The effect of Wittgenstein's criticisms on Russell's theory of knowledge.

Raymond E. Boggs
University of Windsor

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The Effect of Wittgenstein's Criticisms

On Russell's Theory of Knowledge

by

Raymond E. Boggs

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research through the Department of Philosophy in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at the University of Windsor,

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

1993
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The Effect of Wittgenstein's Criticisms

On Russell's Theory of Knowledge

by

Raymond E. Boggs

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University of Windsor,

Windsor, Ontario, Canada

1993
ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF
WITTGENSTEIN'S CRITICISMS
ON RUSSELL'S
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

by

Raymond Boggs

It has long been thought that criticisms that Ludwig Wittgenstein raised against Bertrand Russell's theory of knowledge manuscript caused irreparable damage to the arguments in the manuscript and forced Russell to abandon the project. Recent speculation on the precise nature of these criticisms and how exactly they undermine the manuscript has been used as evidence to support the claim that Wittgenstein forced Russell to give up the positions defended in the theory of knowledge manuscript. Regardless of the accuracy of the speculation on the nature of Wittgenstein's criticisms, the argument developed in this thesis is that the effect of Wittgenstein's criticisms is more limited than has been supposed and did not result in Russell's abandonment of the theory of knowledge or the multiple relation theory of judgement. Instead Wittgenstein's criticisms were probably instrumental in providing the impetus for Russell's later conversion to neutral monism.
This Thesis is Dedicated to
Forest and Ellen Boggs
Whose Practical Support
Made Possible
An Impractical Study
I Would Like to Gratefully Acknowledge the Contributions Made By My Advisor:

Dr. Ralph Johnson

My Readers:

Dr. Robert Pinto
Dr. Stanley Cunningham

And By:

Dr. Jerome Brown
and
Dr. Victor Burgess
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NOMENCLATURE

Acquaintance:

experience, awareness, understanding, coming into contact with
(physical or mental objects)

Apparent Variable:

bound variable

Analysis:

the discovery of the constituents and the manner of combination of
a given complex

Atomic Complex:

a complex in which there is only one relating relation

Class:

a group or collection of item(s) which satisfy a function, a class is
either a single term or that combination of terms which is indicated
when terms are connected by the word "and", if no item satisfies the
function then the class has no members

Complex:

a class of symbols where at least one symbol represents a relation
between two others
Emphatic Particular:

a name in Russell’s sense of the word, it must by its nature designate one and only one individual and unambiguous item eg."I", "you", "me", "this", "that", "here", "now"

Incomplete Symbol:

a symbol which requires some additional context in order to enable it to convey a complete meaning; a symbol which "disappears" by process of analysis

Judgment:

belief

Logical Fiction:

an incomplete symbol used for its linguistic not logical convenience

Multiple Relation Theory:

Russell’s theory of propositions, predates TK but is an intricate part of TK; describes propositions as being composed of constituents related to each other

Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment:

MRTJ: Russell’s theory of belief and possibly understanding; describes belief propositions as being composed of constituents related to one another and the believer

Name:

the proper symbol for a person, sentence or proposition; proper symbol for a fact; can only refer to a particular
Neutral Monism:

the theory that the things commonly regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded as physical do not differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessed by the one set and not by the other, but differ only in respect of arrangement and context

Object of Acquaintance:

any thing (mental or physical) which one can be acquainted with or experience; the fact which corresponds to a term

Proposition:

an expression or assertion; as opposed to a sentence which may be interrogative etc.; a proposition may be true or false and this duality leads Russell to postulate that propositions are "unreal"

Real:

that which is capable of being an object of acquaintance; and are incapable of possessing a true/false duality; immediate data
Chapter One

Introduction

Shortly after finishing Principia Mathematica—a collaboration with Sir Alfred North Whitehead—Bertrand Russell turned his attention to the theory of knowledge. By the spring of 1914, this project was well under way. By the summer of the same year, the project had been shelved.

During the interim period Ludwig Wittgenstein, formerly Russell’s pupil, presented a series of criticisms and arguments which are generally credited with forcing Russell to abandon the book. Why these criticisms had such an impact is a matter of debate, but it is widely thought that Wittgenstein revealed defects in Russell’s theory of types, and the modifications which were necessary to counter Wittgenstein’s claims left the theory of types unable to support several key theories of Russell’s theory of knowledge manuscript (hereafter TK). Among these key notions was Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgement (hereafter MRTJ). As a result, it is widely thought that Wittgenstein was responsible for the destruction of the TK project.

This view, however, appears to be untenable. It is the purpose of this thesis to present an alternate view: while Wittgenstein’s criticisms eventually had an adverse effect on Russell’s theory of types, they had relatively little effect on TK.
Russell’s theory of knowledge is, as Griffin maintains, "more properly a theory of propositions". Russell's theory of propositions is what he calls the multiple relation theory (hereafter MRTP) in its earliest incarnations. MRTP became more encompassing, to include a variety of apparatus necessary to give a more complete account of propositions. This expanded apparatus included (among other things) a theory of acquaintance (hereafter TACQ) and what came to be called the MRTJ. All of this apparatus together with MRTP is what Russell called his TK.
MRTJ is a subset of the more general MRTP. For Russell the word "judgement" is equivalent to the word "belief". MRTJ is therefore a theory explaining belief propositions. An example of a belief proposition is: "Jack believed that men would walk on the moon". It is widely speculated that if Russell's MRTJ could not properly account for belief propositions, the more general MRTP would fail to give a complete account of all propositions. And since the MRTP is a cornerstone of the TK, the TK would collapse.

This is, however, an inadequate account of the importance of MRTJ. It leaves one with the impression that with minor tinkering with MRTJ or the replacement of MRTJ with some other method of handling belief, TK could be redeemed. But any successful attack on the MRTJ is a much more acute problem for the TK than has been previously believed. Failure of the MRTJ does not result in the indirect, domino-like collapse of TK. Failure of the MRTJ constitutes the obliteration of the TK—in the same manner as the death of the Captain of the Victory constitutes the death of Nelson. For Russell, in 1914, the MRTJ was the TK. They were the same thing. Evidence supporting my assertion that the MRTJ and the TK are essentially the same thing will be presented in Chapter Five and its extreme importance will be discussed.

As is necessary with any account of knowledge, Russell believed it necessary to give some account of cognition and what it was, exactly, that held the power of cognition. In other words he has to explain what understanding is if he intends to explain how we understand propositions. Initially Russell used his theory of
acquaintance to accomplish the requirement of explaining how we understand. This theory was intertwined in the explanation of the multiple relation theory and the two together comprise TK. It must be noted however that the bulk of TK is an explanation and application of the multiple relation theory. Wittgenstein's criticisms have no direct effect on the multiple relation theory of judgement. Instead they focus on the theory of types which Sommerville claims is necessary in order to support that with which we may be acquainted. This will be discussed in Chapter Seven.

If Russell could devise a "theory of understanding" which did not rest on the theory of types, then the theory of knowledge project would not have to be abandoned due to Wittgenstein's criticisms. It will be maintained here that in effect Russell did just that.

Before proceeding further it will be helpful to clarify a few important terms.

The theory of types was Russell's answer to his continuous query on contradictions. It was introduced in, and formed a crucial part of, Russell's and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica. Because of its logical roots, the theory of types is involved in a plethora of intertwining complexities, particularly with regard to the many logical concepts and logical demonstrations, which are either found in the Principia Mathematica or issue from it. Nevertheless, the nature of the theory and its intended effect are relatively simple. As Wittgenstein states in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus:
3.332 No proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (that is the whole of the "theory of types").

While Wittgenstein is sometimes accused of maintaining too strict an economy of words, the often verbose Russell gave a similarly simple definition of the theory of types using more technical language.

The technical essence of the theory of types is merely this: Given a propositional function "ψx" of which all values are true, there are expressions which it is not legitimate to substitute for "x"... This will mean: "If 'x' is a member of the class α' is a proposition, and 'ψx' is a proposition, then 'ψ' is not a proposition, but a meaningless collection of symbols."

The theory of types was not intended to deal with contradictions generally. Russell states in the Principles of Mathematics that there are three kinds of contradictions: mathematical, logical and linguistic. Not surprisingly, Russell considers mathematical and logical contradictions to be essentially the same thing.

The logical and mathematical contradictions, as might be expected, are not really distinguishable... and since these notions [linguistic contradictions] are not logical, it is possible to find solutions which depend upon other than logical considerations. This renders possible a real simplification of the theory of types...
Henceforth, in this thesis, I will use the term "contradictions" only to refer to those contradictions which are mathematical or logical in character.

The theory of types forbids a class to be a member of itself. Once this rule is established and if it is adhered to, it is Russell's contention that contradictions can no longer be generated.

The MRTJ is really a multiple relation theory of belief propositions. The reason for this misnomer is that Russell thought that the most complex and logically troublesome propositions were "belief propositions"—he uses belief and judgement interchangeably.

One very important relation which comes under the head of knowledge of propositions is belief or judgement; but this relation requires different treatment according as the proposition concerned is atomic or molecular.4

In TK Russell says that "a" believes "x" will have the same logical form as "a" understands "x", and that belief presupposes understanding. He seems to be moving towards something like: if one can understand belief propositions one can (in most cases) understand understanding because belief and understanding will be analysed in the same fashion. This will be made more clear in a discussion of understanding in Chapter Four.

The MRTP maintains that propositions can be understood by breaking them down into their logical components. These components are of two sorts: logical objects, and relations of the logical objects. Later a third sort of component is
introduced: logical form. The proposition "Sam loves Jill" is analysed into the component logical objects "Sam", "Jill"; the component relation "loves"; and a logical form which dictates the order in which the other components must stand.

The more complex proposition, "Ted believes that Sam loves Jill", is analysed in a similar fashion to the previous proposition, with the addition of the object "Ted" and the relation "believes" which have a scope over the contained proposition "Sam loves Jill".

Simples, like "Sam and Jill" and relations such as "loves" or "believes" cannot, according to Russell, be broken down further, yet they must be understood. Russell eventually came to believe that simples were understood because they are sensations which constitute both the physical object "Sam" and the mental subject which recognises a relation between the object "Sam" and some other object. The fusion of the mental and physical realms into one substance is at the heart of the theory of neutral monism.

Neutral monism eventually becomes Russell's answer to the problem of explaining the understanding or comprehension of simples, like "Sam". Russell's adoption of a theory of neutral monism is essential to the limiting of the effectiveness of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the theory of knowledge. Russell's discussion of neutral monism will be detailed in Chapter Three.

Before finally accepting neutral monism, Russell relied on his own TACQ in order to explain the understanding of the simple components of propositions. "Acquaintance" is Russell's word for "experience". We experience or become
acquainted with simples and the relations that stand between them, and this experience constitutes understanding. The nature of Russell’s early reliance on the theory of acquaintance and his related concept of understanding, will be the subject of the Chapter Four of this thesis. The second part of Chapter Four will deal with Russell’s notion that one can be acquainted with complexes and that Sommerville believes that it is this notion which Wittgenstein exploits to severely damage the MRTJ.

In the Chapter Six of this thesis, the nature of Wittgenstein’s criticisms will be discussed. These criticisms strike at the heart of the theory of types as presented in the Principia Mathematica. They also involve inconsistencies and possible inconsistencies between the theory of types and other propositions and demonstrations which appear in the Principia Mathematica. It must be noted that at times Wittgenstein provides little explanation of the notation which he uses to express his arguments, frequently changing and redeveloping his own logical notion.

Wittgenstein’s criticism exposes some flaws in the theory of types and its relation to certain key ideas expressed in the Principia Mathematica. There are, however, at least two different methods for overcoming these problems as they relate to the theory of knowledge—specifically the theory of acquaintance. Wittgenstein’s solution is presented in his Notebooks, and in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Russell’s solution comes in the form of his conversion to neutral monism and his maintenance of MRTJ.
These are views which Russell held concurrently, and they together accomplish what TK was intended to do. The theory of neutral monism provides an explanation of the understanding of the simples which are the result of the MRTJ.

The second part of Chapter Five of this thesis will describe Wittgenstein’s and Russell’s responses to the objections which the former raises.

It must be admitted that Wittgenstein’s criticism eventually had an adverse effect on the theory of types, and that Russell considered the problem of contradictions to be very important. If he could not rely on the theory of types, Russell would have to find some other way to deal with contradictions. If the theory of knowledge could not be somehow employed to eliminate contradictions then a major portion of Russell’s project would have necessarily failed. Consequently, one would be justified in saying that Wittgenstein destroyed the theory of knowledge.

The final chapter will discuss the ramifications of this inquiry and will suggest further research into the suspect nature of the effects of Wittgenstein’s criticisms.

The effect of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of the TK constitutes a puzzling philosophical mystery because of the vague and terse correspondence through which they were presented. The manner in which Russell describes his reaction to Wittgenstein’s criticisms is equally perplexing. Also because much of the available correspondence detailing Wittgenstein’s criticisms was only one way—by Wittgenstein only—there has been an overemphasis of Wittgenstein’s concerns, with much less emphasis on Russell’s response. This is understandable since
there is much less material available on Russell’s thoughts about Wittgenstein’s objections. Nevertheless the weight of research on Wittgenstein’s correspondence adds to the confusion because it leaves Russell’s options, to a large extent, uninvestigated.

The background of this philosophical intrigue will be discussed in the Chapter Two of this thesis.
Chapter Two

The Mystery and the Dispute

Russell’s conversion to neutral monism* is no doubt one of the three main reasons for the confusion about the nature and impact of Wittgenstein’s criticisms. Wittgenstein did not destroy TK as is commonly thought, but he did force Russell to make a choice between two theories which were central to the manuscript. Wittgenstein’s arguments convinced Russell that the theory of types was incompatible with TACQ insofar as it was presented in TK. Russell had to choose one of them. He chose the theory of types.

It will be shown why Russell thought that these two theories were incompatible, and it will be argued that Russell continued to pursue TK even after he discarded the notion of publishing a book of that title, and that consequently the impact of Wittgenstein’s criticisms was much more limited than is commonly thought and is confined to compelling Russell to prune TACQ from TK.

Unfortunately TACQ happened to be the trunk of the theory of knowledge tree and without acquaintance the mass of branching theories (see Fig. 1, p.3) comprising the theory of knowledge were left without structural support.

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*As will be discussed in Chapter Two Russell begins to lean towards neutral monism in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918). By 1921, in Analysis of Mind he is advocating a philosophy which very much resembles his TK description of neutral monism.
Acquaintance is Russell’s explanation of our understanding of terms. We are acquainted with both simple and complex terms. Wittgenstein’s criticism eliminates the possibility of being acquainted with complex terms. (I ask for the reader’s indulgence so that the necessary background can be acquired in order to permit a more detailed explanation of Wittgenstein’s criticisms.) Unfortunately acquaintance with complex terms is discussed through the first two parts of the TK.

For this reason Russell, who was accustomed to writing in long and continuous sessions at a rate of ten pages a day making few corrections or alterations, would have found it difficult to sift through the manuscript making tedious erasures of reference to acquaintance. It would have been much simpler and easier to start over.

This is in fact what Russell did. He set forth his ideas about the theory of knowledge in several articles and books, none of which were entitled "The Theory of Knowledge", and few of which contained the scantiest reference to TACQ, whereas TACQ is particularly prominent in the early parts of the TK manuscript.

The absence of a published work called "The Theory of Knowledge" gives the impression that Russell abandoned the TK in favour of neutral monism, when actually Russell appropriated neutral monism in order to provide a foundation for his epistemology.

The second major reason why Wittgenstein is thought to be responsible for the shelving of the manuscript is that Russell himself is misleading when he talks
about the effect of Wittgenstein's arguments. Initially Russell follows Wittgenstein's attack on the theory of types, and this, for reasons which will be discussed later, causes Russell very great distress. Russell communicates this anxiety by way of letters and recollections in his autobiography without filling in many of the details of the situation and of the arguments. It appears that later Russell may well have eliminated the problem with the theory of types by rejecting TACQ, but as stated earlier this ruins several months of work. But this was considerably better than having to dispense with the theory of types. That would have ruined several years work, and would have done considerable and perhaps irreparable damage to the Principia Mathematica. For Russell, the chief benefit of discarding TACQ would be that it rendered Wittgenstein's criticism considerably less harmful.

That Russell may have recognised that he had initially give too much weight to Wittgenstein's arguments is important because of the lack of available information which has resulted in a widespread misunderstanding of the power of Wittgenstein's criticisms.

