The purity of Kant's ethics in light of his doctrine of the summum bonum.

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THE PURITY OF KANT'S ETHICS
IN LIGHT OF HIS DOCTRINE OF THE SUMMUM BONUM

by

Sandra Orsini

A Thesis
submitted to the
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
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ABSTRACT: THE PURITY OF KANT'S ETHICS IN LIGHT OF
HIS DOCTRINE OF THE SUMMUM BONUM

by

Sandra Orsini

Immanuel Kant demands a "pure" ethics. The moral law is
based. "not in the nature of man, nor in the circumstances of the
world in which man is placed. but...a priori solely in the
concepts of pure reason." (1) The incentive to moral action ought
to be reverence for the law itself; yet Kant introduces the
concept of the summum bonum as a necessary extension of morality.
This concept originates from the demands of practical reason
which seeks not only virtue for its own sake, but also seeks the
reward of future happiness in proportion to worth. Several
critics have charged Kant with inconsistency because he promotes
"duty for duty's sake", yet he allows happiness to play a role in
his ethics. What follows is an examination of this role, and
more specifically, an investigation of the purity of Kant's
ethics in light of this role.
NOTES ON ABSTRACT

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ........................................................................ iv

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM .................................. 1

II. THE NEED FOR A PURE ETHICS ...................................... 9

III. THE KANTIAN NEED FOR GOD ...................................... 19

IV. HAPPINESS DEFINED .................................................... 29

V. THE SOURCES OF ACTION ............................................. 38

VI. AN ATTEMPT AT A JUSTIFICATION OF THE ROLE OF HAPPINESS .............................................. 43

VII. FROM MORALITY TO RELIGION ................................... 52

VIII. CRITICISMS OF KANT'S ETHICS .................................... 68

IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS .............................................. 90

BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................. 97

VITA AUCTORIS ............................................................ 99
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

One of the main tasks evident in the ethical works of Immanuel Kant is the development of a moral law imposed on all rational beings by reason itself. This self-imposed moral law is a "supreme law of freedom". (1) The moral agent chooses to be subject to the moral law because the law as developed through pure reason is valid for all rational beings. The law is morally valid as a ground of obligation carrying with it absolute necessity. (2) It derives its validity from the fact that it springs from our will and intelligence, and therefore from our proper true self. (3) It is because Kant seeks a law valid for all rational beings that the ground of obligation must be "sought not in the nature of man, nor in the circumstances of the world in which man is placed, but ... sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason." (4) It is our rational nature which exists as an end in itself and as such, is uniquely capable of discovering our proper moral end. In order to answer the question, "What ought I to do?", reason must not confine itself to the laws of nature, whereby it is forced to struggle with the conditions of this world. Reason must look for "pure" moral laws which exist apart from these conditions and thereby allow the individual to aspire to become something better.

Kant claims that everything empirical is injurious to the purity of morals because the worth of the good will (as the only thing good without qualification) lies in the fact the "the principle of action is free from all influence by contingent grounds". (4) Kant demands an ethics which is pure: based on rational grounds rather than on the empirical grounds of
self-interest. The moral law for Kant must be universally or objectively valid, unconditioned by any particular end. Kant places the demands of reason on his ethics, yet he also acknowledges the fact that "morality ineluctably leads to religion" because practical reason not only asks the question "What ought I to do?", but also asks "What is to result from this right conduct of ours?" (6) He claims that "it is far best to acknowledge our moral need of God." (7) Religion provides us with a "highly necessary hypothesis", namely that righteousness has its reward. (8) Kant admits that "no man can possibly be righteous without having the hope, from the analogy of the physical world, that righteousness must have its reward. [One] believes in reward on the same ground that [one] believes in virtue." (9) This hope for happiness first begins with religion. (10) However, if morality must lead to religion, which in turn leads to a hope in the reward of happiness, then perhaps this hope plays a role in the development of the moral law itself, as well as in the incentive behind the moral law. If the hope for happiness plays either or both of these roles, then Kant's ethics would not be "pure" because the law would be conditioned by the incentive of future reward. and furthermore, it would be conditioned by the laws of the empirical world. A moral law, as such, would take human weakness and limitation into consideration, thereby manipulating the law to fit the human condition as it is, rather than aspiring to elevate it to what it ought to be.

Kant creates this complex problem for himself by demanding a pure doctrine of virtue and yet introducing in some respect, through religion, a doctrine of happiness. When practical reason
demands that desert and reward be united through the concept of the \textit{summun bonum} or highest good. The moral law may be reduced to a well-disguised doctrine of happiness. Several critics have charged Kant with an inconsistency of this sort because he claims that in order for an action to have moral worth it must be done for duty's sake, yet at the same time he holds that no one can be virtuous without hoping for reward. The purity of Kant's ethics is questioned because of the introduction of happiness as a component of the highest good. One example of a criticism along these lines is made by Schopenhauer who claims that happiness may be detected in the highest good:

...like a secret article, the presence of which makes all else only a sham contract. It is not really the reward of virtue, but yet is a voluntary gift, for which virtue, after work accomplished, stealthily holds its hands open. (11)

There are other critics who also point to a problem with the doctrine of the highest good. In Allen Wood's \textit{Kant's Moral Religion}, an attempt at a defense of Kant's moral faith is made. Wood touches on this problem, and maintains that "it may be Kant's critics, and not Kant himself who have been guilty of a fundamental misunderstanding of Kant's ethics." (12) Wood presents the views of several of Kant's critics. He states that Erich Adickes concludes that Kant repudiated the moral arguments in the \textit{Opus Postumum}, since the doctrine of the highest good represents an intrusion of hedonism into Kant's ethics. (13) Wood also cites Herman Cohen as concluding that the doctrine of the highest good must be completely rejected if Kant's fundamental principles are to be maintained. (14) Wood also quotes Fredrich Paulsen as claiming that the second critique is "internally inconsistent" in
a way so blatant that it "is probably not to be met with again in
the history of philosophical thought." (15) Wood describes these
criticisms:

These criticisms cannot be taken lightly: they
represent a large body of scholarly opinion, and
address themselves to fundamental issues in critical
moral philosophy. The "inconsistency" with which Kant
is charged at this point however, is seldom stated with
the clarity one would wish. The doctrine of the highest
good is more often treated with indignant rejection
than with reasoned refutation. The clearest criticisms
usually maintain that Kant's doctrine of the highest
good contradicts his ethic of "duty for duty's sake."
by introducing a "corrupt" motive for moral volition,
and motivating moral action by the promise of rewards
rather than respect for the moral law. It is sometimes
noted, of course, that Kant gives frequent and
strenuous denials that his doctrine of the highest good
makes happiness a motive for moral volition. But such
protestations have not fooled Kant's wily critics. If
Kant has not blatantly contradicted himself, still the
document of the highest good is held to be a supreme
example of clandestine moral corruption. (16)

By Kant's own standards a "pure" ethics is one which detaches
itself of all motives of self-interest, of sensibility, and of
reward and punishment. However, the hope in future happiness as
one component of the highest good may make Kant's ethics unpure.
heteronomous, and hedonistic. Happiness may be an incentive to
morality, thereby making the moral law empirically rather than
rationally based. Furthermore, if happiness is sought as an end.
then the moral law may be viewed as both hedonistic and
heteronomous, because the will not only aims at future happiness
as an end, thereby making the desire for happiness a motive,
(i.e. hedonism), but the moral law would be conditioned by that
end, making the will externally determined by its object rather
than by itself (i.e. heteronomy). The question of this thesis is,
does Kant's ethics remain pure, in light of his doctrine of the
highest good which includes the component of happiness as reward for moral action? Perhaps, as Wood points out, a different reading of Kant's ethics is necessary in order to make sense of the two seemingly incompatible views: one which says that moral worth is based on the fact that an action is done from duty, and the other which recognizes the role of an anticipated reward of happiness.

Kant's doctrine of virtue need not be understood as a well-disguised doctrine of happiness if a fundamental Kantian distinction is taken into account. The distinction between noumenal and phenomenal modes of existence is of great importance for Kant. This is evident because this distinction occurs in almost all of Kant's works. If this distinction is recognized and acknowledged, then perhaps the inconsistency he is charged with is unwarranted. Kant is in a very real way trapped in both realms. It is because of this that he is forced to travel between the "is" and the "ought" frequently in his ethical writings. This frequent shifting between realms may be the cause of confusion for some readers who misinterpret Kant as claiming that it is possible for us to act purely from duty, when he really is much more pessimistic about the possibility of the human attainment of virtue here on earth. It is because of this pessimism that morality ineluctably leads to religion, and practical reason finds it necessary to postulate God and the immortality of the soul. These postulates, which lead to the hope for happiness, are practical reason's attempt to satisfy itself based on its own inadequacy which arises from the fact that it is the product of rational but finite creatures who are involved in a dialectical
struggle between their two different natures.

The hope for happiness arises from a need to satisfy the imperfect, impure, and uncultivated will which is on a lifelong journey struggling to become virtuous. Ideally, duty ought to be done for duty's sake, but realistically the imperfect will requires an incentive other than the law itself. namely, that of the hope that virtue has its reward. The fact that Kant finds it necessary to introduce the hope of happiness into his ethics does not necessarily mean that he is guilty of inconsistency or taints the purity of the moral law. This is what will be argued in defense of Kant in the final two chapters.

Before getting to a defense of Kant, it is first necessary to establish more specifically how the problem originates. In Chapter II, I begin with why Kant demands a pure ethics in the first place. The problem of the inadequacy of happiness as a guide to moral conduct is also addressed there. The doctrine of the *summum bonum* is dealt with in Chapter III, which illustrates how the need for God arises as a postulate of practical reason, since God guarantees the possibility of the unification of desert with reward. In Chapter IV, the concept of happiness is explored and divided into what I call "base" and "noble" types: the question concerning the type of happiness legitimately hoped for is also addressed. Chapter V examines the sources of action through a discussion of several technical terms Kant uses throughout his works. Chapter VI deals with an attempt at a justification of the role of happiness made by Kant himself. This justification has to do with the fact that as finite creatures we must look to ends other than the law itself. The
question of how morality leads to religion is dealt with in Chapter VII, where an attempt is made at a justification of religion through an examination of three roles that God must play. After I have identified the origin of the problem in the first seven chapters, I will present the criticisms of Kant's ethics and develop a response to these criticisms in the chapters VIII and IX.
NOTES ON CHAPTER I


(2) *Groundwork*. [389].

(3) *Groundwork*. [461].

(4) *Groundwork*. [429].

(5) *Groundwork*. [389].

(6) *Groundwork*. [426].


(9) *Lectures on Ethics*. p. 82.


II. THE NEED FOR A PURE ETHICS

In all of his ethical writings, Kant insists on a pure ethics, one based on rational rather than empirical grounds. The reasons why this purity is essential for Kant are quite complex. I will first define what a pure ethics means for Kant. Secondly, I will focus on why Kant insists on an ethics of this sort. I will concentrate on what Kant says in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, because it is here that he most clearly attempts to legitimize the need for purity.

In the preface to the *Groundwork* Kant emphasizes the need for a "pure moral philosophy". He describes a pure moral philosophy as one which is "wholly cleared of everything which can only be empirical and can only belong to anthropology." (1) In a pure moral philosophy, the ground of obligation must be sought a priori solely in the concepts of pure reason. (2) Later on in the same work, Kant claims that duty is the practical, unconditioned necessity of action holding for all rational beings. (3) The purity of moral law lies in the fact that there is nothing on which it depends, or on which it is based, other than reason itself. Moral principles must have an:

...origin entirely and completely a priori and must at the same time derive from this their sovereign authority — that they expect nothing from the inclinations of man, but everything from the supremacy of the law and from the reverence due to it, or in default of this condemn man to self-contempt and inward abhorrence. (4)

Everything empirical is therefore unsuitable as a contribution to the principles of morality, since the proper worth of an absolutely good will lies in the fact that the principle of action
is free from all influence by contingent grounds. (5) As stated in the introduction, a "pure" ethics is based on rational rather than empirical grounds. It is therefore not based on or dependent on self-interest. I now turn to the reasons why Kant insisted on such purity.

As I see it, there are at least three reasons why Kant thinks reason must be our guide in ethical matters. The first has to do with the inadequacy of other possible guides. The second reason has to do with Kant's standards of universality and objectivity in creating laws for human ethical action. The last reason has to do with the dualistic nature of our existence as creatures who belong to two related but very different realms. These reasons may not be entirely distinct from each other, but I will treat them separately.

Kant first attempts to illustrate why an impure ethics is inadequate. An ethics based on inclination, self-interest, self-love, would be based on empirical grounds and would aim at the end of happiness. Kant sees several problems with such an ethics. He claims:

In the natural constitution of an organic being - that is, one contrived for the purpose of life - let us take it as a principle that in it no organ is to be found for any end unless it is also the most appropriate to that end and the best fitted for it. Suppose now that for a being possessed of reason and a will the real purpose of nature were his preservation, his welfare, or in a word his happiness. In that case nature would have hit on a very bad arrangement: by choosing reason in the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions he has to perform with this end in view, and the whole rule of his behaviour, would have been mapped out for him far more accurately by instinct: and the end in question could have been maintained far more surely by instinct than it ever can be by reason. (6)

Kant's point is that we are creatures that have reason and will
and that there must be some sort of function for these possessions. Instinct would seem to be a better guide if we take happiness to be our end, since reason often inhibits us from pursuing that which we instinctively desire. This is not exactly Kant's strongest argument, but the reasons why reason would be inadequate to guide us in our pursuit of happiness are of most importance, and I will deal with these next.

If happiness is the end for which we strive, then reason must be inadequate to help guide us to this end because of several problems we have with the concept of happiness. We not only have a problem deciding the means to happiness, but more importantly, we have a problem defining the concept of happiness as an end itself. We all desire happiness, yet we have a problem defining what happiness really is. The concept of happiness is so vague that we could not really aim at it through our specific decisions and actions. Happiness is almost an empty concept; it is too vague to be construed as an end. Kant claims that:

...men cannot form under the name 'happiness' any determinate and assured conception of the satisfaction of all inclinations as a sum. (7)

He goes on to discuss why counsels of prudence cannot be imperatives commanding categorically because of the indeterminateness of this concept:

Unfortunately.... the concept of happiness is so indeterminate a concept that although every man wants to attain happiness, he can never say definitely and in unison with himself what it really is that he wants and wills. The reason for this is that all the elements which belong to the concept of happiness are without exception empirical - that is, they must be borrowed from experience; but that none the less there is required for the Idea of happiness an absolute whole, a maximum of well-being in my present, and every future state. (8)
Kant asks if it is riches or knowledge and insight, or a long life that we really want. The problem is we do not really know. Happiness of this sort is tied up with the empirical realm and its sometimes unforeseeable consequences. Not only are we unable to know from experience what would constitute such a totality of empirical goods, but because of this we are also unable to determine the means to attaining such a state. Kant goes so far as to claim that this all-encompassing happiness as the totality of empirical goods does not really exist in this empirical realm. Happiness is an Ideal of imagination. Kant claims:

...happiness is an Ideal, not of reason, but of imagination - an Ideal resting merely on empirical grounds, of which it is vain to expect that they should determine an action by which we could attain the totality of a series of consequences which is in fact infinite. (9)

Kant claims that we would need to be omniscient in order to know with certainty what it is that would make us happy. If we are to develop an ethics as a guide to achievement of this end, and if we want to know for certain how we can achieve this end, then we would need some sort of universally binding rules to help us in our pursuit of an indeterminate end. This would not make sense, because we cannot even agree on what constitutes the desired end itself.

