The role of the church in Peruvian political development.

Mary Helen. Mooney
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THE ROLE OF THE CHURCH
IN
PERUVIAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

by

Mary Helen Mooney

A Thesis
submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
through the Department of
Political Science in Partial Fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree
of Master of Arts at
The University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
1976
ABSTRACT

The purpose of the thesis is to analyze the role of the Church in the political development of Peru. The focus of attention in this regard is the extent to which socially-progressive change, that is change emphasizing an improvement in the socio-economic and political position of man within society, has taken place within the Peruvian Church itself. The analysis is carried out with respect to the three interdependent dimensions of that institution - the normative, structural, and attitudinal (as indicative of the behavioural).

Following a delineation of the concepts and a general review of the literature, the thesis examines the nature and extent of change within each dimension.

To determine change in its normative stance, a number of pastoral letters and statements from the national episcopal conferences are analyzed both descriptively and quantitatively through thematic content analysis. The most important development, that of the theology of liberation, receives more detailed attention.

Within the structural dimension, important changes are highlighted, followed by greater in-depth treatment of the two most significant of these - the comunidades de base and the clerical organization of ONIS. Data for this
analysis was obtained through library research, informal interviews with Peruvian clergy, and personal observation.

To secure data relating to the attitudinal dimension, a semi-structured interview schedule was administered to a quota sample of the lower clergy in the dioceses of Lima and Chiclayo principally. The questions covered a number of normative and structural issues, and the responses to these were cross-tabulated with personal data, such as place of residence, national origin, age, clerical status, and associational membership, to clarify the attitudinal trends present within the sample.

The thesis then concludes with a summary and further integration of the data from the three dimensions, including its reference to the general literature as previously discussed.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is difficult to adequately thank all those who have helped to bring this thesis to its completion. Nevertheless, I would like to make the attempt by means of a few specific acknowledgements in this regard, the first being to my parents and family for their support and patience during the past two years. In a special way, I wish to thank my principal advisor, Dr. Jake Soderlund, not only for his indispensible guidance, but also for his constant encouragement and confidence without which I might have lost purpose in the undertaking. Also, to Dr. Alexander Craig and Rev. Ron Pazik for their suggestions and criticisms I extend my appreciation.

Further, I would like to gratefully acknowledge the generous financial support of the Social Science Research Council which allowed me to carry out the necessary field research in Peru. Finally, affectionate thanks go out to my friends in Peru who unselfishly extended to me their hospitality and assistance but also, and more importantly, helped me to broaden my understanding of what "development" really should mean.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.</strong> INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II.</strong> RESEARCH METHODS</td>
<td>21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III.</strong> THE NORMATIVE DIMENSION</td>
<td>37.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV.</strong> THE STRUCTURAL DIMENSION</td>
<td>71.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V.</strong> THE ATTITUDINAL DIMENSION</td>
<td>125.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VI.</strong> CONCLUSION</td>
<td>168.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX A</td>
<td>176.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX B</td>
<td>182.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>184.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VITA AUCTORIS</td>
<td>196.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>Socio-Economic Data For The Four Coastal Sugar Co-operatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>Thematic Orientation Of Pastoral Letters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-2</td>
<td>Thematic Orientation Of Episcopal Conference Statements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-1</td>
<td>Staff Strength Of The Peruvian Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-2</td>
<td>Growth and Change In The Peruvian Clergy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-1</td>
<td>Role Of Faith Orientation By Place Of Residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-2</td>
<td>Focus Of Most Crucial Problems Facing The Church By Place Of Residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-3</td>
<td>Preferred Basis Of Episcopal Authority By Place Of Residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-4</td>
<td>Preferred Model Of Church By Place Of Residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-5</td>
<td>Future Movement Of Church Toward Comunidad De Base Framework By Place Of Residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-6</td>
<td>Role Of Faith Orientation By National Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-7</td>
<td>Use Of Church Doctrine To Justify Socialism By National Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-8</td>
<td>Focus Of Most Crucial Problems Facing The Church By National Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9</td>
<td>Preferred Basis Of Episcopal Authority By National Origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10</td>
<td>Preferred Model Of Church By National Origin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

vii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5-11</td>
<td>Future Movement Of Church Toward Decentralization Of Authority By National Origin</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-12</td>
<td>Assessment Of Contribution Of Foreign Clergy By National Origin</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-13</td>
<td>Role Of Faith Orientation By Age</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-14</td>
<td>Use Of Church Doctrine To Justify Socialism By Age</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-15</td>
<td>Focus Of Most Crucial Problems Facing The Church By Age</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-16</td>
<td>Preferred Basis Of Episcopal Authority By Age</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-17</td>
<td>Preferred Model Of Church By Age</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-18</td>
<td>Assessment Of Contribution Of Foreign Clergy By Age</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-19</td>
<td>Role Of Faith Orientation By Clerical Status</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-20</td>
<td>Preferred Model Of Church By Clerical Status</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-21</td>
<td>Role Of Faith Orientation By Associational Membership</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-22</td>
<td>Interest In National Politics By Associational Membership</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-23</td>
<td>Preferred Basis Of Episcopal Authority By Associational Membership</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-24</td>
<td>Future Movement Of Church Toward Prophetic Role By Associational Membership</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-25</td>
<td>Assessment Of Foreign Financial Aid By Associational Membership</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Within the course of this thesis, the author will attempt to analyze the role of the Catholic Church in Peruvian political development, and in so doing, will examine on a multi-dimensional basis, the type and extent of change which has taken place within the Peruvian Church in terms of the degree to which it has become "socially progressive".

Any fundamental shift in the response of the Church to the challenge of socio-economic change will be a result of the congruency of change among its normative, structural and attitudinal dimensions. These three dimensions, of course are interdependent since, for example, ideas are limited by the ability of the structures to formalize, articulate and implement them while structures may provide the needed capabilities but are useless if the appropriate value orientations are not present to give them direction.¹ It is, however, in the actual behaviour of its clergy and laity, based on and stimulating further change in the first two dimensions, that the Church has its greatest impact on the wider society. One of the most direct and reliable indicators of what that be-

¹Donald E. Smith, Religion and Political Development (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), pp.18,19.
haviour most likely will be is that of attitudes, and in this thesis they will be used in lieu of behaviour itself in analyzing that dimension. The role of the Church in Peruvian political development, then, will be examined according to its basic normative, structural and attitudinal aspects.

For the purposes of this study, "the Church" will refer primarily to the hierarchy and active laity of the Peruvian subunit of the transnational Roman Catholic Church system. The justification for thus limiting the definition of the Church lies in a number of factors. First of all, although the vast majority of Peruvians are at least nominally Catholic, few have been active members of the Church in terms of liturgical and other programme participation, and thus have had little direct impact in determining the societal role of the Church. Secondly, the hierarchical organization of that institution inherently creates a situation in which the clergy, particularly the highest level, that of bishops, has been predominant in policy-making for the Peruvian Church. Finally, despite the fact that the influence emanating from the centre in Rome is considerable for the national Church in terms of policy direction, the actual impact of any pronouncement from the centre must be qualified

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by the practical interpretation it receives in the hands of the authority figures of the national unit.

The term "socially progressive" in this study will refer to both a value and behavioural orientation which, in relation to other alternatives, places emphasis on the improvement of the socio-economic and political condition of man within the society. This orientation is viewed by its proponents as a prerequisite to the fulfillment of the professed goal of the Church, that of providing the means by which all men can achieve spiritual salvation. In this thesis, also, it is seen as essential if the Church is to play an active and positive role in political development.

Perhaps "development" itself is the most elusive of the concepts which are important in this study. Within the discipline of political science, the field of political development has come into prominence only relatively recently and its theoreticians are still trying to specify the essential characteristics of that process. For the most part, the focus has been on its "evolutionary" and domestic nature, usually viewed through glasses tinted by Western democracy.\(^3\) In determining the level of political development which nations have achieved, some

authors have isolated the crucial factors to be, for example, the degree of equality within the system, the latter's capacity to meet the demands placed on it and the extent of functional differentiation and specialization within the political system. Adjustments to such factors are advanced by other students of the field. Some, for example, place additional emphasis on the importance of the various systems capabilities and the secularization of the political culture, while others stress the need for the integration of organizational structures and the institutionalization of political procedures and organizations, the most important being the political party.

Still other scholars, in the last few years, have been placing greater emphasis on the elimination of international dependency as the key factor in the development of the Third World. "Structural dependency," which per-


vades all spheres of society and extends from the international to the local level is, for these authors, the essence of "underdevelopment". 8

Present in various degrees of explicitness in most works dealing with political development is the notion that structural change (referring to a change in a set of persistent intergroup relationships) seems essential to the creation of greater societal dynamism geared toward changing the status quo which has thus far benefitted only the few. Some of the more recent literature dealing with the developmental process has also increasingly stressed the latter's inherently normative or ethical nature, postulating that any kind of desirable change or "growth" cannot necessarily be considered "development". Within this perspective, the concept of "social justice", imply-


ing a more equitable distribution of available resources, is given greater attention. This enables a more accurate assessment of the actual impact such change has on those it is meant to develop, a consideration largely ignored in earlier, more mechanistic approaches.

Therefore, keeping in mind the multi-faceted nature of the concept, the definition of development employed in this thesis will be that of economic growth coincident with change in social, economic and political structures which facilitates an improvement in the quality of life for the majority of the population.

Within the Latin American context, one of the key institutions which must be considered in any examination of efforts toward such structural change is that of the Church. Along with the military and the large-scale landowners, the Church was a member of the traditional Triumvirate of stagnation in Latin American society. This alliance had long persevered in many countries, including Peru, but today it is frequently divided over the ends and means of policy-making. The Church may now more properly be considered an elite interest group in the region. In contrast to most Third World interest groups


which usually lack grass-roots organization and a permanent bureaucracy, thus tending to be ad hoc coalitions.\textsuperscript{12} the Church is a clearly differentiated and highly formalized organization which espouses broadly-shared values.\textsuperscript{13} As such, it is reasonable to assume that in a developing political system where political and social participation still is limited to a small minority, the Church exerts a disproportionate degree of influence relative to the small number of its leadership and active members.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, its role in at least certain aspects of political development is potentially an important one.

The controversy among scholars and churchmen alike over what the specific nature and extent of that role will be, has centred around the orientation of the Church toward what is generally considered the secular function of promoting economic and social change, and its ability to carry out such a function.\textsuperscript{15} An examination of the literature will help to clarify the arguments presented in this controversy.


\textsuperscript{14} Von Lazar, \textit{Latin American Politics}..., p. 49:

\textsuperscript{15} Von Lazar, \textit{Latin American Politics}..., p. 62.
There is no need here to belabour the point that since the time of the Conquest, the Church has been a strong and pervasive force in Latin American society, though the degree to which this has been true varies from country to country.\textsuperscript{16} Briefly, in the case of Peru, the Church has typically been one of the pillar institutions of national life.\textsuperscript{17} Since independence it has generally been on good terms with the civil government as its power has never become a political issue and, unlike many of its neighbours, there never has been a significant anti-clerical campaign within the polity. Catholicism is still the state religion and Peru is one of only a few Latin American nations in which religion has been, at least until recently, an integral part of the school curriculum.

In the twentieth century, the lower clergy in Peru

\textsuperscript{16} For a comprehensive historical review of the Latin American Church, see J. Lloyd Mecham, Church and State in Latin America (2nd. rev. ed.; Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1966).

has produced many liberal and critical individuals. However, in general, the Church has been the staunch supporter, legitimator and benefactor of the status quo. In the pre-World War II period, it vigorously opposed the popularly-backed reform party, APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana), until the latter considerably modified its policies in its bid to secure political power.

Similarly, although it now promotes the social Gospel, the Universidad Catolica was founded in 1917 specifically to help combat the rising popularity of communism in the nation. In addition, pro-fascist philosophy was the basis for efforts during and immediately following the Second World War to check the spread of leftist organizations, including some peasant organizations as well as marxists and communists. There still is little formal dialogue between the Church and these groups even though their individual concerns have become somewhat more aligned.

As a result of its former anti-reformist stance, the Church, by mid-century, had lost much of its prestige and influence and had become stagnant in ideology and expansion. Much of the population had become indifferent to its purpose as its key links were to the upper and upper-middle classes.

