The attitude of the Times towards Hitler's assumption and consolidation of power, between January 1933 and August 1934.

John Charles. Liandzi  
*University of Windsor*

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THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIMES

TOWARDS HITLER'S ASSUMPTION AND CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

BETWEEN JANUARY 1933 AND AUGUST 1934

by

John Charles Liandzi

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of
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ABSTRACT

THE ATTITUDE OF THE TIMES

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Examinations of The Times' attitude towards Hitler's Germany tend to concentrate on the period of Appeasement which evolved after 1936. As a result they neglect The Times' aspirations for peace, which the newspaper felt did not necessarily change because Hitler had been appointed Chancellor of Germany. This thesis, therefore, is a close examination of the articles on the consolidation period of Hitler's Germany, which appeared in The Times. It argues that, during this early period of the new Germany, The Times proceeded from the overriding considerations of disarmament and of collective security through the League of Nations. That The Times still promoted these causes long after it was clear that they were unattainable, was due in no small measure to Hitler's ability to exploit the pacifism of the period.
For present purposes, the thesis is divided into six considerations: criticisms and traditional views of *The Times* policy; personalities responsible for *The Times* policy; formation of the one-party state; early foreign policy; the "second revolution;" the Austrian crisis, and conclusions.

The introduction discusses the criticisms and traditional views of *The Times* policy, and points out their relationship to this discussion, and their limitations.

Chapter One puts into perspective the experiences and hopes of the Editor, Geoffrey Dawson, and the Assistant Editor, Robert Barrington-Ward, and how these affected the conduct of *The Times* policy. Both men were firm believers in the concept of disarmament and collective security, and under their direction *The Times* pursued these goals.

Chapter Two is concerned with *The Times* response to the creation of the one-party state. *The Times* overriding concern was that negative foreign opinion regarding Germany's domestic affairs might adversely affect disarmament.

Chapter Three examines *The Times* reactions to Hitler's foreign policy, namely his clandestine rearmament and Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference. Disarmament was so highly prized at *The Times* that Hitler's duplicity in this regard was all the more successful.

Chapter Four concentrates on Hitler's struggle for supremacy within his own political party. This was essentially a behind the scenes conflict; thus *The Times* Berlin Correspondent had difficulty in obtaining accurate information. The few public episodes only added to *The Times* confusion on the subject.
Chapter Five examines The Times' reaction to the Austrian crisis, the conclusion of which was rapidly followed by Hitler becoming Führer and Reich Chancellor. With this crisis The Times revealed the lengths to which it would go for the sake of disarmament.

The thesis concludes that The Times' policy towards Germany during the consolidation period was conducted with the highest motives—disarmament and collective security, each with Germany's participation. The policy was a failure for several reasons; The Times valued disarmament too highly, failed to associate Germany's aggressive internal development with possible external aggression, responded favourably to Hitler's pacific statements despite his contrary behaviour, and ultimately proved to Hitler that Europe would do little to thwart his designs.
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To Lou-Anne Grimwood and Irene Bellefeuille I owe the typescript.
INTRODUCTION

The Times has been described as "one of the chief glories of English journalism [holding an] unchallenged position as the most independent journal in England."1 This is a highly qualified assessment, purposefully made in the context of Britain's appeasement of Hitler's Germany and The Times' role in that policy. Indeed, Colin Coote, a leader writer for The Times, charged that events at Printing House Square were "a microcosm of what happened in Downing Street."2 Echoing Coote is the argument that The Times' policy represented little more than "journalistic surrender to the Nazis."3 Such charges and supporting evidence against The Times are, however, highly selective and pay scant attention to the memories of the War and the aspirations for a lasting peace which undoubtedly influenced The Times' attitude towards Germany, especially during the consolidation period (the period between Hitler's appointment as Chancellor on January 30, 1933 and the death of President von Hindenburg on August 2, 1934 when Hitler assumed the position of Führer and Reich Chancellor).


The suggestion that The Times was a "microcosm of...Downing Street" has a certain surface validity. In each instance the professional and personal relationships between Geoffrey Dawson (the Editor) and Prime Ministers MacDonald, Baldwin, and Chamberlain were of the best possible kind. If Dawson's own politics strengthened the social relationships with Baldwin and Chamberlain, so much the better. It would seem that any influence that Dawson may have exercised regarding policy was derived from a community of thought he shared with all three. With Prime Minister MacDonald this was collective security through the League. Under Baldwin this gave way to treaty revision, and under Chamberlain it was Appeasement.

On the other hand, the "microcosm" argument ignores the point that The Times, in name and in fact, was "independent." Its reputation was due considerably to its maintenance of this independence, even if it required a struggle against its proprietor (discussed more fully in Chapter One). With suitable cynicism one might suggest that The Times' independence was easier to maintain under MacDonald's National Government. The corollary would be that The Times was hand in glove with both Baldwin and Chamberlain. Neither assessment is correct; The Times found itself in agreement with and opposed to the government of the day, and the distinction was never left in doubt.

Similar difficulties arise in accepting the argument regarding The Times' "journalistic surrender to the Nazis." Again, because supporting evidence can be found, it has created a wholesale interpretation. The traditional view presented of The Times during the pre-war years has been of a newspaper whose correspondents' attempts to report accurately the
events in Germany were thwarted, not only by the National Socialist Government, but also by the machinations of Geoffrey Dawson, and by his even more enthusiastic subordinate, Robert Barrington-Ward. The most prominent feature of this view, the apparent conflict between the Editor and The Times' Berlin Correspondent, Norman Ebbutt,4 came into sharp focus in Dawson's correspondence regarding Ebbutt's expulsion from Germany in 1937. In a letter to The Times' Geneva Correspondent, Dawson expressed surprise at the expulsion because he had been doing his "utmost, night after night, to keep out of the paper anything that might have hurt [the Germans'] susceptibilities."5 Even worse was a second admission. Dawson wrote, in a letter to Lord Lothian dated May 23, 1937, that "I spend my nights...dropping in little things which are intended to soothe them."6 Added to this was Barrington-Ward's dictum that it was "one thing to report a foreign situation to London, and another to be deciding in London what the attitude should be. If The Times' policy was to be conciliatory, then it was expected that the correspondent should bear that fact in mind."7

4Norman Ebbutt was the Berlin Correspondent to The Times; however, he was assisted by D. L. Reed, and they both submitted reports to The Times. Consistent with The Times' policy, all articles appeared with the by-line "From Our Own Correspondent;" therefore, reference will be made always to "the Berlin Correspondent" when examining articles on Germany which originated from the Berlin Office of The Times.


During the consolidation period at least, the Berlin Correspondent appears to have had little difficulty with either Dawson or Barrington-Ward. His comments, frequently contrary to The Times' view, appeared prominently, and on occasion even on the same page as leading articles which took the opposite stand. Furthermore, Dawson was wise enough to acknowledge that Ebbutt was The Times' expert on German events, so much so that at least on one occasion, in correspondence regarding the Austrian crisis, Dawson asked Ebbutt's advice on how to deal with the material he was providing (see page 135).

The Times' critics have tended to concentrate on the period after 1936, but their remarks have been applied to The Times' attitude towards the entire pre-war period of Hitler's Germany. The intention here, therefore, is to examine The Times' attitude towards the consolidation period. It will be argued that the evident 'wait and see' policy was legitimately pursued. This is not to deny its faults, but to say that they resulted from The Times' misreading the evidence of this period of Germany's development, with the tragic consequences that The Times counselled conciliation long after events had proven its futility.

For the purposes of this study, the consolidation period of National Socialist Germany has been divided into four areas: formation of the one-party state; early foreign policy; the "second revolution;" and the Austrian crisis. Research has required a detailed examination of all articles on German affairs which appeared in The Times from January 31, 1933 to August 3, 1934. The views and interpretations in these articles have been compared with contemporary and later analyses of the period.
It is anticipated that this study will provide a means to understanding the motives behind The Times' policy, and provide a source for further study of this period.

The Times' decision to "wait and see" was born of increasing British sympathy for Germany's difficulties under the Treaty of Versailles, and the growing belief that many of its provisions required revision. Equally important was The Times' unfailing support for the League of Nations, and the conviction that "collective security" would have meaning only if all the Powers participated freely and wholeheartedly. The Times believed that Germany would willingly participate in foreign policy discussions, but only if her internal reconstruction was achieved without outside interference.

The Times' "wait and see" attitude had another aspect. In Britain at least, Hitler's rise to power had been viewed largely in terms of the evident buffoonery of the National Socialist Party, but this view failed to perceive that the clownish parades and exhortations masked its more sinister aspects. Even on the day Hitler took office, British refusal to take him seriously found expression in a Daily Herald article which described Hitler as "highly strung as a girl and vain as a matinee idol. As a demagogue the little man is superb."8 Indeed, Hitler never seemed less likely to succeed as chancellor than on the day of his appointment. His minority position in the Cabinet was aggravated by his openly inimical relationship with Vice Chancellor Franz von Papen, and particularly with

Alfred Hugenberg, leader of the Nationalist Party (D. N. V. P.), and Minister of Economics and Agriculture jointly. Hitler was still seen as the "drummer" of his industrialist backers, and it was confidently expected that he would be cast aside at the first opportunity. When he made it plain that he intended to stay, many in Britain became 
"aesthetically disturbed" by the more enthusiastic manifestations of the Nazi movement."9 Others in Britain, including The Times, took a more intellectual view of German developments; for this group, "the issues raised by Nazi Germany turned not upon its internal policy [but] whether Nazi German foreign policy was a threat to peace or whether it could be contained and opposed without war."10

Germany answered the question of containment during the consolidation period, but the warning went unheeded at The Times. The problem lay with The Times' delineation between Germany's internal and external policies. Hitler's domestic consolidation, with all the accompanying crudeness and absurdity, remained a matter on which Germans alone could decide. The Times was more exercised by Hitler's external policies, the key being his attitude towards the League and the Disarmament Conference. This was a tactical error on The Times' part because the regime's true colours were revealed in the repressions and militarisation of its populace, not in any pacific speeches or non-aggression pacts. Consequently, The Times continued to counsel that discussion was the best way, unable to realise


that the possibility of containing Hitler's ambitions via judicious con-
cessions did not, and would not exist.

These preceding considerations taken together suggest that The
Times' attitude towards Germany during the consolidation period proceeded
from the honest belief that the street orator, comic aspects aside, once
in a position of responsibility, would be sobered by the enormity of the
task. From a revulsion to war, and not necessarily a fear of it, The
Times argued for the resolution of grievances through the League, fully
expecting that the new Germany would be a sincere participant. The
History of The Times is in all probability correct when it argues that
The Times failed to realise "the folly of yielding to a probable enemy
that which had been withheld from a possible friend."11

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND

The Times' attitude towards Hitler's Germany was inextricably bound to the attitudes of Geoffrey Dawson (Editor from 1912 to 1919 and from 1922 to 1941), and Robert Barrington-Ward (Assistant Editor from 1927 to 1941). It is generally accepted that under Dawson's direction The Times' attitude regarding Germany was archetypical of appeasement. Certainly, both Barrington-Ward and Dawson had had experiences of the First World War that left them with the determination that it should never happen again.

The coming of the War had interrupted Barrington-Ward's reading for the Bar, his free-lance writing for The Times, and his recent appointment as Dawson's secretary. As with so many who joined the colours, Barrington-Ward was convinced of "the justice of the cause, that both from the material and moral point of view, it is the right thing to do...The present is a time rather for the protection than the study of international law." ¹ He was equally confident that the War would be over by Christmas.

If, as seems likely, we retain command of the sea, Germany will be at starvation's door in about three months. And that takes no account of the financial situation. But much depends on what happens in the eastern theatre of the land War....I hope the French may be able to roll the Germans up on their own account. ²

¹McLachlan, Chair, p. 43.
²McLachlan, Chair, p. 43.
To say the least, Barrington-Ward discovered the opposite, and it came as an immense shock to him. For the next four years his letters told of the horrors he had witnessed, hence his determination never to go to war again. His attitude was further soured by the events at Versailles, which caused him to write that "people who decry honest peace efforts should be made to spend a night in a shell-hole. The League idea is practical politics; peace has to be organised on new lines." In later years, he came to believe that "the fighting had not been worthwhile because the peace had been bungled." and it became part of his determination that "war between the same contestants...must be avoided." After reading Sassoon's Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, Barrington-Ward noted in his diary:

We were right to make victory definite, I believe, but the failure to make peace definite and to sacrifice for peace as it had been sacrificed for victory was a crowning inconsistency for which we are paying now and for which our children may have to pay. The war, with all the crudities it threw up, was essentially fine in spirit. The peace was essentially vindictive and vulgar, bred by French blindness, and ruthlessness out of British party politics. The peace has put many honest people wrong about the war.

Barrington-Ward did not return to The Times until 1927, having spent the intervening years as Assistant Editor at the Observer. When he did join The Times, it was ostensibly to assume a position as Assistant Editor, but Gordon Robbins' previous resignation, however, had left a vacancy in the day editorship, a gap which Barrington-Ward happily filled. He remained Dawson's deputy until succeeding to the Editorship in 1941.

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3McLachlan, Chair, p. 46.
4McLachlan, Chair, p. 48.
5McLachlan, Chair, p. 49.
6McLachlan, Chair, p. 50.
Geoffrey Dawson experienced the War as a newspaper editor "fighting on two fronts—for country, and for the dignity of the paper." Not only was there the danger of allowing the newspaper to succumb to the more hysterical, even if effective, elements of the propaganda effort, but all sense of propriety was severely hampered by the machinations of the owner, Alfred Harmsworth (Lord Northcliffe). The first indication of future difficulties had come in January 1912, prior to Dawson's editorship. Dawson's diary entry for January 11 referred to "a very petulant telegram" received by Nicholson (the Manager); Dawson felt that it was "better ignored." A more serious controversy came over the ratification of the Declaration of London. The issue of belligerents' and neutrals' rights in the matter of contraband was a particularly sore point. Northcliffe was decidedly against any agreement that would effectively reduce the power of the Royal Navy. The Times, however, intended to support ratification. An exchange of letters and telephone calls between Northcliffe and the editorial staff, Buckle (Editor), Bell (Managing Director), Chirol (Foreign Department), and Monypenny (Assistant Editor) marked so heated a crisis that Northcliffe instructed Nicholson, "if resignations are offered accept them." In the end, The Times took a neutral stance on the issue; there were no resignations, but it did evidently herald "the virtual surrender of the 'soul' of The Times into the hands of Northcliffe." For Dawson, the last straw came over


8Wrench, Dawson, p. 81.


10The Times Publishing Co., The History, p. 346.
Northcliffe's attitude towards the prospect of Lloyd George winning the 1918 General Election. In his other newspapers, the Evening News, the Weekly Dispatch, and in the Daily Mail, Northcliffe embarked upon a campaign against "The Prime Minister Who Took the Wrong Turning." His attempt to bring The Times into line with these papers was met with Dawson's stiff opposition, and eventually Dawson resigned. In his own account of the affair, Dawson wrote that his resignation was due to "his growing conviction that it had become impossible to conduct The Times well...under the strain of incessant complaints from Lord Northcliffe, and that these complaints were inspired at bottom by personal vanity and the intention to use the paper for his own political aggrandisement." 

Dawson returned to The Times under circumstances which were a significant factor in the newspaper's approach to National Socialist Germany. In 1922, following the death of Lord Northcliffe, The Times passed into the hands of Colonel J. J. Astor. For his part, Astor was anxious to devise the "best means of stabilising the property and strengthening a staff long harassed by every sort of pressure." The first step was to replace the Editor, Wickham Steed. To John Walter, member of the founding family, went the task of informing Steed that "Astor and I wished to keep the policy of the paper in our own hands, that he, Steed, had impressed his own personality so strongly on the paper's policy and had


12 Wrench, Dawson, p. 175.

impregnated it so thoroughly with his own views that the risk of disagreement with him on some important question...was greater than we were willing to incur."14 Dawson greeted the prospect of returning to The Times less than enthusiastically, noting in his diary that it was "a most depressing prospect which gave me a sleepless night."15 His last conflict with Northcliffe had been particularly frightful; a change of proprietorship did not necessarily guarantee that there would be no recurrence.

After considerable thought and consultation, Dawson indicated his willingness to return, but only if "the Editor was supreme on the editorial side, as was the Manager on the managerial side."16 In a lengthy memorandum to Walter and Astor, Dawson stated his terms:

Every Editor worth his salt must have a 'free hand' to conduct his side of the paper as he thinks best so long as he is in charge of it....The power of the Proprietors is exercised properly by the appointment and dismissal of the Editor, not by interfering with his work or doing it themselves.

The editorial side of the paper, for which the Editor is primarily responsible, means, of course, everything printed in it, except the advertisements....The Editor must be responsible just as much for the presentation of news, letters, pictures, and the captions, etc., as for the opinions expressed by the paper....

This leads naturally to the question of the editorial staff, which again means all those engaged in producing the editorial side of the paper....No Editor can do his work properly if his assistants or correspondents are liable to be appointed except by his own choice or with his full approval....The Editor must ultimately be responsible (however much he may delegate the choice of their subordinates to heads of departments) for the selection of his assistants at home and abroad, and for the allocation of their duties....The Proprietors should act only through the Editor and the Manager in their respective spheres--in other words, there must be no risk of either being confronted with 'instructions' given to some member of his staff without his knowledge. One of the most fertile sources of misunderstanding and confusion has been the disregard of this elementary principle of administration.17

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15 Wrench, Dawson, p. 208.
16 Wrench, Dawson, p. 209.
That the terms were far-reaching is an over-simplification of the issue. By accepting them, the proprietors seemingly "would place Dawson in the position of autocrat over the whole of the editorial content of the paper ..."\textsuperscript{18} Astor's own response, however, was that Dawson's memorandum "fairly represents the traditional constitution of The Times as far as it is possible to define it, and that it conveys a true idea of the lines upon which we intend that the paper shall be conducted in the future."\textsuperscript{19}

One of Dawson's most significant acts as Editor came in the spring of 1929, when he abolished the "Imperial and Foreign Department." In the words of The History of The Times:

it was the most important decision of Dawson's second innings and most deliberately reached. It was done so in the belief that an editorial staff of a newspaper could not be organised in a rigid hierarchy. He rejected the idea that foreign policy by its nature required that a man be set aside to give his whole time to the study of its complexities, and preferred to rely upon his personal intuition.\textsuperscript{20}

The change began as a necessary response to the death of Harold Williams, the Foreign Editor. As a temporary measure Wallace, Chirol, and Steed were to divide the work amongst themselves, each writing on the area which fell into his particular sphere of interest. "Wallace knew India as well as he knew Russia and Europe. Chirol knew China and Japan as well as India and Europe; he also had some knowledge of the United States."\textsuperscript{21}

Acting on the assessment of Barrington-Ward and Brumwell that the

\textsuperscript{18}The Times Publishing Company, The History, p. 782.

\textsuperscript{19}The Times Publishing Company, The History, p. 780.

\textsuperscript{20}The Times Publishing Company, The History, p. 789.

arrangement was working satisfactorily (Dawson had been in India until the spring of 1929), Dawson made the arrangement permanent.

There is considerable disagreement over the background to this decision. The History maintains that the Assistant Editors, Brunwell and Barrington-Ward, both firmly urged the necessity of filling the position of Foreign Editor,22 and that Dawson simply replied that a suitable replacement could not be found. Wrench, arguing to the contrary cites Dawson’s diary entry for December 4, "I spent...a long afternoon completing my notes on the Foreign Department...I got Brunwell and Barrington-Ward in general agreement..."23 Gannon finds it extremely "difficult to understand The History of The Times' obsessional criticism of Dawson's decision" arguing that the criticism rested on two assumptions:

first the explicit assumption that there was available 'a man of mature judgement, versed in foreign affairs, eastern and western, able and willing to write leading articles at short notice and capable of instructing leader-writers and revising their articles'...Second there is the tacit assumption that such a man, when found, would have directed The Times' policy otherwise than Dawson did.24

Gannon also challenges The History's charge that Dawson did not make "any serious enquiry in any direction,"25 by referring to Dawson's memorandum to Lord Brand. As late as July 18, 1936 Dawson wrote that "a really good Foreign Editor would be a great support."26

Dawson was by no means dogmatic enough to assume that this situation was flawless. He was quite aware that "it will often happen that we shall


23Wrench, Dawson, p. 223.


all have to write on subjects on which we know very little."\textsuperscript{27} It may have been an honest admission, but it left Dawson open for attack. It has been said that \textit{The Times}, in its comments on the developments in National Socialist Germany, was directed by a man "without any knowledge of European history, still less of German history, without knowing one word of the language or having the slightest insight into the German mind."\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{27}Wrench, \textit{Dawson}, p. 225.

CHAPTER TWO

FORMING THE ONE-PARTY STATE

On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany; within six months hardly a trace of the Weimar Republic remained. The seemingly systematic process of destruction (which conformed to Hitler's aim of total power before President Hindenburg died) began almost the day Hitler took office. Over the objections of Alfred Hugenberg, leader of the Nationalists, the Reichstag was dissolved and elections were set for March 5. Hitler failed to win an electoral majority, but events during the campaign period had made this immaterial. The forced dissolution of the Prussian Landtag, on February 6, placed Prussia irrevocably within the National Socialists' hands. The Reichstag fire not only effectively ended the election campaign, but the resultant emergency decrees removed all civil liberties and placed Germany under a state-of-emergency which persisted until 1945. The Gleichschaltung (co-ordination) of the states, a process which lasted less than forty-eight hours, between March 3-5, initiated National Socialist rule in those states where the governments were not already compliant. The new Reichstag met for one tempestuous session, on

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March 23, long enough to pass the Enabling Bill. On May 2, the trade unions ceased to exist. After that, the German political parties were dissolved, either voluntarily or forcibly. On July 14, 1933, Hitler declared Germany to be a one-party state.

"WAIT AND SEE"

From the outset The Times adopted a "wait and see" attitude towards Hitler's appointment. Once established, this attitude persisted, with occasional modifications, throughout the consolidation period. It was an attitude largely based on the evidence of recent German political and economic developments, and European reaction to them, as recorded by The Times' own correspondents in Berlin, Paris, and Rome, and possibly above all, on a fundamental tenet of The Times' policy, i.e. support for the League of Nations and for a Disarmament Convention.2

For strictly legalistic reasons, The Times considered Hitler's appointment as "desirable" in as much as "Herr Hitler, who leads the strongest party in the Reichstag, and obtained almost a third of more than 35,000,000 votes in the last election, should be given the chance of showing he is something more than an orator and an agitator...."3 The Times based this opinion primarily on the recent turmoil of the German political scene and concluded that Hitler as Chancellor seemed the only alternative to a "praesidial" government. Aware that "the


President has taken a risk," The Times was equally aware that "a return to a Papen administration would have plunged Germany into a crisis of the first magnitude."\(^4\)

The major contributor to The Times' dispassionate assessment was the reassuring fact that the National Socialists were in a minority position within both the Cabinet and the Reichstag. The Times' Berlin Correspondent pointed out that, with only three National Socialists (Hitler, Frick, and Goring) in a Cabinet of eleven, (von Papen, von Neurath, Blomberg, Schwerin-Krosigk, Hugenberg, Gurtner, Seldte, and Rubenach) the new Government was purely "National," a coalition which, for the time being, meant that the National Socialists were still without sole control in Germany.\(^5\) The Berlin Correspondent took the retention of von Neurath at the Foreign Ministry, and of von Schwerin-Krosigk at the Finance Ministry, to be reassurances to foreign observers, since both men were experienced, had been members of both the Papen and the Schleicher Governments, and were "men of national outlook with no close party associations." A further reassurance to foreign observers was the fact that Hugenberg now held the two Reich Ministries of Agriculture and Economics; thus preoccupied, his "ideas on the forcible conversion of foreign debts will remain in the company of other bright ideas which aided the Nazis and Nationalists in their days of irresponsible agitation, but will look less attractive to responsible Ministers."

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\(^4\) The Times, "Herr Hitler", p. 11

In the interests of economy, only the first and last quotation from an article appearing in The Times will be footnoted. The reader is to assume that all intervening quotations are from the article cited.

\(^5\) The Times, "Herr Hitler", p. 10
As for the Government's minority position in the Reichstag, the Berlin Correspondent pointed out that a majority, since it depended upon a coalition with either the Catholic Centre or the Bavarian People's Party, was unlikely since the Cabinet had been formed between the "Harzburg Brethren" before there had been any approach to the clerical parties. The most that Hitler could expect was "toleration," since the Centre had made it known that it would wait "unperturbed to see what the Government's measures are like."  

European reaction also viewed Hitler's appointment in light of the recent German political crises. While French reaction was reserved, Italian press comment was openly enthusiastic. The Times' Paris Correspondent noted that the news had "aroused the greatest interest in France, in spite of domestic politics, but there is little of the alarm such an event would have provoked a short time ago." Although the National Socialist Cabinet minority position was reassuring, the French were under no illusion regarding the possible direction of Franco-German relations; "the last thing expected" was any improvement. Most significantly, the Paris Correspondent quoted French sources as expressing the hope that "a Hitler in power may prove less dangerous than a Hitler unhindered by responsibility." The Times' Rome Correspondent reported the assertion of the Italian press that Hitler's appointment marked the "end of the political life imposed upon Germany by the Weimar Constitution...."

7. The Times, "New German Cabinet," January 31, 1933, p. 9. The Paris Correspondent's comment concerning "domestic politics" was a reference to the advent of the Daladier Government just two days previously.
[The Italian press discredited] any apprehension that a Nazi Chancellorship may mean the revival of an imperialistic and aggressive Germany."9 Instead, it was a welcome sign that "Germany may now regain her rightful place among the nations...[and make her contribution] to civilisation and to the equilibrium of Europe."10

If the assurances were evident, so were the warnings. The Times was keenly aware that Hitler's appointment as Chancellor represented a danger to the German parliamentary system, the future of which depended "mainly upon the unknown quantity of Herr Hitler's constructive powers, and of his ability for the first time to exercise power with responsibility."11 The Times' Berlin Correspondent echoed this view by noting that "Herr Hugenberg and the Nationalists are frankly out to do away with Parliamnetarism....Herr Hitler has always boasted that his Chancellorship would be a firmly rooted one."12 As for the National Socialist Cabinet minority, The Times' Berlin Correspondent pointed out that "Herr Hitler has obtained the 'leadership' he has always claimed, and two of his nominees have received important posts" (Frick, as Minister of the Interior, and Göring, as Commissioner for Aviation, Minister without Portfolio, and Prussian Deputy Commissioner for the Interior). Already, the moderates and the parties of the Left were concerned that the Government would not follow the constitutional path once it was firmly established,

"with the Prussian police in . . . Göring's hands, the Reichswehr no longer under Schleicher's control, and the Nazi 'Brown Army', if not recognised by the State, at any rate conscious of being the personal bodyguard of the Chancellor."\(^{13}\)

Clearly, The Times adopted the legalistic view of Hitler's appointment. Two closely related motives were evident. As a question of German internal politics, foreign opinion of the new Government was secondary to that of the German people.\(^{14}\) Also, Hitler's appointment came at a delicate time in the disarmament talks. Germany had only recently been persuaded to return to the Disarmament Conference, but it was plain to all that when the Conference would reconvene, the German delegation would be representing more strident views. The Times, always anxious for a disarmament convention, felt it best to aggravate the situation as little as possible. Its fears at the developments in Germany were expressed, in this instance, in terms of Disarmament, and wherever possible, these fears were couched in "sympathetic" terms:

> the effect of the change of Government on the attitude towards armaments will be watched with misgivings. But in fairness to the Nazis, it must be admitted that they have in fact said little more on the subject of German disabilities under the Treaty of Versailles than the most constitutional German parties, although they have said it much louder.\(^{15}\)

The Times' legalistic view, however, was fundamentally flawed; it was a view which conformed to Hitler's tactic of using "legal means" to achieve his ends. The legality tactic has been said to have begun

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\(^{13}\) The Times, "Herr Hitler", p. 10.

\(^{14}\) The Times, "Herr Hitler in Office," January 31, 1933, p. 11.

