’s neutral balancer, to the new assertiveness of the newly independent Third World, in addition to the Morgenthau and MacEachin notions of a coalition of European powers in the face of the superpowers—indicate that the common denominator is the search for an alternative to the superpowers and to what they stand for. A major means of realizing this is a degree of unity and independence from the superpowers in foreign policy matters. Underlying all these notions is the dissatisfaction with superpower hegemony.

The operational definition which will be followed in this paper will treat as "Third Force Orientations" any
attempts at promoting, and perhaps leading a coalition of
the non-superpowers, the intent being to undermine the power
and influence of the superpowers, and/or to increase the
power and prestige of the leadership of the Third Force.
This Force would be made as concrete and viable as possible,
through a common anti-superpower foreign policy output, in
as many issue areas as possible. With this definition in
mind, a workable framework must be adopted for the entire
study, so that data in the following chapters will have
greater relevance and applicability.

Hence, any contemplation about the promotion of, and poss-
ible leadership of, a third force must of necessity arise
out of a fundamental dissatisfaction with the contemporary
international status quo (as was mentioned in my treatment
of the common denominator) which was dominated by superpower
hegemony.

The second part of the proposed framework consists of
the actions taken by the protagonists, in order to satisfy
their grievances. These initiatives gave the actors a
margin of independence, which was the necessary prerequisite
for the formation of the new third force.

Thus, dissatisfaction, remedial action, and independence
will, inter alia lead to an examination of these conditions
in the chapters entitled The Legacy of the Past and The
Drift Towards a Third Force.

In addition to these favourable conditions, care must
be made to take into account the methods by which France
and China articulated the Third Force concept and based their policies on it.* Thus, this paper will devote a chapter on how China and France outlined the Third Force, that is, on the concepts of the Third Force which were espoused by China and by France. These notions will be related to the actual policy output which culminated in Diplomatic Recognition, which will be dealt with in an additional chapter.

The framework will be completed by an analysis of the results in the chapter entitled Variables Undermining the Third Force, followed by a Concluding summary and commentary.

Hence, the framework will trace a course of events starting from a) basic dissatisfaction, proceeding to b) remedial action, and a drive for independence which led to diplomatic recognition. Finally, c) the results and conclusion will close the discussion.

In general, the dissatisfaction will be found in the consciousness of China and France of a once glorious past, when those two powers enjoyed hegemony in East Asia and Europe respectively; (China for a long duration, France intermittently) and in their desire to revive some semblance of that hegemony.

*These "personalized" concepts do not depart from the selected concept developed in this paper. The purpose of restating them is to clarify the relationship between their foreign policy output and the Third Force concept as we know it.
The remedial actions will consist of the actions taken by these countries in order to satisfy their grievances. 

These remedial actions were the Chinese and French attempts to revive their power and prestige by demanding a share in global decisionmaking. That followed were the Sino-Soviet and the Franco-American splits, in which the leaders of the Eastern and Western blocs refused to satisfy the demands of these actors.

In turn, independence will be implicitly demonstrated in the Sino-Soviet and the Franco-American splits themselves, and will be best manifested in the nuclear policies of China and France, which defied the wishes and/or the policies of their alliance leaders, and which were, incidentally, identical. This identity was supplemented by other basic political and diplomatic variables ingrained in the contemporary foreign policies of China and France, such as considerations for influence in Europe and Asia, in the U.N., and in the Third World in general—all of these related of course, to the worldwide aspirations of these two countries.

The examination of the Third Force concepts of China and France will look into China's United Front and Intermediate Zone concepts as well as the drives for influence in Africa and Asia. Also, deGaulle's concepts of "Europe" and the place of France in it and in the world will be probed. Next, the act of diplomatic recognition itself will be examined from third force perspective, and finally
the results will demonstrate how the third force drive was a futile undertaking, on account of incompatibilities between the Chinese and French interpretations of the third force, and even of inconsistencies within the interpretations themselves.

This paper does have limitations. The Third Force concept in International Relations has scarcely been developed as a theory. Perhaps more studies should be carried out on the topic itself, on its nature, its composition, and its functions. However, this author has attempted to conceptualize it, to arrive at a plausible definition, and to apply it.

Other limitations exist in terms of the difficulties in gathering data directly related to the third force. Mao has used the term only once, while DeGaulle never utilized this specific term, but he did use the term "third power" once in his memoirs. Both leaders, however, have used expressions which are closely related to it. Fortunately, there is data on Chinese and French foreign policy outputs which do match up with the definition given of the third force. Hence, this author makes extensive use of quotes by decisionmakers.* DeGaulle's press conferences and speeches are widely used, as well as interviews with Chinese leaders.

*Although plausible inferences are made, they are avoided as much as possible, and direct quotes are treated as the best and most available source on what were the intentions of the decisionmaker, especially those quotes which do correspond to the policy output in relation to the topic under study.
These interviews were conducted by André Malraux*, around 1965, and they give first-hand information as to what the Chinese leaders were thinking in the 1950s as their foreign policy commentary must have reflected position they had developed in the early years of the decade—if not before. The Chinese official press is also consulted, mostly the Peking Review. The information is related to the given definition of the Third Force, and to the Third Force notions by authoritative, secondary sources.

*Malraux was the French minister of culture at the time. He had dramatized the Chinese Revolution in a novel entitled Man's Fate (La Condition Humaine), which was based on Chiang Kai-shek's suppression of the communists at the end of the first Chinese Revolution of 1927.
IV. The Legacy of the Past

The discussion now concerns itself with the first two states proposed in the research framework, that is, a) dissatisfaction and b) remedial action. At this point, I must hasten to explain that wherever "China" or "France" or any other state is mentioned, the reference will be made not necessarily to France or mainland China as personified entities, but naturally, to leaders and to decisionmaking elites and their opinions.

As we have already observed, (see chapters II and III) after the Second World War, and especially after the acquisition of nuclear capability by the U.S.S.R. (following the suit of the U.S.) the pre-war configuration changed. Instead of a globe which was dominated by a shifting number of "great powers", what came into being was world domination by the two "superpowers", the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.. The rest of the great powers became either second rate entities in the world balance, or perhaps even irrelevant to it.

As far as the two powers spotlighted in this study were concerned, the fundamental dissatisfaction with the superpower dominated status quo in the 1960's arose from the awareness by China and France of the contrast between their own great past, and the now painful realization of lost power, which had gradually come about through invasion and war.

In looking into the plight of China, one can begin by conceding that of all major cultures, China's was, in all probability the oldest, existing unbroken until the pre-
sent. It must also be realized that his very awareness of a common and great past is one of the components of any nationalist sentiment (in addition to a common present condition, and the hope for a common and great future). These nationalist feelings have an effect on all cultures, including the French, but for our present purpose, we shall first examine the displaced position of China.

A noted China scholar, Harold Hinton, suggests that in the non-Western world, the past is especially influential on the present and the future, in thought-pattern, in behaviour, and in culture. Indeed, ancestor worship in Eastern cultures and in pre-Mao China was very intense, serving as a connection and a link to the cycle, which made a person not only a member of the present, but part of the past and of the future as well. The Communist takeover in China might have had little effect on such a frame of mind, since the past cannot easily be erased. As Lucian Pye contends, the traditional Chinese respect for authority, for doctrine, and for those in power, have been manipulated by the Communists to consolidate the power of party cadres of Marxian-Leninism and of the Mao personality cult. The force of the past still is an all-important component of the present, and hence, of the present, foreign policy decisionmaking process, in China. The following pages demonstrate how strong that force can be.

Going back to antiquity, although China had no overseas
territories, the tribute system* was a means of recognizing Chinese hegemony in the Eastern world. Even though it facilitated trade, more importantly, it recognized the cultural superiority of China, offering no margin for equality or competition. Stability rested not in the balance of power in the Western sense, but on the harmonizing power of China itself, which was deemed to be the center of the world. The reader is reminded at this point, that ethnocentrism is not a uniquely Chinese trait. Virtually all civilizations and cultures use and have used the technique in their socialization process, for the purposes of giving the population a common identity. Cases in point are school textbooks which delve deeply into the nation's history while devoting only a few pages to the rest of the world, or national maps which place a particular country at a strategically central position on the globe. Also, concepts such as the "white man's burden" and "Manifest Destiny" abound in Western history as well.

What was unique to China was that Chinese ethnocentrism was more intense than that of others; indeed, it was the cornerstone of Chinese relations with the outside world. As popular sayings go, the higher one is, or believes himself to be, the lower he falls when there is a fall. In-
evitably, that happened to China.

The harmonizing power of China was shattered by the intrusion of Western powers, which was paved by the long-standing internal dynastic strife. Although held in contempt by the Chinese, the Western intruders showed a military superiority and thoroughness of enterprise, which the Chinese could not handle by traditional methods.

What followed was "cultural shock" and the so-called diplomacy of cultural despair (the need to borrow from other cultures—in this case the Western—in order to survive). The Chinese opened embassies, they became adept in Western concepts of international law, etc. they reorganized their armies on the Western system. In turn, attitudes among Chinese intellectuals passed from culturism (resistance to Western institutional models, and an attempt to safeguard the old order) to nationalism, as they attempted to respond to the Western challenge through Western means, without adapting those means to the Chinese context. The Chinese could not effectively respond to the West by simply adopting Western military methods, as modernization is not the result of such a change, but vice versa. The point is that the whole society had to approach modernity for any measure of success, but the Chinese of the late 19th and early 20th century wanted to remain essentially Chinese (i.e. to preserve the essence of the traditional culture). 73

However, the one aspect of Western intrusion which was most traumatic was the Western economic exploitation of
China. Surely, there were well intentioned Westerners, such as missionaries and social workers,* but the fact remains that the Europeans in China were concerned mostly with acquiring rights and privileges for promoting their economic endeavours.74

As was mentioned earlier, the Chinese were incapable of preventing or of handling this trend by traditional methods,** and in frustration, they turned their ancient contempt for, and fear of, alien intrusion into a new nationalist xenophobia, and violent outbursts against foreigners were not infrequent. A manifestation of this was the Tientsin massacre of June 21, 1870, which for a long time remained "the most wholesale example of Chinese ferocity against foreigners".75

Then, following the defeat of China by the Japanese at the end of the 19th century, the already entrenched Western powers maneuvered for more concessions and spheres of influence.

*Many cynics contend that usually, after the missionaries, there come the surveyors, the settlers, the politicians, and the armies. There is some truth to these judgements.

**In the traditional Chinese setting, such foreign content for Chinese sovereignty and "face" would not have happened in the first place, since Chinese culture was accepted as superior by the surrounding cultures, before the extensive contacts with the West. Hence, the Chinese were not accustomed to the Western insolence presently demonstrated, (one emperor's word or will was no longer the law, as it was in older times) and hence, there were no ready made solutions—within the new system—to solve such problems.
ence in and around China. France herself asked for, and achieved "rectification of the Indo-Chinese frontier" and she staked out areas which adjoined her Indo-China possessions. 76

In turn, The Boxer Rebellion which shocked the West arose out of a hatred for Western missionaries, which was intensified by the frustration brought on by floods, drought, famine, and banditry. In short, the Western upheaval undermined the ancient confidence in Confucianism, brought about frustration and helplessness, and inflicted an unhealing wound on China. It is no wonder, therefore, that the past has a great bearing on present Chinese politics. Indeed, "the Chinese have been obsessively concerned with their humiliations in the 19th century." 77

The irony is that France herself was partaking in the Western ravages of China in the 19th century. She participated in the squabbling for railway concessions, and Britain herself was looking

with great uneasiness upon the recolute struggles of the French to gain a supreme hold upon Kwangsi, Yunnan, and Kueichu provinces. 78

Indeed, "each of the powers would have been glad to apply a Chinese 'Monroe Doctrine' on the other." 79 In the end, France had succeeded in acquiring railway concessions, and after a small war, she also acquired Annam as a protectorate. Hence, it would be interesting to contemplate why China has held a favourable view of France, especially in the 1960's, the period principally under scrutiny.
The fact is that until she was replaced by Japan in the 1930's and 40's, and by the United States in the 1950's and 60's, Great Britain was singled out as the culprit of imperialism because of the opium war, and of the dominant role the British played in the subsequent foreign economic exploitation of China. Indeed, Great Britain fought two trade wars, one from 1840 to 1842 (the opium war) and the other from 1856 to 1860. The opium war was crucial. When Britain discovered a good market for opium in Canton, the imperial Chinese government decided to crack down on this activity. Hostilities erupted, and Great Britain seized Hong Kong in 1840. Without going further into the conflict, suffice it to say that the opium trade was thought to corrupt the souls of the Chinese, and the aftermath of defeat forced China into servitude, into the Western state system, and to unequal treatment by the West.

Subordinate as it was, China was forced to agree on free trade with the outside, to trade opium, and to accept foreign residents, with extraterritorial privileges, so abhorrent to any country with any sense of self and a desire for some semblance of sovereignty.

Again, the Western onslaught had torn the ancient empire to pieces, and the opium trade was "perhaps the most hated symbol of...(Western)...intrusion...". Great Britain, having been the protagonist in the opium conflicts, was thus tagged as the Western blight personified. In addition, the vast British empire provided the fodder for the Communists...
in later days to concentrate the anti-imperialist movement against the British, later adding the Japanese and the Americans, and to keep the pressure off the others, including the French.* Indeed, French imperialism has seldom been singly mentioned by the Chinese, even in recent times. For instance, Chen Yi, the Chinese Foreign Minister in the 60's, in an interview with Andre Malraux, noted that "from 1840-1911... (China)... suffered the ravages of British imperialism, then of Japanese imperialism". Periodically, however, France is derided as a 19th century imperialist.

A solution on how to escape out of her cultural, political and military difficulties was slow in coming for China. While on the one hand, the Chinese conservatives at the turn of the century argued for strengthening of the traditional institutions and for slow innovation, the intellectuals, on the other hand, advocated revolutionary force, since the old virtues had lost credibility.

What was to come added to the fuel of frustration. In addition to 19th century humiliations, the turmoil of the early 20th century produced more despair. The Chinese were more perplexed now by the fact that after the West admitted China into the state system, it was reluctant to treat her as a full member, but only as a second class citizen. After her victory over Russia in 1905, Japan asserted herself as

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*The Communist regime itself has always seen the world in Marxist-Leninist terms. Even after 1949, when the British empire begun to dismantle, the British imperialist legacy was still alive in Chinese propaganda, in addition to the newly found American scapegoat.
the supreme power in the Far East, and was to have a great bearing on China in the near future.

In addition to this change in the Far Eastern international theatre, there occurred further important upheavals domestically. The Manchus collapsed in 1912, and the person of Sun Yat-sen emerged, as well as his movement, the Kuomintang. Externally, there took place the outbreak of WWI, and in 1915 Japan introduced her 21 demands on China. All of these affected Sun Yat-sen's policies shortly afterwards, and into which I shall now delve.