In 1984 McMaster University published its newly acquired TK manuscript which had been written in Russell's own hand. This new wealth of information has made it possible to draw a more detailed and more likely explanation of the events and arguments which occurred during 1912-1913 period when Russell was writing the manuscript.
Prior to McMaster's acquisition of these papers, the only information available on the nature of Wittgenstein's arguments and their effect on Russell's TK was comprised solely of correspondence between Russell and Wittgenstein, and between Russell and Lady Ottoline Morrell. In these letters Wittgenstein is characteristically sure of himself and is characteristically brief in his explanations of his arguments. Russell, on the other hand, displays a frustration which is indicative of being faced with a problem which he has not yet solved. In fact Russell gives the impression that a great deal of his thought is severely impaired by the problem, and that it is a problem which he will never be able to solve.

Although there are some (Blackwell, Copi, Wrinch) who feel that Russell could not really have been greatly distressed by Wittgenstein's letters, it is more likely the case that, initially, when Russell felt that the theory of types was threatened, he was genuinely and greatly concerned. Later after making the decision to dispose with acquaintance, Wittgenstein's criticisms "merely" initiated a switch to neutral monism as a foundation for his epistemology. (Russell had long had respect and sympathy for neutral monism, but he was never completely satisfied with it. Russell's predisposition toward the theory of neutral monism will be discussed in Chapter Three.)

Russell does not say why he was so distressed and he does not say what part of the TK was affected by Wittgenstein's views. One must be mindful of three points in order to realise what part of the TK Wittgenstein's arguments affected, and to what extent.
First, Wittgenstein's arguments are aimed at the theory of types. In fact Sommerville demonstrates that these arguments were the basis for later work which had a great affect on the theory of types.

Second, following these arguments Russell retains the theory of types with only cosmetic alterations, but he does abandon acquaintance immediately. This makes it possible to recognise Wittgenstein's objections, and too keep the theory of types (at least for several years until Wittgenstein developed new and more damning criticisms).

In view of such evidence, it is no wonder that Wittgenstein is credited with having destroyed Russell's theory of knowledge. Since Russell does not state why Wittgenstein caused him so much trouble, and he does not state what type of work Wittgenstein ruined, it is easy to confuse having to start writing the project over again with having to rethink and redevelop the entire project, and it would appear that such a confusion plays an integral role in the in the various misinterpretations of Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's manuscript.

Third, Wittgenstein contributes greatly to the confusion. His verbal economy and terse style of writing confused even Russell. Judging by Wittgenstein's letters to Russell, Russell apparently had to ask Wittgenstein repeatedly to clarify and elaborate on his arguments. Letters R3, R8, R11, R12 and R13 (Letters to

*The most resent work done on this topic has been by Nicholas Griffin ("Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement" Philosophical Studies) and Stephen Sommerville (Types, Categories and Significance Dissertation. McMaster U.) both of whom make the claim that the criticisms which Wittgenstein made against the MRTJ were fatal to both the MRTJ and the overall TK project.
Russell, Keynes and Moore) all indicate that either Wittgenstein is trying to respond to questions which Russell had asked concerning statements in Wittgenstein’s previous letters, or that Wittgenstein is expressing regret for not being able to clarify. In each case Wittgenstein’s response is both reluctant and cryptic.

If one is impressed by Wittgenstein’s genuine intellect (and many scholars are, including Russell himself), then this sort of behaviour tends to inflate one’s view of not only the credibility but of the impact of Wittgenstein’s arguments. But Wittgenstein is long on proclamations and short on reasons. He could be rude—insulting and easily angered—seeming to expect Russell to read his mind, and treating Russell rather poorly if he did not. On occasion he stops little short of calling Russell stupid.

Nevertheless, one needs only look at the tremendous range and quantity of work which Russell wrote after 1914, in order to realise that Russell (in spite of what he may have written to the contrary in 1916) quickly regained his impulse to do philosophy. Among these works are: The Analysis of Mind (1926); The Analysis of Matter (1927) "On Order and Time" (1935); or An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth (1940).

The TK was originally intended to be divided into two sections: analysis and synthesis. The second section was intimately connected with the Lowell Lectures (later published as Our Knowledge of the External World).
The second, or constuctive, section [of TK], which was to have dealt with the use of logical techniques in the construction of space, time, cause, and matter, was not written as the second half of the original book, nor as a second book, but is represented in the constructive work done in the Lowell Lectures. Thus, in preparing the lectures Russell borrowed from what would have been the entire concluding section of his major project [TK], and provided an example of what such constructive philosophy would be, as is indicated in the full title *Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific in Philosophy*.

But with the exception of a few essays which appeared in *The Monist*, the first section (which was to be divided into three parts) of the project was left unfinished, the collapse of the project apparently due to the devastating nature of Wittgenstein’s argument against the MRTJ—or so it would seem.

Although in various private letters Russell gives the impression that Wittgenstein’s arguments crippled him, this is not an accurate portrayal of the power of Wittgenstein’s arguments, which is more limited than is generally supposed (if it is confined to an attack on Russell’s TK). Irving M. Copi remarks that:

His [Wittgenstein’s] old teacher must have been teasing him to elicit from Wittgenstein in his letter of 22.7.13 the sober "I am very sorry to hear that my objection paralyses you." He could be insufferably rude even to his illustrious teacher, as on page 128: "I am upset that you did not understand the rule for the signs in my last letter, since it bores me unspeakably to explain it! You could get at it for yourself if you would think a bit!"
Russell's letters to Lady Ottoline Morrell do not seem to substantiate Copi's claim that Russell must have been teasing Wittgenstein in order to provoke some sort of humorous response. In fact Russell consistently tried to pry the argument out of an inarticulate yet terse Wittgenstein, bit by bit, through several pieces of correspondence and meetings between the two. Russell displays increasing frustration as the argument begins to take shape, until finally he declares that he cannot go on; to which Wittgenstein responds with the "I am sorry..." passage quoted on the previous page.

Nevertheless, in spite of this and other problems, Russell eventually publishes virtually everything which is contained in his notes for his proposed book on epistemology. These ideas are expressed under various titles including *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, published in 1918.*

The second part of the TK, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, was written in a short period of time beginning on the second day of 1914.

I used to sit in the parlour of "The Beetle and Wedge" at Moulisford, wondering what there was to say about our knowledge of the external world, on which before long I had to deliver a course of lectures. I got back to Cambridge from Rome on New Year's Day 1914, and, thinking that the time had come when I really must get my lectures prepared, I arranged for a shorthand typist to come next day, though I had not the vaguest idea what I

*The best way to prove this is to show the ideas of the TK as they appear in later works by Russell. Unfortunately this task is too involved for this thesis. But a preliminary comparison of the TK with latter works is presented in Appendices D and E of this thesis.*
should say to her when she came. As she entered the room, my ideas fell into place, and I dictated in a completely orderly sequence from that moment until the work was finished. What I dictated to her was subsequently published as a book with the title Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field for Scientific Method in Philosophy. 7

The passage above has further interest. It does not correspond to certain letters in which Russell "confesses" that Wittgenstein had a very great and ill effect on Russell’s ability to do philosophy. For the moment, the nature of Wittgenstein’s argument is not at issue. Please bear with me. Sommerville’s reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s criticism will be discussed in Chapter Five, beginning on page 63.

Proponents of the theory that Wittgenstein’s criticisms forced Russell to abandon his work on the TK use Russell’s "confessions" to establish the tremendous effect that they believe Wittgenstein’s criticisms had on Russell. They then use these "confessions" as justification for manufacturing the nature of Wittgenstein’s criticisms. 8

The correspondence between Russell and Wittgenstein does not provide detail about Wittgenstein’s supposedly most damaging criticism. Therefore, it is necessary for the proponents of the view to provide a possible and probable

8Geach, Griffin and Sommerville all cite Russell’s confessions as evidence that Wittgenstein did in fact make criticisms of the MRTJ specifically and the TK in general. And they all go on to use these same confessions as evidence to justify their assertion that these criticisms forced Russell to abandon the MRTJ (and therefore the TK) in spite of the fact that Russell did not abandon the MRTJ.
cause for Russell to give up work on TK. A possible and probable cause takes the form of a "reconstructed" criticism which may have been presented by Wittgenstein, and which does such damage to key Russellian notions, as to make it believable that Russell did abandon work on TK under the weight of Wittgenstein's criticism.

However if the truthfulness or accuracy of Russell's "confessions" is in doubt, then there is no reason to suppose that Wittgenstein's criticisms had any great effect on Russell, and therefore there is no reason to manufacture what such a Wittgensteinian criticism might look like. And further, there is no reason to speculate as to what it might pertain.

As previously indicated, Russell dictated the lectures which were to become Our Knowledge of the External World on January 2nd of 1914. We may safely assume that he picked the topic some time prior to January 2nd of 1914. But in one of the often quoted "confessions", contained in a letter (not written until 1916) to Lady Ottoline Morrell, Russell says that: "I wrote a lot of stuff about the Theory of Knowledge which Wittgenstein criticised with the greatest severity". Russell then goes on to say in the same letter that:

I had to produce lectures for America, but took a metaphysical subject although I was and am convinced that all fundamental work in philosophy is logical. My reason was that Wittgenstein persuaded me that what wanted doing in logic was too difficult for me."
The emphasis on the fact that he had to produce the lectures indicates a pressing need or impending time restraint.

Russell's lectures on the *Principles of Social Reconstruction* were not given until 1916, three years after Wittgenstein conveyed his final criticisms—criticisms to which Russell refers in the letter. Russell does not indicate that he had any trouble developing these lectures. In fact, he describes the writing of *The Principles of Social Reconstruction* as spontaneous, and it was completed at least a full six months prior to the date when he had to present the lectures.

Russell does, however, say that he had very great difficulty producing the *Our Knowledge of the External World* lectures. He states in his *Autobiography* that his mind was a blank until January 1st of 1914, and to his surprise he was able to dictate the lectures to a typist on the following day. The lectures were to be delivered in March of the same year.

The circumstances of Russell's rushed composition of the *Our Knowledge of the External World* lectures and the dates of composition and delivery of the lectures would indicate that these were the lectures to which Russell was referring in his letter to Ottoline Morrell.

However, Wittgenstein's criticisms (1913) were delivered a year before Russell says he finished writing the lectures (1914). And yet Russell still steadfastly maintains the necessity of recognising that judgement must be analysed as a
relation consisting of more than two terms (i.e. a multiple relation)* If Wittgenstein's criticisms against the MRTJ were the reason for choosing a metaphysical topic, Russell would surely have avoided talking about belief as a multiple relation. Russell supposedly chooses a metaphysical subject to avoid a logical topic. Yet in one of his few discussions of logic, Russell speaks about belief in the manner Wittgenstein is supposed to have exposed as seriously errant. This negates the benefit of changing to a metaphysical topic. Therefore, it cannot be the case that Russell "chose a metaphysical topic because Wittgenstein had shown him that what wanted doing in philosophy was too difficult for him." (In spite of the fact that Russell makes this claim in a letter to Lady Ottoline Morrell—previous quote.) And, therefore, the accuracy and truthfulness of Russell's "confession" that Wittgenstein had a profound and ill effect on Russell's philosophy are in doubt.

The question of why Russell would mislead Lady Ottoline Morrell with regard to the effect of Wittgenstein's criticisms comes to mind.

A possible reason for Russell's apparent inaccuracy is that he was (by his own admission) prone to dramatics and philandering. It may well be the case that Russell was trying to play on Morrell's sympathies. The content of the letter in question would appear to support the conclusion that Russell might have been

*on pp. 67-68 of Our Knowledge of the External World Russell aggressively asserts that belief must have a more complicated form than that of a two-term relation because if it is not then the "the problem of error [is] insoluble and the difference between belief and perception [is] inexplicable. This is wholly consistent with the MRTJ as it appears in the TK.
trying to make Lady Morrell feel sorry for him and perhaps even guilty for having wronged him or for not having supported him.* He begins his letter with the following passage:

I [Russell] enclose a letter from Captain White. You will see that he feels the same sort of hostility or antagonism to me that Lawrence feels—I think it is a feeling that seems to exist in most people with whom I feel in sympathy on the spiritual side—probably the very same thing which has prevented you from caring for me as much as you thought you would at first.  

Russell then goes on (in the same 1916 letter) to mention his current dilemma of being misunderstood by his audiences, and then reminds Morrell that she was seeking psychological help when he first relayed his concern over Wittgenstein’s criticisms, and that she did not then respond to his "suffering".

My impulse was shattered, like a wave dashed to pieces against a breakwater. I filled with utter despair, and tried to turn to you for consolation. But you were occupied with Vittoz [a Swiss psychologist] and could not give me the time. 

*On p. 214 of Autobiography Russell states that "we [Russell and Morrell] ceased to be lovers in 1916..." The tone of the letter and the date might suggest that Russell’s reason for trying to play on Morrell’s sympathies was to try to avoid an impending breakup.
The first sentence of the passage above is also often quoted to show that Wittgenstein’s criticisms had a profound effect on Russell’s work. Yet this sentence also supports the contention that Russell was not being entirely truthful with Morrell: although he is willing to tell the readers of his Autobiography, in a footnote, that “[he] soon got over this mood”, he gives the impression in the letter itself that his desperate mood was just dissipating at the time of the writing of the letter—some two years later.

Similarly, when Sommerville quotes the previous passages, with the intent of supporting the contention that Wittgenstein’s “onslaught” caused Russell great despair, he fails to recognise Russell’s “disclaimer”. This is no doubt due to the fact that Sommerville had the privilege of working from Russell’s original letter, to which no footnote would be attached.

Other scholars have also failed to notice the amendment, thus transforming Russell’s “romantic fiction” into widely accepted “historical fact”. The acceptance of this “historical fact” (Wittgenstein delivered criticisms which caused Russell such despair that he was forced to abandon work on the TK) gave legitimacy to speculation on the nature of Wittgenstein’s criticism. Because the accuracy of Russell’s “confession” is doubtful speculation on the nature of Wittgenstein’s criticism is not warranted. Without Russell’s statement of the severity of the problems which Wittgenstein’s criticism’s caused him, and without a more detailed correspondence, we have no way of determining what Wittgenstein may
have been concerned with or to what extent Russell was able to manage the
problem; if there was any real problem. Sommerville admits:

In addition we have to reconstruct Wittgenstein’s
criticisms and their effects—through the period 1913-1918-
—from the meagrest evidence."

Russell’s correspondence to Wittgenstein, however, still further complicates the
situation—because almost all of it is missing. While Wittgenstein writes to Russell
saying that "I am sorry that my objection paralyzes you", there is no

Corresponding letter from Russell to Wittgenstein stating that this is in fact the
case.

Clearly Russell must have written or said something that would indicate to
Wittgenstein that Russell was troubled by Wittgenstein’s objection. But since we
cannot examine the context, Copi might well have been right to suggest that
Russell was trying to goad Wittgenstein into saying something humorous or

Outrageous.

It would seem more likely, however, that Russell was trying to get Wittgenstein
to say something more detailed. Wittgenstein’s criticisms came in terse blurbs,
and he did not seem to like to elaborate.

It distresses me that you did not understand the rule
dealing with signs in my last letter because it bores me
BEYOND WORDS to explain it. If you thought about it for
a bit you could discover it for yourself!
This is the sign for \( p \equiv p \):
it is tautological because "b" is connected only with those paires of poles that consist of opposite poles of a single proposition (namely p). Apply this to propositions with more than two arguments and you will obtain the general rule for the construction of tautologies. I beg you to think about these matters for yourself; it is INTOLERABLE for me, to repeat a written explanation which even the first time I gave only with the utmost repugnance.\textsuperscript{12}

The passage above is rather long but that portion of it which is devoted to explanation (rather than complaining about doing so) is quite terse.

It is not the case (considering Russell's continued and prolific ethical, social, and logical output) that Russell's "paralysis" was permanent. He may merely have been waiting for a clarification of Wittgenstein's criticism, recognising that it was probably important enough to force some sort of alteration—but needing more detail in order to counter it.
Clearly Wittgenstein made some sort of criticism which affected the theory of knowledge. But because the letters in which Russell "confesses" that Wittgenstein destroyed TK are probably not accurate, and because we do not know what initiated Wittgenstein's use of the word "paralyzed", the assumption by scholars that Russell did not continue work on TK is not justified and the speculated effect of Wittgenstein's criticisms is overblown.