This leads to the second reason why we need a pure ethics. Kant wants rules that everyone can follow all of the time. A universal end should be aimed at as determined by our universal nature as rational wills. Kant claims:

Empirical principles are always unfitted to serve as a ground for moral law. The universality with which these laws should hold for all rational beings without exception - the unconditioned practical necessity which
they thus impose - falls away if their basis is taken from the special constitution of human nature or from the accidental circumstances in which it is placed. (10)

It is only reason which can formulate such an end for Kant. It is only reason which can establish universally valid objective laws which would help us to reach our universal end as set out for us by reason itself. Kant claims that it is a mistake to formulate our moral laws taking human weakness into account. He cites the ancient philosophers as making such a mistake because they accommodated their laws to the limited capacity of human nature.

Moral laws must never take human weakness into account, but must be enunciated in their perfect holiness, purity, and morality, without any regard to man's actual constitution. This is an important point to notice. The moral laws of the ancient philosophers were not pure because they made no demands on man beyond those which human nature could perform. They thus accommodated their laws to the capacity of human nature. Where they went beyond these limitations and enjoined abnormal courage or munificence, the incentive was not the pure moral judgment but pride or honour. Only since the time of the Gospel has the full purity and holiness of the moral law been recognized, although indeed it dwells in our own reason. (11)

If laws do not go beyond the limitations of our actual imperfect constitution, then anyone who does better than expected would be honoured because of this. This honour or pride that results from doing really no more than what we ought to do, might become an incentive to morality itself. The moral law would therefore be conditioned by the anticipated reward of pride or honour. This is problematic, especially considering that such rewards are only fitting if one goes above and beyond what ought to be done. An ethics which is accommodated to the limited capacity of human nature, gives out rewards unjustly because it does not ask any
more of the agent than what the agent as limited, is capable of. It is therefore our capacity for reasoning which forces us to place demands on ourselves, to make us strive for better than what we actually are.

The third reason why ethics cannot be based on the empirical for Kant is the most important. As creatures belonging not only to the sensible world, but to the intelligible world as well, we must demand more of ourselves than adherence to the laws of nature. If we were only members of the sensible realm we would not truly have free wills. Kant claims:

...if I were solely a member of the intelligible world, all my actions would be in perfect conformity with the principle of the autonomy of a pure will; if I were solely a part of the sensible world, they would have to be taken as in complete conformity with the law of nature governing desires and inclinations — that is, with the heteronomy of nature. (In the first case they would be grounded on the supreme principle of morality; in the second case, on that of happiness.) But the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world and therefore also of its laws; as so in respect of my will, for which (as belonging entirely to the intelligible world) it gives laws immediately, it must also be conceived as containing such a ground. (12)

It is reason which seeks the unconditioned. It is through our reason that we can aspire to be something better than what we are. A good will cannot be good unless it is free to determine itself. It is only reason which can legitimately formulate objectively valid, universally binding laws for all rational beings. This is the kind of ethics Kant had in mind.

After this summary analysis of Kant's need for a pure ethics, I shift the focus to the pursuit of personal happiness. There are numerous places where Kant blatantly insists that the pursuit of personal happiness as an end does not constitute moral
action. What follows is just a small sample of such instances.

In his discussion of the empirical principles of heteronomy Kant attacks the principle of personal happiness:

The principle of personal happiness is, however, the most objectionable, not merely because it is false and because its pretense that well-being always adjusts itself to well-doing is contradicted by experience: nor merely because it contributes nothing whatever towards establishing morality, since making a man happy is quite different from making him good and making him prudent or astute in seeking his advantage quite different from making him virtuous: but because it bases morality on sensuous motives which rather undermine it and totally destroy its sublimity. Inasmuch as the motives of virtue are put in the same class as those of vice and we are instructed only to become better at calculation, the specific difference between virtue and vice being completely wiped out. (13)

If we view our end as happiness of this sort, then we would make our choices based on how we could best achieve this end. This would not give us any apodeictic laws to follow but, rather, conditional laws. This was not good enough for Kant.

...everything that is empirical is, as a contribution to the principle of morality, not only wholly unsuitable for the purpose, but is even highly injurious to the purity of morals: for in morals the proper worth of an absolutely good will, a worth elevated above all price, lies precisely in this - that the principle of action is free from all influence by contingent grounds: the only kind that experience can supply. Against the slack, or indeed ignoble, attitude which seeks for the moral principle among empirical motives and laws we cannot give a warning too strongly or too often... (14)

Kant was looking for rules which would be binding no matter what. In order for us to formulate such rules, and to decide to subject ourselves to them, (not simply for the most part in most circumstances, but always, even when we think we might find it in our best interest to break the law just this once) they must not be based on the empirical. However, Kant does not deny
happiness is important to us. Although the principle of happiness is an inadequate basis for formulating moral laws, this does not necessarily mean that there is no place for happiness whatsoever in our lives. The moral law and the principle of happiness are not mutually exclusive. Kant claims:

But it does not follow that this distinction between the principle of happiness and that of morality is an opposition between them. And pure practical reason does not require that we should renounce all claim to happiness, but only that the moment duty is in question we should take no account of happiness. It may even in certain respects be a duty to provide for happiness: partly, because (including skill, wealth, riches) it contains means for the fulfillment of our duty; partly, because the absence of it (e.g. poverty) implies temptations to transgress our duty. But it can never be an immediate duty to promote happiness. Still less can it be the principle of all duty. Now, as all determining principles of the will, except the law of pure practical reason alone (the moral law), are all empirical, and therefore, as such, belong to the principle of happiness, they must all be kept apart from the supreme principle of morality, and never be incorporated with it as a condition: since this would destroy all moral worth just as much as any empirical admixture with geometrical principles would destroy all certainty of mathematical evidence. Which in Plato's opinion is the most excellent thing in mathematics, even surpassing their utility. (15)

At that most crucial moment when an agent must decide on the proper course of action to take, it is duty to the moral law which should be the guiding force. Though an action might coincide with the path the agent perceives as leading to happiness, happiness must not be the direct moving principle. The question the agent needs to ask in order to tell if the action has moral worth (done from a pure disposition), is whether or not the same course would be chosen even if happiness was not perceived as a direct or indirect result. The moral worth of an action is destroyed when any principle of happiness is
incorporated into an individual's maxim as the condition under which the supreme principle of morality, the moral law itself, is followed.

Happiness, as well as other empirically-based incentives, is inadequate as a basis for formulating laws of proper moral conduct valid for every rational being all of the time. It is because of the standards of universalizability and objectivity, standards reason itself imposes, that Kant must attempt to rid his ethics of all empirically-based incentives limited to conditional laws of action. Furthermore, because we are creatures belonging to two realms, our reason demands that we look to what we ought to become rather than restrict ourselves to what we are. I have shown why Kant demands purity in his ethics: I will next turn to the concept of the *summum bonum*, since this is how practical reason allows the concept of happiness to play a necessary role in Kant's ethics.
NOTES ON CHAPTER II

(1) Groundwork, p. 389.
(2) Groundwork, p. 389.
(3) Groundwork, p. 425.
(4) Groundwork, p. 426.
(6) Groundwork, p. 395.
(7) Groundwork, p. 399.
(8) Groundwork, p. 418.
(9) Groundwork, p. 419.
(10) Groundwork, p. 442.
(11) Lectures on Ethics, p. 66.
(12) Groundwork, p. 454.
(13) Groundwork, p. 442.
(14) Groundwork, p. 426.
(15) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 186 (222-3).
III. THE KANTIAN NEED FOR GOD

The Kantian need for God arises out of a practical rather than a psychological necessity, hence a rational, rather than a personal type of God is postulated. (1) God is a postulate of pure practical reason. This postulate is a concept which is necessitated by the inability of practical reason to satisfy its own need for Justice. The concept of God arises out of morality. since God as Justice personified, as Moral Lawgiver and Judge, is needed to guarantee that our struggle to become virtuous, rational, pure wills is not futile. The concepts of God and the immorality of the soul are needed to make the highest good or sumnum bonum possible. Kant's ethical system hinges on the fact that achievement of a good will must be possible. An individual must be capable of becoming virtuous and must somehow benefit from this struggle. First I will begin with an examination of Kant's conception of the sumnum bonum. Secondly, I will illustrate how the antinomy of practical reason leads to the postulates of God and immortality of the soul.

Kant finds it necessary to introduce God as a postulate of pure practical reason in order to solve the antinomy of practical reason. It is in his Critique of Practical Reason that he best illustrates how this dialectic of pure practical reason results in the necessary postulation of God as Judge. Much of this critique is concerned with the notion of a sumnum bonum. I will first explore what Kant meant by this notion, and then, how it leads to the postulates of God and a future life.

In Chapter II of the "Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason".
Kant attempts to define the concept of the *sumnum bonum*. In order to explain this concept it is necessary to divide it into its two separate components, *sumnum* and *bonum*. The component "bonum" basically is simple in that it can be defined as good. *Sumnum*, on the other hand, has two possible meanings. It may mean highest or supreme, or it may mean most perfect. *Sumnum bonum* may therefore mean highest or supreme good, or most perfect good. In Kant's words, it can mean "the supreme, the condition which is itself unconditioned or not subordinate to any other originarium." or it can mean, "the perfect or that whole which is not a part of a greater whole of the same kind." (2) This distinction is important for Kant because it enables him to recognize the existence of two distinct elements in the *sumnum bonum*. These are virtue as worthiness to be happy, and happiness in exact proportion to virtue. He claims that:

...virtue (as worthiness to be happy) is the supreme condition of all that can appear to us desirable, and consequently of all our pursuit of happiness, and is therefore the supreme good. (3)

Although virtue is called the supreme good, this does not mean that alone it is the sufficient or perfect good. In other words, although virtue, as worthiness to be happy, is the supreme condition of all that we desire, this does not mean that virtue in itself is the whole and perfect good desired by rational but also finite beings. The fact that we are finite rational beings is the key here, since it is because we are finite that we act with an end in mind. (This will be examined further later on in the thesis). Our practical reason demands more than worthiness to be happy. Kant explains:
But it does not follow that it [virtue] is the whole and perfect good as the object of desire of rational finite beings; for this requires happiness also, and that not merely in the partial eyes of the person who makes himself an end, but even in the judgment of an impartial reason, which regards persons in general as ends in themselves. For to need happiness, to deserve it, and yet at the same time not to participate in it, cannot be consistent with the perfect volition of a rational being possessed at the same time of all power, if, for the sake of experiment, we conceive of such a being. (4)

The **sumnum bonum** must consist of virtue which is worthiness to be happy and actual happiness itself. We do not merely want to become virtuous wills who are worthy of happiness, but we want to be happy as well. This happiness is of a special kind however, that is justice or happiness in exact proportion to virtue. We need to hope that we will get what we deserve. This would be the highest and most perfect good. Virtue is good in itself, but not perfect in that happiness is really what we hope for. Justice is what our practical reason craves. (5)

Virtue (worthiness to be happy) and happiness must be united so we can legitimately morally determine our free wills to pursue the highest good. There are two ways of understanding this connection:

...either the endeavour to be virtuous and the rational pursuit of happiness are not two distinct actions, but absolutely identical, in which case no maxim need be made the principle of the former, other than what serves for the latter; or the connexion consists in this, that virtue produces happiness as something distinct from the consciousness of virtue, as a cause produces an effect. (6)

For various reasons Kant holds the latter of these conceptions of the relationship between virtue and happiness. He discusses the Stoic and Epicurean notions of the **sumnum bonum** and how inadequate they were.
The ancient Greek schools were properly speaking, only two, and in determining the conception of the sumnum bonum these followed in fact one and the same method, inasmuch as they did not allow virtue and happiness to be regarded as two distinct elements of the sumnum bonum, and consequently sought the unity of the principle by the rule of identity, but they differed as to which of the two was to be taken as the fundamental notion. The Epicurean said: to be conscious that one’s maxims lead to happiness is virtue; the Stoic said: to be conscious of one’s virtue is happiness. (7)

Regardless of whether or not Kant adequately expresses the views of these two schools, he attempts to distinguish his notion of sumnum bonum from these two principles. The Stoic and Epicurean principles are incorrect when they reduce the sumnum bonum to self-contentment resulting from knowing that you have done the "right" thing. This is not enough for Kant’s practical reason. Although he may not ever adequately define happiness, he does think that it has to be more than self-satisfaction. There must be some sort of other-satisfaction as well, in order to satisfy our need for Justice. The internal conscience which plays the role of internal Judge, is insufficient in identifying whether or not a will is pure. This is one reason an impartial other, God, is postulated in order to see that Justice is served. In the most perfect world people would be rewarded for their right conduct and punished for their immoral conduct. If we have universally binding laws we choose by our own free wills to determine ourselves to, then there must be some sort of positive result from this perfect conduct of ours. Virtue is not the whole and perfect good that rational but finite beings desire. We desire happiness as well. Even if this desire is one which arises in part because of our nature as finite rational beings rather than unconditioned rational wills, it still is a legitimate desire. In order for us
to legitimately bind our free wills to self-created laws, we must hope for the whole and perfect end suited to natures such as ours, which desires virtue and happiness. Again, to paraphrase Kant: to need happiness and desire it, but not to have it cannot be consistent with the perfect will of a rational being. I will now turn to the problem which develops from this concept of sumnum bonum.

The antinomy of practical reason arises because pure practical reason must assume the sumnum bonum to be realized by our will if and only if virtue and happiness are necessarily united. As already stated, Kant unlike the ancients, identifies two elements in the sumnum bonum as the highest and most perfect good. It is because of this that he cannot accept a reduction of virtue to happiness or happiness to virtue, which is exactly what he sees the ancients as doing when happiness is defined as self-contentment or satisfaction with oneself due to a recognition of virtue. Happiness must entail more for Kant, namely some sort of justice or virtue equated with the exact proportion of happiness deserved. Kant identifies the problem:

The analytic has, however, shown... that happiness and morality are two specifically distinct elements of the sumnum bonum, and therefore their combination cannot be analytically cognized (as if the man that seeks his own happiness should find by mere analysis of his conception that in so acting he is virtuous, or as if the man that follows virtue should in the consciousness of such conduct find that he is already happy ipso facto), but must be synthesis of conceptions. (9)

The ancients saw this as an analytic connection, whereas Kant sees the combination of virtue and happiness as synthetical in order that this combination satisfy the conditions of highest and perfect or whole good. Kant claims that because the connection is
synthetic it must also be conceived as the connection of cause and effect. Therefore:

...either the desire of happiness must be the motive to maxims of virtue, or the maxim of virtue must be the efficient cause of happiness. (10)

The first disjunct is absolutely false because maxims that place the determining principle of the will in the desire of personal happiness are not moral and are furthermore, without virtue. The principle of personal happiness is inadequate as a moral motive to virtuous action. The second disjunct is also found false, but not absolutely so. We know that happiness is not always the result of virtuous action here in the sensible realm, but if we suppose that justice somehow exists in the noumenal realm then the second proposition is not absolutely false. Kant claims:

That the endeavour after happiness produces a virtuous mind, is absolutely false; but...that a virtuous mind necessarily produced happiness, is not absolutely false, but only in so far as virtue is considered as a form of causality in the sensible world, and consequently only if I suppose existence in it to be the only sort of existence of a rational being; it is then only conditionally false. (11)

The key to the resolution of the antinomy lies in the conditional falseness of the second proposition. If we suppose that we exist as part of the noumenal realm, and if we suppose that there exists a God (Justice Personified), and if we suppose that we will participate in some sort of afterlife where virtue is rewarded with happiness, then the summum bonum could be realized and the antinomy solved.