\(^{15}\) The Times, "Herr Hitler", p. 11.
as early as 1923 when the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch had proved that "any direct attack upon the existing order was doomed." Even before the Putsch, Hitler had been informed, in a memorandum from his comrade Scheubner-Richter, that "the nationalist revolution must not precede the acquisition of political power; rather, control of the nation's police constitutes the prerequisite to the nationalist revolution." From November 1923 on, Hitler covered his aims with a blanket of respectability, and he deceived everyone, even when he spoke plainly. At the 1930 Reichswehr trial, Hitler announced that:

The National Socialist movement will try to achieve its aim with constitutional means in this State. The constitution prescribes only the methods, not the aim. In this constitutional way we shall try to gain decisive majorities in the legislative bodies so that the moment we succeed we can give the state the form that corresponds to our ideas.18

The Times' carefully weighed response to Hitler's opinion largely conformed to contemporary opinion, certainly as reported by its Paris and Rome Correspondents, and by opinion at home possibly symbolised by the motion passed by the Oxford Union that "this House will under no circumstances fight for its King and Country."19 Balanced or not, The Times' attitudes have placed it squarely in the continuing discussion of the "inevitability" of Hitler's appointment. In support of The Times' assertion that Hitler should be Chancellor because he "leads the strongest party in the Reichstag," was one contemporary

17 Fest, Hitler, p. 195.
analysis that argued:

[Hitler] was called into office as the leader of the party that held the greatest number of seats in the legislature. He was appointed by the legitimate President of the Republic, who had the constitutional power to appoint anyone whom he thought able to obtain the necessary support in the Reichstag, and certainly, to try out the leader of the largest group.20

The assertions that Hitler's appointment was the only alternative have been countered with considerable vehemence. Hitler's appointment, it is said, was the work of a "political elite" which "relinquished, partly in tired resignation, partly frivolously, and partly maliciously," a freedom of choice which remained almost until "the very end."21

Another argument is that when Hitler was appointed, the National Socialist movement, despite its size, was clearly in decline,22 as the result of the November elections demonstrate, and as Goebbels' diary entries confirm.23 As for the reassuring National Socialist Cabinet minority, this point has been curtly dismissed, as "any informed observer, who did not restrict himself to counting party noses, might well have predicted that Cabinet opposition to schemes pressed by the dynamic Nazi leader would prove slight, and in any case, ineffectual."24

The strongest criticism of The Times' response to Hitler's appointment appeared in The History of The Times, Printing House Square's post-war self-evaluation. In the chapter on "Appeasement", The History sees

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20 Arnold Brecht, Prelude to Silence (New York: Howard Fertig, 1968) p. 73.


23 Brecht, Prelude, p. 71-72.

little that was redeeming; nothing is said about The Times' emphasis on Disarmament negotiations, nor are The Times' concerns about the appointment discussed. Instead, the analysis deals in polemics and hindsight. It has been suggested that the evident inaccuracies and prejudices in this chapter are due to the fact that they bear all the earmarks of Wickham Steed's authorship.25 The History's criticism centres on the fact that The Times "discussed the change of Chancellor as a normal event in German internal politics," that Hitler's government "was to be treated exactly like any other."26 In support of this claim, The History cites a leading article dealing with the dissolution of the Reichstag:

No one doubts Herr Hitler's sincerity; that nearly twelve million Germans follow him blindly says much for his personal magnetism as well as for the volume of the discontent of which he is the spokesman. But nothing is known so far of his capacity for solid administration and for co-operation with allies or colleagues, which are the real tests of a ruler; and until he proves himself to possess these qualities it is sheer waste of time to speculate about the future of Germany.27

Admittedly, this statement remains difficult to accept. Hitler's sincerity certainly was in doubt, not least by The Times. If, by asserting that speculation about Germany was a waste of time, The Times was counselling against over-reaction, it damaged its own case by being almost flippant. At this point, however, The History's own errors come into play. The History countered the "normal event" verdict with the statement that the "Correspondents were soon making it clear that something other than normal

25 McLachlan, In the Chair, p. 102.
26 The Times Publishing Company, The History, p. 84.
27 The Times, "Dissolution in Germany," February 3, 1933, p. 11.
events were occurring in Germany."\(^{28}\) Unfortunately, *The History* omitted to note that the Berlin Correspondent was also able to dismiss such events with: "if Germans wish to treat other German citizens as vermin, that is their affair."\(^{29}\) Lastly, there is the criticism based on hindsight: "Nothing was said to indicate what, indeed, the office was singularly loathe to realize, that January 30, 1933 marked the beginning of scientific and resolute warfare to a degree that the world has never known."\(^{30}\)

The *Times*, regardless of contemporary and later criticisms, accepted Hitler's Chancellorship as a product of the German political scene. Further evaluations or changes of opinion would have to await developments during, or the outcome of, the forthcoming election.

**THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN**

For the next five weeks, *The Times* observed Germany's pseudo-legal election campaign. It was a campaign notable primarily for its violence and general subversion of the constitution; above all, it allowed the National Socialists five weeks to establish themselves in their governmental positions. The campaign began when the breakdown of Hitler's sham negotiations with Kaas, leader of the Centre, proved that a parliamentary coalition would not be formed. The necessary Reichstag dissolution, setting elections for March 5, was obtained despite Hugenberg's objections. Though few realised it at the time, with this act the non-National Socialist majority in the Cabinet, that bulwark of constitutional correctness to which contemporaries looked, was already broken.\(^{31}\)

\(^{28}\) The Times Publishing Company, *The History*, p. 84.

\(^{29}\) The *Times*, "The German Upheaval," April 10, 1933, p. 11.


\(^{31}\) Bracher, *Dictatorship*, p. 195.
Throughout the campaign the Government, on the flimsiest of pretexts, systematically destroyed its opponents' abilities and rights to conduct their own campaigns. The Times was not overly sympathetic to the Communists' difficulties, but it watched those moves attentively. The Times' Berlin Correspondent kept Printing House Square fully informed of the developments; he took the forced dissolution of the Prussian Landtag and the general subversion of the campaign process to be dangerous developments, not only within Germany, but for Europe. The Times responded with an early modification of its "wait and see" attitude. Hitler's campaign methods were deplored, but were placed within his own political context.

Hitler opened his campaign with a speech at the Berlin Sportpalast. The Times' Berlin Correspondent reported that it was a speech containing "no positive proposals, and full of vague generalities." On the domestic scene, Hitler announced a "four-year plan to redeem the peasant and end unemployment;" on the foreign scene he promised to "guard the vital rights of the people," and to call for the world to reduce arms. "The only concrete proposal was to endorse compulsory labour service." The fact that the speech was scheduled for a future rebroadcast caused scathing comment in elements of the German press, duly recorded in The Times. Not entirely surprising was a comment from Hugenberg's own Lokalanzeiger, a demonstration that all was not harmonious in the National Socialist-Nationalist camp. It was the Lokalanzeiger's opinion that the speech had "impressed them in the U.S..." The Socialist Vorwärts commented that the speech had "left the Eskimos speechless."
Part of the National Socialist election scheme was to force simultaneous elections in Prussia; a majority there would give the National Socialists full control of Germany's largest State, fully three-fifths of the country. Unable to force a dissolution of the Prussian Landtag during the February 4 session, The National Socialists secured a presidential dissolution on February 6. The constitutional importance of this decree, "For the Protection of the German People," was discussed by The Times' Berlin Correspondent. The decree simply stated that "the attitude of the State of Prussia towards the judgement of the Supreme Court of October 25, 1932 has caused a confusion in the national life which endangers the welfare of the State." In effect, according to expert opinion recorded by the Berlin Correspondent:

citing the decree, sweeping away the judgement of the Supreme Court, marks the end of legality. It may even mark the beginning of a Monarchist restoration, for if the Supreme Court, the final guardian of the Constitution, can be thus overruled by a brief decree on the ground that the welfare and security of the country is endangered, a return of the Hohenzollerns might be decreed with equal brevity on the ground that it alone could restore tranquility and confidence.

Prussia was now squarely under Göring's authority, despite Papen's appointment as Commissioner, and he immediately set about realising the provisions of the Scheubner-Richter memorandum; a week later The Times' Berlin Correspondent reported the effect of Göring's activities. A wave of dismissals had removed all the Socialists and Centrists from their State positions; in several instances, police chiefs were removed solely because they were unpopular with the local National Socialists. By February 16, Göring had made considerable progress with press suppression. The suspension of the Socialist Vorwärts for printing "offending passages".

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(a charge never clarified), was accompanied by an announcement prohibiting the newspaper from printing the text of the order concerning the suspension. It was almost superfluous for The Times' Berlin Correspondent to write that "if the order is strictly applied, all independent judgement of the justice or injustice of the suppression will become impossible."\(^{38}\)

The power to prohibit or disperse campaign meetings deemed dangerous to public order, granted by a presidential decree on February 4, completed the picture.

Hitler's speech at the Berlin Sportpalast, on February 10, though still full of vague generalities, was marked by an emphatic expression of his plans: "if the German people should desert us that will not restrain us. We will take the course necessary to save Germany from ruin."\(^{39}\)

This statement, as noted by The Times' Berlin Correspondent, was omitted from the official report of Hitler's speech, as available in Germany. Even so, the Berlin Correspondent drew his own conclusions:

Herr Hitler intends in any event to stay in power. Such an intention would pre-suppose the President's support, or faith in the ability of the present rulers to dispense with it, and this again would open the question whether the Reichswehr, the ultimately decisive element, has under the influence of General von Schleicher's rapid downfall, and other events, been weakened in its political neutrality.\(^{40}\)

Within two weeks of the campaign's opening, the opposition parties (particularly the Communists) were virtually reduced to a standstill. The Times had expected as much when it wrote, on February 3, 1933, of the possibility that the new Government's anti-Communist campaign "will convince a number of uncertain adherents to the other parties, that here

\(^{38}\) The Times, "Nazi Rule," February 17, 1933, p. 16.

\(^{39}\) The Times, "Hitlerism," February 11, 1933, p. 11.

\(^{40}\) The Times, "Hitlerism," p. 11.
at last is the 'strong' Government that the German tradition and temper-ament demand." This by no means suggested that The Times expressed any sympathy towards the Communists. On the contrary, since it referred to previous election campaigns noted for the Communists' "murderous attacks" on the National Socialists, the paper apparently felt that the difficulties might be deserved. Thus by February 17, it had become plain to The Times that a National Socialist State was in the offing, and that the election campaign was a pretense. The Times' Berlin Correspondent informed Printing House Square of "the first unmistakable step towards the establishment by the Nazis of a Fascist regime in Germany." The occasion was Goring's meeting with the provincial governors, at which he announced that the S.A. (Storm Troopers) and the Stahlhelm (Veterans' Organisation) were to be armed and employed as auxiliary police; the S.A. would police all future election meetings; Communist meetings were now banned altogether, but the authorities were to see that all possible arrangements were made for National Socialist meetings in Communist areas. The Berlin Correspondent emphasised the deteriorated situation with an analysis of the President's position:

[The National Socialists'] confidence implies that they regard the President as a prisoner of the development of the situation initiated by himself. Nominally the President should have the power at any moment, by withdrawing his confidence from Herr Hitler, or, in the last resort, by exercising his authority over the Reichswehr, to intercept events.

Despite all the obvious subversions of the constitutional process, and the violence which characterised the election campaign, the National Socialists still claimed they could "...find 'legal means' to their end."

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41 The Times, "Dissolution in Germany," February 3, 1933, p. 11.
42 The Times, "Dissolution", p. 11.
43 The Times, "German Fascist Regime," February 15, 1933, p. 11.
44 The Times, "German Fascist", p. 12.
The Berlin Correspondent had seen enough of this tactic, and replied that "...the concept of legality has already suffered so much damage that the word is beginning to lose respect." Goring's activities in Prussia provided The Times with an itemised account of the method; "...in his capacity as Prussian Commissioner Captain Goring is dismissing wholesale...the holders of administrative posts who are suspected of Socialist proclivities...The electoral campaign of political opponents is...hampered by...the suppression of their newspapers...of meetings and even the use of placards." As blatant as were these activities, The Times saw them as a product of Hitler's political situation:

The position of Herr Hitler in his own Government is not altogether happy. He is surrounded by colleagues with whose party he was recently on the worst of terms...Herr Hitler's strength is in his hold upon the people...For the present it can be understood that he thinks it best to continue to play his more familiar role.

By this stage in the campaign, Hitler's methods, couched in "legality," had considerably eroded the constitutional process; thus, presidential decrees were instrumental in the dissolution of the Prussian Landtag, and in Goring's total ban on the Communists' campaign. Such drastic changes in Germany were treated accordingly at The Times, but not to an extent that constituted a change in attitude. In effect, The Times saw

\[46\] The Times, "Chancellor Hitler" February 17, 1933, p. 13.
\[47\] The Times, "Chancellor" p. 13.
little difference between Hitler's present campaign methods and those of the past. This does not suggest approval, but rather, in pointing out that Hitler was continuing "to play his more familiar role," The Times reminded its readership that Germany's political scene had been deteriorating for some time, that this had not begun with Hitler.

The Times' response to the campaign thus far was also a point of departure. Even though The Times sought to place events within the political context, it openly criticised Hitler for the first time since his coming to power. Criticism and even condemnation became a feature of The Times' view of the new Germany, but was tempered with "understanding" wherever possible. This had first occurred when The Times had discussed its fears for Disarmament. Now it occurred more frequently and applied to different events with varying degree.

The remaining weeks of the campaign made it plain that regardless of the "election" results, Hitler and the National Socialist Party would form the next German Government. The Times' dislike of Hitler's methods caused it to cast about for reassurances, and it chose Italian precedent. The Times' Berlin Correspondent was not so easily reassured, and his comprehensive analysis of German developments was the first in that series of special articles which became increasingly controversial.\(^{48}\) When the Reichstag fire effectively ended the campaign, it confirmed the Berlin Correspondent's suspicion that the continued violence would be a pretext for the elections' postponement.\(^{49}\) Hitler's sweeping use of the fire, the so-called Reichstag Fire decrees, gave rise to the belief that the

\(^{48}\) They were the cause of the Berlin Correspondent's eventual expulsion from Germany in 1937. Also, they have been taken as evidence of the rift between the Berlin Correspondent and Printing House Square.

\(^{49}\) The Times, "Dangers in Germany," February 17, 1933, p. 13.
fire was a National Socialist ploy. It was a theory to which The Times immediately subscribed. Under such repressive circumstances, the elections were held, and Hitler was more than compensated for his failure to win a majority by having obtained the decrees.

Although The Times placed Hitler's campaign methods within his own context, it was still anxious that this state of affairs soon end. A favourable comparison with Mussolini's earlier struggle in Italy under similar circumstances suggested that a politically stable Germany could emerge: "Herr Hitler has in fact, like Signor Mussolini ten years ago, made a great reputation for himself in opposition. He has now to show that, like his great Italian prototype, he is capable of constructive leadership in office...."

The Times clearly revealed what The Times expected of Hitler. In 1933 Mussolini was far from being his own caricature. Ever since his "March on Rome" in 1922, Mussolini had established for himself a respectable position in European circles. The Lateran agreements of 1929 had substantially contributed to this renown, and the Four Power Pact, although never implemented, added further prestige. Thus Mussolini, once famous for the force of his opposition, had become, for the present, a respected leader. It seemed reasonable to suppose that Hitler, given time, would do likewise.

The Times' Berlin Correspondent expressed his concerns in an analysis which touched on politics, economics, foreign policy, and armaments. His tone was one of extreme urgency, and contrary to The Times' earlier opinion that speculation on the future of Germany was a waste of time, he argued

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that "it must be of serious moment to countries in whose external and economic policies consideration Germany plays an important part to observe what sort of Germany is going to emerge from the present confusion."

On the political scene, the Berlin Correspondent was already talking in terms of the Communist Party's proscription. This probability gave more force to the National Socialists' claim to "find other means" of retaining power if a majority was not forthcoming. This seemed the likely result since "the Government would have to rely, under normal Parliamentary conditions, on the support or toleration of either the Centre or of the new Christian-Nationalist bloc of small moderate Conservative groups." As to returning to "normal Parliamentary conditions," the Berlin Correspondent felt that this depended upon the power of the President to intervene, but his authority had "suffered from the intrigues and Constitutional experiments which have accompanied political changes in Germany during the last year." Germany's political future, in reality, was dependent upon a series of "ifs" and "probabilities."

If national decisions were again reposed in Parliament, and the Government left without special powers, the Presidential authority would again be free from entanglements. The Reichswehr would probably support it, despite rumoured Nazi sympathies in cavalry regiments, if the President took a strong lead.

Naturally, the Government had been doing its best to deny accusations that its rule would be unconstitutional. It contended that "the Nationalist group under von Papen and Hugenberg has no cut-and-dried plan for the restoration of the Monarchy; and that Herr Hitler and the Nazis have no detailed scheme up their sleeves for perpetrating their hold over the country whether the elections give them a legitimate right or not."

51 The Times, "Dangers in Germany," February 17, 1933, p. 13
The Berlin Correspondent pointed out that these, among other assurances, could be believed, but he emphasised that "it would be a breach of duty on the part of any foreign observer not to warn public opinion abroad against accepting the validity of such denials as lasting beyond March 5."

On the subject of economics, the Berlin Correspondent warned that, although Hugenberg had said little recently concerning the forcible conversion of foreign debts, the idea had not been forgotten. The presence of von Schwerin-Krosigk, Neurath, and Dr. Luther (at the Reichsbank) were guarantees "against financial and currency experiments;" yet, there was little to suggest that "the two Ministers will be able to remain in the Cabinet after the elections, or that Dr. Luther for all his tenacity, will long withstand attempts to undermine his position and force him to make way for Dr. Schacht."

As for foreign policy, the National Socialists wished theirs to be "for the time being...rather moderate...[and] to reassure foreign countries, especially Great Britain and Italy...." The omission of France for this reassurance, if it meant anything at all, served to confirm that "the last thing expected" was any improvement in Franco-German relations.

Germany's armaments policy was a further difficulty for Europe. The Times' Berlin Correspondent wrote that Germany's "first demand is for the disarmament of the other powers. Alternatively she claims an arrangement for the practical, though not immediate, full realisation of the principle of equality in the armaments retained by the other powers; in default of that she apparently intends to claim a free hand to put the principle into practice herself."

The Berlin Correspondent concluded this analysis with a categorical warning; however, while his distrust of Hitler was evident, it would appear
that the "legality" tactic had an effect on him, because his fears were now centred elsewhere:

If there was ever anything in the British conception of the Monarchist-militarist-Junker-annexationist Germany, against which resentment was directed in the War years, that conception is represented to-day in the rigid outlook of the reactionary Nationalist group of Herr Hugenberg. With the normal development of Republican life, that outlook might have died out within a generation. In present circumstances it may revive, and with it inevitably a suspicious alertness on the part of other countries, however the disarmament problem may work out. Of the possible foreign policy of an unfettered Nazi regime it is too early to judge. 52

This analysis confronted The Times with a cynical view of German developments. Clearly, the Berlin Correspondent considered a National Socialist Government to be a foregone conclusion, one whose policies on key considerations spelled confrontation. The Berlin Correspondent's cynical view of the National Socialists' protestations of continued constitutionality, his contempt for all that Hugenberg represented, and the less than pleasant prospect of a foreign policy conducted by an "unfettered" National Socialist Government, were early indictments of his intention to continually warn of the inherent dangers the National Socialists represented to European stability.

THE REICHSTAG FIRE

The Berlin Correspondent's cynicism soon appeared to be justified by events. The burning of the Reichstag, on the night of February 27, 1933, and the promulgation of the emergency decrees the next day, no doubt seemed to bear out Hitler's claim to "find other means" of retaining power. The

question of responsibility for the fire is of concern here only in relation to The Times' incredulous response to the authorities' claims and proclamations resulting from the fire. To be sure, the Berlin Correspondent's reports and The Times' increasing wariness of Hitler's activities were made all the more acute following the fire, and the subsequent wholesale arrests of Socialists and Communists ended, once and for all, any pretense of an election campaign.

The Prussian authorities' communique, bearing all the earmarks of Göring's authorship, and the announcement of the emergency decrees, were treated in individual reports by The Times' Berlin Correspondent. The communique gave what he termed, "an illuminating glimpse into the state of mind prevailing in Germany." The Berlin Correspondent's report was largely a transcript of the communique. Thus, The Times learned that "this act of incendiarism...was to have been the signal for a bloody uprising and civil war...," and that a police raid on the Karl Liebknecht House had turned up "instructions for a Communist terrorist outbreak on Bolshevist lines..." Accordingly, Göring had taken "the most drastic measures," expected the "utmost discipline at this grave moment," and expected the "complete support of the people whose safety he has guaranteed with his own person." The immediate result was that the entire Prussian police were on an emergency footing; the auxiliary police were called out, and of course Communist newspapers were suppressed for one month in Prussia, and the distribution of pamphlets and leaflets was suspended for two weeks.\[^{54}\]


On top of these measures came a Cabinet announcement of new discoveries. The Cabinet determined "beyond doubt that prominent leaders of the Communist Party were directly connected with the incendiarism."\textsuperscript{55} This decision resulted in the "Decree for the Protection of the Nation from the Communist Danger," and the supplemental "Decree Against the Betrayal of the German People and Treasonous Machinations," the so-called Reichstag Fire Decrees. For the Berlin Correspondent, the immediate significance of the first decree was that it rested on the authority of the police. "In Prussia, Captain Göring...will thus become for the time being the virtual arbiter of life and death."\textsuperscript{56} The apprehensions were well justified. By the end of April, in Prussia alone, some 250,000 to 300,000 persons were taken into custody. The resultant overcrowding brought about the first provisional concentration camps, the first being opened on March 20, 1933 in the barracks of an old powder factory at Dachau.\textsuperscript{57} Soon that name would be joined by Oranienburg, and both would be mentioned frequently in \textit{The Times}. The long-term significance of the Reichstag Fire Decrees was that by suspending all civil liberties, particularly \textit{habeas corpus}, they established the legal basis of National Socialist rule and made possible the circumventing of the courts and state bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{58}


\textsuperscript{56} \textit{The Times}, "Crisis", p. 14.

\textsuperscript{57} Bracher, \textit{Dictatorship}, p. 358.

\textsuperscript{58} Fest, \textit{Hitler}, p. 397-8.
The Times responded to these events with total disbelief, disgust, and fear for the future of international peace. The accusation against the arsonist, van der Lubbe, caused The Times to wonder "how his preparations, which must have been extensive, escaped the notice of the guards." The Government, by declaring a state of emergency, had in effect ended a campaign which had been "one-sided from the first." This provided The Times with an opportunity to compare the National Socialists' methods with those of the Russian Communists and Italian Fascists. Each believed that "freedom of speech and of electoral propaganda should be the prerequisite, and indeed the monopoly, of the party." More than anything else, The Times was concerned about the ramifications this would have on the international scene. The Times reasserted its opinion that the Germans' choice of Government was their own affair, but added:

what does concern this country and other nations is the spirit in which their new Government propose to face their difficulties and their responsibilities. ...In spite of appearances the Nationalist Ministers may still be able to control their colleagues. But the fact remains that the policy of the Nazi wing...has produced a state of nervous anxiety in which the most trivial incident may have disastrous consequences; and in the present state of Europe the continuance of this high tension in Berlin must remain a danger to international peace.60

By March 2, 1933 the term "revolution" was applied to German events, and it was duly noted by The Times' Berlin Correspondent. He wrote that there were Germans who already regarded the current scene as a "transitional stage in German affairs...either indignant or puzzled, or both, that the bloodshed and oppression...should be taken so seriously abroad."61

Apparently for many, the prime motivation was that "the cause must prevail,"

59 The Times, "Tension in Berlin," March 1, 1933 p. 15.
60 The Times, "Tension", p. 15.
but that cause had never been defined. Instead, the Berlin Correspondent commented, "Herr Hitler...preserves a simple belief in this cause though he never seems to get much nearer to defining it than 'cleaning up' a 'heap of ruins', which had not been noticeable in Germany when the 'national forces' assumed power." It was evident that this "revolution" was actually aggravating the animosities of the "nationalist" forces, so much so that The Times' Berlin Correspondent could write of a probable confrontation between them; "...the Nazis' determination to have their own way, and the Nationalists' dawning misgivings...are plain to read." Nor was the probability of a Nazi success in this struggle particularly pleasing, due to the presence of "extremists," especially Göring and Goebbels, within the group:

the sweeping precision with which Captain Göring has grasped power in Prussia has attracted the notice of even his Nationalist allies. Dr. Goebbels' plans for filling the streets of all Germany with marching Nazis in uniform, and his threats that the bill will yet be presented to the 'wreckers of German freedom' and will have to be paid, have also not gone unnoted.

Amidst this atmosphere, with polling day just around the corner, the Berlin Correspondent correctly concluded that "anything can happen in Germany now."62

For the better part of five weeks, The Times observed and commented as the National Socialists concentrated power in their hands. By adopting a "wait and see" attitude, by avoiding polemics and hysteria, The Times first emphasised the "legalistic" point of view. Within the German political context, Hitler was another chancellor, seemingly with less chance of success than his immediate predecessors. The conservative Cabinet, including, in particular, von Neurath and von Schwerin-Krosigk, augured

well for foreign developments, and served equally as a moderating influence on Hitler's internal schemes. When developments suggested the contrary, The Times modified its opinion, conscious that foreign comment would have definite, possibly negative, effects on the Disarmament negotiations. Thus all the repressions and violence, and particularly the abrogation of all civil liberties following the Reichstag Fire, while repugnant to The Times, remained matters upon which the German people alone could decide. Since this decision would inevitably affect the future course of foreign affairs, The Times used its foreign concerns as a vehicle for commenting on German domestic politics, as when The Times used the "high tension in Berlin" to focus on the "danger to international peace."

The March 5 election failed to give the National Socialists their Reichstag majority. Their 288 seats, an improvement over their previous 246, were still short by forty; thus, Hitler was still dependent in strict parliamentary terms, upon the support of Hugenberg and Papen. Nevertheless, the National Socialists celebrated the election results as a tremendous victory, and the nationalistic "revolution" moved rapidly towards the creation of the one-party State. By July 14, 1933 that goal had been achieved. The intervening period was dominated by four domestic events designed to meet that end, namely the Gleichschaltung (co-ordination) of the states, the passage of the Enabling Act, the destruction of the trade unions, and the systematic elimination of the other political parties.
GLEICHSCHALTUNG

The steps leading to the one-party State were taken with such speed and precision that they gave the impression of having occurred according to a carefully orchestrated schedule. Later examinations confirm this impression:

A dynamic program of surprise assaults enabled [Hitler] to deliver blow upon blow, smashing open each new position the opposition occupied. The discouraged forces that tried to oppose him were given no opportunity to compose themselves and regroup their ranks. They unwittingly threw all kinds of chances into his path, and with growing cleverness he learned to use them.63

The above emphasis is however, that Hitler's actions "were not so minutely calculated in advance as may sometimes appear in historical hindsight," but conformed only to his fundamental objective of full power before Hindenburg died. Another appraisal has stressed "accident and improvisation" over "superior planning," but has warned against hastily dismissing Hitler's long-range goals in favour of seeing National Socialist policy as a "mere reaction to the challenge of the times."64

When read to-day, The Times' leading articles and the reports of its Berlin Correspondent still convey the overwhelming sense of dynamism with which the newspaper was confronted. As Germany moved towards the one-party state, The Times' response was markedly more negative, but there was still room for favourable observation, where applicable.

The Gleichschaltung of the states was achieved through the appointment of Reich Commissioners over the various governments and was "justified" under authority of the Reichstag Fire Decrees. The process usually involved

63Fest, Hitler, p. 387.
64Bracher, Dictatorship, p. 199.
three phases: "the S. A., embodying the wrath of a people outraged beyond
control,"\textsuperscript{65} created disorders in the various state capitals, usually by
occupying government buildings and demanding the removal of mayors, police
commissioners, and ultimately of the stage government; the local National
Socialist Party leadership appealed to the Minister of the Interior (Frick)
to restore order;\textsuperscript{66} he found no difficulty in placing the state under the
authority of a National Socialist Reich Commissioner. Within the space of
twenty-four hours, the Gleichschaltung had had a devastating effect on the
federal structure of Germany; its completeness and rapidity were summed up
by The Times' Berlin Correspondent: "The Nazi steam-roller has passed over
every one of the 17 federal states, leaving the political map of Germany
uniformly Nazi."\textsuperscript{67} This verdict was later expanded:

Germany herself probably does not fully realise yet what has happened
to her. Until February 28 the President alone had the power, in virtue of
his powers under Article 48 of the Constitution, to intervene in a
Federal State in the interests of law and order, but the delegation of
the powers to the Reich Government by the Presidential decree of that
date has enabled the Nazis...to establish their nominees as virtual
dictators in every State capital where there was not already a complacent
government.\textsuperscript{68}

**THE ENABLING ACT**

Following hard on the heels of the Gleichschaltung of the States came
the passage of the Enabling Act. This Act was an amendment to the constitu-
tion and its passage required a quorum of two-thirds of the Reichstag
deputies, and had to be passed by two-thirds of those present. Despite the

\textsuperscript{65}Fest, Hitler, p. 399-400.

\textsuperscript{66}Noakes and Pridham, Documents, p. 177.