Fortunately for China, Japan's 21 demands were counter-balanced by U.S. influence, which helped China to a seat at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. However, an increasingly ineffectual Peking government promoted the outbreak of the student-led May Fourth Movement of 1919. The failure to apply Wilson's fourteen points to China, and the dubious treatment accorded to China at the Paris Conference, dismayed the already bitter Chinese intellectuals, who had regarded the recent conflagration as the vomit of a corrupt Western international system. The May Fourth Movement pressed for a refusal to sign the treaty of Versailles, which was ratifying the Japanese gains of 1915. Incidentally, these

*These were separated into five groups, all of them dealing essentially with Chinese economic, political, military, and land concessions to Japan. For details, see Paul Hibbert Clyde The Far East, 3rd edition, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1968, pp. 420-421.
concession stood until 1922, when the Washington conference liquidated them, without, however, erasing the already entrenched anti-Western sentiments in China.

In the domestic arena, Sun Yat-sen set up an alternative nationalist-oriented government in Canton, and he conceived of his three principles.* He introduced a weak concept of populism,** but his foundations were fragile, because rule from below was not yet widely trusted in China. Despite Sun Yat-sen experienced repeated frustrations, and he sought the help of the Comintern; he accepted Soviet advisers, money, and arms, and he also tolerated the Chinese Communists in his midst.

After the death of Sun, the Kuomintang party was headed by General Chiang Kai-shek, who feared Russian control from above, and Communist social revolution from below. Thus started the conflict between Chiang and the Communists.

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**Chinese populism was patterned on the Russian equivalent, which had tried to avoid the early mistakes of Western capitalism. Hence, it required at least some semblances of early industrialization, and consequently, a proletariat. China lacked these more than Russia did, but the Chinese populists trusted the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, and found, in populism, an emotional outlet. See Asher C. Ojha Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition, Boston; Beacon Press, 1971, pp. 36-37.
which was to last until the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and the Second World War. Chiang's weakness was that he did not control most rural areas, and he was also afraid of social change.

The Communists were hard at work. One of their major tasks was to reinterpret Chinese history and culture in class terms. Their new version of events was that Confucianism had never really been the ideology of the "people". Instead, it was the ideology of the gentry, and peace and stability were really the exception rather than the rule, because the people were really "revolutionary" most of the time. This new account of history identified the communists with the "people" and with their "revolutions". Leninism fell on fertile soil, explaining what had happened to China both domestically and in internal policies in a new way, and offering hope for the future. The Chinese revolution of the 20's and all following movements were thus based on the same perceptions of humiliations and cultural despair. The past, once again, was influential on what would happen for a long time to come.

In looking back, we have emphasized the Chinese perception of a lost greatness and of humiliation. It was also noted that Great Britain was primarily blamed for these vicissitudes, and that France escaped such a fate, thus facilitating later moves toward a better relation between France and China.

In advance of scrutinizing the various Chinese attempts
to resurrect its greatness, to regain her place in the sun, and the subsequent Chinese setbacks in doing so, it will be important that we scan the parallels in France.

Just as the Chinese considered themselves supreme in the Asian world, at one particular historical era, and were accepted as such by the East Asian peoples, likewise in Europe, the French believed (and still believe) that above all else, it was their culture which was superior. It goes without saying that France was, if not the major power, one of the major powers in Europe from the Middle Ages, up until the Second World War. Many factors contributed to making France great; among them was her revolutionary tradition which swept Europe in the 19th century, her great armies, her military victories, and her empire. Of very significant importance was also the calibre of her diplomats, especially the ones who displayed an uncanny ability to preserve France as a great power, even during her most dangerously weak moments.

To mention just a few, the French grand diplomacy was begun by Richelieu, who relied on serious negotiation, on the French national interest, on the backing of national opinion, and on Machiavellian principles. Through his efforts France was to be raised to a position of dominance in Europe. The tradition was continued by Talleyrand, who, like de Gaulle in a later age, revived France intact from a great defeat, while simultaneously playing the great powers against each other. Additional personalities come
to mind, such as Theophile Delcassé, the architect of the Entente Cordiale, or Briand and his League oratorics and peace movement of the 20's. It was through her diplomats that France had become a power to be reckoned with.* According to Time (Feb. 7, 1964) even in recent times French diplomats are highly rated, and their exhaustive training gives them minds that operate with a rapidity and lucidity that is the envy of their colleagues.92

The diplomatic efforts of France have always acted in the interests of France, anticipating others to act on their interests in turn. Time again contends that

...the French have never confused diplomacy with a popularity contest, and this is the point the U.S. has been highly slow to learn. ...The French base their international relations on mutual interests, and when that is not possible, on French interests alone.93

DeGaulle himself resolved to revive the French grand diplomacy, and through it, to make France great. Generally speaking, he believed that politics is not an affair of ideology (whether democratic, socialist, or totalitarian) in a world of nation states.94 The rebirth of nationalism in Eastern Europe reinforced his belief, not in the ideol-

*It is highly difficult to "calculate" the components of power (the ability of a state to achieve its internal and external objectives on its own). Some of these components may be population, industrial production, and weaponry, combined with intangible factors such as morale, national character, quality of government, and diplomacy. See John Spanier, Games Nations Play: Analyzing International Politics, New York; Praeger Publishers, 1972, p. 106, referring to Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th edition, New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1967, pp. 106, 44, and 196-201.
ogy of nationalism per se, but in the importance of national interests.* Hence, considerations of national interest were more important than ideological ones. It was a concern for realities and possibilities which defined the foreign policies of states. In time, he came to exclaim that

Doubtless, there still remains between the regimes in power in Moscow and in Peking a certain doctrinal solidarity that may be manifested in the world rivalry of ideologies. Yet under a cloak that is torn a little every day, appears the...difference in national policies.**

Consequently, de Gaulle had concluded that he should act with a long-range view in mind. He perceived that the Sino-Soviet split, the Russo-U.S. coexistence, and East European nationalism were perhaps divorced from democratic, socialist, or totalitarian ideology, and were instead springing from the differences in socio-economic development. Hence, as de Gaulle might say, what appeared to be an ideological basis for politics to some people, was perhaps, not exactly the

*Raymond Aron says: that "A great power always wants something else, and something more than security and power; it seeks an idea, in the broadest sense of the term. Men do not separate the idea from the interest." See Raymond Aron "En quête d'une doctrine de la politique étrangère" in Etudes Politiques (1972), p. 473.

**Werner Levi argues that national interests (the survival of the state and all its components) guide the policies of statesmen, and moral norms are usually the qualifiers of such policies. See Werner Levi "The relative irrelevance of international norms" in J.M. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, New York: The Free Press, 1969, pp. 191-199. For an informative debate as to whether or not ideology plays an important role in foreign policy decisionmaking, see "Ideology and power politics: A symposium" in E.P. Hoffman and P.J. Fieron, Jr., The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy, Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971, pp. 102-136.
In de Gaulle's view, such far-reaching politico-diplomatic insights were lacking in American diplomacy. As far as he was concerned, the United States had made great mistakes in foreign policy, such as in the Yalta agreements (supplemented by the Potsdam accords, in the opinion of de Gaulle) which eventually divided Europe, and to which he was not invited.*

The General felt equally and personally affronted by every president from Roosevelt to Kennedy. He believed in the greatness of France, even during the time when France stood weak and defeated at the end of WWII, and therefore, he expected the British and the Americans to treat him as the representative of a great power. One poignant example of personal affront was the situation when de Gaulle took offense at Roosevelt's inviting him to confer with the

*De Gaulle never forgave the allies for failing to invite him to the conference. He wrote that "...the world would discover that there was a correlation between France's absence and Europe's new laceration". It appears that, while the overall terms of the agreements were not objectionable, de Gaulle thought that he might have paid more attention to the specifics. de Gaulle wrote that the agreements "...remained vague as to the practical measures to be applied (in Eastern Europe) which came down to leaving the Soviets to their own devices". See Roy C. Macridis, De Gaulle; Impeachable Ally, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966, pp. 122-126, quoting The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960, Volume III, pp. 90-91, 95-99, 229-231, and "Speech of February 5, 1945" in Discours et Messages 1940-1946, Paris; Berger-Levrault, 1946, pp. 561-563. Perhaps de Gaulle suspected that the U.S. naively withdrew 150 kilometers from conquered territory, and gave in to the Russian position; however, it is difficult to see what anyone could have done short of war, because Russian armies were already in Eastern Europe.
latter at Algiers, which de Gaulle considered French soil. 31

This perceived American refusal to accept him as a relatively equal partner in Western policy making prompted de Gaulle to seek independent paths in foreign policy. In this way, he hoped to make the U.S. take humiliation for letting France down in the Suez conflict, by undermining NATO, and to make it known to West Germany that she could be safer—Germany supported the U.S. position on NATO—if she followed de Gaulle. It should be mentioned at this stage that the idiosyncratic factor in de Gaulle, which prompted him to be personally affected by the public policies of others, had an important bearing on his policies as well. However, it must not be discounted that he was also a diplomat of the old school, who acted through national calculation of interest, in order to reassert French and European independence through grand diplomacy.**

*What de Gaulle wanted was a voice in Allied strategy, which would be relative to France’s power position in the West. He had said that the U.S., which had to carry the major burden for Western defense, must have a bigger voice. See Roy C. Macridi: De Gaulle: Implacable Ally, New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966, p. 26.*

**The old realism did have guidelines in regard to the domination of superiors and the submission of weaker states. However, there was nothing to prevent an astute diplomat from seeking and achieving equality with his superiors. Witness the scene at the Congress of Vienna, when Talleyrand first gained the support of the smaller states, and then manipulated the conference to treat him as an equal, even though France was the vanquished state. Then the major powers referred to themselves as “allies”, Talleyrand protected “allies against whom?”. Napoleon was on Elba, France had made her peace, and the French king had guaranteed it. If there were still “allied” (cont. on next page)
From what has been said thus far, our initial tenet that the past is influential on the present and the future, holds true for France as well as for China. Jules Vernant, expounding on French foreign policy, states that "politics is a result of an accumulation of experiences and traditions of which the nation is a cadre". Hence, the "specter of Yalta" which haunted deGaulle becomes very prominent in Gaullist foreign policy analysis. According to Miller, the Franco-Chinese rapprochement itself really began after Yalta. The Yalta Conference taught deGaulle to fear solutions to European problems—without European participation—by other forces, namely the superpowers. After the nuclear test ban treaty was signed in 1963, he wanted to join ranks with another power which disagreed with such procedures, and which had refused to sign the ban. China, which identified with the vicissitudes of France, was the likely partner.

As we have already noted, France herself was no less a culprit in the Western plundering of China than was Great Britain. It was also pointed out, however, that the Opium Wars were the most traumatic action in that process, in that they brought about the Western onslaught on China, and as Great Britain was the main actor in the Opium Wars and the "opening up" of China, her imperialism has been consistently

** (cont.) powers, Talleyrand said, then he was one too many in the conference. Upon this he participated as an equal. See Crane Brinton The Lives of Talleyrand, New York; Norton and Co., Inc., 1963, pp. 168-169.
attacked, and that of other—such as France were spared. With this, it becomes clear that it was easier for China to choose France (rather than Britain) for closer association among all other Western powers—the Netherlands were a small power, Germany was not in the security council.

Indeed, this line was followed even in the 1960's. A New-China News Agency dispatch on Jan. 23, 1964, commenting on 'Sino-French relations', nowhere mentions French imperialism in China, in Indo-China, or elsewhere. Rather, traditional Sino-French friendship is expressed. A later issue of the Peking Review (Jan. 25, 1968) headlined that British imperialism was on its last leg, having lost the support of the Third World, and was resisted in Europe by France. Thus, Chinese partiality to France was not concealed by the Chinese decisionmaking elites, although in the latter instance China may have been goading but the conflict between two capitalist states.

So far in this part of the discussion, the attempt was to support the assertion that China and France were two old powers, who were dissatisfied with the international status quo because of their nostalgia for their lost power and prestige. This nostalgia turned into a drive by both powers to regain their past great power status or leverage. The following pages deal with part (b) of the research framework, that is, the remedial action taken to satisfy the grievances of the two protagonists.
V. The Drift Toward the Third Force:

The Sino-Soviet Split

China's efforts to restore its power were stirred by Soviet rivalry in the Socialist camp, in what came to be labeled as the Sino-Soviet split;* in part, a debate on power and on how to behave towards the West.

The rift developed in three different issue areas: that is, in regards to (a) organization, decisionmaking, and leadership, (b) revolutionary strategy and tactics, and (c) intra-bloc assistance. The first area, dealing with organization, decisionmaking, and leadership was the subject of a debate on whether or not to retreat from monolithic politics, and if that was answered affirmatively, how to do so. The Soviets contended that the international proletariat had only one fatherland, the Soviet Union, towards which all communists' devotion must be directed. China, however, believed that each communist party should be independent and equal, and fully sovereign in internal matters. Democratic centralism, China contended, could be espoused within a single party, but not where the international movement was concerned. For China, there was no margin for interference of one fraternal party in the internal affairs of another.

China characterized as arm-twisting the Soviet Union's

anti-Statist movement, and the verbal attack on Albania and Yugoslavia. China used as further support of these charges the Russian partial withdrawals of economic assistance, of trade, of military commitment, and of cultural exchanges from parties which did not accept Soviet leadership. Thus, on what may be termed a question of independence, China was denied the right, by the Soviet Union, to proceed on her own.

The second issue area was concerned with revolutionary strategy and tactics, that is, questions of how communism will triumph most quickly and with least cost. Both China and the USSR agreed that the present era was one of global transition from capitalism to socialism, and also the epoch of the demise of imperialism. But the agreement ended at this point. The Soviets contended that peaceful coexistence must be the main strategy with the capitalists. Peaceful coexistence did not necessarily mean letting up in the struggle. Ideological, political, and economic class struggle was to continue, but global war which was suicidal must be avoided.

China, on the contrary, proclaimed that the era when the "East wind prevailed over the West wind" was at hand. The Socialist camp had the advantage now, and for the Soviet Union to fail to distinguish between friends and enemies,

*This was claimed by Chairman Mao, on the occasion of the disclosure of the orbiting of the first Soviet Sputnik.
and to collaborate with the U.S. (as the Chinese accused them of doing) was unacceptable, to say the least. The four contradictions* in the world were still in full effect, and it would be foolish for the U.S.S.R. to continue to downgrade national liberation movements. Consequently, the Chinese said, there must be other alternatives, besides peaceful coexistence, even with the advent of nuclear weapons. China thought that the fundamentals of Marxism should not change, and that willful surrender and calculated suicide should not be permitted to come about. In looking back, this issue as well, which was concerned with revolutionary strategy and tactics, was also lost for China, as far as her great power aspirations were concerned, because China's interpretation of history, and the proposed Chinese course of action, were not accepted by the bloc leader.