But as I am not only justified in thinking that I exist also as a noumenon in a world of the understanding, but even have in the moral law a purely intellectual determining principle of my causality (in the sensible world), it is not impossible that morality of mind should have a connexion as causal with happiness (as an
effect in the sensible world) if not immediate yet mediate (viz. through an intelligent author or nature). And moreover necessary: while in a system of nature which is merely an object of the senses this combination could never occur except contingently, and therefore could not suffice for the \textit{summum bonum}. (12)

Kant further divides the resolution of the antinomy into two parts. In order that the \textit{summum bonum} be possible the attainment of virtue must be possible, as well as the attainment of happiness in proportion to this virtue. On the possibility of the attainment of the first element the immortality of the soul must be postulated. Kant claims that:

\begin{quote}
For a rational but finite being, the only thing possible is an endless progress from the lower to higher degrees of moral perfection. (13)
\end{quote}

Kant must postulate the immortality of the soul, an existence apart from the sensible realm. Since virtue can only be attained by rational beings who have an endless duration of their existence and personality. I have chosen to limit the discussion of the first condition of the \textit{summum bonum} since it is with the notion of God that happiness is more directly related for the purposes of my thesis. The question as to whether or not Kant's rational argument for postulating the immortality of the soul is valid is beyond the scope of the paper. However, immortality of the soul is a necessary postulate of pure practical reason in order to satisfy the first condition of the \textit{summum bonum} (i.e. virtue is attainable by rational beings). Now to the more important question of the second condition of the \textit{summum bonum} and how it may be met.

On the possibility of the second element of the \textit{summum bonum}, happiness proportioned to virtue, practical reason must
postulate the existence of a rational other who can judge and distribute justice. God must be a postulate of pure practical reason in order that the sumnum bonum be possible. God becomes a concept practical reason creates for itself in order to satisfy its deficiency. This deficiency is in part the result of our finite nature. We are restricted in the sensible realm to look at things from the perspective of causes and effects. We exist in space and time and it is because of this that we realize that justice does not and cannot exist in this realm. Our practical reason asks, "Why should I act from duty?" Though this is hardly a perfect or holy will demanding a reward here, it is the will which we have as finite beings. Not only do we need to exist indefinitely in order to make progress, we also need a Judge to cause the effect of happiness in exact proportion to virtue. There must be a cause adequate to the effect of happiness proportioned to virtue. Kant defines happiness as:

...the condition of a rational being in the world with whom everything goes according to his wish and will, it rests, therefore, on the harmony of physical nature with his whole end, and likewise with the essential determining principle of his will. (14)

Although "the moral law as a law of freedom commands by determining principles, which ought to be quite independent of nature and of its harmony with our faculty of desire (as springs). ...the acting rational being in the world is not the cause of the world of nature itself." (15) We must promote the sumnum bonum which must be possible, but it is not within our power to ensure a connection between virtuous action and happiness as members of the sensible realm. According to Kant the cause of all nature must be distinct from nature itself.
The supreme cause of nature is a being which is the cause of nature by intelligence and will. "It follows that the postulate of the possibility of the highest derived good (the best world) is likewise the postulate of the reality of the highest original good, that is to say, of the existence of God." (16) It is our duty to promote the *summum bonum* (which we must of course presuppose as possible) and if the *summum bonum* is possible only if God is posited as existing, then it becomes morally necessary to assume the existence of God. (17) God is needed to guarantee that the *summum bonum* is possible. Without the postulates of God and immortality of the soul the *summum bonum* would be impossible, and therefore the moral law which commands its pursuit would be invalid.

Something quite interesting seems to have happened to Kant's notion of duty as a sufficient motive of the will to virtue. We will now leave the need for God and tend to the need for happiness. The role that the hope for happiness and Justice play in our imperatives needs to be examined in order to determine whether or not Kant has tainted the purity of his ethics.
NOTES ON CHAPTER III

(1) See Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 109. "The concept of God is not a natural concept, and it is not necessary from a psychological point of view...."

(2) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 206.

(3) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 206.


(5) When I use the term "justice" here, I am referring to the reward rather than the punishment aspect of fair consequence following a given act. To be rewarded for good conduct is just. The moral individual should not be punished for being moral, but in a just world would be compensated with happiness as a reward.

(6) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 207.

(7) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 207.

(8) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 207.

(9) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 209.

(10) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 209.


(12) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 211.


(14) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 221.

(15) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 221.

(16) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 222.

(17) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 222.
IV. HAPPINESS DEFINED

As we have already seen, Kant finds it necessary to introduce the concept of happiness into his ethics. He is careful to limit its role so as to keep all self-interest out of moral action. If immediate self-interest must be put aside in order for duty to be pursued, then it would seem that self-interest of the future should be put aside as well. In other words, happiness in this life or in the next must be put aside when duty is in question. Kant attempts to make a place for happiness in his ethics without destroying its purity. Whether or not he is successful in this endeavor must be examined later. I now turn my attention to the type of happiness which plays a role in Kant's ethical system.

The type of happiness which we can legitimately hope for is of importance since the purity of Kant's ethics is being questioned in light of this hope. At the least, an examination of Kant's definitions of happiness will enable one to determine the extent of impurity if in fact this hope leads his ethics to be impure. As already noted in Chapter II, on several occasions Kant claims that happiness is an "ideal of imagination", an "indeterminate concept", "resting on empirical grounds." (1) It is therefore inadequate as a guide to ethical action. Yet, Kant states that we can legitimately hope for happiness in a future life if we have been deserving. The type of happiness for which we can legitimately hope is quite different from the concept of happiness which is empirically based.

Kant uses the term "happiness" to represent at least two quite distinct states of states of being. In his Lectures on
Philosophical Theology. Kant attempts to distinguish between these two states. The first type fits the general definition of happiness as the satisfaction of empirically based desires, whereas the second type is better described as self-contentment. Self-contentment can be further divided into three components: self-perfection, self-mastery, and self-respect. Kant describes the two kinds of happiness:

There are two kinds of happiness: (1) One consists in the satisfaction of desires. But desires always presuppose needs, which are why we desire something. Hence they presuppose sorrow and ill too. (2) But there is also the possibility of a kind of happiness which is mere enjoyment, without any needs. Any man who wanted to be happy in this way would be the most useless man in the world. For he would completely lack any incentives to action, since incentives consist in desires. Fundamentally we cannot even frame a correct concept of happiness for ourselves except by thinking of it as a progress toward contentment. (2)

Happiness as the satisfaction of desires is intimately connected to the empirical world. Mere enjoyment or self-contentment is not dependent on physical conditions. (3) Yet, interestingly enough Kant claims that happiness in the first respect is more adequate to move humans (as rational but finite beings) to action. The more "noble" type of "happiness" (self-contentment) is inadequate to this task because it is not based in sensuous desire. Insofar as we are finite beings, existing in the phenomenal realm, we are moved more effectively by ordinary desire rather than by the thought of attaining self-contentment. Kant goes on to describe self-contentment as directly connected with noumenal freedom:

Pleasure in one's state is called welfare. And insofar as this pleasure applies to the whole of our existence, it is called happiness. Happiness is consequently pleasure in our state as a whole. Pleasure in one's
own person is called self-contentment. But freedom constitutes that which is most proper to us. Consequently, self-contentment is a pleasure in one's own freedom, or in the quality of one's will. If this self-contentment were to extend to the whole of our existence, it would be called blessedness. The distinction between self-contentment and happiness is just as necessary as it is important. For one can be fortunate, and in that sense, happy, without being blessed, even though the consciousness of one's own worth or self-contentment belongs to a perfect happiness. But self-contentment can certainly be found without good fortune, because at least in this life good conduct is not always combined with well-being. Self-contentment arises from morality, while happiness depends on physical conditions. (4)

In this sense, self-contentment means the self-respect a properly freely determined will has for itself. The self-respect evolves from the judging of one's will to be good. It constitutes self-reflection concerning progress towards becoming a better person. Consciousness of one's own worth as a person is a necessary condition of what Kant calls a "perfect happiness". A perfect happiness or blessedness requires self-contentment to extend to the whole of our existence. This would entail happiness as earthly creatures as well as self-respect or consciousness of worth. We are not however, capable of such a state.

Kant claims that self-contentment is a negative concept rather than a positive one. In this respect it seems to represent a sort of self-control or self-mastery:

From this we can understand how the consciousness of this faculty of a pure practical reason produces by (virtue) a consciousness of mastery over one's inclinations, and therefore of independence on them, and consequently also on the discontent that always accompanies them, and thus, a negative satisfaction with one's state, i.e. contentment, which is primarily contentment with one's own person. Freedom itself becomes in this way (namely indirectly) capable of an enjoyment which cannot be called happiness, because it
does not depend on the positive occurrence of a feeling, nor is it, strictly speaking, bliss, since it does not include complete independence on inclination and wants but it resembles bliss in so far as the determination of one's will at least can hold itself free from their influence; and thus, at least in its origin, this enjoyment is analogous to the self-sufficiency which we can ascribe only to the Supreme Being. (5)

Self-contentment as self-mastery is a negative contentment since it has to do with the suppression of desire to the point where reason has come to rule. It is a freedom experienced when inclinations no longer control actions. Self-mastery has to do with the prevention of mutiny and disorder within oneself, resulting in a peace or harmony between sensibility and understanding. (6)

Self-mastery falls short of full self-contentment which would include an absolute self-sufficiency. This can only be found in the Unconditioned, who having no needs is a complete whole unto Itself. As humans we cannot attain self-sufficiency of this sort, (at least in this life), because although we can be masters over our inclinations, we still have inclinations, wants, and needs. We cannot be self-sufficient or complete simply by denying or supressing them. Self-contentment resulting from self-mastery does however provide us with an incentive to virtuous action:

For man, good fortune is not a possession, but a progression towards happiness. Yet full self-contentment, the comforting consciousness of integrity, is a good which can never be stolen from us, whatever the quality of our external state may be. And in fact all earthly happiness is far outweighed by the thought that as morally good men we have made ourselves worthy of an uninterrupted future happiness. Of course, this inner pleasure in our own person can never compensate for the loss of an externally happy state. But it can still uplift us even in the most troubled
life when it is combined with its future prospects. (7)

But what of these future prospects? What do we have to look forward to? How exactly is future happiness which I will call "Happiness" different from physical happiness and self-contentment or moral happiness? To this I now turn.

Kant seems reluctant to commit himself to any direct discussion concerning future Happiness. Since we do not exactly know what we will be like after we have left the physical realm, it is difficult, if not impossible, to speculate about what we will desire (if we have any desires at all). Kant claims:

We know nothing of the future, and we ought not to seek to know more than what is rationally bound up with the incentives of morality and their end. (8)

Although we can "know" nothing of the future, we can sense however that desire is intimately connected to the empirical world. It is because of this that we might legitimately speculate that the self-contentment branch of happiness would be more characteristic of what future Happiness entails. If our life journey to achieve the perfection of the *summus bonum* must be extended beyond life in a physical sense, then perhaps it is incorrect to place empirical demands of empirical happiness on a future existence which may be devoid of empirically based desires. In other words, just because we as phenomenal creatures find it difficult to think of happiness other than in terms of how we, as phenomenal creatures, connect it to empirical desires, does not mean that future Happiness of a future noumenal state has to conform to our limited view of happiness as empirically based. Kant describes what he calls "moral happiness":

By this I do not mean that assurance of the everlasting
possession of contentment with one's physical state (freedom from evils and enjoyment of ever-increasing pleasures) which is physical happiness; I mean rather the reality and constancy of a disposition which ever progresses in goodness (and never falls away from it). (9)

The important point here, is "constancy of a disposition". We all know that happiness in its empirical form is fleeting and mixed with deficiency and want. We are happy for a moment when a given desire is met, yet shortly after this we are burdened with a new desire creating a want or deficiency. Furthermore, as creatures existing in the empirical realm we are subject to the laws of cause and effect. Things do not always go as we plan. We cause things to happen and choose which desires we should pursue, but we also have things happen to us without any choice on our part. We must "bear the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune", and choose how we will deal with them. Moral Happiness as a constant disposition is contentment independent of physical states.

Future Happiness seems to consist in the lack of cause and effects characteristic of empirical existence. In a footnote Kant talks about blessedness and holiness as perfect Happiness wherein these conditions do not lie. He introduces the notion of a "blessed future":

...blessed future: for this is the word that reason employs to designate perfect well-being independent on all contingent causes of the world, and which, like holiness, is an idea that can be contained only in an endless progress and its totality, and consequently is never fully attained by a creature. (10)

Although Kant claims that this state is never fully attained by any creature, we have to wonder if he means that it cannot be attained by any finite creature. He does claim that:

For a rational but finite being, the only thing
possible is an endless progress from the lower to higher degrees of moral perfection. (11)

Happiness does not seem to be a switch God chooses to flick on for us after we die. Our future life as an extension of this earthly existence, seems to consist of a pursuit of the same end, (the summum bonum), but perhaps without the stumbling blocks of the empirically based desires of earthly existence. Kant describes Happiness as a process:

The Infinite Being, to whom the condition of time is nothing, sees in this to us endless succession a whole of accordance with the moral law; and the holiness which His command inexorably requires, in order to be true to His justice in the share which He assigns to each in the summum bonum, is to be found in a single intellectual intuition of the whole existence of rational beings. All that can be expected of the creature in respect of the hope of this participation would be the consciousness of his tried character by which, from the progress he has hitherto made from the worse to the morally better, and the immutability of purpose which has thus become known to him, he may hope for a further unbroken continuance of the same. However long his existence may last, even beyond this life, and thus he may hope not indeed here, nor at any imaginable point of his future existence, but only in the endlessness of his duration (which God alone can survey) to be perfectly adequate to his will (without indulgence or excuse, which do not harmonize with justice). (12)

This unbroken continuance of self-sufficiency, of a harmony of physical nature with the human end, the endless progress towards moral perfection, seems to be what Happiness is all about. This is a far cry from the base sort of happiness which is connected with self-interest and self-love. The pursuit of earthly happiness based on inclination is what hinders the moral pursuit of moral perfection. It seems that even if Happiness as we have come to understand it through Kant's texts does play a role in why we choose to act morally, one cannot legitimately criticize
this pursuit as causing impurity to the same extent that an earthly pursuit of happiness might. Therefore, regardless of whether or not Happiness plays a role in motive to action, thereby making self-interest of a nobler sort the subjective ground to action, the pursuit of this type of Happiness might be a moral pursuit in itself. This must be kept in mind later when directly assessing the purity of Kant's ethics. I will now turn to the technical discussion of the sources of action, focusing on the distinction between grounds, motives, springs, etc.
NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

(1) *Groundwork*. [418].
(2) *Lectures on Philosophical Theology*. p. 119.
(3) *Lectures on Philosophical Theology*. p. 129.
(4) *Lectures on Philosophical Theology*. p. 129.
(6) *Lectures on Ethics*. p. 139.
(7) *Lectures on Philosophical Theology*. p. 130.
(8) *Religion Within Limits*. p. 149.
(9) *Religion Within Limits*. p. 61.
V. THE SOURCES OF ACTION

Kant uses several technical terms when describing how the human will is and ought to be moved to action. I will attempt a brief analysis of these terms, namely, spring or incentive, motive, ground, and their corollaries. This task is a difficult one, because at times Kant seems to make technical distinctions between such terms, and at other times, he seems to use several of them interchangeably. I choose not to engage in a detailed analysis of his reasons for this apparent shift; doing so would lead too far beyond the scope of the paper. (1) The importance of understanding what Kant meant by these terms is, for his purposes, to enable us to distinguish between what is and what ought to move the will to action. For the purposes of this paper, a rudimentary understanding of these terms should suffice in order to further understand what role the hope for happiness plays in virtuous action.