\textsuperscript{67}The Times, "Nazi Coup in States," March 10, 1933, p. 10.
National Socialists' interpretation of the election results as a victory, it was clear that they did not have the numbers required. The lengths to which they went to achieve their quorum spoke loudly for the importance the National Socialists placed in an Enabling Act; furthermore, these efforts emphasised the "improvisational" nature of Hitler's methods. The Reichstag Fire decrees were all that Hitler really needed, but because they were the result of unforeseen, "fortuitous" circumstances, the National Socialists apparently had not yet fully realised their potential, hence, the need for an Enabling Act. The problem of a quorum was raised in the March 7 Cabinet session. Göring announced that the Communists, holding eighty-one seats, were of no consequence since they had all been arrested. The problem was a potential Socialist and Centrist boycott of the session, each party holding 118 and 70 seats respectively.69 The Cabinet changed the rules of procedure and had the changes publicly announced. Deputies who absented themselves from the Reichstag without prior permission of the President of the Reichstag (Göring), could be excluded for sixty session days; they would, however, count as present for quorum purposes.70

The Reichstag session of March 21, 1933 was the necessary preamble to passing the Enabling Act. Held at the Garrison Church at Potsdam, which contained the tomb of Frederick the Great, the entire ceremonial was placed in the more than capable hands of Goebbels. In his preparations for the day, Goebbels noted that "with such great state ceremonies, the smallest touches matter."71 Even the date was deliberately chosen as the anniversary of the first Reichstag session under Bismarck, on March 21, 1911. On the other hand, the day has been derisively termed a "touching comedy (Rührkomodie),"72 and

69 Noakes and Pridham, Documents, p. 177.


71 Fest, Hitler, p. 404.

72 Bracher, Dictatorship, p. 196.
The Times announced that "the day, nominally no more than the occasion of the opening of the Reichstag which enjoys no credit at all in Nationalist Germany was deliberately celebrated as that of the rebirth of the German Reich." The focal points of the session were Field Marshall von Hindenburg saluting the empty chair reserved for the Kaiser, the Chancellor, in a cut-away coat "awkward but respectful," Hindenburg's vigil at Frederick the Great's tomb, and the handshake between Hitler and Hindenburg (later reproduced on countless postcards and posters), which sealed "the apostolic succession."

The Times' interest in this opening ceremonial was confined largely to the significance of the Potsdam site, parenthetically noting the new location "after the strange destruction of the Parliament Hall during the Nazi reign of terror." In short, the Garrison Church "was purposely chosen...because it contains the tomb of Frederick the Great...To every German—and to every Pole—Frederick the Great was the ruler who linked the two portions of Prussia, then as now sundered by a strip of Poland." Here, The Times briefly discussed Frederick's career, the "supreme man of arms, cynical and ruthless," and invoked the opinion of Lord Roseberry that Frederick's qualities "were a curse to his age and his kind...Ever since Frederick's day Prussia has been like a pike in a pond, armed with sharp teeth and endless voracity...Her policy, brutal as it is, requires genius and Prussia has not been richly endowed in that way." No sooner had The Times cited these inflammatory remarks, than it hastily tempered them.

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75 Bullock, Hitler, p. 268.

by stating that no one could deny the greatness of Hindenburg or the political abilities of Hitler. The Times found it understandable that Germany seek inspiration from the famous conqueror, and thought it "fair to presume...the rulers of modern Germany intend to apply the lesson to wholly different purposes." With this much said, The Times again gave its disapproval of the recent German excesses, noting that as long as they remained within Germany they were Germany's affair. On this occasion, however, The Times warned of the consequences of taking these excesses across the border:

...if these methods were to be applied to foreign subjects, or transferred to the field of foreign affairs, [they would] become a matter of concern to other countries; and a development in that sense would have the immediate, inevitable, and deplorable effect of isolating Germany and of driving foreign Governments to concert policy against her.77

This statement is extremely important because when Germany later tested it, in its dispute with Austria, the bravado disappeared. The Times, apart from expressing sympathy for Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, said nothing that encouraged concerted policy. In fact, when Austria attempted to solve the problem herself, in January 1934, by applying to the League, The Times actively discouraged these attempts, fearing that such activity would jeopardise disarmament: Germany had withdrawn from the Disarmament Conference three months previously.

The Times' response to the speeches at Potsdam, as reported by its Berlin Correspondent, became more significant in the long run. When Hitler spoke of Germany's desire to be a true friend of a peace "which would at last heal the wounds from which all suffered,"78 The Times urged that foreign

statesmen should try to examine Germany's external claims, despite internal excesses of the regime, as they would of any other Government. In particular, The Times argued: "If the conclusion is reached that certain articles of the Peace Treaty may have been harsh in conception, or may be unjust in their present application, they should be unhesitatingly modified or cancelled."

It is true that The Times' statement echoed prevailing British sympathies for Germany, but it came at a time when events in Germany were having an unsettling effect on Europe; nothing had happened in Germany to warrant such an early call for Europe to pursue a revisionist policy. In this The Times revealed the importance it placed in a Disarmament Convention. Disregarding the internal chaos of Hitler's Germany, The Times responded immediately, and favourably, to Hitler's vaguest utterances on the subject of foreign affairs. The Times' awareness of this chaos was evident in its disagreement with Hindenburg's satisfaction that the new Reichstag "acknowledged more than any of its predecessors the nationalist and martial State." This, The Times argued, was true only where "those survivors who are allowed to take their seats" were concerned, but with this said, The Times responded to Hindenburg's call for a "united, free, and proud Germany" by stating that "there is ample and legitimate space in Europe for a Germany which is the old Field Marshall's ideal." With such statements coming so early in Hitler's Chancellorship, the charge that The Times was an appeaser does not seem wholly unjustified.

The most critical event, indeed the sole purpose, of this short-lived Reichstag, was the passage of the Enabling Act on March 23, 1933. Regardless of whether the Reichstag Fire Decrees or the Enabling Act was the most significant legislation, it is clear from the evidence that both the National Socialists and the opposition parties saw far-reaching importance in such an Act.

As it seemed to The Times' Berlin Correspondent, on March 23, 1933, "the Reichstag...in all docility passed the Government's Enabling Bill."\(^{80}\) This assessment, however, was not altogether accurate, due to events of which the Berlin Correspondent could know nothing, nor was it entirely fair given the prevailing atmosphere, of which he was all too aware.

Certainly, the seeming capitulation of the Catholic Centre in the face of Hitler's "decide for peace or war"\(^{81}\) conclusion to his speech was a mark of this docility, but the Berlin Correspondent had no idea of the agony the Centre underwent during the recess between hearings, while he sat in the press gallery, or what finally motivated the Centre's affirmative vote. Self-preservation was certainly a factor. The historian of the Centre Party, Karl Bachem, acknowledged this when he outlined the probably catastrophic results of a negative vote, since the Bill would have passed anyway.\(^{82}\) The Centrists in the Reichstag would probably have been beaten up on the spot, the Centre Party smashed almost at once, and Catholic civil servants dismissed immediately. Precedent was also a contributing factor. Bachem refers to the chaotic period of 1919, and points out that the Centre, in collaborating with the Social Democrats, had been instrumental in saving Germany from the throes of Bolshevism. Now the Centre Party hoped that, in siding with the National Socialists, Germany could be saved from Communism, Bolshevism, and anarchy.\(^{83}\)

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\(^{80}\) The Times, "Power for the Nazis," March 24, 1933, p. 12.  
\(^{81}\) The Times, "Nazis," p. 12.  
\(^{82}\) Noakes and Pridham, Documents, p. 191.  
\(^{83}\) Noakes and Pridham, Documents, p. 191.
The story behind the Socialist vote against the Bill was an entirely different matter. Second only to the Communists, The Socialist Party had suffered restrictions of all kinds. As late as March 22, The Times received from its Berlin Correspondent a report on the latest episodes; eleven imprisoned Socialist Deputies had been denied their liberty, by a vote of the Procedure Committee of the Reichstag, and the Government had issued a press statement warning against a negative vote. Under such circumstances, the Socialists attended the Reichstag session of March 23, but even there, they found no respite. As one Socialist Deputy recorded:

We were received with wild choruses; 'we want the Enabling Act!' Youths with swastikas on their chests eyed us insolently, blocked our way, in fact made us run the gauntlet....The Kroll Opera House was crawling with armed S. A. and S. S. men....When we Social Democrats had taken our seats on the extreme left, S. A. and S. S. men lined up at the exit and along the walls behind us in a semicircle. Their expressions boded no good...

None of this appeared in The Times' Berlin Correspondent's reports of the day's events. Similar error remains with the Berlin Correspondent's description of the Socialist leader, Otto Wels. Termed by the Berlin Correspondent as a "pathetic figure," Wels gave the Socialist Party's reasons for opposing the Bill. But far from being pathetic, Wels' defiance of the National Socialists was a patient and dignified response to Hitler's well-worn theme of German decay under the Socialists. Not one word of Wels' speech appeared in the Berlin Correspondent's report. Instead he recorded that Wels was shouted down by Hitler, who then proceeded to launch into a


85 Noakes and Pridham, Documents, p. 192.
frightening tirade. There were some Socialist attempts to deny Hitler's accusations, but they only induced the S. A. and S. S. to threaten the Socialist Party. In spite of it all, the Socialists voted against the Enabling Act, but it was a futile gesture. The Berlin Correspondent discussed the changed power situation between Hitler and Hindenburg:

Hereafter Herr Hitler may for four years, without the assent of Parliament, make and promulgate laws, even if they deviate from the Constitution, enact the budget, take up loans, and conclude treaties--other than alliances--with foreign States. The President...foregoes his obligation to promulgate such laws and his power of caveat or postponement...but he retains his other rights under the Constitution (which include the emergency powers of Article 48, the formal representation of the Reich, and give him the last word in the conclusion of alliances, the declaration of war, and the conclusion of peace).

The Times' Berlin Correspondent reserved for himself the last word on the Enabling Act, laid bare the workings of the "legality" tactic, and, in a departure from The Times' stated attitudes towards Germany and foreign affairs, stated his own views on the possible direction of foreign affairs. Concerning the passage of the Enabling Act, the Berlin Correspondent announced that "the pageantry of Potsdam on March 21...has set the seal on the German counter-revolution....The nose of the Weimar Republic has been rubbed in the dust." As for the inner workings of the "legality" tactic, the Berlin Correspondent wrote that:

this was not a revolution in the ordinary sense. It was a series of clever coups d'Etat in which it was sought to preserve outward legal forms. The explanation, which I have on the best authority, is sound enough. The German Nazi movement had not the advantage, like the Italian Fascist movement, of a hereditary Head of State prepared to collaborate. It had to do with an aged Field Marshal elected President who, however sentimentally disposed towards a

86 Noakes and Pridham, Documents, p. 193-94.
nationalistic revolution, cherished views on his constitutional oath which made it essential that each stage should appear to his satisfaction as 'legal' and constitutional.

On the subject of foreign affairs, the Berlin Correspondent pointedly argued that it would be a grave error "to assume, because of the precision and rapidity of the counter-revolution, that a stable Germany has already emerged from the brief chaos, complete and suitable to be approached for the negotiation of lasting agreements." 89

The Times gave no opinion of its own on the passage of the Enabling Act, nor did it comment on any of the information in the Berlin Correspondent's article. One possible explanation may come from an examination of the events which did occupy The Times. Coinciding with the passage of the Enabling Act was Prime Minister MacDonald's report on his recent visit to Lausanne, and Sir John Simon's conversations with Mussolini over the proposed Four Power Pact. By the time the Berlin Correspondent submitted his article, negotiations for the Pact had proceeded to the point where initialing seemed imminent; thus, as important as the revelations concerning the "legality" tactic may now seem, they doubtless paled in comparison with progress towards the Four Power Pact. Most interesting of all is The Times' treatment of the Berlin Correspondent's article. As already noted, the comments concerning foreign affairs were in direct opposition to those of The Times. Moreover, in this article the Berlin Correspondent contradicted Barrington-Ward's dictum that it was Printing House Square's, not the foreign correspondents' task, to decide the newspaper's attitude towards events. Even so, The Times placed this article opposite its own leading article which approved the progress towards the Four Power Pact, noting that

89 The Times, "The German Upheaval," April 11, 1933, p. 11.
the Pact adopted the principles of the Locarno Treaties, and extended these principles to the problem of treaty revision. The net result was that The Times' readers were presented with what much later could be interpreted as evidence of the conflict that would smoulder between Printing House Square and its Berlin Correspondent.

The coincidence of the passage of the Enabling Act with the developments towards the Four Power Pact may explain The Times' lack of response, but it cannot excuse The Times' failure to perceive the true significance of German developments. The Enabling Act visibly continued the Constitutional subversion begun by the Reichstag Fire decrees; again, Hitler maintained his show of "legality." The Gleichschaltung of the States was accomplished under authority of the Reichstag Fire decrees; the end of the German parliamentary system, the essence of the Enabling Act, was achieved through a vote of the Reichstag. For all practical purposes, Germany was now a National Socialist State. For The Times, these changes, accompanied by "excesses," were still matters of German internal politics.

By scorning the Potsdam ceremonies, The Times, in one sense, saw through Hitler's "legality" tactic, but The Times' own interpretation of this "legality" (as given in its initial reaction to Hitler's appointment as Chancellor) no doubt caused its failure to realise fully what had happened. The Times relied on the conservative Ministers' abilities to control the National Socialist Cabinet minority, but failed to see that these so-called guarantors of constitutionality had already acquiesced in the constitution's subversion. Hitler obtained the Reichstag Fire decrees only through prior agreement of the Cabinet; the conservatives corrupted the constitution further when the quorum requirements for constitutional amendments were arbitrarily changed in Cabinet.

The Times' failed perception extended to foreign affairs. At first, The Times' discussion of Potsdam's significance and the tomb of Frederick the Great as focal points of the "rebirth of the German Reich," appeared as warnings of a possible revival of German militarism. This impression was immediately reversed, however, by The Times' presumption that the Government would use the inspiration to wholly different purposes. Above all, the reliance on the conservative Ministers, augmented by Hitler's seeming pacifism at Potsdam, gave further impetus to The Times' support for Disarmament, thus accounting for the urging that Europe adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards Germany where armaments were concerned.

THE COLLAPSE OF THE TRADE UNIONS

Following the passage of the Enabling Act, Hitler turned his attention to removing the last barriers to his one-party State. The first to fall were the unions. On May 2, 1933, following an impressive May Day which disarmed the unions, they were destroyed. With the May Day holiday, the National Socialists granted the unions' long-standing demand for a paid national holiday. The move came as a complete surprise. "There was nothing left for them to do but welcome the act and ask their members to observe the holiday."91 The celebration, however, was a public avowal of Hitler's Cabinet struggle. Everywhere banners flaunted the slogan "German Socialism," and the day was celebrated as "the second great popular festival of the National Socialist revolution."92 At no time was the Nationalist presence in the Cabinet acknowledged.

91 Bracher, Dictatorship, p. 215.
Foreign opinion of the German celebrations differed. French Ambassador François-Poncet recorded his impressions of the staging; The Times’ Berlin Correspondent contrasted the "rather meagre demonstrations of former years," with the "prodigious gathering," at which uniforms abounded. The Times took a dim view of the affair; the paid nature of the holiday was an obvious success, but the vast crowds were due to the "known consequences of hostility to any sort of Nazi celebrations," and considered the entire day to be unproductive. The Times reduced the entire German celebration to the observation that "Hitler proved himself once more greater as a showman than as a director of policy."

On May 2, 1933 the true purpose of the May Day celebrations was dramatically revealed. Throughout the Reich, all union offices were occupied by detachments of the S.A. and S.S. The Times’ Berlin Correspondent submitted a primarily factual account, noting that the takeover was performed by the National Socialists "as a party," that the Government's role was the "passive one of non-intervention." The completeness of the takeover caused the Berlin Correspondent to comment that the unions' "capacity for resistance to a Fascist regime was overestimated by nearly everybody."

THE ELIMINATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES

The waning influence of von Papen and of Hugenberg had become increasingly pronounced following the passage of the Enabling Act; the dissolution of the trade unions had demonstrated how ineffectual these two had already become.

95 The Times, "The New May Day," May 2, 1933, p. 15.
96 The Times, "German Trade Unions," May 4, 1933, p. 12.
97 The Times, "German Unions," p. 12
Between April 12 and July 6, 1933, The Times carried a number of reports which depicted the National Socialists' systematic removal of von Papen, Hugenberg, and the political parties. The first move was against von Papen. It was common knowledge that, although he was Commissioner for Prussia, real power lay in Göring's hands. This fact was confirmed with Göring's appointment as Premier of Prussia. The Times' Berlin Correspondent discussed the effect of this change. Von Papen was now left only with the Vice-Chancellorship, and his future role would be confined to representing Germany at international conferences and at meetings with foreign statesmen. The new Prussian Cabinet, as appointed by Hitler, was virtually uniformly National Socialist; Göring was still the Minister of the Interior for Prussia; Keitel and Rust were Ministers for Justice and Fine Arts respectively, finance, to which the National Socialists attached less importance, remained with Popitz, who had no party affiliations. As for Hugenberg, he was still unconfirmed in the Prussian Ministries of Labour and Agriculture, which he administered along with the Reich Ministries of Agriculture and Economics.

The elimination of Hugenberg from the Cabinet required just over three months. As early as March 11, Cabinet minutes recorded that:

Hitler, contemptuous of the feeble Nationalist showing in the recent elections, displays a growing tendency to criticise and snub Hugenberg. He now refers slightingly to one of the latter's projects: and when Hugenberg, following Hitler's proposal that a Propaganda Ministry be established, senses the dangers involved and says he would like to reflect on the matter until the next meeting, Hitler insists on an immediate decision. The whole Cabinet thereupon approves the plan...

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99 The Times, "Prussian Premier", April 12, 1933, p. 12.
100 The Times, "Uneasy German Partners," April 25, 1933, p. 13.
101 Noakes and Pridham, Documents, p. 188.
The Times first learned of an impending rift through its Berlin Correspondent's report of April 25, 1933. The Correspondent discussed several of Hugenberg's statements which demonstrated the extent of the quarrel. He had expressed disapproval of "enforced changes...in the controlling organs of business," and had reminded everyone that he was "in a position to break up the government if driven too far [because] the continuance of the Nazi-Nationalist Government in its present composition was a condition of the Enabling Act." Hugenberg's claim was weaker than he perhaps realised. One reason was the erosion of his power base, the Nationalist Party. The Times' Berlin Correspondent summed up the situation thus far:

In spite of the progressive elimination of the Nationalists, it seems that Herr Hugenberg believes himself able to check the revolutionary movement before it goes too far. Few good judges share this belief. The Nationalists are running in double harness with a party increasingly conscious of its power....Prominent Nazi leaders...have said that 'the revolution is only beginning' and that 'for us a slackening of the pace is retrogression.' All signs are that the Nationalists will be left behind.

The Hitler-Hugenberg struggle came to a head during the Cabinet meeting of June 23, 1933. The occasion was the dissolution of local groups of the Militant League of Young Nationalists, capped, on June 20, by the forced dissolution of the entire Nationalist Militant League. During the meeting, Hugenberg's conduct at the recent London Economic Conference came into question, and partly because he had disgraced Germany while in London, Hugenberg found no support coming from any of his Cabinet colleagues. The net result was

that Hugenberg, on June 27, 1933 offered his resignation from the Cabinet. A courier was dispatched to the President, bearing the substance of Hugenberg's case; even now, and with no Cabinet support, Hugenberg relied on the Enabling Act's wording aiding him. The Times' Berlin Correspondent viewed Hugenberg's case as a "question of loyalties, and whether the President will support, and is able to support, his claim to a fulfilment of solemn undertakings."105 Hugenberg's resignation was accepted two days later.

The demise of Germany's political parties almost paralleled the steps taken against von Papen and Hugenberg. Some parties, particularly the Communists and the Socialists, were forcibly dissolved; others, including the Nationalists and the Catholic Centre, announced their "voluntary" dissolution. The Communist Party, Hitler's first and most obvious target, had been victimised throughout the election campaign; its forced dissolution was strategically delayed until after the March 5 election. The Socialist Party survived until its forced dissolution on June 22, 1933. The period between Wels' speech opposing the Enabling Act and the final dissolution had been marked by a series of internal crises and external reprisals. The Party's inability to decide how actively to oppose the National Socialists, coupled with the flight of some of its prominent members, caused dissension and a loss of touch with its membership. Not even its May 17 attempt at accommodation, by endorsing Hitler's "peace speech" could save the Socialist Party. On June 22, the Socialist Party was outlawed as a "party hostile to the nation and state.106

106 Bracher, Dictatorship, p. 221.
The "voluntary" dissolution of the Nationalist Party came after a series of reprisals which all but ended the Party's existence outside of the Reichstag membership. As previously mentioned, the reprisals were in the form of dissolutions of the local groups of the Nationalist Militant League. The first occurred in Pomerania, on the ground that "former Communists' had enrolled."107 The final blow came when the entire Militant League was dissolved on June 20. On June 27, the same day Hugenberg offered his resignation from the Cabinet, the Nationalist Party announced its own dissolution. The reasons, duly recorded by The Times' Berlin Correspondent, were to "indicate the goodwill of the leaders of the Nationalist [Party]... towards the Government...."108 The last party to dissolve was the Catholic Centre, on July 5, 1933. It is interesting to note that few German newspapers commented. The Times' Berlin Correspondent noted that the Deutsche Zeitung could not forgive the Centre for having collaborated with "'Jew-Democrats'" and "'Jew-Socialists.'"109 The Vossische Zeitung, according to The Times' Berlin Correspondent, noted that Brüning, when he was Chancellor, "was on the way towards the development of a sounder Parliamentary system than the rigid proportional representation and party group-bickering to which the collapse of democracy in Germany is generally attributed."110

The Times was keenly aware of the enormity of the dissolution of Germany's political parties:

One of the penalties of 'totalitarianism' is, of course, that it deprives the country of many of its ablest men of action and most independent thinkers, who are no longer allowed to perform even the useful function of constructive opposition. Its forced uniformity drives free thought across the frontier, suppresses individual liberties, and inculcates the slave mind. What opposition there is to the dominant regime—and there is plenty in Germany—becomes furtive and double-faced, or merely passive and impotent for either good or ill.\footnote{The Times, "The Totalitarian State," July 8, 1933, p. 13.}

Nor was The Times above placing the blame where it was clearly due. "The Nazis have brought Germany to this pitiable condition by their ruthless exploitation first of the rubber club and then of dismissal from public or private job." Despite this condemnation, The Times was still hopeful that Germany could profit from Hitler's methods, noting certain improvements since his coming to office:

\footnote{The Times, "Totalitarian," July 8, 1933, p. 13.}

[Hitler] undoubtedly desires to reinculcate the old German virtues of loyalty, self-discipline, and service to the State. Some of the grosser forms of post-War demoralisation have been checked under the new regime; and Herr Hitler will win support which will be very valuable to him if he will genuinely devote himself to the moral and economic resurrection of his country.\footnote{Bracher, Dictatorship, p. 221.}

With such little regard for the significance of events, The Times anticipated a later verdict to the effect that "almost unnoticed, the formerly imposing structure of German liberalism crumbled."\footnote{Bracher, Dictatorship, p. 221.}

Within six months of becoming Chancellor, Hitler had, through his "legality" tactic, made monumental progress towards his goal of total power before the President died. All that he needed to complete the picture was somehow to make himself independent of the National Socialist Party (particularly the S. A.), and to have the Reichswehr acquiesce in his plans. Already Hitler had transformed a "reassuring" Cabinet minority into the driving force behind the Government, "legally" disposed of the Left opposition
with the Reichstag and, by extension, the political parties, through the
Enabling Act. To be sure, no legal basis existed for the dissolution of
the trades unions, but such distinctions were irrelevant.

The Times chose to view such developments strictly in their domestic
context. At such an early stage in Germany's internal development, there
was little to persuade The Times that Hitler's repressive methods would be
translated to foreign affairs. Recent developments, if not Hitler's
actions (with the ultimately glaring exception of Austria) suggested the
contrary. The Times had witnessed Mussolini's metamorphosis from revolu-
tionary to statesman, and on May 17, 1933, Hitler had apparently begun to
emulate his "prototype" with his famous peace speech to the Reichstag. It
no doubt seemed to The Times that Germany was developing along ultimately
positive lines. The violence and repressions which resulted in the col-
lapse of Germany's democratic system were certainly deplorable, but against
this The Times could assert that Germany was undergoing a moral regenera-
tion. Internally, Hitler had succeeded beyond all expectations. The
Times was anxious that he be "successful" externally.
CHAPTER THREE

EARLY FOREIGN POLICY

Hitler's early foreign policy has been summed up as:

the double interaction between his plans and hopes on the one hand and on the other the existing realities in Germany's domestic and international situation. Characteristic of this period is the constancy of Hitler's plans; their execution, however, involved some adjustment to the exigencies of the contemporary scene. ¹

One very obvious factor of this "contemporary scene" was the drastic reversal of Germany's hard-won international esteem in the face of Hitler's appointment as Chancellor. In its wake came street brawls, expulsions from office, and the shoddy treatment of the Jews, Socialists, etc. Hitler retrieved some of this esteem by successfully exploiting Europe's emphasis on negotiation. For most of his first year in office, Hitler kept up the pretense of wishing to arrive at a disarmament convention (his May 17, 1933 "peace speech" in this connection was a masterly deception), and paid lip service to collective security through his participation in the negotiations for a Four Power Pact. When the pretense became inconvenient, Hitler abruptly announced Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League, and then ingenuously smoothed the

ruffled feathers by announcing the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of January 26, 1934.

_The Times_ consistently argued in favour of the Disarmament Convention, the Four Power Pact, and even applauded the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact, despite its deviation from the concept of collective security. Germany's withdrawal, rather than the pacific words of May 17, conformed to Hitler's real foreign policy plans, not only as laid down in _Mein Kampf_, but as so recently expressed in his meeting with the generals, on February 3, 1933. When these aims are examined against Hitler's public pronouncements, one can better appreciate the way in which _The Times_, through the fault of wishing so strongly for a successful Disarmament Convention, took Hitler at his word when he spoke of peaceful solutions to international problems.

**PREPARATIONS FOR THE REICHSTAG ADDRESS**

Hitler's foreign policy, it is generally accepted to-day, aimed at gaining Lebensraum in the east, something he felt that German statesmen before the War should have pursued.\(^2\) Hitler had already argued in _Mein Kampf_ that all of Germany's alliances should be formulated with Lebensraum in mind. Thus, "the aim of German foreign policy today must be the preparation for the conquest of freedom for tomorrow."\(^3\) This was the principal subject at three meetings Hitler held with members of the Düsseldorf Industrial Club, on January 27, 1932, with the leading generals and admirals on February 3, 1933, and with industrialists, some of whom had been present at Düsseldorf, on February 20, 1933. At the


\(^3\) Hitler, _Mein Kampf_, p. 610.
first of these meetings, Hitler re-affirmed his belief that:

the prerequisite for success in foreign affairs was a revolutionary change in the domestic situation in Germany. The whole structure of Germany must change, the opposition parties crushed, democratic and pacific thought extirpated, and a large new military force built on an ideologically unified basis.4

The meeting with the generals was crucial since, as Hitler well knew, he needed their support to accomplish his aims. Conversely, the generals were the only group who could effectively stop him. His entire speech, lasting more than two hours, was an appeal in which he attempted to show that the generals' interests and his own coincided. The means to an economic recovery lay in Germany expanding its land base. This required a strong army. "Ever since the 'Great Depression' of 1873-96, it was well known in all western industrial countries, including the U.S.A., that overseas expansion and military production were valuable and proven means of overcoming economic difficulties."5 The task of Hitler and the National Socialists would be to consolidate their anti-democratic regime, as well as to apply whatever indoctrination that was required to allow the generals to provide the requisite army.6 Hitler later confirmed this in the February 8 Cabinet meeting when he stated that "for the next four to five years the main principle must be: everything for the armed forces."7 He candidly admitted to the Cabinet that the programme would be extremely dangerous. While Germany was weak, and presumably no longer able to disguise her clandestine rearmament programme, "France—if she

4Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 40

5Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 25.


7Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 27.
has any statesmen at all—would launch a preventive war against Germany."  

The February 20 meeting, with essentially the same industrialists as a year ago, proceeded along similar lines. From this group, Hitler needed financial support for the upcoming March 5 election campaign. In return, Hitler promised to protect private enterprise from Communism, hence the need to eliminate democracy:

"Private enterprise cannot be maintained in the age of democracy; it is conceivable only if the people have a sound idea of authority and personality. When, however, the defense of the existing order, its political administration, is left to a majority, it will go under irrevocably... It is, however, not enough to say: We do not want Communism in our own economy. If we continue on our old political course, then we shall perish."  

Against this background of clearly stated objectives, with both the Army High Command and the industrialists made to realise that their interests coincided with Hitler's, the benefits of deceiving Europe were even greater. Furthermore, Hitler had one more collective, willing accomplice—the Cabinet, that "guarantor of constitutional correctness," abetted Hitler's every move.