Some authors believe that even today the situation has changed little in Latin America generally, in that the Church still maintains its conservative attitudes and
structures as well as its paternalistic and authoritarian leadership.\textsuperscript{18} They feel, and often with much reason, that despite radical declarations to the contrary, the bishops still accept the existing national and international set-up, seeking consensus rather than supporting the necessary societal changes.\textsuperscript{19} One of the most outspoken critics of the Latin American Church maintains that that institution is even contributing to the dependency problem by becoming a satellite of North American sources of support. It is thereby undermining its own potential and often-claimed role of advocacy for real structural change, instead withdrawing when the latter actually seems to be a threat.\textsuperscript{20}

Most observers, however, perceive important fundamental changes taking place more recently in the functioning of the Church in Latin American society. In the case of the Peruvian Church, for example, its image in the eyes of many has changed considerably in the last twenty-five years. Beginning in the late fifties and early

\textsuperscript{18}Francois Houtart and Emile Pin, \textit{The Church and the Latin American Revolution} (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965).


sixties, it began to respond to internal and external pressures to place greater emphasis on ameliorating the poverty situation common to most Peruvians. More recently, the military regime, the most actively reformist in modern Peruvian history, has provided the atmosphere for the Church to continue and amplify this image.

Thomas Bruneau points out, however, that it is often difficult for the student to determine the degree and effectiveness of such change since the research on the Church in Latin America has been carried out not only without the proper appreciation of historical background, but also and more importantly without regard to any particular common paradigm, resulting in a chaos of approaches and conclusions. 21 Nevertheless, it is possible to discern basic attitudes among the authors concerning the role of the Church in the course of Latin American development.

Many students of the Latin American Church are optimistic that the institution does have an important contribution to make in regard to the political development of the region. Often their optimism is based on the ability of the Church, as a transmitter of values, to provide legitimacy through symbolic moral support to the societal (and in particular, the political) system during

the necessary but destabilizing period of change. This is the position held by Donald Smith, for example, and though he feels the "particularistic" ideology of the Church will decline in the face of a more "universalistic" one, such as socialism, it will nevertheless maintain its key support role for a considerable length of time. 22

Ivan Vallier goes somewhat further in suggesting that, in addition to supporting the positive trends that are already underway, the new religious elites which are forming and gaining strength may play a secondary but still causal role, not merely a symbolic one, in the societal change taking place in the Latin American nations. 23

Thomas Sanders feels that some of the positive trends alluded to by Vallier should include those of nationalism and socialism, and in giving increasing support to these movements at least some sectors of the Church


have already demonstrated a capacity for "innovation, break with tradition, and radicalism of persons and groups within an authoritarian, conservative religious system deeply-rooted in the statue quo."\textsuperscript{24} Similarly, others such as Jacques Lambert are hopeful that the necessary realignment of political forces will take place on an even broader scale.\textsuperscript{25} Further, a noted student of the Latin American Church, Frederick Turner, implies that this role of symbolic or ideological support is primary and genuine since the Church in most nations has lost its access to political power and thus must rely almost entirely on its ability to extend moral leadership for its basis of influence.\textsuperscript{26}

Many, essentially optimistic that the Church can and must play a significant role in Latin American development also strongly feel that structural change, both internally and externally in its relations with society, is necessary and should be the immediate focus of attention.


tion. Viewed as a major hindrance to greater dynamism in Church-societal relations is the fact that within the Church the "new" Catholic elites which are oriented toward social reform can have little total impact without the approval for their activities from the higher and normally much more conservative echelons in the hierarchy.

Again, greater concern is expressed by others for the crucial internal development of a new and active laity and the structures for its greater participation in the social and religious aspects of the Church as a prerequisite for a significant role in the development process.

Counterbalancing the more or less positive viewpoints mentioned above, there are an equal number which exhibit pessimism regarding the actual capability of the Church to act as a stimulus to societal development. Many feel that this is directly related to its structural inability to adjust to the increasing pressures of


change. In his detailed study, David Mutchler maintains that internal fragmentation resulting from "staff-staff" and "staff-line" conflicts undermines the Church's instrumental capacity to induce structural change in the society as a whole.\(^{30}\) Another seasoned observer of Latin American institutions, Luigi Einaudi, feels that the "institutional drag" of the Church is a major obstacle to a more revolutionary stance with regard to the necessary radical changes that many advocate.\(^{31}\) The belief is held by still others that the Church as an institution is basically suffering from a lack of both human and material resources and thus cannot be assured of an important role in the development process.\(^{32}\) Further, Emmanuel de Kadt implies that the Church cannot effectively use the resources which it does have since it is too divided internally, as Mutchler suggests, to provide the clear, loud and specific pronouncements which are essential to give direction to its reform-oriented activity.\(^{33}\)

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\(^{33}\) de Kadt, "Church, Society and Development..." The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. VIII.
The additional possibility that the Church is adjusting, but only enough to survive, has been raised by a number of authors. Even Turner, who is sympathetic to the ability of the Church to adapt itself to a more positive role, agrees with Sanders' feeling that, at best, "cautiously progressive" is an adequate description of the attitude displayed by the Church thus far, indicating perhaps a desire to change primarily in order not to be undermined. He notes, however, that Richard Adams illustrates a somewhat more pessimistic viewpoint when the latter compares the Church to the Latin American campesino in that "it has a great ability to survive, but its condition has improved only slightly, if at all, over the years." Others, the most notable being J. Lloyd Mecham, feel that the secularization of society and the traditional indifference of the population to the Catholic religion do not bode well for the Church's ability to participate more actively in Latin American development. Finally, one author argues that the Church may have demonstrated its impotence in passing the ultimate test of

34 Silvert, Churches and States..., pp. 216-18.
35 Turner, Catholicism and Political Development..., p. 233.
37 Mecham, Church and State..., p. 423.
performance since in North-East Brazil, where it has massively concentrated its resources under progressive leadership, it has failed to make any significant contribution to the improvement of the socio-economic situation there.  

Sanders feels that the reluctance of the Church to take more dynamic action in the field of societal reform is based on the fact that "the institution has commitments and responsibilities not only to maintain traditions and sources of income, but to preserve communication with all of its members of whatever political and social beliefs." He thus has highlighted the distinctive nature of the Church which many researchers fail to take into account and thereby distort their analysis. As Lebret and Bruneau have reminded students of the Latin American Church, its essential role is that of mediator between God and man toward the goal of the salvation of the latter. Because this is its primary objective, however, it does not mean that the Church may not find it necessary to work toward structural change in society in order to achieve that goal. For example, the progressive sec-


39 Sanders, "Catholicism and Development..." in Silver, Churches and States, p. 81.

40 Bruneau, "Power and Influence..." Latin American Research Review, p. 28.

41 L.J. Lebret, The Last Revolution: The Destiny of
tors of the Brazilian Church found it to be essential in their societal context to concentrate first on helping the majority to become more fully human before directing their efforts more singularly toward the task of evangelization. In this regard, it is believed by a large number of analysts that the Church can best serve the interests of a developing society by making use of its ability, unavailable to marxist ideologues, to give a broader meaning to the process of development by placing emphasis on the need for dignity and justice in addition to material progress, a concept which is receiving greater attention today from both policy-makers and social scientists, as previously indicated.

Although many would disagree, it has been suggested that, in light of the above, the only logical role for the Church is that of carrying out its prophetic function, that is, the interpretation of the Gospel teachings in concrete situations, and consequently the clear denunciation of injustice where it is found, a role which is revolutionary in itself. One Brazilian


author, however, doubts that on the basis of how the Church has fulfilled its function of service to the oppressed in the past it will be able to do any better in understanding the conditions for justice and self-determination in the future. 44

Brian Smith, on the other hand, in one of the most recent and balanced reviews of the situation of the Church in Latin America, is more sympathetic to the performance of the Church in the recent past, stating that it can no longer be used in rationalizing support for the established interests of the region and that at least its indirect impact on social change has already proved to be significant. Nevertheless, he too warns that the tensions and ambiguities actively present in all basic dimensions of the Church will preclude a "clear line of direction for its future role in society." He suggests that, given the pervasiveness of Church organization, its most strategic input with regard to social change will come as a consequence of its ability to "persist and experience gradual but continual change itself." This would enable it to accept the challenge created by the increasing number of military regimes in Latin America of presenting the only remaining institutional opposition to growing systematic oppression in many cases, and more

generally, to provide the crucial moral and structural support for grass-roots leadership that will allow the latter to survive and develop until conditions favour its emergence.45

In focusing on the Church in Peru, then, the crucial changes in its normative, structural and attitudinal aspects will be examined in this thesis to more specifically determine the extent to which it will indeed be prepared to exert a socially-progressive influence within Peruvian society.

CHAPTER 2

RESEARCH METHODS

One of the first indications of change in an institution such as the Church, and one which is usually the least expensive in terms of resources, is that of a reorientation of its ideas as exhibited in its verbal position concerning both specific issues and its societal role in general. This normative position is important in that it not only provides some insight into the general attitudes of the religious elite, but also it potentially can determine the direction of the highly stratified national Church as a whole.

If, indeed, the Church is moving from a declared traditional orientation to one of social progressivism, then it should exhibit a higher level of innovation or, as one author puts it, greater "generation, acceptance and implementation of new ideas and processes...."¹ Its declared position would become that of commitment to social change. For example, greater emphasis would be placed on the need to raise the standard of living as well as the general level of participation of the disadvantaged sectors, rather than on the necessity of halting the spread of communism, aprismo, and the seculariza-

tion of society.

The literature dealing with innovation in organizations strongly suggests, however, that if it is to stimulate change, an intellectually innovative policy must be qualified by organizational framework, and the extent to which the structural change necessary to effectively implement that position has taken place. If such change is not forthcoming, then it is highly probable that the resulting behaviour will not be substantially different from that of the past, despite platitudes to the contrary. In attempting to identify the specific changes in Church structure which may help or hinder its implementation of a socially-progressive stance, the literature suggests that among the crucial variables in this regard are, for example, internal patterns of association and interaction and a diversity of legitimate channels of inputs into the decision-making process.

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It should be remembered also, however, that despite a high degree of organization which enhances internal communication, it is true, as Donald Smith points out, that the more complex the ecclesiastical structure, the greater will be the strains and conflicts caused by any major ideological changes.  

Again, in order that normative and structural changes be effective, they must be accompanied by a meaningful change in attitudes which most often would then stimulate appropriate behaviour. The literature dealing with other national Churches in Latin America suggests that attitudes leading to socially-progressive behaviour are those which favour, for example, a view of religion which integrates its spiritual and social aspects, incorporation of the layman into programme activity and direction, and exertion of pressure on government officials and agencies for the socio-economic changes needed.  

It is clear, then, that any adequate framework for the study of the Church in Peru must encompass all three aspects, the normative, structural and attitudinal.

Various methodological tools were employed for the


analyses contained in the thesis. In operationalizing the normative dimension in terms of the nature and direction of declared Church policy, official Church documents were examined, and the technique of quantitative analysis was used to supplement the major descriptive analysis. To help clarify the extent of change in this dimension, the time period of the examination covered the last twenty-five years, that is from 1950 to 1975, and was divided into the two roughly equal eras preceding and following the Second Vatican Council (1963-65), since many have suggested that this is the major turning point in the social orientation of the Church. In comparing the dominant orientations of the two periods, a number of pastoral letters written between 1950 and 1975 were selected. These documents appeared in one of three official Church publications, Amigo del Clero (1950-67), Documenta (1968-72) or Iglesia en el Peru (1973- ).

In a second part to the analysis, change since the Medellín Conference of 1968, regarded as another key event for the Latin American Church, was looked at more closely. For this purpose, documentation consisted of statements made by the national episcopal conference in various years following 1968.

For the content analysis in both sections, the paragraph was selected as the unit of enumeration with its thematic orientation as the basic indicator. The
latter was chosen rather than the use of symbols since it is superior in terms of validity, a factor deemed important since the documents are considered significant for their ability to give direction to institutional and personal behaviour.

Further, a dichotomous "conservative-progressive" scale was used to measure the direction of the thematic orientation of each paragraph. Included as conservative themes, for example, were the traditional emphasis on fear of secular ideologies and the lack of aspirants to the priesthood; an emphasis on the passive acceptance of the current situation and one's inability to change it; a private, sacramental approach to man's relationship to God; and a triumphal attitude of the Church toward society. Among the progressive themes, on the other hand, were those of a more favourable attitude toward change, including an emphasis on "liberation" from existing unjust structures; concern for the social, political and economic as well as spiritual aspects of men's lives; the need for greater lay participation within a more community- and service-oriented Church; and so on.