It is necessary to shuffle through several of Kant's works in order to find an explanation of the terms in question. The terms each have a dualistic nature to complement the dualistic nature of the human will. The dualistic nature of the terms also reflects the distinction between what actually does and what ought to move the human will to action. Ideally, the subjective motivation, determination, impulsion, spring, ground etc., would be in accordance with the objective. If this were to be the case then it would not even make sense to speak of motive, impulse, spring, etc., because the elective will, being at one with the rational or Divine Will. (the Moral Law itself), would no longer
require any type of driving force. This is what makes Kant's discussion of these terms rather confusing, since he shifts focus from "is" to "ought" so frequently. This is in part caused by the somewhat restricted phenomenal language and phenomenal experience we are trapped in.

In so far as we are end-oriented beings, and this because of our finite, sentient natures, we require a motive or spring for action. Kant recognizes this problem as one unique to all rational beings possessed of a free will. He defines "spring" or "motive":

...we understand by motive [spring] the subjective ground of determination of the will of a being whose Reason does not necessarily conform to the objective law, by virtue of its own nature.... (2)

Kant also refers to "spring" as "the internal determination of the will". (3) This internal determination should be the idea of the law itself. Hence, "we should strive with all our power that for all dutiful actions the thought of duty should be of itself an adequate spring." (4) This is the way it should be, but the spring, or that which truly moves one to act, might never in this life be free of all external determinations such as ends, rewards, or punishments. Again, the concept of spring or motive is restricted to finite beings:

For [it] suppose[s] a limitation of the nature of the being, in that the subjective character of his choice does not of itself agree with the objective law of a practical reason: [it] suppose[s] that the being requires to be impelled to action by something; because an internal obstacle opposes itself. (5)

This explains why the term motive or spring cannot be applied to the Divine Will. The Divine Will merely implements itself, it does not need any motivation or driving force to move it to
action. The subjective and objective are united in the Divine Will. This is what we attempt to strive for, a uniting of the subjective with the objective moral law valid for all rational beings. For humans, unless the "objective principle of determination" is alone the "subjectively sufficient determining principle of action", the action conforms to the law or "fulfil[s] the letter of the law", but does not contain the "spirit" of the law. (6) Because "ethics is not merely a philosophy of the good act but of the good disposition", this is not sufficient. (7) The terms have to do essentially with the "heart". The purity of heart or the willing disposition to good is what is necessary for truly moral action. The notions of spring and motive are therefore, shown to be fundamentally synonymous for Kant. They both involve the inner workings of the will and how it is moved to act.

Kant does attempt to distinguish between the terms "incentive" and "motive" in the *Groundwork*. Again, this distinction is confusing because of the distinction between what the motive or incentive should be in order for the action to be considered moral, and what the motive or incentive actually is, in a rational will. Kant defines the terms:

Now what serves the will as the objective ground of its self-determination is an end; and if this end is given by reason alone, then it must be equally valid for all rational beings. On the other hand, what contains merely the ground of the possibility of the action, whose effect is an end, is called the means. The subjective ground of desire is the incentive; the objective ground of volition is the motive. Hence there arises the distinction between subjective ends, which rest on incentives, and objective ends, which depend on motives valid for every rational being. Practical principles are formal when they abstract from all subjective ends; they are material, however, when
they are founded upon subjective ends, and hence upon certain incentives. (8)

Incentives, therefore have to do with the desire for subjective ends, whereas motives have to do with the objective ground of volition. We would need no incentive other than respect for the law itself if we were not end-oriented (that is, subjectively end-oriented). The incentive feeds the subjective ground of volition (will). Again, if the human rational will was synchronized with its moral law, then there would be no need for incentives or motives. These serve only to make up for what we lack in morality. (9)
NOTES ON CHAPTER V

(1) I do not want to lump all of these terms together as if they are indistinguishable, but because of the difficulty in separating them, without making reference to every text in which they are used by Kant, I will not dwell on such technicalities. (especially considering the fact that different translations are found for several of the terms in different works). A detailed analysis of the workings of the human will is not the present task. Kant himself admits the human impossibility of determining the true motive behind human action. "...we can never, even by the strictest examination; completely plumb the depths of the secret incentives of our actions." (Groundwork, [407]) What is of importance here is the distinction between what actually is the motive, incentive. spring. determining ground and what these ought to be. The moral law ought to be sufficient in itself as a motive to action, but this is not always the case. It is because the moral law is an advent of reason and the understanding that it has no real "driving force" for beings of a dualistic nature (sentient and rational) (See Religion Within Limits, p.65)

(2) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 164.

(3) Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, p. 290.

(4) Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, p. 303.


(7) Lectures on Ethics, p. 72.

(8) Groundwork, [427].

(9) Lectures on Ethics, p. 56.
VI. AN ATTEMPT AT A JUSTIFICATION OF THE ROLE OF HAPPINESS

Kant attempts to justify the role that happiness plays in determining the will to moral action. It must be remembered that happiness is only introduced into the scheme of his ethics after the moral law itself has been developed as a product of pure reason. It must also be noted that ideally, the law itself ought and should be enough to motivate an individual to virtuous action. However, Kant himself admits that this is not the case. He does not ignore the limits of rational wills which happen to be embodied in the phenomenal world and are therefore necessarily influenced by this world. In Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, Kant admits the uniquely human inadequacy to act out of duty or respect for the moral law, whereby the law itself is sufficient to move one to action. (1) As I see it, there are at least three rather complex reasons as to why we as humans are limited, and thus require this hope for happiness in order to comply with the moral law. I may have touched briefly upon these reasons in previous chapters, but I did not develop them in any detail, as I will do here. First, we need the hope for happiness since we are by nature beings moved to action with an end in mind. Second, we need this hope to make up for what we lack. We are sentient beings on a journey to becoming virtuous, rather than perfect beings with no need for any motivation other than the law itself right from the start. Lastly, and most importantly, we need a hope for happiness in the same way we need religion, not as the source of the law itself, but as a necessary extension of it. The third reason will be dealt with in the
next chapter. From Morality to Religion. It is because of these reasons that "morality leads ineluctably to religion" providing incentive as well as aid in the overcoming of the obstacles to virtue. (2) I will now turn to the first of these justifications.

I. As Finite Creatures we are End-oriented

In *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*, Kant outlines the way in which the human will is moved to action. It is because of the nature of the will as objective and subjective, as noumenal and phenomenal, that humans must have an object in mind in order for the will to be determined. Kant claims:

"...morality requires absolutely no material determining ground of free choice, that is, no end, in order either to know what duty is or to impel the performance of duty. On the contrary, when it is a question of duty, morality is perfectly able to ignore all ends, and it ought to do so...it matters not at all what sort of end this is, indeed, the man who finds it needful, when his avowal is lawfully demanded, to look about him for some kind of [ulterior] end, is, by this very fact, already contemptible." (3)

If morality had the need for its own sake to look to ends, it would be reduced to rules of prudence and the will behind the act would be heteronomous. (4) Yet, although "for its own sake" morality requires no end which must precede the determination of the will, it is "necessarily related to such an end." (5) The end is not the ground, but rather, the "[sum of] inevitable consequences of maxims adopted as conformable to that end." (6) Kant claims:

For in the absence of all reference to an end no determination of the will can take place in man, since such determination cannot be followed by no effect whatever; and the representation of the effect must be capable of being accepted, not. indeed, as the basis for the determination of the will and as an end
antecedently aimed at, but yet as an end conceived of as the result ensuing from the will's determination through the law. Without an end of this sort a will, envisaging to itself no definite goal for a contemplated act, either objective or subjective (which it has, or ought to have, in view), is indeed informed as to how it ought to act, but not whither, and so can achieve no satisfaction. (7)

An end does arise out of morality, although it is not its basis. Kant recognizes that the question of the morally uncultivated will: "What is to result from this right conduct of ours?" needs to be answered in order to bring the will to action whereby it can become virtuous and perhaps come to act according to and from duty itself apart from all hoped for or promised consequences or rewards. (8)

Kant claims that we need to envisage an end to which we can direct our action so we can at the very least "act so as to be in harmony with that end". (9) This end is described by Kant as:

...and idea of an object which takes the formal condition of all such ends as we ought to have (duty) and combines it with whatever is conditioned, and in harmony with duty, in all the ends which we do have (happiness proportioned to obedience to duty) — that is to say, the idea of the highest good in the world for whose possibility we must postulate a higher. moral, most holy, and omnipotent Being which alone can unite the two elements of the highest good. (10)

This "natural need to conceive of some sort of final end for all our actions and abstentions, taken as a whole", is "justified by reason", for without it there would be a "hindrance to moral decision." (11)

However, this "natural need" does not provide the basis for morality, but rather arises out of morality, presupposing basic ethical principles. It is only after the moral law has been developed in all its purity that the need for a final end arises.
...it cannot be a matter of unconcern to morality as to whether or not it forms for itself the concept of a final end of all things (harmony with which, while not multiplying men's duties, yet provides them with a special point of focus for the unification of all ends): for only thereby can objective, practical reality be given to the union of the purposiveness arising from freedom with the purposiveness of nature, a union with which we cannot possibly dispense. (12)

Again, we must remember that we are not yet what we ought to be and therefore we must strive to unite our objective with our subjective nature. We must unite our autonomous agency with our heteronomous need to look to end in order to determine ourselves to action. "The subjective final end of rational worldly beings is their own happiness (each of them has this end by virtue of having a nature dependent upon sensuous objects)...." (13) Yet, even so, the moral law commands absolutely, regardless of any consideration of consequences. Kant claims:

All men could have sufficient incentive if (as they should) they adhered solely to the dictation of pure reason in the law. What need have they to know the outcome of their moral actions and abstentions, an outcome which the world's course will bring about? It suffices for them that they do their duty; even though all things end with earthly life and though, in this life, happiness and desert may never meet. And yet it is one of the inescapable limitations of man and of his faculty of practical reason (a limitation, perhaps, of all other worldly beings as well) to have regard, in every action, to the consequence thereof, in order to discover therein what would serve him as an end and also prove the purity of his intention - which consequence, though last in practice is yet first in representation and intention. (14)

Practical reason must extend itself beyond the law and it can do so because the moral law must be taken in relation to "the natural characteristic of man, that for all his actions he must conceive of an end over and above the law (a characteristic which makes man an object of experience)." (15.) In sum, the finite
nature of our existence forces us to look to ends other than the law itself. We need to hope for future happiness because we need an end to strive towards that satisfies our sentient nature. We must struggle to overcome this need and make the law itself adequate to move our wills. This only happens when the uncultivated will embarks on a journey to virtue.

II. The Journey of the Uncultivated Will

I will now turn to a related but somewhat distinct reason or attempt at justification for this hope of happiness. If virtue itself "consists precisely in self-overcoming", then as sentient beings on a journey to becoming virtuous, humans are not automatically able to act purely from duty right from the start. (16) It is because of an imperfect nature and an uncultivated will that we must look to ends which may not be as noble as the law itself construed as an end. Kant seems to have a rather pessimistic or perhaps realistic outlook when it comes to the present state of humanity as limited by its phenomenal existence:

In this earthly world, there is only progress. Hence in this world goodness and happiness are not things to be possessed, they are only paths toward perfection and contentment. Thus, the evil in the world can be regarded as the incompleteness in the development of the seed toward good. (17)

Furthermore:

...man has to struggle with his own limits, his animal instincts. The means toward goodness lies in reason. This means is man's striving to put himself out of his uncultivated condition. When man begins this striving, he first uses his reason to serve his instincts. But finally he develops it for its own sake. (18)

The roles of moral self-education and habit are quite important for Kant since moral self-development is virtue itself and this
is basically all that we can strive for in this earthly existence. It is only because we cannot act purely from duty that we must manipulate reason so it serves to provide us with encouragement and an imperfect motive to make up for our imperfection.

The heteronomous notions of consequences and of reward and punishment are necessary incentives to lead the primitive uncultivated will to becoming a pure good will. In his Lectures on Ethics Kant speaks of "moral training" and how although actions done for fear of punishment or hope of reward are not moral, they may lead to an internalized conscience and moral virtue itself:

The Subject must first be habituated to morality. Before we speak to people of reward and punishment we must first try to develop the doles erecta. The moral feeling must be enlivened so that the Subject can be swayed by moral Motives. If this fails, we must then have recourse to the subjective incentives of reward and punishment....reward and punishment can serve indirectly as a means of moral training. If a man does good for the sake of reward, he will gradually acquire the habit of good deeds and will ultimately do them regardless of reward and merely because they are good. (19)

It is only when moral motives fail that subjective incentives should be considered. As previously stated, these are introduced to make up for the lack of morality.

Kant even goes so far as to suggest a method for moral training which seems almost Aristotelian in nature:

Man is not so delicately made that he can be moved by objective grounds; he is not endowed by nature with a spring which could be wound up to produce the desired result. But we can produce a habitus, which is not natural, but takes the place of nature, and is produced by imitation and oft-repeated practice...From its early infancy we ought to instill in the child an immediate hate and disgust of hateful and disgusting actions; an
immediate, not a mediated abhorrence, which has only a
pragmatic usefulness: an action should, therefore, be
represented to the child not as forbidden or harmful
but as in itself detestable. (20)

Regardless of whether or not this method of moral training is
effective, the notion of internalized conscience, whereby the
individual strives to become virtuous, is of importance. The
action, whether good or evil, should be done or avoided simply
because it is inherently so, rather than because it may be
rewarded or punished. Even in the child the law must first be
instilled so that it is recognized as good in itself apart from
all consequences. Only when moral motives are not sufficient
should other motives come into play.