Rather than stop working on the TK after Wittgenstein's criticism, Russell keeps MRTJ, the theory of types and the theory of acquaintance plays an increasingly lesser role in his philosophy as he moves toward neutral monism. A discussion of this theory will occupy the next chapter.
Chapter Three
Neutral Monism

Russell’s shift to the theory of neutral monism is a shift of perspective. Russell’s old theory of acquaintance has as an underlying assumption: the notion of a duality of mind and matter. Through his theory of acquaintance Russell maintains that one becomes acquainted with relations between objects through an active experiencing of them. In the TK, Russell expresses the experience of relations as a relation of the mind of the one who experiences, with objects of experience.

This relation between mind and the relations which we are to understand is not necessary in the neutral monist’s doctrine. According to Russell the neutral monist believes that mind and matter are secondary classifications of the single and primary "stuff" that composes the world. This stuff is "sensation." Instead of maintaining that mind is somehow removed from matter yet becomes aware of material things and their interactions together and with mind, the neutral monist suggests that when we speak of mind we group sensations in a certain manner, and when we speak of matter we group the same sensations in a different pattern of organisation.

Consequently, the neutral monist maintains that philosophers tend to manufacture two things that simply do not exist. These things are:
consciousness or mind (Russell uses "mind" and "consciousness" interchangably) and matter. Consciousness concerns us the most here.

Misguided, philosophers tend to embellish consciousness with powers and properties which result in much philosophical confusion. Russell took this view very seriously, though he was not prepared to accept it until Wittgenstein convinced him that something had to be done to eliminate the judgement of nonsense in Russell's theory of knowledge. As we will see, the elimination of the possibility of judging nonsense was instrumental in pushing Russell toward neutral monism while abandoning his old theory of acquaintance.

This shift in Russell's thought was not as great as it might seem. It did not necessitate the abandonment of the MRTJ which was the backbone of much of the theory of knowledge. And in spite of various problems which Russell saw in neutral monism, he considered the theory to be the only serious rival to his own theory of acquaintance.

This theory [acquaintance] has to be defended against three rival theories: (1) the theory of Mach and James, according to which there is no distinctive relation such as "acquaintance", involved in all mental facts, but merely a different grouping of the same objects as those dealt with by non-psychological sciences... The first of these rivals [neutral monism] is the most interesting and the most formidable, and can only be met by a full and detailed discussion, which will occupy a second chapter.15
Russell says that the neutral monists have, in certain areas, done a service to philosophy by providing fresh perspectives and observations which had somehow been overlooked by earlier thought.

It is important to be clear as to the extent to which the experience of one mind may overlap that of another. Neutral monists have done a service to philosophy in pointing out that the same object may be experienced by two minds. This certainly applies, as a matter of fact, to universals and abstracts; it applies also, though I think only as a theoretic possibility, to things of sense. 14

Further Russell seems to imply that neutral monism, whether correct or not, is a considerable advance beyond classical dualism. Neutral monism might be flawed but not to the extent of many of its rival theories, including some of the most respected.

Neutral monism...maintains that there are not two sorts of entities, mental and physical, but only two sorts of relations between entities, namely those belonging to what is called the mental order and those belonging to what is called the physical order. In favour of this theory, we may admit that what is experienced may itself be part of the physical world, that the old distinction of "mind" and "matter", besides ignoring the abstract facts regarding "matter", and the "space" in which matter is, as something obvious, given, and unambiguous, and is in hopeless doubt as to whether the facts of sensation are to be called physical or mental. In emphasizing all this, we must acknowledge that neutral monism has performed an important service to philosophy. 16

30
In spite of the "advancements" which Russell believed that the neutral monists had made, he has reservations about several ideas which seem to arise from neutral monism.

Russell lists five aspects of James's neutral monism to which Russell objects. Two of these are very much interrelated—so much so that if one of the problems is solved the other disappears. Russell complains that it is difficult, under neutral monism, to distinguish between an individual's experience and things that lie outside an individual's experience:

If neutral monism is true, a mind which had only one experience would be a logical impossibility, since a thing is only mental in virtue of its external relations; and correspondingly, it is difficult for this philosophy to define the respect in which the whole of my experience is different from the things that lie outside my experience.  

This problem would be eliminated if neutral monism could give a better account of emphatic particulars such as "I", "you", "this", "that". The reason that things experienced are difficult to separate from things that are possible to experience is that James's and Mach's neutral monism (at least as Russell understands it) does not give an adequate account of "I". Russell's emphasis of the word "I" is an attempt to make a distinction between what is experienced by a specific individual (named I, according to Russell) and the possible experience of things not yet experienced. Yet Russell duplicates his first objection with his fifth.
In addition to these difficulties, there is a fifth, more fatal, I think, than any of them, which is derived from considerations of "this" and "now" and "I". 17

The second objection which Russell raises can be eliminated (as we will see) by simply introducing into neutral monism, a slight modification of the correspondence theory of truth. Russell says that because James reduces belief to sensation, "Fatal results with regards to the theory of error" are produced.

A second difficulty is derived from belief or judgment, which James and his followers unduly assimilate to sensation and presentation, with fatal results as regards the theory of error. Error is defined as "belief in the unreal", which compels the admission that there actually are unreal things. 18

It is not the admission of unreal things that is really bothering Russell here. After all Russell is prepared to admit all manner of hallucinations into the realm of what is. (Russell makes the claim that hallucinations are real in the TK, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and The Analysis of Mind.) When Russell was writing TK he still believed that neutral monism was contradictory to the notion of false belief.

"The true and the false"... "are respectively the real and the unreal, considered as objects of a possible belief or judgment."

32
There is nothing unusual in this definition, yet it suffers from a defect so simple and so fundamental that it is amazing how so many philosophers can have failed to see it. The defect is that there is no such thing as the unreal, and therefore, by the definition, there can be no such thing as the false; yet it is notorious that false beliefs do occur.¹⁹

All propositions (according to Russell's correspondence theory of truth) will also correspond to a fact or group of facts.

These facts will be the occurrences of the actual sensations. Through TACQ one can say that one may judge a sensation falsely. But neutral monism dictates that sensations are immediate. A material object does not cause a sensation which can then be misinterpreted as being caused by some other and different material object. Rather, the sensation is first and we construct the object accordingly.

Therefore, we cannot judge a sensation falsely. Sensations will all be true and therefore all propositions which correspond to them will also be true. All propositions will correspond to sensations, therefore, all propositions will be true. As Russell interprets, it there cannot be any false propositions under James's system.

It is the result that there can be no false propositions that bothers Russell. But such a conclusion is not warranted. All sensations will be true, but they will occur in a specific manner in a "specific pattern" or relation. The proposition must accurately portray the relations between sensations in order to be true.
Inaccurate representations will produce false propositions, even though the component sensations are true.

We are still left however with the case of hallucinations. Here Russell maintains that while the sensations are accurately represented by the proposition proclaiming them, a belief based on the proposition is nevertheless false because it does not correspond to a fact.

A hallucination is a fact, not an error; what is erroneous is a judgment based upon it. But if I believe that to-day is Wednesday when in fact to-day is Tuesday, "that to-day is Wednesday" is not a fact. We can not find anywhere in the physical world any entity corresponding to this belief. ...it is impossible to account for the occurrence of the belief "that to-day is Wednesday" without invoking something not to be found in the physical world.20

But in fact it is not necessary to "invoke something not of the physical world" in order to explain false belief under neutral monism. Insufficient sensual data explains false belief quite nicely. If we know that on Wednesday the mail man comes, we may believe that it is Wednesday because the mailman came, when in fact he has decided or been directed to deliver the mail on a different day.

What Russell seems to be overlooking is that facts depend on a conglomeration of occurrences in the physical (or neutral) world—not just one. The correspondence theory of truth must be appended to include the assessment of the totality of evidence available—not just a specific event or entity. With this modification we need not proclaim the "unreal" or that some things "subsist". And
we need not be compelled to think of "mind" as being anything very different from matter.

Russell's third objection is also not very convincing.

The same point arises in regard to memory; for if what is remembered actually exists in the mind, its position in the time-series becomes ambiguous, and the essential pastness of the remembered object disappears.\textsuperscript{21}

Russell eventually solves this problem himself by realising that remembering is itself an experience of a past experience. The time series is maintained by the link between the first experience of object with the second experience of experience of the object. This establishes a definite order and therefore a recognition of "past".

Fourth, Russell objects to James's definition of knowledge. But here he admits that this definition may not be essential to neutral monism.

A fourth difficulty arises in regard to the definition of knowledge offered by James, though here it is hard to say how far this definition is essential to neutral monism.\textsuperscript{22}

Immediate experience, which I should regard as the only real knowledge of things, he [James] refuses to regard as knowledge at all: and it would seem that what he calls knowledge of a thing is really knowledge of a proposition of which the thing is not even a constituent.\textsuperscript{23}
All this really amounts to is a complaint that James does not accept the theory of acquaintance, and as we will see, Russell was forced to abandon the theory of acquaintance himself.

Therefore, of the four objections against neutral monism which Russell lists, only one has any real staying power, and this one stayed with Russell for the rest of his life. This is the argument to which he refers in *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*.

There is, on the other hand, the argument from emphatic particulars, such as "this" and "now" and "here" and such words as that, which are not very easy to reconcile, to my mind, with the view [Neutral Monism] which does not distinguish between a particular and experiencing that particular.  

But by this time, Russell is already expressing reservations about what he considers the most powerful of the arguments against neutral monism.

But the argument about emphatic particulars is so delicate and so subtle that I cannot feel quite sure whether it is a valid one or not...  

In 1917 Russell reflected on these arguments which were published in *The Monist* in July of 1914.
You will find a discussion of the whole question in some articles I wrote in The Monist, especially in July 1914, and in the two previous numbers also. I should really want to rewrite them rather because I think some of the arguments I used against neutral monism are not valid. I place most reliance on the argument about "emphatic particulars", "this" "I", all that class of words that pick out certain particulars from the universe by their relation to oneself...  

We see then, that as Russell said it, the shift from the theory of acquaintance to neutral monism was not very drastic. It generated only one significant conflict with his theory of knowledge. And he felt that this conflict could be overcome.

I feel more and more inclined to think that it [neutral monism] may be true. I feel more and more that the difficulties that occur in regard to it are all of the sort that may be solved by ingenuity.  

Whatever a detailed and thorough analysis of James's and Mach's neutral monism might be, and whatever notions might be essential to the official doctrine, it is Russell's view of neutral monism which is important to us here, because it is Russell's view of neutral monism which shaped his eventual conversion and the development of his brand of neutral monism. At the beginning of his analysis of neutral monism, Russell gives the following definition:
Neutral monism...is the theory that the things commonly regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded as physical do not differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessed by the one set and not by the other, but differ only in respect of arrangement and context.23

By this Russell means that in neutral monism what is physical and what is mental are the result of classes which are defined differently yet isolate and group together the same members. To give an analogy, the records of a database can be sorted many different ways by extension, alphabetically in ascending or descending order, by field etc. The manner in which such records are sorted provides a different emphasis and may induce a different viewpoint on the same information. The total of possible experience is essentially a database that can be organised in a fashion which we call mental or a fashion which we call physical.

The theory [neutral monism] may be illustrated by comparison with a postal directory, in which the same names come twice over, once in alphabetical order to the mental, and the geographical order to the physical.24

This way of looking at things eliminates the notion that an idea is something different from the thing that it represents. Describing what the neutral monist sees as dualistic confusion, Russell says the following:

The whole context of an object is so different in the mental order from what it is in the physical order that the object itself is thought to be duplicated, and in the mental
order it is called an "idea", namely the idea of the same object in the physical order. But this duplication is a mistake: "ideas" of chairs and tables are identical with chairs and tables, but are considered in their mental context, not in the context of physics.  

The whole duality of mind and matter, according to this theory, is a mistake; there is only one kind of stuff out of which the world is made, and this stuff is called mental in one arrangement, physical in the other.  

Instead of mind being something over matter which analyses and processes the experiences that come to us as a result of the interaction and relationships between material things, neutral monism professes that sensations are the common building blocks of both the material and physical. As Russell puts it:

Thus we seem to have here, in sense, a neutral ground, a watershed, from which we may pass either to "matter" or to "mind", according to the nature of the problems we choose to raise.  

This union of mind and matter appeals to Russell's desire to analyse and simplify. It provides an explanation which requires only one type of thing to begin with— from which the totality of knowledge can be explained. Russell believed that philosophy ought to enlist the fewest entities and principles possible.
In favour of this theory, we may observe, first and foremost, the very notable simplification which it introduces. That the things given in experience should be of two fundamentally different kinds, mental and physical, is far less satisfactory to our intellectual desires than that the dualism should be merely apparent and superficial. Occam’s razor...which I should regard as the supreme methodological maxim in philosophizing, prescribes James’s theory as preferable to dualism if it can possibly be made to account for the facts.33

In the passage above, Russell’s emphasis on the virtue of the simplicity of neutral monism is important. It is important because, as we will see, it provides the basis for Russell’s response to Wittgenstein’s objections. The simplicity of neutral monism will allow Russell to escape the so-called paralysis which has so often been wrongly attributed to him.

Neutral monism became Russell’s replacement for his theory of acquaintance. In order to understand why this replacement was necessary we will need to examine TACQ. This will be the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Four

Acquaintance

Acquaintance was the foundation for Russell's TK. The rest of the theory was supported by it. When one grafts a tree to the base of the trunk of another, one still has the same tree bearing the same fruit. Only the roots are different and this serves to make the tree stronger. Russell grafted his theory of knowledge onto the roots of neutral monism. His theory became stronger but not greatly different.

Whether one agrees with this analogy is important for two reasons. First, Russell was accused of being fickle and of changing his philosophy rather indiscriminately.

Russell commentary has come in two phases: in the first phase, his contemporaries seemed bemused by the changes of his philosophy and established a reputation for fickleness which has clung to his work. An example of this is C.D. Broad's remark that Russell develops a new philosophy every few years (in "Critical and Speculative Philosophy", 1924, 79).34

This sort of view tends to strengthen the notion that Russell might simply abandon TK because of a few criticisms presented by Wittgenstein. It is clear that Russell considered his work over several decades to be quite consistent and an
orderly progression. He admits to revising his views but he maintains that this process is an essential part of philosophy, and of science.

On a very great may matters my views since I began to write on philosophy have undergone repeated changes. In philosophy, though not in science, there are those who make such changes a matter of reproach...For my part, I should regard an unchanging system of philosophical doctrines as proof of intellectual stagnation. A prudent may imbued with the scientific spirit will not claim that his present beliefs are wholly true, though he may console himself with the thought that his earlier beliefs were perhaps not wholly false. Philosophical progress seems to me analogous to the gradually increasing clarity of outline of a mountain approached through the mist...35

Perhaps Russell’s view of himself is more accurate than his critics view of him. In my view Russell’s work is largely consistent and displays a linear progression (in the sense that his views seem to change only when necessitated by a problem which he finds unsolvable within the strictures of his current views). He seems reluctant to change his views particularly if they happen to be mathematical views. (Appendix B will detail the connection between Russell’s mathematical and epistemological work.) Russell was not anxious to give up the theory of types, in spite of the fact that he recognised problems with the theory not long after publishing the Principia Mathematica.

The manner in which Russell responded to Wittgenstein’s criticism of TK provides an excellent example of the progression of Russell’s ideas. He responds
only when necessary and then he changes his view only as much as will allow him to overcome Wittgenstein’s objection. This view will be discussed in the following chapter. Russell was not prone to major rewrites as is commonly thought.

Perhaps most important of all, Theory of Knowledge [TK manuscript] illuminates the continuity of development, the changes and the reasons for the changes which heretofore seemed mysteriously to appear between 1910 and 1919.38

Eames seems to think that Russell is more consistent than is usually supposed.

The second reason that the issue of whether or not one accepts Russell’s replacement of the underpinnings of the theory of knowledge as evolution rather than revolution is important because Wittgenstein was chiefly responsible for initiating this change. In other words: the credit which is given to Wittgenstein should only be proportionate to the magnitude of the impact of his arguments. If Wittgenstein merely pushed Russell in a different direction rather than destroying the TK entirely, Wittgenstein’s effect is clearly less than is attributed to him.

There are two reasons why the abandonment of the theory of acquaintance in favour of neutral monism should be regarded as evolutionary rather than revolutionary.

First, the body of the TK remains largely the same and those changes which are made do not issue from the rejection of acquaintance.
Second, the theory of acquaintance describes knowledge or understanding as a relation. Neutral monism (at least Russell’s brand) does not alter this premiss.

In the TK, Russell says that acquaintance is active experience or awareness; he replaces the word “experience” with the word “acquaintance" in order to denote that experience is a relation.