Virtually from the day it took office, Hitler's Cabinet worked for the collapse of the Disarmament Conference. Constantin von Neurath, the man to whom The Times' Berlin Correspondent had pointed as representing a stabilising influence, was one of the more willing assistants. Neurath revealed his attitudes to the new foreign policy in the Cabinet meeting of February 8, 1933. In discussing the expiring terms of the arms truce established by the Disarmament Conference, Neurath stated that all effort was to be made to prevent their extension. However, "we must not be the only ones to do so since our intention to rearm would thereby be

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8 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 27.
9 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 27.
manifested too soon."10 In a memorandum of February 15 to Defense Minister Blomberg, Neurath wrote: "if a failure of the conference really proves inevitable, the lack of an intention to disarm on the part of France must appear as the cause."11 Memoranda between Berlin and the German delegation at Geneva, beginning with that of February 25, 1933, were full of instructions to walk out of meetings if given pretexts arose. The February 25 directive was that the delegation was to "walk out of the committee dealing with air force questions if it discussed a French proposal to internationalise civil aviation ahead of disarmament schemes."12

Nadolny, the leading German delegate to the Disarmament Conference, treated German journalists, in late April, to a candid discussion of Germany's aims:

...Germany hoped to secure legalisation for a standing army of 600,000 but was in the process of building an army of that size anyway....[There were] two possible dangers in Geneva: one was that the British and French might agree to a German army of 300,000, reduce their own forces a little, and then insist on an international control of the newly agreed levels. If the British and the French were to insist on such a programme, Germany would leave the Conference and perhaps also leave the League. The second danger was that the other powers would in fact agree to disarm substantially and therefore refuse to allow Germany to rearm at all: this too, would lead Germany to depart from the Conference.13

The meaning was unmistakable. The very concessions for which Germany had been arguing were now the precise conditions under which Germany would leave the Disarmament Conference.

10Noakes and Pridham, Documents, p. 167.

11Noakes and Pridham, Documents, p. 168.

12Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 44.

13Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 161.
With the knowledge of these events, one may plainly discern the
hollowness of Hitler's "peaceful" intentions as espoused in the May 17
Reichstag address. Because The Times was necessarily unaware of Hitler's
true intentions, or of the motives which sparked the address, it con-sidered
the speech to be "earnestly but moderately worded."14 Hitler had
now shown himself to be a statesman. Obviously, such praise was hardly
in keeping with Hitler's motives.

THE REICHSTAG ADDRESS

The Reichstag address was prompted largely by the MacDonald Plan,
which contained a mechanism whereby all Continental armies would be re-
duced to specific sizes, and eventually to be replaced altogether by
short-service militias. The German Cabinet debated the Plan on May 12,
1933. Von Neurath was against acceptance, but was apprehensive over the
possible isolation of Germany.15 Hitler also wanted to reject it, ar-
guing that "unless we were accorded heavy weapons any departure from the
system of the Reichswehr was unthinkable."16 Finally, the Cabinet de-
cided that Hitler issue a declaration indicating that the possibility of
Germany remaining within the League had been made "exceedingly doubtful
by the actions of our opponents."17

Hitler's address was favourably received in European circles, France
excepted. Hitler still condemned the Treaty of Versailles as being the

14The Times, "Herr Hitler's Speech," May 18, 1933, p. 15.
15Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 44.
16Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 44.
17Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 44.
root of Germany's ills, and expanded this to include the current world crisis. He insisted on revision, especially with respect to the "War-guilt lie," but he scored his first point with the statement that "the Treaty of Versailles is no solution to the world's problems, but nevertheless no German Government will of its own accord break an arrangement without being able first to supplant it by a better one." Turning to disarmament, Hitler demanded that the world disarm to Germany's level or, at the very least, accord Germany equality of armament. In this connection he referred to the MacDonald Plan: "the German Government sees in it a possible starting point for the solution of the disarmament question...." The remainder of Hitler's speech was animated by a professed desire that the world's problems be solved through negotiations, adding that "no fresh European war is capable of putting something better in the place of the unsatisfactory conditions which to-day exist....The outbreak of such a madness without end would lead to the collapse of the social order in Europe." As was decided in the May 12 Cabinet meeting, Hitler warned that, while Germany was willing to "settle all difficult questions with other Governments by peaceful methods...the German Government [could]...in no circumstances allow [itself] to be forced into any kind of signature which would signify the perpetuation of Germany's degradation." Any attempt to keep Germany a "permanently defamed people" would render it impossible for Germany to "continue to belong to the League of Nations." 


Reports from its Berlin, Paris, Rome, and Warsaw Correspondents underscored the importance The Times placed in the speech. The Berlin Correspondent, in one report, considered the speech to be a "most effective presentation of the German case."\(^{20}\) In a companion article, he dealt with German observations of foreign reception of the speech. An official communiqué stated that "the Government of National Socialist Germany...note with deep satisfaction the tremendous effect of the speech on the outer world."\(^{21}\) Of equal importance to the Berlin Correspondent was the fact that, despite the present impossibility of Press and Parliamentary opposition, "there is no doubt that Germany solidly approves the speech..." A case in point was Hitler's reference to Poland: "Young Germany is animated by the deepest understanding for similar feeling, as well as justifiable claims to live, by other peoples. This generation has suffered too much from the insanity of our time to wish to visit similar suffering upon others." From this, the Berlin Correspondent suggested that "if Dr. Brüning...had made the same speech, and had as candidly admitted the right of Poland to live, he could not have counted on the same unanimous support. That, from the point of view of the world, is a gain."\(^{22}\) The Times' Rome Correspondent reported that the overriding attitude of the Rome Press was that Hitler had demonstrated his willingness to negotiate; therefore, foreign governments, especially France and her allies, were "adjured to realise that a truly decisive moment has arrived."\(^{23}\) In Warsaw, The Times' Correspondent noted that the Warsaw


Press appreciated Hitler's change in tone, but was ever mindful that the main object of his policy was the abolition of the Treaty of Versailles. The Times' Paris Correspondent reported the mixed reception of the French Press. On the one hand, it was satisfied that "wiser councils prevailed and the German Government took timely steps to avoid a rupture which would have meant the end of the Disarmament Conference," and was surprised at the "studied moderation of the speech." This the French Press took to mean that the views expressed were those of the Wilhelmsstrasse and not of the "National Socialist demagogue." On the other hand, skepticism was prevalent. The Times' Paris Correspondent noted that:

apart from these matters of detail, however, it is observed that there has been no change of policy. Herr Hitler's attitude is that of all the other German politicians who have preceded him at the Wilhelmsstrasse. He abandons none of the claims for treaty revision, and, in asserting that he will seek to realise them only within the framework of the treaties, he is merely repeating what Herr Stresemann and his successors have said before him, with the result that the other parties to the Peace Treaties have been continually tricked into concessions.

Hitler's speech had its own impact on The Times. The newspaper gave qualified approval to the content of the speech, but was unreserved in its praise of the performance: "Behind Herr Hitler, demagogue and showman, the world caught a first glimpse yesterday of Herr Hitler the statesman. A very short period of responsibility may have taught him already the truth of a saying attributed to Bismarck, that politics is the art of the possible."

previous speeches had been removed since he was now "for the first time, deliberately addressing a world audience."

Hitler's demand that Germany be accorded equality of rights The Times acknowledged to be "in principle irrefutable," but was at pains to point out that, with the one exception of armaments, Germany had attained actual equality. Germany was a member of the League, and had been given a permanent seat on the Council. As for the continued inequality in armaments, The Times offered the following explanation/justification:

...in view of the use Germany made of her armed strength in the not very distant past, and the present inculcation of militarism in the youth of the country by the new regime, with its teaching that Germany has legitimate aims which can only be gained by the employment of force, it is really almost impossible to expect neighbouring countries at once to renounce their own superiority in armaments—especially when it is considered that one of the 'legitimate aims' is the drastic alteration of Peace Treaties which to some are the very charters of the national existence.

The Times preferred that equalisation be gradual, and cited statements by Hitler which seemed to concur with this view. Germany's willingness to renounce instruments of aggression, the favourable response to the MacDonald Plan, the willingness to dissolve the entire armaments remaining to her provided other nations were so willing, and Germany's preparedness to effect the re-organisation of the long-service army on a proportional basis, were all given close attention in the leading article.

Some of Hitler's comments, however, received disapproval: "He could not resist some jibes at the expense of the League of Nations; and, when he said that Germany had faithfully fulfilled her obligations under the Versailles Treaty, he was hardly telling the whole story." Once again though, The Times felt it necessary to temper its criticism: "...his statement that international agreements can only have real value if they are made between nations of equal rights cannot really be challenged.
There will never be a tranquilised Europe until the imposed Versailles Treaty has been converted, with a minimum of alterations, into an agreed peace."

Overall, The Times felt that the speech was likely to produce a better atmosphere at Geneva, and The Times' tone had switched from insisting that articles be "unhesitatingly modified or cancelled" to simply undergoing a "minimum of alterations." A possible reason for this change in tone was The Times' stated reservation. The speech had to be "tested by the conduct of the German delegate [at Geneva]...It has moreover to be examined against the background of [Hitler's] own doctrine of force elaborated in his remarkable work 'My Fight' which has become a sort of gospel to young Germany." The Times also was cognisant of the fact that Germany's military was anxious for a quiet period in order to "strengthen their armed forces and mature their plans." Despite this, The Times was of the opinion that "this country would prefer to regard Herr Hitler as sincere in his desire to collaborate with the rest of the world in building a common prosperity and peace on an agreed basis of equal rights."\textsuperscript{28}

For the present, The Times had what it had long awaited—Hitler's personal assurance that Germany's foreign policy would emphasise negotiation. This hardly suggests that The Times responded with a blind enthusiasm. There were areas still in need of clarification, and they had been duly noted. The satisfaction at The Times, however, had been translated to the most cynical of its correspondents, because the Berlin Correspondent acknowledged much when he wrote that the address was a "most effective presentation of the German case." Above all, the speech

had come at a time when negotiations for the Four Power Pact had been increasingly in the news. When the Pact was initialed on June 8, 1933, it appeared that Hitler had rapidly transformed his pacific words with the appropriate actions.

One more aspect of The Times' response must be discussed. The leading article on the Reichstag address mentioned Mein Kampf. This raises the whole issue of the validity of citing the work when discussing Hitler's foreign policy. The reference shows that some members of The Times' editorial staff had a certain familiarity with the work. Even so, its indiscriminate use could not be without its potential pitfalls. It has been pointed out that "far too much has been read into the so-called foreign policy chapters...No statesman is in a position to indicate ten years in advance what he is going to do later."29 Also, since "it was written in prison, Hitler could afford to be more frank than in public speeches."30 Conversely, the fact "that Germany was again able to become a Great Power and make a bid for world power, lends a certain prophetic plausibility to Hitler's savage outbursts."31 There is also the question of Mein Kampf's acceptance within Germany, especially within the National Socialist Party. "The average party member did not read the book, and among the leaders it was a common saying that Hitler was an extraordinary speaker, a great leader, a political genius, but 'it's too bad he had to write that silly book.'"32 Finally, there is the question of an English


31 Robertson, Pre-War Policy, p. x.

32 Heiden, Führer, p. 283.
translation. While it may be true that Hitler "forbade its publication in English,"33 The Times printed three excerpts from what it announced to be the "authorised English translation."34 Judging from the letters to The Times, by those who bothered to comment, the excerpts from Mein Kampf were not seriously received. Once such correspondent was Gordon Childe, who described Hitler's views on the Aryans as "arrant nonsense."35

THE FOUR POWER PACT

Parallel discussions concerning the Four Power Pact diverted The Times' attention from the Disarmament Conference, despite the impetus of the Reichstag address. As suggested earlier, Germany's participation was "proof" of Hitler's desire for peace. Simultaneously, and fundamentally; participation was a further time-saving device. Discussions of the proposed Pact first appeared in The Times' number for March 20, 1933. The occasion was the Rome meeting between Mussolini, MacDonald, and Sir John Simon (British Foreign Minister), at which Mussolini presented his plan for "the collaboration of the Western Powers in an effort to maintain, in the spirit of the Kellogg Pact and the 'no force' declaration, a long period of peace for Europe and the world."36 Almost from the very beginning (it was first proposed to France on March 2, 1933; Germany showed "interest" on the week-end of May 19-20, 1933) the pact was doomed. Each


of the other parties had objections to certain provisions and sought either their removal or their alteration. In the end, the four powers signed, but never ratified, "a collection of loose generalities."37 The Times' Berlin Correspondent recorded German dissatisfaction with the Pact, as expressed by Alfred Rosenberg, in the Völkischer Beobachter. "It has not been possible...to carry out the original idea in a form which would have done justice to Germany's legitimate expectations, still, the principle that the fate of Europe must be borne in the hands of the four great Nations, if a terrible collapse is to be avoided, has gone through."38 Even so, there had been two distinct advantages to Germany's participation in the negotiations. Even in Mussolini's view, the negotiations had offered Germany a certain amount of time to rearm.39 Secondly, the Pact signified "a kind of moral acceptance of Germany into the society of great powers."40

When taken together, Hitler's Reichstag address, and Germany's participation in the Four Power Pact, fulfilled the immediate foreign policy objectives of the German Cabinet. The Reichstag address, by putting most of Europe at ease, prolonged the disarmament talks, thus gaining for Germany the necessary time to continue her rearmament programme. Through her participation in the Four Power Pact, Germany's position at Geneva was all the more enhanced, the better to effect Neurath's requirement that France appear to frustrate all disarmament proposals. With such

37 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 50.
38 The Times, "German Welcome," July 17, 1933, p. 12.
39 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 164.
40 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 164.
motives unknown at Printing House Square, it is quite understandable that Hitler's promises, so quickly followed by an overt demonstration of his "peaceful" intentions, were favourably received. It cannot be denied, however, that The Times' favourable response resulted from a certain self-deception, born of its hopes for European stability.

GERMANY WITHDRAWS FROM THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

The direction to which all of Hitler's meetings, negotiations, and speeches moved was Germany's withdrawal, on October 14, 1933, from the Disarmament Conference and the League of Nations. The immediate cause was the fact that Germany's clandestine rearmament programme had proceeded to a point where it could no longer be disguised. French apprehensions were such that, by September 11, 1933, The Times' Berlin Correspondent could report that:

the French Government were considering the advisability of drawing the attention of the League to clandestine rearmament in Germany, that evidence of rearmament had been prepared, and that the decision of the Government would depend largely on the degree of support which they received from Great Britain and perhaps Italy.41

French apprehensions were further aggravated by the knowledge that Germany intended making some counter-proposals of its own when the Disarmament Conference reconvened. The Times' Paris Correspondent reported the proposals tentatively as:

That Germany should be allowed to build fortifications on the French model on the French eastern frontier and to equip them with heavy defensive weapons.
That all bombing aircraft should be abolished and that fighters, of which Germany would have her share, should be allowed.

That supervision of armaments should be organised, if at all, not on a basis of general and equal reciprocity between all nations, but bilaterally between Powers of status.\textsuperscript{42}

That the proposals were obstructionist was obvious enough. Lord Tyrell, British Ambassador to France, had his own dim view of the proposals:

Fortifications...would provide Germany with an excuse for the possession of heavy artillery, and more particularly, of facilities for its manufacture. To abolish bombers while retaining fighters might leave the air power of Germany, with her fleet of large commercial aircraft, easily convertible into bombers, in a commanding position. The bilateral organisation of armament control might tend to create a new hierarchy of Powers and to break up the French alliances in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{43}

These developments prompted The \textit{Times}' Berlin Correspondent to submit a two-part discussion, "Germany and the World," beginning on September 26, 1933. He reported that a recent speech by von Neurath had been summed up by a \textit{Deutsche Tageszeitung} headline "No More Giving Way." Neurath had claimed that, if the armed countries continued to evade their disarmament obligations, Germany "will have the right and the duty to provide for the equality and security of its own people according to its own judgement and without any hesitation or false scruple."\textsuperscript{44} The \textit{Times}' Berlin Correspondent pointed out that, while Neurath had really said nothing new since Schleicher had first made the claim last summer, Rosenberg, writing in the \textit{Völkischer Beobachter}, had provided a new version: "according to international law, if France refuses to fulfill her obligations Germany would have to regard the Versailles Treaty as revised and nullified and would henceforth have no more obligations herself.

\textsuperscript{42}The \textit{Times}, "Germany and Armaments," September 25, 1933, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{43}The \textit{Times}, "Germany," September 25, 1933, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{44}The \textit{Times}, "Germany and the World," September 27, 1933, p. 15.
arising from the Treaty."

The Berlin Correspondent added his own evidence of Germany's military developments. Foreign observers:

have seen and heard marching and drilling incessantly with and without arms. They have seen the Hitler battalions, the S. A. and especially the S. S. change from somewhat ragged columns of enthusiasts into fine soldierly units....

Add to this all that may be covered by the term 'field exercises' to-day contained in the regulations of practically all German organisations....The drafting of Reichswehr soldiers whose 12 years service has ended into the S. A. and S. S....is another of many facts which make it hard to regard these forces as no more military in character than the 'gymnastic societies, night-watchmen, and firemen' to which Herr Hitler ingenuously compared them in his big speech in May.

On the subject of materials, he was careful to state that, while "enough has become public to disclose the trend of projects to supply the air services.... the alleged acquisition of arms still forbidden in the Treaty is not a matter which can properly be investigated or pronounced upon by the individual foreign resident, journalist or not. It is a matter for Governments and Geneva." Still, the Berlin Correspondent felt that it required "a remarkable gift of the imagination to see any real military danger in the stage so far reached," adding that the real danger lay not in these elementary preparations, "but in the spirit behind them."45

In the second installment to his article, the Berlin Correspondent concentrated on the effects of a speech by von Papen, in which was unveiled "a vague new conception of nationhood,"46 and the effects of Professor Banse's book Military Science, with the thesis that "the

45The Times, "Germany," September 27, 1933, p. 15.
nation, from childhood on, should be impregnated and familiarised with
the idea of war," which had recently been introduced into German schools.
For the Berlin Correspondent, von Papen was the "most bewildering
spokesman of the new regime," who opened his speech with the reminder
that "one-third of the German people to-day live outside the frontiers
of the Reich," and continued with the claim that Germany's new concept
of nationhood was already surmounting "the Balkanisation of Europe...
which the Paris suburban treaties...brought us...and which was a product
of the Liberal [sic] nineteenth century." Despite the fact that von
Papen placed "irredentism and the danger of warlike experiments among
the vices of this 'Balkanisation,'" his audience "understood...something
very much like irredentism." Added to this was the rapidity with which
Professor Banse's thesis (first discussed in The Times on September 6,
1933), was being put into practice. The Berlin Correspondent expressed
particular concern over the effects of applying this thesis to German
schoolchildren:

[They] are taught versions of recent history which are bound to
give them a distorted and unsympathetic view of the outside world.
That brooding German minds, ignoring the outside belief that
Germany lost the War, regard the Armistice terms as those of rob-
bbers is comprehensible; but to present that exclusive point of
view to children is not the best method of ensuring a peace-loving
nation in years to come....

There were those in Germany, however, who were genuinely concerned at
the reaction foreign residents in Germany would have to these events.
"In spite of a certain detachment, which does not exclude sympathy, such
observers realise that much of the shouting and exaggeration is sheer
revolutionary exuberance." Even so, foreign suspicion was justified.
Given that Hitler and Goebbels were "sincerely persuaded of the peaceful
intentions of their people," the Berlin Correspondent wrote that, there was no guarantee that in "three, five or even more years, when Germany has increased her armaments, and when some followers of the Bänsch school consider war inevitable, an expansionist movement stimulated by these flamboyant methods may not burst out of the German frontiers."

As the situation stood, the Berlin Correspondent concluded that:

\[\text{there seems some reason to suppose that the purer school of National Socialism...is at the heart more interested in...a happy National Socialist commonwealth within the Reich...than the more reactionary Nationalist school through which the Junker-industrialist interests are seeking to secure their new hold on Germany.}\]

Which of these two would prevail had yet to be decided. In the meantime, it was "impossible for the outside observer to remain blind to the dangers inherent in present-day psychological developments in Germany."\(^{47}\)

The Times gave its own assessment of the situation, and was animated by a determination that the Disarmament Convention become a reality, that sufficient agreements in principle had been obtained, and that further talks would have disastrous effects. There was no mincing of words, but it was not the spectre of a newly armed, militaristic Germany that The Times raised:

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\text{Unless this problem of Disarmament is faced now in a really bold and courageous spirit Europe will be left to drift, nation arming against nation, with every prospect that the increased expenditure upon unwanted arms will give an impetus to Socialist and Communist sentiment, and lend a certain reasonableness to its contentions.}^{48}\]

For the remainder, The Times referred specifically to its Berlin Correspondent's comments of the last two days. To his suggestion that "...it requires a remarkable gift of the imagination...," The Times added that "there is no proof, in fact that Germany is arming beyond the

\(^{47}\)The Times, "Germany and the World," September 27, 1933, p. 15.

\(^{48}\)The Times, "Arms and Germany," September 28, 1933, p. 11.
limits of defensive weapons which are proposed in the Draft Convention."
As for the constant marching and drilling, The Times responded that "however efficiently [they] drill, they cannot be compared with long-service professional soldiers," and even they were no longer to be feared since "the last crisis at the Disarmament Conference was over the refusal of Germany to agree to transform her Reichswehr into a militia system," and this had now been reversed.

From The Times' standpoint, here at least, Germany had made substantial efforts to ensure a successful Conference. While it more than hinted that failure to reach agreement would not necessarily be Germany's responsibility, The Times did admit to the difficulty of trusting Germany "in her present state of militaristic agitation, to keep within the terms of the new undertakings to be signed at Geneva," but categorically asserted that it was the task of the other countries to "soothe" rather than "aggravate the situation:"

The Draft Convention...offers at least a partial remedy. It lays down the only principles on which there has so far been substantial agreement. Limitation, gradual reduction, immediate control—all have been agreed to in principle on the first reading of the Draft Convention. The moment has come for a final effort to establish them in practice.49

These agreements in principle, of course, proceeded no further. Between September 25-30, Hitler, Blomberg, the Foreign Ministry, and the Geneva delegation agreed to a negotiating position. It demanded "numerical equality with France in size of army and number and types of weapons during the first stage provided for in any convention, and superiority to France as a counterweight to France's eastern allies in the second stage."50 This would clearly be unacceptable to France, thus


50 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 164.
providing Germany with an excuse to withdraw from the Conference as provided by Neurath's formula. By October 12, however, the situation had been reversed. Britain and the U. S. A. had been won over to the French demand that Article 213 of the Treaty be invoked in light of Germany's rearmament. Berlin realised that this would cause a collapse under circumstances which would ascribe blame to Germany. A more suitable method for Germany to leave the Conference came when von Neurath, having gone to Geneva to meet with the German delegation, found himself presented with a proposed two-stage convention which included controls and appeared to delay German rearmament for several more years. This neatly conformed to the conditions discussed by Nadolny to the German Press in April. Neurath's return to Berlin began a series of discussions which resulted in Germany's decision to withdraw. To be sure, there were those, including Nadolny, who favoured continued discussion and rearmament as before, but Goebbels preferred withdrawal and successfully persuaded Hitler. A more immediate reason for leaving was that the rearmament programme was scheduled to enter a more intense phase, and besides, withdrawal was something which National Socialism had advocated since the early days of opposition. Thus, it was hardly the precipitate and ill judged decision The Times called it.

51 The Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associate Powers, and Germany (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1919), Article 213, p. 96. "So long as the present Treaty remains in force, Germany undertakes to give every facility for any investigation which the Council...may consider necessary."

52 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 164.

53 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 164.

54 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 164.

55 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 165.
All discussion at the newly convened Disarmament Conference was abruptly halted on October 14 when Mr. Henderson, President of the Conference, received von Neurath's telegram informing the Conference that Germany was "deeply humiliated by the deliberate refusal of a real moral and actual equality." While The Times noted the "calm reception of [the news] in all countries," the withdrawal prompted sufficient diplomatic activity that dispatches from its correspondents in Berlin, Geneva, Rome, Washington, Paris, and Vienna, dominated the Foreign Page of The Times to the virtual exclusion of all other news.

The Times' Berlin Correspondent submitted three dispatches for the October 16 number. Firstly, he focused on the expected effects of the withdrawal on domestic affairs. With many Party members disillusioned at not having been rewarded for their part in the "revolution," the Berlin Correspondent saw the withdrawal as a "brilliant stroke," designed to focus attention away from:

the Reichstag fire trial, which has not been going very well from the regime's point of view; to stimulate the enthusiasm of the Government's supporters, which has shown signs of giving way everywhere to discontent; to provide the Government with a vote of confidence on an issue of national honour which no German can dare to disregard; to rid the Reichstag of all relics of the party system; and to lay the foundation for the proposed regional reorganisation of the Reich.

Thus the Berlin Correspondent confirmed "the double interaction between [Hitler's] plans and hopes...and...the existing realities in Germany's domestic and international situation." Secondly, the Berlin Correspondent reported almost exclusively on Hitler's broadcast speech of October 15.


Despite recent evidence to the contrary, Hitler spoke of "Germany's downright fanatical devotion to the task of fulfilling her obligations," and reminded Europe that if the Communists had succeeded in Germany, standing "on the Rhine and the North Sea" would have been the "outposts of a revolutionary Asiatic world empire." Instead, there stood "peaceful German workers wishing to earn their bread by honest toil and in honourable co-operation with the other nations of Europe." Again Hitler reminded Europe that:

"The demand of the German nation and...Government has not been for weapons but for equality of rights. If the world decides that all weapons are to be abolished down to the last machine gun we are ready at once to join in such a convention...But if the world grants to each nation certain weapons we are not ready to let ourselves be excluded from the concession as a nation with inferior rights...."

Thirdly, the Berlin Correspondent was concerned with the German Government's manifesto on policy in light of the withdrawal. The manifesto announced that "'the German Government and the German People (Volk) are at one in the will to pursue a policy of peace, reconciliation, and understanding as the basis of all decisions and actions," and it was concluded by Hitler on a personal note. "As Chancellor of the German people...I am convinced that the whole nation will rally as one man to an affirmation and a decision [a reference to the November 12 plebiscite in which Germany was asked to approve the Government's decision of October 14] which derive just as much from love for our people and respect for its honour...."
The Times' Rome Correspondent reported on an official communiqué, as well as on the markedly divided Italian opinion. The communiqué stated that "...the decision taken by the German Government, although unexpected, has been received with the greatest calm," stressed the importance of viewing the "situation as it is," and pointed out that "the substance and the tone of the speech by Hitler and of the messages issued to the German people do not close all doors...." As for public opinion, there was the sector which was "distinctly favourable to Germany," applauding the decision as "being thoroughly justified," and saying that the true culprits were France and Britain. The opposite view held that Germany had now "revealed herself in her true colours, that she has violated both the spirit and the letter of the Four Power Pact...and that France has been shown to be right in her distrust of Herr Hitler and his Government." The Rome Correspondent's own comment centred largely on the possibility of Mussolini invoking the Four Power Pact, but was mindful that the Pact was now in jeopardy, since it was designed to operate within the League, and Germany intended withdrawing.

French reaction, as recorded by The Times' Paris Correspondent, was marked "...with a grave sense that the deepest suspicions of German bad faith in the matter of disarmament are now confirmed." To the French, German participation at Geneva had only served to delay decisions; now that matters had come down to actual assurance, Hitler had been presented with two alternatives, "a confession of failure to [the Party] rank and

file, or a resounding challenge, applauded by all the nationalist sentiment in Germany...." As far as the French were concerned, "Hitler preferred the prospect of an immediate victory at home to the less spectacular fruits of a wise diplomacy."66

The Times responded with total dismay at the withdrawal because it saw, for the first time, that the Disarmament Conference was in real danger of total failure. Hitler's move was considered "headstrong abruptness," and it elicited no sympathy other than a re-affirmation that Germany's case contained some "obvious and general truths."67 The Times insisted that "it is the plain duty of other Governments to show [Hitler] that the ways of the swashbuckler and the hothead will bring him no success in diplomacy," and rejected outright any suggestion that the move was prompted by events at the morning session of the Conference, pointing out that the manifesto, and the broadcast speech, bore "every sign of careful preparation." As for the upcoming November plebiscite, The Times argued that to foreigners "it must appear as sheer humbug." With this much said, The Times still hoped that the situation could be salvaged if a convention, even without Germany's initial participation, were quickly achieved, so that the world could "judge what it might have been." By making the convention public, The Times hoped, the facts of the convention would become known in Germany, even though that country was "barred to news." "Germans themselves [could] understand that by far the greatest obstacle to the attainment of a Disarmament Convention is the deliberate and incessant militarisation of the German people. Their own "moral


disarmament' is the supreme and most urgent requirement of European peace."68

There were few in Europe who realised the full implications of the withdrawal. For all intents and purposes the Disarmament Conference was dead, even though talks dragged on. Sir Horace Rumbold, British Ambassador to Berlin, had already called attention to the close similarity of Hitler's moves with those advocated in Mein Kampf, and he warned that, once Hitler's objectives had been attained, "it would be misleading to base any hopes on a return to sanity or a serious modification of the views of the chancellor or his entourage."69 Brigadier Arthur Temperley, British military representative to Geneva, not confined to diplomatic niceties, declared "there is a mad dog abroad once more and we must resolutely combine either to ensure its destruction, or at least its confinement until the disease has run its course."70

The withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference climaxed Hitler's bad faith on the armaments issue. Germany's armament programme, no longer disguisable, proceeded apace, and should have served as a warning that Hitler had no intention of finding peaceful solutions to the world's problems. Instead, Hitler's deceit was matched by The Times' belief that continued negotiation was the best method of accommodating Hitler to the idea of collective security. To be sure, The Times curtly dismissed Hitler's reasons for withdrawing from the Conference, and was joined by the press in France, and particularly, in Italy. Unfortunately, The Times had already indicated its future attitude towards Germany and


69 Robertson, Pre-War Policy, p. 27.

70 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 166.
armaments. It was so anxious for a successful Disarmament Convention that French concerns over Germany's rearmament had been countered with the argument that the new levels had yet to have reached those proposed in the draft convention. Even The Times' Berlin Correspondent, who had warned that "in three, five, or even more years..., these flamboyant methods may...burst out of the German frontiers," had also argued that it required "a remarkable gift of the imagination to see any real military danger in the stage so far reached." Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, rather than sparking a more aggressive policy towards Germany, caused The Times to argue all the more strongly for a Disarmament Convention and to applaud any seemingly "peaceful" move that Hitler made.