Because field conditions did not permit a basis of intercoder reliability to be established at the time the content analysis was being carried out, the author recoded a sample of the paragraphs eight months later, and found the level of reliability to be .92.
It should be noted here that there were no documents available at the diocesan or parish levels with which to make a comparative study with the national level.

Finally, the development and impact of the "theology of liberation" will be examined as the most significant normative occurrence of the period under study.

With respect to structure, the techniques used in identifying and describing changes in this dimension were those of library research and, more importantly, personal observation and informal interviews with members of the clergy, active laity and outside observers. The important developments at both the mass and elite levels were examined, and the major foci were the *comunidades de base* for the former and the ONIS group of clergy for the latter.

In the literature, there seems to be general agreement that there are often crucial differences in the degree of change at various structural levels within the institution. Where it is useful to clarify such differences or to clearly illustrate a more general statement, data will be presented with examples from the three principal levels, those being the national, diocesan, and local. The national level, of course, encompasses the Peruvian Church as a whole while the diocese selected is that of Chiclayo, located in the northern coastal region
of the country. Within this diocese, the parish foci are those of the major sugar co-operatives of the area - Pomalca, Cayaltí, Pucalá-Pátapo, and Tuman - though because of interviewing difficulties, relatively less information was obtained for the last.

Also, where it is both possible and beneficial, the focus of the analysis, particularly for these two dimensions, will be narrowed to one political issue. In this regard, the decision to concentrate primarily on agrarian reform is justified since it is not only conceded to be among the most important in any discussion of Third World development by students of that phenomenon, but also it has been the specific target for government policy changes since 1968 by the present military regime, thus accentuating its importance in the Peruvian context. Background information concerning this issue will follow later in the chapter.

In assessing the attitudinal indicator of the behavioural dimension, the analysis will depend largely on the results of a semi-structured interview schedule administered by the author to forty-five members of the lower clergy. The sample itself was a quota sample, most of which was filled in either the Lima or Chiclayo diocese. A number of items of personal background information was secured for each respondent, the most important of which are: place of residence, national origin, age, clerical
status (either secular or religious), and associational membership. In operationalizing the attitudes themselves, the second part of the schedule consisted of a number of both open and multiple-choice questions pertaining to normative and structural issues. Many of the questions were modified forms of some used by Brian Smith in his recent research on the Church in Chile, and were used with that author's permission. The responses to these were cross-tabulated with the personal variables already mentioned to clarify the attitudinal tendencies present within the sample.

Before proceeding, in the next chapter, to the examination of the normative dimension, a brief description of the coastal agrarian situation and the importance of the sugar co-operatives within it will supply the regional and local context for the study.

As in the other Andean countries, most Peruvians live in the sierra, many still in Indian communities. Unlike these nations, however, Peru also has a large rural proletariat in the northern coastal region. It is important not only in numbers (40,000 in sugar production alone) but also in its position as the labour force for the modern plantations producing two of the main export commodities for the nation, sugar and cotton. This region generally supports the most efficient of the country's agro-industrial enterprises, but until the
agrarian reform of 1969, these were extremely concentrated in terms of ownership. This was particularly true in the Departments of Lambayeque (in which the diocese of Chiclayo is located) and La Libertad where only six agro-businesses controlled 90% of the sugar production and processing. This narrow economic elite formed the basis of one of the strongest pressure groups in the political system as its members also controlled much of the nation's banking, credit and import-export sector.\(^7\) The strong labour unions of the region resulted from the organizational efforts of the APRA party in return for electoral support.\(^8\)

Although the Apristas fought for greater popular participation, neither it nor the rural unions sought agrarian reform as a primary goal. The unions were, and

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still are, concerned with immediate social and economic benefits for their members rather than with any general redistribution of these.\footnote{Julio Cotler, "The Mechanics of Internal Domination and Social Change in Peru," in Irving Horowitz, ed., Masses in Latin America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 429; Cotler and Portocarrero, "Peru:...," in Landsberger, Latin American Peasant Movements, pp. 304, 310-11; Barracough, Agrarian Structure..., p. 255.}

The first significant agrarian reform law during the period of this study was enacted by President Belaunde Terry in 1964. On a national scale the reform was weak, poorly-financed and full of loopholes reflecting a preference for increasing the productivity of the traditional system rather than for a genuine redistribution of resources and power.\footnote{James F. Petras and Robert LaPorte, Jr., Cultivating Revolution: The United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America (New York: Random House, 1971), pp. 257, 94, Table IX p. 95.}

In contrast, the law of 1969 was an attempt by the new military government to undermine the political strength of both the landed oligarchy and the Apristas.\footnote{Gitlitz, "Impressions...," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. XIII, p. 460.} A secondary aim of the reform was to broaden the national participation of the lower sectors as well as to improve the material benefits available to them.\footnote{Jane S. Jaquette, "Revolution by Fiat: The Context of Policy-making in Peru," Western Political Quarterly, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (1972), p. 655.} The military achieved its first objective by outlawing all
political parties and moving quickly through fairly simple reform procedures to take possession of the large coastal sugar plantations before the oligarchy could solidify its strategy. With regard to its second objective, the regime has opted to stress the economic growth of the area rather than the greater popular political participation and influence it can afford the peasant sectors.

There is ample evidence of this regulated participation in the government's behaviour since the 1969 law was passed. It has discouraged the continued support of unions within the co-operatives by often co-opting or imprisoning the elected leaders, brutally breaking up strikes, appointing additional government bureaucrats and setting up an internal system of surveillance of union activity. Still, these relatively strong unions have withstood government attempts to dissolve them, a clear indication that the workers, despite their supposed ownership of these agricultural production co-operatives (CAPs), do not feel that they have sufficient access through which to influence the decisions made concerning them. The context, then, is one in which the


lower classes, once dominated by a landed political
elite, have more recently been incorporated into a number
of essentially state-run structural units\(^\text{15}\) which con-
tinue to effectively minimize pressure "from the bot-
tom up" in the political system.

The parishes being considered in this study, Pomal-
ca, Cayalti, Pucala-Patapo, and Tuman, encompass the
populations of four of these coastal sugar co-operatives.
The majority of workers, their families, the factory,
most offices and the Church are located in the one large
"town" of the former haciendas. In addition, each parish
has within its jurisdiction a number of anexos or small,
outlying communities of workers' families. Many have
migrated to the co-operative from the Cajamarca and Bam-
bamarca regions of the sierra, seeking a share in the
more promising life of the coast.

Despite the fact that the new co-operative system
supplies its members, or socios (comprising 70% to 80%
of the workers) with housing, health and educational bene-

\[\text{Ambiguous Land Reform Plan,}\] \textit{Wall Street Journal}, July 8,
1971, p. 10.

\(^{15}\text{In addition to SINAMOS, the government's social mobilization agency, some of these units include parallel organizations to the national campesino and labour unions, the teachers' federation, and since the police strike of February, 1975, the national political parties of the pri-
}\text{vate sector. See also, Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Peru's Am-
}\text{biguous Revolution," \textit{Foreign Affairs}, Vol. LIII, No. 4,}
}\text{tics}, Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, (1974), pp. 52-84.\]
fits, all of the CAPs mentioned here have experienced worker unrest since the reform. This has been the result of strong union demands for higher wages, corruption among both elected and appointed officials, and intervention by the national government in their administration. Increasing population pressures, greater under- and unemployment, and little effective participation in economic and political decision-making continue to characterize the local area.

The reader can see in Table 2-1 that each of the four co-operatives covers a vast area and involves a great deal of capital. Although Tuman and Pucalá-Pátapo are the smallest in area, they are also the most productive and efficient. Cayaltí, on the other hand, lags far behind third-ranking Pomalca both in terms of liquid capital and production even though it has nearly half the area of the latter and three-quarters its number of workers. It should be mentioned, also, that since these figures were released, the population of Cayaltí has expanded at a faster rate than in the other three cases, thus accentuating its economic problems. Traditionally, Cayaltí has been the least financially solvent of the agro-industrial enterprises, and its resulting inability to expand its benefits as quickly or as extensively as the others has often culminated in the most serious labour unrest, led by the strongest union,
in the area.

**TABLE 2-1**

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA FOR THE FOUR COASTAL SUGAR CO-OPERATIVES.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tuman</th>
<th>Pucalá-Pátapo</th>
<th>Pomalca</th>
<th>Cayaltí</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area (hectares)</td>
<td>8,541</td>
<td>12,352</td>
<td>66,138</td>
<td>31,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>10,598</td>
<td>22,450</td>
<td>23,230</td>
<td>18,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Workers</td>
<td>1,873</td>
<td>3,194</td>
<td>3,251</td>
<td>2,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid Capital (*000s soles)</td>
<td>449,102</td>
<td>708,970</td>
<td>612,725</td>
<td>23,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production(^a) (for 1969)</td>
<td>83,588</td>
<td>86,428</td>
<td>79,095</td>
<td>48,423(^b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)Figures are in toneladas.

\(^b\)This is an estimate – actual figure is reported as 726,345 quintales.

Source: *Del Latifundia a la Co-operativa* (Lima: Difusión de la Reforma Agraria, n.d.), pp. 40, 43, 45, and 47.

The parishes were formerly cared for by non-resident priests from Chiclayo who were more or less appendages to the hacendado families, and who came only to say Mass and administer the sacraments. This former lack of attention resulted in little genuine integration into the practice and belief system of the religion, and in an image of the
Church as an institution that cared little for the
general well-being of its members. Within approximately
the last fifteen years, however, each has acquired its
own pastor, and in most cases, these men have been less
easily identified with the local political and economic
power.

Because Pátapo is a second, and actually larger,
population centre for the CAP Pucalá, it will be treated
as a separate unit for the analysis unless otherwise
noted. The three Peruvian priests from Pátapo and Pomal-
ca, as well as the Spanish pastor of Pucalá, are not
directly dependent on the co-operative since they are sup-
ported by a contract between the latter and the bishop.
A contribution is made to the diocese, which is passed on
to the priests, and a minimum of services, such as housing
and transportation, are provided for the priests. In
Tuman, the pastor is supported by his congregation while
the Canadian team, which has been in Cayaltí since 1961,
is directly supported financially by its home diocese of
London, Ontario. Currently, the team consists of four
priests and a equal number of sisters. Of the former,
only two work in the co-operative parish itself, while
the other two administer the smaller independent towns
of Zaña and Mocupe outside Cayaltí.

Again, then, the political context is one in which
the reform process is strongly controlled by a military
government which does not enjoy widespread, grass-roots support nor, indeed, permits popular political participation outside the structures which it has set up. Within this situation, the Church, as a major social institution with a pervasive organization capable of transmitting values, can demonstrate support for, and significantly contribute further to, genuine development through its internal change toward a more socially-progressive orientation. The major purpose of the analysis which follows, then, is to determine the extent to which such change has taken place within the Peruvian Church.
CHAPTER THREE

THE NORMATIVE DIMENSION

As expressed in official documents, the normative orientation of the senior ecclesiastical hierarchy in Peru has changed significantly during the past twenty-five years. A socially-progressive stance has become dominant, particularly since the Medellin Conference of 1968, and despite signs of a conservative resurgence, it appears that this stance will be a permanent though diluted one.

In dealing with the normative dimension, one must be wary of attributing too much influence to ecclesiastical documents within the Peruvian Church. As in the case of papal encyclicals, the majority of the faithful are unaware of, or indifferent to, their content. Again, many of those who are knowledgeable in this regard oppose the ideas expressed in them. Even the diffusion of their ideas depends to a large extent on the willingness of the individual bishop and priests to do so. Finally, the more widely-read documents are usually ambiguous enough that statements can be found in them to support a wide spectrum of opinion. The last factor, of course, is meant to help maintain at least the appearance of unity in the Church.

¹Turner, Catholicism and Political Development..., pp. 209-10.
Despite these limitations, however, statements emanating from the hierarchy must be evaluated in any serious study of change in the Peruvian Church. Often, for example, they provide the crucial justification, and sometimes stimulus, for actions taken at the local level by dynamic though small sectors of priests and laity. Of course, structural change, particularly within the Church itself, can be stimulated and made more effective by appropriate value statements of senior officials. Also, these statements can provide a certain degree of legitimacy for government goals and policies in political systems, such as that in Peru, which lack effective popular participation. Since 1968, the military government has frequently cited favourable episcopal and clerical statements to lend further credibility to their reform proposals. 2 It will be useful, then, to examine how this value or normative orientation of the hierarchy has changed in the last twenty-five years.