Now since we have decided that experience is constituted by a relation, it will be better to employ a less neutral word; we shall employ synonymously the two words acquaintance and awareness... thus when A experiences an object O, we shall say that A is acquainted with O.37

Acquaintance is not limited to what is sensible or material. Hence, the status of an object is also not limited to the sensible or material. Russell makes this point very clear early in the TK.

It will be maintained that acquaintance is a dual relation between a subject and an object which need not have any community of nature. The subject is mental, the object is not known to be mental except in introspection. The object may be in the present, in the past, or not in time at all; it may be a sensible particular, or a universal, or an abstract logical fact. All cognitive relations—attention, sensation, memory, imagination, believing, disbelieving, etc.—presuppose acquaintance.38
It must be observed that Russell did not (particularly in his manuscript) use terms such as acquaintance as he specifies they ought to be used. For instance, Russell makes much of the importance of using the word "acquaintance" instead of the word "experience". Nevertheless at times he uses the words interchangeably.

This is also true of Russell's use of the words "acquaintance" and "understanding". However, acquaintance is not the same as understanding. They are extremely similar in function but their logical form is different.

...whereas understanding and acquaintance, as I shall try to show, are very widely different in logical form, and give rise to quite different logical problems.\(^\text{30}\)

But just as acquaintance is the most comprehensive and fundamental of dual cognitive relations, so understanding is the most comprehensive and fundamental of propositional cognitive relations.\(^\text{40}\)

What we have here are two different types of knowledge. Acquaintance is knowledge of terms, while understanding is knowledge of propositions containing terms.

Knowledge of terms is what we have called "acquaintance". Knowledge of propositions is a more complicated matter, and has forms which differ both according to the relation of the subject to the objects...
involved, and also according to the nature of the objects themselves.\textsuperscript{41}

It is clear that there is something which we may call "understanding the proposition", which is presupposed equally by assertion, suggestion, doubt and volition. This has some affinity to acquaintance, though it is really much more complicated. It is perhaps easier to discover what is meant by "understanding a proposition" than to discover what is meant by a "proposition".\textsuperscript{42}

Whereas an object of acquaintance is something that Russell considers to be real, an object of understanding (i.e. a proposition, etc.) is something that Russell considers to be unreal (i.e. an incomplete symbol).

Now a proposition is in my opinion an "incomplete symbol", i.e. some context is necessary before the phrase expressing a proposition acquires a complete meaning.\textsuperscript{43}

Russell says that propositions are unreal because he does not want to admit the reality of false propositions but he cannot deny that there are false propositions. For Russell therefore, propositions are true or false but they are also unreal.

We must therefore say that, in the sense in which propositions are involved in believing and in propositional understanding, there is no difference, as regards reality, between true and false propositions. And this in turn, since it is repugnant to admit the reality of false propositions, forces us to seek a theory which shall
regard true and false propositions as alike unreal, i.e. as incomplete symbols.44

Objects of acquaintance are not true or false they simply are, and as such there is no reason to deny their reality. Objects of acquaintance are real.

The fundamental characteristic which distinguishes propositions from objects of acquaintance is their truth or falsehood. An object of acquaintance is not true or false, but is simply what it is: there is no dualism of true and false objects of acquaintance.45

Russell uses the phrase "objects of acquaintance" to mean anything with which one can be acquainted. An object of acquaintance is something which has no true/false duality (and is, therefore, what Russell calls real). An object of acquaintance also has the characteristic of being something of which a subject can be aware.

We will define a "subject" as any entity which is acquainted with something, i.e. "subjects are the domain of the relation "acquaintance". Conversely, any entity with which something is acquainted will be called an "object" i.e. "objects" are the converse domain of the relation "acquaintance".46

Objects of acquaintance are not limited to concrete physical entities like "rock" or "dog". Russell insists that objects of acquaintance can also be mental
constructs or mental events. While this imposes no immediate problem, the unlimited range and potential logical complexity of mental objects can create serious logical problems for Russell’s TK.

And although there are entities with which we are not acquainted, yet it seems evident that nothing of the same logical nature as objects of acquaintance can possibly be either true or false. Of course, a judgment or a statement may be true or false in one sense, although it is an event which may be an object of acquaintance.47

In the passage above Russell falls victim to the grammatical ambiguities which the perfect logical language he is trying to develop is supposed to prevent. Judgments can be true or false, and hence should not be objects of acquaintance. But because Russell had allowed mental events to be objects of acquaintance, he had to allow that mental events like judgement can be objects of acquaintance. However, judgment is the most logically complex of all Russellian relations. In order to be acquainted with a judgment one must presuppose what is being judged. In other words, one has to judge the judgment in order to judge the judgment, ad infinitum. This is what I believe is the grammatical embodiment of Wittgenstein’s criticism of the TK. In Chapter Six I highlight Sommerville’s reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s criticism. Sommerville’s reconstruction shows that Wittgenstein was probably exposing the conflict which arises between the Principia Mathematica and the TK. This conflict and the contradictions which unavoidably develop are clearly centered around Russell’s
explanation of judgment. But it is Russell's application of acquaintance which is the source of the problem.

If Russell was willing to reconsider his assertion that mental events are objects of acquaintance, the problem could be avoided. It is my contention that Russell's later conversion to neutral monism was the result of reconsidering mental events and acquaintance. If as Russell says, (quoted on p.38) there is no difference between "chairs" and "ideas of chairs", then the analysis of "chair" and the analysis of "idea of a chair" should be also be the same.

However, initially Russell says, in the quotation above, that "a judgment or a statement may be true or false in a sense..." suggesting that there is a sense in which a judgment may not be true or false. It is Russell's own introduction of this ambiguity which is the cause of criticisms which Wittgenstein develops.

Unfortunately, Russell makes the same mistake of introducing ambiguity when he discusses neutral monism. He says that (p. 38) there is only one kind of "stuff" in the world and it is called "mental" in one arrangement and "physical" in another arrangement. Here the introduction of "arrangement" creates a potential problem. If Russell means the arrangement of the constituents of "The chair is black" and "I believe the chair is black", then neutral monism can confer no benefits with regard to the problem of belief propositions, having a true/false duality being considered as a mental event having no true/false duality. There is no benefit because the problem is not solved, it is only concealed.
As will be discussed in the following section of this chapter, the arrangement of constituents must be restricted in some way. If arrangement is not restricted, then it follows that nonsense can be judged. But, in order to "obey a restriction" on the arrangement of the constituents of a proposition, we must make a further judgement which implies the same set of restrictions and therefore more judgements ad infinitum.

Consequently, the ambiguity created by "mental events" has the same ill effect as the ambiguity introduced by "arrangement". The "ambiguity of arrangement" constitutes one of the forms of what Sommerville and Griffin call the "directional problem". I have used the term "ambiguity" to emphasize the irony in Russell falling victim to the defects of language that the TK was designed to avoid.

The true/false duality of propositions is also central to Griffin's explanation of the directional problem. Both Wittgenstein and Russell felt that propositions had to be significant; otherwise they would not be capable of being understood. If it were possible that the theory of understanding did not prevent insignificant propositions, then it could not be an accurate theory of understanding. For Russell, a significant proposition was one which could be either true or false (i.e. one which has a true/false duality). If it could be either true or false then it would have meaning. But if we could reorder the terms so that the proposition could not be true or false, then we would not be prevented from judging meaningless propositions. And Russell did not want to admit that meaningless or insignificant propositions could be judged.
If "S" believes that there is a relation between "a" and "b", "S" must somehow be able to recognise the significance of the order of the terms. "S believes a loves b" does not entail that "S believes b loves a". And "S believes a b loves", or "S believes Juliette Romeo loves" is confused to say the least. Griffin explains:

The problem is as follows: It is essential that any theory of judgment be able to distinguish

(7) S believes that a precedes b
from,

(8) S believes that b precedes a.

The problem of doing so I shall call the "direction problem". This problem is common to all theories of judgment, but is more easily solved for some than for others. The multiple relation theory is one for which it is not easy. Moreover... there is a further form of the directional problem which seems to be unique to Russell's theory, for the theory has to distinguish both (7) and (8) from such putative judgments as

(9) S believes precedes a b
(10) S believes b a precedes. 44

This problem was one that required Russell to account for not only how we are acquainted with a relation but also how we are able to be acquainted with the correct order of the terms of that relation. It is clear that Russell recognised the problem, but what is not as clear is what he intended to do about it.
But not even an atomic complex is determinate when its constituents, particular and universal, are given. "A precedes B" is a different complex from "B precedes A", though it consists of the same constituents. A complex has a property which we may call its "form", and the constituents must have what we call determinate "position" in thesis form "A precedes B" and "B precedes A" have the same form as well as the same constituents; they differ only in regards the position of the constituents. ⁴⁹

Griffin says that in order to meet this requirement, Russell made use of the notion of logical form.

Taking logical forms in the sense just outlined, it is very tempting to solve the wide direction problem this way: If we represent the logical form of an elementary dyadic complex by "xRy", we cannot substitute a, /precedes/, etc. because such substitutions are ruled out by the type restrictions indicated by different styles of variable. In the elementary dyadic case, the form tells you where to put the relating relation. ⁵⁰

If Griffin and Sommerville are correct, Russell now has to find some way of defining the position of terms or constituents within the form of the complex relation. And he has to decide just what sort of logical status position and form will have. Russell treats logical form as if it were a constituent of a complex. Drawing a map of a five term complex, Russell shows logical form as one of the constituents. He alters his notation for logical form: "xRy" becomes "R(x,y)".

52
Thus we are led to the following map of our five-term complex.

In this figure, one relation goes from $S$ to the four objects; one relation goes from $R(x, y)$ to similarity, and another to $A$ and $B$, while one relation goes from similarity to $A$ and $B$.\[^{51}\]

The increasing number of "things" which are necessary to explain understanding increases the chances that these "things" will create new conflicts. Essentially, then, Wittgenstein's criticisms consisted of finding new ways in which nonsense might be derived from Russell's ontology. The complex apparatus which Russell was forced to create in order to support the theory of acquaintance eventually became incompatible with the theory of types (or more correctly, acquaintance became incompatible with the application of the theory of types as prescribed by the *Principia Mathematica*).
In order to see how this conflict between acquaintance and the theory of types develops and in order to recognise its ramifications, we will have to trace through Wittgenstein's criticisms of the theory of knowledge and Russell’s reactions to them.

But before going on to discuss this conflict and Wittgenstein’s criticisms, it is important to understand the relationship between TK and MRTJ.
Chapter Five
The Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement

As
The Theory of Knowledge

As has been shown at length in Chapter Four, Russell divided knowledge into two categories: knowledge of simples or terms, and knowledge of complexes and propositions. Knowledge of terms is called acquaintance. Knowledge of complexes is called understanding.

Knowledge of terms is what we have called "acquaintance". Knowledge of propositions is a more complicated matter, and has forms which differ both according to the relation of the subject to objects involved, and also according to the nature of the objects themselves.52

What follows is a discussion of "understanding a proposition" where Russell seems to be using the word "understanding" to mean the same thing as the word "knowing".

It is clear that there is something which we may call "understanding the proposition", which is presupposed equally by assertion, suggestion, doubt and volition. This has some affinity to acquaintance, though it is really much more complicated.53
With regard to the two quotes above, one notices the similarity in phrasing stating in the first that "Knowledge of terms is acquaintance, knowledge of propositions is a more complicated matter" and in the second, "there is something we may call understanding the proposition, which has some affinity to acquaintance but is really much more complicated". Russell appears to have substituted understanding for knowing, and as there is no other explanation of what knowing is, it is reasonable to suggest that knowing is understanding.

Next Russell seems to be moving towards equating understanding with belief. He does say that there is some difference between belief and understanding. This difference is that belief carries with a connotation of affirmation, while understanding does not.

Now when I speak of "understanding a proposition" I am speaking of a state of mind from which both affirmation and negation are wholly absent.64

But Russell dismisses this difference as unimportant to the discussion at hand.

The distinction between understanding and believing is, however, less important for our present purposes than the distinction between understanding and acquaintance.65

These two distinctions are connected by the lack of affirmation which is characteristic of understanding. Russell says that this lack of affirmation appears
to consist of a simple presentation. Presentation would constitute acquaintance, but propositions can not be presented because they are unreal [chapter four]. Therefore the term “acquaintance” is inadequate. This is a minor difference and yet Russell considers the difference between belief and understanding to be less important.

The fact that Russell considered the MRTJ to be a theory of knowledge is important for two reasons. First, it is important to understand the scope of Wittgenstein’s argument. Wittgenstein was not simply attacking an important component of the TK—he was attacking the heart of the TK itself. Even if Sommerville is right that Wittgenstein’s criticisms were devastating to the MRTJ, no one has shown why this would cause Russell to stop writing the TK. It seems unlikely that the elimination of one theory out of the many that appear to comprise the TK would make the entire project untenable.

Similarly no one has shown why Russell might say something as outlandish as: “Wittgenstein has shown me that what wants doing in philosophy is too difficult for me.” No one has given any adequate explanation of Russell’s claim that Wittgenstein’s criticisms “paralysed” him.

These things however are easily understood once we recognise that Russell’s analysis of belief was to be his explanation of knowledge. If Sommerville is right, Wittgenstein’s criticisms would have necessitated either a complete change as to what Russell thought epistemology was, or the admission that he could not give an adequate explanation of epistemology.
Second, it is important to understand that for Russell, in 1914, the MRTJ was the TK because one can not appreciate the nature or intent of the project if one does not understand Russell’s view of what it was that constituted epistemology.

Similarly, one can not appreciate the function or intended nature of the MRTJ if one discounts its greater scope. In 1913-1914 the MRTJ was Russell’s ultimate explanation of how we know. Russell divides epistemology into two parts. The first part of epistemology Russell maintains lies within the proper boundaries of the study of psychology. This part of epistemology would not discuss or introduce any distinctions between true and false. The second part of epistemology does introduce and discusses what Russell calls The distinction between truth and falsehood... And this according to Russell results in questions which are to be answered by the study of philosophy and logic.

It is obvious that much of epistemology is included in psychology. The analysis of experience, the distinctions between sensation, imagination, memory, attention, etc. the nature of belief or judgment, in short all the analytic portion of the subject in so far as it does not introduce the distinction between truth and falsehood, must, I think, be regarded as strictly part of psychology.68

On the other hand, the distinction between truth and falsehood, which is plainly relevenat to the theory of knowledge, would seem to belong to logic, though this is open to some degree of doubt. And in any case, as soon as we reach the theory of judgment, even apart from truth and falsehood, the difficulties encountered are almost
entirely logical, and logical discoveries are required for the progress of the subject.⁵⁷

Russell’s emphasis on the solving of logical problems associated with epistemology and his emphasis on the distinction of truth and falsehood are key to understanding his unorthodox view of epistemology. Russell maintains that the traditional definitions of epistemology or theory of knowledge are inadequate because “knowledge” is an ambiguous word.

Theory of knowledge, or epistemology is more difficult to define. To begin with, no definition can be satisfactory which introduces the word “knowledge”, both because this word is highly ambiguous and because every one of its possible meanings can only be made clear after much epistemological discussion.⁵⁸

The ambiguity of “knowledge” provides a motive for a new definition of theory of knowledge or epistemology. The similarity of the logical analysis of understanding and belief provide a method of redefining epistemology.

The central problem of epistemology is the problem of distinguishing between true and false beliefs, and of finding, in as many regions as possible, criteria of true belief within those regions... We may define epistemology in terms of this problem, as: The analysis of true and false belief and their presuppositions, together with the search for criteria of true belief.⁵⁹
Since epistemology is theory of knowledge and depends upon the analysis of true and false belief propositions—and the MRTJ is Russell’s method of analysing belief propositions—the MRTJ is a theory of knowledge.
Chapter Six

Wittgenstein's Objections

to Russell's

Theory of Knowledge

We come now to the crux of the matter—Wittgenstein's objections. In his essay, "Russell's Multiple Relation Theory of Judgement", Nicholas Griffin maintains that the MRTJ fell because it could not co-exist with the theory of types.

After 1913 Russell abandoned the multiple relation theory, which became one (of the many) more or less innocent victims of type theory.80

Griffin gives Wittgenstein credit for realising that the MRTJ was incapable of supporting Russell's developing philosophy.

The multiple relation theory (more properly a theory of propositions than of belief) and the related doctrine of logical forms had clear roots in Russell's absolute realism. At the same time they were to provide a basis for the transition to the theory of orders. What Wittgenstein realized, and what Russell failed to realize at first, was that they were totally unsuited for that task.81
Yet Russell continued to hold the MRTJ even after Wittgenstein’s criticisms were clear to him. Speaking of the lectures which Russell made in the following year, Eames remarks:

The lectures are of interest in giving a fuller treatment in published form of Russell’s attempt to naturalize some of the ideas of Wittgenstein and to avoid some of the targets of his criticism. It is noteworthy, however, that some form of the multiple relation theory of belief [judgement] is defended in spite of the earlier criticisms.  