On the third question in the Sino-Soviet debate, that is, intra-bloc assistance, the Russians maintained that fraternal communist countries should be closely tied in politics, in economics, and in defense—all three categories to be presumably under the aegis of the U.S.S.R., which

*The contradictions: 1) between the Socialist camp and the Imperialist camp, 2) between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries, 3) between the oppressed nations and the imperialists, and 4) among the imperialist countries, and among the monopoly capitalist groups. See for instance "A proposal concerning the general line of the international Communist movement" in The Polemic on the General Line of the International Communist Movement, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1965, p. 7.
would render all assistance possible. The Chinese countered with the position that each country must be self-sufficient, and any assistance given would not endanger the independence of the recipient. On this third question as well, which was concerned with independence in politics, in economics, and in defense, the Chinese position, seeking a high degree of independence, was again blocked by the Soviet Union.

This series of Chinese frustrations had unfolded in five stages. From 1956 to 1957, the two opposing parties engaged in discussion and in persuasion. After 1957, the dispute spread beyond China and the U.S.S.R. into the international Communist movement. The third stage occurred with the Soviet criticism of Albania in 1961, which brought the dispute into the open, and the fourth stage in 1962 when China's criticisms over Cuba and over Soviet behavior during the Indo-Indian border war, brought retaliation by the U.S.S.R. in party congresses in Eastern Europe. In 1963, the fifth stage was acted out, when China attacked the person of Khrushchev by name.

It goes without saying that there was conscious power seeking in both the policies of China and the U.S.S.R. China had perceived traces of betrayal by the U.S.S.R. and was seeking an independent course of action. After all, China could say that Russia had failed to consult the Chinese on worldwide issues, and had even abandoned China in the Quemoy crisis of 1954 and 1958. Also, the Russian support for U.N. activities in the Congo situation, the Kremlin's
threat to use nuclear weapons on behalf of Cuba, and the 
recall of Soviet experts were all considered as betrayals 
by China. Worse yet, the Soviets supported India, and the 
backing of a non-communist country against a communist one 
was a heinous crime from the Chinese viewpoint. Finally, 
China contended that

...the unilateral abrogation of the agreement 
to provide nuclear assistance, was merely fur-
ther proof that that Soviets wished to keep 
China dependent. 103

The "ino-Soviet split was clearly a decisive development 
within the communist movement. Since Communism claims to 
be a universal ideology, the split undermined the movement 
and fostered a proneness for instability, because of defection 
to one or the other factions, and it also encouraged 
demand for more independence for the smaller parties.

As for China, she suffered losses on three fronts: the 
economic, the political, and the military. On the economic 
front, projects left unfinished by the Russians either re-
mained unfinished, or the Chinese attempted to complete 
them at great short term cost. On the political front, China 
was isolated from the main body of the socialist camp, with 
only a few allies, and in her opinion, she was abandoned 
by the U.S.S.R. On the military front, China felt the nu-
clear umbrella of the Soviet Union being withdrawn, and, 
instead of protection, she now perceived a threat of nuclear 
blackmail.

Thus, China, an aspiring world power, was disatisfied 
with the international status quo, firstly, because she had
lost her former great power status, and secondly, because her attempts to regain it were blocked by the Soviet Union. Consequently, she pursued her independent course, more vigorously now, in order to achieve her goals of global influence. Prior to delving into that endeavour, let us again investigate the parallel Franco-American conflict which led to a similar split.

The Franco-American Split

This rupture can be seen as the core of a movement in Europe, which arose out of satisfaction with the recovery and prosperity of the later post-war years, of pride in the assertion of European prerogatives, and confidence in the reconciliation with the East.\textsuperscript{104} France, an especially Gaullist France, was the leader and champion of these sentiments.

The reason for this attitude by France can be understood in terms of development during the decade or so after the Second World War. During this period, France had become dependent on the United States economically and militarily. However, with de Gaulle's return to power, "France, with astonishing speed... (had)... recovered her political stability, ended the colonial wars, and returned to vibrant economic health".\textsuperscript{105} General de Gaulle's personal antipathies towards the U.S., in addition to his aspirations for France, do not warrant repetition, as they have already been stated, (see Chapter IV) but as far as his views on the future of Europe as a whole were concerned, de Gaulle felt that all out
economic, military, and diplomatic dependence on the U.S. was no longer necessary. De Gaulle best expressed this position when, speaking on behalf of France, he declared that

"...the national and international condition of our country resembles less and less what it used to be. How could the terms and conditions of her relationship with the United States fail to be altered thereby?"

On top of this, de Gaulle's Yalta setbacks (see Chapter IV) had made him reluctant to subscribe to any outside arrangements made by the United States, which would be made over Europe's and France's head, especially any solution to the German problem. Rather, his developing conciliation with the East was with the intent to facilitate Moscow's eventual conciliation with the West. De Gaulle hoped that France could be the broker, as long as Paris was not perceived to be the representative of Washington.

As de Gaulle saw it, most of his previous attempts to satisfy himself within the Western camp had proven futile. The general frequently requested from the U.S. a voice in global strategy relative to France's power position in the Western camp (see Chapter IV) and for admission into the Anglo-Saxon club within the Atlantic Alliance. One attempt at achieving this was his proposal for a tripartite directorate in 1958, but he was turned down. The NATO foreign ministers council meeting in Paris on December 16-18, 1958 failed to take action on the proposal, and John Foster Dulles claimed that it would lead to U.S.-British-French domination of NATO, and to increased French power and
influence in the Alliance. However, since de Gaulle's underlying concern was the return of France to a position closer to her former great power status, it was only natural that he would demand some say in Western foreign policy.

Having been repeatedly turned down on this, de Gaulle perceived his alternative to be an independent path. This would be possible only through economic independence and military self-sufficiency, the very things for which China was pushing for in the Sino-Soviet split.

On the economic front, France had grown increasingly uneasy of the American presence. The heavy American investment in European industries, the dreaded brain-drain, the disparity between research and development funds between the U.S. and Europe, and the widening U.S. technical superiority in such industries of growth as computers, electronics, aircraft, and space, produced an apprehension about the American embrace. It was feared that, unwittingly, Europe could be reduced to the same subordination to the U.S. as ancient Greece bore toward Rome. Unless the trend can somehow be reversed, we are doomed to become a continent of hotel keepers, store clerks, salesmen, and tourist guides. 109

*The Compagnie des Machines Bull, a leading computer manufacturer, and the pride of French technological prowess, was falling behind on loans, and had falling stocks and financial losses. General Electric proposed to buy 20% of Bull. De Gaulle vetoed the effort. However, nothing could save Bull except the assets of G.E. New attempts to satisfy both G.E. and de Gaulle were approved by the government, when semblances of Bull's independence were agreed upon, because Bull played an important role in de Gaulle's force de frappe. See Fortune, July, 1954, pp. 154-155, 242, 244.
One of Europe's reactions to the American presence was the formation of the E.E.C., within which, Kennedy thought, were grounds for U.S. collaboration, as well as for European unity, which he endorsed for political-security reasons. However, his endorsement of British entry into the E.E.C. induced "Trojan Horse" suspicions in de Gaulle. For his own reasons, de Gaulle did not take too kindly to the E.E.C. idea. Because its institution and prospects for formal federation were incompatible with French nationalism, de Gaulle, for reasons which will be explained at greater length in Chapter VI, opposed it. De Gaulle was determined to prevent the U.S. from using the E.E.C. in order to enhance its economic domination of Europe.* The General had expressed gratitude for the U.S.-post war assistance to Europe and France both in grants and investments. However, gratitude for past assistance was not to provide a maneuvering chart for the aspiration of a former great power. France's policy was to reduce a perceived U.S. economic domination of Europe. De Gaulle repeatedly turned down Great Britain's

*According to Servan-Schreiber, the E.E.C. was already serving U.S. interests. The theory was that it was difficult for European governments to arrive at a common economic policy, because all proposals had to be ratified by national assemblies. This was difficult, because national interests conflicted. On the contrary, as far as U.S. firms in Europe were concerned, a decision made, for instance, in Detroit, was binding on all European subsidiaries of the company, and the tariffs in E.E.C. countries, being substantially reduced for the benefit of those countries, were ideal for American companies, because they were unwittingly given greater leeway for maneuver and for more expansion. See J. J. Servan-Schreiber The American Challenge, Ronald Steel, trans., New York: Atheneum, 1969, pp. 43-45.
bid for entry into the E.E.C., because of his feeling that the special relationship between the U.K. and the U.S. would make Great Britain America's "Trojan Horse" in Europe. Besides Great Britain's impending economic woes, which resulted in the devaluation of the pound in 1957, would be inherited by Europe upon Great Britain's entry, and conversely, an economically strong Britain could present unwanted competition to France.

Another offensive prong wielded by de Gaulle was directed against the American dollar. France demanded gold for the settlement of U.S. balance of payments deficits. This was designed to undermine the dollar in general, and the Euro-dollar in particular. The U.S. objected to de Gaulle's gold proposals, claiming that the gold standard had "collapsed in 1931 and proved incapable of financing the huge increase of world trade," and requested a monetary reform conference, which was eventually held, and saw considerable give and take between the U.S. and French positions.

In matters of defense, after WWII, France became increasingly dependent on the U.S. for her defense. It may still be the case that to this day, U.S. military strength is an indispensable element in the European power equation, in the face of Soviet armaments in the Warsaw Pact countries. However, in the days of the Franco-American dispute, it was the judgement of France that the Soviet menace was not as great as it had been immediately after WWII. Thus, Europe could afford the opportunity to pursue an independent path in
foreign policy. Proposed NATO revisions would make the Alliance more outward looking, and concerned with aspects of peace as well as of defense. According to de Gaulle, NATO was established under circumstances very different from those prevailing in the 1950's, and that is more, there existed grounds for fears of U.S. abandonment of Europe (something typically ambivalent of de Gaulle, as will be pointed out shortly). These fears may have begun when the U.S. changed its European defense policy from one of "massive retaliation" to that of "flexible response" but de Gaulle offered as an example the Cuban missile crisis, which proved to him that the U.S. was willing to risk worldwide nuclear conflict without consulting its European partners.114 Both the U.S.-Soviet detente and the greater threat that Russia presented to the U.S. made for doubts that the U.S. would risk its own destruction to defend Europe, despite U.S. 

commitments in NATO.

As a result, questions of nuclear sharing arose, but de Gaulle was repeatedly turned down, as was the case with the U.S.-British Nassau talks on nuclear assistance, to which he was not invited. On the later question of the Multilateral Nuclear Force (M.L.F.), de Gaulle suspected that the U.S. would use it as a tool for further domination of allied

*The so-called "MacNamara Doctrine" called for a conventional response to a conventional Russian threat, so that more time would be available to avoid, or to prepare for, nuclear confrontation.
strategy, since it would be the U.S. who would control the deployment of any nuclear weapon. In the final analysis, from de Gaulle's point of view, what the Atlantic Alliance had amounted to was a colossal Atlantic Community, under American leadership, which would soon completely swallow up the European community...not at all what France had wanted.

On closer inpection, de Gaulle's position was ambivalent. He was opposed to U.S. forces if they were too strong in Europe, and equally opposed to them if they were not there to defend Europe. This however, is besides the main thrust of de Gaulle's position, which was concentrated on the reduction of American influences in Europe. De Gaulle had maneuvered himself into a position where he felt compelled to order NATO out of France in 1957, and to embark on an independent angle. The rationale was that France, the "great power" that it was, must have margins for independence, because it is intolerable for a great state to leave its destiny up to the decisions of another nation, however friendly it may be.

Moreover, since France had worldwide interests, France must also have worldwide military commitments in order to defend these interests. This required the possession of nuclear weapons, which no matter how obsolescent or ineffectual, in de Gaulle's mind were very important (witness the inability of the superpowers to use their nuclear weapons arsenal, thus making the lesser power much more influential).
ince according to de Gaulle, a great state that does not possess them while others do is not the master of its destiny. 117

France would develop her nuclear Force de Frappe in order to promote both her independence and her growth, no matter how non-viable or ineffective one might think the Force de Frappe would be against a nuclear foe. As far as de Gaulle was concerned, the nuclear force was something to be contended with, and anyone contemplating to attack France would think twice before doing so. 118 Even though there was a fear that the U.S. would be unwilling to risk its own destruction by starting a nuclear war in defense of Europe, there was consolation in the detonator theory. In this respect, the French nuclear force could be used as a detonator for U.S. nuclear power, since any nuclear clash, already in effect, would inevitably bring the U.S. into the conflict.

One is tempted to suspect that de Gaulle's unusual demands on nuclear sharing and global decisionmaking were designed

*There are several approaches by which one can comprehend the detonator effect. For example, France can be imagined as the initiator of a nuclear conflict, and the U.S. as a later participant for the purpose of protecting Europe and American interests therein. Another approach claims that once France or Britain attacked the U.S.S.R. with nuclear weapons, Russia will not retaliate against either of them, but against the U.S. instead, again triggering the American arsenal. See Hans J. Morgenthau "From Great Powers to Superpowers" in Brian Porter, ed., International Politics 1912-1969 The Aberystwith Papers, London; Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 136, quoting the Economist (February 15, 1964).
specifically to be rejected, so that he could justify and pursue more easily his independent policies. This was successful to some extent, but by and large the U.S. remained adamant in refusing to succumb to the wishes of DeGaulle.

The U.S. position was that only the U.S. should control the deployment of nuclear weapons since there were possibilities of being engulfed in a nuclear war the U.S. ought not to have part in if the lesser states were given no such say; neither was there enthusiasm in distributing U.S. nuclear secrets.

Also, the U.S., reviewing the experiences of World Wars I and II, when the allied command performed better when it was integrated, adopted the position that the NATO command should also be integrated under one (U.S.) leadership, if it was to function effectively in conditions of war. DeGaulle still objected, citing the need for French military independence in order to defend French interests in Africa and elsewhere, which were outside NATO's defense concerns.

The U.S. insisted in its position, with mild changes which were unacceptable to France, and DeGaulle continued on the path to independence from the NATO military infrastructure, because he felt France should have

* a force capable of acting in our behalf, with what is commonly called a "striking force" capable of being deployed at any time and any

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*Thomas B. Schelling in The Strategy of Conflict, New York: Oxford University press, 1970, pp. 9-10, contends that strategic actions are taken on the basis of a knowledge of the opponents' reactions to such, which will facilitate further actions by the initiator—this is the so-called "game theory".
place... (The) basic of thi force will be Atomic weapon which...must belong to us; and since... France could be destroyed from any point in the world, our force must be ready to act anywhere on earth. 121

Common Identity in Independence

The Chinese and French Policies on Nuclear Weapons

In looking back, it was observed that both Chinese and French attempts to regain their lost power and prestige through persuasion of their alliance leaders had failed dismally. Regardless of the realities of their dilemma, ultimately it was their perceptions of the situation which shaped the policies of decision makers. In their eyes, they were rudely turned down on their demands for shared leadership on world issues. The rejection was the final blow for them. Not only did the Franco-American and the Sino-Soviet split further frustrate France and China, but they also initiated that drive for independence which would be a prerequisite for any third force movement.