THE GERMAN-POLISH NON-AGGRESSION PACT

European anxiety that Germany be held to agreements as reflected in the memoranda continually passing between Berlin, Paris, and London on the subject of armaments. When, on January 26, 1934, Germany and Poland announced the Non-Against Pact, to be in force for ten years, the immediate reaction was tremendous approval. The conclusion of the Pact seemed to justify attempts at continued discussion with Germany; the time-limitation notwithstanding, The Times hailed the Pact as an "Eastern Locarno."71

The Times' Berlin Correspondent emphasised the positive aspects of the Pact, but raised the question of how Germany intended regaining the Corridor during the next ten years, adding that, "although nobody living

71The Times, "An Eastern Locarno," January 27, 1934, p. 10
in Germany would believe that the question of the Corridor is disposed of by this agreement, it seems to offer a brighter prospect for the future of German-Polish relations.\textsuperscript{72} Emphasis was also placed on the fact that "the Pact does not in any way affect Polish relations with France, Rumania, or the League of Nations...The procedure laid down for solving disputes under the specific renunciation of force...leads either to the Hague Court or to the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{73}

The Times was unequivocal in its reception of the "excellent news.\textsuperscript{74} Again the time-limit was mentioned, but The Times saw significance in the fact that Germany had voluntarily recognised her eastern frontiers. The Times also noted that, since Hitler had come to power, relations between Germany and Poland had improved. With the conclusion of this Pact, "Herr Hitler has shown in this respect that he understands the difference between the agitator and the statesman." The Times saw in the move the hope that "Germany, her position of equality recognised in practice as well as in principle, will settle down in the end and be a good neighbour on her eastern flank and in the west," and concluded by asking if Germany could not "apply the same principle to the German-speaking country to the south of her.\textsuperscript{75}

The continued discussions on armaments questions, and the renewed impetus for negotiation, represented by the Non-Aggression Pact, were for The Times demonstrations that Germany could be held to negotiated

\textsuperscript{72}The Times, "A Better Neighbourhood," January 27, 1933, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{73}The Times, "Neighbourhood," January 27, 1933, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{74}The Times, "An Eastern Locarno," January 27, 1933, p. 10.

\textsuperscript{75}The Times, "Locarno," January 27, 1933, p. 10.
agreements. It was in this same frame of mind that Britain concluded the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, and when Germany re-occupied the Rhineland in 1936, The Times regarded the move as "A Chance to Rebuild." 76

Long before either of these events, the National Socialist regime had already revealed its savagery at home, and demonstrated its lack of respect for other countries' "right to live." The Röhm Purge and its aftermath ended, for the duration of the Third Reich, the rule of law in Germany. The "German-speaking country" to which The Times referred was Austria. The animosities between these two countries, Reich inspired and abetted, occupied space in The Times almost as a separate consideration of foreign affairs. Whereas Hitler's intentions concerning the Disarmament Conference, the Four-Power Pact, and the League of Nations were well disguised, the Austro-German conflict, since it carried German aggressiveness across her borders (the very thing for which The Times had threatened dire consequences), was far more blatant. Yet The Times' anxiety at preserving some semblance of Disarmament and collective security even surpassed its abhorrence, first of the Röhm Purge and second, of the assassination of Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE "SECOND REVOLUTION"

From July 6, 1933 until its bloody conclusion with the Röhm Purge on June 30, 1934, the domestic consolidation of the Third Reich was dominated by a struggle within the National Socialist Party. On the one side, Hitler, posing as the "moderate among radicals," the "healer of the nation's wounds," fought to halt the "révolution" and control the party rank and file; on the other side, Ernst Röhm and the disaffected "old fighters" felt that the "révolution" had gone badly; the expected rewards (jobs and political office) had gone to very few, so they clamoured for a "second revolution." Essentially, Hitler's concept of the National Socialist State required the immediate imposition of the National Socialist scheme on a still intact government and business machinery. The net result was that:

the reluctance with which large portions of the civil service accepted the democratic Republic was matched by their readiness to cooperate with a new regime that promised to substitute order, stability, efficiency, and 'national values' for the disturbing innovations of a crisis-ridden 'unnational' parliamentary democracy.¹

Rather than replace civil servants and businessmen with National Socialists, Hitler preferred that they be educated into the National Socialist concept of the State. Röhm, on the other hand, required the immediate removal of

¹Bracher, Dictatorship, p. 229.
the entire governmental and business machinery, and its replacement with
the truly National Socialist State.

For the most part, the conflict was waged behind closed doors, but
periodically, both sides offered tantalising glimpses of the struggle.
Hitler followed his July 6, 1933 call to halt the "revolution," made in a
speech to the assembled Reichsstatthalter, with an appeal to order addressed
to the Dortmund S. A., on July 10, and had the appeal repeated in an order
from Frick, on July 11, 1933. Rohm's protests, centering on the relation-
ship of the Reichswehr and S. A., caused considerable weakness in the
"party unity" façade, painstakingly maintained at the Nuremberg party
rally in September, and bolstered by a further call to order, this time
by Hess, in November. By March 1934, party disaffection had increased to
the point where Goebbels was forced to implement a vigorous propaganda
campaign against "critics and carpers." In essence, this was the German
Government's first really public acknowledgement of the crisis; as such,
it afforded The Times' Berlin Correspondent his first opportunity for
authoritative comment. The campaign's effect, however, was severely cur-
tailed by a surprisingly blunt speech by Papen, delivered at the University
of Marburg in June. Until eclipsed by the Rohm Purge, the speech was the
subject of hysterical denials and counter-charges in the German Press, and
it caused considerable panic within the party hierarchy.

By reporting on such public occurrences, The Times' Berlin Correspondent
informed Printing House Square of the developing conflict. On various
occasions he was forced to speculate on the outcome of given episodes; he was
often correct, particularly concerning a "possible" purge. The nature of the
conflict, with Hitler's moderate pose always on view, caused The Times to
sympathise with Hitler's efforts. Even the Berlin Correspondent was obliged
to give Göring the sobriquet "moderate."
News of the Rohm Purge changed all this. The Times learned the
graphic details and, for a time, abandoned its stand that Germany's internal development was her own affair. Unfortunately, The Times caused doubt of its sincerity in this matter by printing a leading article which managed to sympathise with the Purge. The aftermath of the Purge, particularly Hitler's Reichstag address of "justification," caused such disbelief at The Times that it appeared that the newspaper might abandon its consiliatory attitude to Hitler altogether, and treat him in the light he himself had shown. For those who might have missed it the first time, Hitler repeated his brutality, in Austria, and The Times reacted accordingly. Even so, The Times soon returned to championing the cause of the League, and favoured agreements with Hitler, almost until the outbreak of war.

HALTING THE REVOLUTION

Hitler first attempted formally to end the National Socialist "revolution" on July 6, 1933. His reasons, while of an obviously tactical nature, did not rule out a fear of events proceeding outside his control. "More revolutions," he informed the assembled Reichsstatthalter, "have succeeded in the first onslaught than successful ones have been checked and brought to a halt." 2 The Reichsstatthalter's task was, therefore, the "winding up of the revolution," to see that:

the present state of affairs...be improved and the people embodying it...be educated to the National Socialist conception of the State. A businessman must not therefore be dismissed if he is not yet a good National Socialist; especially if the National Socialist put in his place knows nothing about business...The task of National Socialism

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2 Fest, Hitler, p. 450.
is the safeguarding of the development of our people. But we must not keep looking round to see what next to revolutionise; rather we have the task of securing one position after another in order to hold them, and occupy them gradually in model fashion. In this we must gear our actions to a period of many years, and plan in terms of long periods of time.\footnote{Noakes and Pridham, Documents, p. 211.}

Hitler's speech, published in both the Völkischer Beobachter and The Times for July 8, 1933, was taken by The Times' Berlin Correspondent "presumably as plain confirmation of Herr Hitler's effort to check the Nazi extremists."\footnote{The Times, "New German State," July 10, 1933, p. 13.} The Berlin Correspondent speculated as to how far Hitler was willing to go in this effort. He referred to those who wondered why Hitler had not followed Mussolini's line and made examples of some of his older followers who were not up to the new task. He concluded that, due to the "peculiar difficulties arising out of the history of the movement," Hitler was content to play "clique against clique... slow in reaching decisions affecting personal changes, but quick and firm in acting them out." This did not mean the winding down would be uneventful. The Berlin Correspondent pointed out that, no matter how "smoothly they may follow the course laid down at the moment...the wilder revolutionaries had [not] yet abandoned their dreams."\footnote{The Times, "German State," July 10, 1933, p. 13.}

Hitler was acutely aware that his action would arouse the animosities of the "old fighters," and the more they protested, the more "moderate" Hitler appeared to be. This strategy was clearly in operation when Hitler addressed the Dortmund S. A. on July 10, 1933. In reporting the speech, The Times' Berlin Correspondent discussed the choice of Dortmund.\footnote{The Times, "Nazi Discipline," July 11, 1933, p. 13.}
Westphalian area housed an S. A. which was noticeably more "radical" than other S. A. organisations. It had recently concluded a vigorous press campaign with an anti-Jewish boycott modeled after the April 1 boycott. Evidently it had been far more successful. For the Berlin Correspondent, Hitler's address to the S. A. was a "very plain appeal for them to conduct themselves always as befitted the warriors of the German revolution."

For the S. A. it meant that there would be no further rewards. Hitler reminded the S. A. of the movement's recent triumphs, and capped this with the claim that "we are the greatest organisation in the history of Germany," and that "we have taken upon ourselves a tremendous responsibility." Certainly Hitler ascribed considerable responsibility for these successes to the S. A., but still his appeal was simple and direct:

    I beg you my S. A. and S. S. men and you men of the Stahlhelm who have joined us, to...conduct yourselves so that the coming generations see in you the proud colour-beaters of the German uprising. Allow yourselves to be unsettled just as little in the future as in the past; be a front of iron discipline and determined courage, a front of brotherliness and comradeship....7

Frick's July 11 order was similarly reported by the Berlin Correspondent.8 Frick spoke in the name of the Führer. The Statthalter, the State Governments, the Premier of Prussia, and the Prussian Minister of the Interior, were reminded that it was Hitler who had called an end to the revolution; therefore, further talk of a continuance of the revolution, or of a second revolution, "meant rebelling against the Leader himself."

The Statthalter were given a particular task; "...to maintain the State

authority in all matters and in all circumstances, and ruthlessly and with
the use of all State means of force to oppose any attempt to shake or even
dispute that authority..." For the Berlin Correspondent, this order meant
that "a second revolution..., a further series of revolutionary waves, or...
revolution as a permanent condition," was out of the question.

With Frick's contribution registered, it was all the clearer to the
Berlin Correspondent that Hitler intended to "apply the brake firmly to
the party machine and sternly to check the zealots...whose further private
encroachments in industry might hinder the process of constructive work
which the party is now, apparently, to apply itself."9 Frick's order
marked the conclusion of the party hierarchy's public intention to halt
the "revolution." Whatever Hitler may have expected to result, it was
clear to The Times' Berlin Correspondent that a struggle would shortly
begin.

Röhm's vehemence increased the longer the "second revolution" was
delayed. At one of his gatherings he raged:

Adolf is rotten. He's betraying all of us. He only goes round with
reactionaries. His old comrades aren't good enough. So he brings
in these East Prussian generals...Adolf knows perfectly well what I
want. I've told him often enough. Not a second pot of the Kaiser's
army, made with the same old grounds. Are we a revolution or aren't
we...? Something new has to be brought in, understand. A new disci-
pline. A new principle of organisation. Right now he wants to sit
up in the mountains and play God. And guys like us have to cool our
heels, when we're burning for action.10

Such feelings, expressed to a sympathetic audience, revealed the extent to
which "party unity" had been reduced to a façade.

The Nuremberg party rally of September 1933 was one Government attempt

9The Times, "Check to Nazi Extremism," July 12, 1933, p. 13
10Fest, Hitler, p. 451-2.
to maintain party unity. It succeeded in as much as observers remained in
the dark concerning the party's inner crisis. The evident spontaneous
enthusiasm, despite the obvious organisation, induced The Times to observe
that:

there can be no real doubt that the Nazi movement is animated by an
immense enthusiasm, which may perhaps have been partly prompted by a
vigorous resolve to escape from despair, but which, nevertheless,
imparts to it a driving power which is sweeping the majority of the
German people.11

Although impressed with the 'success' of the rally, The Times was
far from responsive to the thematic proclamation: "to bind the leaders
and the led yet more closely together, to strengthen one and all in their
belief in ultimate victory, and to impart a great spiritual and psycho-
logical impulse to continue the struggle." The Times, naturally unable
to gauge the true depth of this theme, or how it was received by the
"old fighters," was confined to rhetoric: "A struggle against what?
Victory over whom?" The Times found its answer in the proclamation's
attack on the Jews and on democratic institutions, and argued that "surely
the Nazis have completed their inglorious triumphs" in both these areas.
It noted that, already, large numbers of German Jews were "herded in con-
centration camps," while others were deprived of the means of earning their
livelihood. As for democratic institutions, "hardly a trace" remained;
the ballot box was "derided as a cowardly device for exercising anonymous
pressure; free elections are stigmatised as a form of national licence; the
right of criticism was dismissed...as a mere slogan, for which Nazism would
substitute an 'inner unity of thought and desire.'" The Times gave what it
considered to be the British concept of this "inner unity":

11The Times, "The Nazi Rally," September 6, 1933, p. 11.
a 'unity of thought' which is attained by bludgeoning different views out of the heads of those who hold them is not an 'inner' unity, but an artificial and worthless standardisation, exacting compliance not from conviction but from terror or from calculated self-interest.

The Times argued that the real danger of the National Socialist system was the threat to "international understanding," because the movement represented "methods and principles of government profoundly repugnant at least to this country, to France, and to the United States." It was in this context that The Times placed the absence of those countries' official representatives among the Diplomatic Corps at Nuremberg. But the danger, however, did not prevent The Times from acknowledging whatever reassurances Hitler was inclined to offer. This time, the newspaper seized upon one "very reassuring sentence" in Hitler's speech, in which he asserted that "Germany had no need of rehabilitation on the battlefield, for there she had never lost her prestige." The Times agreed that "that is a sentiment with which former opponents in the field will not refuse to concur." In Hitler's statement, The Times saw a possible attempt to "wean his followers from the idea, so plainly inculcated in his earlier writings and speeches, that only by military prowess could that position be regained for Germany which she had lost in 1918." The Times did note, however, that in the recent past, no one had espoused this prowess more than Hitler, and pointed to a discussion by its Berlin Correspondent of Professor Banse's *Military Science*. Naturally, The Times preferred to consider Hitler sincere in his pacific statements, and to think that they were not "just a calculated effort to impress foreign opinion." An assumption to the contrary, however, would result from the world judging the German leaders "by their policy rather than by their profession." As things presently stood, Germany had done little as yet that was reassuring.12

12 The Times, "Rally," September 6, 1933, p. 11.
Measured against The Times' interpretation, the Nuremberg rally was wholly successful. The National Socialist hierarchy presented observers with a tremendous demonstration of "party unity," all the more convincing due to the genuine spontaneity of the celebrations. Although The Times objected to the suggestion that there would be a "continuation of the struggle," this was in effect one key to the rally's success. The durability of this success would be another matter. For the present, the disaffected could be happy believing that there would be further rewards. The Times could not know that, to Hitler, the suggestion meant nothing of the kind; instead, it meant an enthusiastic, unified party under his leadership for the immediate purpose of weakening Röhm's power base. Moreover, it eliminated distractions from Hitler's more pressing problems—how to disguise the rearmament programme in light of the upcoming resumption of the Disarmament Conference, and how to ease both his generals' and Europe's uneasiness over the seemingly increased role of the S. A. The Times' objection to the "continued struggle" was a clear demonstration of how successfully Hitler disguised his real intentions from foreign observers by simultaneously speaking of a struggle, and emphatically denying Germany's need to redeem herself on the battlefield, Hitler forced The Times to conclude that this would be an internal struggle. This in turn threw The Times back on its own policy of maintaining that Germany's internal development was her own affair, emphasising the "reassurance" in the Führer's speech.

By November 1933, it was clear that the euphoria of the Nuremberg rally had had little effect on the unrewarded members of the National Socialist Party. The situation required a new call for discipline, this time issued by Deputy Leader Hess. With this move, The Times' Berlin Correspondent
reported, the conflict had taken a different turn. According to Hess' order, it was the work of the "old fighters" which was being jeopardised by "the over-zealous, who for the most part are to be found among the latest converts to the National Socialist ranks."¹³ The order promised severer punishments than had hitherto been ordered, for anyone who exceeded what the Berlin Correspondent termed, "the somewhat blurred limits of the law."

The Berlin Correspondent regarded the order as interesting on two counts. Firstly, it marked an "adjustment to prevailing conditions." Some of the "overzealous" had taken to pressuring non-party members into flying flags and performing the "German salute." This resulted in some of the Berlin population "walking on the right hand pavement of certain broad avenues" in order to avoid constantly meeting and saluting processions, because they simply could not be bothered. Secondly, the order was an effort, "not very far-reaching perhaps, but perceptible" to reduce some of the tensions during the period immediately prior to the November 12 "plebiscite." One notable cause of this fear was the introduction of the Blockwacht system in which party members, assigned given areas of the city, would engage citizens in "casual" conversation in the hopes of ascertaining their true attitude towards the party. The Berlin Correspondent wrote of a distinct feeling among non-supporters of the regime that, no matter what they did, the results would be the same; it would be safer for them personally if they simply marked "the desired cross on the voting paper."¹⁴ With this report, The Times saw its interpretation of unity of thought realised; "calculated self-interest" was indeed the motive behind many affirmative votes.


even the almost comic veneer of a city population dodging endless processions could disguise the cynicism which had taken hold in Germany.

Hess' order had absolutely no effect on Röhm. On December 8, 1933, and despite the fact that he had been appointed to the Cabinet the week before, as Minister without Portfolio, Röhm addressed a joint meeting of the Diplomatic Corps and representatives of the international Press. His topic, "The Mission of the Storm Detachments," was, in the words of The Times' Berlin Correspondent, "an eloquent exposition of the theory that soldiers were the best guardians of peace;" and "an indignant repudiation of the allegation that the Nazi storm troopers are soldiers." The Berlin Correspondent quoted Röhm as saying "the Storm Detachments...could not be compared with any army or other military formation. Their duty was to form the new German State in the spirit of National Socialism."15

Röhm's performance was a perfect example of the Berlin Correspondent's reasons for frustration when trying accurately to report on this conflict. Röhm's argument ran counter to his conflict with the Reichswehr, that the S.A. stood "side by side" with the army i.e. that the S.A. was the Army's equal, and that eventually it would replace the Army. From the evidence available, it appears that Röhm argued strongly for both ideas; the determining factor was the audience of the moment.16 This would certainly explain the performance of December 8; around that time, and despite the fact that Germany was no longer a part of the Disarmament Conference, Britain and France were considering Germany's latest proposal, a 300,000 man army. It

15 The Times, "Defense of Nazi Storm Troops," December 9, 1933, p. 11.
16 Fest, Hitler, p. 791f.
was common knowledge that France was extremely nervous concerning the potential reserve represented by the S. A. There was no better forum than a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps, nor a better medium than the S. A. Chief of Staff, to allay these fears. The boost to Röhm's morale as a result of the international exposure was another matter.

Throughout January and February of 1934, the conflict, for the most part, returned to its closed door scenario. The one significant public event, Hitler's letter of reconciliation to Röhm, published in the Volkscher Beobachter for January 2, received no comment in The Times.

The internal squabbles of the National Socialists, while interesting when known, paled in comparison to disarmament developments. At this time news of Sir John Simon's visit to Rome, the French aide-memoir which considered Germany's proposed 300,000 man army as "excessive," took precedence. Germany took interest in Eden's appointment as Lord Privy Seal as a sign that Britain was "determined to support the League of Nations and to bring disarmament negotiations back to Geneva as soon as possible." 17

In essence, Röhm's struggle for the S. A.'s primacy was categorically defeated during this period. The issue was brought to a head in January when Röhm addressed a memorandum to Blomberg stating that the defense of the country was the "domain of the S. A.," and that the Reichswehr's task was military training (presumably of the S. A.) 18 This development made it clear that Hitler had to make his position emphatically known.


18 Fest, Hitler, p. 454.
What The Times' Berlin Correspondent did not know was that in his speculations in his articles summing up Hitler's first year in office, he correctly foresaw Hitler's precise solution:

"...Herr Hitler might endeavour—in an early outbreak probably with success—to extinguish those elements as rebels, with the combined aid of the regular Army, the old Nationalistic Stahlhelm, and possibly some units of the picked S. S. Nazi Guards."

For the present, it was enough for Hitler to inform a joint meeting of S. A. Leaders and Generals that the Reichshehr would remain the sole bearer of arms in Germany. A week earlier, Hitler had gone some way in allaying French fears, and at the same time prolonging the myth that Germany was still willing to negotiate disarmament questions. On February 21, 1934, in a conversation with Anthony Eden, Hitler stated that "the S. A. and S. S. would have no arms, receive no instruction in the use of arms, take no part in manoeuvres and undergo training by officers of the army...[all] subject to verification by a system of control." During a subsequent conversation, Hitler informed Eden that "his own common sense and political instinct would never allow him to sanction the creation of a second army in the state...." Only later did Eden realise that this "was the forerunner of Nazi horror, though many did not interpret it so."
"CRITICS AND CARPERS"

Beginning in March 1934, and lasting until the events of the Röhm Purge, the party hierarchy embarked upon a propaganda campaign directed against "critics and carpers." The first indication of the campaign came from Goebbels who discussed the issue of disaffection. As reported by The Times' Berlin Correspondent, Goebbels affirmed that National Socialism "demanded to be accepted whole, and not in parts," and even acknowledged that the Government had made mistakes; however, he categorically denied "the right to criticise the mistakes of the Government to those who had no share in the responsibility and the burden of work." 23 Through this and later public developments, the Berlin Correspondent provided The Times with more substantive commentary on the conflict. The Marburg episode showed the regime to be shakier than the party hierarchy had cared to admit. It also fuelled the Berlin Correspondent's speculations on the outcome, but not to the extent that he was fully prepared for the actual purge.

The inauguration of the campaign against "critics and carpers" afforded The Times' Berlin Correspondent the opportunity to provide an analysis of what he termed "The German Jigsaw." 24 In his first installment, he discussed the comparative power bases which Berlin and Munich represented for Hitler and the remainder of the party, respectively. Hitler had declared that Munich was to remain the headquarters of the party, and was to be the artistic and cultural capital of the Third Reich. A number of expansive building projects was already under way to prove the point, but to those in Munich

who regarded these as heralding the transfer of the political capital from Berlin to Munich, the Berlin Correspondent wrote:

[it is not] easy to conceive of Munich's becoming the political administrative capital of the Reich. National Socialist ideas...may originate in the Brown House, and sometimes be tested first in Bavaria. In that Munich's political importance lies...But the place of formal promulgation, the seat of departmental administration, must, it would seem, remain Berlin.

Berlin's pre-eminence over Munich had recently been demonstrated by two episodes in the Reichswehr-S.A. dispute. Contrary to Rohm's wishes, S.A. officers would not be automatically granted commissions in the Reichswehr. S.A. recruits going to the Reichswehr would still be enrolled on the traditional basis, by the individual rather than by whole units as Rohm demanded. All that Rohm received was the application of the "Aryan Clause" to the Reichswehr. The Berlin Correspondent quickly termed this a "sop" since the minority of officers that were non-Aryan, were exempted on the basis of their war service.25

The Berlin Correspondent's second analysis was confined almost exclusively to the Reichswehr-S.A. conflict, and painted Hitler in as favourable a light as the situation would allow.26 He considered Hitler's decision to take Blomberg's advice concerning the recruitment of officers and men into the Reichswehr as "characteristic of Herr Hitler's developing statesmanship." This, however, seemed to encourage some imponderable speculations on the outcome of the struggle. Some saw further strained economic relations with other countries; others believed that the hopeless disarmament negotiations could cause France to hint at a preventive war against Germany, to be dropped if France agreed to a 300,000 man short-service army,

26The Times, "The German "Jigsaw," May 9, 1934, p. 15.
provided the S. A. was disbanded. The Berlin Correspondent pointed out that while "all this may sound fantastic," it was true that "an unofficial emissary recently visited Paris and saw Marshal Petain there;" however, he discounted the credibility of the suggestions because they were:

not taken seriously in well-informed quarters [because] firstly, nobody believes that Herr Hitler would allow a real conflict between the Army and the Brownshirts. Secondly, the Army would not want it. Thirdly, the disbandment of the S. A. and S. S. is almost inconceivable, though a sensible reduction is not only conceivable, but might even be popular.

The Berlin Correspondent regarded the Brownshirts as an "indispensable part of the Nazi Revolution. Their uniform is a symbol of it. The whole prestige—as well as the security—of the revolution and the very National Socialist movement itself is bound up with their existence." For these reasons, the S. A. could not be disbanded, but there was nothing to stop a reduction in its size, if only to allay French fears.

Through his attempts at controlling the "revolution," Hitler had seemingly been giving increasing evidence of mastering "the art of steering a course between the extremes of fanaticism and reaction..." The Berlin Correspondent pointed out that the task had been far from easy; "a fresh wave of disillusionment and restlessness, far stronger than that of last autumn..." had added to Hitler's difficulties, and there was a prerequisite to Hitler's success, support of the Reichswehr. In all, it appeared to the Berlin Correspondent that Hitler would succeed in holding the "revolution," and again, the use of a purge seemed the probable method.

Faith in the Fuhrer himself is unimpaired. It is still confidently believed that as soon as he can turn his attention from foreign and economic affairs he will carry out the necessary 'purge' with energy. The hope may be heard expressed, however, that the time will soon come. There can be no doubt that if it does he will have wholehearted
support far outweighing the natural reluctance of those who may be victims of the purge, for whom in any case, his word is still law.27

THE MARBURG SPEECH

Whatever effect the campaign against "critics and carpers" was having in the eyes of the hierarchy, it was almost totally lost when von Papen delivered a speech at the University of Marburg on June 17, 1934. Without a doubt the speech, ghosted by Edgar Jung, was the strongest criticism Papen ever made of the "revolution," and marked one of the most serious threats to Hitler's regime, and one that seems to have severely shaken Hitler personally. 28 For The Times' Berlin Correspondent, the vigorous suppression, and subsequent denials, of the speech were further additions to his frustrations encountered in trying to report on the internal struggle. That he was able to report at all was due to a transcript printed in the Reich addition of the Frankfurter Zeitung, as provided by the official News Agency. 29 Subsequent newspaper editions never mentioned it again; a scheduled rebroadcast was replaced by dance music.