In fact Russell continued to present a MRTJ for several years. Was this sheer persistence in the face of Wittgenstein’s overwhelming criticism? Did Russell simply insist that he was right in spite of conclusive or convincing evidence to the contrary? I think not. It may be that Sommerville’s "reconstructed" criticisms are devastating, but there is insufficient evidence to warrant attributing those criticisms to Wittgenstein in 1913. Even if these logical criticisms are valid, Sommerville’s and Griffin’s contention that they caused Russell to shelve the MRTJ are outlandish in view of the fact that evidence linking them to Wittgenstein is almost non-existent. If this reconstructed argument really does have the power attributed to it by Sommerville and Griffin, it would be far more appropriate to say that Sommerville destroyed the MRTJ in 1986 rather than saying that Wittgenstein destroyed the MRTJ in 1913. 

There are several criticisms of the MRTJ. Each seems to be spawned from Wittgenstein’s arguments. Armstrong, Geach and Mackie all claim that the theory
doesn’t work”. Griffin does a convincing job of arguing that such criticism was off the mark because Wittgenstein’s criticisms were not properly understood.

It is the following contention of Griffin that is now the chief detractor of the multiple relation theory and the theory of knowledge: the MRTJ was an innocent victim of the theory of types. If Griffin is right and Wittgenstein’s criticism showed that the MRTJ had to be abandoned, why does Russell nevertheless cling to it? My answer (and my thesis) is that in spite of appearances Russell continued to have faith in the MRTJ and believe that it could be maintained, along with the theory of types, but only if he were to abandon the theory of acquaintance and adopt a form of the theory of neutral monism.

Both Griffin’s claim that other critics misunderstood Wittgenstein’s criticisms and his claim that the MRTJ fell victim to the theory of types are based on a single argument presented in an appendix by Sommerville in his doctoral thesis. We

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1 In “Russell’s Multiple Relation theory of Judgment” in Philosophical Studies 47 1985 (p. 213), Griffin gives the following summary: The Theory [MRTJ] survives as an historical curiosity, rather than a serious philosophical position. Thus, Mackie claims “no one now... takes it very seriously” ([16], 28); and Armstrong holds the theory “unworkable”, saying that it was criticized so effectively by Geach that “it would be wasted labour to go over the ground again” ([1], p.44).

“Griffin, “Russell’s Multiple Relation Theory of Judgment” in Philosophical Studies 47 1985 (p. 245)
should examine this argument*. Sommerville clarifies Wittgenstein's final objection to the nonsense which might arise from Russell's MRTJ.

*Only Sommerville...has pointed out the precise connection between Wittgenstein's "exact" formulation of his objection in his letter and his later published version.**

I contend that Wittgenstein and Russell began to pursue different courses of action in order to solve the problem of acquaintance with complexes after Wittgenstein offered his criticisms. Both men have solutions to Wittgenstein's significance requirement**, but it is Wittgenstein's solution which requires the abandonment of MRTJ. And it is Wittgenstein's path which Sommerville and Griffin follow.

Wittgenstein makes his point of departure clear when he changes the manner in which he speaks about the MRTJ. On July 22 of 1913 Wittgenstein writes:

I am very sorry to hear that my objection to your theory of judgement paralyses you. I think it can only be removed by a correct theory of propositions.***


***Sommerville maintains that Wittgenstein's significance requirement is the same thing as the requirement that nonsense can not be judged, and the same thing as the requirement that from any proposition A believes aRb, aRb v ~aRb must be directly derivable without further premisses. This will be discussed at greater length in the remainder of this Chapter.
Prior to Wittgenstein’s June letter (in which Wittgenstein finally clarifies his objection to some extent), he referred to the multiple relation theory as “our” and the problems associated with it as “our” problems**.

Griffin is correct to point out that the MRTJ is “more properly considered a theory of propositions”. When Wittgenstein says that he thinks that the problem “can only be solved with a correct theory of propositions”, he is in effect saying that Russell needs a new theory of judgement.

There is however no evidence that Russell thought that anything was significantly wrong with the MRTJ. After Wittgenstein’s 1913 arguments were levied, the MRTJ did not occupy a smaller or more limited place in Russell’s philosophy. Rather the theory of acquaintance which began to disappear.” It would appear then that Russell may have believed that Wittgenstein’s objections could be overcome by removing the theory of acquaintance.

In order to understand how deletion of the theory of acquaintance might overcome Wittgenstein’s criticisms, we must take a much closer look at Wittgenstein’s final argument. In June of 1913 Wittgenstein gives Russell an explanation of his objection.

**In his letter to Russell written in the summer of 1912 Wittgenstein says “I believe our problems can be traced to atomic prop[osition]s.” In his next letter dated December 26 1912 he says “I had a long discussion with Frege about our Theory of Symbolism... The complex problem is now clearer to me and I hope very much that I may solve it.” Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore (pp. 16-17)

*In Russell’s 1917 lectures (which became The Philosophy of Logical Atomism [1918]) there is little mention of acquaintance. By the time Analysis of Mind (1921) was published, acquaintance was wholly absent.
I can now express my objection to your theory of judgement exactly: I believe it is obvious that, from the proposition "A judges that (say) a is in the relation R to b", if correctly analysed, the proposition "Ra v ~Ra" must follow directly without the use of any other premiss. This condition is not fulfilled by your theory.66

The above passage will be referred to as the "final argument" for the sake of clarity and easy reference and because this argument was the final instalment of Wittgenstein's criticism of the TK.

In September of 1913 Wittgenstein restates his objection in less mechanical language.

Every right theory of judgment must make it impossible for me to judge that "this table penholders the book". (Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement)...a proper theory of judgment must make it impossible to judge nonsense.66

This view was also expressed in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, published in 1921. In section 5.5422 of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein says the following:

The correct explanation of the form of the proposition, "A makes the judgement p", must show that it is impossible for a judgement to be a piece of nonsense. (Russell's theory does not satisfy this requirement.)67
Sommerville shows the connection between this formulation forbidding nonsense or requiring that nonsense be forbidden, and Wittgenstein's more formal presentation of his final argument.

Wittgenstein's claim that "from any proposition A believes aRb, aRb v ~aRb must be derivable without further premisses", alludes to a section of the Principia Mathematica where Russell and Whitehead explicitly define significant propositions as those propositions which are capable of being either true or false. This definition allows Whitehead and Russell to demonstrate *13.3 of the Principia Mathematica, which in turn allows them to demonstrate in *20.81 that any two types which have a common member are identical. In the note preceding *13.3 Russell and Whitehead write the following:

The following proposition is useful in the theory of types. Its purpose is to show that, if "a" is any argument for which "φa" is significant, i.e. for which we have "φa v ~φa", then "φx" is significant when, and only when, "x" is either identical with "a" or not identical with "a". It follows (as will be proved in *20.81) that, if "φx" and "ψx" are both significant, the class of values of "x" for which "φx" is significant is the same as the class of those for which "ψx" is significant, i.e. two types which have a common member are identical."

*13.3. ⊢ φa v ~φa ⊇ φx ≡ x=a v x≠a
*20.81 ⊢ φa v ~φa ψa v ~ψa ⊇ x(φx v ~φx)
    = x(ψx v ~ψx)
But a function of the form demonstrated in *13.3 is only possible if "φa" and "~φa" are of the same type. (This requirement presents no problem here because we are only dealing with one variable "a" and therefore only one type.) This requirement is due to the demonstration employed in *9.61 which allows Russell and Whitehead to establish functions of the sort demonstrated in *13.3.

If ψx and φx are elementary functions of the same type, there is a function ψx v φx. By *9.14, there is an a for which "φa" and therefore "ψa", are significant, and therefore so is "ψa v φa", by the primitive idea of disjunction...

The same proof holds for functions of any number of variables.69

It must be noted that the passage above states that if elementary functions are of the same type then the complex is significant, and that "the same proof holds for functions of any number of variables." Therefore *13.3 can be transformed into a dyadic function, but if this new function is to be significant, its elementary component functions must be of the same type. Converting *13.3 into a two-variable relation, we get the following:

\[
|- :: aRb v ~aRb. C :xRy v ~xRy. \equiv :
\]

\[
x=a . y=b . v . x\neq a . y=b . v . x=a . y\neq b . v . x\neq a . y\neq b
\]

Griffin explains this implication in the following manner:
What this amounts to is the following: If "aRb" is significant then "xRy" is significant iff "x" and "y" are either identical or not identical to "a" and "b". The proposition is used in Principia in proving that any two types with a common member are identical (*20.81).70

According to Sommerville this is where the problem lies. In order for this dyadic function to be significant, the antecedent of the conditional must be what Sommerville calls "satisfied": for the antecedent "aRb v ~aRb" to be satisfied, "a" and "b" must be of the same type, and "aRb v ~aRb" must follow directly from what is being judged. Sommerville contends that if "a" and "b" are not of the same type and if "aRb v ~aRb" does not follow directly from "aRb", then the antecedent could be satisfied even if the consequent were false. If the consequent of the function were false, the function would be true no matter what the status of the antecedent of the function. And since a significant proposition is defined (by Russell) as being any proposition which is true or false, it would not be necessary to prohibit insignificance.

But this solution offers no hope for Russell. If the consequent is false, contradictions arise. This means that "a" and "b" cannot be significantly related because they imply contradictions. The consequent is itself a biconditional, and thus in order for the consequent to be false, one of the components of the biconditional must be false:

\[ xRb v ~xRb. \equiv :x=a . y=b . v . x\neq a . y=b . v . x=a . y\neq b \]
It is impossible for "aRb v ~aRb" to be false. Thence, if the biconditional consequent is to be false, "x=a . y=b . v. x≠a . y=b . v. x≠a . y=b". must be false— but this requires the falsity of each disjunct. In this case, there would be no items "a" or "b", to be related in any fashion ("aRb" or "~aRb"). Therefore, the antecedent cannot be satisfied.

Russell is now stuck with the requirements that "aRb v ~aRb" must follow directly from the judgement "aRb" (that is "a is related to b"), and that "a" and "b" are of the same type, without further premisses. As shown above, these requirements must be met in order to demonstrate the significance of "a" and "b" and therefore the judgement "aRb". Therefore, Wittgenstein's final argument expressed in his letter to Russell in June of 1913, and his later complaints in "Notes on Logic" and *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, that Russell's theory did not prevent the judgement of nonsense, are in fact different formulations of the same objection.

Because Russell had dealt with Wittgenstein's earlier criticisms (as shown in the previous chapter) and because the criticisms that "nonsense must not be judged" and "from "aRb", "aRb v ~aRb" must be directly derivable" are the same objection, Russell now had only one significant problem to overcome. This problem was Wittgenstein's final argument.

That "aRb v ~aRb" must be derived from the judgement aRb without further premisses dictates that the significance and similarity of type, of "a" and "b" must
be established through analysis of the complex alone. Russell's analysis of the complex "A" judges "aRb" is:

\[ J\{A, a, b, R, x\varphi y}\]

This represents: "A" judges that "a" is related by relation "R" to "b" and this relation is of the logical form "x\varphi y".

One of the component terms of this analysis must be able to convey the notion of the significance of "a" and "b" in order for Russell's analysis to withstand Wittgenstein's objection. "A" is not an option because "A" is the "judger"—"A" is represented as understanding the relation. This understanding is supposed to come from being acquainted with the other terms of the relation. Any understanding of the relation which is somehow derived from "A" requires further judgements and therefore further premisses. "a" and "b" are supposed to be simples, which cannot be further analysed. Russell has represented "R" as a nameable item of acquaintance—it is a term of the same sort as "a" and "b". For "S" 's judgement that "aRb", Griffin describes the problem in the following manner:

\[ B(S,a,R,b,\alpha)\], where \( \alpha \) is the form of an elementary dyadic complex. Does this ensure that aRb is significant? The answer is not without further premisses. For we need to stipulate that a and b are indeed individuals, that R is a first-order relation and that \( \alpha \) is the form of a first-order dyadic complex. Why won't Wittgenstein allow us these stipulations? Because to make them would require further judgments.\]
Therefore we cannot be acquainted with any complexes because even the most simple sorts of complexes require that their constituents are significant. And it is impossible to determine significance without additional premisses. The only component of Russell's analysis which appears to be capable of establishing the significance of "aRb" is the logical form.

But in order that we might be able to understand the logical form, Russell was forced into maintaining that logical form, too, is an item of acquaintance. But this will not work according to Griffin because (as stated above) we need to stipulate that the symbol for form represents the form of a first-order dyadic complex. This stipulation is an "extra premise".

The nature of Wittgenstein's final argument (the only one which is of any significant force) is that it will not permit the inclusion of "extra premisses" in order to understand the proposition. The addition of further premisses violates Wittgenstein's restriction that from "S" judges "aRb", "aRb v ~aRb" "must follow directly without any further premisses".

The most elementary component of the TK, therefore, is now inconsistent with and incapable of supporting the overall project. There are at least two different solutions to this problem.

Clearly, the MRTJ and TACQ are in conflict with one another, and one of them is in conflict with certain theorems of the Principia. Griffin and Sommerville both seem to imply that we cannot be acquainted with complexes because of some defect in the MRTJ. This seems like a strange conclusion (particularly when it is
acquaintance which Russell begins to remove from his epistemology—not the MRTJ).

It seems more likely that it is a defect in TACQ which is responsible for its own inability to handle acquaintance with complexes (or at the very least that this is a possible interpretation and it is probably the interpretation to which Russell subscribed).
Chapter Seven

Does the Eventual Fall of the Theory of Types

Hinder the Theory of Knowledge?

It must be recognised that Wittgenstein’s views eventually had a very great impact on Russell’s theory of types. He was to a large extent responsible for the dismantling of the theory types. Even though this happened long after Wittgenstein presented his objection to TK, these objections were probably the basis for his latter criticisms of the theory of types.

With this in mind Wittgenstein might still be credited with destroying the theory of knowledge if the theory of types was an essential component of the theory of knowledge. It is widely held that with regard to the MRTJ the theory of types is primarily necessary to restrict the judgment of nonsensical beliefs."

Wrinch, Black and Blackwell all think that the objection can be met by imposing conditions on the judging relation restricting the types of items which can fill its second and subsequent argument places. Wrinch is alone in noting that there are already type restrictions on the terms of the judging relation—in this it doesn’t differ from any other relation of Russell’s formal system. It is clear such

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restrictions could be used to ensure that nonsense could not be judged, were it desirable to ensure this.\textsuperscript{72}

Griffin shows why it appears that the theory of types is necessary to prohibit the judgement of nonsense and offers an alternative to avoid the use of the theory of types in this manner. He proposes that nonsense is and can be judged and that Russell ought not to forbid it. Griffin then shows why this avenue is not open to Russell.

Why not simply allow nonsense to be believed as, I've suggested, it very often is. This route was not open to Russell, because it is built into Russell's view of propositions that they are either true or false, and these are significant. We now see immediately why Russell cannot permit belief (or even doubt) in nonsense. In fact, nonsense cannot be the product of any multiple relation of propositional attitude, for, if it were, the product would be a nonsensical proposition, and this, since all propositions are significant, is impossible... Consequently the propositions which emerge will not be regimented by type theory.\textsuperscript{73}

In other words, if Russell allowed nonsense to be believed, then he would have no way of avoiding nonsensical propositions, and according to Russell propositions must be significant, therefore they cannot be nonsensical. Griffin makes no query into the possibility that nonsense might be avoided by some means other than the theory of types.
Griffin then goes on to investigate whether the theory of types could be introduced at a more fundamental level in order to prohibit nonsensical judgements before they are formulated and therefore before they are believed.

The only thing more fundamental than the multiple relation of understanding is the notion of acquaintance. If type theory could be brought in at the level of acquaintance then the multiple relation theory could utilize type distinctions and block nonsensical judgements. As Sommerville ([35], p 707) points out, we cannot be acquainted with type differences. For, as noted, every logical object is a summum genus, and every act of acquaintance with a logical object is of a different logical type to an act of acquaintance with a different logical object. Thus there can be no single act of acquaintance with two different logical objects, and thus no single act of acquaintance which takes in objects of two logical types (for such acquaintance would not itself be of any determinate logical type). [4]

Here both Griffin and Sommerville are very close to the actual effect of Wittgenstein’s criticisms—the inability of the theory of types to support the theory of acquaintance. By discharging acquaintance and opting for neutral monism, Russell is free to apply the theory of types, because neutral monism allows Russell to maintain that there is a can be a single image of two or more objects at the most fundamental level of understanding, as shown in the previous chapter.