A good depiction of this spirit of independence was the common reach for nuclear self-sufficiency. To be sure, the idea of paralleling Chinese foreign policy interests with the French ones which are more familiar can be safely undertaken, since "Chinese foreign policy interests are not very

*For a concise comparison of the Chinese and French nuclear programs, based on primary, high level sources, see B. W. Augusten "The Chinese and French programs for the development of national nuclear forces" in ORBIS, (Fall, 1967), pp. 846-863. A substantial portion of my analysis on French and Chinese nuclear policies is based on this comparison.
different from the traditional interests of great powers. A joint probe of French and Chinese nuclear policies will also be of assistance for our purpose, both in order to compare the two policy trends, and to analyze their relationship. This I will attempt to do, despite the fact that little knowledge exists on Chinese nuclear capabilities.

The Chinese economy is still agricultural, and is smaller, in comparison to other major powers. For instance, in 1968, China's G.N.P. was $14 billion; that is, one-tenth that of the U.S.. The relative daily wage for that same year was 25c. Thus, the economic obstacles to the development of nuclear production would be greater. Both China and France, however, considered nuclear development to be a helping-rather than a hindering variable in their economies. Leading spokesmen for both countries also considered the undertaking to be a boost to their national power and status as well. The French built their force de-frappe for prestige, for power, and for their intra-alliance aims; and in addition, as a leverage against the U.S.S.R. with the direct deterrence effects of such a force, and the detonator threat as well. Similarly, when China exploded an H bomb in 1966, France commented that the feat was "remarkable, but it would not have much military effect in the near future except for propaganda". Thus, even though the real potentialities of nuclear weapons were limited for both China and France, nevertheless, both believed that their forces served useful diplomatic
purposes. Indeed, the Chinese developed their force not only for the purposes of independence and for a deterrent against the U.S. (in hopes of embroiling the U.S.S.R. in any potential conflict) but also to deter the Russians as well.* Harold Hinton suggests that, at one point, the U.S. discouraged a Soviet attack on Chinese nuclear installations. 127

The limitations in both French and Chinese nuclear forces were not difficult to detect. Both forces were considered to be defensive deterrents for their respective owners only, and hence, incapable of defending others, much less of attacking others. The force de frappe was a counter city force, and not an all-out threat to the U.S.S.R. China's capabilities to wage war, especially beyond her borders, were questionable, since she had no bases abroad, no adequate delivery systems, and no nuclear armed sea vessels. The weakness of the Chinese air force made defense against even a conventional attack nonviable, not to mention the possible preemptive strike by either superpower to demolish any first strike capabilities she might have developed.

Since both Chinese and French perceptions of their nuclear weapons were identical, could not their intentions about the uses of such weapons have been identical as well? Augenstein contends that this was so, because their basic

*It is not clear against whom the Chinese force was designed for use. The Chinese undoubtedly saw an imminent danger in the Soviet Union, yet Chinese official propaganda branded the U.S. and its imperialism as a great enemy who was to be resisted.
motivation was national greatness and political importance. 128
Premier Chou En-lui has contended that "...other great
nations have such weapons, and smaller ones would have them
in due course." 129 French diplomats have characterized their
own nuclear force as of little military value "...but it is
highly effective in diplomacy." 130 Thus, despite the
questionable usefulness of their forces, the decisionmaking
elites of both countries perceived these forces as very
important, both psychologically and diplomatically. Hence,
the policies on nuclear forces cannot be easily dismissed
from the framework of the decisionmaking processes of both
countries.

Indeed, when China proclaimed that
the possession by the Chinese people of...nu-
clear weapons...is a great encouragement to
all the revolutionary peoples of the world, 131
one, can clearly detect here the notion that China was court-
ing the third world and was giving vague promises of support
for wars of national liberation.

The superpowers did not support the idea of separate
Chinese and French nuclear programs. Moscow was anxious
that the nuclear enfant terrible of the East might join
with its equivalent in the West—the French—especially at
a time when Mao was bringing up old Chinese claims on
Soviet territory.

Despite this fact, the two bloc upstarts, China and
France, also had similar views on nuclear proliferation,
which conflicted with those of the superpowers. The Chinese,
as well as the French criterion for opposing superpower attempts to curb nuclear proliferation can be better understood through the adage "it depends on who judges." China contended that there could not be a threat to world peace as long as nuclear weapons were possessed only by socialist states, and deGaulle reiterated that in all endeavors, monopoly, nuclear monopoly not excluded, seems to be the best policy, especially for those who already have it. Thus, he disposed of superpower objections to nuclear proliferation, by articulating the suspicion that the superpowers really wanted to keep their nuclear monopoly, when they voiced their fears of proliferation.

In a vision, leaders of both countries agreed that it would not be wise to rely on the nuclear power of others, and that is more, they also agreed that nuclear proliferation did not increase the danger of war. With the signing of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty of 1968,* Chinese denunciation of the superpowers intensified again. The treaty was branded as "something imposed on the non-nuclear states to bind them hand and foot," to make them accept nuclear monopoly by the superpowers, and to force them to succumb to nuclear blackmail. The Peking Review wrote that

*China best articulated its policies on nuclear proliferation in 1968. For closer inspection of their development and for earlier views, see Morton H. Halperin, China and Nuclear Proliferation, Chicago: the University of Chicago, 1968.
the so-called "treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons" was produced solely to meet the common interests and counterrevolutionary needs of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear overlords.

The journal goes on to state that whereas previously, the element of gunboat diplomacy was prevalent in international relations, now there was nuclear blackmail wielded by the superpowers. The real solution for the nuclear problem, said Peking Review, lies in the destruction of all nuclear weapons. Until that is accomplished, China would develop its own nuclear power to prevent its own destruction by the superpowers. But she would never use nuclear weapons first. China charged the Soviets as being hypocrites because they escalated at the same time that they were espousing disarmament. Finally, in order to connect her charges to her worldwide policy, China charged that disarmament was a ploy by the superpowers to prevent smaller countries from waging wars of liberation against the two giants.

Thus far, we have observed both China and France, two formerly great powers, attempting to regain their power, but at the same time perceiving the superpowers as hindering that drive for a world status. This further increased dissatisfaction with the status quo, and it led to independent action for power, best illustrated in identical anti-superpower policies on nuclear weapons. As both countries were identified as alliance outcasts and as independents, grounds were firm for an association between the two. As Dutt asserts
...it is not surprising that Peking should have fixed on France...in Europe to which it should not closer to. Many of the political assumptions and policy goals of General de Gaulle and Chao Tse-tung are identical.138

Political Diplomatic Grounds for Third Force Action

It has already been indicated that China and France were trying to revive their lost power, and their attempts to do so were stifled by their alliance leaders. Consequently, they undertook to follow independent paths to power (in relation to the superpowers), which were clearly similar, and which, in fact, converged, leading to the viable speculation that there were traces of the beginning of a Third Force between France and China in these actions.

Prior to entering the domain of French and Chinese points of view on the Third Force Concept, we might do well to reflect on some fundamentals of foreign policy. According to Isher Ojha, powers who aspire for a world role pass through three stages of development. The first stage is the clear definition of national boundaries; the second stage is the establishment of peripheral spheres of influence, where neighbouring territories are secured against succumbing to external influences, which might threaten the state concerned. The third stage is the transition from territorial security towards a world role.139

While post-war France was at the end of the second stage in the 1950's, and was in fact combining her desire for influence in Europe with her greater designs for a world status, it would seem that China was going through all
three aspects once, which is a painful experience itself. Boundary disputes with the U.S.S.R. and India still abound, and as far as the current state of concern, it is still in the process of realization. China still views the world on the Chinese model: a central China, an Asian periphery, and an alien beyond. However, China was enclosed by U.S. military bases, which to some extent justified her claustrophobia.

In view of this conception of the world which was held by China, and at the same time her dreams for a world role, it is possible to conclude that at this time, she had great power aspirations. The worldwide pretensions of China were voiced in a New China News Agency dispatch on Jan. 29, 1964, which stated that "China and France are great nations and play important roles in international affairs." Mao himself has said, "If our methods are the right ones, if we tolerate no deviation—China will be restored to greatness." To that end, one variable which would be important was an increased Chinese influence in Europe. Out of better relations, China expected to reap some economic benefits, because China has regarded Western Europe as an important source of capital, equipment, and technological contact.

*China did make overtures to Europe of which France was the major candidate—and is the subject of this paper. China also wooed the third world, especially Africa, with propaganda and foreign aid (for instance, the trans-Tanzania railway) but more will be said on this search for influence in Europe shortly.
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ence in Europe shortly.
Malraux replied on behalf of France* that

as far as the influence we may be able to bring to
bear on the U.S., I believe that is of the same
order as that which you can bring to bear on the
Soviet Union. 147

On the basis of the above comments, one can conclude that
the aims of both countries in the CG's were to use each
other in order to influence the superpowers.

In addition to the a set of having Europe on her side,
China pondered that the United Nations would be an important
forum for her, both for the purposes of contact as well
as for propaganda. However, one of the reasons why China
was reluctant to join the U.N.** was an apprehension that
there was not enough support for her, that "we cannot have
a majority in voting...and we shall lose our present freedom
of action". 148 However, with France as a potential friend,
a member of the Security Council, and able to influence its
former African colonies, the outlook would be brighter. The
African vote at the United Nations was substantial. In
order to gain its support, it was required that amicable
relations with France be established, because France still

*The quote must not be misconstrued as ironical. Malraux
did not necessarily mean any inability to influence the
superpowers.

**Sometime later, (in 1965) when Indonesia withdrew from
the U.N. in protest of the seating of Malaysia in the
Security Council, China tried to organize a rival "re-
volutionary" United Nations.

See Harold C. Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest: An Analysis
of China's Foreign Relations Since 1949; Bloomington;
Indiana University Press, 1972, p. 147.
had good relations with Francophone Africa through the now defunct French Community.

Of course, in conjunction with this leverage through France, China would also woo Africa by propaganda. Consequently, China preferred to be the champion of the oppressed against the oppressors. China charged that the United States was a villain, that Africa had an abundance of national resources, and that the United States was plundering them, exploiting Africa for America's own benefit. China undertook to defend the interests of the "oppressed" Third World, provided that certain conditions were met. China's relations with other countries would be based on the degree to which they were pro-Chinese and anti-imperialist. Note must be taken that in this context, as opposed to the Chinese model of the world mentioned in another context earlier in this section, China viewed the world in Marxist-Leninist terms. The 1949 quote by Mao, that no nation could be in the Middle, that it "must lean to one side", applied at this time (the 60's) as well.*

One must not fail to add that China's continuing support for wars of national liberation was an essential part of China's struggle against the superpowers. Ironically, China supported these struggles only morally. The rationale for this policy, as explained by China, was the thesis that

*However, in due time, there developed an appreciation for the neutrals who were seen as stepping towards the right direction, as buffer zones for China's defenses.
that conflict cannot be conducted from abroad, that they must have a local power base in order to succeed.

China was also discriminating in the support it gave to wars of national liberation. Peking was reluctant to support revolutions or coups in colonies or former colonies where the colonial, or former colonial power, was likely to intervene, especially if that power had good relations with China. One example of this unorthodox stand was the difficulty in encouraging rebellion in French Somaliland, which was part of the last remnants of European colonialism. However, Peking endorsed revolutions in neighboring Portuguese territories. The rationale may be that fomenting rebellion in French colonies and former French colonies, might have served to reverse de Gaulle's relations with China, and might have led to closer Franco-American relations instead. These paradoxical positions into which China had maneuvered herself, worked against her Third Force plans. We shall deal with this aspect of China's policy in a later chapter.

For the present, besides the reasons which facilitated her bonds with France, we shall mention the considerations promoting France herself to pull closer to China. These were the familiar objectives of a world influence. France still had good relations with Francophone Africa, and de Gaulle's trip to Latin America in 1964 was designed to increase France's influence there. The Middle East would also be wooed by arms deals and anti-Israeli policies. In addition, Southeast Asia appeared to be a prospective area
for the reestablishment of a certain degree of French influence.

At the time when China, along with the U.S., was beginning to move into Africa (after Chou En-lai's whirlwind tour of that continent in search of U.N. votes), where France had interests, de Gaulle needed a listening post in Peking. He also renewed his efforts to restore French political influence in the Far East. Doubtlessly, his good record on Algeria could be an asset in this effort.

In any event, if France was to have a world role, wrote Vernant, she had to see that Southeast Asia became stable. Stephen Brauws adds that if de Gaulle wanted to play a leading role in any settlement in that area, he needed direct diplomatic relations with Peking. Since Peking would, of necessity, have to be consulted.

Thus, better relations with China were of major importance to France, both for an Asian balance favourable to France, and for an internal balance in France itself, favourable to the government, with the Left, including the powerful French communist party, already a government ally in foreign policy matters, placated.

The importance of China for de Gaulle can be traced in his personal reappraisal of her. In contrast to the General's November 19, 1959 characterization of China as...

...the yellow multitude...numberless, and wretchedly poor...indestructible and ambitious, building by dint of violent effort, a power which cannot be kept within limits, and looking around at the expanses over which it must one day spread...
China was now, around 1964,
under a government which aimed at its laws,
and, externally had shown itself to be a
sovereign and independent power. The
reference to sovereignty and to independence clearly
indicates that de Gaulle saw China in the same light that he
saw France, as a nation which was on the rise, and which was
on its own and in the same predicament as France, and whose
friendship could be a good asset for France. Thus, on
France's side as well, the drift toward Third Force politics with China can be clearly detected.

Indeed, a brief glance at the most significant events in
both China's and France's foreign policies shows similar
patterns in policy output. China's general foreign policy
shows a change in the middle 50's from its being a loyal
ally in the "socialist camp to becoming a rival to the Soviet
Union, both within the communist alliance, and in the world
arena as well. The pattern shows a course of increasing
independence from the U.S.S.R. and at the same time increasing hostility towards it. This continuity is not broken,
and various different experiments in regard to this policy
were attempted; for instance, the Bandung Conference, the
emphasis on nuclear self-sufficiency, and the desire for
influence in Africa.