The lesson of morality must be learnt: it ought not to
be mixed with solicitations and sensuous incentives; it
must be taught a part and free from these; but when the
rules of morality in their absolute purity have been
firmly grasped, when we have learned to respect and
value them, then, and only then, may such motives be
brought into play. They ought not, however, to be
adduced as reasons for action, for they are not moral
and the action loses its morality on their account;
they ought to serve only as subsidiaria motiva
calculated to overcome the inertia of our nature in the
face of purely intellectual conceptions. Having done
their work of overcoming this inertia, they ought then
to give way to the truly genuine moral motives. In
other words, the function of the sensuous motives
should be merely that of overcoming greater sensuous
obstacles so that understanding can again bear rule.
But to mix inextricably moral and nonmoral
considerations is a terrible perversion of which many
are still guilty. (21)

The hope for happiness is necessary in order to bring the
uncultivated will to virtue since sensuous obstacles require
sensuous motives in order to be overcome. Again, it is because of
our sentient nature that we find it necessary to hope for
happiness. As uncultivated, finite creatures, we need an extra
incentive. As we shall see in the next chapter, this is when
morality leads to religion.
NOTES ON CHAPTER VI

(1) Religion Within Limits. p.4.
(2) Religion Within Limits. p.5.
(3) Religion Within Limits. p.3-4.
(4) Groundwork. [411].
(5) Religion Within Limits. p.4.
(6) Religion Within Limits. p.4.
(7) Religion Within Limits. p.4.
(8) Religion Within Limits. p.4.
(9) Religion Within Limits. p.4.
(10) Religion Within Limits. p.4-5.
(11) Religion Within Limits. p.5.
(12) Religion Within Limits. p.5.
(13) Religion Within Limits. p.6 ft.
(14) Religion Within Limits. p.6 ft.
(15) Religion Within Limits. p.6 ft.
(16) Lectures on Philosophical Theology. p.114.
(17) Lectures on Philosophical Theology. p.117.
(18) Lectures on Philosophical Theology. p.118.
(20) Lectures on Ethics. p.46.
(21) Lectures on Ethics. p.76.
VII. FROM MORALITY TO RELIGION

Morality, for Kant, ineluctably leads to religion in part because of the limits of our nature. As finite beings existing in a sensible realm, we are end-oriented and our wills are uncultivated, on a journey to becoming pure. In the same way that, "Happiness is not a ground, not a principle of morality, but a necessary corollary of it," moral religion is an "idea [which] arises out of morality and is not its basis." (1) For various reasons Kant thinks that "it is far best to acknowledge our moral need of God." (2) I briefly touched on this need for God in Chapter III in a discussion which was restricted to the summum bonum. There are, however, other reasons why morality must lead to religion. These reasons are connected with the role that happiness plays in Kant's ethics. (3) God is needed to take on three roles. The first role is that of Judge of inner disposition. Only God is able to judge the purity of the human will because omniscience is required to evaluate the disposition of the will as a whole, and furthermore, it is only God who can see far enough into the inner workings of the will in order to identify the true motive behind action. God is also needed to take on the role of aid. God plays the role of an aid to the uncultivated will becoming virtuous (overcoming-itsel). Lastly, as well as most importantly, God is needed to play the role of an incentive to morality. This role encompasses the first two roles because in knowing that God is to Judge and to impart aid to those who are deserving, God becomes an incentive to morality. There are also other distinct ways which God plays the role as
incentive. I will examine the first two roles briefly, then concentrate on the last and most important role of God as incentive, since this is perhaps the most questionable role with regard to Kant's ethics retaining their purity.

The hope for the reward of happiness begins with religion, rather than with morality itself. It is because of this hope that there arises the need for a being to judge inner disposition or worthiness of reward, as well as the need for a being to help bring about the conditions of such a reward. Kant describes the introduction of reward into moral religion:

...morality should never be treated as a doctrine of happiness, that is an instruction how to become happy: for it has to do with the rational condition (conditio sine qua non) of happiness, and with the means of attaining it. But when morality has been completely expounded (which merely imposes duties instead of providing rules for selfish desires), then first, after the moral desire to promote the sumnum bonum (to bring the Kingdom of God to us) has been awakened, a desire founded on a law, and which could not previously arise in any selfish mind, and when for the behoof of this desire the step to religion has been taken; then this ethical doctrine may be called a doctrine of happiness, because the hope of happiness first begins with religion only. (4)

It is therefore only after the moral law has been grasped in itself and internalized, that the hope of religion (future happiness) legitimately arises. Kant promotes a doctrine of ethics first and foremost, and only when human inadequacy is admitted does a hope for happiness come into play. It is with this hope for happiness that the need for Judge and Divine Aid arises. I now turn to the need for God as Judge.

The purity of disposition is the condition by which we may hope to be judged by God. For various reasons we are not capable of true self-judgment and therefore we require the recognition of
another who may judge and reward us for our earthly actions. Kant admits of this need:

...we can never, even by the strictest examination, completely plumb the depths of the secret incentives of our actions. For when moral value is being considered, the concern is not with the actions, which are seen, but rather with the inner principles, which are not seen.... (5)

It is precisely because these inner principles are not and cannot be seen that humans are inadequate to this task of judgment:

...for it is not possible for man to see so far into the depth of his own heart that he could ever be thoroughly certain of the purity of his moral purpose and the sincerity of his mind even in one single action, although he has no doubt about the legality of it. (6)

The only way in which humans could perform such a task is if their wills become one with the Divine Will. Only a pure heart can recognize another heart as pure. Because we are not pure wills but rather wills on a path to becoming pure, we cannot judge ourselves. There are too many factors involved which make it impossible for sentient beings to distinguish between the real motive behind their actions and all other motives which may influence the determination of the will. (7) Furthermore, God does not judge the will with regard to particular acts so much as with regard to its disposition or state as a whole. This is why Kant states:

...in all duties the conscience of the man must regard another than himself as the judge of his actions....the authorized judge of conscience must be one who knows the heart. (8)

God is therefore necessary in order to judge worthiness of the reward of happiness.

Now that I have established the need for God as Judge, I will
turn to the reasons behind this need for a hope in a Judge to impart happiness as deserved. Kant makes some rather bold comments pertaining to what he calls the "natural promise" of happiness:

...morality and happiness are two elements of the Supreme Good, that they differ in kind, and that, whilst they must be kept distinct, they stand in necessary relation to one another. The moral law contains within it a natural promise of happiness: it tells me that if I conduct myself so as to be worthy of happiness I may hope for it; here the springs of morality and morality thus, has a necessary relation to happiness...Happiness is not a ground, not a principle of morality, but a necessary corollary of it. (9)

I assume that this natural promise has to do with our natural state as sentient beings trapped for the most part in a phenomenal world. If we were rational wills only, we would not need to hope for happiness or for any consequences. Kant goes so far as to say that moral laws cannot command without fulfilling this need:

God's governance of the world in accordance with moral principles is an assumption without which all morality would have to break down. For if morality cannot provide me with the prospect of satisfying my needs, then it cannot command anything of me either. (10)

The whole concept of having "needs" is one unique to rational but human wills. As conditioned by our sentient existence we must think in terms of ends other than the noble end of perfecting our own wills to the extent that we no longer "need" anything other than the natural satisfaction with the dignity of our own nature as rational autonomous wills. Kant also claims:

...the absence of a supreme judge would make all moral laws ineffectual. There would be no incentives, no reward and no punishment. Knowledge of God is, therefore, necessary to make moral laws effective... (11)
Again, here Kant is speaking about the imperfect, uncultivated will which needs to look to God as judge, as grantor of reward, in order to give driving force to the laws of morality. Although the laws are worthy in themselves of obedience, as developed by the understanding, in imperfect wills they lack the potent drive of sensibility.

Morality consists in this, that an action should arise from the impulsive ground of its own inner goodness, and this is a matter of moral purity...this impulsive ground has no driving force. Moral perfection has indeed the approbation of our judgment, but because this impulsive ground is the creation of the understanding, it has not the strong driving force of the motives of sensibility. (12)

I will deal more with God as incentive later on in this chapter. I will now turn to God's role as aid, which again emphasizes the imperfect will of humans as in need of assistance (through religion and God) in order to help it perfect itself.

It is Kant's pessimism or realism concerning the human inadequacy to act morally which leads to religion, hope for reward, and hope for aid. There are many instances where Kant indicates this pessimism. Kant makes claims such as the following:

...the highest goal of moral perfection of the finite creatures - a goal to which man can never completely attain - is love of the law. (13)

and, "[The] ideal of holiness is not attainable by any creature..." (14) Furthermore, Kant is pessimistic concerning the Kingdom of Ends:

The idea of such a state possesses a thoroughly well-grounded objective reality in human reason (in man's duty to join such a state), even though, subjectively, we can never hope that man's good will will lead mankind to decide to work with unanimity towards this goal. (15)
It is this realistic portrayal of the human inadequacy with respect to the moral law that leads morality to extend itself to the idea of religion. God is not only judge of moral worth, but an aid to it, for those worthy of aid. This assistance is to make up for what we lack; for how we fall short of morality. In his Lectures on Ethics, Kant dwells on the concept of divine aid most:

The moral law must not be indulgent, but must be the expression of supreme purity and holiness, and in so far as man is weak and unable to comply unaided with the holy law he must look for divine aid to make up for the deficiency and to render him capable of compliance with the law. (16)

In this sense divine aid seems to mean assistance to virtue, or assistance to self-overcoming. Compliance with the law is not good enough for Kant. This quote suggests that we look for aid when we are most primitive on our journey to becoming moral. There is also another sense of divine aid which Kant refers to which has to do with our inability to meet the demands of the perfection of the moral law.

But though weighed in the scales of the moral law man finds himself wanting, his belief that his moral insufficiency will be made good by Heaven meets his need. Let us cherish none but good dispositions; let us exert ourselves to the utmost of our powers to comply with the moral law; we can then hope that Heaven will find the means to make up our deficiency, and by our very endeavors we should become worthy of the support and aid of Heaven. (17)

When we are placed in the seat of judgment by God we can hope for aid in overcoming our moral insufficiency. There are however, conditions of such assistance or grace:

...in moral religion...it is a basic principle that each must do as much as lies in his power to become a better man, and that only when he has not buried his inborn talent (Luke XIX 12-16) but has made use of his
original predisposition to good in order to become a better man, can he hope that what is not within his powers will be supplied through cooperation from above...it is essential to know what man himself must do in order to become worthy of this assistance. (18)

Only when one has indicated a worthiness of assistance can one hope to be assisted. Kant was quite careful to guard against the corrupt notion that as humans we are weak and our only hope is the grace of God. He claims that we should not "allow ourselves to fall into the indolence of awaiting from above, in passive leisure. what we should seek from within." (19) Hope for happiness is therefore necessary in order to provide us with reassurance that virtue will be aided as well as rewarded.

The role of God as incentive will be examined next. Kant admits that religion is an incentive to morality. Although it is an incentive, this does not mean that it should be an incentive of a pure will. However, the human will, as impure and sentient requires an incentive other than the law itself. As I have stated in Chapter V, Kant defines incentive in the Groundwork as "the subjective ground of desire which strives for "subjective ends" (20) I will first examine several passages where Kant describes the need for the incentive of religion. Secondly, I will discuss why he thinks that the atheist cannot be moral. Lastly, I will point out the distinction between the hope for reward and the hope for worthiness of reward. Kant thinks that this distinction somehow justifies the role happiness plays in ethical decision making.

It is only when the subjective ground of desire is united with the objective ground of volition (valid for every rational being), that action is moral. On the way to becoming moral he
subjective ground is not united with the objective ground or motive. Kant claims:

For although his virtue must be without any selfishness, after denying the many claims of seductive temptations he may still feel in himself the impulse to hope for happiness. He tries to act according to the duties he finds grounded in his own nature. But he also has senses which oppose these duties with their continuous dazzle, and he would in the end be blinded by this dazzle if he had no further incentives and powers to help him withstand it. Hence in order that he might not set against his own powers, his reason compels him to think of a being whose will is those very commands which he knows to be given for themselves a priori with apodictic certainty. (21)

Yet even though religion provides incentive and powers to help one withstand the dazzle of sensuous temptations, ideally the law itself should be adequate to this task.

Kant goes on to claim that morality must lead to religion not to provide us with more knowledge about what is good but to help make our moral convictions firmer. (22)

...our morality has need of the idea of God to give it emphasis. Thus it should not make us more learned, but better, wiser, and more upright. For if there is a supreme being who can and will make us happy, and if there is another life, then our moral dispositions will thereby receive more strength and nourishment, and our moral conduct will be made firmer. (23)

He also claims that:

The knowledge of God, therefore, must complete morality, but it must not determine whether something is morally good, or a duty for me. This I have to judge from the nature of things, in accordance with a possible system of ends; and I must be just as certain of it as I am that a triangle has three angles. But in order to provide my heart with conviction, import, and emphasis, I have need of a God who will make me participate in happiness in accordance with these eternal and unchangeable laws, if I am worthy of it. (24)

Hence, Kant speaks of religion as giving morality emphasis, more strength and nourishment, more incentives, a morally moving
power, more conviction, etc. (25) Yet, still, in order for an action to be moral, it must be done from duty regardless of religion, God, or promised reward. In a discussion of the distinction between the good and evil person, Kant claims that the reversal of the ethical order of incentives incorporated in one's maxim is all important:

Hence the distinction between a good man and one who is evil cannot lie in the difference between the incentives which they adopt into their maxim (not in the content of the maxim), but rather must depend upon the subordination (the form of the maxim), i.e., which of the two incentives he makes the condition of the other. Consequently man (even the best) is evil only in that he reverses the moral order of the incentives when he adopts them into his maxim. He adopts, indeed, the moral law along with the law of self-love; yet when he becomes aware that they cannot remain on a par with each other but that one must be subordinated to the other as its supreme condition, he makes the incentive of self-love and its inclinations the condition of obedience to the moral law; whereas, on the contrary, the latter, as the supreme condition of the satisfaction of the former, ought to have been adopted into the universal maxim of the will as the sole incentive. (26)

Again the notion of morality first, then religion is stressed. The moral worth of an action will be judged by the agent's disposition or the heart that lies behind the various incentives to action. An act will be moral if it is done from duty without regard to any promise of future reward. Only after the moral law has been recognized as what ought to be sufficient to move the will, can extra incentives be realized. Even once this occurs, when it comes down to it, the sole determining incentive should be the law itself.

Kant claims that "it [religion] is a highly necessary hypothesis." (27) He goes so far as to say that the atheist cannot be moral since in the atheist "all the incentives of
morality have broken down." (28) In another passage he says:

But then there must exist a being who rules the world according to reason and moral laws, and who has established, in the course of things to come, a state where the creature who has remained true to his nature and who has made himself worthy of happiness through morality will actually participate in this happiness. For otherwise all subjectively necessary duties which I as a rational being am responsible for performing will lose their objective reality. Why should I make myself worthy of happiness through morality if there is no being who can give me this happiness? Hence without God I would have to be either a visionary or a scoundrel. I would have to deny my own nature and its eternal moral laws. I would have to cease being a rational man. (29)

Subjectively necessary duties would lose their objective validity since without religion (which includes the ideas of God and immorality of the soul), the striving to attain the highest good, the summum bonum, would be pointless. The natural promise that morality implies would not be fulfilled:

Without religion obligation is motiveless. Religion supplies the condition under which the binding force of the laws can be thought. But how then are we to explain that there exist men who do good though they have no religion? They do so not from principles, but from designs to good which belong to sensibility. But let such a man find himself in a difficult situation, let vice come along smiling temptingly and let him be in a position in which he can transgress without losing his good name, then if he has no religion to support him he is in a bad way. It is far best to acknowledge our moral need of God. (30)

It is somewhat pessimistic of Kant to claim that without God presented to rational wills as dangling the possibility of the realization of the highest good humans could not be moral. What happened to the dignity of humanity as autonomous rational wills capable of revealing the moral law unto themselves and obeying it on its own merit?