Von Papen, speaking on the subject "The Aims of the German Revolution," stated that "a sharper observation of German developments was expected of him because of his personal part in preparing the way for the revolution." This caused the Berlin Correspondent to observe that "a very responsible part, indeed, has always been attributed to him in the overthrow of the Schleicher regime..." His obligation to Hitler, von Papen continued, was such that, "from the human as well as from the statesman's point of view 'it would be a mortal sin not to say in this decisive phase of the

27 The Times, "Jigsaw," May 9, 1934, p. 15.

28 Fest, Hitler, p. 459.

29 The Times, "Nazi Storm," June 19, 1934, p. 15.
German revolution that must be said." With the demise of enthusiasm and the need for hard "work on the revolutionary process," there was a need for "public and manly discussion, which was lacking in the German Press at the moment...." Von Papen reminded his audience that "the alliance of January 30, 1933 between National Socialism and the Conservative forces had been concluded in full agreement on the aim of regeneration." The one-party State was justifiable only insofar as it was "necessary for making the break with the past secure and until the new selection of personnel got into its stride." Von Papen's view of the campaign against "critics" was decidedly opposite that of the Government:

Humanity, freedom, and equality before the law were not liberal but Germanic-Christian conceptions. The basis of the State was at all times justice....The people knew that at times heavy sacrifices were expected of them. They would put up with them and follow the Führer with unshakable loyalty, if only every word of criticism were not interpreted immediately as malice and if despairing patriots were not branded as enemies of the State.

The Berlin Correspondent's report of this speech reflected his earlier complaint (given in The Times' number for January 30, 1934) that "nothing is fought in the open," because he was reduced almost entirely to speculation. He felt that it was equally possible that the speech could "denote the beginning of the clash, frequently prophesied as inevitable, between moderates and fanatical extremists. Or it may be a flash in the pan...." Nor were any clues to be found in the German Press. The speech's vigorous suppression gave rise to a rather bizarre episode of hysterical denials of a speech few had heard or read, and of counter charges made against persons who remained unnamed. Two occasions, reported by The Times' Berlin Correspondent, were indicative. Alfred Rosenberg used the Völkischer Beobachter to denounce a speech which he did not mention, and Goebbels lashed out against "club armchair critics" in a speech whereby von Papen was called everything but his name. Even the nature of the internal
struggle was playing havoc with impressions of various National Socialist leaders. Most notable was Göring who, as a result of this episode, was now considered "moderate." This same man, who had issued the hysterical orders following the Reichstag fire, had issued the "shoot without question" order to the Berlin police force, and who had behaved so ludicrously at the Leipzig fire trial, had now "in a more moderate and constructive way" made a speech which had "a certain similarity with Herr von Papen's speech."

Apart from the furor it raised, the speech also caused Hitler agonising questions concerning possible presidential and military support for von Papen. The answer to the first question was not soothing. The speech, evidently written some weeks previously, had been read by Hindenburg before its delivery; afterwards, Hindenburg sent von Papen congratulatory telegrams. As to von Papen's motive, which would more readily clear up the question of support, The Times' Berlin Correspondent could only speculate:

if the speech was intended merely as a courageous personal initiative for a movement within the regime itself to check excessive zeal on the 'radical' wing, the Vice-Chancellor might perhaps look for influential protection. If, on the other hand, it was meant to test public feeling in connexion with plans, long talked of in 'reactionary' quarters, for something more energetic in the nature of a coup, it is not at all certain that the Reichswehr would be prepared to take part.30

The Times' own analysis of the speech echoed its Berlin Correspondent's dilemma. Above all, The Times argued that "a return to normal conditions in Germany is as desirable in the interests of Germany herself as of Europe."31

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The problem lay with the method, already termed "repugnant," of returning to this normality. Hitler's earlier attempts at halting the revolution, especially when directed against Röhm's ambitions, had found a certain sympathy at The Times. As late as March 1, 1934, Géoffrey Dawson stated in a letter to the Berlin Correspondent:

There will be plenty of British sympathy with Hitler if he manifestly sticks to the line of helping a genuine renascence [sic] of the youth of Germany, and particularly if in doing so he succeeds in stamping on the 'old gang.' It is the greatest possible mistake to suppose that average British opinion has swung clean away from him during the last year.32

That was before Goebbels opened the campaign against "critics and carpers," outwardly directed against a new enemy. Continual newspaper suspensions and dismissals of editors were evidence that Germany was "in danger of losing entirely its sense of proportion."33 Such "injustices and absurdities," plus an unchecked fanaticism, "would inflict lasting damage on Germany." Arising from this atmosphere was the Papen episode, which The Times saw as "another example of how far from normal the conditions are to-day." The Times argued that von Papen's statements amounted to "not much more than a plea for the right to criticise," and that his statements "in a free country, would not have been particularly defiant."

Even so, its criticism of the campaign notwithstanding, The Times' sympathies lay with Hitler. It was clear that his attempts at steering a middle course were satisfying no one. The discontented among the National Socialists themselves were divided between those who advocated a purge of doubtful elements within the movement, and those who hoped

32 The Times' Archives, Dawson Papers, letter to Norman Ebbutt, March 1, 1934.

33 The Times, "Critics and Carpers," June 21, 1934, p. 15.
for a relaxation of present restrictions. The more radical of Hitler's supporters wanted to establish the Socialist side of the regime. On the other side, the Junker-Industrialists, "who meant Hitler to be their champion in the restoration of order and authority, are doubtful now whether he is really their man." The Times cautioned, however, that as a result of these problems "it would be premature to infer that the National Socialist system is breaking up. There is too much that is essentially German in the Hitler regime." His avowed aims of restoring "Prussian ideals of discipline and service," and of restoring Germany's position as an unquestioned equal with the greatest of foreign powers, was too firmly rooted in popular support. Nor was this support lacking in Hitler's aims of eliminating class differences, or in subordinating private and group interests to State control.

It had become plain to both Hitler and to observers of his regime that his difficulties in implementing his aims naturally led to criticism. The question was whether Hitler would allow open criticism. To The Times, the Marburg episode offered a ray of hope since von Papen was still Vice-Chancellor, a possible sign of "sanity returning to Germany...." If it was to be otherwise, The Times, seeing no difference here between Stalin's Russia and Hitler's Germany, tersely concluded that "a prison of the mind is being built from Vladivostok to Strasbourg."34

The Marburg episode, with the continual press denials and accusations throughout the remainder of June, with the probability that Hitler would triumph in his struggle, and with a sense of finality, clearly demonstrated that Europe would in future deal with a Germany whose internal system would remain "repugnant." The Times was certainly aware of this when it

34 The Times, "Carpers," June 21, 1934, p. 15.
rendered its "prison of the mind" verdict. The campaign against "critics and carpers," with Marburg as its doubtful highlight, was viewed by The Times as it viewed all internal German developments, by its effect on foreign affairs. Thus, the internal "excesses" of the regime duly noted, Hitler and his "moderate" associates seemingly offered a better chance for a tranquil Europe than Röhm ever would. To be sure, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League, and the continued harassment of Austria, which was also rapidly approaching its bloody climax, did little to promote goodwill, but in return Hitler had made his "peace" speech to the Reichstag, had continued to "negotiate" disarmament matters, had concluded the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland, and had agreed to the Four Power Pact.

Once more, the internal struggle returned to its closed door scenario while the public eye was kept focused on the continued press denunciations. It would appear, however, that Hitler's reaction to von Papen's speech was far more profound than the public refutations would have indicated. The mere possibility that von Papen had Hindenburg's support, struck at the very roots of Hitler's aim at total power by the time of the President's death. Hitler had already learned the consequences of the lack of Reichswehr support; neither Röhm nor von Papen would be allowed to jeopardise that support. As it was, the question of Hindenburg's successor was pressing. Hindenburg's doctors had made it known they did not expect him to outlive the year. Hitler's hurried visit to Neudeck, on June 21, to gauge Hindenburg's attitude towards events (and no doubt to test the prognosis for himself), was at least gratifying, as Hindenburg reportedly stated that "if Papen cannot keep discipline, he has to take
the consequences.35 Even so, Hitler had little time to solve the succession problem. No matter how it came about, Hitler's solution could potentially be prevented by Reichswehr coup. To counter this Hitler had the S. A., but its use in such an eventuality would make Hitler Rohm's effectual prisoner. The Reichswehr's somewhat dubious role in the Rohm Purge more than suggested that it was in order to purchase the Reichswehr's assent to his assumption of the Presidency that Hitler sacrificed Rohm.

THE ROHM PURGE

The Rohm Purge, by virtue of its swiftness and ferocity, was a profound shock to the world. In Berlin, foreign correspondents were informed of events via Göring's press conference, an "official eyewitness," and proclamations and announcements. Göring's press conference gave rise to the conspiracy myth, the "eyewitness" gave the dramatic details of Hitler's personal role, and the proclamation discussed the diminished role the S. A. would play in future.

At The Times, news of the Purge caused a drastic, but in the end temporary, re-evaluation of its maxim that Germany's internal development was her own affair. Unfortunately, even the reversal was marred. Occurring on a week-end, the Purge had a particular effect at The Times; Geoffrey Dawson, observing the week-end in the country, had left Brunwell in the chair.36 The net result was the leading article "Purging a Party." It remains one of the most effective pieces of ammunition for The Times' critics since it had clearly appeared to condone the purge. Dawson's attempt to reverse the impression of "Purging a Party"

35Fest, Hitler, p. 460.
seems to have met with mixed success. While he noted in his diary the "perfect state of congratulatory letters" for the leading article "Medieval Methods,"\(^{37}\) letters to the Editor objected to equating the glories of the Medieval Age with the barbarity of Hitler's action.\(^{38}\)

Through its Berlin Correspondent's reports, *The Times* learned the details of the purge and of the alleged conspiracy which prompted the action. The Berlin Correspondent kept his own comments to a minimum, but in capturing the drama of the moment, he betrayed a certain relief that the purge had at last happened:

> With the dramatic suddenness which the world had come to expect of them Herr Hitler and his most powerful lieutenants have suppressed the movement of the wilder Brownshirts towards a 'second revolution,' made an example of the ringleaders, and delivered at the same time a glancing blow at 'reactionary' intrigue.\(^{39}\)

It was at Göring's press conference that foreign correspondents first learned that Göring and Himmler had been aware of, and watching, for some "weeks, even months," preparations for a "second revolution." The apparent source of this conspiracy was former Chancellor von Schleicher, who had put Röhm in contact with a "certain foreign power" and the "eternal discontented of yesterday." Schleicher for his part had been shot "while resisting arrest." Göring also raised the issue of the homosexuality of Röhm and his associates; evidently Hitler's patience with the group had been lost once "news" of the conspiracy was made known to him.

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\(^{37}\) Wrench, *Dawson*, p. 316.

\(^{38}\) *The Times*, "Medieval Methods," Mary McKissack, Letter to the Editor, July 5, 1934, p. 15.

\(^{39}\) *The Times*, "Herr Hitler's Coup," July 2, 1934, p. 16.
The Times' Berlin Correspondent paid the authorities' stated reasons for the purge short shrift. Hitler's year-long difficulties with the "old fighters" (to include more than the S. A.) had made it obvious that the pretext for the inevitable confrontation would be the ideological differences concerning a "second revolution." Such had been the tendency of the Berlin Correspondent's reports and articles to The Times. Consequently, the discovery of a supposed plot was no surprise, nor was the nature of Schleicher's death. As for the "degrading conduct of a group of sub-leaders associated with the disgraced S. A. Chief of Staff," the Berlin Correspondent pointed out that "the unfortunate tendencies prevailing in those quarters have been known since long before the revolution. They appeared hardly in keeping with the leadership of forces claiming to represent a movement of youth clamouring for the purification of national morals."  

A second, "anonymous eyewitness" account of the purge was important for the details of Hitler's personal role, and no doubt was intended to strike the appropriate chord with the German public opinion.  

Through this source, Hitler's devious visit to labour camps in western Germany, his night flight to Munich and personal arrest of Röhm, and his interception, arrest, and ordered execution of S. A. leaders en route to Röhm's residence at Wiessee, became public knowledge. Also, and most significantly, it was this account that first stated that the source of the alarm which had brought the Munich Storm Troops onto the streets the previous evening (supposedly the signal of the conspiracy), was the

40 The Times, "Coup," July 2, 1934, p. 16.

41 The Times, "S. A. Chief's Plot," July 2, 1934.
S. A. leadership itself. Clearly, the Reichswehr's role was being downplayed, but nothing could disguise the fact that it was the Reichswehr which had occupied the Munich Brown House, making it obvious for those who cared to notice, that this was more than a party struggle, and that, contrary to its jealously guarded tradition, the Reichswehr had taken sides in an internal political dispute.

All these events were made known to the German public via special, late afternoon editions of the newspapers. The public's hunger for news, evidently witnessed by The Times' Berlin Correspondent, was so strong that a newspaper vendor was mobbed and pursued along a Berlin street. In no instance could the Berlin Correspondent detect any concern over the action. Even the announced death of the popular Group Leader Ernst of the Brandenburg S. A., was no exception. Only recently he had been the admiration of women as he had stood with his collection box for the Winterhilfe fund, and had been applauded as he marched at the head of his unit; "now none regretted him." The news of von Papen's house arrest and the death of his assistant, Klausener, also seems to have created little comment.

The Times' Berlin Correspondent attempted to see these events with a view to the "practical results." The "occasion" of the event and the "psychological reaction to the methods" notwithstanding, Hitler had "set in train the big 'purge' of the S. A. and party which has long been considered overdue in moderate circles." It appeared to be "proof of his determination and the tendency of his principal advisors, to steer a middle course...." What is surprising here is that the supposedly secret Reich list, drawn up by Commandant Eicke of Dachau, on Hitler's orders, featured explicitly in this report:
It was well known that moderate National-Socialists, as well as Herr von Papen and 'reactionaries,' had long had in mind a list of 'radical' revolutionaries, either fanatics, exploiters of office, or a mixture of both, whose disappearance from high posts was desirable in the interests of both better conditions at home and Germany's reputation abroad. On this list stood Röhm and Heines.

The moral depravities seem to have been dismissed by the Berlin public, since these were already well known, but the "graphic description of the Fuhrer's personal reckoning..." had evidently had the desired effect on the population. The "outstanding effect," the Berlin Correspondent concluded, "is that the 'clean up' has been given an effective start, the strength of the National Socialist regime has been reaffirmed, and conspiratorial 'reactionaries' have been given a discouraging lesson."42

The Times' leading article, "Purging a Party," was the newspaper's initial reaction to the Purge. In many ways it was a response to the Berlin Correspondent's previous statements concerning a purge; in others, it represented some of the misconceptions about Hitler which existed at The Times. On numerous occasions, the Berlin Correspondent had predicted a purge, and this had been echoed in his March 1 correspondence with the Editor (see page 101). Seeing the need for a purge, however, was one matter, but the personalities involved, the entire history of the National Socialist Party, and the fundamental nature of the current dispute foretold the bloodletting of June 30. At this point the misconceptions came into play. A politically and economically sound Germany, quite apart from the obvious benefits to that country, was essential to European stability. Hitler's "developing statesmanship" seemed better suited to effect this than Röhm's second revolution. With such a frame of reference The Times could quite conceivably conclude that:

42The Times, "Plot," July 2, 1934, p. 17.
...Herr Hitler, whatever one may think of his methods, is genuinely trying to transform revolutionary fervour into moderate and constructive effort and to impose a high standard of public service on National Socialist officials.43

No doubt this same "developing statesmanship" had deluded some observers into believing that Hitler would effect a more civilised solution to his problem. The Times noted that:

Herr Hitler could probably have accomplished his purpose of weakening his insubordinate chiefs by his intended reorganisation [of the S. A., a reference to the upcoming month's leave of absence ordered for all the S. A.], the discontented among them [having] a shrewd suspicion that when they returned...a complete 'reorganisation' would have been effected over their heads.

Instead, Hitler, along with Göring, "had decided that immediate and drastic action was necessary." Anything else would have been entirely out of Hitler's character; as a generaliser on history, he knew the folly of allowing a pretender to survive, to serve as a rallying point for the discontented, and to undermine his own position.

The deceptions were such that The Times gave equal credence to the alleged conspiracy, and to the conduct of the shot leaders, and placed Hitler on a pedestal!

Herr Hitler is himself a man of austere habits, and our Berlin Correspondent implies that he was as much moved to anger against his subordinates by the conviction that their personal conduct was discrediting the cause of National Socialism as by his belief that they were plotting a 'second revolution.'

As for the Berlin Correspondent implying anything, it was that the German public was paying little attention to either justification, and certainly not to the question of morals. On the other hand, Schleicher's reputation had given the conspiracy theory a certain plausibility, and The Times assessed him as having been:

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...an able Staff Officer with political affiliations and a talent for intrigue... Of the ex-Chancellors General von Schleicher was the only one who was out of touch with Herr Hitler, was capable of ruthless action, and still commanded some sort of respect.

Plots and morals aside, the elimination of the S. A. as an effective force within the Reich had long seemed the key to stable internal and external German development. When at last the purge came, The Times found itself in the delicate position of being at once relieved and horrified. In such an atmosphere, The Times weighed the two in the balance, saw the progression that "having reached power by violence, Herr Hitler is now fighting extremism with violence and trying to establish moderation by force," and concluded that despite his methods, Hitler's attempt to rehabilitate the movement would be beneficial in the long run.44

For Geoffrey Dawson, such an attempt at rationalising the purge would not do. Upon his return to Printing House Square, he immediately set about reversing the impressions of "Purging a Party;" the result was the leading article, "Medieval Methods."45 In this article The Times accepted the German authorities' claim that "law and order prevail throughout the Reich," but immediately challenged the claim that "the whole nation stands in unprecedented enthusiasm behind the Leader." The Times went no further than to concede that "Herr Hitler appears to have consolidated his position for the moment by killing off everyone capable of exploiting the disaffection which clearly prevailed among large sections of the Nazi Storm Troops." Nor did The Times see this as a permanent solution, but added that "his chosen method, however, seems


more likely to drive the disaffection underground than to prevent it spreading."

The Times saw that the true significance lay not with the Purge itself, but with the complacent acceptance of the "savagery, the disregard for all forms of law which are the indispensable safeguards of justice and which are sacrosanct in every modern civilised State." The purge, as The Times saw it, was the culmination of a long series of events which had "weakened the moral fibre of the nation." The economic and political upheavals had taken their toll. The continual warfare between the National Socialists and the Communists, prior to Hitler's regime, "with its almost daily tale of violent collision and of cold-blooded murder, had the effect of dulling all normal sensitiveness." Added to this were the incessant persecutions, suppressions, preachings and propaganda. The net result "helped widen the gulf which separates Germany to-day from other Western nations." In short, Germany had "reverted to medi eval conditions." The justification of the Purge, based on the "exposed" immoralities and supposed plot, were dismissed by The Times as being "in keeping with the medievalism of the whole proceeding...All Oriental and medieval despots have been ready with such stories to justify the removal of people who have become dangerous, or whom it would be convenient to have out of the way." There remained little for The Times to do in this article than to point to the events in Germany as a reminder to all Englishmen to "remain faithful to our old method of government by persuasion, to shun all short cuts and violent remedies, and to recognise the dangers inherent in all quasi-military organisations for the pursuit of political ends."

The attitudes expressed in "Medieval Methods" were far more than the attempts of a newspaper editor to correct an unfortunate impression. The
savagery of the Röhm Purge caused The Times to re-evaluate its fundamental view, that Germany's internal development was her own affair; even the Berlin Correspondent had commented that "if Germans choose to treat other German citizens as vermin, it is their own affair...." The Times had to make it clear that under no circumstances could such savagery be dismissed as a purely internal affair, nor could its complacent acceptance in Germany be ignored; but here too, The Times' concerns for European stability were reasserted. It was true that "no pity need be wasted on the dead Nazi leaders, who on every reckoning have richly deserved their fate." It appeared equally true that their removal would be of general benefit, because "so long as they were in authority at the head of the Brown Army they were a menace to peace and to all orderly progress."46

As a result of his "moderate" posture maintained throughout the crisis, Hitler surmounted the Röhm Purge, and suffered little from the invective hurled at him from The Times. Medieval despot or not, Hitler remained far more preferable to The Times than Röhm would ever have been. This remained true even after the savagery was repeated in Austria, and when Hitler cynically and finally subverted the law in his account of the Purge to the Reichstag.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE PURGE

For nearly two weeks Hitler delayed any public statement concerning the Röhm Purge. One suggested explanation is that "for a while he seemed perplexed and was evidently haunted by the murders of Röhm and Strasser. Otherwise his ten days of silence can hardly be explained."47


47 Fest, Hitler, p. 468.
When he did address the Reichstag, on July 13, his ramblings were less than impressive (The Times stated that Hitler's account carried "no conviction at all"), but his claim to have been the nation's "supreme judge," coupled with the terse Cabinet law announcing that the murders were "justifiable acts of self-defence by the State," not only revealed the extent to which justice had deteriorated in Germany, but, judging by European newspaper reaction, it appeared that Germany would now be recognised for what it was.

According to The Times' Berlin Correspondent, Hitler's attempt to justify the Röhm Purge was enlightening in only one essential. Through his "emphatic expression of thanks and loyalty" to the President and the Reichswehr, Hitler gave the German public:

a clear indication of the alignment of forces in Germany, which already existed before June 30, but only became unmistakably clear to all after the events of that day. The Army remains the ultimate argument in Germany; the Brown Army...can never again be under any illusion about its ability to direct the march of events.\(^{49}\)

Such an admission "destroyed something that is unlikely ever to be completely reconstructed: the illusion of the indestructible patriotic unity, of the eternal loyalty to each other which the National Socialist leaders so often proclaimed." To the Berlin Correspondent, it seemed that the future of Germany depended upon Hitler's prestige. The latter, admittedly "a most difficult factor to estimate," would be largely determined by the ability of such dramatic touches as Hitler's claim to be the supreme court, to carry the people from June 30.


Another difficulty confronting the German public was the obvious contradictions in Hitler's speech. Hitler's claim that Ernst's role in the conspiracy was to seize the Berlin government buildings ran counter to newspaper reports that Ernst had been arrested in Bremen. Also, there was Hitler's continued harping on the homosexuality of the alleged conspirators, a factor that had been public knowledge for some time. If, as Hitler claimed, these men were traitors and had been dealt with as such, the allegation of immorality was superfluous.

Regardless of how the German public received Hitler's speech, The Times' Berlin Correspondent felt that "there can be little difference between the weighing up of the situation to-day and a fortnight ago." Both moderate leaders and leaders of the Reichswehr had agreed that "certain excrescences required removing." The manner of the removal, while a product of the "peculiar mentality of many people concerned," did not disguise the fact that "it had been put off too long, and for this procrastination the regime and the National Socialist movement have to pay. As it is, even if the patient recovers enough to carry on, an ugly scar is bound to remain."\(^{50}\)

The Times' own assessment of Hitler's justification continued the earlier theme of Germany as a medieval tyranny. The Times saw the speech for what it was, "an ex parte statement, to which those who are accused in it can make no reply...."\(^{51}\) The Times acknowledged the difficulties which Röhm's ambitions and Schleicher's talent for intrigue had represented, but categorically asserted that if there was any proof of the

\(^{50}\) The Times, "Defence," July 14, 1934, p. 12.

alleged conspiracy "the conspirators would not have been shot out of hand, but given a public trial in which their guilt would have been revealed to the whole world." Furthermore, The Times argued, by having the conspirators dispatched, by virtue of having been the supreme court of the nation, Hitler had clearly "thrown aside all the principles of law and justice...which civilised nations have painfully established for the protection of human life and individual liberty." A second matter which The Times repudiated just as strongly was the suggestion that a foreign power was involved in the alleged conspiracy:

Nothing could be more mischievous and nothing could be more untrue. There is not one of Germany's neighbours which does not wish to live at peace with her and to leave her to work out her internal problems without interference from outside.52

The Röhm Purge contributed more to Germany's internal recovery than The Times could possibly realise. The Times' revulsion at the method notwithstanding, Hitler had successfully eliminated the potential opposition within the National Socialist organisation, a move which The Times had long awaited. Of necessity then, The Times' condemnation of the violence was short-lived. On the other hand, the Cabinet law retroactively legalising the murders, coupled with Hitler's claim to have been the supreme court definitively established the nature of the regime. Rule of law had given way to arbitrariness; murder had been sanctioned as an instrument of official policy. Thus far, however, such arbitrariness applied primarily to internal policies. Externally, Hitler still represented "moderation." Even the abruptness of his withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, and the worsening conflict with Austria were tempered by a demonstrated willingness to "negotiate." The Times, too easily wooed by

"reassuring sentences," failed to appreciate that Hitler was more than capable of shifting his arbitrariness to foreign affairs.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE AUSTRIAN CRISIS

The Austrian crisis, of June 1933 to July 1934, temporarily jeopardised The Times' sympathetic attitude towards Germany. Throughout the crisis, The Times supported Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, and ignored Germany's claim that it was "a domestic affair in which no one need meddle,"¹ and unequivocally condemned Hitler as the cause. The Times went as far as to threaten concerted European action if the crisis worsened. Unfortunately, when Austria let it be known, on January 18, 1934 that she would take her case to the League, The Times balked; it had no desire to see Germany arraigned, fearing the negative effects on disarmament. Clearly, The Times betrayed the desperation with which it clung to the idea of disarmament, and the sacrifices it was willing to make for the cause. It is not enough to argue that The Times could not possibly be aware of Hitler's true foreign policy intentions, as announced to the German High Command in February 1933. The Berlin Correspondent's reports concerning Germany's clandestine re-armament, the proof which had prompted the intended joint Anglo-French action in September 1933, and Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament

¹François-Ponçot, Fateful Years, p. 167.
Conference had made certain of Germany's direction. The timing of Austria's announcement could not have been worse; the lack of European enthusiasm for such a move appeared justified with the signing of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact eight days later. The myth that Hitler would negotiate was preserved, and it survived Dollfuss' assassination on July 25, 1934.

The first stage of Germany's policy towards Austria was significant because it sparked little response from the European Powers. Italy (in spite of Mussolini's troop mobilizations following the assassination), France, and Britain, showed Adolf Hitler that "much might be dared without running too many risks."2 Hitler's goal, Anschluss, was hardly a secret. The Treaty of Versailles, because it explicitly stated that Austria was to remain a separate entity,3 had done much of the propaganda work, and had created extensive Anschluss sentiments on both sides of the border. Anschluss was part of the National Socialist Party Programme of 1920,4 and it appeared on the opening page of Mein Kampf.5 Even so, this aim was not peculiar to the National Socialists. "After the end of the old Reich, in the movement of 1848, and again after the collapse of the Habsburg Empire in 1918, it was common property, from the non-monarchist Right to the Social Democratic Left."6 Similar ambitions obtained in Austria. "Ever since the decision of the National

2François-Ponçet, Fateful Years, p. 153.

3The Treaty of Peace, Article 80, p. 47.


5Hitler, Mein Kampf, p. 3.

6Bracher, Dictatorship, p. 293.
Assembly in 1919, Vienna had never given up the idea that 'German Austria'—the independent state which had emerged from the former Habsburg monarchy—should join the Reich."^7

Despite being favourably disposed to the idea of Anschluss, Austria resisted joining with Hitler's Germany for two general reasons. Firstly, "the National Socialist idea of the Reich of all Germans was not the same as the federalist concept of liberal democrats and socialists. Hitler wanted to bring Austria into the German Reich via forced incorporation into the co-ordinated unitary state, not via constitutional and lawful revision."^8 Secondly, there was Chancellor Dollfuss. His resistance against Austrian Nazi activities proved stronger than had been expected. The unwelcome visit to Austria by Bavarian Minister of Education Dr. Frank was the first open incursion by a German official into Austrian affairs. Frank's unceremonious departure sparked a series of economic, diplomatic, and terrorist activities. These were intended to cause the collapse of the Dollfuss Government, to be replaced by a National Socialist government wholly subservient to Berlin. Instead, these activities had the opposite effect of causing Italy, France, and Britain to rally behind Austria; for a time it appeared that Germany, instead, would be diplomatically isolated. In this context, the Rome Protocols of March 17, 1934, since they had Italian participation, were taken more seriously by Hitler than was the French and British démarche of August 7, 1933. Hitler's hurried visit to Rome,

^7Hildebrand, Foreign Policy, p. 61.

^8Bracher, Dictatorship, p. 293.
shortly following the signing of the protocols, proved disastrous for Austria. Mussolini's megalomania caused the most tragic of misunderstandings, and the eventual assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss was a direct result.

"DOLLFUSS AT BAY"

The Austrian crisis was effectively opened as a reprisal by Germany for Dr. Frank's ungracious reception during his visit to Austria. The Times noted that:

Dr. Frank was officially informed...that his coming was 'not very desirable' and that he would not be allowed to speak on current political questions. He therefore addressed his Austrian fellow-Nazis on the subject of the liberation from the Turks 250 years ago, skilfully insinuating...that the enemy from whom Vienna ought now to be rescued was Dr. Dollfuss....

The more serious of the reprisals was Germany's attack on Austria's tourist industry. Beginning in June 1933, all Germans wishing to visit Austria were required to purchase a special visa, at the prohibitive cost of 1,000 marks. Since the vast majority of Austria's tourism originated from Germany (The Times estimated seventy-five percent), the new requirement effectively brought this trade to a standstill.