An important change in policy was detected after the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, which increased the hos-
tility towards the U.S.S.R.; and at the same time decreased
it in regards to the U.S. (For a chronology of events,
Appendix I.)

By the same token, de Gaulle's general foreign policy (see Appendix II) showed a more clear and definite pattern of independence from the U.S.; caution against its encroachment in European affairs; and a drive for greater French influence in world affairs. The general foreign policy framework was not changeable, as the guidelines for French independence were strictly followed. Different experiments were tried, for instance the Franco-German Pact and the trip to Moscow and to the Western hemisphere, but all were related to de Gaulle's general goal for a greater role for France (see Chapter V, VI, VII) in the world balance.

Hence, both countries followed definite patterns of independence from the superpowers, which were conducive to common outlooks in regards to the international environment (see Chapters V, VI, VII) and which were gradually converging towards a Third Force.

However, in order to clarify the relationship between French and Chinese foreign policy outputs and the Third Force concept, it becomes important that the concepts of the Third Force, as they were held by these two powers, be examined more closely than they were in the introduction, which attempted to scan all notions of the Third Force and to form a general notion of it.
VI. China and Prince Outline the Third Force

The Chinese Approach

In an earlier section of this paper (Chapter III) it was indicated that the Third Force could be regarded as the advocacy and possible leadership of a coalition of non-superpowers, the anticipated end being to stand up against the superpowers, and to benefit from that stand. With that in mind, we may now review the Chinese way of going about that endeavor.

China in the 1960's was preoccupied with imperialism and anti-colonialism. She continued to see imperialism as the major threat to the world; hence, she had fears of the West and of a Russian invasion of China. Moreover, as Malraux contends, like the Soviet state before "...the war, the Chinese state...(nee ed)...enemies," 156 Consequently, while China had an ideological hostility toward Europe, the preoccupation with countering imperialism made her more concerned about American and Soviet influence in Europe. For example, the American efforts to strengthen European unity, or to safeguard NATO's defenses, met with Chinese polemics against U.S. domination of Europe.

Consequently, in the face of what it saw as American imperialism, China proposed the broadest possible worldwide united front against the United States, a concept based in part on the hope of dividing the West against itself by exploiting the contradictions among the Western powers, particularly those between the U.S. and its European allies. 157

The Chinese espousal of the United Front idea was closely related to her provocateur role, in regard to the difficult-
The reader is reminded that while the term provocateur designates an international relations role in contrast to the international relations strategy of the united front, the provocateur role and the Chinese international united front strategy of the 1960's have this much in common: the aim in both cases is to bring about a Third Force, as opposed to two other forces, with the intent of benefitting from the diminished power of the opponent.

We have thus far mentioned two notions of the Third Force in Chinese international relations, namely the provocateur notion, and the united front idea (a united front first directed against the U.S., and later against the U.S.S.R.). This paper will now proceed to examine other variations or spinoffs of the united front notion.

Chinese reaction to rapprochement disputed deGaulle's contention that ideologies are relatively unimportant. In fact, China saw its role in international affairs as leader of the people's liberation movements in the Third World, where she hoped her ideology would count.

Since in China's eyes the United States obstructed independence both in Europe and elsewhere, a new popular front
in the offing against U.S. imperialism. The only credentials for entering that front would be the profession of anti-Americanism. On January 21, 1964, the Peoples Daily printed an article by Mao Tse-tung entitled "All the Forces Opposing U.S. Imperialism in the World, Unite." In that article, Mao perceived that U.S. imperialism could not tolerate the existence of the socialist camp. Therefore, the Soviets, by collaborating with the U.S. for world domination, were undermining their own interest, and the unity of all socialist countries. Thus, they were helping U.S. imperialism. China rationalized that the U.S., by being an obstacle to socialism and communism, the very elements of progress, was also an obstacle to progress itself. Thus, the new popular force against the "anti-progressive" U.S. was hailed as the "progressive force".160

To further indicate the general anti-U.S. position of China in the 1960's, concentrated of course on the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, we can cite the interview by Mao to Andre Malraux in 1965. Mao equated the U.S. with imperialism, and Chen Yi contended that unlike Britain and France, the U.S. was stirring up trouble everywhere. Consequently, resistance to the U.S. was imperative, according to Chinese leaders.161

One major method of resisting the U.S. was through the African countries, whom China tried to convince of the dangers of neo-colonialism, and of the fact that the real enemy was the U.S. and not Great Britain or Portugal. China
proclaimed that it was the U.S. which was trying to exploit the natural resources of Africa at a great profit. Besides, it was not only Africa which was threatened. American imperialism, said China, threatened everyone. As a consequence, China was proposing that all countries which refuse to be satellites or vassal states of the United States have no alternative but to join hands against this despot.

These indications lead to the conclusion that at the time—the mid 50's—Yahuda contends the United States was already the explicit target for the C.P.R.'s projected international United front.

The U.S. was derided as a national foe in domestic Chinese politics, and in the international sphere as a class villain who was to be resisted. At about the same time the Mao article appeared in People's Daily (Jan. 21, 1964) a new version of the third force (originating in a Mao interview with Anna Louise Strong in 1945) was put forward, specifically, the idea of intermediate zones, which would be free to move against the Soviet Union as well as against the United States. It must be mentioned here that this was the period when the Sino-Soviet polemic had reached a high point.

It may be true that, as Yahuda says, the U.S. was the major obstacle to China's external objectives. After all, it was the U.S. which prevented China from taking over Taiwan, it was the U.S. which kept the C.P.R. out of the

*These will be elaborated upon shortly.
U.S., it was the U.S. which had encircled China with its containment policy. The U.S. and the U.C.S.R. were perceived by the Chinese to be a Russian betrayal of the communist movement, and hence, the U.S. was not the only villain. The U.C.S.R. was perceived to be in collusion with the U.S., both diplomatically and militarily for world domination, and the Chinese presented as proof of this the nuclear test ban treaty which had been signed in August 1963. Consequently, opposition would now be directed against both superpowers.

In 1964, this notion of the Chinese third force, that is, the intermediate zone concept, involved two groups: a) the developing countries, and b) the developed countries, minus the U.S. As Van Ness explains, Mao proposed a broad international united front against the U.S. (which) for the first time... had been extended to include the noncommunist states as well as the people of the countries of Western Europe. 169

According to the zones theory, the independent and colonial parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America were the first intermediate zone, while Western Europe, Oceania, and the other capitalist countries were the second intermediate zone.

It is important to repeat at this stage that the Soviet Union was also a villain in Chinese eyes, that the call for the intermediate zones strategy signified that the danger came from the U.S.S.R. as well as from the U.S. The Chinese considered the Soviets as insidious within China as
all aim from without,* and therefore, the Russians also became the object of the "struggle".

This determination to resist the dual hegemony stemmed from the deep-seated aspirations for independence and for a world role. The endorsement of the second intermediate zone was also connected with the effort towards diplomatic recognition by de Gaulle, and it justified Peking's policy of trade and friends in with France at the time. In that manner, Mao was clearly attempting to appeal to the Middle Powers, who were guarding their sovereignty and independence against the superpowers. At the same time, according to Holsti and Sullivan,

"China... was... attempting to form a bloc within the communist system, consisting of the poorer and less developed but ideologically purer nations." 136

In the final analysis, it is not of major importance whether the Chinese Third Force was labelled as a united front or as a progressive force, or as an intermediate zone. The fact which bears significance is that in general, all came to mean the same thing: a coalition against the superpowers. In relation to this, China would celebrate the establishment of diplomatic relations with France as a victory over U.S.

*The fear of Soviet-style "revisionism," among Chinese Communist cadres is ever present in Mao's mind. His solution is the promotion of a constant revolutionary fervour among both the leadership and the masses, and constant vigilance so that people could be kept from turning "soft". Thus, he ushered in the revolutionary fervour of the Cultural revolution in the late 60's."
imperialism, and as a proof that the Chinese version of the world was more correct than was the Soviet one. To Khrushchev's contention that the Western paper tiger had atomic teeth, the Chinese realized that the teeth could soon fall out with the advent of the final stage of Western decline. As proof, the Chinese were pointing out the loss of U.S. control over its satellites, exemplified by French political-diplomatic maneuvers. Finally, the Sino-French relationship was labelled as a "Third Force" by Mao himself.*

The polemics against the two superpowers intensified again at the time of the signing of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty in 1978. The Peking Review on Nov. 17, 1972, formally outlining China's policy on disarmament stated, interestingly enough, that since peoples are presently concerned more about their independence, accordingly, peoples' struggle are more important than disarmament.** Any disarmament conference would produce more harm than good, because the Third World will be diverted from its anti-imperialist struggle, and the two superpowers will consolidate their hold over the globe, and will also cover up their arms.

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*Mao included Germany and Italy in this third force. See Roderick MacFarquhar, China Under Mao: Politics Take Command, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1966, pp. 462-463. DeGaulle does not use the term itself, but he comes close to it when he refers to the "third power".

**Chinese doctrine states that 1) countries want independence, 2) nations want liberation, and 3) peoples want revolution. See, for instance, Peking Review, Jan. 3, 1975, p. 8.
race.

China maintained that imperialism is the root of all wars. Consequently, the small and medium powers must defend themselves against imperialism, presumably under Chinese leadership. According to China, there is no arms race where self-defense is concerned. Disarmament is sought, but the superpowers must disarm first, since it is they who are in an arms race and in a position of hegemony over certain spheres. Any talk about peace is sheer folly, according to China.

Any disarmament should be complete, and the superpowers must vow not to use nuclear weapons first in any conflict, not to attack the non-nuclear states, and to withdraw from foreign soil. 168

Thus, all through the decade of the 1960's, China was preoccupied with the anti-imperialist argument. Again, the plausible conclusion would be in accord with Scalapino's thesis that...

...perhaps the single most important fact about China is its profound dissatisfaction with the status quo, and hence, its determination to keep the revolutionary momentum at the highest possible level. 169

including the desire for the formation of third force to bring about a change in the status quo.

The Chinese notion of the third force lacked clarity with respect to its organization and leadership process, but there indeed were attempts to organize such a force. For instance, reference could be made to the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, and to its secretariat,
which was based in Cairo. The first conference of the
A.A.P.C.O. was held there, and was followed by other Asian
and Afro-Asian conferences in Delhi and Bandung, which wit-
tnessed the battles between Peking and Moscow for the domi-
nation of the Third World. Another Afro-Asian conference,
in which the Chinese anticipated a success for their en-
deavors, was to be held at Algiers in the middle of 1965,
but it was cancelled because of the Boumedienne coup.

Some additional examples of Chinese plans for gaining the
leadership of the third force were the April 1963 Djakarta
Asian-African journalists' conference, which Peking domi-
nated, and also the Chinese attempts to split up the
World Federation of Trade Unions, or to dominate the Afro-
Asian Unions.

Nevertheless, despite the impression which is sometimes
given, the the Chinese Third Force was primarily concerned
with the Third World, there were indications that Europe
could be included in that Third Force through the interme-
diate zones thesis. France definitely figured in the Chinese
scheme of things. As Mao himself once reportedly described
the Sino-French relationship, it was "France...and ourselves,
that is...(to say)...the third force".

The French Approach to the Third Force

France, in her turn, had her own concept of the Third
Force. While China based her foreign policy on anti-imper-
rialism and anti-colonialism, deGaulle, according to Burnham,
based his foreign policy on six major tenets. These were
that: 1) Nation have traits and that the e traits change slowly. Ergo, 2) ideolog is are secondary to national considerations. Also, 3) the rules of diplomacy arc Machia-
vellian, and since 4) France personifies Western civilization, 5) de Gaulle, who represent France, speak for the West, and hence, 5) on fundamentally, hi decisions arc cor-
rect. 174 As an addendum to this basically realpolitik
oriented foreign policy, we might do well to mention Jules
Vernat's listing of Gaullist foreign policy tenets, which are of the following kind:

1) The world is divided between the liberal west and the totalitarian East. The West must consolidate its forces, in order to defend itself against the overt and covert onslaughts on the East.

2) Along this functional division, there exist the political, military, and economic divisions, concentrated under the powerful bloc leaders. The West has to accept the United States as a leader, or it must form a third force—a united Europe under French leadership.*

3) a) Decolonization stopped European metropolitan influence abroad. b) With the absence of direct Euro-
American influence in the third world, the U.S.S.R. could move in to fill the gap. 175

The role of France was to move in time to forestall such a

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*The underlining is added by this author and will be duly explained.
emerging, by taking Third Force action. However, this was a more diverse than dualist in nature, and he asserted that...

...we could foresee, and later, we witnessed the vast movement toward freedom which the world war and its aftermath unleashed in every corner of the globe, in which the rival bids of the Soviet Union and America did not fail to emphasize. 176

He also recognized that...

in the great transformation which is taking place from one end of the universe to the other, the itching for independence of erstwhile dominated peoples, and also the incitements thrown out by all the degeneracies of the world are not the only motivating forces. 177

that the powerful nations now realized that their own welfare depended on the cooperation of the former colonies, and not on domination.

As a consequence, the now more numerous third world was capable of action. The General, thinking in panoramic strategies rather than trivialities, speculated that a good chance existed to ally with the Third World, which by its very nature, according to him, shielded away from the superpowers. Witness his attempts to keep the ties with former colonies through the non-defunct French community.

His greatest goal, however, was to create a Third Force bloc, beginning with Europe, which could rally around France and assume the position of balancer between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Since 1945, his plan was as he related in his Memoirs...

...to assume France primacy in Western Europe,
by preventing the rise of a new third Reich... To cooperate with East and West, and if need be, contract the necessary alliances on one side or the other without accepting dependency--to persuade the states to form a political, economic, and strategic bloc to establish this... as ONE OF THE THREE WORLD POWERS* and... the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-American camps.**

After Europe, the possibility of the Third World joining in would be pursued.***

These tenets and policies espoused by deGaulle stemmed from an almost mythical belief in the genius of France and in the role that it should play in the world. France would, therefore, gradually assume control of Western Europe, whose security would become less and less the concern of the United States. France might lead the six of the E.E.C. in forming a political entity strong enough and determined enough to follow a policy which was independent of that of the United States.**

DeGaulle also referred to a Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals" meaning a Europe which would include Russia, and exclude the United States, and which would become an essential factor in the world Balance of Power. It would follow that since deGaulle led and dominated France, by the same

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*The emphatic form is used only by Chiozzi and not by de Gaulle or George Ball.

**DeGaulle never abandoned his basic French nationalism. Perhaps this is detrimental for his realization of European independence. A loose European federation might have been acceptable to deGaulle, but he rejected a federated or a supranationalist Europe, for reasons which will be explained shortly.
taken, he would lead the coalition; he would be in the center as a balancer and an arbiter.