Before getting on to the distinction between hope for reward
and hope for moral worth. I will briefly summarize the three attempts at justification for hope in happiness. The first has to do with the fact that as phenomenal beings we are end-oriented and must have an end in mind in order to bring the will to action. The second reason for hope in happiness as reward, has to do with the recognition of the uncultivated will as on a journey to becoming moral and in need of pathological motivation. The last has to do with the need for religion which provides the understanding with the concept of a God who will provide aid, judgment, and emphasis or incentive to morality. In all of these cases the imperfect human will is in need of the concept of reward simply because of its imperfection. Once the will becomes moral, the moral law itself becomes adequate to move the will. I will now focus on the distinction between direct hope for reward and the more or less indirect hope for disposition worthy of reward.

In every case in order to judge an action as having moral worth or as being devoid of moral worth, the impulsive ground ought to be the law itself rather than any promise of happiness whether in this life or the future. My own happiness ought not to be the determining principle of my will. Yet, in many cases in imperfect wills, the role this hope for happiness plays is more influential on the will than the law itself. In order to determine which impulsive ground determines the will directly, it is necessary to ask the question which incentive is made the condition of the other. In other words, if all hope for happiness were removed, would the individual act in the same way? Kant distinguishes between two senses of hope for happiness. One
seems to be more noble than the other because it is only an indirect hope for happiness. In the first sense, happiness is hoped for directly. I hope to be rewarded by being granted the state of happiness. In the second sense, happiness is indirectly hoped for, in that the primary hope is for a worthy disposition which leads to the reward of happiness. A direct hope for happiness without moral worth would make ethics heteronomous, since the individual performs the action in order to secure happiness. In the latter sense, the individual performs the action in order to become a moral person who can then hope to be rewarded for such an accomplishment.

There are several places in Kant’s *Lectures on Ethics* where he candidly speaks of the role reward should play in determining an individual will to moral action. He claims that reward ought never to be the impulsive ground of action:

> If we are moved to do something for reasons of physical welfare, purely for the sake of the promised reward, the action has no morality...No man can demand that God should reward and make him happy. He may hope for reward from the Supreme Being, he may expect that God will see to it that he does not suffer for his good deeds, but reward must not be the impulsive ground of his action. Man may hope for happiness, but this hope ought not to be the incentive, merely his consolation. (31)

Hope for happiness as a consolation is a hope to help us struggle through all of the injustices we must suffer in this life since desert and reward are not united. Not only would the action have no morality if done for sake of future reward, it would also make no sense. It is impossible to know what happiness would consist of in a future world where we might not be the same type of individual we are at present. Desiring a phenomenally related
happiness, and thereby acting in such a way so as to secure it, would be pointless, if we are no longer phenomenal beings and our notion of happiness has changed. Furthermore, Kant claims:

To set up as an incentive that which offers the greatest reward is wrong: but it would be correct to say that we ought to do that which is worthy of the greatest reward. (32)

It is morality and not religion which makes us worthy of the greatest reward. Kant claims:

Morality must not lower herself. Her own nature must be her recommendation. All else, even divine reward, is nothing beside her, for only morality makes us worthy of happiness. Moral grounds of impulse ought to be presented by themselves and for themselves: everything else should be kept separate...(33)

We must hope to be moral first, and then turn to religion to offer us hope of reward.

Kant recognizes that if hope or fear were made the fundamental springs and taken as principles, an action's moral worth would be destroyed. This is why morality cannot be considered a doctrine of how we should make ourselves happy:

Hence morality is not properly the doctrine how we should make ourselves happy, but how we should become worthy of happiness. It is only when religion is added that there also comes in the hope of participating some day in happiness in proportion as we have endeavored to be not unworthy of it. (34)

Furthermore, it is only when religion is added that hope for happiness plays any role in decision making.

Compare with this what is said of charity toward the needy from sheer motives of duty (Matthew XXV, 35-40), where those, who gave succor to the needy without the idea even entering their minds that such action was worthy of a reward or that they thereby obligated heaven, as it were, to recompense them, are, for this very reason, because they acted thus without attention to reward, declared by the Judge of the world to be
those really chosen for His kingdom. and it becomes evident that when the Teacher of the Gospel spoke of rewards in the world to come he wished to make them thereby not an incentive to action but merely (as a soul-elevating representation of the consummation of the divine benevolence and wisdom in the guidance of the human race) an object of the purest respect and of the greatest moral approval when reason reviews human destiny in its entirety. (35)

Hope for reward is therefore distinct from the hope for worthiness of disposition. There is also a difference between reward as sole incentive and as one amongst many incentives, the proper one being the law itself. Reward can only be thought of as coinciding with a good disposition. Furthermore, a good disposition is one which is pure and moves a will to action for strictly moral reasons. Only upon meeting the condition of becoming moral can we hope to participate in the reward of Happiness. Not only is this happiness directly tied to the morally pure disposition, it is a special type of happiness a disposition of this type would appreciate. Now that I have summarized Kant's attempts at a justification of the role of happiness in his ethics, I will now deal with several criticisms based on what many claim is an inconsistency.
NOTES ON CHAPTER VII

(1) See Lectures on Ethics, p. 77: Religion Within Limits, p. 5. (Kant is using the term "corollary" to describe the relationship between the principle of morality and how it naturally extends itself to the hope for happiness.)
See also:
Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 151: "The knowledge of God...must complete morality, but it must not determine whether something is morally good, or a duty for me."
Lectures on Ethics, p. 86: [of religion] "...it is a natural corollary of morality."

(2) Lectures on Ethics, p. 82.

(3) A justification of religion is intimately tied to a justification of the role of happiness since it is religion which unites desert and reward through the idea of God as able to judge inner disposition, or worth, as well as able to grant happiness to those worthy of it. Our nature as end-oriented and uncultivated wills provides us with reasons as to what exactly is the role of happiness and why. Kant in attempting to justify religion indirectly reveals an explanation and justification of the role of happiness.


(5) Groundwork, [407].

(6) Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, p. 303.

(7) See Religion Within Limits, p. 130: "The idea of highest good, inseparably bound up with the purely moral disposition, cannot be realized by man himself..."

(8) Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, p. 322.

(9) Lectures on Ethics, p. 77.

(10) Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 159.

(11) Lectures on Ethics, p. 40.

(12) Lectures on Ethics, p. 65.

(13) Religion Within Limits, p. 136.

(14) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 176.

(15) Religion Within Limits, p. 86.

(16) Lectures on Ethics, p. 66.

(17) Lectures on Ethics, p. 92.
(18) **Religion Within Limits**, p. 47.

(19) **Religion Within Limits**, p. 179.

(20) **Groundwork**, [427].

(21) **Lectures on Philosophical Theology**, p. 41.

(22) See also **Lectures on Philosophical Theology**, p. 31: "Natural morality must be so constituted that... can be thought of independently of any concept of God, and elicit our most zealous devotion solely on account of its own inner worth and excellence. But it serves to increase our devotion if after we have taken an interest in morals itself, to take interest also in the existence of God, a being who can reward our good conduct. And then we will obtain strong incentives which will determine us to the observance of moral laws. This is a highly necessary hypothesis."

(23) **Lectures on Philosophical Theology**, p. 24.

(24) **Lectures on Philosophical Theology**, p. 159.

(25) **Lectures on Philosophical Theology**, p. 31.

(26) **Religion Within Limits**, p. 31.

(27) **Lectures on Philosophical Theology**, p. 31.

(28) **Lectures on Philosophical Theology**, p. 40.

(29) **Lectures on Philosophical Theology**, p. 110.

(30) **Lectures on Ethics**, p. 82.

See also **Lectures on Ethics**, p. 54: "No man can possibly be righteous without having the hope, from the analogy of the physical world, that righteousness must have its reward. He believes in reward on the same ground that he believes in virtue."

(31) **Lectures on Ethics**, p. 52-4.

(32) **Lectures on Ethics**, p. 54.

(33) **Lectures on Ethics**, p. 76.

(34) **Critique of Practical Reason**, p. 227.

(35) **Religion Within Limits**, p. 150.
VIII. CRITICISMS OF KANT'S ETHICS

Most critics of Kant's moral arguments focus on the doctrine of the highest good as playing a problematic and perhaps unnecessary role in Kant's ethics. As previously stated the purity of Kant's ethics is questioned because of the introduction of happiness as a component of the highest good. Most criticisms point to an inconsistency between Kant's doctrine of virtue and his doctrine of the highest good which includes future happiness.

The charge of inconsistency can further be divided into two related but distinct charges. The first charge is of hedonism; the second of heteronomy. The charge of hedonism primarily has to do with the motivation of the will. If the desire for happiness is the primary motive of the will, then Kant's ethics would basically be reduced to a sophisticated hedonistic theory. The charge of heteronomy has to do with the question of the determination of the will by an external end or object. In the case of heteronomous action the agent is not autonomous because the will is determined externally by the object or end rather than by the self-imposed moral law as reason commands. The law, as well as the agent become conditioned and determined by the external end. It is rather difficult to separate these two charges because they are related. If Kant promotes a hedonistic theory of ethics, then he also necessarily promotes heteronomy. (ie. if the primary motive of happiness comes to condition the agent's choice as desired end, then the agent's action, as well as the moral law itself become heteronomous). Although the charges of hedonism and heteronomy are so intimately related, I will
attempt to keep them as separate as it is possible. First, I will examine these two charges as distinct by providing examples of such criticisms made by a small selection of critics, then I will respond to these particular problems. In the final chapter I will present an argument to show that these charges are based on a fundamental misunderstanding of Kant's purposes.

In order to examine the charge of inconsistency based on hedonism, it is first necessary to define the term. Andrews Reath in "Hedonism, Heteronomy and Kant's Principle of Happiness" presents an adequate definition of the concept.

Psychological hedonism is a thesis about the objects of desires, which leads to a theory of motivation. It holds that all desires are desires for pleasure in the agent, or for the means thereto, where pleasure is construed as a definite feeling or experience. Thus it makes the desire for pleasure the primary motive to human action, to which all other motives can be reduced. (2)

With regard to Kant, hedonism is charged since happiness of a future state as an end (or more correctly, as a part of a legitimately desired end—the highest good), somehow becomes a motive to action. The motive is not duty or reverence but rather the prospect of future happiness of some sort. As I see it, the sort of happiness aimed at may not be relevant to the critic who charges hedonism. In other words, it may not matter whether future happiness is the "base" type (based on the satisfaction of sentient desires) or the "noble" type (self-contentment). This will be addressed later. All that matters is that happiness, pleasure or well-being of some sort as an end, takes on the role of the primary motive to action. I now turn to several critics of Kant's ethics based along these lines.
Some critics claim that Kant has reduced virtue as well as God to a means to happiness. By making happiness a motive, as part of the desired end, Kant's doctrine of virtue becomes nothing more than a well-disguised ethics of happiness. For instance, A.Seth Pringle-Pattison claims that since God's role is ultimately reduced to that of Paymaster, God and Virtue become instrumental to the pursuit of happiness.

Kant starts from the conception of the *summum bonum* as the object of a rational will, the end, that is to say, whose realization is enjoined by the law of duty; and, in formulating it, the preacher of duty for duty's sake, who had so rigorously purged his ethics of all considerations of happiness or natural inclination, surprises us by the boldly hedonistic lines on which he rounds off his theory. Job is not to serve God for naught after all....the definition of virtue as "worthiness to be happy" seems...to put virtue in a merely instrumental relation towards happiness, as the real object of desire and the ultimate end of action. (3)

Pringle-Pattison goes so far as to claim that God is also merely a means. a "deus ex machina introduced to effect the equation between virtue and happiness." (4)

Theodore M. Greene in his introduction to Kant's *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*. is concerned that Kant has virtually reduced religion to morality. (5) Greene states his concern along the same lines as Pringle-Pattison:

[Kant's] erroneous account of happiness, in turn, greatly weakens his postulate of God's existence. For, in the first place, God is introduced to guarantee to men a mental satisfaction too closely allied to our lower nature to evoke respect or moral approbation. And in the second place, however we conceive of the reward which He is postulated to guarantee in the next life, God still remains. in Kant's argument. a deus ex machina introduced to resolve our moral perplexities, the great Paymaster who is to reward us for our moral efforts. But surely, if, on Kant's own principles, it is wrong to use men merely as means to our own ends, we are not entitled to bring God into our scheme of things
primarily as a means to our ultimate happiness. Once again, had Kant been able to conceive of happiness in a profounder and more realistic way he might have thought of God as the guarantee of the genuineness and durability of the moral order as a whole. (6)

Although Kant's conception of God is lacking to some extent, especially to those Christian philosophers in whose concept God is more personal and interested than Kant's, this does not have to do directly with the purpose of this paper. Yet, I think that it is necessary to see that a possible cause of scepticism about Kant's ethical doctrine is due to his inadequate concept of God. Some may be overly critical of Kant's ethics because of this inadequacy, which at times seems to be taken as an attack on the more personal concept of God. In the cases of Pringle-Pattison, Greene and others, the primary concern seems to be with Kant's concept of God, yet they extend their criticisms to Kant's ethics because of this. However, if Kant has in some way manipulated the concept of God so as to reduce God to a means to the attainment of the hedonistic pursuit of happiness, then those critics, although perhaps indirectly motivated nonetheless, have a legitimate concern regarding the purity of Kant's ethics.

More recently, Stephen Scott complains that Kant really represents a self-interest theory in that the individual is moved by the desire for self-contentment which entails a desire for self-respect. Scott concludes from his analysis of how duty can be an incentive, or how the mysterious non-empirically based emotion of reverence can motivate an individual to action:

…it does not follow that moral action has a motive other than self-interest. I do not see how he [Kant] thought it might follow. For self-respect is an obvious part of anyone's welfare. Surely, the fact that everyone requires for his happiness a sense of
worth is too visible to be ignored or to need defense. So, Kant's best argument, if successful, explains how moral action is essential to an agent's welfare. (7)

In these first three criticisms of Kant, happiness of some sort is seen as a motive, thereby reducing Kant's ethical theory to a "self-interest" theory based on a pursuit of happiness. My first challenge concerns whether the type of happiness hoped for is significant.