At the outset of the crisis, The Times made its attitude known in unmistakable terms. Dollfuss, in his battle against "both home and foreign attackers," was so far holding his own with tenacity and success." The Times also acknowledged the success of Dollfuss' recent visit to Italy. With both Mussolini and the Pope, Dollfuss had "established excellent personal relations," he had concluded a concordat with the Pope, and had left Italy knowing that "an independent Austria has a

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9The Times, "Dr. Dollfuss at Bay," June 7, 1933, p. 13.
warm friend in Italy and Signor Mussolini." Mussolini had also assured
Dollfuss that Italy would contribute its share of a new loan designed
to bolster the Austrian economy, a task made all the more difficult by
the fact that, by using such tactics as the special visa, Germany was
trying to ruin Austria.

The Times contrasted its own admiration for Dollfuss with Germany's
view; "to Germany Dr. Dollfuss is the enemy, because he is resisting,
with something of the dictatorial vigour and propagandist enthusiasm of
Herr Hitler himself, the combined efforts of the German and Austrian
Nazis to Nazify Austria." 10 The "dictatorial vigour" was an oblique
reference to Dollfuss' March 4 decision to dispense with the parlia-
mentary structure and rule by decree. The "propagandist enthusiasm"
likewise referred to Dollfuss March 4 ban on the wearing of the Nazi
uniform, and to his campaign, "Austria for the Austrians," now under way.

In a later comment, The Times curtly dismissed Germany's objections to
these measures with the reminder that Germany's own parliamentary
structure had been similarly "replaced, and that in Germany "any other
signs or emblems but those approved by the Nazi Government are of course
totally suppressed...." 11 As for Germany imposing the special visa, The
Times categorically refused to accept the explanation that it was
designed to protect Germans from unpleasant incidents, and argued that
"to non-Nazis this tender solicitude must seem singularly ironical." 12

12The Times, "Austria," July 6, 1933, p. 15.
The Times just as strongly placed the blame for the current dispute squarely on Hitler, whose "policy towards Austria is in fact one of arrogant interference with internal Austrian affairs by bringing indirect pressure to bear on the head of her present government." ¹³ It was not enough that there was support in Austria for a union with Germany. The irrefutable fact was that "Dollfuss is the responsible representative of his country..., and he is definitely opposed to the machinations of his Nazi compatriots and their German allies....Elsewhere than in Germany his gallant stand will be watched with considerable sympathy." ¹⁴

Coinciding with Germany's introduction of the special visa was a series of Austrian Nazi terrorist activities, mutual diplomatic reprisals, and above all, Dollfuss' attendance at the London Economic Conference. The terrorism within Austria had been such that by June 12, 1933, the authorities had gathered enough evidence to prove that Habicht, the so-called German Inspector for Austria, had been the instigator: Austria had refused to recognize Habicht as either the Inspector, or as the Press Attaché to the German Legation in Vienna. Armed with the necessary information, Austria arrested Habicht and subsequently had him expelled. German protests in Vienna at Habicht's arrest met with no response, so in return Germany "saw itself compelled to demand of the Austrian Legation that its Press Attaché should leave the territory of the Reich at once." ¹⁵

In the meantime, Dollfuss was in attendance at the London Economic Conference, and The Times observed that, in referring to his country's


¹⁵The Times, "Austrian Measures Against the Nazis," June 14, 1933, p. 15.
present difficulties, Dollfuss "confined himself to a single, though most
telling and apposite quotation...from Schiller--Es kann der Beste nicht
Frieden leben / Wenn es dem bösen Nachbarn nicht gefällt."16 (The best
man cannot live in peace if an evil neighbour will not let him.)17
According to one account of the incident, Dollfuss was loudly applauded
by the delegates.18 Neurath, on the other hand, was roundly booed by the
London crowd, and in letters to Hitler and Hindenburg of June 19, 1933,
he described the change of attitude in London since he was last there as
Ambassador in 1932. His censure by King George V personally only added
to his discomfort.19

The Times' growing sympathy for Austria was clearly expressed in a
"Special" article which discussed the crisis. The Times' Special
Correspondent in Vienna was compelled to acknowledge that "the Nazis were
bound to become an active force in Austrian politics after Herr Hitler's
first big success in the Reich. It was equally inevitable, when control
of the Reich was won that the party should make a strong bid for power in
Vienna."20 This, however, did not prevent him from pointing out a funda-
mental flaw in the National Socialists' (both Austrian and German) tactics.
In personally attacking Dollfuss, they had inadvertently reversed his
political fortunes, lifting him from a perilously low level following his

17 Robertson, Pre-War Policy, p. 14.
18 Robertson, Pre-War Policy, p. 14.
19 Robertson, Pre-War Policy, p. 15.
March decision to rule by decree, to one of popularity at home and immense prestige abroad. From this the Correspondent raised some questions, answers to which "might supply the key to the future."

Is it a new respect for their adversary or simple exasperation that has impelled those responsible for the Nazi campaign in Austria to throw moderation to the winds? Does Herr Hitler hold that persecution is the one thing needed to carry the Austrian party from strength to strength? Are some of his subordinates allowed to do more or less what they like, or is Austria a personal fetish for him? Is supreme value attached to a speedy triumph in Austria for the sake of impressing the Reich, or is it thought that the international situation might prove even less favourable for a delayed attack?

The Times wholly approved of Austria's conduct throughout the crisis, as it had developed thus far, and offered its own view of the expulsions. Habicht's arrest was more than proper in as much as he had been appointed to "a public position in a foreign country, [and] a whole series of bomb outrages had been committed by those whose activities he was supposed to inspect." On the other hand, Herr Wasserbäch, the Austrian Press Attaché, had been chief of the Press Department of the Austrian Legation, and had held diplomatic immunities, for the past ten years. The Times offered Wasserbäch the consolation that, since he was now to assume similar responsibilities in London, "he perhaps will not be altogether displeased at his transfer." Commentary aside, this leading article was important because here The Times spoke of the consequences of continued German aggression.

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21 The Times, "Austria," July 6, 1933, p. 15.

What is done within the borders of Germany no doubt officially concerns Germany only. But the same acts carried across the frontier cease to be purely a German affair. There is a risk that the whole peace of Europe may be disturbed by these incursions, which are calculated to lead to counter-demonstrations and to provoke controversies which go far beyond the questions of the ultimate political future of Austria. If any question of international action should eventually arise, German opinion, which is nowadays kept without information of hostile foreign views, may be surprised at the readiness with which public opinion in other countries would rally to the side of a small nation which has chosen to defend itself from being bullied.\textsuperscript{23}

Through these early events in the Austro-German crisis, The Times was given unmistakable evidence that vast disparities existed between the pacific words of Hitler's May 17 Reichstag address, and his obvious attempts less than a month later, to supplant the Treaty of Versailles with respect to Austria. This evidence, however, did not necessarily require a change of attitude towards Germany. The threat of "international action" was consistent with The Times' support for the collective security system of the League. "International action" simply served to remind Germany that, if her aggression continued, she could expect censure by the League. It was no doubt expected that Germany would realise the damaging consequences to her international esteem. All that Hitler had gained with his Reichstag address he would lose if he continued to meddle in the internal affairs of Austria.

DEMARCHE

The continuation and intensification of the crisis made it evident that Germany was undaunted by possible League censure. In early July, the Austro-German crisis was continued by a particularly odious broadcast and leaflet campaign, orchestrated by Habicht, directed at the person and

\textsuperscript{23}The Times, "Tension," June 15, 1933, p. 15.
government of Chancellor Dollfuss. By August 7, 1933, the deteriorated situation required "international action." The resultant representations made by the French and British Ambassadors to Berlin were the type of fiasco on which Hitler's designs thrived. It was the first indication of how shallow was the support for Austria.

The German broadcast campaign opened on July 6, 1933 with a speech by Herr Habicht. In essence, the speech was a manifesto to the Austrian National Socialists. A Munich Correspondent to The Times reported that:

after calling Dr. Dollfuss a traitor and alleging that his policy was financed by French and Czech money, the manifesto announced the determination of the Austrian Nazis to continue the collaboration with those of the Reich. The broadcast finished with an exhortation (which was not published in the Press) to the party members who are deprived of their newspapers to pass on all printed propaganda they can lay their hands on and 'cut the swastika on every tree and every rock in the country.'

Naturally the Austrian reaction to the broadcast was swift, but the protests were a wasted exercise.

By August 3, however, the problem had become sufficiently pressing for The Times' Paris Correspondent to write that "while no definite démarche of any kind has yet been taken from Paris," the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt that "the action of the Nazis, if continued on the same lines, will become intolerable and that steps may then have to be taken to put a stop to it in conjunction with other Powers." To this statement, the Paris Correspondent added the qualifying analysis that:

concerted international action on the Austrian question has not actually been decided on, and there has been no direct appeal for


it from the Austrian Government. The position has, however, been fully discussed in the course of ordinary diplomatic conversations on Central European affairs, and the British, French, and Italian Governments, it is stated here, are independently keeping a close watch on the situation....

Germany considered possible diplomatic intervention as "interference in German-Austrian relations," and The Times' Berlin Correspondent discussed this reaction from the viewpoint of German press censorship.

The German public is almost unaware of the intense activity that has been in progress on the Austro-German frontier. Part of it has listened to the anti-Dollfuss broadcasts... but the fact of the air raids into Austria and the dropping of Nazi literature only became known from the retransmitted reports of foreign comment.

The situation having worsened, diplomatic representations were made to Berlin on August 7, 1933. Significantly, France and Britain acted independently; Italy abstained altogether. The French Ambassador, François- Ponçet, has recorded his view of the event, and he has few kind words for the British or, especially, the Italians.

To prove efficacious, the action of the three powers should have been discreet and accomplished firmly in common; exactly the opposite happened, admittedly through the fault of the Parisian press, which announced the decisions of the powers ahead of time....

Britain and Italy, annoyed at the indiscretion... no longer consented that the step be taken simultaneously by the three representatives at Berlin. We therefore presented ourselves at the Wilhelmstrasse on August 7 in dispersed order, nor is it certain that the Italian diplomat did not break his word and remain aloof. As for the British chargé d'affaires, whose statement followed mine, he did his best to palliate the language I had used previously. The result was precisely what might have been expected under such conditions. The Reich Government replied haughtily that the démarche... was aimless... the difficulties existing between Austria and the Reich were purely a German question.... The three powers

26 The Times, "Germany and Austria," August 4, 1933, p. 10.
27 The Times, "German Attitude," August 4, 1933, p. 10.
accepted this rebuff without turning a hair, so that instead of intimidating Hitler they had encouraged him.²⁹

The Times' Berlin Correspondent's report on the démarche was written largely in terms of the German official announcement on the subject. Thus, "the French Ambassador was informed that the German Government did not consider the invocation of the Four Power Pact in this form as proper; that there had been no treaty infractions of any kind on the German side; and that Germany therefore considered this interference in the German-Austrian dispute as inadmissible."³⁰ The Berlin Correspondent saw the crisis in terms of Hitler's domestic concerns. "The...struggle for Austria, indeed, may very well be vital for the Nazis. It may well determine whether the Hitlerist state is to endure or not." It was obvious that a German victory would make a tremendous impression on public opinion, both in Germany and in Central Europe; it would recall the defeat of Brüning's attempt to establish a customs union in the face of French and British opposition. Germany would be bound to conclude that "Hitler has succeeded where Brüning has failed." Foreshadowing the eventual outcome, the Berlin Correspondent wrote that "[the National Socialists] are firm believers in the ultimate irresolution of Germany's opponents in this matter. They do not believe that in the last resort France or Great Britain or Italy is prepared to go very far beyond remonstrances on behalf of Austria."³¹ As for The Times' opinion regarding German reception of the

²⁹ François-Ponçet, Fateful Years, p. 147.

³⁰ The Times, "German Comment," August 8, 1933, p. 10.

³¹ The Times, "Comment," August 8, 1933, p. 10.
démarche, one need read no further than the blunt assertion that there
was no need to critically examine the communiqué of the official German
reception of the British and French representations.32

THE RICCIONE TALKS

On August 9, 1933, barely two days after the démarche, Habicht
resumed his Munich broadcasts. He denounced Dollfuss as belonging to a
gang of terrorists, accused the Government as being "capable of anything
except something good." and deemed the appeal to "anti-German foreign
countries, especially France" to be contrary to "all laws of democracy,
international law, and morality."33 The effect of this broadcast was to
drive Austria to seek a firm commitment of protection from Italy. Thus,
Dollfuss met with Mussolini at the Italian resort town of Riccione.

At the conclusion of the Riccione talks, an official statement to
the press spoke of the community of interest between the two leaders:

The head of the Government reaffirmed the standpoint of Italian
policy so far as concerned the future and the life of Austria....
Chancellor Dollfuss outlined the Austrian situation from the in-
ternal as well as the international point of view, and [based]
himself upon the principle of the independence of Austria.34

What the statement did not acknowledge was the heavy price Mussolini
exacted for his continued support. The Heimwehr was to be given a
greater role in government, and the Social Democrats were to be eliminated
as a factor in Austrian politics.35 Dollfuss' acceptance of the proposal

32The Times, "The German Reply," August 9, 1933, p. 11.
33The Times, "Germany and Austria," August 10, 1933, p. 10.
34The Times, "Austria and Germany," August 21, 1933, p. 10.
placed Austria irrevocably within Italy's influence, and thereby sacrificed a substantial amount of that independence he was so anxious to preserve. Within a few months, the more far-reaching consequences of the proposal would become graphically apparent.

The Times, and various elements of the European press, unaware of the true significance of the Riccione talks, were confined to admiring Mussolini's role in the affair. The Times' Rome Correspondent referred to Mussolini's preference for "friendly inquiries" rather than formal representations. He evidently had been prevented from acting on August 7 due to his own difficulties in curbing his more enthusiastic followers. By remaining aloof, however, "as a friendly mediator between Germany on the one hand and Great Britain and France on the other he may prove to have more weight with Herr Hitler than by ranging himself too immediately and unreservedly against him." The Times' Paris Correspondent reported that the French press was almost unreserved in its praise for Mussolini; La Liberte reported and agreed with the French Government's approval of Mussolini as mediator. Other newspapers, equally enthusiastic, issued stern warnings to Germany. Le Journal warned that "it would be a mistake to suppose that the diplomatic actions of France, Great Britain, and Italy will be confined to remonstrances in Berlin." Le Temps spoke of British opinion on the German campaign. "...Great Britain is now thoroughly alive to the Nazi danger, and that the policy of concessions to Germany will no longer be

pursued....Concerted action by France and Great Britain is more than ever the surest and only guarantee of peace."\(^{39}\) The Times' Berlin Correspondent reported that Germany was apparently non-plussed by the continued moral support shown by Italy.\(^{40}\) Habicht's latest broadcast evidently expressed Germany's view, that no amount of economic aid could forestall Austria's inevitable union with the Reich; furthermore, he "even implied that peace in the long run depended on this union."\(^{41}\)

The Times added its own support for continued economic aid for Austria. It reviewed the economic difficulties suffered by the "successor states" following the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy, reminded its readers of the political and social upheavals created by economic distress, and pointed to National Socialism as a result of that distress. National Socialism's "swift rise...despite the crudities and absurdities of its appeal, is hardly explicable apart from the economic conditions on which it has brooded."\(^{42}\) The conclusion was obvious:

the very excesses of this agitation have been a warning to Europe. The immediate problem exercising European statesmen is to find a cure for similar conditions in Austria...before they produce similar results, and to ease by economic adjustments the political tensions....

In this context, Mussolini's talks were fully endorsed, and The Times hoped that "practical measures on [economic] lines will result in growing number from the movement set on foot by...Signor Mussolini."\(^{43}\)

\(^{39}\)The Times, "Opinion," August 22, 1933, p. 10.

\(^{40}\)The Times, "Another Anti-Austrian Broadcast," August 23, 1933, p. 10.

\(^{41}\)The Times, "Broadcast," August 23, 1933, p. 10

\(^{42}\)The Times, "Aid For Austria," August 29, 1933, p. 10.

\(^{43}\)The Times, "Aid," August 29, 1933, p. 10.
The expressions of sympathy, and the promises of economic aid, were the closest that Europe came to assuring Austria's independence. In fact, as later evidence would show, Dollfuss' meeting with Mussolini effectively sabotaged that independence. The Times' endorsement of the economic assurances was the closest the newspaper came to advocating actual demonstrations for aid for Austria. Much more importantly, this episode was the earliest demonstration for Hitler of Europe's indecisiveness. The August 7, 1933 démarche clearly revealed the improbability of joint British-French-Italian action against him. On occasion he would come close to jeopardizing this indecisiveness, as with the eventual assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, but he always returned, until it was no longer convenient, to his posture of negotiation.

**AUSTRIA ATTEMPTS TO APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE**

Throughout the remainder of 1933, Austria's situation had so badly deteriorated that on January 18, 1934, Austria gave formal notice that she intended invoking Article XI of the League Covenant and citing Germany as an aggressor. British, French, and Italian reaction to the news was to dissuade Austria from this action. The Times, consistent with its policy, again expressed sympathy for Austria, but argued against the move, fearing its negative effect on disarmament. With no support forthcoming, Dollfuss succumbed to Mussolini's demand that the Social Democrats be eliminated in Austria. Unwittingly, in so doing Dollfuss did much of the Austrian and German National Socialists' work. The immediate result of what was in fact a civil war was the signing of the Rome Protocols. For the first, and last time, it appeared that concerted support for Austria could
become a reality. That Hitler considered the development serious was evidenced by his hurried visit to Rome, the first of only four foreign visits he ever made as Chancellor, prior to the outbreak of war. Naturally, The Times fully supported the Protocols, unaware of the misunderstanding that resulted from Hitler's visit, and which contributed directly to Dollfuss' assassination.

Austria's announced intention to apply to the League created considerable concern in the British Cabinet. The result of its January 25, 1934 meeting was the resolution that "the next step was for the British Ambassador in Berlin, accompanied by his French and Italian counterparts if they so wished, to make further representations." Austria was to be prevailed upon to delay the citation until the results of this latest diplomatic move became known.

The Times shared the Cabinet's concerns. While it continued to express sympathy and admiration for Chancellor Dollfuss, The Times also spoke of "misgivings which must inevitably arise as to the advisability and efficacy of bringing a difference of this sort before the Council." The Times grounded these misgivings in two areas. For the first, The Times quoted from Article XI: "the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations," and then it stated: "but it seems at least highly desirable that members of the Council should have from the first clearly in their minds what action may in the circumstances of this case be both wise and effectual." This argument, however, was secondary to The Times' real fear. "There is the

45 The Times, "Austria and Germany," January 25, 1934, p. 11.
further consideration that a formal arraignment of Germany before the Council must inevitably have a prejudicial effect upon the disarmament negotiations, which have reached a critical stage [France was then considering Germany's proposal of a 300,000 man army], but which, if carefully nursed, may yet reach a moderately satisfactory conclusion. Instead of a formal arraignment, The Times argued that:

members of the League Council who are also signatories of the Four Power Pact should make it abundantly clear in Berlin how important they believe it to be for the cause of peace and for the good name of Germany herself that she should prevent further complications by calling off the campaign of calumny and violence against the Austrian Government.46

Unfortunately, the damage was already done.

The Times' statement is one reflection of Britain's pacifist attitude during this period, and goes a long way in substantiating the charge of "journalistic surrender to the Nazis." Without question The Times made it explicitly clear that there was to be a definite limit to the British sympathy for Austria. If Austria made a formal representation to the League, Britain could potentially be obliged to provide Austria with considerably more than sympathy. For The Times, Austria was not worth a Disarmament Convention. While it is superfluous to suggest what would have happened had Austria's threat been realised, it is relevant to suggest that The Times' opinion must have delighted the Wilhelmstrasse.

That disarmament was uppermost in the minds of the editorial staff of The Times, at the height of the Austrian crisis, is revealed in correspondence between Printing House Square and its Berlin Office.

A. L. Kennedy, author of many of the leading articles on German affairs, in a letter to D. L. Reed, of the Berlin Office, wrote on January 24, 1933:

the only hope for a disarmament convention lies in Germany keeping her armaments to the defensive level, which is roughly defined in the draft convention. So long therefore as Germany is not deliberately building large calibre guns or big tanks (over 16 tons) or frankly going in for bombing aeroplanes I do not feel that the chance for a disarmament convention is so hopeless.... On the contrary, I think that a necessary precondition of any scheme is that Germany should have defensive armaments and forces. Then it will be up to other countries to show whether they really seriously mean to get rid of the big aggressive weapons all round.47

Austria featured in correspondence between Geoffrey Dawson (the Editor) and Norman Ebbutt (the Berlin Correspondent):

What worries people most at this moment is the bullying of Austria, which I cannot help thinking is short-sighted in itself apart from the effect on foreign opinion. Any private light that you can throw on the situation, and any suggestion that you may have for our dealing with it at this end, will always be welcome.48

Ebbutt's reply, dated March 14, noted, "I cannot yet agree with those who say Germany is resigned to having lost Austria, but it is pretty clear that a more patient and dignified policy is to be pursued for the time being...."49

Germany could well afford to relax her onslaught on Austria, but not because of a willingness to pursue a "more patient and dignified policy." On February 12, 1934, for what amounted to a three-day civil war, Dollfuss unleashed the Heimwehr on the Socialists. The propaganda advantage for Germany was vigorously exploited, and The Times' Berlin Correspondent recorded the rhetoric. "Was it for this that the world

47 The Times Archives, Kennedy Papers, letter to D. L. Reed, January 24, 1934.

48 The Times Archives, Dawson Papers, letter to Norman Ebbutt, March 1, 1934.

49 The Times Archives, Ebbutt Papers, letter to Geoffrey Dawson, March 14, 1934.
gave its moral support to Herr Dollfuss? What would the world have said if National Socialism had bombarded the workpeople of Vienna...? Will Herr Dollfuss after these events go to Geneva to arraign Germany before the world?" German newspaper analysis, reported in this same article, was divided. Newspapers that were formerly Nationalist referred to the bombarded workers as "red insurgents." The official National Socialist Press realised it had to change the nature of its campaign; it could no longer attack the Austrian Socialists since they represented "the embittered masses of Austrian workpeople," and the National Socialists claimed to be a workers' party. This requisite change in policy was not understood by the Austrian National Socialists, who accused Berlin of betraying them. They failed to appreciate that this change conformed to Hitler's tactic of awaiting the outcome of events, and acting accordingly.

_The Times_ said little that was new. It did acknowledge the success of Dollfuss' recent visit to Hungary, arguing that "it has always appeared that the most natural way of reconstructing a prosperous economic unit in the Danubian basin was to begin with some practical understanding between Austria and Hungary...." _The Times_ argued that, if such a venture was to be successful, "the neighbours of Austria should eschew dog-in-the-manger policies and hectoring methods, and, respecting each other's political sovereignty, try to build up again an extensive area of economic unity." _The Times_ carefully avoided suggestions of further economic or political assistance.

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50 _The Times_, "Upheaval in Austria," February 13, 1934, p. 12.
Dollfuss' successful visit to Hungary was given substance on March 17, 1934 when Dollfuss, Mussolini, and Gömbos (Premier of Hungary) signed the Rome Protocols. By this act, European "sympathy" took on a more viable form, though not enough to support Dollfuss' desire to invoke the League Covenant. For Hitler, the Protocols meant that Austria indeed had friends; his "patient and dignified policy" not only meant waiting while the Austrian Heimwehr did some of his work, it also marked Hitler's unwillingness to test Austria's new relationship.

For The Times the Rome Protocols were a "wholesome policy of international helpfulness [that] has begun where it is most badly needed." Politically, the Protocols represented Mussolini's determination "to maintain the threatened independence of Austria...." Economically, "by enlarging Austria's...activity they should strengthen the position of Dr. Dollfuss and the policy for which he stands." The Times expressed its admiration for Mussolini, as it had so often in the past, but it was not necessarily blind to a more fundamental motive for protecting Austria. "Mussolini wishes to prevent the absorption of Austria [because] he has no liking for a common frontier with Germany." As for his response to the arraignment of Germany before the League, it evidently coincided with The Times':

...Signor Mussolini was strongly opposed to the suggestion and did not hesitate to express what he thought. He felt that it could have no practical result and would merely increase the already strong anti-League feeling in Germany at a moment when it was generally desired to bring Germany back to Geneva.55

54 The Times, "The Rome Protocols," March 19, 1934, p. 15
HITLER VISITS ROME

The Rome Protocols, coupled with Dollfuss' May 1, 1934 announcement of a more fascist oriented constitution, put Hitler's relationship with Mussolini on the worst possible footing. The solution required that Hitler visit Rome in June. Much has been written concerning this meeting, beginning with Hitler's somewhat awkward looking appearance in civilian dress. The most significant point about the meetings was the fact that the two dictators talked without the aid of interpreters. Mussolini's knowledge of German, coupled with his own vanity, prompted him to feel capable of dealing with Hitler on a one to one basis. The result could not have been more disastrous, despite the conclusions of the international press. As The Times' Rome Correspondent reported, "Signor Mussolini appears to have scored a success since it is said that the independence of Austria was the basis upon which the heads of the two Governments found themselves in agreement as to the advisability of doing all in their power to re-establish tranquility in that country." The Times' approval of the apparent agreement was unequivocal:

...it will certainly have been an immense gain to European stability if the Venice meeting has secured the neutrality of Germany in the struggle being waged within the Austrian frontiers. It is obviously the right policy that Austria should be allowed to decide her own destiny without interference from others.

Naturally, The Times did not know that the agreement had been based on a misunderstanding. Hitler had left the meetings confident that Mussolini would be content, provided Germany did not effect an Anschluss or a totally

56 Weinberg, Foreign Policy, p. 101.


National Socialist government in Austria. This still left Hitler room to support Habicht's radio broadcasts, providing the two preconditions prevailed. Mussolini, on the other hand, believed that he had made it abundantly clear that there would be no negotiations on Hitler's hopes for Austria (particularly new elections), while the present conflict prevailed. Nor would Mussolini withdraw his support for Chancellor Dollfuss. Hitler's misinterpretations allowed him to support the terrorist campaign, and when the different interpretations were brought to his attention, he chose to ignore the distinction. The result was that preparations for a coup in Vienna occupied the intervening weeks between the June meetings and July 25, 1934.59

THE ASSASSINATION OF CHANCELLOR DOLLFUSS

The Times' reaction to the Dollfuss assassination was a mixture of shock and disgust. This, however, did not prevent the newspaper from sticking to strictly legalistic viewpoints and counselling against precipitous action. The Times' number for July 26, containing reports from its Vienna, Berlin, Munich, and Trieste Correspondents, as well as announcements from the Reuter and Exchange news services, was a graphic demonstration of The Times' attitude. The Vienna Correspondent's report remains an important factual account of the attempted coup.60 From this report, The Times learned the pertinent facts. The conspirators had entered the Chancery disguised as police; they broadcast that Dollfuss had been severely wounded during the raid. Later in the day, when it had become evident that the coup had failed, it was Neustädter-Stürmer's.


task to announce, on behalf of President Miklas, that he would recognise no action by a Minister under compulsion, and that if there was no loss of life, the insurgents would be given a safe conduct to the border. The latter promise was nullified when it was announced that Dollfuss had been deliberately allowed to die of his wounds.61

With this information, plus the knowledge of the crisis of the past year, The Times registered its own verdict.62 In essence, The Times reviewed the events which had led to the attempted coup, yet still found it possible to adopt a strictly legalistic view. Despite all the aiding and abetting by the German Government, The Times argued: "It would be unfair, in the light of present information, to attribute to the German Government the responsibility for yesterday's reckless adventure; but unquestionably the revolt owes something to the persistent instigation that has come from Germany."63

Subsequent reports reaching The Times did little to change its attitude towards the assassination. To be sure, the revulsion was unmistakably expressed, but The Times still looked for reassurances. The most significant repercussion of the attempted coup was the movement of Italian troops to the frontiers of the Brenner and of Carinthia. This action, plus Mussolini's telegram of condolences to the Austrian Vice-Chancellor, made it clear to The Times' Rome Correspondent that "Italy is determined not to swallow German disclaimers of responsibility for yesterday's happenings."64

The Rome Correspondent's attempt to analyse Italian response to the assassination left him unable to distinguish which particular event aroused the greatest indignation, "the pitiless barbarism of denying the Chancellor medical and religious comfort," or the "impudence and cynicism" with which the Munich radio station denied German complicity. The assassination, coming so soon after the shock of the Rohm Purge, caused Italians to draw obvious conclusions. A complete takeover of Austria would be dangerous enough: it seemed infinitely more so "if carried out by a people which, in its present frame of mind, seems determined to challenge the moral feelings of the civilised world, and perhaps to seek a remedy for its own internal dissensions and difficulties by deliberately provoking international upheavals." Nor was Mussolini's quick action to be underestimated. No single act had done more to illustrate how delicate was the situation. Consequently, Italian spokesmen were concerned "not to aggravate the situation by any ill-considered utterances," and were emphatic that "serious dangers to peace [could] best be averted by the maintenance of calm throughout Europe." As a result, the Italian Press argued that "the guarantee of the independence of Austria is a collective European interest, even more vital to-day than it was earlier in the year, when the simultaneous declarations of policy were made by Great Britain, France, and Italy." Without a doubt the worldwide revulsion at the Dollfuss assassination marked the lowest ebb of Germany's international relations. 

addressed itself to this, voicing its own disgust at "political desperadoes who respect no laws and recognise none of the common obligations of humanity, but who choose to consider that their own particular purpose may and should be achieved by any methods, however barbarous and inhuman."69 The callous way in which Dollfuss was made to die induced The Times' harshest assessment of Germany of the entire appeasement period. "The full story...is making the name of Nazi to stink in the nostrils of the world. A system which flourishes on such methods inspires loathing and disgust everywhere." As to the coup's failure, The Times rhetorically asked what had happened to the expectant who, according to Germany, numbered eighty percent of all Austrians. The Times also matched the Italian disinclination to accept the Munich radio station's disclaimers. It pointed to all the German assistance to the Austrian Nazis' terrorist campaign; the munitions bearing the "Army Weapons Office" label from Charlottenburg; the subversive literature originating in Germany; and of course the Munich radio broadcasts. With all this evidence to the contrary, The Times still argued that there was at present "no occasion at all for intervention in Austrian affairs." Not even Mussolini's mobilisations threatened this stance, since "no country is more determined than Italy that the independence of Austria shall be maintained; and only if her independence were endangered by any foreign country would there be a serious prospect of complications."70

The Austrian crisis, Germany's first incursion into aggressive foreign affairs, was received by The Times with the vacillation characteristic

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of the pre-war period. By failing to advocate support for Austria's bid to have Germany censured before the League, The Times demonstrated to Germany the extent to which Britain clung to the idea of a disarmament convention. Not even Germany's aggression against a fellow League member could divert The Times from this goal. The Austrian crisis proved collective security to be a myth. At the height of the crisis, while The Times argued against Austria arraigning Germany before the League, Germany confounded all of Europe by announcing the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact. It made little difference to The Times that this "bilateral" agreement undermined the collective security system; Hitler had once again demonstrated his "statesmanship." When Mussolini acted independently of Britain and France on Austria's behalf, Hitler, for the first time, received a serious set-back to his designs. Again, however, he was dealing from his preferred "bilateral" position. The outcome of these talks was applauded by The Times which ignored the fact that Britain and France had not been included in the procedure.