Although the Peruvian Church did initiate a relatively slow reorientation toward a socially-progressive posture during the 1950's, the beginning of that decade saw it still following very much the Spanish trend of Catholic thought which has been succinctly described by some authors

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as "overly-spiritualized." In other words, this normative tendency was characterized by an acceptance of the existing societal structures as the will of God; an almost complete concentration on the life in the world to come, consequently with little regard for the present materialistic situation; resignation and fatalism concerning conditions of poverty and one's ability to change them; and an emphasis on charity and the benefits of goods intentions alone, as opposed to the results of the practical application of specific policies. Also explicitly emphasized was the role of prayer, the sacraments, one's personal relationship with God, and the indispensability of the Church in the process of salvation.

Typical of the declarations of the hierarchy in the early fifties regarding both the distribution of various Christian virtues and its own position within the society is the following exhortation by Cardinal Guevara:

Let the arrogance of the vain be humbled; may the rich be persuaded to practice justice, generosity and charity; may the poor take as their model the Holy Family of Nazareth which also earned its bread by daily labour; and, finally, may those who have the destiny of the State in their hands be convinced of the fact that there is no more solid social base than that founded on the doctrine of

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Christ and the protection of the freedom of the true Church. (5)

Elsewhere, the Church officials reacted strongly against any sign of greater lay autonomy. After outlining, in military terminology, the three essential characteristics of lay groups to be blind obedience, discipline and a spirit of unity, the Cardinal demanded that any "evil tendency" toward autonomy be "arrested immediately" so that confusion does not interrupt the uniformity of criteria and the harmony which should reign among the militant faithful. (6)

The stance just illustrated had been sharpened in the 1920's and 1930's to combat the communist and aprista challenges, respectively, to the traditional ideological dominance of the Church. (7) Given the strength of these and similar statements, it is clear that this outlook persisted among the Peruvian hierarchy. Reflecting this concern, Pope Pius XII as late as 1957 outlined the chief dangers to the Latin American Church still to be an increase in Protestant sects, secularization of the culture, marxisn (particularly in organized labour) and the chal-


7Adams, The Second Sowing..., p. 211.
leng of a "disquieting spiritualism,"\(^8\) within the population.

Nevertheless, by the middle of the decade, the Peruvian Church had begun to gradually change its value emphasis as it realized that it was still losing ground to the secular reform ideologies, particularly among the lower and lower-middle classes who did not see the Church as being able to provide active support for modernization. It attempted to overcome its image as a servant to the upper classes by belatedly responding to the social encyclicals which had been published since the late nineteenth century\(^9\) and to the pressures of some of the other Latin American and European Churches.\(^10\) By 1955, the Peruvian bishops had joined their continental counterparts in at least passively calling for the Church and its members to become more aware of the problems facing the nation.\(^11\) To a significant degree, Franco-Belgian philosophical thought started to replace the Spanish emphasis


\(^9\) Particularly "Rerum Novarum" (1896) and "Anno Quadragesimo" (1931).


on a strictly spiritual orientation of faith. The former stressed within the Church a more favourable attitude toward change, a greater concern for the present life in all of its dimensions, the personal responsibility required to achieve change and a realization of the inadequacy of good intentions alone in effecting desired behavioural change.  

The development of a progressive orientation in the verbal position of the Peruvian Church occurred slowly, however, and was not without its setbacks.

The period from the mid-fifties to the early sixties seems to be one of transition as many of the pastoral letters are neutral or balanced in their value orientation. The period itself exhibits a gradual shift toward a more reform-oriented pastoral emphasis. For example, in 1955 the newly-appointed primate, Cardinal Juan Landazuri Ricketts, declared in support of past policy, he was convinced that if the country remained faithful to the great traditions of faith and virtue "which its founders bequeathed it, days of progress and triumph in the spiritual and material order await it." On the other hand, in the first effort at a socially-focused pastoral letter, issued in 1958, a call was made for clerical and lay

12 Vitalis, Significance of Change... pp. 7/21-22.

participation in a series of Social Weeks aimed at studying the problems facing Peruvian society in light of the social encyclicals. Again, however, though the first session was a success, the remainder were cancelled as a result of the uneasiness which they were creating for the Prado regime.  

14 Again, in 1961, the episcopate officially made reference to the need for improving the social, political and economic conditions of the masses but as Carlos Astiz notes, this exhortation was vague, directed to no social group in particular, and accompanied by the qualification that such improvement must not be made at the expense of the existing structures.  

This ambiguity is once again clearly illustrated in a pastoral letter regarding an important problem of the Church, that of vocations. The hierarchy still identified the crucial "battle" as that against laicism and secular thought, such as marxist ideology. Significantly, however, it was pointed out in the same letter that many youth of the nation express the ideals of social justice but do not have good examples of priests to follow in this regard. In thus acknowledging the need for the clergy to be more reform-minded, the hierarchy had


taken an important step toward a more visibly progressive stance. This can be appreciated more fully when this statement is contrasted to a "spiritualized" description of the priest made in 1950 as "the instrument of sanctification and grace, guide, teacher, and pastor who leads souls to their eternal destiny."  

By 1963, with the assumption to power by the more reform-minded Fernando Belaunde Terry and the additional strong base provided by the social documents of John XXIII and the Vatican Council, the Peruvian hierarchy went beyond the usual request for social justice as a means to improve the dignity of man, to make an urgent appeal for meaningful reform. This was deemed significant for the clarity with which the Church warned of the strong possibility of violence resulting if those in position of power continued to support conditions of misery.  

It was at this time that the Church began to be somewhat more explicit in asserting its role of providing an active presence in society as spokesman for greater social just-


18 Bourricaud, Power and Society..., p. 248; Forrester, "Christian Democracy in Peru...".

ice toward the disadvantaged sectors. This became manifest first at the Plata del Mar meeting of CELAM (Consejo Episcopal Latinoamericano) in 1966 and then more vociferously at its Medellin conference in 1968.

Beginning in the mid-sixties and continuing to the present, there has been a dramatic increase in the incidence of pronouncements exhibiting a progressive normative posture being issued by Church officials. For example, by 1965 the hierarchy began to more adamantly stress the importance of the laity in expressly recognizing the existence of two priesthoods in the formation of the Church, those being the faithful and the specifically ordained ministers, and that the priests' duty is not to be the authoritarian ruler of the laity but rather to help them fulfill their individual Christian commitments.

In contrast to the traditional foci regarding social virtues noted above, the Cardinal declared earlier in 1968 that

the prostrate and underdeveloped situation in which large core groups find themselves, even in our own land, not only is an affront to human dignity and justice but also is a most serious and continuing offense against peace.(21)

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19 Herrera, "Man and the Latin American Church,..., p. 97.


21 Cardenal Landazuri Ricketts, "Exhortación Pastoral
It is certainly in the institutional interest of the Church to maintain peace and harmony within the nation, but the continuing trend of this line of social concern in the pastoral letters of the following years indicates that self-survival is not the primary motive in this change of verbal stance. For example, the bishops had become more specific by 1970 in this regard as they described Peru as a nation "bloodied and mutilated" by the lack of doctors, proper communications and educational facilities, and effective reform policies.\(^{22}\)

Other documents repeatedly and clearly espouse the prophetic role for the Church in declaring its solidarity with the poor, calling for radical change in man's fundamental attitudes, and emphasizing the need for man to develop a greater critical awareness of his reality, enabling him to exercise more actively his coreponsibility in effecting change where necessary.\(^{23}\)

It can be seen in Table 3-1 that, for the period preceding Vatican II, the documents examined show quantitatively that although half of the paragraphs can be classified as neutral, the greater majority of the remaining


TABLE 3-1
THEMATIC ORIENTATION
OF
PASTORAL LETTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-Vatican Period</th>
<th>Post-Vatican Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Conservative</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Neutral</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Progressive</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

units are clearly conservative in values expressed. Indeed, they comprise nearly one-third of the total. The documents of the post-Vatican era, on the other hand, exhibit a significant shift toward the progressive side of the value continuum. Conservative themes have dropped notably, as a percentage of the whole, while the number of units indicating a progressive theme or value orientation represent nearly 60% of those examined, increasing from 14.9% in the previous period. Within this increase, there appeared to be a significant change in the incidence of very explicitly progressive statements whereas these were negligible prior to Vatican II. In general, the progressively dominant units have increased by 45%, corroborating more precisely what is amply evident in a reading analysis of the pronouncements of the last twelve years.

Although the later documents are obviously quite
progressively-oriented overall, the degree of "progressivism" tends to vacillate rather than to maintain a steady or increasing level of change. This is not too surprising. The author does not doubt the sincerity of the bishops in accepting the need for change, but rather the drastic reversal in statements found in these documents prompts questions regarding the depth of this change of orientation. Indeed, many of those interviewed feel that most official statements today are revealing an increasing number of traditional attitudes though sometimes these are masked by the use of some progressive terminology.

In evaluating more closely the continuing trend within the normative dimension, the author examined statements of the conclusions of episcopal conferences, as well as some synodal papers, of the post-Medellin period. These documents, which are longer, more detailed and more widely diffused than pastoral letters, are the results of the deliberations of the Peruvian episcopate as a whole and theoretically are supported by all.

Before dealing with the documents themselves, a word about the significance of the Medellin Conference of CELAM in 1968 and its impact would be helpful. Considered a watershed for continental Catholicism by most but somewhat of an anomaly by many others, it has be-

come the symbol of change in the Latin American Church. The pronouncements of the conference were strongly supported by the Peruvian Church and clearly provide legitimacy for radical social, and the use of violence, if necessary. These ideas expanded on an interpretation of Paul VI's *Populorum Progressio* (1967) but more importantly demonstrated the widespread impact which a "new" Latin American theology had among many elements of the continental hierarchy. This "theology of liberation" is most clearly associated with the Peruvian theologian, Gustavo Gutierrez, and continues to provide the ideological framework for the episcopal statements of the Peruvian Church.

The theology of liberation essentially is an attempt to relate the more progressive values of the post-Vatican Church to the Latin American reality which, for the most part, is seen as one of national dependency and internal exploitation of large sectors of the population. More specifically, it demands that the Church address itself directly to the oppressed sectors and, after guiding them in a critical analysis of their situation, to take action in conjunction with them in order to effect a more human or total process of development resulting in greater self-*

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determination. For the Church itself, the process of liberation entails, among other things, the prophetic denunciation of those aspects of existing social, political and economic systems which result in oppression, and a "conscientizing evangelization," the active spreading of the Gospel message resulting in greater awareness of one's economic and political situation, which is the first step in that crucial process of active participation in the political system.  

This theology of liberation will be discussed in greater detail later in the chapter. However, that it has affected at least the most influential of the Peruvian hierarchy is evident in the closing statement of the episcopal conference held in 1969. After examining the Peruvian reality in terms of gross structural inequalities, including direct reference to the "unjust system of land tenancy" and to the political manipulation of the masses, the bishops admit to partial responsibility for these conditions and outline their role in relation to society to


be that of defending the rights of workers, denouncing injustices, particularly with regard to the working conditions of the peasantry, and supporting the efforts toward organization by the lower classes. They also express their willingness to accompany their verbal position by "concrete gestures of solidarity with the poor and the oppressed, if they should be necessary."  

The second part of the document deals with the guidelines for the renovation of the Church itself toward a vocation of "Evangelical poverty" or "commitment to the solidarity of those who are suffering" through changes in attitudes, life style and action. A number of specific proposals are put forward in this regard, including a re-examination of all Church properties and other assets in view of their usefulness in serving all the people of God; the adaptation of a simpler life-style among priests and religious; explicit denunciation of injustice wherever it is found; and the creation of an authentic or committed laity and its participation in various administrative Church bodies. Although many of these proposals have not yet been achieved, the document itself is much more

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29 "Closing Statement..." Between Honesty and Hope, p. 232.

30 "Closing Statement..." Between Honesty and Hope, pp. 232-34.

31 An advisory board for the hierarchy regarding their attitudes on socio-economic issues was also recommended.
radical in content than its Medellin forerunners and clearly gives notice that the hierarchy has decided to "officially" opt for the poor within the society.