If the base sort of happiness is hoped for in itself, then the purity of Kantian ethics can be questioned on the grounds of the introduction of hedonism, as well as heteronomy. There is some evidence to support that this is the case in Kant's texts, particularly when he postulates a future life which is necessarily devoid of sentient-based wants in order to guarantee the possibility of a kingdom of ends. (8) However, Kant may only be talking this way to appease our sentient nature as intimately connected to sentient-based desires. It is because we do desire happiness of the base sort in so far as we are creatures, that this type of happiness would constitute part of our final end. It is the qualifier "part of" which is of importance here. This will be dealt with later. If however, happiness of a different sort is aimed at, then perhaps the purity of Kant's ethics could remain intact without being reduced to a hedonistic or self-interest theory of ethical motivation. In the last criticism made by Scott, self-interest is a motive. Virtue is pursued in order to attain the condition of self-respect, which in turn is a condition of happiness. Scott seems to be reducing Kant's theory to a self-interest theory whereby the agent really desires happiness first, but knows that this end can not be attained without the
self-recognition of worth. (i.e. self-respect). The agent indirectly
seeks self-respect, but directly seeks happiness. In either case
the agent is motivated by self-interest and therefore Kant's
theory is basically hedonistic. As I see it, even if virtue is a
means to self-respect, this does not necessarily mean that we may
legitimately question the purity of Kant's ethics. Scott has
identified the rather odd notion of using oneself as a means to
becoming one's proper or true self. Self-worth. or respect. is
virtue itself. It is because we have created the law by virtue of
our reason, that it deserves respect. It is because we are
capable of developing and subjecting ourselves to the moral law
that we are worthy of respect. In other words, it is our capacity
to use our reason to formulate laws by which we can determine
ourselves which is worthy of respect. Kant addresses this type of
criticism when he discusses a rational love of good pleasure in
oneself:

...the maxim of self-love as unqualified good pleasure
in oneself (not dependent upon success or failure as
consequences of conduct) would be the inner principle
of contentment as is possible for us only on the
condition that our maxims are subordinated to the moral
law. No man who is not indifferent to morality can
take pleasure in himself, can indeed escape a bitter
dissatisfaction with himself, when he is conscious of
maxims which do not agree with the moral law in him.
One might call that a rational self-love which prevents
any adulteration of the incentives of the will by other
causes of happiness such as come from the consequences
of one's actions (under the name of a thereby
attainable happiness). Since, however, this denotes an
unconditional respect for the law, why needlessly
render difficult the clear understanding of the
principle by using the term rational self-love, when
the use of the term moral self-love is restricted to
this very condition, thus going around in a circle.
(For only he can love himself in a moral fashion who
knows that it is his maxim to make reverence for the
law the highest incentive of his will). (9)
Self-respect, rational self-love or moral self-love are all dependent upon the knowledge that one has a pure disposition, thereby making this type of happiness contingent upon worth. If happiness of the more noble sort as "self-contentment" is a part of the highest good we aim at, then although Kant's theory is in a sense self-interested, it is not hedonistic. It is not only natural but necessary to be interested in becoming what one should become. Kant claims:

By our nature as beings dependent upon circumstances of sensibility, we crave happiness first and unconditionally. Yet by this same nature of ours (if we wish in general so to term that which is innate), as beings endowed with reason and freedom, this happiness is far from being first, not indeed is it unconditionally an object of our maxims; rather this object is worthiness to be happy, i.e., the agreement of all our maxims with the moral law. That this is objectively the condition whereby alone the wish for happiness can square with legislative reason — therein consists the whole precept of morality; and the moral cast of mind consists in the disposition to harbor no wish except on these terms. (10)

To fulfill one's nature as worthy of dignity is not an end which is distinct from following the law itself.

The main objection to this type of criticism is that for Kant there is an intimate connection between desert and reward. In these criticisms, this fact seems to be ignored. Kant forms a heterogeneous conception of the Highest Good as containing both worth (as a condition) and happiness (as reward). Since worth is the condition of reward, reward is not directly aimed at in itself; especially considering the fact that if reward is motive, then the condition of worth is not met. Several authors defend Kant from such criticisms of hedonism on these grounds. Mark Packer in "The Highest Good in Kant's Psychology of Motivation",
claims that the Highest Good does not mitigate the purity of the moral law. The feeling of reverence originates from an agent's own moral faculty rather than heteronomously from some external object thereby making it autonomous and "self-wrought". (11) However, "the end or object that motivates the will cannot be willed apart from the law, since it must presuppose the formal conditions of the law for its possibility." (12) Packer quotes Kant's "On the Old Saw: That May be Right in Theory, but it Won't Work in Practice" in order to illustrate this point. Kant claims:

In man, therefore, the motive force lies in the idea of the highest good possible through his efforts. The motivation is not the happiness he means to gain for himself in this cooperation; it is rather that idea as an end in itself and hence, its pursuit as duty. For the idea contains not the prospect of happiness pure and simple, but only that of a proportion between happiness and the worthiness of whichever subject it may concern. When a will is determined, however, by limiting itself and its purpose to the restrictive condition of belonging to such an entirety, it is not selfish. (13)

Furthermore what Packer calls "moral happiness" which is the motivating object of the human will, can be "willed only by not being willed at, since to desire happiness is to reduce the unconditional validity of the law to a hypothetical imperative expressing merely instrumental relations." (14) Packer basically concludes that happiness is only willed indirectly since worth is willed first as the condition of the attainment of moral happiness. In other words, "to will one's true happiness is to will one's autonomy, and this is nothing other than willing the moral law as an end in itself." (15)

Several other commentators have defended Kant along similar grounds. Daniel O'Connor in "Kant's Conception of Happiness"
bases his defense of Kant on a distinction between two types of happiness: "happiness of fortune" and "happiness of achievement". (16) The distinction is similar to what I have chosen to call happiness of the base and noble sorts. O'Connor claims:

The purpose of nature is evidently not to endow every human being with the happiness of fortune. If that were the purpose, it could only have been secured by instinct. Having tasted the forbidden fruit of freedom, men have outgrown that kind of happiness. An individual, in whom the consciousness of rational power is awakened, will not be satisfied with passive acquiescence in what life puts in his way. The gifts of fortune are not to be despised or rejected, but they do not suffice. To them must be added a happiness of our own achievement. (17)

O'Connor also discusses contentment as motive:

Gradual progress in the exercise of freedom, increasing control over inclination and passion is reflected inwardly as contentment...Contentment is a sense of release from the bondage of passion; it is thus a negative satisfaction, the awareness of freedom in the negative sense, rather than a positive satisfaction, which always begins in sensory stimulation. But contentment is something a man would not willingly be without. Lack of it spoils the happiness of a morally sensitive person. And the possessor of contentment would not trade it for any degree of happiness. To make contentment the motive for actions (as Epicurus did) is to confuse contentment with happiness, the mistake of confusing the consciousness of (negative) freedom with the consciousness of (positive) satisfaction of inclinations. (18)

It is the happiness of our own achievement which is actively sought. Yet it is sought only indirectly as conditioned by the highest good. It is the consciousness of virtue which brings about contentment. Contentment is an indispensable condition for happiness, yet not the whole of happiness. The highest good includes the idea of the harmonious unity of our powers and our purposes. (19) Again, the highest good is sought, yet not on
purely hedonistic grounds, since consciousness of virtue or worthiness to be happy is the condition of reward.

John Silber in "The Moral Good and the Natural Good in Kant's Ethics", presents an interesting discussion of the moral good as a condition of the complete good. If an individual does not recognize him or herself as worthy, then he or she cannot be as happy as possible. Silber describes Lady Macbeth as unable to fully appreciate the natural goods she acquired because of the wrongful means by which they were acquired. All of the natural goods she acquired could not transform her worthlessness into worthiness. (20) Kant claims:

We must not be blinded by the outward glitter that frequently surrounds the vicious man. If we look within him we always read, as Shaftesbury says, the admission of his reason: "Thou art nevertheless a villain." The restlessness of his conscience torments him constantly, agonizing reproaches torture him continually, and all his apparent good fortune is really only self-deception and disappointment. (21)

Furthermore, since the natural good (as the idea of happiness), refers to "an absolute whole, a maximum of well-being in [one's] present and in every future, state", its value although constant with respect to an individual's sensible nature, is relative with respect to the person's state as a whole. (22) Silber claims:

Faced with his worthlessness, a moral person cannot justify the continuation of his happiness; to the contrary, he can only justify its discontinuance. The desires of his sensible nature may urge him to seek the natural good, but the maxims of happiness merely advise, while the maxims of the moral law command. The law commands that he not passively accept the delights of happiness as gifts of nature, but rather that he justify his possession of these delights. It further demands that if by transgression of the law he has forfeited all worthiness of the natural good, he then forfeit the actual delights that accompany its possession. ...Our rational nature sets a limit to the esteem in which we can rightly regard our sensible
nature. That is, the moral good, the will, sets a limit to the esteem in which all particular goods and even the natural good itself are rightly held. For man to be happy without being virtuous is an affront to his rational nature, and the moral good depreciates the value of the natural good in the context of the total person when this situation obtains. (23)

It is only the moral good which is absolute and unconditioned because although "the value of one's happiness is diminished by one's failure to deserve it, one's worthiness to be happy is in no way diminished by his failure to be happy." (24) Again, worth as (moral good) is a condition of the complete good which entails satisfaction of the desire for the natural good. Since true happiness is incomplete without meeting the condition of worthiness, it is worthiness which is aimed at rather than happiness in itself.

I now turn back to Andrews Reath's definition of psychological hedonism in order to see if those who have defended Kant against such a charge have succeeded. Reath states that in psychological hedonism "all desires are desires for pleasure in the agent, or for the means thereto, where pleasure is construed as a definite feeling or experience". (25) If happiness of the future is desired and thus a motive (whether it be self-contentment or the base kind of happiness), then it would seem that Kant has introduced a type of hedonism into his ethics. Even if the end aimed at is worthiness of happiness, then it would still seem that hedonism has entered here as worthiness is a means to the desired end of happiness. One may argue however, that Kant might claim that regardless of actual happiness being granted as a reward, the agent should still act according to the moral law since the disposition is good in itself. But this
interpretation may have its own problems. There is, however, one condition that Kant's doctrine of the highest good does not meet, thereby making the charge of hedonism unfounded. Since no one has reached a truly moral disposition in this lifetime, the happiness aimed at cannot be defined. How can happiness be a direct motive of the will when it is an indeterminate concept based on an ideal of imagination rather than on reason? (26) Furthermore, even if Kant did modify his definition of happiness as self-contentment, or self-sufficiency, making it a concept which is a priori and independent of empirical laws, it still is an incomplete definition and therefore incapable of being a motive. In hedonism, pleasure or happiness must be "construed as a definite feeling or experience", yet it is not possible for us to know this feeling until we have experienced it. Happiness cannot be a motive in this respect. As A. Phillips Griffiths points out in "Kant's Psychological Hedonism", for Kant the human will cannot be determined by pleasure but rather merely influenced by it. (27) Humans unlike other creatures without rationality cannot be pathologically determined. This is why irrational creatures are not free, whereas we are.

In sum, Kant's doctrine of the highest good does not make his ethics impure by the introduction of hedonism because happiness is aimed at only indirectly, as conditioned by a worthy disposition. Furthermore, even as an indirect motive of self-respect, happiness does not seem to be distinct from the worthiness of disposition. Also, happiness cannot be a direct motive because if it were, then it could not be attained. Finally, happiness whether a priori or empirically based is an
idea which cannot be adequately defined, and therefore cannot determine the will. There is also another response to the charge of hedonism which I will address in the discussion of the charge of heteronomy. It has to do with the confusion of ends and motives of action.

The charge of heteronomy is distinct but related to that of hedonism, since if Kant's ethics entails hedonism, this necessarily leads to an external determination of the will, which is heteronomy. It is not difficult to see how hedonism entails heteronomy. If an agent's will is determined or conditioned by something external to itself, then the will is not pure or free. If agents could not act autonomously, then they could not be held responsible for their good or wrong-doings. In the *Groundwork* Kant distinguishes between autonomy and heteronomy of the will. Autonomy of the will is "the property that the will has of being a law to itself (independent of any property of the object of volition)." (29) Heteronomy describes the will which "seeks the law that is to determine it anywhere but in the fitness of its maxims for its own legislation of universal laws, and if it thus goes outside of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects..." (30) In the case of heteronomy, "the will does not give itself the law, but the object does so because of its relation to the will". (31) If any form of happiness in itself is a motive to action, then the individual's maxim becomes conditioned by the desired effect. The agent in this case would be determined not by the self-imposed law, but by the object of the will. Kant is well aware of this problem. Although the moral law is the sole determining ground of the pure will, it
only prescribes the form of the maxim as universally legislative, thereby abstracting as a determining principle from all matter (every object of volition). Kant warns that although the sumnum bonum is the whole object of a pure practical reason, it is not to be regarded as its determining principle. The moral law alone is the principle. (31) Kant claims:

This remark is important in so delicate a case as the determination of moral principles, where the slightest misinterpretation perverts men’s minds. ... if we assume any object under the name of a good as a determining principle of the will prior to the moral law, and then deduce from it the supreme practical principle, this would always introduce heteronomy, and crush out the moral principle. It is, however, evident that if the notion of the sumnum bonum includes that of the moral law as its supreme condition, then the sumnum bonum would not merely be an object, but the notion of it and the conception of its existence as possible by our own practical reason would likewise be the determining principle of the will, since in that case the will is in fact determined by the moral law which is already included in this conception, and by no other object, as the principle of autonomy requires. This order of the conceptions of determination of the will must not be lost sight of, as otherwise we should misunderstand ourselves, and think we have fallen into a contradiction, while everything remains in perfect harmony. (32)

Because the law was determined first for Kant, apart from any consequences or hope thereof, his ethics remain pure.

Allen Wood claims that critics of Kant have confused the end with the motive. The end is not necessarily the motive of an action. Happiness must have nothing to do with the motivation of the will. However, one cannot conclude that happiness must have nothing to do with the ends or objects that the morally good person sets before him or herself in obedience to the law. (33)

For Kant, the crucial moral question is one of motivation: what must be "strenuously avoided" in his view is making any empirical object a material consideration (whether this be one’s own happiness, or
anything else) the unconditioned motive of the will. Of course, all willing is purposive, and all finite willing represents an end to itself. But such an end need not, and indeed should not, become the motive of the will. (34)

Kant addresses this problem in his *Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, where he foresees the criticism that the notion of duty itself does not determine the will since it is only by means of the happiness in prospect that the individual is moved to duty. This is a charge of circular reasoning as well as contradiction. Kant states the problem:

...[S]ince [the individual] can promise himself this reward of virtue only from the consciousness of having done his duty, it is clear that the latter must have preceded: that is, he must feel himself bound to do his duty before he thinks, and without thinking, that happiness will be the consequence of obedience to duty. He is thus involved in a circle in his assignment of cause and effect. He can hope to be happy if he is conscious of his obedience to duty if he foresees that he will thereby become happy. But in this reasoning there is also a contradiction. For, on the one side, he must obey his duty. without asking what effect this will have on his happiness, consequently, from a moral principle: on the other side, he can only recognize something as his duty when he can reckon on happiness which will accrue to him thereby, and consequently, on a pathological principle, which is the direct opposite of the former. (35)

"Euthanasia (quiet death)" of all morality is the consequence of adopting *eudaemonism* as the principle of action. as opposed to "*eleutheronomy* (the principle of freedom of the inner legislation)." (36) Although the pleasure which must precede the obedience to the law is pathological, following the physical order of nature, the moral order must be preceded by the law in order that it may be felt. Kant attempts to explain the origin of such a criticism as based on our inability to completely understand the freedom of the elective will:
The cause of these mistakes is no other than the following: Those who are accustomed only to physiological explanations will not admit into their heads the categorical imperative from which these laws dictatorially proceed, notwithstanding that they feel themselves irresistibly forced by it. Dissatisfied at not being able to explain what lies wholly beyond that sphere, namely, freedom of the elective will, elevating as is this privilege that man has of being capable of such an idea, they are stirred up by the proud claims of speculative reason, which feels its power so strongly in other fields, just as if they were allies leagued in defense of the omnipotence of theoretical reason, and roused by a general call to arms to resist that idea; and thus at present, and perhaps for a long time to come, though ultimately in vain, to attack the concept of freedom, and if possible render it doubtful.