During the Austrian crisis, The Times misread all the signs. Long before its Berlin Correspondent stated it, it had become clear that Hitler needed a foreign policy success to divert attention away from his difficulties over the "second revolution." Withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference had been the first solution, but when the internal dissension persisted Austria appeared to be a second possibility; its forced incorporation into the Reich would satisfy the Anschluss sentiments on both sides of the border, and it would show that Hitler was capable of effecting foreign policy in the teeth of the Treaty of Versailles. The coup's failure barely affected these ambitions. By dissociating itself from the attempted coup, the German Government reduced European response to the
impotence of expressions of disgust. For the same reasons that no
European nation sided with Austria in January, 1934, no European nation broke
off diplomatic relations with Germany over the affair. Europe soon for-
got about Austria and turned its attention to further negotiations with
Hitler's Germany.

THE USURPATION OF THE PRESIDENCY

That Hitler's regime persisted until 1945 was due in no small part
to the fact that he surmounted first, the Rohm Purge and second, the
assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. In the first instance, the
Reichswehr's complicity in the purge made possible Hitler's usurping of
the Presidency, a total subversion of the Constitution and a violation
of the Enabling Act which had begun the process. Also, through its oath
of personal allegiance to Adolf Hitler, the Reichswehr rendered itself
incapable of rebelling against its Commander-in-Chief, until the abor-
tive plot of July 20, 1944. These developments emerged as severe
repercussions of Hindenburg's death, and were treated extensively by
The Times' Paris and Rome Correspondents, but received no response from
Printing House Square.

By holding the combined offices of President and Chancellor, Hitler,
the Berlin Correspondent pointed out, had "more power over 66,000,000
Germans that the Hohenzollern emperors, Bismarck, President von Hindenburg,
or any other man before him." The Reichswehr's oath of allegiance
"disposed of any element of uncertainty the situation might have contained."72

On the contrary, the Berlin Correspondent argued that, with the swearing of the oath, Hitler had "planted his standard on the last stronghold of the State," thus effecting a "great and incalculable change in Germany's situation." The Berlin Correspondent reminded his readers that, in the past, the Reichswehr's aloofness from politics had represented for so many in Germany "the decisive argument, potentially able to intervene if things got too bad." The events of August 2 changed all that. The Reichswehr, which had so recently brought disaster to those who had sought to control it, "would never turn against its Commander-in-Chief; it is not a force to make military coups d'état, to make or unmake Presidents or Reichsführer." 73

Italian and French reaction to these developments was, on the one hand, reserved, and on the other, decidedly negative. The Times' Rome Correspondent attributed Italian reserve to the shocks and disillusionments of recent events, the Röhm Purge and, particularly, the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss. 74 The Times' Paris Correspondent reported French reaction as recorded in the press. Le Temps, viewing the coincidence of President Hindenburg's death with the anniversary of the outbreak of the War as an ill omen, lamented that Germany was now in the hands of a "Hitlerite religion, compounded of hate and violence, the chaos of minds and hearts, the abandonment of a people to instinct released by the worst forms of demagogy." 75

To all this The Times made no statement. All its revulsions that the name of Nazi was "stinking in the nostrils of the world," that

74The Times, "Comment in Italy," August 3, 1934, p. 12.
Germany had become a medieval tyranny, so vastly different from the patient "wait and see" attitude which had been the basis of The Times' earlier view, were now nullified by this silence. The Times missed the opportunity of categorically denying the constitutional validity of Hitler's latest moves. More importantly, The Times failed in its responsibility to point out the type of Germany with which the world would in future be dealing. The Times' silence came at the precise moment when, in the words of Le Temps, "the real experiment of the new Germany is beginning now."76

CONCLUSIONS

The Times' attitude towards Hitler's consolidation of power not only stemmed from a universal distaste for war and from a decade of increasing British sympathy for Germany, but above all else, it was the direct result of maintaining that the demagogue, given time, would evolve into a responsible statesman. It no doubt seemed at The Times that one of the surest ways of promoting Hitler's evolution was to take him at his word, especially when he spoke of desiring a peaceful foreign policy, but The Times failed to see that Hitler was determined to prove the principle misguided. The tragedy was that The Times, unshakably committed to the League, insisted that Germany's external development should not be jeopardised by immediate and unreserved foreign comment regarding Germany's internal situation. Taking its cue from Hitler's pronouncements rather than his actions, The Times promoted a revisionist policy. Internal developments, which were the real indicators of the mood of the new Germany, remained matters for Germans alone to decide. It was not that The Times' generally sympathetic attitude towards National Socialist Germany persisted blindly in spite of Hitler's aggressiveness, but that The Times' own self-deceptions plus Hitler's increasing skill at exploiting them ensured that they would be continuously offered.
The Times, as a contemporary observer, was necessarily unaware of the backstairs intrigues which had engineered the downfall of the Schleicher Government. Thus, it accepted Hitler's appointment as Chancellor essentially in terms of its apparent "legality" and its "desirability." The "legality" seemed plain enough, but Hitler's "desirability" was more than qualified. His ideas and methods were distasteful to many contemporaries, both at home and abroad; Hindenburg's dislike of Hitler personally was known to all, and of course the appointment was made without the guarantee of presidential support. To outside observers, such episodes as the Beer Hall Putsch had given rise to the comic opera attitude towards the National Socialists, and when this attitude yielded, it was replaced by concern over the party's aggressive foreign policy. For The Times at least, one overriding factor seemed to favour the appointment. On January 30, 1933 Hitler was the leader of a National Socialist Party which had the largest number of seats in the Reichstag; as Chancellor, Hitler would have a broad base of Reichstag support, something which few chancellors since the birth of the Weimar Republic had secured, and by extension, Chancellor Hitler would have wide popular support. Hitler's attitude towards democracy was sufficiently known that contemporary eyes turned to the German Cabinet as the guarantor of Germany's democracy. It was beyond anybody's imagination that the "conservatives" would so willingly assist Hitler's efforts. For The Times, stability in Germany, quite apart from the obvious benefits to that country, would promote political and economic stability in Europe, and above all else, promote a successful conclusion to the Disarmament Conference. For the present, Germany had chosen to place her own future,
and the stability of Europe, in the hands of Adolf Hitler. The Times, mindful of the adverse effects of negative foreign opinion, chose to wait and see.

Hitler's intention to retain power regardless of the election results was sufficiently obvious that The Times gave the campaign no credence at all, but saw it as a propaganda exercise which subverted all forms of the democratic process. Even the pretense of a campaign was effectively ended with the burning of the Reichstag. No change of policy seemed to be necessary since the campaign violence appeared to continue the trend of recent German politics. In the present case, the repressive measures were directed primarily against the Communists, for whom The Times had little sympathy. Also, The Times believed it saw parallels between the National Socialist upheaval and the Fascist revolution in Italy. Consequently, there seemed virtue in allowing Hitler time to consolidate his position, expecting that, with Mussolini as his mentor, Hitler would settle down and govern constitutionally. Entirely without parallel, however, was the burning of the Reichstag. For the first time, The Times was openly contemptuous of the National Socialists, whom it naturally suspected as being the only group which would profit from the situation. Hitler's skillful exploitation of that disaster was indeed a masterpiece of opportunism which ultimately guaranteed the life of the Third Reich. Still, The Times insisted that the final decision on the matter remained with the German electorate, and placed its own emphasis on the potentially disquieting effect of the fire on Europe's stability.
The Times' almost naive response to the election campaign can be accepted on one condition, that The Times was incapable of interpreting events with Hitler's cynicism. The campaign violence was more than the forces of the Right combating those of the Left. Armed with the "constitutional" gains from that fray, Hitler could combat all opposing forces, and thus fulfill his promise of using constitutional means to mould the State as he saw fit. The Times' comparison of Hitler with Mussolini epitomised the problem. Mussolini's evolution into statesmanship was now the model, and The Times viewed Hitler's election campaign with the tacit assumption that he intended to follow Mussolini's line. As a result, The Times fell victim to its own hopes. The election violence was not a temporary upheaval from which Germany would soon emerge ready to participate in international affairs; otherwise, the extremism of the Reichstag Fire decrees, suspending habeas corpus, served no purpose. As for the fire itself, it was the first internal event since Hitler's appointment as Chancellor which The Times discussed as a probable influence on Europe's attitudes towards the new Germany. In effect, The Times linked internal and external developments, thereby nullifying its premise of separating the two. Even so, this did not necessitate a change of policy. The Times continued to work for European stability, not by warning Europe of the dangers represented by the new Germany, but by urging the accommodating gesture.

After March 5, 1933 Germany moved rapidly towards the one-party state. Two steps, the Gleichschaltung of the states and the passage of the Enabling Act, marked The Times' opportunity to adopt a more realistic approach to Germany, without necessarily abandoning its dream of a
disarmament convention, nor for that matter, of a revised peace treaty. The Gleiehschaltung was a foretaste of Hitler's arbitrary rule, and there was nothing to suggest that this behaviour would be confined by Germany's borders, but the wariness required, and the caution counselled by The Times' Berlin Correspondent went unheeded at Printing House Square. The Enabling Act continued the constitutional subversion begun by the Reichstag Fire decrees. It overtly rendered the Reichstag superfluous and the office of the President impotent; any belief that Hitler would not abuse the Act should have been dispelled by the National Socialists' conduct during the election campaign. Similarly, the energies Hitler and Göring expended to ensure the necessary vote underscored the importance they placed in the Act, and it is again necessary to emphasise that the arbitrary changes in quorum requirements were accomplished in Cabinet with the acquiescence of those guarantors of constitutionality, von Neurath and Schwerin-Krosigk. Only in retrospect can it be suggested that the Enabling Act gave Hitler no powers which were unattainable via the Reichstag Fire decrees, and while The Times can hardly have been expected to perceive this, it does not excuse the decision to pursue external developments when much of Europe's stability rested with events inside Germany. Nor was this misguided emphasis particularly surprising. Although contemptuous of the Potsdam ceremonies which preceded the passage of the Enabling Act, The Times too fell victim to the display; it was to President Hindenburg's dream of the new Germany, rather than Chancellor Hitler's ultimatum to the Reichstag, that The Times responded when it argued for treaty revision.
By July 14, 1933 Hitler could truly proclaim Germany to be a one-party state. While The Times had been quick to condemn the forced demise of Germany’s other political parties, it would appear that The Times opinion was modified by one major event during this period, the Reichstag Address of May 17, 1933. Regardless of the motives behind it, the address contained statements for which observers, particularly The Times, had anxiously awaited. Until that time, none of Hitler’s assurances to the other countries had been evident. Instead, they had witnessed a forceful elimination of political opposition, accompanied by an increased militancy engendered in the German nation. Coming at a time of internal upheaval, the address focused European attention elsewhere, and gave The Times evidence to support its arguments for treaty revision.

The Times persuaded itself that the National Socialist upheaval was only temporary, and that ultimately it was Germany’s own affair. None of this was expected to affect Germany’s conduct of foreign affairs: Europe was advised to fairly examine Germany’s external claims, regardless of the internal situation and to seek reassurances in the Italian precedent and in the Reichstag address. Because The Times considered Germany’s domestic situation to be beyond its precinct, it could not look too deeply within Germany for assurances. Had it done so, it would have found none, and as a result The Times would in all probability have counselled a closer scrutiny.

Foreign affairs, on which The Times felt best able to comment, was the area in which it was the most misled. One must remember that, prior to Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, Germany had left the Disarmament Conference and had only been wooed back by a number of concessions; these,
however, had been made to the Schleicher Government. The Times feared that the conference would reconvene in a hostile atmosphere, all too aware that treaty revision and disarmament could only have meaning if achieved through co-operation, with Germany's full support, regardless of its present government's domestic policies. Germany's renewed participation, therefore, was at the very least an indication that disarmament could be achieved.

Even without the supreme value it placed on disarmament, The Times could not possibly have attributed Germany's participation to the cynicism by which it was motivated. Far from desiring disarmament, Hitler's long-term foreign policy, Lebensraum in the east, required rearmament; his immediate aim was to disguise, for as long as possible, the military preparations. The agreed procedure was to participate in disarmament discussions while secretly rearming, a method wholly successful when measured against The Times' reactions to the Reichstag address, the Four Power Pact, the discovery of Germany's clandestine rearmament programme, Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference, and Germany's announcement of the Non-Aggression Pact with Poland.

The Times regarded Germany's return to the Disarmament Conference as a critical first step by the new Government, but it was all too aware that an authoritative statement of Germany's foreign policy was necessary if the talks were to be of any real significance. Since coming to power, Hitler had made no mention of foreign affairs, save his vague wish of reassurance to the other nations. In the meantime, Germany's internal upheaval had been anything but reassuring, and a peaceful foreign policy under such conditions seemed doubtful. Against the background of internal discord
and foreign discomfort, Hitler addressed the Reichstag on the subject of foreign affairs. *The Times* was sufficiently nervous over Germany's future foreign policy that it perhaps greeted the Reichstag address less with approval than with relief. As already mentioned, the timing temporarily diverted international attention away from the domestic situation. In content, the address conformed to all the peace ambitions animating Europe at the moment. Hitler's acknowledgement of Poland's sovereign rights was entirely unexpected and was probably the most welcome statement of all. Given the history of National Socialist propaganda on that subject, the acknowledgement was far-reaching, and was not lost on *The Times*. Almost parenthetically, Hitler concluded with the threat that if Germany remained a second class nation, without equal rights, she would withdraw from the Disarmament Conference and the League. While international reception of this was according to type, *The Times* chose to work towards successful disarmament talks and treaty revision, thus voiding the threat.

Hitler's statements unquestionably lent considerable force to *The Times*' argument for conciliation, despite his unfavourable comments concerning the League. Nor did *The Times* ignore the possibility that the speech would allow Germany's military time to "mature their plans." Unwittingly, *The Times* had exposed the real motives behind the speech, but for the present, and without evidence to the contrary, *The Times* preferred to consider Hitler sincere. In short, *The Times* had waited long enough for this speech; now that it had come, it was not to be jeopardised by dwelling on points which could be successfully defused at the conference table.
The Times' argument for the conciliatory approach was soon given further impetus with Germany's participation in the Four Power Pact. Although the Pact itself came to nothing, for both The Times and for Hitler, Germany's participation served a number of purposes. The Times naturally saw this as a fulfillment of Hitler's promise to pursue a peaceful foreign policy; such an overt display was bound to have the right effect on an institution that failed to grasp the essential worthlessness of the Pact. From Hitler's standpoint, the negotiations had proven to be a further time-gaining device while he continued with his rearmament programme.

By October 1933, evidence of Germany's clandestine rearmament programme had been gathered by France, and Britain and the United States had agreed to support France in a formal representation to the League. Initially, neither Britain nor the United States was particularly enthusiastic about the move, a reluctance which revealed the importance the Powers placed on disarmament; such action at the present stage of negotiations would have meant further delay, and in all probability ruined disarmament hopes forever. As The Times argued, there had been sufficient agreements in principle that a disarmament convention could now be achieved, and besides, Germany's rearmament had yet to reach the limits established in the Draft Convention. Despite Britain and the United States agreeing to support the French representations, The Times remained committed to concluding the convention, fully aware of the extent of Germany's rearmament. Interestingly enough, The Times did not proceed from the belief that the programme would be halted at the agreed levels, but candidly admitted that the current state of Germany's militaristic agitation cast
serious doubt on the possibility. Even still, The Times saw a need for the accommodating gesture, and insisted that the responsibility for disarmament lay not with Germany, but with the other countries whose task it was to soothe rather than aggravate the situation.

The Times based its argument principally on its support for the League and on the observations of its Berlin Correspondent. His assessment of the rearmament programme clearly misread the situation, not because his critical abilities abandoned him, but because misconceptions intervened. Only a monumental misunderstanding could have caused the Berlin Correspondent to dismiss many of the concerns raised by the rearmament programme, that the so-called "purer school of National Socialism" would triumph over the Banse expansionist school. A possible explanation presents itself. By September 1933, Hitler had successfully presented a "moderate" posture in two key areas: "moderation" in combating "second revolution" sentiments, and "moderation" in foreign affairs. Its influence on the Berlin Correspondent's view of the "second revolution" will be discussed subsequently. Its influence on his assessment of Hitler's rearmament programme was to create in him the mistaken belief that the Banse school of thought differed from Hitler's. No doubt The Times was anxious to promote Hitler's "moderation" and gratefully received its own Correspondent's assessment of Hitler's actions.

Germany's withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference on October 14, 1933 was not as precipitate and ill-judged as The Times believed, but was the synthesis of several ideas. Withdrawal was a long-standing policy of the National Socialist Party, and Hitler's intention that Germany re-arm pre-dated Mein Kampf, but they were effectively linked by Constantin
von Neurath. Under his guidance, Germany participated in the Disarmament Conference solely to disguise its rearmament programme, and the Cabinet only considered withdrawal when disguise was no longer possible. Germany's clandestine rearmament programme and Hitler's prepared speech which followed the withdrawal were unmistakable evidence that this was no act of impulse.

Disarmament was so highly prized at The Times that Germany's withdrawal from the Conference impaired the newspaper's judgement on the matter. The Times' reluctance to admit that Disarmament was now dead may be understandable, but only desperation can explain promoting a convention, without Germany's participation, just to show the world what it might have been, and only naivety could have fostered the hope that a published convention would have had any effect on a German public whose press was severely censored. Even if these arguments had been pursued, The Times had already predicted their effect in its dictum that for Germany, opinion abroad was secondary to opinion at home. The Times Berlin Correspondent reinforced this when he struck at one essential motive for the withdrawal—to deflect public attention away from embarrassing internal difficulties suffered by Hitler's regime. Consequently, the withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference could only bolster Hitler's public image.

Unquestionably, Hitler's immediate loss of international esteem was more than offset by the lesson he learned. Continued memoranda on disarmament passing between Berlin, Paris, and London proved to Hitler that he could rearm and achieve his long-term foreign policy, provided that he paid lip-service to negotiation. The first test came on January 26, 1934 with the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact. The Times may well have
greeted it for what it was, an "Eastern Locarno," but as was noted in passing, the question of the Corridor remained unanswered. Also, *The Times* failed to note that, in concluding a bilateral agreement, Hitler had pierced the fabric of collective security. For the present, these were distinctions which may have seemed best ignored, but they proved to be fundamental in the long run.

*The Times'* attitude towards the National Socialist regime was increasingly influenced by Hitler's attempts to curb the party's demands for a "second revolution;" thus, as Hitler's difficulties rose, there was a corresponding increase in sympathy from *The Times*. This was hardly a remarkable development, but proceeded from what *The Times* accepted as evidence of Germany's stabilisation, on the one hand, and certain expectations, on the other. When Hitler first issued his call to halt the revolution, the National Socialist State was an accomplished fact, the Reichstag Address had been delivered, and the Four Power Pact was less than two weeks away from signature. *The Times'* inherent dislike for totalitarianism notwithstanding, it grudgingly accepted the National Socialist regime's domestic achievement for the sake of its apparent peaceful foreign policy. Against all of this, the "second revolution" ideology of Ernst Röhm threatened to continue the internal upheaval, with the inevitably disquieting effect on European stability. Given the crudeness of Röhm's appeal, in contrast to Hitler's seeming moderation, *The Times* could do little but sympathise with the latter.

International interest in the struggle focused mainly on Röhm's ambitions regarding the S. A. Despite his denial that the S. A. units were soldiers in the traditional sense, France was at that time (December 1933)
considering Germany's latest proposal of a 300,000 man army, and was con-
siderably agitated at the potential reserve represented by the S. A. For
The Times, once the struggle had become an overt threat to disarmament, the
issue was clear: Röhm had to be removed, and the sooner the better. To
be sure, when Geoffrey Dawson wrote of Hitler stepping on the old gang,
he little suspected the blood purge of June 30, 1934—despite the accuracy
of the Berlin Correspondent's predictions.

Röhm's removal could never have been a simple matter: his refusal
to conform to Hitler's concept of the National Socialist State, his long-
term relationship with Hitler, and his prominent and popular position
within the National Socialist movement led inevitably, because of Hitler's
historical and political outlook, to his complete destruction. Hitler's
conversations with Eden, in February 1934, indicated that he had been
persuaded of the eventual solution, but the time lapse suggests that
Hitler was still reluctant to employ the method; also, his delayed speech
of "justification" reflected the psychological effects of having had to
deal so finally with a man who had been a long-time friend.

The Times' confused reaction to the Röhm Purge, obvious ammunition
for the newspaper's critics, in fact paralleled Hitler's dilemma. The
Times had long recognised that Röhm's removal was necessary for Germany's
stability and for the peace of Europe, but was evidently reluctant to
admit that the violent history of the National Socialist Party prescribed
the solution. Judging from The Times' first reaction to news of the
Purge, there were those on the editorial staff, no doubt influenced by
the Berlin Correspondent, who had no false scruple and chose the practi-
cal results over the methods. For a newspaper of The Times' status,
however, failure to condemn a policy by murder was an abrogation of its
responsibility which Dawson tried to mend when he ordered a second leading article. The result was an over-compensation for the earlier favourable reaction, and one which barely acknowledged the evident long-term benefits of Röhm's assassination.

The Times' reactions to the Röhm Purge stemmed partly from its Berlin Correspondent's interpretation of the "second revolution," and from correspondence passing between Printing House Square and its Berlin Office. Hitler's "moderate" posture and the Berlin Correspondent's frustrations when attempting to obtain reliable information essentially presented a one-sided view of the struggle. His difficulties were in no way relieved by such developments as Röhm's press conference, in December 1933, or by von Papen's speech at Marburg, in June 1934. The first essentially denied the nature of the Reichswehr-S. A. struggle, and the second only continued the Berlin Correspondent's bewilderment with von Papen. Not even the furious aftermath of von Papen's speech, except Göring's speech, was enlightening, and all Göring achieved was a further confusion by also adopting a "moderate" posture.

Ultimately, The Times' fault does not rest with its confused response to the Röhm Purge, but in the fact that The Times ignored the lesson and continued its conciliatory approach. After the Röhm Purge there could have been no illusion regarding National Socialist Germany; the regime had revealed its true savagery, and Hitler's speech of "justification" had in fact repudiated all rule of law in Germany. What Hitler had accomplished at home he soon demonstrated he could repeat abroad.

The Austrian crisis marked a dramatic departure from Hitler's earlier foreign policy restraint, a gamble which brought Germany perilously close to diplomatic isolation; however, Austria's foiled attempt, in January 1934,
to bring her cause to the League proved to Hitler that Europe ultimately would abandon Austria. The Times, in accordance with European sentiment, fearing that Austria's move could jeopardise disarmament, preferred that her security be guaranteed by such measures as the Rome Protocols. Such a development clearly demonstrated that disarmament was no longer highly prized as a noble ideal, but was clung to with an embarrassing desperation. As for collective security, while there is no doubt that the Rome Protocols were a set-back for Hitler, they simultaneously provided his escape route from isolation, because he could negotiate from his preferred bilateral position. The direct result of the Hitler-Mussolini talks was the assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss.

At the outset of the crisis, The Times unequivocally supported the Austrian struggle against obvious German attempts to effect an Anschluss. Political terrorism and economic reprisals were methods which no government could have long withstood, and The Times well understood the need for such measures as Mussolini's guarantee of a loan to support Austria's economy. Similarly, The Times had no patience with the Habicht-Wasserbäch episode or with the Munich radio broadcasts, which were the direct cause of the August 7, 1933 démarche, the logical first step in what The Times called "concerted action" against Germany's external aggression.

The Times' enthusiasm for Austria's cause cooled drastically when Austria announced her intention to apply to the League. From The Times' standpoint, any action which threatened disarmament prospects were disastrous, and Austria's plans, coming at a time when Germany was still actively negotiating armaments' limitations, threatened to drive Germany further away from the idea of collective security. Instead of a formal
application to the League, which would have further tested the concept of "concerted action," The Times preferred that Austria's security be guaranteed by such means as the Rome Protocols, a further gesture to which Britain could safely give her approval. Failure to support Austria's bid to approach the League played directly into Hitler's hands; a formal arraignment would have been a diplomatic blow that his regime may not have survived, given the relationship between Hitler's domestic and foreign policy. Following the Rome Protocols, Germany's international reputation was at its lowest, and Hitler fully realised that he must re-establish friendly relations with Mussolini. At this point, Mussolini's megalomania came to Hitler's aid, and Dollfuss' fate was sealed.

The immediate aftermath of Dollfuss' assassination, Mussolini's troop mobilisation to the Brenner, and the unanimous abhorrence of Germany's denial of responsibility for the abortive coup, almost made Germany's isolation complete. These reactions came too late, however, and too much had been done to collective security for Hitler to suffer for long. The Austrian crisis had unmistakably revealed the value that Europe placed on Disarmament, and Hitler wasted little time in reverting to his old ploy of offering bilateral agreements. His first success after the crisis was the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 1935.

For nearly two years, The Times, aided particularly by its Berlin Correspondent, observed and commented as Hitler consolidated his regime. The Times' initial "wait and see" response to Hitler's Chancellorship was born out of necessity. Naturally unable to react favourably, The Times was all too aware of the potentially disastrous effects of negative external comment on an internal matter, especially if coming from
a newspaper of *The Times*’ influence. When this response yielded to negativism, the tone reflected *The Times*’ concern that Germany’s internal development could disrupt the progress towards a Disarmament Convention and damage the concept of collective security. The supreme value *The Times* placed on these two matters caused it to misjudge completely Hitler’s motives, and rendered it incapable of realising that he was not similarly inspired. Germany’s clandestine rearmament and subsequent withdrawal from the Disarmament Conference and the League had definitely pointed out the direction of its new foreign policy, even if the shock was muted by the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact. The Röhm Purge, so quickly followed by the assassination of Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, revealed the National Socialist regime in its true horror. With these developments on record, there was nothing new to learn about Hitler’s Germany, and nothing was to be gained by continued negotiation. From the summer of 1934 until the outbreak of war, Europe embarked on a course in which “pacifism” assumed all its negative connotations. By following suit, *The Times* sacrificed its credibility and all it had achieved by its initial calm. *The Times* is to be criticised for its failure to adjust to reality and recognise the fact that Hitler was bent on war, not for its sincere desire to promote the redress of grievances which had persisted for far too long.
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VITA AUCTORIS

Mr. Liandzi was born in August 1951. He received his Bachelor of Education degree from the University of Western Ontario in June 1977 and is a Secondary School teacher in Niagara Falls, Ontario.

In 1981 he became a candidate for the Master of Arts degree in History at the University of Windsor.