Russell makes virtually no mention of the theory of types in TK. He maintains in the latter sections of Part Two that rules are necessary to govern how we may analyse complex terms. But once the notion of complex terms (in the building
block sense of the theory of acquaintance) is eliminated, with the elimination of acquaintance, the theory of types is no longer necessary to support the notion of complex terms because they do not exist in the neutral monistic doctrine (as was shown in Chapter Two of this thesis).

Russell makes little mention of the problem of contradiction in TK. It might be argued that because Russell did not discuss the problem of contradiction in TK because this problem was not one that was relevant to the theory of knowledge. This view however seems to be somewhat unlikely since the problem of contradictions is very closely related to the problem of judging nonsense and Russell is very much opposed to allowing nonsense to be judged.

Russell’s introduction of the term "form" (in TK) and the notions of "form of a complex" as well as "form of a relation" were all primarily in response to Wittgenstein’s claim that we ought not to be able to judge nonsense: a claim with which Russell agreed.

In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1918) devotes an entire chapter to the theory of types and symbolism. In that chapter Russell refers to contradictions as essentially bits of nonsense*. Russell’s view of a contradiction (as it applies here) is that it is the result of proposition of the sort that one mistakes as a class containing the class itself as a member of itself. The theory of types serves to prohibit such mistakes and their resulting nonsense.

*Bertrand Russell, Philosophy of Logical Atomism
That has to do with the fact that classes, as I shall be coming on to show, are incomplete symbols in the same sense in which the descriptions are that I was talking of last time; you are talking nonsense when you ask yourself whether a class is or is not a member of itself, because in any full statement of what is meant by a proposition which seems to be about a class, you will find that the class is not mentioned at all and that there is nothing about a class in that statement."

Russell's introduction of the theory of types into *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* is due to his effort to undermine the judgement of nonsense". Since most of the rest of *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* is contained or discussed in the TK, it would appear that Russell ought to have included the theory of types in the TK as well.

The fact that he did not mention the theory of types in the TK is perhaps the result of an absent Part Three of the Manuscript. Types are discussed in the next to last chapter of *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* and since the latter part of the theory of knowledge is incomplete, perhaps Russell would have included it had he chosen to finish the manuscript. It must be noted however, that there is no mention of types or the theory of types in Russell's outline for Part Three of the manuscript.

Still a discussion of the theory of types and contradictions might have been fitted in the proposed chapter three, entitled "Inference—Valid and Invalid, Logical

"Chapter VII *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* seems to introduce the discussion of contradictions and theory of types in order to deal with the problem of the judgement of nonsense."

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and Psychological." Or it may have been that Russell found an alternative method of handling contradictions, though this is an unlikely suggestion since Russell is still advocating type theory three years later in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.

It is possible however that Russell was developing alternative methods of dealing with the problems of contradiction and judging nonsense. Whether or not this was the case, the most promising method of eliminating problems of contradiction and prohibiting the judgement of nonsense lies in an extension of the concept of form and the process of "analysing out" classes as incomplete symbols, as exemplified by the "present King of France is bald" example. But Russell did not pursue this option.

The Philosophy of Logical Atomism is a turning point in Russell's thought*, a point at which Wittgenstein had an undeniable affect and influence. But this was an influence which spurred adjustment and refinement rather than imposing stagnation. In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism one can see Russell grappling with Wittgenstein's criticism of the theory of knowledge--criticisms which generated a conflict in Russell between the theory of types and an extended theory of form.

This conflict is perhaps accentuated because of the nature of the book. It is composed of chapters representing individual lectures in a series of lectures on

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*Russell gives Wittgenstein credit for showing him various ideas or notions, as on p. 46. Here too Russell first begins to move towards neutral monism, "I [Russell] think more and more that it [neutral monism] may be true..." p. 153.
Logical Atomism. Part of the lectures were devoted to answering questions from the audience, and it is no doubt that it is this forum which is responsible for allowing us a particular insight into the transition of Russell's thought which was occurring at this time.

In the *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, Russell seems to be leaning away from neutral monism. He states that he sees two reasons in favour of the theory of neutral monism. The first is that it exemplifies Occam's Razor. He describes the second reason as "perhaps somewhat frivolous."

The other reason—perhaps a somewhat frivolous one—is that every diminution in the number of entities increases the amount of work for mathematical logic to do in building up things that look like the entities you used to assume. Therefore the whole theory of neutral monism is pleasing to me, but I do find so far very great difficulty in believing it.\(^7\)

Near the end of *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* Russell seems to be leaning in the opposite direction—in favour of neutral monism.

Having said that, I ought to proceed to tell you that I have discovered whether neutral monism is true or not, because otherwise you may not believe that logic is any use in the matter. But I do not profess to know whether it is true or not. I fell more and more inclined to think that it may be true. I fell more and more that the difficulties that occur in regard to it are all of the sort that may be solved by ingenuity.\(^7\)
A similar transition seems to be taking place with regard to the theory of types. While Russell is explaining how the theory of types prohibits contradictions and their arising nonsense he also says that the form of a contradiction might be translated in such a way that the contradiction disappears, eliminating a mistake caused by a muddle of grammar.

It is absolutely necessary, if a statement about a class is to be significant and not pure nonsense, that it should be capable of being translated into a form in which it does not mention the class at all. This sort of statement, "Such-and-such a class is or is not a member of itself", will not be capable of that kind of translation. It is analogous to what I was saying about descriptions: the symbol for a class is an incomplete symbol; it does not really stand for part of the propositions in which symbolically it occurs, but in the right analysis of those propositions that symbol has been broken up and disappeared.78

Thus it would seem that the stress which Russell puts on explaining contradictions dictates that TK requires some replacement for the theory of types. It would also appear that such a replacement might be developed from Russell’s notion of "incomplete descriptions". Contradictions might be "analysed out" by recognising that classes themselves are incomplete symbols. Perhaps one might revive the bulk of Russell’s TK by pursuing this option.
Chapter Eight

Conclusion

Recent work which was either primarily concerned with the logical dialogue (Sor.:merville) between Wittgenstein and Russell or has been based on work which was primarily concerned with the mathematical dialogue (Griffin) between Wittgenstein and Russell has largely refuted the older and more standard reasons for assuming that Wittgenstein caused the demise of the TK, while at the same time they have created new and more detailed reasons for making the same assumption.

But because this new evidence (the reconstruction of Wittgenstein's arguments) issued from an investigation of how Wittgenstein had affected Russell's mathematical thought, the tie between Wittgenstein's criticisms and Russell's TK is tenuous. Wittgenstein's criticisms are tethered to the TK by only two slender threads.

The first of these threads is the mathematical overlap of the theory of knowledge with those portions of the *Principia Mathematica* which were affected by Wittgenstein's arguments. There are many ideas expressed in the theory of knowledge which are based on the *Principia Mathematica*, however there is only one idea which is important to the TK, and is affected by Wittgenstein's
mathematical attack: the theory of types. While the theory of types is not mentioned in the uncompleted manuscript, it is (or some replacement for it) necessary in two instances.

The first of the instances is that of the employment of logical form in conjunction with the theory of acquaintance. Here the theory of types is necessary in order to distinguish between atomic complexes and atomic simples. But as shown in Chapter Four, the replacement of the theory of acquaintance with a theory of neutral monism eliminates the need for a "rule mandated" distinction between atomic complexes and atomic simples.

Chapter Seven details the reasons why type theory or some replacement for it is necessary in order to handle contradictions. And in Chapter Seven it was suggested that the theory of types may actually be superfluous in the attempt to account for contradictions and that they could be explained and accounted for by extending the use of the process of atomic analysis and the correspondence theory of truth. Both of these notions are clearly employed in the theory of knowledge already, so their use in solving the problem of contradictions is not a significant departure from the manuscript. In addition, this approach was hinted at in the Principia Mathematica by Russell and Whitehead and was employed in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus by Wittgenstein.

The second thread which ties TK to Wittgenstein's criticisms is Russell's statement that the two are related. All of the currently respected evidence is derived from this connection. Russell's confession that Wittgenstein presented
him with an argument that was so devastating that Russell knew he would never again be able to do fundamental work in philosophy licenses the extremely speculative process of reconstructing Wittgenstein’s “devastating argument” from bits of logical blurbs that Wittgenstein passed to Russell in a series of letters. Without Russell’s confessions there is no reason to suppose that Wittgenstein destroyed the theory of knowledge and therefore there is no reason to speculate on the nature or type of argument that could have been so devastating.

In Chapter Two we found that both the sincerity of Russell’s confessions and the topic to which they referred are somewhat doubtful. Once these confessions are brought into doubt, the second thread that ties TK to Wittgenstein’s arguments is severed. Sommerville’s reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s arguments as they relate to Russell’s mathematics may still be valid. But, as stated above, the only tie between Russell’s mathematics and the theory of knowledge which was effected by Wittgenstein’s arguments was the theory of types. And we have already discounted the importance of the theory of types to TK.

Wittgenstein also discounts the importance of the theory of types by showing that the theory of types is superfluous.

3.333 The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself.

*Sommerville admits that his reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s arguments is "extremely speculative" and that it is based on the "meagrest evidence".
For let us suppose that the function $F(fx)$ could be its own argument: in that case there would be a proposition $F(F(fx))$, in which the outer function $F$ and the inner function $F$ must have different meanings, since the inner one has the form $\phi(fx)$ and the outer one has the form $\psi(\phi(fx))$. Only the letter $F$ is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself signifies nothing.

This immediately becomes clear if instead of $F(Fu)$ we write $(\exists \phi): F(\phi u) \cdot \phi u = Fu$.

That disposes of Russell’s paradox.\(^7\)

Lastly the TK was not destroyed by Wittgenstein. Its component parts can be found in Russell’s writings written and published after Wittgenstein’s criticisms were levied. This I believe could be demonstrated by a careful comparison of the texts of the manuscript with the texts of The Philosophy of Logical Atomism and The Analysis of Mind, as well as other related articles.

One problem would plague such a comparison. The third part of the manuscript was not completed. This problem, however, might be overcome by reconstructing what such a text might look like, by utilising the outline which Russell gives and by recognising the close connection of Russell’s earlier mathematical work. This connection can be easily demonstrated as is shown in Appendix B of this thesis. By comparing the mathematical work with the outline one would have a basis for picking out work written after Wittgenstein’s arguments that might have been included in the manuscript. A successful comparison of the first two sections of the manuscript with "Post-Wittgensteinian"
theory of knowledge would suggest that the third part of the manuscript was also incorporated into Russell's later writings.

Unfortunately, this project would demand a thesis in its own right. Nevertheless, I have begun the project and included this partial and preliminary effort in Appendix C.

In light of the evidence presented above, it is reasonable to conclude that the widely held view that Wittgenstein caused the demise of Russell's theory of knowledge is incorrect. Further, the Griffin's claim that "the theory knowledge was an innocent victim of type theory" is not warranted.
APPENDIX A

The Development of Russell’s
Early Mathematical Thought

When one makes the attempt to reconstruct the development of a philosopher’s thought one is frequently impeded by lost texts, translations which may have lost there accuracy through conversion from one language to another over hundreds or even thousands of years, texts whose authorship is uncertain at best, and convoluted arguments that somehow manage to foster vagueness and obscurity out of their very length and attention to detail. But Wittgenstein presents us with the opposite and unlikely problem of extreme brevity. So much so that Russell was constantly requesting clarifications and further articulations on Wittgenstein’s ideas.

Russell, however, confronts us with none of these problems. He was more than willing and able to detail his thought both in a clear and relatively straightforward fashion and in the technically precise method of formal logic. Virtually the only exception to this is his published views on belief. And even in this case much can be extrapolated from his manuscript notes and published writings. The only problem one has when dealing with Russell is wading through the abundant material of an unusually long and productive life. Russell not only gives us his philosophy and tells us how it evolved, but he also tells us what he was thinking,
what drove him, what caused him to change his mind and what caused him to
rejoice and despair. True, what one writes about oneself is necessarily somewhat
cclouded by what one wishes to write. Nevertheless, Russell's Autobiography is
ccharacterised by the disclosure of incidents and thoughts which convey a sense
of honesty to the reader. And from the detail that Russell provides us, we can
infer some of the possible causes of the torment which resulted from
Wittgenstein’s argument.

Russell says that from the age of eleven he was fascinated by mathematics.

This was the first time it dawned on me that I might have
some intelligence. From that moment until Whitehead and
I finished Principia Mathematica, when I was thirty-eight,
mathematics was my chief interest and my chief source
of happiness. Like all happiness it, however, it was
unalloyed. I had been told that Euclid proved things, and
was much disappointed that he started with axioms. At
first I refused to accept them unless my brother could
offer me some reason for doing so, but he said: "If you
don’t accept them we cannot go on", and as I wished to
going on, I reluctantly admitted them pro tem.50

This reluctance to accept mathematical axioms was part of what spurred
Russell into writing the Principles of Mathematics, which was intended to show
that mathematics and logic were essentially one in the same. This book was
written in 1900 and published in 1903. In it Russell maintained that all
mathematical expressions are in fact reducible to some logical proposition whose
main operator is either formal or material implication.
We require, then, in the propositional calculus, no indefinables except the two kinds of implication—remembering, however, that formal implication is a complex notion, whose analysis remains to be undertaken.  

Russell begins by providing a definition of pure mathematics.

Pure mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form "p implies q," where p and q are propositions containing one or more variables, the same in the two propositions, and neither p nor q contains any constants except logical constants. And logical constants are all notions definable in terms of the following: Implication, the relation of a term to a class of which it is a member, the notion of "such that", the notion of relation, and such further notions as may be involved in the general notion of propositions of the above form. In addition to these, mathematics uses a notion which is not a constituent of the propositions which it considers, namely the notion of truth.  

By basing mathematics on logic, Russell could eliminate the need for axioms which stand alone offering no proof for their own validity—except of course that they allow one to solve problems. Logic is based on two indefinables and ten axioms (rules governing how implication propositions may be manipulated).  

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"Russell later reduce the axioms still further with Sir Alfred North Whitehead in the Principia Mathematica."
From what has now been said, the reader will perceive that the present work has to fulfil two objects, first, to show that all mathematics follows from symbolic logic, and secondly to discover, as far as possible, what are the principles of symbolic logic itself. 

The particular notions which appear in the propositions of symbolic logic, and all others definable in terms of these notions, are the logical constants. The number of indefinable logical constants is not great: it appears, in fact, to be eight or nine. These notions alone form the subject-matter of the whole of mathematics: no others, except such as are definable in terms of the original eight or nine, occur anywhere in Arithmetic, Geometry, or rational Dynamics. 

It was Russell’s intent to try to give mathematics a firm foundation by basing it on the most fundamental axioms of logic. And you cannot do the logic if you don’t accept its axioms. Nevertheless, Russell reduced a plethora of axioms down to a few axioms. In Principles of Mathematics, Russell lists ten of these axioms.

Thus the number of indemonstrable propositions may be capable of further reduction, and in regard to some of them I know of no grounds for regarding them as indemonstrable except that they have hitherto remained undemonstrated. 18. The ten axioms are the following. (1) If \( p \) implies \( q \), then \( p \) implies \( q \); in other words, whatever \( p \) and \( q \) may be, \( "p \) implies \( q" \) is a proposition. (2) If \( p \) implies \( q \), then \( p \) implies \( p \); in other words whatever implies
anything is a proposition. (3) If \( p \) implies \( q \) then \( q \) implies \( q \); in other words whatever is implied by anything is a proposition. (4) A true hypothesis in an implication may be dropped and the consequent asserted. This is a principle incapable of formal symbolic statement, and illustrating the essential limitations of formalism... Before proceeding further it is desirable to define the joint assertion of two propositions, or what is called their logical product... It is as follows: If \( p \) implies \( p \), then, if \( q \) implies \( q \), \( pq \) (the logical product of \( p \) and \( q \)) means that if \( p \) implies that \( q \) implies \( r \), then \( r \) is true. In other words, if \( p \) and \( q \) are propositions, their faint assertion is equivalent to saying that every proposition is true which is such that the first implies that the second implies it...