De Gaulle's repertory was abundant in projects aimed at exercising French influence. However, if these projects did not have short-run benefits, or if they had limited benefits, (for instance, the Franco-German treaty of cooperation, the repeated rejections of Great Britain's aide to enter the E.E.C., the overtures to Moscow) he could turn to new projects, for the purpose of maximizing his potentials— which were limited.

In this respect, his diplomatic recognition of China signified that China was, to de Gaulle, a potential leader in Asia, and that improvement in relations with China would help France's world position and ambitions. By his China policy, de Gaulle could have also wanted to prove to the Russians that he was advantageous to deal with since he was so influential; that if ignored, he could stir up the tumultuous currents of the communist world, as well as those of the West. Finally, the decision to improve relations with China was, according to Raymond Tournaux,

an almost desperate attempt to break the embrace of the two superpowers, to break the hegemony of the two blocs, and to oppose a new American-Soviet version of Yalta. 180

The French inability to bring this ambition to reality has already been discussed (see Chapter V) and will be referred to again, (in Chapter VIII) but the fact which must be remembered is that oftentimes it is not the realities of the situation which influence decision makers, but
their perceptions of these realities. DeGaulle believed in the image he propagated about a powerful France. Even though deGaulle's enjöy may have been unrealistic, he was aware of his own mortality and for the need for priorities and withdrawals. In fact, he was realistic, as his policies on decolonization showed, as well as his attitude towards the Soviet Union and China. His demands for a share in making decisions which would affect Europe, and thus France, can hardly be termed unrealistic. In any event, he did have some guidelines about at least the European phase of his third force. In brief, countries had to be devoted to the interests of Europe in order to be accepted in the European third force. Hence, Great Britain was not to be admitted until she became more European. Finally, Europe's defense would be entrusted to France.

From an organizational standpoint, deGaulle introduced the "Europe of the fatherlands" and the "Europe of the states" notions, which meant that institutionwise, there would be no supranationality. Parliaments and judicial bodies, it was feared, would smother France's identity and individuality.

DeGaulle summed it up when he said:

That is why, if the union of Western Europe... is a capital aim of our actions outside, we have no desire to be dissolved within it. Any

*The debate still continues as to whether or not deGaulle was a realist. For an informative account, see for instance P. Roy Wilis, DeGaulle: Anachronism, Realist, or Prophet, New York; Holt, Rhinehart & Winston, 1967.*
ten that would consist of handing over our sovereignty to a new assembly would be incompatible with the rights of the French Republic.111

Instead, de Gaulle advocated annual and/or periodic summit meetings at the foreign ministerial level, in order to streamline foreign policies.

In addition to Europe, the French priorities would be directed towards the Third World. France's attempts to win influence in the newly independent countries as also an attempt to reduce the influence of both the American and Russian hegemonies. Francophone Africa would be an asset, judging from the modus operandi France had used these countries through the remnants of the now-defunct French Community. In addition, present efforts were directed at gaining more influence in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East, and in Latin America.

Hence, both France and China courted not only each other but the Third World as well in their aims of organizing a Third Force. The independent-minded Third World for its part, reciprocated in kind. As Feito notes,

> the appearance on the scene of two new competitors—China and France—(...) (seemed) ... to improve the chances of the nonaligned to charge a high price for their neutrality.122

Thus, along with the converging sino-french foreign policy outputs, which were based on frustration, independence, and global "designs", the conditions were favourable for Third Force politics. In the pursuit of such a course of action, what was needed between France and China was at least formal, diplomatic recognition.
VII. Diplomatic Recognition: The Third Force Achieved

The decision by Peking and Paris to recognize each other can be characterized under two labels: it can be seen either as the beginning of the third force, or the culmination of the third force. The first characterization can be applied if one fails to look at the results of the relationship. One could think that diplomatic recognition was the beginning of better things to come, for China and France. However, as the next chapter of this paper will indicate, the Sino-French Third Force was never to amount to much, not only because there were contradictions between the Chinese and the French notions of the third force, and within the individual concept themselves, but also because the basic hopes of the two actors were not realized. Thus, this author opts for the second characterization, since diplomatic recognition seems to be the best that China and France could achieve.

Hence, the high point of the Sino-French Third Force movement—I say Sino-French because the bilateral relationship itself is treated as the Third Force in this paper—was diplomatic recognition, the result of the gradually converging policies of both countries. These stemmed from a mutual dissatisfaction with the superpower dominated international environment and from similar frustrations in both countries' attempts to alter the dual hegemony and to partake in what they thought was rightfully their share in world leadership. Finally, we saw them taking independent
paths from their respective alliances and the policies on nuclear armament typified. There and other mutual advantages called for diplomatic recognition, for China and France to be engaged, at last, in a formal relationship.

For commercial reasons the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and Switzerland had recognized China in 1950. Great Britain, one of the first Western countries to recognize China was, in the 60's, through Hong Kong, an important trading partner.

France herself had almost recognized China in 1949, but the endeavor did not materialize because Peking had recognized the Vietminh when the French were still deeply involved in Indochina. Again, in 1954, the colonial problem had prevented the establishment of diplomatic relations. Then, with the dawning of the 60's, the Chinese were demanding an end to the war in Algeria, the withdrawal of French troops, and negotiations between the Algerian nationalists and the French government as a sine qua non for any improvement in relations between France and China. By ending the war in Algeria through the granting of independence, deGaulle had established some respectability in Chinese eyes, and proposals were initiated for the establishment of diplomatic recognition.*

*Most countries seeking diplomatic recognition do not usually behave this way, because they are not in a position to give ultimatums. They need all the friends (cont. on next page)
When Chen Yi and Chou En-lai toured Africa (Dec. 1962 to Jan. 1964) they expressed friendship towards France, and they again mentioned that their university training was French. Then, on January 14, 1964, the New China News Agency reported the visit to China of a French parliamentary delegation. On January 20 a banquet was held for the delegation, during which the Chinese said that the visit helped establish friendlier relations, and cultural-economic ties. The French delegation responded in kind. Finally, on January 27, 1964 diplomatic relations were established. China stressed that the basis of the Sino-French relationship was, according to the Peking Review (Nov. 1, 1963) the good impression of China formulated by Edgar Faure, and also on the recognition by France of Chinese accomplishments during China's "socialist reconstruction."

The joint communique which was released was, in itself, a formal, dry, diplomatic announcement of an agreement to exchange ambassadors. What was more interesting was the post-recognition commentary in the Chinese press. A ministry of foreign affairs spokesman declared to the New China

*(cont.) they can get. One might think that the other side would adopt intransigent positions. However, Mao's regime was not an ordinary one. Already recognized by a number of Third World and Communist countries, and a self-appointed leader and moral supporter of independence movements, it was imperative for China to have a strong position on Algeria. Also, China, as is expected in such situations of divided countries where the "other" section is a vital interest, was to set high prices for recognition in the near future, by requiring recognition of their claims over Taiwan.
and the Chinese people. He also reiterated that the establishment of diplomatic relations would enhance friendship, economic and cultural relations, and the growth of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.*

However, by and large, the account does not so much express sino-French friendship as express Chinese hostility to the superpowers. The Chinese were relating the sino-French relationship to the evolution of Communist ideology, and were attacking the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The document derides American attempts to isolate China, and it vows that China will establish relations with even more countries. It also charges that American non-recognition of China was doomed to failure, and as diplomatic recognition by France proved, isolation was only the wishful thinking of the United States, just as was the "two Chinas" policy, because Taiwan was proclaimed by Peking to be part of China, and not an independent entity.

A five month interval elapsed between the agreement to exchange ambassadors, and the actual exchange. This raised speculation that there might have been difficulties between France and China, especially on the question of Taiwan. The

*Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty. 2) Mutual non-aggression 3) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs 4) Equality and mutual benefit 5) Peaceful coexistence. See, for instance, Peking Review, April 30, 1969.
February 21, 1964 issue of *Time* magazine (p. 37) contends that the C.P.R. was demanding that France break relations with Taiwan as the quid pro quo of the exchange. At first, de Gaulle had announced that he would not break ties with Chiang, (hoping that the latter would instead break ties with France) but Chiang was pressured by the U.S. not to sever relations with France. Then, Peking put the appropriate pressure on France, and the French charge d'affaires in Taiwan informed the Taiwanese foreign minister that with the advent of ties with China proper, the raison d'être for relations with Taiwan had ceased to exist. Upon receipt of this message, the Taiwanese cabinet met and terminated diplomatic relations with France.

The stiffest opposition to diplomatic recognition came from Washington, as well as from the Nationalist Chinese. *Life* magazine on January 31, 1964, reported that de Gaulle's recognition of China was a direct affront to the U.S., and the U.S. government sent a brief, curt note deploiring the move as unwise and untimely. De Gaulle, however, told Dean Rusk that diplomatic recognition was *dans la nature des choses*, in the nature of things. Jules Vernant agrees with de Gaulle when he writes that:

> it is because politics must take account of realities that the French government has announced its decision to recognize Communist China.

China had the rights to a proper international existence.

*West Germany, as well, opposed the move, fearing a potential disruption of Western unity.*
Wernant wrote, as had Poland, Hungary, and Rumania. Hence, if one bases policy on rationalism, he must contend with the reality of states, not with ideologies.

Nevertheless, there was a section of the American press which was sympathetic to deGaulle. Time magazine, in the edition of February 7, 1964 (p. 30) reported that deGaulle was not just defying the U.S., that he believed in the long run, he was doing the U.S. a favour. In addition, political columnist Walter Lippman called the act of recognition one which the West would approve someday.187

When one looks back, as far as deGaulle was immediately concerned, diplomatic recognition of Peking would go well with left-wing parties in France in an election year. In the international sphere, recognition was in line with the general fluidity of French foreign policy, with the idea of a leading role in Europe, with a basis for a conference on Southeast Asia,188 and with the new prestige of France in Africa. The period from late 1963 to early 1964 has been termed as the French "year of defiance" when France vetoed British entry into the E.E.C., when deGaulle refused to sign the nuclear test ban treaty, and when he recognized China.

However, it may be contended that the Chinese got the better piece of the pie.189 In the end, it was clear that there was little scope for the expansion of French economic relations with China; that country did not need to have diplomatic recognition in order to trade. The international
France was an important second language, the school system was patterned under the French, and many plantation owners were French. Also, as a former colonial power France could have exerted influence in Hanoi as well as Saigon, because leaders in both capitals had had experience with the French.
In the interview with Mai Chin, Chen Yi declared that "General de Gaulle is right to resist the United States in Europe." When reminded that de Gaulle did not favour a dual hegemony, he responded that China did not favour a five-fold hegemony either, even though there "will never be too many allies on behalf of peace." Chou En-lai added that the

was very struck by General de Gaulle's criticism in his last press conference of the Russian and American plans for world hegemony. And also, by the phrase "the Pacific where the fate of the world will be played out." It would seem that the Chinese leadership was paying particular attention to those of de Gaulle's comments which suited their own policies. The Chinese responses leave the question open as to what was acceptable to China. If China did not favour a five-fold hegemony with India as a prospective member, in addition to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., France and China, then, what was the alternative? If China had worldwide aspirations, was there the possibility of a three-power system with the Chinese league as the "third" power? Moreover, if the fate of the world was to be played out in the periphery of China, perhaps there were prospects for a superpower status, in which China would participate in global decisions, or better still, for Chinese leadership of the revolutionary movements — itself a "world saving" endeavor in Chinese eyes. Once more, traces of Third Force orientations can be detected.

Thus, it can be safely said that the French policy of
independence from the U.S. was very important for China, de Gaulle was perceived as a crucial ally in the imperialist camp, and a good medium for encouraging dissentions within the West. Consequently, China was wooing France in the hope of seeing the establishment of a steadily widening sphere of influence directed against the superpowers. As evidence of China's interest in seeing the spirit of independence flourish within the second intermediate zone countries besides France, we may note the January 21, 1964 issue of People's Daily which cited undocumented quotes by Alistair Douglas-Hume, by de Gaulle, by Ludwig Erhard, and by Japanese leaders, which proclaimed independence from the U.S. Besides promoting divisions within NATO, China also sought the breakup of SEATO as well, since both Britain and France belonged to it, and since SEATO was perceived to be an obstacle to Chinese aspirations.

In looking at the similarity between the two policies once again, the concern of France with the East, that is, the communist world, was somewhat identical with China's concern with the West. While not as volatile as was China in provoking more schisms in the Eastern World, nevertheless, the French provocateur role can still be detected. Both J. Daniel and Guy de Carnoy describe de Gaulle's position as follows: the multifaceted contradictions in the communist world, should give the West a leeway to press for solutions to important problems such as Vietnam. De Gaulle foresaw the outcome of the war and the probable rise of China as a
great power in the region, he desired neutrality for Southeast Asia, and he realized that any solution of the issues in that area would not come to fruition without Chinese consent. De Gaulle's solution was to move in, not only to reestablish a strong French political influence in that region, but also, through better relations with China, to acquire guarantees for the non-communication of South Vietnam.

The dissatisfaction with the dual hegemony and the futility of attempting remedial action within the alliance framework led both countries to follow converging paths of policy, resulting in diplomatic recognition which hopefully would lead to the establishment of a Third Force.

Unfortunately, for both China and France, the superpowers were still in a dominant position in the early 70's, their leadership still uncathed, and both China and France were still second rate powers. This leads up to the factors which undermined the Third Force movement between China and France.
VIII. Factor: Undermining "The Third Force"

The "Third Force" was not successful, because from the beginning there were weaknesses in it—the incompatibilities between the French and the Chinese notion of the Third Force, as well as the irreconcilable conflicts within each of these notions.

As it developed, neither France nor China considered the Third Force relationship to be mutual, reciprocal, or egalitarian. Rather, each country was acting on its own, and was concerned only for its own interests. As far as China was concerned, the Third Force would be led by China, and the French as well wanted to dominate it. Consequently, there were no provisions for coordinated, planned action.

In addition, while both countries would be in the Third Force, the only official reasons which they gave for diplomatic recognition were of a pragmatic nature, such as economic gain and cultural benefits, as the pre-recognition commentary indicated. However, such considerations, if not reinforced by deeper philosophical commitments, are shortlived, since pragmatic commitments of an economic sort are susceptible to reversal, on account of changes in trade policy and world economic conditions. Indeed, the China market did not prove to be as lucrative as it once was hoped it would be. Even the commitment to oppose the superpowers was unstable, because of limited capabilities, and because of significant changes in the international system.
aside, according to Stephen Brumfer, the French advantages from the Chinese association were dubious, because, after all, de Gaulle did not conclude an "alliance" with the Chinese. Instead, he "merely established diplomatic relations," and he did not withdraw either from the Atlantic Alliance or from the SEO. Thus, he showed his political opportunism. His withdrawal from NATO was not explicitly related to the sino-French rapprochement, and the strategic location of France in the European heartland could still afford France the luxury of American protection without French commitments.