A similar orientation is expressed in "Justicia en el Mundo," the Peruvian bishops' position paper to the 1971 World Synod in which the hierarchy again spelled out the necessity of its role being that of making known and stimulating the implementation of justice and inwardly changing man, creating in him a new set of values and a sense of co-responsibility in the achievement of a new society. (32)

Significantly in this document, which is still used as one of the basic references for social action in the Church, there is a comparatively long treatment of the issue of agrarian reform and to some of the specific shortcomings of such a policy which may result in only a new form of structural dependency. (33)

The next major statement to be published, entitled "Evangelización," was issued following the 1973 episcopal conference and is probably the most often cited of all the post-Medellin documents. Like the conclusions of the 1969 conference, it first examines the Peruvian reality specifying what are seen as the major socio-economic problems. A theological reflection then details to a greater

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extent than before the intimate relationship between this reality and Christian values and goals, concluding with more specific pastoral objectives and a long treatment of the importance of education in this regard. In outlining the relationship just mentioned, the bishops reaffirm that

liberation is not reduced to the political sphere, but neither is it fulfilled outside of it... Within this concept of salvation of all of man and all men, the political situation constitutes a particularly important aspect of human existence. Precisely because it is the mission of the Church to save man, this is also a commitment to achieving a social, economic and political order which would be capable of sustaining and stimulating man's progress. It is without doubt that the complete fulfillment of man is strongly conditioned though not absolutely determined by the type of society, that is, its fundamental structures, in which he lives... For this reason the task of salvation cannot be indifferent to the existing social order. (34)

Among other things, the document also warns its audience for the first time of the danger of the "liberators" themselves becoming the "oppressors" by becoming a dominant elite enclosed within themselves. Because of its good explanation of key pastoral concepts being employed since Medellín, this document is used extensively in programmes for the formation of the laity and in other statements as a basis of support for further positions taken.

Although "Evangelización" stresses the crucial need

for greater involvement and responsibility of the laity in
the Church, the bishops have indicated that future confer-
ences to deal specifically with this question were not to
be held until 1976 and 1977. In the meantime, the inter-
vening sessions reverted back to the perennial themes of
"Family and Population" and "The Christian Community and
Vocations to the Priesthood" for 1974 and 1975, respective-
ly. Though these certainly are important issues for the
Church, they reflect institutional survival as its in-
creasingly primary concern. Rather than ensuring further
support and guidelines for the effective implementation of
its stated commitment to help ameliorate the temporal and
spiritual deprivation of the poor, the bishops have ap-
proached the problem by way of the traditional avenues
of poor family life and scarcity of clergy as the foci of
their deliberations.

The normative orientation of the bishops, without
a doubt, still reflects a progressive stance overall but
as can be seen in Table 3-2, proportionately the number
of paragraphs containing progressive themes has decreased
significantly since 1969. This is more than can be ex-
pected from a body truly committed to such drastic change.
It is particularly evident in the case of the 1975 pro-
nouncement concerning vocations. With regard to young
people, some of whom are possible future candidates to
the priesthood, the bishops continue to urge priests to
increase their credibility with them by deepening their social commitment. On the other hand, they have almost completely discarded the use of the term "liberation," the once predominant theme.

TABLE 3-2
THEMATIC ORIENTATION
OF EPISCOPAL CONFERENCE STATEMENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Conservative</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Neutral</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Progressive</td>
<td>98.8</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>64.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The sharp drop, then, from 98.8% to 39% in the category of progressive attitudes expressed, does seem to support the general feeling that the bishops, though still accepting the need for change, are again becoming more conservative in their verbal leadership.

Though it is unlikely that the official statements of the Peruvian Church will lose their progressive tone, there are a number of factors which seem to indicate that the somewhat stronger conservative trend will persist at

least into the near future. First of all, in this regard, is the continued strong reaction of a great many bishops all over Latin America, including Peru, against the now clearer implications of positions taken at Medellín in 1968. Many observers feel that the decisions of the conference were an indication of the true feelings of only a very small minority of the episcopate present. Some believe that many bishops supported the documents as good propaganda for the Church at a time when populist movements were gaining strength. For many others, the documents were partly a consequence of the "inability of busy administrators to supervise closely some of their more liberal advisors, who were charged with drafting conference position papers."  

Since the Peruvian Church statements had gone beyond those of Medellín in challenging the commitment of Christians to more profound change, it is not surprising that, as concrete application of their words were increasingly demanded, the bishops most opposed to them should assert

36The Latin American bishops have elected Cardinal Lopez of Colombia as the current president of CELAM. He is noted as a strong opponent of liberation theology, and is primate of one of the most conservative Churches on the continent. Juan Luis Segundo, S.J., in an interview with Dow Kirkpatrick, July 3, 1975 (mimeo).


38Crahan, "Latin American Church...." America, August 30, 1975, p. 91.
themselves more vigorously to impede the process. This also draws attention to the fact that, in terms of unity in this respect, the Peruvian hierarchy is not as monolithic as the image it strives to present. This is true in most Latin American Churches. Though the ideological divisions in Peru are not strong enough to create an open challenge to the unity of the national Church as a whole, it is evident that beyond the large number of "neutral" and/or administratively-minded bishops there are three or four among these prelates who are clearly identified with either end of the progressive-conservative continuum. Fearing the structural changes demanded by the "liberationist" interpretation of the Gospel, and seeking the security of the past when human rights were important but subordinated to a spiritual emphasis, it appears that the "rightist" bishops have begun to co-ordinate their opposition efforts to a much greater degree. They are attempting to mobilize their influence directly within the episcopate but also through support of their wealthy lay co-workers. Dismayed with the humanist and marxist language and by a lack of a more spiritual orientation, some of these bishops have openly denied the validity and content of the Medellin decisions and the "Justicia en el

39 Such division is much more evident, for example, in the case of the Brazilian Church.

40 Interview with Dr. Miguel Vallier, former director of Acción Católica, June 21, 1975.
Mundo." Many others have either done nothing to promote the documents in their diocese or have actively impeded small lay and clerical groups from doing so.41

Evidence of the increasing influence of the conservative element can be found in the tone of the documents themselves, as we have already seen, but also in the refusal of the episcopate to republish "Justicia en el Mundo" in the the use of more traditionally-oriented cursillistas, or formation directors, from Spain; and the recent publication of a catechism outlining the basic truths of the faith in remarkably pre-Medellín terminology and concepts. It should be noted, however, that many bishops, including the Cardinal, do not support the latter. In terms of this general resurgence of conservative attitudes, one Church official feels that there has been a betrayal of trust by the bishops in that for the first time, the people, basing their hopes on the published documents, expected a great deal from them and have been disappointed thus far.42 No doubt these expectations were too high considering that the group has not been noted for its propensity for rapid change in the past.

Also helping to reinforce the conservative sector of

41 Interviews with Ricardo Antoncich, S.J., Director of CEAS-Campesino; Monseñor Schmitz, Auxiliary Bishop of Lima; and Sister Margarita Maria Recavarren, Executive Secretary of the Peruvian Conference of Religious, June, 1975.

42 Interview with Ricardo Antoncich, June 19, 1975.
the episcopate is not only the aristocratic background of many of the bishops, a factor which closely links them to the traditionally dominant sectors of the society, but also the age of the prelates which must be considered. The average age of all the bishops in Peru in 1974 was fifty-five 43 a point at which most cannot be expected to exhibit a significant liberalization of viewpoint, nor to present many vacancies within the next few years. In the past, of course, even the new appointees reflected the normative preference of the remaining bishops thereby delaying an advancement of those of the progressive orientation. 44 Increasingly, however, as the general attitudinal change espoused in the documents becomes the value basis for a greater number of priests and bishops, the range from which replacements for vacancies must be chosen will be narrowed.

Again contributing to the ease with which the bishops have reasserted their conservatism to a certain degree is the relative lack of challenge until recently from either the government or the people to deepen and realize stands taken earlier. A number of those interviewed felt that the Peruvian population is less politicized and less

43 Demographic data compiled by the author from Anuario 1974, Arzobispado, Lima, 1974; Crahan, "Latin American Church...," America, August 30, 1975.

44 Turner, Catholicism and Political Development...
dynamic than many of their Latin American counterparts. Coupled with few serious public disagreements between Church and State, this has precluded any heavy pressure on the hierarchy to take more aggressive stands regarding social issues.

Despite the above considerations, the overall progressive stance of the documents will most likely be maintained, stimulated by the changes in the Church which they have already initiated and also by the changes being attempted by the military government since 1968 to which the Church is being forced to respond and adapt. The Agrarian Reform and Social Property laws, for example, will help the hierarchy to continue its emphasis on the importance of the laity and the formation of an authentic Christian community. Another factor to be considered is the Cardinal himself who seems to exercise a good deal of moral suasion among the other bishops. Though certainly not considered to be among the most liberal of the clergy, the general opinion seems to be that he is sufficiently open, flexible and personally concerned for social and ecclesiastical reform that the more progressively-minded clergy and laity at least will have little to fear from him regarding their activity.

As the final part of the analysis of this dimension, a closer evaluation will be made of the nature and impact of the theology of liberation, clearly the most important development during the past twenty-five years for the
Peruvian Church.

As was mentioned earlier in the chapter, one of the principal authors of this interpretation of the Christian message has together with a number of others has been Gustavo Gutierrez, himself a one-time marxist who has tried to combine the economic analysis of this theory with theology's emphasis on the value of the human element in a Christian approach to social justice and development.

Many consider the theology of liberation to be political theology in the sense that it reverses the general order of theological study by first examining the reality to which it will be applied, then developing the theory from this interpretation, and finally elaborating the new relationship between this theory and practice. Faith thus helps to purify, criticize and make radical the socio-political commitment of its adherents. Gutierrez attempts to eliminate the inevitable criticism that this is mixing religion and politics by defining the political sphere as all-inclusive. Whereas "politics".

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45 In the Bible, the word "liberation" is synonymous with "salvation". It is again being used because it describes, more clearly than the latter, contemporary man's longing for self-determination.

46 Herrera, "Man and the Latin American Church...", p. 267.

47 Herrera, "Man and the Latin American Church...", p. 264-65.

per se is more specifically an orientation toward power, everything, he feels, has a political colour as man attempts to fulfill his desire to control his own future by participating fully in the decisions made in all spheres of his life. Because man obviously has not achieved that goal, he must first become aware of what the structural obstacles to this political liberation really are. ⁴⁹

Liberation at this primary level, however, is insufficient in itself. There must also be attitudinal or value change in man himself to support structural change. Finally, a freedom from sin, the source of all injustice, is the most important to liberationists as Christians. This final level, however, cannot be attained without previously and/or simultaneously achieving the first two. The clear implication of this, of course, is that the Peruvian Church, even if it so desired, could not maintain an apolitical stand with regard to the important issues facing the society. If it does not clearly outline its position on certain problems, its silence is interpreted as acquiescence to the existing order. To Latin American Catholic leaders today, then, the idea that elements of the political and religious spheres should be mutually exclusive is both hypocritical and unrealistic given contemporary social conditions and traditional poli-

⁴⁹Gutierrez, A Theology of Liberation..., pp. 222, 47-49.

It was not until the Medellin Conference reiterated its main themes that liberation theology was recognized as a significant phenomena in the Peruvian and Latin American Churches.\footnote{Gutierrez had travelled extensively throughout Latin America prior to the Conference to make the "liberación" concept better known among the bishops who would be attending.} Though the impact of this conference has diminished among many bishops, the process of reevaluation and de-privatization of religion which it stimulated is seen as irreversible.\footnote{Segundo, interview with Kirkpatrick, July 3, 1975.} Therefore, despite its only modest acceptance by the Peruvian faithful, liberation theology appears not to be a popular movement in vogue for the present, but rather a genuine and permanent theological development in that Church. Among other things, it has profoundly altered the deliberations of the episcopate. One bishop feels that the areas of most concern to the bishops in the recent past include placing the Gospel on a practical level in men's lives, interpreting the current social situation to determine God's will, and stressing the community rather than individual aspect of reli
region. Structural changes among the clergy, which will be discussed in the next chapter, have also been stimulated by this normative orientation. Adding to the likelihood that it will persist well into the future in the Peruvian Church is the fact that proponents of liberation theology are in the process of deepening its theological base which its critics assert is much too shallow.

As was pointed out earlier, the theology of liberation thus far has not been widely accepted either by the clergy or by the laity in Peru. Many of the former have ideological or practical objections to it while the latter are often ignorant of its content and implications. A closer examination of the data regarding the distribution of normative attitudes will be made later in the thesis, but it appears that in comparison to the data of other students, it is more widely accepted outside the main metropolitan area of Lima. Although a majority of the clergy interviewed for the thesis were favourable in their evaluation, a substantial number of those expressing positive feelings also had reservations regarding its theological basis and/or applicability.