We can now state the six main principles of inference, to each of which, owing to its importance a name can be given; of these all except the last will be found in Peano’s accounts of the subject. (5) If \( p \) implies \( p \) and \( q \) implies \( q \), then \( pq \) implies \( p \). This is called simplification... (6) If \( p \) implies \( q \) and \( q \) implies \( r \), then \( p \) implies \( r \). This will be called the syllogism. (7) If \( q \) implies \( q \) and \( r \) implies \( r \), and if \( p \) implies that \( q \) implies \( r \), then \( pq \) implies \( r \). This is the principle of importation... (8) If \( p \) implies \( p \) and \( q \) implies \( q \), then if \( pq \) implies \( r \), then \( p \) implies that \( q \) implies \( r \). This is the converse of the preceding principle, and is called exportation. (9) If \( p \) implies \( q \) and \( p \) implies \( r \), the \( p \) implies \( qr \): in other words, a proposition which implies each of two propositions implies them both. This is called the principle of composition. (10) If \( p \) implies \( p \) and \( q \) implies \( q \), then \( "p \) implies \( q \)" implies \( p \) implies \( q \). This is called the principle of reduction. 55

Russell regards this reduction in the number of axioms as a great improvement, drawing on the principle of Occam’s Razor which one can find Russell citing in virtually every one of his publications, no matter what the main topic of the publication might concern.
In spite of the fact that Russell was pleased with the eventual form of *Principles of Mathematics*, he found it to be much more difficult and involved than he had expected.

I thought the work was nearly finished, but in the month of May I had an intellectual set-back almost as severe as the emotional set-back which I had in February. Cantor had a proof that there is no greatest cardinal number, and it seemed to me that the number of all the things in the world ought to be the greatest possible...This led me to consider those classes which are not members of themselves, and to ask whether the class of such classes is or is not a member of itself. I found that either answer implies its contradictory.\textsuperscript{66}

It seemed unworthy of a grown man to spend his time on such trivialities, but what was I to do? There was something wrong, since such contradictions were unavoidable on ordinary premisses. Trivial or not, the matter was a challenge. Throughout the latter half of 1901 I supposed the solution would be easy, but by the end of that time I had concluded that it was a big job. I therefore decided to finish *The Principles of Mathematics*, leaving the solution in abeyance.\textsuperscript{67}

Russell notifies the reader of this problem in the *Principles of Mathematics* in a chapter, called "The Contradiction".

Russell and Alfred North Whitehead present their solution to the contradiction problem in *Principia Mathematica*, an enormous undertaking which contains logical proofs for the many claims made in *Principles of Mathematics*. This book
required their joint efforts over a ten year period from 1900 until 1910, and Russell says that their notes had to be hauled off to the publisher in the bed of a pick-up truck. The Theory of Logical Types is presented in second chapter of the Introduction, and it is this theory that Russell and Whitehead believed would solve the contradiction problem.

A very large part of the labour involved in writing the present work [Principia Mathematica] has been expended on the contradictions and paradoxes which have infected logic and theory of aggregates. We have examined a great number of hypotheses for dealing with these contradictions; many such hypotheses have been advanced by others, and about as many have been invented by ourselves. Sometimes it has cost us several months’ work to convince ourselves that a hypotheses was untenable. In the course of such a prolonged study, we have been led, as was to be expected, to modify our views from time to time; but it gradually became evident to us that some form of the doctrine of types must be adopted if the contradictions were to be avoided.  

That the Theory of Logical Types is located at the beginning of the Principia Mathematica may or may not be of any significance, but from the above passage it is clear that they considered the theory of types to be a very important aspect of the project. Russell makes this still clearer in his autobiography.

I was trying hard to solve the contradictions mentioned above. Every morning I would sit down before a blank sheet of paper. Throughout the day, with a brief interval for lunch, I would stare at the blank sheet of paper. We spent our winters in London, and during the winters I did
not attempt to work, but the two summers of 1903 and 1904 remain in my mind as a period of complete intellectual deadlock. It was clear to me that I could not get on without solving the contradictions, and I was determined that no difficulty should turn me aside from the completion of *Principia Mathematica*, but it seemed that the whole of the rest of my life might be consumed in looking at the blank sheet of paper.\(^9\)

In 1906 I discovered the Theory of Types. After this it only remained to write the book out.\(^9\)

It is easy to see how important Russell considered the Theory of Types to be to the *Principia Mathematica*, and how important both were to his state of mind.

We thus earned minus 50 pounds each by ten years’ work. This beats the record of *Paradise Lost*.

The strain of unhappiness combined with very severe intellectual work, in the years from 1902 till 1910, was very great. At the time I often wondered whether I should ever come out at the other end of the tunnel in which I seemed to be. I used to stand on the footbridge at Kennington, near Oxford watching the trains go by, and determining that tomorrow I would place myself under one of them. But when the morrow came I always found myself hoping that perhaps *Principia Mathematica* would be finished some day.\(^9\)

So I persisted, and in the end the work was finished, but my intellect never quite recovered from the strain. I have been ever since definitely less capable of dealing with difficult abstractions than I was before.\(^2\)
Russell calls the work on the *Principles of Mathematics* his "magnum opus" and says the following about his trouble solving the contradictions.

So difficult it was, that to think of it [producing the *Principia Mathematica*] all required an all but superhuman effort. And long ago I got sick to nausea of the whole subject, so that I longed to think of anything else under the sun; and the sheer fatigue has become almost incapacitating.  

Abstract work, if one wishes to do it well, must be allowed to destroy one's humanity; one raises a monument which is at the same time a tomb, in which voluntarily, one slowly interns oneself.

Obviously, Russell was so attached to this work that anything that would have impaired or destroyed it would have caused him tremendous difficulty. He admits to a certain paranoia concerning the *Principia* manuscript.

The manuscript became more and more vast, and every time that I went out for a walk I used to be afraid that the house would catch fire and the manuscript get burned up.
This fear must have caused considerable worry as Russell had made it a practice since boyhood to go out for a walk every day. Since Wittgenstein’s criticism really attacked the theory of types one can not help but wonder if it sparked the same sort of fear.
APPENDIX B

The Overlap Between Russell's
Mathematical and Philosophical ideas

After the completion of the *Principia Mathematica* Russell did not immediately begin to focus his attention on the theory of knowledge and the nature of mind. He had some unfinished business which he attended to first. Russell had originally intended to develop what he thought would be a better groundwork for physics. This project was delayed however, because he soon found that it could not be completed without solving some mathematical problems first. And to do this he needed a better logical apparatus. Hence, *Principia Mathematica*.

"The problem of matter", or "matter" for short, was Russell's usual way of referring to the problem of providing philosophical foundations for physics. His interest in this problem was first aroused shortly after he had finished work on his Fellowship dissertation for Trinity College, which was published in 1897 as *An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry*. He planned to follow this book with one on the philosophy of physics. "Sixteen years ago now I stated gaily on the philosophy of matter," he wrote Lady Ottoline in 1913, "and after a year I found there were a few preliminaries to be settled, which have taken all my time till now. Now I have the necessary groundwork at last. In matters of work my life has had very great continuity and unconscious unity" (#695, pmk. 8 Feb.). The "few preliminaries", thus ironically described, consisted in that investigation of the philosophical foundations of mathematics which he and Whitehead had provided in *Principia Mathematica*.90
That Russell states: "in matters of work my life has had very great continuity and unconscious unity", is a telling observation. His mathematics builds out of his logic, his physics builds out of his mathematics and his theory of knowledge builds out of all three. Russell believed that psychology would eventually be reduced down to concepts of physics.

This gap would be filled in later by others. Russell was very conscious of the communal intellect if not communal effort that shapes theories and eventually forms them into what can be regarded as concrete knowledge.

The TK was an attempt to bridge the bit gap between the works of William James, Meinong, and himself and Whitehead. It is a marriage of psychological concepts with logical concepts. This is illustrated well by Russell's outline for a course description of Theory of Knowledge—preserved in Russell's own hand. He divides the necessary apparatus into logical and psychological. He divides the data of knowledge into sensible and logical.

Theory of Knowledge

Criticism of current theories: idealism, the pragmatist theory of truth, Bergson's "intuition" and "intellect". Logical apparatus: simples and complexes, relations, particulars and universals, truth and falsehood. Psychological apparatus: Acquaintance, belief, analysis, self-evidence. The data of knowledge: (a) sensible, (b) logical. The nature of consciousness and the varieties of
realism. our knowledge of space, time, and matter. Induction. Causality. 97

The formulation of this theory would be his second great work. The TK would combine the elements of modern psychology with modern logic. Russell found aspects of William James's Neutral Monism philosophy rather appealing. He pays homage to James in several of his publications. Nevertheless, Russell is not satisfied with its accuracy. He maintains that many of the problems with James and virtually every other philosopher are the result the misleading grammar which is inherent in all of the conventional spoken languages. The solution to this problem is the development of a proper symbolism. Just as Russell used logic to resolve his quest for a better mathematics, he sees in logic the preciseness necessary to eliminate the problems of philosophy.

The sort of contradictions about which I shall be speaking in connection with types in a later lecture all arise from mistakes in symbolism, from putting one sort of symbol in the place where another sort of symbol ought to be. Some of the notions that have been thought absolutely fundamental in philosophy have arisen I believe entirely through mistakes as to symbolism—e.g. the notion of existence, or if you like, reality. Those two notions stand for a great deal of what has been discussed in philosophy...Now my own belief is that as they have occurred in philosophy they have been entirely the outcome of a muddle about symbolism, and that when you have cleared up that muddle, you find that practically everything that has been said about existence is sheer and simple mistake, and that is all you can say about it. 98
We see from the beginning of this passage that Russell finds it difficult to talk about contradictions, without also talking about types. This is particularly interesting since Wittgenstein may well have accused Russell's Theory of Types as being "entirely the outcome of a muddle about symbolism." It is the intent of the TK to provide the proper symbolism for the analysis of propositions. This is also the fundamental concern of The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. Russell finds in his previous work convenient and useful key notions which translate well into philosophy, if one is to analyse it through logic. In fact in Russell's manuscript notes for The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, published as Volume VIII of The Collected Papers of Bertrand Russell, he makes specific reference to the Principia Mathematica as the basis for certain concepts.

This is one reason why you must distinguish a unit-class from its only member. Another is that, if you do not, you will find that the class is a member of itself which is objectionable, as we saw earlier in this lecture. I have omitted a subtlety connected with the fact that two formally equivalent functions may be of different types. For the way of treating this point, see Principia Mathematica *20, and Introduction, Chapter III. 69

This passage is also reprinted exactly in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (p. 139.) Another crucial carry-over from the Principles of Mathematics and Principia Mathematica is the principle of Occam's Razor. In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism Russell says of the maxim of Occam's Razor:
What is the smallest number of simple undefined things at the start, and the smallest number of undemonstrated premisses, out of which you can define the things that need to be defined and prove the things that need to be proved? That problem is by no means a simple one, but on the contrary an extremely difficult one. It is one which requires a very great amount of logical technique...You do need this apparatus of symbolic logic that I have been talking about.100

Russell is more succinct on this matter in Our Knowledge of the External World.

The above extrusion of permanent things affords an example of the maxim which inspires all scientific philosophizing, namely “Occam’s razor”: Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity. In other words, in dealing with any subject-matter, find out what entities are undeniably involved, and state everything in terms of these entities. Very often the resulting statement is more complicated and difficult than one which, like common sense and most philosophy, assumes hypothetical entities whose existence there is no good reason to believe in.101

While the apparatus of symbolic logic is necessary for The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, apparently the Theory of Knowledge and The Philosophy of Logical Atomism are helpful in understanding the Principia Mathematica. In order to explain various concepts Russell introduces in the Principia Mathematica, he gives English language propositions of the logical points that he wishes to make. In fact, to someone who was unfamiliar with the dates at which the various works were completed it might appear that the TK was the inspiration for the Principia

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Mathematica. One can find paragraphs that is Principia that are virtually identical to those that appear in the Theory of Knowledge and The Philosophy of Logical Atomism. The famous "Scott is author of Waverley" example which is featured prominently in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism's chapter on descriptions and incomplete symbols is also used as an example in Chapter III of the introduction to Principia Mathematica. The same is true of the even more infamous "King of France" example.

It might be suggested that "Scott is the author of Waverley" asserts that "Scott" and "the author of Waverley" are two names for the same object. But a little reflection will show that this would be a mistake. for if that were the meaning of "Scott is the author of Waverley," what would be required for its truth would be that Scott should have been called the author of Waverley: if he had been so called, the proposition would be true even if someone else had wrote Waverley; while if no one called him so the proposition would be false even if he had written Waverley. Thus the proposition "Scott is the author of Waverley" is not a proposition about names, like "Napoleon is Bonaparte"; and this illustrates the sense in which "the author of Waverley" differs from a true proper name.\textsuperscript{102}

Strangely enough, Russell makes his point more clearly in the passage above than he does in the corresponding passage in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.

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You sometimes find people speaking as if descriptive phrases were names, and you will find it suggested, e.g. that such a proposition as "Scott is the author of Waverley" really asserts that "Scott" and "the author of Waverley" are two names for the same person. That is an entire delusion; first of all, because, "the author of Waverley" is not a name, and secondly, because, as you can perfectly well see, if that were what is meant, the proposition would be something like "Scott is Sir Walter", and would be not depend on any fact except that the person in question was so called, because a name is what a man is called.\textsuperscript{103}

Russell’s definitions for an incomplete symbol match even more closely than his examples.

By an "incomplete" symbol we mean a symbol which is not supposed to have any meaning in isolation but is only defined in certain contexts.\textsuperscript{104}

These things like "the author of Waverley", which I call incomplete symbols have absolutely no meaning whatsoever in isolation but merely acquire a meaning in context.\textsuperscript{105}

Clearly, Russell makes use of concepts which he and Whitehead originally developed in Principia Mathematica, though Whitehead would probably not agree that Russell’s subsequent ideas on mind and knowledge follow from the work that the two did together.
There are many examples of concepts which were originally worked out in the early stages of Russell's philosophy and later appear with little alteration in TK, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, The Analysis of Mind, and sometimes all three. When one looks into the affect of Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's TK, the most interesting of these recurring concepts is MRTJ. It occurs in all three of the above works, but it undergoes a transformation or evolution that is more

Dear Bertie

I am awfully sorry, but you do not seem to appreciate my point.

I don't want my ideas propagated at present either under my name or anybody else's—that is to say, as far as they are at present on paper. The result will be an incomplete misleading exposition which will inevitably queer the pitch for the final exposition when I want to put it out.

My ideas and methods grow in a different way to yours and the period of incubation is long and the result attains its intelligible form in the final stage, - I do not want you to have my notes which in chapters are lucid, to precipitate them into what I should consider as a series of half-truths. I have worked at these ideas off and on for all my life, and should be left quite bare on one side of my speculative existence if I handed them over to someone else to elaborate. Now that I begin to see day-light, I do not feel justified or necessitated by any view of scientific advantage in so doing.

I am sorry that you do not feel able to get to work except by the help of these notes—but I am sure that you must be mistaken in this, and that there must be the whole of the remaining field of thought for you to get to work on—though naturally it would be easier for you to get into harness with some formed notes to go on. But my reasons are conclusive. I will send the work round to you naturally, when I have got it into the form which expresses my ideas.

Yours affectionately
Alfred N. Whitehead

[Russell adds a comment which appears in the footnote on p 28 of this essay.] Autobiography (pp 306-307).

*This will be discussed in Appendix C of this thesis.
It will be seen that, according to the above account, a judgment is not a relation of two terms, namely the judging mind and the proposition, but is a relation of several terms, namely the mind and what are called the constituents of the proposition. That is, when we judge (say) "this is red," what occurs is a relation of three term, the mind, and "this," and red. On the other hand, when we perceive "the redness of this," there is a relation of two terms, namely the mind and the complex object "the redness of this." When a judgment occurs, there is a certain complex entity, composed of the mind and the various objects of the judgment.\textsuperscript{108}

In Russell's manuscript notes for TK, the MRTJ is elaborated on substantially. It is the subject of an entire chapter and various parts of the discussions in this chapter are referred to in various others. Russell literally illustrates the concept of multiple relations by making maps of subject and objects—arrows showing how they are related.

In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Russell renounces maps saying that belief relations are of a sort that can not be mapped. His explanation is less detailed and he points out various problems, one of which is his acknowledgement that the form of the belief relation varies according to what is believed.
We again get more detail in *The Analysis of Mind*, but Russell is much less inclined to express his ideas regarding the relations of belief in mathematical terms. Where, in *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, he apologised because the necessary logical apparatus to explain his ideas clearly had not yet been developed, he tries to make do with the English language in *The Analysis of Mind*.