Hence, no deep political commitments were undertaken by either China or France, although at the time of the agreement to establish diplomatic relations, the undertaking was perceived by both Chinese and French leaders, as well as by the superpowers and the influential press in the West, as a major initiative.

Along with these undermining factors which appear on the surface, there were additional weakening factors associated with Chinese and French notions of the Third Force, as well as discrepancies between the notions, which were detrimental to its success. Hence, according to the Chinese notion, it was clear that between the imperialist world and the socialist camp, there lay the two intermediate zones. China, an aspiring great power, was seeking influence and involvement in global politics at the expense of Washington and Moscow, through these intermediate zones. This aim,
however, was antithetical to the Marxist doctrine of support for leftist revolution in both the developed and the developing world. A viable, Chinese-led Third Force would need the political support, not of revolutionaries, but of the governments in those intermediate zones. Hence, there appears a contradiction between one of the aims of the Third Force, that is, the opposition to superpower hegemony, and another aim, the support for revolutions.

One more flaw was ingrained in the use of the "country-side-cities" analogy, which was incompatible with the employment of the second intermediate zone concept. The reader is reminded that, in addition to North America, Western Europe as well was considered as one of the cities of the world, which would be engulfed and smothered by the countryside. How this would square with China's attempts to organize the coalition of the second intermediate zone, which would include Europe, was not clear.

As far as the contrast between the Chinese view of the aims of the Third Force, and the French view of these aims was concerned, it appears that France and China espoused the Third Force concept for different reasons. The Chinese were not interested in deGaulle's concept of a neutral Asia, or for his desire for détente. Rather, they wanted to use the new relationship in order to counter U.S. influence, and to reduce Khrushchev's power in international affairs.

DeGaulle also wanted China to put more pressure on the
"U.S.S.R. in the area of international relations, now that China had become independent. This was for the purpose of perhaps persuading the Soviets to agree to a Southeast Asian peace on de Gaulle's pattern, or to lessen the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe, or perhaps even compete with the U.S.S.R. in the international arena. However, the pressure which Peking applied was not inter-state pressure, but pressure of an unorthodox nature, since China became the rallying point of all the radical elements of the communist movement against the Soviet Union. This was a new and innovative pressure on ideological terms, something which may not have been in line with the policies of de Gaulle—although the end result may not have been repulsive to him.

In addition, the Chinese were once again returning to an older position, which by now had become obsolete, that is, the return within the pre-nuclear bastion based on the superiority of manpower. Although Mao did not overtly say so, Malraux infers in Anti-Memoirs, that according to Mao, there would be a victory for Communism, simply because Russia, China, and India constituted over half the population of the globe. As Mao Tse-tung's and Chou En-lai's views on "People's War"* came close to confirming this

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*Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai reject the importance of the strength of nuclear weapons against the people in a "People's War." For more details on the Chinese theory of People's War, and on the strategy of "protracted warfare," that is, the strategy of luring the (cont. on next page)
attitude, it becomes clear that this apparent lack of fear of a devastating nuclear war was reflected in the futile Chinese attempts of the 1960s to unite the Third World (the many) against the superpowers (the few), on the basis of the many being able to overcome the few, no matter how well equipped the latter were. Perhaps China had not yet grasped the realities and the potentialities of nuclear warfare, nor the range and force of great power commitments spread throughout the globe by investments, by treaties, and by military presence, all of these not so easily denounced by local governments, or given up by the superpowers, or discredited by Chinese propaganda.

The plight of any Third Force movement becomes apparent, when one considers that the 1960s was a period when the capabilities of the superpowers had reached the stage when any coalition, including the rival superpower and its allies, dared not present a mortal threat to either superpower, because of the prevailing balance of terror (I refer to the possession of I.C.B.M.s and A.B.M.s). Hence, in looking at the reasons why the Third Force failed, it is necessary to look at the "realities" of the situation, instead of the decisionmakers' "perceptions" of it. Thus, regardless of what decisionmakers thought of their country's capabilities, or of what they proclaimed them to be, the capabil-

ities of the superpowers were such that a coalition led by China or by France would have small chance of success in "eliminating" U.S. imperialism as China had hoped, or in being an effective balancer between the superpowers as France had hoped.

Robert A. Scalapino writes that at this time, (around 1954), the People's Republic of China was not in a position to engage in nation to nation competition with the U.S. 201 Likewise, the London Institute for Strategic Studies contends that the Chinese relied heavily on manpower, and it also adds that China was far from being in a position to claim the status of a great or a medium military power. This was on account of the lack of nuclear bombers, compounded by a primitive delivery system and a backward pilot training program, which had resulted from a lack of spare parts and few practice flights. 202 In addition, there were problems with the primitive radar network. The relatively small navy, and difficulties in mobilization, coupled with inadequate logistics support, did not redeem the situation. Michael Yahuda goes on to say that China was in effect, "challenging both superpowers... before...(it)... had nuclear capability against either". 203

Thus, the Chinese could compete only by promoting global revolution. However, as it turned out, China could not

*With additional variables, such as domestic problems and pressures in the U.S., one could say that U.S. imperialism may have been induced to "retreat".
accomplish even this mission. The Chinese directly supported guerrilla war which were aflame mostly around the Chinese periphery in Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos, countries which were linked with the feared U.S. encirclement of China. In the case of revolutions in other parts of the globe, China was unwilling, or, better still, unable to commit herself, apart from giving moral support. The Chinese argument that revolutions must have local support if they are to succeed was only half true, as revolutions need outside backers as well. Hence the argument was a face-saving one, designed to cover China's inability to support most of them, and it undermined China's credibility as a leader of revolutionary endeavours. In addition, the advocacy of revolutions on the Chinese model, contradicted China's contention that, as was the case in China, every revolution has its own characteristics and nuances.

Hence, there were many weaknesses in the Chinese concept of the Third Force. These weaknesses ranged from the miscalculation about the capabilities of the superpowers and the lack of capabilities on the part of the lesser powers, to the mutual cancelling out of some of the Chinese Third Force notions. For example, the contradiction between the intermediate zone idea and the countryside-cities analogy, put more hurdles in the obstacle-laden course to the realization of the Chinese Third Force project.

Turning to the consideration of French capabilities, Guy de Carmoy contends that France as a minor nuclear power
did not possess a credible second-strike capability. He is supported in this respect by Raymond Aron, in that, even if all thirty "large" bombers in combat readiness were launched again to the U.S.S.R., decisionmakers must be prepared to accept the destruction of France at the cost of only a partial loss for the U.S.S.R. Roy C. Macridis sums up the problem France was facing by pointing out one of the irreconcilable contradictions in de Gaulle's concept of the Third Force, namely the ambiguity as to what the European Third Force would consist of. For instance, Germany was a nagging problem because

"...a Third Force in Europe without West Germany and without wholehearted British commitment could not be strong enough."

But if Germany was included, she might assume the predominant role in Europe. France's tragic dilemma was that she was not strong enough to go it alone, and all the schemes for European unity underlined the basic weakness of the French, not only in respect to the U.S., but also in respect to the U.S.S.R., to Great Britain, and to West Germany. This dilemma was compounded by the French unwillingness to join a European federal state. In addition, some of the Third Force notions, such as European Unity and Neutralist Unity, were formulated under the stresses and strains of the Cold War-plagued 1950's. In the 60's the intensity of these movements was lessened, but France clung to them, and attempted to use them for her own purposes at a time when nationalism, which is detrimental to any federative
movement, was in vogue again.

It is evident that the attempts of both China and France to organize a viable Third Force against the superpowers were bound to be futile. In the words of François Fejtö...

...the convergences in the interests and designs of Paris and Peking...(were)...too limited to speak seriously of the establishment of a Paris-Peking axis, or of a league of the malcontents in the two blocs. 207

What is more, the periodic French overtures to Moscow irritated China, and might have contributed to the later Chinese efforts for a rapprochement with the U.S. By the same token, when U.S. President Johnson decided to halt the bombing of North Vietnam in 1968 and to negotiate a peace agreement, one major policy problem between the U.S. and Gaullist France was at any rate temporarily removed.*

Later in 1968, there occurred the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact countries under Russian instigation, in a successful attempt to suppress Prague's short, liberal "springtime". Whereas before this event, both China and France had expressed major apprehensions about the U.S. in its superpower capacity as far as their ambitions were concerned, (China had the fear of U.S. encirclement, and France blamed her-power frustrations in the Western camp on the U.S.) after the invasion, the Soviet Union now merited apprehension on the part of both China.

*Although Nixon reintroduced the bombing in 1972, the French insolence of the deGaulle years was a thing of the past, and the trend towards relatively smooth Sino-American relations was already set.
The imposition of the Brezhnev doctrine in Eastern Europe raised some apprehensions in China. Jack Smith, in a pamphlet "singing the praises of the Chinese line, justified the Chinese stance when he declared that in the Czecho-Slovakian case, the Soviets..."

...allege that such an act as rendering military aid to a fraternal country to do away with the threat to the socialist system is in the common interests of the camp of socialism and is upholding the sovereignty of another country... (The Chinese think that)...this is not and out gangsterism put out by the new Czars to justify their aggression.

He goes on to say that China feared that this "limited sovereignty" doctrine might be applied to China as well.

With deGaulle's denunciation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in his press conference of September 9, 1968, it can be safely concluded that the Czechoslovakian crisis was the turning point in Sino-French relations in regard to the U.S. Suddenly, the Franco-American split, never really that antagonistic or inimical in the first place because deGaulle's position was that in a genuine crisis France would side with the U.S., was toned down. One might ask, since both France and China disapproved of the invasion, why did it not serve to reinforce the Sino-French relation-

*A policy which is also referred to as the "doctrine of limited sovereignty". This was concocted by the Soviet Union after the invasion of Czechoslovakia, in order to rationalize its policy in that country. The U.S.S.R. claimed that it had the right to intervene in any socialist country, in order to protect the interests of communism from outside menaces and from domestic decadence.*
chip? The answer to this lies in the differences in the intensity of disapproval. France did not feel directly threatened. In his press conference of September 3, 1956, de Gaulle mentioned the threat to Europe, and his hope that nationalism would continue to flourish in Eastern Europe. Besides, from the Western point of view, the invasion was a gesture of despair by the Soviet Union, and a sign of the fact that Communism can only maintain itself by force. However, China saw the invasion as a first step to the invasion of China, and hence, the degree of Chinese disapproval of the invasion, as well as the reasons for such a disapproval, were different from that of France.

The Chinese and French support for the Arabs in the Middle East conflict again was not identical. France gave mostly material and only implicit moral support to the Arabs. This was in line with France's interest in the Mediterranean, and with the desire of establishing the independence of France from the pro-Israeli foreign policy of the U.S. Of no little consideration also were the politics of Arab oil, the profits from arms sales to the Arabs, and perhaps the lessening of the U.S.S.R.'s influence in the Middle East.

China, however, supported the Arabs and especially the Palestinians, only through propaganda, and only to keep up with its line on giving moral support to "oppressed" and revolutionary peoples. If China wished to lessen Soviet influence in the area, it would have had to give substantial
military aid to the Arab, something which did not materialize.

With the passing of de Gaulle, Pompidou was less grandiose in foreign policy, and with France's economic problem increasing, foreign policy issues did not receive such emphasis in that country.*

As for China, there was ping-pong diplomacy, and it led to the Nixon visit and to improved overall relations with the U.S., especially after the gradual military pullout from Vietnam. In the meantime, border clashes with the U.S.S.R. in 1969 had aggravated the already volatile Sino-Soviet relationship.

Thus, the U.S., a major stumbling block for the aspirations of both China and France, was perceived in a better light by both countries after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. From the Third Force perspective, what may be called a *modus vivendi* was reached with the United States.

Hence, the *raison d'être* for the Third Force ceased to be.

*There were controversies as far as French policy in the Middle East war concerned. Israel seized several gunboats from the port of Cherbourg in 1970, which had been bought by Israel but not delivered by France. As several high level French officials were suspected of having aided the seizure—they were accused of looking the other way—speculation grew that French policy toward Israel may have changed. However, Pompidou suspended several functionaries involved, and, in keeping with the traditional French desire to reassert herself in the Mediterranean, he calculated that the Arab states were indispensable. Thus, he reassured them of French support after the gunboat coup, and he continued the embargo against Israel. See *Newsweek*, Jan. 5, 1970, p. 22, Jan. 12, 1970, pp. 27-8, *Time*, Feb. 2, 1970, pp. 15-16; *Nation*, Feb. 2, 1970, pp. 103-4.
strong, because one of the powers which the Third Force
directed against, the United States, was accommodated
in Chinese and French policies.

The preceding were the major obstacles to the successful
organization of a Third Force against the superpowers by
China and France. In addition to the basic weakness of
both countries in relation to the superpowers, and the am-
biguities and contradictions within the French and Chinese
notion of the Third Force as well as between them, there
were other factors which contributed to the failure of the
Third Force idea. Even though these factors may have been
of lesser importance, they were, nevertheless, influential.
As it turned out, France could not carry much weight with
either the U.S.S.R. or with China. Any attempt at rapp-
rochement with the two powers would have antagonized both
of them. Even the French courting of China did not induce
much response either from the U.S.S.R. or from China it-
self, in the long run. Perhaps neither the Soviet Union
nor China attached too much importance to French policies.

On the contrary, France and China, instead of concen-
trating on, and cultivating their own relationships, gave
indications that they were more concerned about the policies
of the superpowers than those of each other. Thus, the
Sino-French third force was "other oriented"; it was a
response to the policies of others, rather than a initiative
in itself. The same preoccupation with the superpowers
can be seen in both Chinese and French drives for independ-
ence. Although Holsti and Sullivan do not emphasize the fact, their data indicate that for both China and France, the main quarrel was with the policies of the alliance leader, the superpower, rather than with the alliance as a whole. 211

Even the aim of increasing the volume of mutual trade, indicated during the period of recognition, did not meet with much success. China's trade with West Germany, with whom there were no formal relations, with Italy, and with the United Kingdom, was greater than the trade with France in the 1960's. As late as 1969, the China issue of the Union Research Institute shows a trade volume for China and Germany which was double that of Sino-French trade.

Not only did the Sino-French Third Force not solve its difficulties, both those ingrained and those arising later, but also the Sino-French relationship itself vacillated between hostility and friendship after 1968. The Peking Review of May 24, 1968 praised the student-worker strikes in France, and on May 31 denounced the French government as reactionary. Some Peking Review articles continued to support the strikes even in July. Harold Hinton asserts that Peking gave some financial support to the demonstrators. 212 It should be mentioned here that China's method of support for any revolutionary group or movement outside its borders is largely verbal.* Generally speaking, moral

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*Sometimes, guerrilla training, arms, funds, and political advice are given. However, this kind (cont. on next page)
Support is given through the publication of a statement by Mao, supporting the movement, or any article which explains and/or supports the movement, or any mention of the movement in the press. Since most Western European communist parties were Moscow oriented, Peking and rook to support the newly founded and Peking oriented "Marxist-Leninist" parties, not excluding the French one. For example, on January 14, 1968, the New China News Agency reported the meeting of French Marxist-Leninist and the founding of their party. This was also reported by the Peking Review on January 15, 1968 and the party's activities were reported by the Peking Review on July 26, 1968.