Some of the negative criticisms expressed include

53 Interview with Monsenor Schmitz, July 19, 1975.

54 Data collected by Tom Maloney, S.J. indicates that only one-third of the priests in Lima favour the theology of liberation whereas the more geographically-dispersed sample of the author shows over two-thirds of the clergy approve of the concept.
the opinion that it is totally invalid theology and, consequently, has had only a "firecracker" impact, that is, a short, strong life which is quickly dying out. Some feel it has separated the main elements of the discipline, God and man, while so much emphasis has been placed on humanistic criteria that its proponents have lost sight of the fact real liberation, including that resulting in socio-economic advancement, comes first from an eradication of sin rather than vice versa. For these critics, the Gospel alone is sufficient. Others feel more strongly that there is a serious danger that liberation theology can easily degenerate into marxism and result in classism instead of fraternity.

A large number express concern for the future of the Church as an institution. For example, they point to the fact that liberation theology has sharpened the conflict among members of the hierarchy and where its ideas have had an impact on the laity, it has often been the source of "confusionismo" rather than "conscientizac- cion". Others feel more specifically that, because it is both radical and difficult to understand, it has appealed mainly to young Peruvian and foreign clergy, and has precluded more general lay participation. Considering these factors, many feel there is a real danger that Christian communities would be reduced to small, isolated minorities adhering to a Gospel intended for the few.
"Liberationists" have often been accused of having little to offer by way of a new structure for the Church as they proceed to condemn the old. It is also pointed out that the Church is in danger of being outdated since, in assuming a specific stance, it automatically de-emphasizes another thereby alienating a whole sector of the institution's members. Gutierrez has also been criticized elsewhere for his vagueness regarding how the social context is to be changed through class struggle, the perpetuation of paternalism in the relationship of the Church (with its current espousal of the elite-oriented social sciences) to the poorer sectors, and the tactical error of supporting only the oppressed elements which would, in practice, deprive the Church of the resources needed to be influential on a national scale. 

Even some who personally favour this interpretation feel that it will not grow, since the hierarchy as a whole is too conservative and the Peruvian people too passive to develop such a capacity for change.

Most observers today agree that some of these criticisms are justified and are factors that will continue to hinder the wider acceptance of this liberationist approach. Others, however, are the result of misin-

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interpretation. For example, one clergyman points out that the accusation of an over-emphasis on the political implications of one's interpretation of the Gospel is a false opposition. The theology of liberation is simply a response at a particular time to a particular reality, one which now demands greater social justice. If its authors appear to be lacking in spiritual emphasis, it is not a denial of this aspect of man's relationship to God and other men, but rather an effort to counterbalance the great weight of sacramentalism which has predominated for so long in the Church.

Again, though some of its concepts may not be elaborated as clearly as might be desired, it can legitimize, and has already done so, the instinctive aspirations of those working in situations such as the barriadas where social injustice is pervasive. It has helped young Peruvian priests who are concerned about an authentic evangelization to rethink more realistically their whole approach to this process. It will help to prepare the Church for the even greater demands of relevancy which will increase as the population becomes more politically mobilized and seeks a Gospel of "lucha" or struggle as a stimulus for action.

Further, in the opinion of many, liberation theology as a value orientation provides a more valid per-

\[56\text{Interview with Frank O'Connor, August, 1975.}\]
spective of man's relationship to God, giving him a more active and significant role to play. Indeed, now it is stressed that all members, not just the hierarchy, are "the Church". In addition, it helps both to bring God into all aspects of life and to treat people, in a more realistic way, where they are in their life situation without eliminating the Gospel guidelines.

One noted Latin American adherent to the theology of liberation feels that this approach is useful as an intellectual instrument which aids in destroying distorted images of reality which impede an accurate analysis of what change is necessary and how it is to be achieved. He points out that some who try to utilize the theology of liberation simply replace one distortion for another as, for example, in proposing that the socio-economic analysis of marxism is the only possible framework from which to work. From this, they proceed to indiscriminately condemn the existing order. He continues to explain that liberationists often advocate marxism only as the most scientific attempt for the reconstruction of society available among current ideologies. And, since the latter, if appropriate, are to be used to implement faith, that is, the capacity to create the will of God in history, marxism is regarded as useful in this respect. 57

As is admitted by liberationists, this synthesis of faith and political reality is difficult to achieve in practice but, nevertheless, can be influential in redirecting the energies of the human resources of the Church toward a more active, reform-oriented and integrated pastoral approach. Some feel that at the minimum, the result will be greater dignity for the people as human beings rather than as subjects to unjust structures present in many spheres of their lives.

It can be seen that the theology of liberation may still be theologically weak, but as a normative or value orientation it may be quite significant in stimulating structural and behavioural change in the Peruvian Church. This would augment the verbal change which we have seen is evident in the documents of the official Church hierarchy.

In summary, then, the declared normative position of the Church in Peru has changed quite significantly in the past twenty-five years, most notably since Vatican II and the Medellin Conference. It has moved from an overly-spiritualized orientation to the realization of the need for greater emphasis on improving the socio-economic conditions of its members through identification with the oppressed sectors and an advocacy of structural change in society. Similarly, over this time period, the social pronouncements have developed from vague acknowledgements
of societal problems to somewhat more sophisticated statements revealing an attempt to better understand the realities of the situation in which the Church finds itself. More recently, there has been somewhat of an increase in the more traditional orientation of the documents as implications of the above change become more evident. Despite this, however, it seems highly unlikely that it will ever again regain the predominance it enjoyed earlier in the Peruvian Church.

Thus, with a strong and legitimate normative base and adequate links to the decision-making body, reform-minded clergy and laity should be able to locally pursue their policy orientation within the institution and/or to change its structure to induce behaviour that is more socially progressive.
CHAPTER FOUR

THE STRUCTURAL DIMENSION

For an institution such as the Church, one of the important reflections of fundamental normative change is that of the corresponding structural transformation that is necessary for its application in concrete situations. Such change in the structural dimension not only demonstrates that a shift in value emphasis has indeed been profound in key sectors, but it also enhances the possibility that attitudes based on this new emphasis will persist even after initial ideological enthusiasm wanes.

This chapter will examine the extent to which such structural change has occurred in the Peruvian Church. It will be seen that some relevant innovation has taken place, particularly in the late sixties and early seventies. Although the potential impact is significant, on the whole, it has not yet been felt extensively. The two most important developments have been those of the comunidades de base and ONIS. These will be examined in depth both conceptually and as they have developed at the local level, including an assessment of them by the local clergy. Other structural changes which also deserve attention will be dealt with less extensively where appropriate throughout the chapter. These include attempts at more integral and open decision-making, the creation of CEAS-Campesino, the
development of Fe y Acción Solidaria, and the greater prominence of the Opus Dei group of priests and laity.

In keeping with the traditional value orientation of the hierarchy in the years preceding the Second Vatican Council, there was little in the way of structural innovation in the Peruvian Church during that period. In fact, steps were taken in the mid-fifties which had the effect of reinforcing the essentially traditional position documented in the previous chapter. In 1955, the Peruvian bishops joined their Latin American counterparts to form CELAM which was designed to improve regional communication and co-ordination of Church activity. Symbolic of its early orientation, the headquarters was chosen to be Bogota, the conservative stronghold of continental Catholicism. By 1963, however, more moderate and then progressive leadership had become dominant¹ and, as we have seen, this change culminated in the Medellin Conference of 1968 which has since stimulated progressive forces throughout Latin America. More recently, however, CELAM has lost a great deal of its meaning for the Peruvian Church. The more conservative prelates and clergy feel that it has betrayed them in the past, while those of a more progressive stance view its current Colombian leadership as a return to a much more spiritually-oriented function.

¹Turner, Catholicism and Political Development..., p. 151. Additional references are given by Turner in footnote 105.
It should be noted also that during the pre-Vatican period, efforts were made by some laity to implement the spirit of the previous social encyclicals in the formation of the Christian Democratic Party in 1956. Although the party espoused many ideas and programmes regarding social justice, it never had a sustained political impact as it did not acquire substantial support either from the popular sector or from the Church. In addition, it was internally divided and eventually split into two factions, finally losing much of its base support to the popularly-backed and reformist Accion Popular party under Fernando Belaunde Terry.  

The first major effort toward internal structural change in the Church itself came during the early sixties and was a reflection of the beginning of normative change within the episcopate. Spurred by Vatican II's proposals for greater universal decentralization, as well as for an increase in the co-ordination of activity at the episcopal level, the prelates became more integrated in their de-

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liberations through the national episcopal conference and, reflecting more closely on the national reality, became more open as a group to indigenous interpretations of the Church in society in place of the Spanish model which was dominant at the time. 4

Again, responding to their own call for more open communication among hierarchical levels, the bishops have permitted some clerical and lay representatives to participate in the annual meetings of the episcopal conference, and are accepting documents from the diocesan level stating the opinions of the local clergy, and sometimes of the laity, regarding the theme to be discussed at those meetings. Most observers agree, however, that although this certainly is an important step, the resulting impact on decisions made has thus far been decidedly minimal. It appears that the bishops wish to have a clearer idea of what opinions the general membership holds but are still unwilling as a group to dialogue in a meaningful way or to surrender any of their decision-making authority. Even within the episcopate itself, much of the influence is reportedly still concentrated in the Cardinal together

with the ten representatives of the bishops who comprise his Permanent Council of advisors.

A similar situation exists at the diocesan level where the degree of influence from below depends upon the receptiveness of the individual bishop. In talking to a number of priests from the Chiclayo diocese, for example, it seems that their prelate, Monseñor Orbigo, is willing to meet with representatives of the priests' advisory council and allows considerable freedom of choice in pastoral approach. However, in terms of formulating policy, he accepts very little input from below. It is our impression that this is a typical situation for most dioceses in the country. Though the potential for greater participation has increased, it seems that it has yet to be realized to any great extent.

It should be mentioned that in the organizational structure of many dioceses there have been horizontal changes as well that reflect a greater sensibility to the reality of the socio-economic situation of which they are a part. The most obvious in this regard is the division of dioceses in 1972 into "zones" comprised of parishes having similar characteristics. The priests of each zone are to meet on a regular basis to discuss problems which are common to all and offer support to those facing special difficulties. The diocese of Chiclayo, for example, contains five zones, one each for the parishes of the inde-
pendent towns of the north and those of the south, the urban sector, the sierra region, and finally, the four major sugar co-operatives. The priests of the latter meet every two weeks to discuss the particular aspects of their apostolate, and from time to time have demonstrated the usefulness of the structural change in dealing with a number of crucial issues. This was particularly true when the co-operatives were first set up from the traditional hacienda system as the clergy, as a group, sought to determine what should be the official relationship of the local Church to these new economic structures.

Also significant has been the greater use of the Comisión Episcopal de Acción Social within the ecclesiastical administration as a base from which to publish and distribute the position of the Church on social issues. In practice, it also acts as a research body for the hierarchy in gathering and assessing information, in seeking theoretical and methodological tools to orientate its action in a relevant manner, and in offering advice to its members and other clergy.

In an effort to specifically help to improve the effectiveness of the agentes pastorales, or active local Church personnel, who are working with campesino, or peasant, groups the Commission recently created a special de-

partment, CEAS-Campesino, to deal with problems in this field.

Officials of CEAS-Campesino stress that the function of the department is not to maintain a movement of peasants or in any way to supplant the campesino organizations which can and must provide the most effective leadership for this sector of the population. Rather, its function is to help make the local clergy, and bishops in particular, become more aware of the reasons for and consequences of these peasant movements, as well as to clarify their own objectives and capacities to participate effectively in them, if necessary. The department, then, hopes to act as a bridge linking the base to the hierarchy who can more effectively bring the full institutional weight of the Church to bear on the side of the campesino.

In Huancavelica, for example, CEAS-Campesino has helped the clergy to stabilize their relationship with local government departments, to establish useful contacts for gathering reliable information, to legitimize to the bishop their work with the campesinos, and to begin studying specific local problems of the agrarian reform.

Although it is still in the midst of organization, CEAS-Campesino officials are attempting to minimize struc-

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6Interview with Ricardo Antoncich, Director of CEAS-Campesino, July 19, 1975.