(37)

Explaining freedom of the will is a "subjective impossibility". as is explaining an "interest which man can take in moral laws." (38) It is precisely because we are sentient beings that we find it puzzling to think of motives apart from the empirical motives as sufficient to move the will. This is why we then question the legitimacy of the moral law as worthy of being followed in itself. This is part of what Kant calls the "extreme limit of all moral inquiry."

But how pure reason can be practical by itself without other incentives taken from whatever source - i.e., how the mere principle of the universal validity of all reason's maxims as laws (which would certainly be the form of a pure practical reason) can by itself, without any matter (object) of the will in which some antecedent interest might be taken, furnish an incentive and produce an interest which could be called purely moral: or, in other words, how pure reason could be practical: to explain all this is quite beyond the power of human reason, and all the effort and work of seeking such an explanation is wasted. (38)

I now return to Wood's response to the criticism of heteronomy generated by a confusion of the motive of action with its end. Wood claims that Kant admits that the end of happiness is involved in the matter of every maxim for a finite rational
being. Happiness is also part of every object of pure practical reason. This does not imply that happiness is the motive of finite rational volition, but that it is a part of the end. (39) Wood claims:

...it does not follow that the presupposition and systematic inclusion of one's own happiness in the material of one's maxim will mean that this happiness is the motive for action, nor does it follow that one's action will necessarily contribute in the end to one's happiness. Indeed, since the moral law has the effect of limiting and conditioning one's pursuit of his natural ends, it is hardly to be expected that moral action should of itself add to that happiness. But by the same token, one's own happiness, thus limited and conditioned, is necessarily included within the ends pursued by the finite rational being in obedience to the moral law. (40)

Autonomous action is action which is motivated by the legislative form of the agent's maxim, rather than by its matter. Although we require an end in view in order to act, this end need not be our motive. Just as religion arises out of morality and not as its basis, the end of happiness does the same.

Another way of addressing the criticism of heteronomy is by distinguishing between the hope for reward and knowledge of reward. This again has to do with why the prospect of future happiness is inadequate to motivate the will, namely, because it "cannot be construed as a definite feeling or experience" (41) Wood expands on this point in his book, Kant's Rational Theology:

So long as this hope is a matter of faith and not a matter of knowledge, it cannot undermine our moral conduct by serving as its motive. This is because moral faith presupposes that it is our moral disposition which moves us to believe, and not our knowledge that there is a rewarding and avenging God which disposes us to do what morality commands. (42)

If we knew that God exists, as Judge, then our actions would not be autonomous since we would determine them with consequences in
mind. We would still be free to choose which maxims we wish to adopt whether moral or immoral, but we would not be free to choose the consequences of such actions. If we do not have knowledge of God’s existence, and should really be able to know what we "ought" to do as determined through our own reason, then we can choose to act according to maxims regardless of their consequences. Although we hope for reward, we do not know we will receive it, and it is because of this that we can remain autonomous rather than heteronomous agents. Kant himself claims that we should be thankful that we do not have scientific knowledge of objects of faith since if we did:

...all morality would break down. In his every action, man would represent God to himself as a rewarder or avenger. This image would force itself involuntarily on his soul, and his hope for reward and fear of punishment would take the place of moral motives. Man would be virtuous out of sensuous impulses. (43)

In a related defense, Steven Smith in "Worthiness to be Happy and Kant's Concept of the Highest Good" addresses criticisms of heteronomy by distinguishing between a pure will as undetermined by any particular natural end, and a will as being indifferent to natural ends in general. (44) Moral reason cannot be indifferent to consequences. Smith claims:

There is thus a recognizable essential difference between a properly hopeful maxim (in Kant's sense) and a selfish maxim, however much the difference might be obscured in real life by a mixture of motives. (45)

A "properly hopeful maxim" recognizes the connectedness of the two heterogeneous components of the highest good. It cannot will happiness apart from worth. A "selfish maxim" would merely will happiness rather than its condition. Practical reason has limited the pursuit of happiness by imposing the law as requiring
a pure disposition as a condition for its attainment. One can pursue happiness, yet only in so far as this pursuit is consistent with and conditioned by the pursuit of worthiness of disposition. When a conflict between the these two related but separate pursuits arises, the moral pursuit must take over.

In any case, Kant cannot be accused of heteronomy because although following the law may lead to the end of the highest good, the law itself was developed prior to any consideration of this end. Kant maintains that "Ethics cannot start from the ends which the man may propose to himself, and hence give directions as to the maxims he should adopt...", but rather, it has its roots in pure reason. (46) Furthermore, this criticism of heteronomy is one which arises because of the inability of practical reason to fully understand the freedom of the elective will. This results in a confusion of end of action with motive of action, of hope for reward with knowledge of reward and of interrelated maxims with selfish maxims.

I will now turn to a discussion of the overall purity of Kant's ethics. Although the attempt at a defense of Kant against the charges of hedonism and heteronomy may not completely satisfy those who criticize him along these lines, I see a more important defense based on Kant's theory of the two standpoints. Critics who do not note the importance of the fact that Kant represents the human condition as a dialectical struggle of rational but finite creatures, misrepresent Kant by confusing the "is" with the "ought". To this I now turn.
NOTES ON CHAPTER VIII

(1) I have chosen to limit the selection of critics since I think that these are representative of the others who all basically question the purity of Kant's ethics due to the introduction of happiness into the final end of humanity.


(4) Pringle-Pattison. p. 34.


(6) Greene, p. ixiv.


(8) See Chapter III - Happiness Defined and Lecture on Philosophical Theology "But the human race is a class of creatures which through their own nature are some day to be released and set free from their instincts." (118)

(9) Religion Within Limits. p.41 ff.

(10) Religion Within Limits. p.41-42 ff.


(14) Packer, p.117.

(15) Packer, p.118.


(18) O'Connor, p. 200-201.

(19) O'Connor, p. 203.


(21) Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 120-121.

(22) Groundwork, [418].

(23) Silber, p. 432.

(24) Silber, p. 432.

(25) Reath, p. 46.

(26) Groundwork, [418].


(28) Groundwork, [440].

(29) Groundwork, [440].

(30) Groundwork, [441].

(31) Critique of Practical Reason, p. 204.


(34) Wood, p. 52.

(35) Metaphysical Elements of Ethics, p. 288.


(37) Metaphysical Elements, p. 289.

(38) Groundwork, [462].


(40) Wood, p. 60.

(41) Reath, p. 46.


(43) Lectures on Philosophical Theology, [123].

(45) Smith. p. 186.

(46) *Groundwork*, [227].
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Perhaps the answer to the question concerning the purity of Kant's ethics in light of his doctrine of the highest good can be best understood by focusing on the essential duality of the nature of rational but finite beings. Regardless of whether or not future happiness of any sort plays a role in an agent's motives to action, ideally the agent would have no need to look to such an end or to incorporate such a motive into his or her maxim. Reverence for the law itself would be adequate to move the individual to action. It is because Kant is limited by phenomenal modes of expression (language) and phenomenal experience that he seems to shift between what 'is' the case and what 'ought' to be the case. As members of two realms, humans must experience both. We cannot help but allow ourselves to shift between the two, even to the extent of defining one realm with reference to the other. Kant's doctrine of the highest good can be shown to be consistent with his doctrine of virtue if this limit is understood.

Kant discusses the two standpoints of human existence in nearly all of his works. It is because of this that the importance of this theory to Kant's philosophical system cannot be over-emphasized. Kant never denies the importance of either standpoint since both are to some extent inescapable and at the same time essential to the journey of the uncultivated will to virtue. Appreciating the tension between the two realms is necessary in order to understand how virtue be achieved, especially considering that "virtue consists precisely in
self-overcoming". (1) In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant clearly identifies the implications of the dualistic or dialectical nature of human existence. In doing so, he does not deny the natural desire for happiness because to do so would be to deny an essential part of our nature.

No doubt our weal and woe are of very great importance in the estimation of our practical reason, and so far as our nature as sensible beings is concerned, our happiness is the only thing of consequence, provided it is estimated as reason especially requires, not by the transitory sensation, but by the influence it has on our whole existence, and on our satisfaction therewith: but it is not absolutely the only thing of consequence. Man is a being who, as belonging to the world of sense, has wants, and so far as his reason has an office which it cannot refuse, namely, to attend to the interest of his sensible nature, and to form practical maxims, even with a view to the happiness of this life, and if possible even to that of a future. But he is not so completely an animal as to be indifferent to what reason says on its own account, and to use it merely as an instrument for the satisfaction of his wants as a sensible being. For the possession of reason would not raise his worth above that of the brutes, if it is to serve him only for the same purposes that instinct serves in them; it would in that case be only a particular method which nature has employed to equip man for the same ends which it has qualified brutes, without qualifying him for any higher purpose. No doubt once this arrangement of nature has been made for him he requires reason in order to take into consideration his weal and woe. But besides this he possesses it for a higher purpose also, namely, not only to take into consideration what is good or evil in itself, about which only pure reason, uninfluenced by any sensible interest, can judge, but also to distinguish this estimate thoroughly from the former, and to make it the supreme condition thereof. (2)

This rather lengthy quote implies that although it may be immoral to ask "What is to result from this right conduct of ours?", it is not an unnatural question for rational but finite beings. This is a legitimate question posed by our practical but impure reason. As beings who are both finite and rational we have inescapable limitations, but also a capacity which attempts to go
beyond such limitations. It is worth quoting Kant's famous and
inspirational passage on duty in order to illustrate how rational
but finite beings can attempt to elevate themselves from their
finite natures:

Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace
nothing charming or insinuating, but requirest
submission, and yet seest not to move the will by
threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or
terror, but merely holdest forth a law which of itself
finds entrance into the mind, and yet gains reluctant
reverence (though not always obedience), a law before
which all inclinations are dumb, even though they
secretly counter-work it: what origin is there worthy
of thou, and where is to be found the root of thy noble
descent which proudly rejects all kindred with the
inclinations; a root to be derived from which is the
indispensable condition of the only worth which men can
give themselves? It can be nothing less than a power
which elevates man above himself (as a part of the
world of sense), a power which connects him with an
order of things that only the understanding can
conceive, with a world which at the same time commands
the whole sensible world, and with it, the empirically
determinable existence of man in time, as well as the
sum total of all ends (which totality alone suits such
unconditional practical laws as the moral). This power
is nothing but personality, that is, freedom and
independence on the mechanism of nature, yet, regarded
also as a faculty of a being which is subject to
special laws, namely, pure practical laws given by its
own reason; so that the person as belonging to the
sensible world is subject to his own personality a
belonging to the intelligible (supersensible) world.
It is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging
to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference
to its second and highest characteristic only with
reverence, and its laws with the highest respect. (3)

Although this passage is inspiring, as I have pointed out in
previous chapters, Kant is not unrealistic about the possibility
of the attainment of virtue. Although we do have the ability to
become what we ought to become, this struggle is nonetheless
extremely difficult if not impossible. In this world there is
only progress. (This is apparent because of the necessity of
the postulates of God and immortality. These postulates ensure
that our efforts coincide with a moral order which would guarantee that virtue itself is a possibility). Only after these postulates are introduced is practical reason satisfied with the legitimacy of the human pursuit of virtue. Although virtue is seen as a possibility, practical reason questions the ability of duty or reverence to be adequate to move the will to action. It is because we are creatures of both realms that this type of question arises. Practical reason is sceptical of itself since although it recognizes its limits it finds it difficult to accept them. (4) Allen Wood claims that for Kant:

Human reason defines for man a final end, a single highest purpose for his existence, an ideal inseparably related to his finite rationality itself. The rational pursuit of this end in the face of man's own necessary limitations, in the face of failure and uncertainty which surrounds his efforts, demands a moral faith, an outlook which he cannot renounce without at the same time renouncing his reason and his rational distinctions themselves. (5)

It is because of these limitations that we find it difficult to accept the fact that we are capable of acting from motives other than self-interest.

R.Z. Friedman in "Virtue and Happiness: Kant and Three Critics" presents a possible answer as to why we tend to confuse morality as a discipline of virtue and morality as a doctrine of happiness. He claims that since creatures 'straddle' two kingdoms, they are subject to laws of nature, which describe what is, and laws of morality which describe what ought to be. It is because we operate out of two perspectives, a descriptive one and a moral one, that we find it necessary to see virtue as the necessary and sufficient condition of happiness. Friedman claims:

The confusion between morality as a discipline of
virtue and morality as a doctrine of happiness is ultimately rooted in the duality of our perspective as creatures who are both finite and rational. We confuse a descriptive "is" with a moral "ought". It is not the case that the virtuous individual "is" happy and happy because he "is" virtuous, as the classical tradition would have it, but it is the case that we believe that such a causal relationship "ought" to prevail, that the virtuous individual "ought" to be happy precisely because he is virtuous. (6)

Furthermore, it "is" not the case that a rational creature as an uncultivated will on a journey to becoming virtuous "is" pure being motivated by nothing other than the law itself. This is what "ought" to be the case. This is what our reason tries to elevate us to. Although the law reason develops for itself is pure, the motive may not be until the will has become cultivated, until it has become its proper self. The principle of happiness and the principle of morality are not in opposition. As I have already stated, practical reason does not require that we should renounce all claims to happiness, rather, at the moment duty is in question it demands that we should take no account of happiness. (7) The moral law is the "sole determining principle of a pure will," yet, a pure will for humans is one which is becoming pure by purifying itself. If we understand this, then we realize that it is a limit of human reason to pose an end such as the highest good. At times we must admit that the highest good is more than an end. When an extra incentive is needed for the uncultivated will to purify itself, the highest good serves this function as well.

Therefore apart from examining the purity of motives in light of the doctrine of the highest good, based on the criticisms of hedonism and heteronomy, if the natural dialectical tension
between the finite and rational natures, between the principle of happiness and the doctrine of virtue, is fully appreciated. Kant's ethics can be considered pure. It is pure to the extent that humans are capable of being pure. It is limited, yet it strives to elevate itself beyond these limits. Kant points to a light at the end of the dark tunnel of injustice in the world in which we live. This light gives the frustrated and limited will hope in itself to overcome the hope it must have for reward.
NOTES ON CHAPTER IX

(1) Lectures on Philosophical Theology. p. 114.

(2) Critique of Practical Reason. p. 151.


(4) See Groundwork: "Concerning the Extreme Limit of All Practical Philosophy" (463).


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