In contrast to the Chinese anti-French government stance in that period—and the cultural revolution may have played a part in such a stance—at the time of deGaulle's death in 1970, the Chinese flag was flown at half mast and Mao sent a personal letter of condolences to Mme. deGaulle.** War and relations were in effect in the early '70's when the

*(cont.) of aid is given only on a limited scale overseas. See Harold Hinton, China's Turbulent Quest, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1972, pp. 195-196.
China does have an official foreign aid program on a state to state basis. Substantial foreign aid has been received by Pakistan and Tanzania among a limited number of others. For details, see for instance, Kurt Müller, Richard W. Weber, trans., The Foreign Aid Programme of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China, New York; Macmillan, 1968.

**Mao called the passing away of deGaulle unfortunate, and praised him as "...a dauntless fighter against fascist aggression for the defense of the national independence of France". Peking Review, November 13, 1970, pp. 3-4.
French national day was celebrated in Peking and French foreign minister Schuman visited China in July, 1972. 213

As for France, with the prospect of American withdrawal from Europe and the possibility of eventual Soviet superiority there, the French, as of late, became implicit supporters of NATO, opposing American withdrawal and balanced force reductions. At the same time, they desired better relations with the Soviet Union. This was demonstrated by the belated French support for the Soviet-sponsored European Security Conference. Once again, the French were ambivalent as to who were their friends and enemies. While the French were playing down the importance of such a conference—a diplomatic snub at the U.S.S.R.—they were simultaneously sensitive to anything in the agenda which might make the Soviets uncomfortable. 214

Despite the aforementioned instability of the Sino-French relationship, both China and France still hope for the realization of some sort of a Third Force. The N.sinhua Weekly on February 4, 1974, proclaimed that "the Third world is united against the superpowers" and the January 21 issue of 1974 quotes Pierre Messmer as saying that he endorses a European united front in foreign policies and French solidarity with the Third world. It would follow, then, that a coalition against the superpowers is still pursued, and the rivalry with the superpowers is still kept up, at least by the Chinese. The November 19, 1973 issue of the N.sinhua Weekly attacks the Soviet hegemony in Europe,
and the issue of February 4, 1974 praises and approves of European efforts for unity in the face of Soviet opposition to such a movement.

As for France, former Foreign Minister Michele Jobert, a man with a 60's mentality, still advocates the Third Force, being optimistic for some form of a united Europe, even though that movement is beset by problems. In addition, Giscard d'Estaing himself most recently said that

...Europe can rely on itself to organize itself.
...The modern world will only really be the modern world when the place of Europe on its map is no longer simply torn.
Conclusion

This paper has attempted to examine the Sino-French relationship in the 1950's, from the point of view of the Third Force concept, that is, a relationship which was Third Force oriented. The Third Force concept was concentrated upon because of the similarities in Chinese and French foreign policies, and particularly because one aspect of their foreign policies tended to revolve around the concept of the Third Force. The choice was also made in order to help fill the gap in the literature about this concept and on the way it has been employed in the actual conduct of bilateral relations.

Third Force behaviour was broadly defined as any attempt by China and France to promote and perhaps lead a coalition of non-superpowers, for the purpose of standing up against the superpowers. A workable framework was settled on, which was concerned with the dissatisfaction with the superpower dominated status quo, followed by an examination of the action taken to remedy the situation, and then, terminating in an analysis and evaluation of the results.

Dissatisfaction with the leaders of the international environment was established through the awareness of the loss of power formerly held by both China and France. As a consequence, there were attempts by both of them to restore that power, but both attempts were frustrated by the superpowers. The various disputes which ensued came to be known as the Sino-Soviet and the Franco-American splits.
...As a result, the Third Force actors took independent paths to power which culminated in Third Force action.
Both schisms required the Third Force actors to be independent from the superpowers. China and France saw each other as possible Third Force members, since both identified themselves as independents, and both maneuvered consciously for power in order to undermine the superpowers.

In order to accomplish this aim, they needed better relations with each other and eventually with all the non-superpowers. Both China and France had their own versions, or methods of achieving the Third Force. However, the hope of realizing such a force did not materialize beyond the diplomatic recognition stage, since there were contradictions both between the French and the Chinese notions of the Third Force, as well as within each notion.

Finally, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent need felt by both China and France to improve relations with the U.S. undermined the rationale for the Third Force. This occurred when the United States, which was one of the two powers against which the Third Force was directed, was accommodated in Chinese and French foreign policies. Hence, the Third Force had outlived its usefulness.

The above is a brief summary of the contents of this paper. Needless to say, this author is confident that from the facts presented a reasonable case could be made for examining the Sino-French relationship from the perspective
of the Third force concept, and this is what he has tried
to do in this paper.

Having completed the argument, we may now venture to
analyze the failure of the Sino-French Third Force from the
point of view of a theoretical basis, starting from the
fundamental variables which were instrumental in the Chinese
and French splits with their respective alliance leaders.
These factors included strong leadership, \(^{216}\) regime stab-
ility, \(^{217}\) nationalism, and independence-oriented foreign
policies.

Yet, this very nationalism, this very idiosyncratic
leadership, this desire for independence, may have para-
doxically contributed just as much to the lack of unity
between France and China as they did to the Franco-American
and to the Sino-Soviet Splits. The unpredictability of
challenged and idiosyncratic leadership could very well
have led to the reversal of policies. The espousal of
nationalism and of the philosophy of independence may also
have had some disuniting effects on the Third Force.

At the time of the establishment of relations between
China and France, there were expectations that a fruitful
and longlasting relationship might be established. Perhaps,
even at that time, it would have been too much to assume
that a formal alliance might ensue, because alliances nor-
mally stress the element of military cooperation between
states. However, superficially at least, the prospects for
diplomatic and political collaboration seemed good.
Why then were the results so disappointing? The study of international collaboration is underdeveloped, but an examination of the limited range of materials available may provide some clues that will help to explain the inability of the Sino-French relationship to reach the take-off point. In this regard, K.J. Holsti furnishes us with some factors which are important for international collaboration. These are: a) coinciding interests, b) agreement on the substance of transactions toward certain objectives, and c) official and unofficial rules governing those transactions. 218

France and China did have the necessary coinciding interests (a), which helped to promote the idea of possible collaboration between the two powers. These coinciding interests were based on a fundamental desire to revise the status quo and to enhance their power, but France and China could not agree on (b) and (c), that is, the ways to be used in order to revise the international system, and thus, their collaboration was not successful.

Holsti also advises that international collaboration quite often takes place under the auspices of international organizations which are conducive to the "formulation of common policies or coordination of separate national policies", 219 guided by certain procedures, plans, and proposals. Needless to say, the Sino-French relationship was, to say the least, not an international organization resembling for instance the EEC, and furthermore, it is safe to say that between France and China there was no
formulation of common policies or coordination of national policies. Perhaps this was to because France and China's interests, even though they were converging, were not completely identical or even complementary, so as to make the atmosphere conducive for both countries to recognize the advantage of cooperation, of consultation, and of sensitivity to each other's interests. 220

Holsti goes on to say that when collaboration takes place, decisions are made more on the basis of mutual needs than on power, prestige, capability, or reputation, 221 contrary to what was the case between France and China. Intercommunication, which might have helped in the enterprise, because it can predict actions and produce responsive behaviour, 222 was no more intensive between France and China, than between any other two countries with diplomatic relations.

In addition to the lack of reinforcing factors such as extensive trade and other transactions, there was the important lack of consensus about who was the common enemy—if there was one. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Franco-American split was muted, and China was alternating the direction of its attacks between U.S. Imperialism and Soviet revisionism.

Finally, when incompatible values exist between the participants, or different long-range objectives or national aspirations, there can be no precise criteria for agreement on the resolution of common problems. 223 The final chapter
attests that this was the case with the Sino-French Third
Force relationship, and hence, the relationship was pre-
maturely aborted or allowed to lapse.
Appendix I

Significant Events in Chinese Foreign Policy

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<th>Specific Events *</th>
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<td><em>(China was a loyal Socialist camp member).</em></td>
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<td>1954-1957</td>
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Appendix I (cont.)

Oct.-Nov. Sino-Indian border war.

1963
March 8 Peking raised the "unequal treaties" question with Moscow.

1964
Jan. 27 France recognized Peking.
Oct. 16 China exploded her first atomic bomb.

1965
The Vietnam War was escalated.
Sept. 3 Lin Piao published Long Live the Victory of People's War.
Sept. 29 Chen Yi mentioned the possibility of a Sino-Soviet war.

1966
Jan. The U.S.S.R. renewed an alliance with Mongolia and reinforced military units there.
June 17 China exploded her first H bomb.

1965-1968
The Cultural Revolution.
A low international profile.
Appendix I (cont.)

1968-1970

Period of Unsettlement.
The Search for new definitions.

1968

Aug. 21 The U.S.S.R. invaded
Czecho-slovakia.

Aug. 23 China denounced the
invasion.

Sept. 12 Albania withdrew
from the Warsaw Pact.

Oct. 13-31 CCP Central Commit-
tee meeting. Mao branded
U.S.S.R. as a major enemy.

Nov. 25 Peking proposed the
resumption of ambassadorial
talks with the U.S.

1969

March 2 The Sino-Soviet clash
on Champao island.

March 17 Brezhnev denounced
China in a Budapest Warsaw Pact
meeting.

May Peking began to send am-
bassadors back to their posts.
The Cultural Revolution ended.

July Nixon eased trade and
cultural relations on China.

1970

May 20 Mao denounced the U.S.

1970+

Chou En-lai's ascendancy.
Appendix I (cont.)

Detente with the U.S.

for its Cambodian invasion.

July 1 Nixon said that better relations with China would help the U.S. cope with the U.S.S.R.

1971

West Pakistan vs. East Pakistan.

April U.S. table tennis team visited China.

July 9-11 Kissinger's first visit to China.

Oct. 25 Peking entered the U.N.
Appendix II

Significant Events in Gaullist Foreign Policy


1959  March 7  DeGaulle took the first step towards a withdrawal from NATO.

March 25  Camp David meeting between Eisenhower and Khrushchev.

1960  Feb. 13  First French atomic bomb was exploded at Rapsane.

1961  July 31  Great Britain made her first bid to enter the EEC.

1962  October  The Cuban Missile Crisis.


1963  Jan. 14  DeGaulle disagreed with the Nassau accords, and rejected Great Britain's bid to enter the Common Market.

Jun. 22  The Franco-German treaty of cooperation was signed.

Aug. 5  The Moscow test ban treaty was signed.

1964  Jan. 27  France recognized Peking.

April  New steps were taken to withdraw from NATO.

Oct. 16  China exploded her first nuclear bomb.

Appendix II (cont.)

1965 The ECSC, EEC, and the EEC merger.

1966 Feb. 21 France withdrew from NATO.

June 26-29 DeGaulle's trip to Moscow.

1967 June 3-9 The Middle East Six Day War.

June 17 China exploded her first H bomb.

July 24-27 DeGaulle's trip to Canada.

Nov. 27 DeGaulle refused to reopen talks for British entry into the EEC.

1968 July 1 Signing of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

Aug. 21 The Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia.
Footnote:


2. Ibid, p. 100.


4. Ibid, p. 150.


16. Loc. cit.


22. Ibid, p. 74.

23. Ibid, p. 75.

24. Ibid, p. 86.


27. Ibid, pp. 28-29.


29. Spanier, op. cit., p. 87.

30. Loc. cit.


32. Ibid, p. 74.

33. Ibid, p. 90.

34. Ibid, p. 76.

35. Ibid, p. 81.


38. Strausz-Hupé, op. cit., p. 185.


44. Peter Lyon, Neutrality (Great Britain; Leicester University Press, 1969), pp. 64-65.


46. Lyon, op. cit., p. 64.

47. Scalapino, op. cit., p. 329.


50. Ibid., pp. 177-8.

51. Ibid., p. 178.


54. Guy Mollet, "France and Europe" in Foreign Affairs, April, 1954, p. 270.

57. Roy C. Macridis, op. cit., Foreign Policy in World Politics, p. 84.
58. Ibid., p. 99.
60. Ibid., p. 80.
61. loc. cit.
68. Morgenthau and Thompson, loc. cit.
69. Macridis, op. cit., Foreign Policy in World Politics, p. 72.
70. Hassner, op. cit., p. 53.


78. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 121.


8. Ojha, *op. cit.*, *Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition*, pp. 13, 44.

90. For details, see Henry Bertram Hill, trans., The Political Testament of Cardinal Micollet (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press), 1961, pp. 76-8, 94-103.


93. Ibid, p. 27.


99. Miller, loc. cit.


101. Ibid, pp. 7-10.

102. Ibid, p. 10.

103. Ojha, op. cit., Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition, p. 131.


111. Ibid., p. 205.
112. Ibid., pp. 204-212.
119. Diamond, op. cit., p. 79.
120. Macridis, op. cit., De Gaulle Impeccable Ally, p. 137.
121. Ibid., p. 134.
125. Loc. cit.

129. Loc. cit.


133. Ibid., pp. 854, 856.

134. Ibid., p. 860.


136. Ibid., p. 17.


139. Ojha, op. cit., Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition, p. 50.

140. Hsu, op. cit., p. 27.


144. Ibid., p. 366.


146. Malraux, op. cit., p. 345.

147. Loc. cit.


149. Ibid., p. 148.

150. Loc. cit.

154. Ibid., p. 56.
155. Ibid., p. 257.
156. Malraux, op. cit., p. 368.
158. Pejto, op. cit., p. 60.
160. Ibid., p. 30.
164. Ibid., p. 94.
166. Holsti and Sullivan, op. cit., pp. 188-190.
172. Loc. cit.

J. Burnham, *op. cit.*, p. 150.


Loc. cit.


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Ibid, p. 344.


199. Foreign Policy in World Politics, pp. 72-73.
200. Ibid., p. 20.
205. Hassner, op. cit., p. 77.


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Spyros Chionos, son of Constantine and Catherine, was born in Greece on January 30, 1947. He received his primary education in Greece and Windsor, and his secondary education at J.C. Patteson Collegiate Institute in Windsor. His Bachelor of Arts degree was received from the University of Windsor in 1972. He was admitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, in the academic year 1972-73, for a Master of Arts degree.