7Unpublished working document for the national meeting of CEAS-Campesino, 1975.
ture in order to ensure maximum flexibility. A weakness at this point is its acknowledged lack of a *campesino* presence in the administration of the department. The problem must be resolved if it is not to remain simply a clerical organization for, but not by, the peasants and thereby lose its credibility among them. Nevertheless, CEAS-Campesino is a good example of the Commission's priority of organizing itself to be "responsible for specific problem areas of the diverse sectors of social action on a national level."  

Although the organizational changes already discussed are significant and thus have been given at least minimal attention, the most important for the future of the Church is the development of *comunidades de base*. Significantly, this structural change focuses not on the hierarchy but on the mass level of Church membership, the laity. The author will deal extensively with the *comunidad cristiana de base* in terms of its theoretical form and function, the extent to which it has developed at the local level, and some of the implications which it entails. Some feelings of the local clergy toward the concept and its future will also be described.

Increasingly, many of those who advocate an active

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8 Unpublished working document for the national meeting of CEAS-Campesino, 1975.

role for the Church in societal development feel that its hierarchical or authoritative nature is primarily meant to stress the supranatural aspect of development, and therefore can only give general support to the spirit of reform policies. On the other hand, it is the laity, comprising the raison d'être of the Church, that is meant to fulfill the temporal aspect of the Gospel's message. It is they who must act on improving and implementing specific policies.10 "Comunidades cristianas de base", are a concrete response to the increasing theological emphasis on a "community" Church with a minimum of hierarchical structure.11 This call to greater personal responsibility by all members of the Church was legitimized by the Medellin Conference12 and is one of the central themes of the normative re-orientation of the Peruvian hierarchy.

This can be seen as a realistic appraisal for the survival of the Church as an institution as well, given


12 The Church in the Present-Day Transformation... p. 49 and Section 10 "Lay Movements".
the numerically-weak position of the clergy in Peru. The latter situation deserves further attention at this point.

A rapidly growing population is intensifying the problem of trying to maintain and staff the traditional basic administrative unit, the parish, with a limited number of personnel. It is true that in comparison with its Latin American neighbours, the Peruvian Church has been one of the most successful in maintaining its clerical staff strength. As can be seen in Table 4-1, in the

<p>| TABLE 4-1 |</p>
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<th>STAFF STRENGTH OF THE PERUVIAN CHURCH</th>
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<tr>
<td>Total Number of Clergy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Inhabitants per Priest</td>
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Although Latin America contains 38% of the world's Catholics, it is administered by only 10% of the institution's priests. See Joseph F. Beckman, "The Priesthood of the Future in Latin America," St. Anthony Messenger, May 1975, p. 22.
period from 1949 to 1973, the "inhabitants-per-priest" ratio, though still grossly inadequate, actually declined 7.3% as the number of clergy increased by 83% during the same period. Also, many new parishes have been created, no doubt to accommodate population shifts to the urban areas. Despite these optimistic figures, however, an increase of nearly ten per cent in the number of vacant parishes\textsuperscript{14} reveals the growing inability of the Church to properly administer its proclaimed parochial territory.

The growth statistics quoted above are misleading in another sense in that there is no account taken of the fact that the largest increase in the number of priests came as a result of the massive influx of foreign clergy into the country during the period of the sixties. A more comprehensive view of the personnel situation is shown in Table 4-2 below. As can be seen, the number of foreign priests in 1953 already comprised a significant 44% of the total, a figure which had reached over 60% by 1973. The increase is particularly dramatic in the case of diocesan, or secular, clergy and even though nearly 70% still are native-born, at least half of these are over fifty years of age in a nation where 52% of the population is under twenty years old.\textsuperscript{15} Thus, when most

\textsuperscript{14} Anuario Eclesiastico del Peru 1974, Dpto. de Estadistica, Arzobispado de Lima, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{15} Iglesia en el Peru, No. 27 (1975), p. 3.
of the people are inclined to adopt new ideas and perspectives, the age of the clergy raises doubts as to their likelihood of supporting the latter. 16

TABLE 4-2
GROWTH AND CHANGE
IN THE
PERUVIAN CLERGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Peruvian (%)</th>
<th>Foreign (%)</th>
<th>Secular and Religious of total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>91.6</td>
<td>23.95</td>
<td>47.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>76.05</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>87.67</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>62.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secular</td>
<td>Religious</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>60.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Iglesia en el Peru, No. 19 (1974), Table entitled "Clero en el Peru", p. 11.

It is important to note, also, that the Peruvian bishops do not have primary control over the location or nature of work of over 60% of the clergy, including 81.3% of the foreign manpower because these men are members of religious orders and are responsible first to the head of their individual congregations. Since many still are not

involved in pastoral work and do not attend diocesan meetings, the call for greater societal relevancy in the pastoral approach is of primary significance to only about 30% of the total number of clergy.\footnote{17}

It is true that with a smaller percentage of foreign priests now coming from religiously-dogmatic Spain and Italy,\footnote{18} they indeed have helped to strengthen the progressive sector of the native clergy. However, they also signify the continuing need for greater dependence of the Peruvian Church on outside resources at a time when nationalist feeling and rhetoric are increasing in the country. It seems that this need will persist at least into the near future if one uses as an indicator the number of native candidates for the priesthood who are currently in their final years of study. Their number has plummeted from 227 in 1969 to 123 in 1974.\footnote{19}

Many of the clergy, particularly the non-Peruvian members, feel that the bishops will not make the necessary greater efforts to de-emphasize the clerical aspect of the Church as long as this foreign supply lasts. Indications are that they may be forced to act soon since, at least in

\footnote{17}In the diocese of Chiclayo, for example, about 62% of the religious clergy, compared to 87% of the secular priests, are primarily engaged in parish work. See, "Clero Diocesano y Religioso de la diócesis de Chiclayo", Oficina de Pastoral de Conjunto, No. 4, August 1973.

\footnote{18}Forrester, "Christian Democracy in Peru...", pp. 137-38.

\footnote{19}Anuario..., p. 7.
North America, diocese and missionary orders are finding it increasingly difficult to recruit men for this field of the apostolate.  

The precarious position, then, of an adequate native clergy gives greater weight to the reformist call for the increased active participation of the laity. In particular, the emphasis is on according greater initiative to and responsibility of the lower groups in defining their role within the community. The priest, where possible, would then assist them in channelling the activity emanating from their beliefs towards a practical achievement of their desired goals. The key structural change being advocated by many as the natural realization of this emphasis is, again, the creation of comunidades cristianas de base as the basic unit of the Church.

In attempting to describe these comunidades in greater detail, it should be noted that since they have not yet developed extensively in Peru, there are various opinions as to what actually are the characteristics of such groups. There seems to be some agreement among both clergy and authors, however, that a comunidad cristiana de

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20 In the case of the Maryknoll congregation, for example, only 10 to 12 men were to be sent to Latin America in 1975 compared to four times that number a decade earlier. See Beckman, "The Priesthood..." Messenger, p. 22.

base is a small group of committed Christians with an additional common interest (for example, their neighbourhood, occupation, etc.) who come together on a regular basis to reflect on their faith, determine how it applies to their particular situation, decide what action, if any, must be taken as a consequence, and to celebrate their faith and community by means of a liturgy. Patrick Leonard describes it as being "like the early Church, it is grass-roots Christianity; not only at the grass-roots but from and of the grass-roots." Another priest defined it more as a "life" than a legal entity.

Ideally, these groups are spontaneous and thus do not follow any prescribed structural formation process, though one would generally constitute the core of the local Christian community. Since equality among members is essential, decisions are reached through dialogue and consensus, and there is strong rejection of any paternalistic attitudes and their subsequently simplistic solutions to societal problems. In order to maintain effective communication within the group, its size is inherently limited, usually from five to fifteen members, although more mature groups in Brazil, for example, have up to forty members and a number of teams within a

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single group. Although cohesion is certainly important, comunidades cristianas de base are not intended to be closed groups of "good" Catholics. On the contrary, their members try to establish an interrelationship with the community in which they are situated to stimulate its individuals to a stronger commitment to the principles of their faith, and to guide them to more effectively overcome the injustices within their particular situation which contradict those principles. In turn, these groups grow in number and strength with increasing support from the larger mass community. As such, the parish would ideally become the rational, unifying support structure for a number of functionally-oriented base communities within its jurisdiction.

Although the development of these communities is spontaneous, as with all groups, leadership is a crucial factor for concerted activity. The Church is formally trying to increase the number of competent lay leaders.

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24 Vela, Comunidades de base..., p. 261.
through the Programa de Profundización Cristiana (PdPC), a part-time course for the laity consisting of studies of the Bible, the social teachings of the Church, the theology of liberation, and the societal reality of the participants. The latter, then, are to help in the formation of other leaders and groups. Though its impact has thus far been limited geographically to Lima and pedagogically by a lack of sufficient methodology in group dynamics, many of its participants have successfully initiated comunidades, some of them within recently-formed industrial unions in Lima, for example.\textsuperscript{25}

The fact that their whole formation is directed toward being independent of clerical dominance leads many to believe that these communities will indeed survive as an important structure in the Church. In mature groups, the priest is simply an assistant rather than director of activity. Clearly, however, without more formed lay leaders from within the communities themselves, such groups will lose their dynamism to become isolated and irrelevant.\textsuperscript{26} Although an increasing number capable laymen are emerging, the situation still exists in which most parishes in Peru lack this indigenous leadership. Even where comunidades cristianas de base currently are relatively strong, it has been the result of many years of

\textsuperscript{25}Interview with Monseñor Schmitz, July 19, 1975.

\textsuperscript{26}Vela, Comunidades de base..., p. 255.
instruction, stimulation and support by the local priest. This probably will be the case for some time, until the impact of the existing lay leaders is felt more extensively.

The importance of these strong community leaders is recognized as well by the military government, which itself has been trying unsuccessfully to cultivate such leadership through SINAMOS, the official agency geared toward stimulating national mobilization and popular support for the regime. It has happened in some areas that the most dynamic members of the community have been formed as leaders by the local clergy, and then co-opted into SINAMOS by the lure of well-paying jobs and the expectation of having a greater impact from their efforts. Because of this, and the fact that these communities are still relatively few and often weak, the authoritarian government has not yet felt threatened by the formation of such local forms of mobilization.

Taking a look now at these groups at the local level, including some of the problems encountered in their growth and development, perhaps one of the clearest examples of mature comunidades cristianas de base in the coastal region of Peru has been that of the parish of the CAP Laredo, another sugar production co-operative, located outside of the city of Trujillo.27

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27 Information dealing with this parish was obtained in an interview with its pastor, Americo Cardenas, August 1975.
groups of workers, housewives and students have become quite effective pressure groups within the community as most of their work now takes place through public groups (such as the union, the women's club and the high school association) which these laymen have joined and in which they have become major forces in terms of orienting their activity. As a result of their weekly sessions of community reflection, exchange of information and co-ordination of programmes, they obviously have found a strength in peer group support to assume the perceived risks of a more active commitment to their faith.

It was discovered in Laredo and elsewhere, that the critical point in the life of the base community comes when its activity necessarily moves from the religio-cultural to the socio-political realm. For example, when trying to act to resolve specific labour problems, proposed solutions revealed the split between union members, anti-unionists and members of other reform-oriented groups which had not appeared while the discussion still centred on the spiritual justification for action to be taken. A slow but stabilizing process of dialogue is necessary to reach a consensus in typical situations such as this. Frequently, however, the cohesiveness of recently-formed groups does not seem to be strong enough to surmount the basic divisions within them.

This example of a parish encompassing a number of
effective base communities is, of course, still the exception rather than the rule in the Peruvian Church, and clerical receptiveness and support remain crucial factors in their initial formation.

None of the four co-operative parishes of this study have approached the level of comunidad development found in Laredo. In Tuman, although the author was unable to secure a great deal of data, there is no evidence that there are any lay groups formed along this line. Typical of the co-operative parishes, committed laymen are scarce because of the many years of pastoral neglect. Reinforcing this in Tuman, however, is the fact that the Vincentian pastor spends only enough time in the parish to fulfill his liturgical and sacramental duties, and thus cannot provide the support which any incipient lay group still needs to become established. On the other hand, there is less likelihood that the latter will emerge in either Tuman or Pucalá as quickly as in the other parishes since the standard of living is somewhat higher and the level of worker unrest lower in these two cooperatives than in the rest. This creates fewer sources of dissatisfaction to make the Gospel of liberation more immediately relevant to the local situation.