In TK Russell seems satisfied with his logical apparatus. That he is not convinced of this in his later writings can be seen to be largely the result of Wittgenstein’s criticisms. However, that MRTJ survives in some form would lend credence to the view that TK was not simply crushed under the weight of Wittgenstein’s attack. It is the purpose of the following chapter to reconstruct TK out of components of Russell’s subsequent works which he published under different titles.
APPENDIX C

Russell’s Post and Pre-Wittgenstein

Theory of Knowledge

What is meant by pre-Wittgenstein Russellian Theory of Knowledge is The Theory of Knowledge as it appears in Russell’s manuscript notes (not before Wittgenstein made the attack on MRTJ, rather up to the point that Russell decided that this attack was crippling). Post-Wittgenstein theory of knowledge is therefore Russell’s thought on theory of knowledge after this point.

It must be said that there is no post-Wittgenstein Theory of Knowledge as such: Russell did not publish a book of that title, as he had previously intended to do. He did however publish an article called "Knowledge, Theory of" which appeared in The Encyclopedia Britannica, thirteenth edition, Volume 2, pp 642-645. But this article is more a survey of then contemporary thought on the subject, than it is a representation of Russell’s own thought. Nevertheless Russell went on to develop Logical Atomism. And he wrote several works on knowledge and mind. Various portions of these works deal with subjects which Pre-Wittgenstein Theory of Knowledge dealt with. It is these portions taken collectively that will be labelled post-Wittgenstein theory of knowledge.

If all or most of The Theory of Knowledge can be found in Russell’s works written after Wittgenstein’s criticism then Russell maintained a body of thought that can be referred to as a theory of knowledge. The extent to which this body
of thought differs from the original manuscript is the maximum possible extent of the influence of Wittgenstein’s argument. It is also the maximum extent of the power of Wittgenstein’s argument (as far as Russell considered it).

Piecing together this post-Wittgensteinian theory of knowledge is difficult because Russell did not complete the original Theory of Knowledge manuscript (as judged by his outline). Part III is omitted. Russell does, however, provide in his outline the topic of each proposed chapter in Part III.

It has already been argued in Chapter III of this thesis that Russell had a tendency to carry over many of his concepts from his earlier logical writings. If those topics listed in the outline for Part III of the Theory of Knowledge can be found both in Russell’s early logical writings and in his later epistemological writings, then it is more likely than not that they are representative of what Russell had in mind for Part III of The Theory of Knowledge.

Part I

Part I was entitled “On the Nature of Acquaintance”. The first six chapters of this section are those articles which were published in Monist between January of 1914 and April of 1915.

Russell called the first Chapter: Preliminary Description of Experience. This chapter is composed of six questions which Russell asks about experience and the answers that he gives to these questions.

(1). Are faint and peripheral sensations included in "experience"?\textsuperscript{107}
Thus the question we have to consider is whether attention constitutes experience, or whether things not attended to are also experienced.¹⁰⁸

In cases, however, where, in spite of the physical conditions which might be expected to produce a sensation, no sensation appears to exist, as for example when we fail to hear a faint sound which we should hear if our attention were called to it, it would seem that there is no corresponding "experience"; in such cases, in spite of the physical existence of the sound-stimulus, there seems to be sometimes no answering "mental" existent.¹⁰⁹

Russell's answer to this first question in The Theory of Knowledge is very closely paralleled in An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth. In An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth, Russell drops the question and answer format. Nevertheless, in both cases he maintains that attention is a necessary part of recognised experience.

It seems, then that the most immediate knowing of which we have experience involves sensible presence plus something more, but that any very exact definition of the more that is needed is likely to mislead by its very exactness, since the matter is essentially vague and one of degree. What is wantec' may be called "attention"; this is partly a sharpening of the appropriate sense-organs, partly an emotional reaction. A sudden loud noise is almost sure to command attention, but so does a very faint sound that has emotional significance.¹¹⁰

In TK, "attention" is introduced in italic script, and in the passage from An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth Russell emphasizes the word by putting it in quotations.
Russell's views on the connection between attention and experience changed little between the two works.

An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth was written much later than TK. It was the outcome of a series of lectures which Russell gave between 1938 and 1940. Unlike various other publications, An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth contains no disclaimer saying that Russell may no longer hold the views which he expresses in the essays that comprise the book. To the contrary Russell tells us that the book is the result of his "re-consideration" of the whole project.

Finally, during the summer of 1940, I prepared these William James Lectures partly from accumulated material, and partly from a re-consideration of the whole subject.\textsuperscript{111}

Russell had given himself the opportunity then, to re-write, or reconsider the opinions which had held earlier. Therefore, An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth can be considered to be an accurate portrayal of Russell's thought twenty-five years after he was presented with Wittgenstein's arguments against The Theory of Knowledge.

The second question which Russell addresses in the first chapter of The Theory of Knowledge is:

\textit{Are all or any of our present true beliefs included in our present experience?}\textsuperscript{112}
The answer to this question as it is set out in The Theory of Knowledge is that some of our present true beliefs are included in our present experience and some are not. This is due to Russell’s contention that beliefs and knowledge can only be belief or knowledge of some fact. And since there are two kinds of facts, differing in their natures, there are also two kinds of belief and knowledge: namely those that are included in our present experience and those that are not. The first kind of fact is that which is “something different from an existing sensible thing”. It is something expressed by a proposition and removed from immediate experience.

Our mental life is largely composed of beliefs, and of what we are pleased to call “knowledge” of facts”. When I speak of a “fact”, I mean the kind of thing that is expressed by the phrase “that so-and-so is the case”. A “fact” in this sense is something different from an existing sensible thing; it is the kind of object towards which we have a belief, expressed in a proposition.113

The second kind of fact is one which we immediately observe or experience. This is the difference between a fact that we might read in a book, such as, “The earth is 93 000 000 miles away from the sun” and a fact which is directly observable, like “I see a dog”. The latter example is one which Russell calls a primitive fact.

I think, however, that some facts are experienced, namely those which we see for ourselves, without relying either upon our own reasoning from previous facts, or upon the testimony of others. These “primitive” facts, which are
known to us by an immediate insight as luminous and indubitable as that of sense, must, if I am not mistaken, be included in the original matter of experience. Their importance in the theory of knowledge is very great, and we shall have occasion to consider them very fully in the sequel.\textsuperscript{114}

The first kind of experience and the facts that correspond with it are also dealt with in \textit{An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth}, while the second sort of facts are discussed at length in \textit{The Philosophy of Logical Atomism}.

In \textit{An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth}, Russell makes it abundantly clear that the kind of fact he is dealing with here is one which is removed from the sensible world. It is a relation of words, which is missing a verifying experience. These facts are not experienced because no experience accompanies them. They are facts simply as propositions whereas other facts are facts because they make propositions true or false. This is an ambiguity which also affects knowing and belief.

The word "know" is highly ambiguous. In most senses of the word "knowing an event is a different occurrence from the event which is known; but there is a sense of "knowing" in which, when you have an experience, there is no difference between the experience and knowing that you have it.\textsuperscript{115}

In the passage above the ambiguity of "know" is the result of the ambiguity of "fact". Russell deals with both kinds of fact in \textit{An inquiry Into Meaning and Truth}.
In the earlier sections he describes a fact as something apart from experience, and thus having no relation to truth or falsity.

II. In every assertion two sides must be separated. On the subjective side, the assertion "expresses" a state of the speaker; on the objective side, it intends to "indicate" a "fact". 116

Expressing the state of the speaker is to express a fact about the speaker, at a particular point in time. If the speaker is expressing a state like hungry, then there is a corresponding experience which may be "connected" with the fact. However if the statement is about belief then it is possible that there is no corresponding experience to make truth or falsity relevant. This leads Russell to adopt an order of languages, which he does not speak about in TK. But the fact that Russell added more apparatus does not negate the fact that he retained much of his original TK.

We have seen that the object-language, unlike languages of higher orders, does not contain the words "true" or "false" in any sense whatever. 117

He [a man who understands only object words] will, moreover, have no conception of truth or falsehood; he can say "this is butter" but not "it is true that this is butter." 118

Later Russell turns to facts that may be true or false.
...there are "facts", and there are sentences related to these facts in ways which make the sentences true or false, quite independently of any way of deciding the alternative. ¹¹⁹

In The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Russell is much more concerned with this later sense of fact.

When I speak of a fact—I do not propose to attempt an exact definition, but an explanation, so that you will know what I am talking about—I mean the kind of thing that makes a proposition true or false. ¹²⁰

While Russell does not deal directly with the question: "Are all or any of our present true beliefs included in present experience?", he does retain the ideas which he uses to support his answer to the question he poses in The Theory of Knowledge. There is not, therefore, any indication that his position changed with regards to this matter, after Wittgenstein made his criticisms. And since his premisses are largely similar, there is reason to believe that (had he chosen to answer the question in either The Philosophy of Logical Atomism or An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth) his conclusion would have been largely similar as well.

The same sort of evidence is available for question three as is the case with question two. Again Russell does not answer the question directly because he has dropped the question and answer format. However the evidence that he gives for his answer in TK can be found in An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth.
Russell says that we do now experience past things which we remember. This is because if we remember that we knew a thing and we still know it, the knowing is experienced in both cases without an image of the thing.

The remembering refers to something known to be in the past, to what I saw yesterday, not to the image which I call up now. But even when the image has been set aside as irrelevant, there still remains a distinction, between what may be called "intellectual" memory and what may be called "sensational" memory. When I merely know "that I saw Jones yesterday", this is intellectual memory; my knowledge is one of these "primitive facts" which we considered in the preceding paragraph.\(^1\)

In *An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth*, Russell calls statements of a similar sort as "I saw Jones (something) yesterday", existence-propositions. Definite perception propositions are the sort that relate to an experience as it occurs, and correspond to a sensory image or feeling (e.g. "I see Jones"). Except for the addition of this new terminology, Russell makes the same point in *An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth* as he made in *TK*.

At this point, however it is necessary to recall what we said in connection with memory, to the effect that we may, in virtue of past perception, know an existence-proposition without knowing the definite perceptive proposition which existed on the occasion that gave rise to our present vague recollection.\(^2\)
Again the main supporting premiss of Russell's fourth question (How do we come to know that the group of things now experienced is not all-embracing?) is also presented in An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth as well as The Theory of Knowledge. The Theory of Knowledge gives the following example.

One of the obvious empirical refutations [of the notion that we cannot have knowledge that there is experience outside our present experience] is derived from the knowledge that we have forgotten something. When, for example, we try to recall a person's name we may be perfectly certain that the name came into our present experience in the past, but for all our efforts it will not come into our present experience.\(^\text{129}\)

In An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth Russell's focus changes slightly, but his opinion does not. Russell says that when we forget precise information we still have knowledge of a more general nature. If one was bitten by a dog, but one forgets the kind of dog, one nevertheless knows that some dogs do bite. This is in spite of the fact that the singular experience lies outside our present experience. Therefore Russell must still maintain that there are experiences which lie outside our present experiences.

In regard to imperfect memory, the instances are closely analogous to those of disjunctions. "I know that book is somewhere in my shelves, because I saw it yesterday." "I dined with Mr. B, who made a most admirable joke, but unfortunately I have forgotten it." "There are some very good lines in The Excursion, but I can't remember any of them." Thus a great deal of what we know at any given
time consists of propositions about some which we cannot, at the moment, deduce from propositions with singular subjects, nor yet from propositions about all.\(^{124}\)

Question five:

Why do we regard our present and past experiences as all parts of one experience, namely the experience which we call "ours"?\(^{125}\)

Russell's answer to this question is not very profound. He says:

> When we can remember experiencing something, we include the remembered experiencing with our present experiencing as part of one person's experience.\(^ {126}\)

If we take the question and phrase it as an assertion we get the following sentence. We regard our present and past experiences as all parts of one experience, namely the experience which we call "ours". This statement is the conclusion of the argument. The preceding quote is its premiss. But the premiss means the same thing as the conclusion: including "remembered experiencing with our present experiencing " can only mean our present and past experiences are all parts of one experience. Therefore Russell's conclusion is included in his premiss. Johnson and Blair call this type of argumentation begging the question.
You can see why this form of begging the question is also called "arguing in a circle." So the argument offends against the acceptability requirement that the premises may not include the conclusion; that is, each premise must be different from the conclusion.\textsuperscript{127}

A premise can be the same as the conclusion without having exactly the same wording, as in the example just discussed. [not Russell's] As long as the premise expresses the same proposition as the conclusion, the effect is the same.\textsuperscript{128}

I have not found the argument in question five anywhere in Russell's writings, though this is not to say that it is not there. But in view of the fact that the argument is circular, there is a good reason for it not to be there.

Russell's sixth question is: can we know that anything exists outside of what forms our total experience? Russell's answer is "yes". And he cites mathematical proofs of things that can not be experienced. In An Inquiry Into Meaning and Truth Russell gives a different reason for believing that we can know things which lie outside our total experience.

But for the philosopher there are two prior questions: what reason (if any) have I for believing in the existence of other people? And what reason (if any) have I now for believing that I existed at certain past times, or, more generally, that my present beliefs concerning past times are more or less correct?

For me now, only my momentary epistemological premises are really premises; the rest must be in some sense inferred. For me as opposed to others, my
individual premisses are premisses, but the percepts of others are not. Only those who regard mankind as in some mystical sense a single entity possessed of a single persistent mind have a right to confine their epistemology to the consideration of social epistemological premisses.\textsuperscript{129}

There is a remarkable similarity between the ideas in Chapter One of TK manuscript and the ideas that Russell expresses after Wittgenstein’s criticisms. This is also true of much of the rest of TK. However this is not true of Chapters Two, Three, Seven and Eight. Because of this I will skip to Chapters Four, Five, Six and of Part I of TK.

Chapters One through Six were all published in \textit{The Monist}. However, Chapters One, Two and Three were published prior to Russell’s initial recognition that Wittgenstein’s criticisms caused him trouble. Therefore, it is likely that had Russell wished to change them in light of Wittgenstein’s criticism, he would not have been able to, because they were already published.

This is not the case, however, with Chapters Four, Five and Six. These chapters were published between October of 1914 and April of 1915. And because of \textit{The Monist}’s tendency to publish material shortly after receiving it, Russell had time to make alterations or at the very least he had time to add some sort of disclaimer, stating where problems might lie or that he had changed his views since he wrote the pieces.
These could have been the first and second segments of the three-article series, as we know the journal [The Monist] often had a short interval between the receipt of an article and the printing of it.\textsuperscript{130}

Russell made it a practice to acknowledge where problems with his essays might lie, and he also stated that his views had changed, if this was the case. There are numerous cases where Russell brings the reader’s attention to the fact that his views evolved over many years, and occasionally Russell says that his previous views were just false. This was a habit which Russell developed early in his career and continued from his earliest works to his latest.

In \textit{Principles of Mathematics}, Russell devotes an entire chapter to the unsolved problem of contradictions.

And in the second addition to \textit{Principles of Mathematics}, Russell states that he no longer holds some of the views which he set out in the first addition.

In subsequent years the subjects of which it treats have been widely discussed, and the technique of mathematical logic has been greatly improved; while some new problems have arisen, some old ones have been solved, and others, though they remain in a controversial condition, have taken on completely new forms. In these circumstances, it seemed useless to attempt to amend this or that, in the book, which no longer expresses my present views.\textsuperscript{131}
There is a similar qualification in the introduction to the second edition of *Principia Mathematica*.

In preparing this edition of *Principia Mathematica* the authors have thought it best to leave the text unchanged, except as regards misprints and minor errors, even where they were aware of possible improvements.\textsuperscript{132}

Several areas of contention are then listed followed by possible solutions to the problems.

In *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* Russell says that the theory of judgement which he had earlier "put in print was a little unduly simple."

Of *Logic and Knowledge* Russell says the following:

\begin{quote}
It is not for me to judge whether it is worth while to perpetuate the record of what I thought at various times...\textsuperscript{133}
\end{quote}

Nevertheless, in the case of the MRTJ as it appears in the TK, Russell does not make any sort of disclaimer, and continues to hold the theory long after he was aware of Wittgenstein’s criticisms. This would tend to support my contention that Russell abandoned neither the MRTJ nor the interrelated and intertwined TK. The best way to prove this would be to re-assemble the points made in the TK from his latter works. I have included this preliminary attempt in order to demonstrate how this might be done.
Endnotes


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Bibliography


VITA AUCTORIS

NAME: Raymond E. Boggs

PLACE OF BIRTH: Windsor, Ontario

DATE OF BIRTH: 1966

EDUCATION: Essex District High School
            1980-1985
            University of Windsor
            Windsor, Ontario
            1985-1989 B.A.
            University of Windsor
            Windsor, Ontario
            1989-1992 M.A.