Although Justo Irazabal, a Spaniard, as is his counterpart Luis Garcia in Tuman, is more parish-oriented and feels the necessity of placing the Church more
clearly in the arena of socio-economic problems, his approach in Pucalá is decidedly more paternalistic than in the remaining cases. His understanding of comunidades cristianas de base places greater emphasis on the links of these groups to the hierarchical Church rather than on the necessity of Christian groups to apply the Gospel teachings to local situations. In his opinion, it happens too often that neighbourhood bases do not integrate themselves back into the larger community, and consequently tend to create greater divisions within it than existed before. His efforts toward lay group formation have been sacramentally-oriented and they have remained appendages to his authority rather than becoming independent community groups trying to clarify their own particular functions.

In contrast to this situation, the two Young Peruvian priests who administer to the larger portion of the population of CAP Pucalá in Pátapo, feel much more strongly that these grass-roots communities are vital to the life of the Church and that they must be allowed to grow according to the needs and aspirations of the people themselves rather than the particular desires of the priest who supports them. Their aim is to better prepare the laity not simply to be clerical "assistants" but to assume the responsibilities of these comunidades by more clearly emphasizing the integration of faith with the political sphere in its broadest sense.
Within this common orientation, however, there are basic differences in the approaches of the two men which have been the source of some friction between them and has precluded a more joint pastoral approach in the parish. Cesar Herrera places greater emphasis on the Gospel itself, interpreting it in a manner which is most relevant to the youth. The latter, he feels, should be the focus of attention, despite the risk of their becoming too politicized, since they have not yet formed their attitudes toward their role as Christians in society. He has recently begun to work with a high school group which is affiliated with the national movement of Juventud Estudiantil Cristiana (JEC), with the intention of helping them to become conscious of the reality of the co-operative, for instance in identifying the functions of the union to better understand the specific problems of the workers. He feels that in this essentially passive approach to "liberation" and the building of community groups, the committed laity themselves will accept the Gospel teachings and from there promote the struggle against local injustices, at the same time permitting greater security for the continued presence of the clergy in the parish.

Pedro Vasquez, on the other hand, believes that a more aggressive role is demanded both of these grassroots communities and of the clergy in the promotion of
them. Although he has been in the parish less than two years, he has actively supported the Movimiento de Trabajadores Cristianas (MTC), a recently-formed group of about twenty workers, some of whom are already engaged in some form of political activity. He speaks more openly of the problems of the workers and tries to guide them in establishing more directly, as they have expressed this desire, the integral relationship between the message of liberation in scripture and the necessity of their own *lucha* for greater self-determination. For this group, then, his approach at least appears more concrete and reform-oriented than that of his companion who is somewhat more apprehensive of the possible consequences of such a direct role for the clergy. It is too early to judge the persistence and growth of the group to form an active and mature *comunidad de base* in the Church. Although their commitment to their faith is probably stronger than that of the youth group mentioned earlier, it is also more difficult for many of these workers to transform this into specific action since they also risk more in doing so. Thus far, their "activity" has only been theological but they seem to have the greatest potential of any lay group in the co-operative parishes of becoming a stable *comunidad*.

In the parish of the CAP Pomalca, again there have been no strong lay group formations, and the probability
that one will emerge is somewhat remote. Although a group who now comprise a parish council have taken action in some instances to help resolve local problems, their orientation and function is primarily administrative rather than pastoral. Also, though the young Peruvian pastor, Pedro Vidalon, feels that such grass-roots communities are basic to greater lay participation, he has been more concerned with the sacramental aspect of his pastoral duties and in trying to check the influence of the Protestant sects in the community. Formerly the member of a religious order, he has had little experience in parish work and feels there is little time to devote to the support of special groups within that structure. However, he is showing enough flexibility and allying himself more clearly with the people in his attempts to become more independent of the strong military presence on the co-operative such that his order of priorities may change in favour of a more integrated pastoral approach that would include more active stimulation of lay leadership.

Similarly, in Cayaltí, significant lay groups have failed to appear for several reasons, some of them unique to that situation. Primarily, of course, the long period without an adequate Church presence has left the population without a strong foundation in basic Christian principles from which lay leaders can emerge. Beyond this, the fam-
ily structure in Cayalti seems to have deteriorated to a greater degree than in the other CAPs, making the process of character formation and the development of a sense of community that much more difficult. In addition to, and because of, its poor economic situation, this co-operative has been more politically volatile than the others. For example, the workers' union which is still strongly supported by its membership, has had numerous and bitter clashes both with the former hacienda owners and more recently with the co-operative administration. The Canadian priests there, currently Frank O'Connor and Paul Roy, feel that many lay people who have the potential for leadership in active Christian communities have been siphoned off into more purely political activity. Again, there are others, they feel, who are committed both to their faith and to effecting community action but as yet have not perceived the need, or accepted their responsibility, to identify themselves specifically with a Church group in order to build a strong Christian community that integrates the two aspects.

Another important factor impeding the growth of lay groups, paradoxically enough, is that of a visible Church presence which is now, perhaps, too strong. Since the Canadian team of priests and religious came to the parish in the early sixties, their numbers have always been sufficient such that, even for catechetical work,
lay assistance was never really needed. Again, they sometimes find difficulty with the language and, along with their financial independence, this has often impeded them in reaching the depth of understanding and rapport with the people which they desire and which is necessary to support the development of grass-roots structures. This has been reinforced by the fact that the members of the team are changed regularly, after a term of approximately seven years. Considering the time needed for the formation of lay groups, this departure comes at a time when their support for those small groups with whom they may be working would be becoming more crucial. Still, these factors should not be exaggerated since, according to some of the Peruvian clergy and laity interviewed, the Spanish priests in Tuman and Pucalá have done no more toward developing comunidades de base and are even more resented by the people for their arrogant attitude despite their facility in the language and permanent residence in Peru.

Currently, the clergy in Cayaltí, in re-assessing and re-orienting its approach, hold similar views to its counterpart in Patapo, that efforts toward the formation of true comunidades cristianas de base must come from the laity themselves and not be molded by the hierarchy, including themselves, which is a tendency prevalent throughout Peru where lay leadership and initiative are weak.
This seems to be the latest step in a process of adjustment to find the proper role for the local Church at different points in a changing political and socio-economic context. At first sacramentally-oriented, the Canadian approach had become one of paternalistic aid as their social commitment increased, and later became geared to more direct involvement with the workers in their socio-political life as a basis from which to promote a deeper commitment by the latter to their faith.  

No doubt these previous steps were necessary in order to establish concretely that the Church was indeed concerned with the problems of the poor. In this, the priests and religious have a reputation in the diocese for having been quite successful. Nevertheless, it has become more evident that, as the government is assuming greater responsibility for local economic reforms, there has been little real growth in terms of a strong community of committed laity.

There are a few signs, however, that this situation may change within the next few years. The emphasis in the pastoral approach of the clergy now appears to be

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28 In this regard, for example, a credit co-operative was set up by one of the previous missioners, and good relations were established with the workers' union to the point that the priests themselves took part in protest demonstrations and as a consequence of other circumstances, were kept under surveillance by the local military officials.
that of providing support rather than initiative or un-requested help for lay efforts. As well, the number of committed lay individuals has increased since the early sixties and potential leaders among the adults and youth are being encouraged to attend a regional monthly seminar programme being established which will provide its participants with the opportunity to gain a clearer understanding of liberation theology and the basis of their socio-economic reality, as well as to share experiences in the formation and development of grass-roots communities.

Also, by disengaging themselves from direct involvement in specific political or economic activity, and in continuing to stress the intimate relationship between faith and its societal implications, the clergy hope to stimulate lay acceptance of these responsibilities. In this regard, they are also scaling down the administrative size of their operation by eliminating most of the salaried positions for lay workers. Their aim is to minimize the structural aspect of the parish, emphasize the need for voluntary parish support, and to make the parish more manageable for their Peruvian successors who will not have similar human or financial resources.

It is obvious, then, that the development of comunidades cristianas de base has progressed little at the parish level in the area which is the focus of this study. This seems to be typical of the diocesan level as well.
with at least one notable exception, that of the parish in "Diego Ferre", a barriada sector of Chiclayo itself. The pastor there, again a young Peruvian, opted out of his job as rector of the cathedral to help support the growth of what now appear to be the beginnings of relatively strong and articulate groups of laymen, particularly young workers, in that slum area. It is significant to note that his initial efforts toward integrating the spiritual and social aspects of the Gospel were geared toward introducing Christian values and goals into groups already formed but espousing a marxist orientation. While these individuals proved incapable of going beyond the theoretical level, he seems to have been more successful in stimulating a more stable and action-oriented community of groups by reversing his approach, that is, by proceeding first from a study of Scripture and its implications which, in turn, have provided the motivation for action.

Observers indicate that in the sierra, where there are fewer priests available, such as in the Bambamarca area in the neighbouring diocese of Cajamarca, lay leaders have appeared in greater numbers and networks of grass-roots communities are developing much more rapidly. Again, however, this seems to be characteristic of selected regions and cannot be said to be true of the sierra as a whole.

Despite the generally slow initiation and growth of
these base communities within the Peruvian Church structure, few doubt that their impact will be great. This is particularly true, of course, at the local level where, as one author has stated, small moves by a highly visible Church mean a lot.²⁹ For many in the worker and campesino classes, it is the only situation in which they feel a real sense of community and equality. With mutual support, they have less fear to take the necessary risks to fulfill what they feel are the demands of the Gospel. Again, comunidades de base may be seen as examples of the fact that, in attempting to effect concrete changes in society, it is much easier to maintain the necessary enthusiasm for perseverance in a small community with a strong normative base rather than in a larger and more complex organization.³⁰ Further, one prelate feels that, in stimulating the laity's awareness of the necessity of more indigenous leadership and less clerical domination, these comunidades will help to promote native vocations and begin to resolve the problem mentioned earlier of the dependency of the Peruvian Church on foreign sources for personnel.

Because the development of comunidades cristianas de base is still correlated to the receptiveness and support


of the clergy, their attitudes are important in speculating on the future extent of that development. There is reason to be "cautiously optimistic" in this regard as a large majority of those priests interviewed were positive, though sometimes vague, in their evaluation of this new phenomenon. Many feel that these grass-roots communities are the first necessary step for the laity in acquiring the competence and, more importantly, the recognition to determine their own particular ministry, or role, in the Church and society, and to participate effectively in the decision-making bodies at higher levels of the institution as a whole. In the opinion of most, they will probably remain a part of the parish but that the latter structure will assume a "group" rather than a general pastoral focus and become a co-ordinating body for a number of comunidades, as suggested earlier. This may be true particularly for the pueblo joven parishes, that is, those in the poor but developing urban sectors, where these grass-roots groups appear to be growing more rapidly than in many other areas. One author suggests that they have less resistance to change and fewer structures to impede

31 A key figure in promoting the comunidades eclesial de base, as they are known in Brazil, suggests that in the urban areas, the future role of the bishop will be a more direct, dynamic and advised one so that "hopefully, the present sacral, judicial, formal, and now obsolete parish/ convent/curia set-up will be replaced by a CEB/action group/pastoral centre structure, corresponding to the needs of the city and its inhabitants." Jose Comblin cited in Leonard, "Comunidades de Base," Review for the Religious, p. 793
the process. Generally, most believe that comunidades cristianas de base will be the major source of life for the future Church in Peru.

Although there were fewer criticisms of this structural innovation, those that were expressed were crucial and must be resolved if these communities are to have their expected impact. Primary among the negative factors mentioned is the real possibility that these communities will become groups that are more interested in maintaining their perceived "elitist" position within the parish than in trying to stimulate greater commitment to and social application of their faith for their community. This apparently has occurred in the diocese of Cuzco where many campesino unions have developed an anti-Church bias partially as a result of the clerical attitude encountered among many of the active laity of the region. Related to this is the fear, particularly among the members of the upper hierarchy, that these groups will become completely autonomous of ecclesiastical authority. There is little evidence currently that this is the aim of the comunidades, though certainly they seek to be free of hierarchical manipulation.

Other critics feel that these communities tend to be too political for religiously-based groups and that the

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arena of social promotion should be left to the Church as a whole. The latter part of this criticism shows that, indeed, some priests have missed the whole thrust of the post-Vatican re-orientation of the Church. The first point, however, is a valid warning that, without adequate formed leadership, some groups, particularly those of young people, may lose their original normative base to simply become secular pressure groups. In so doing, they would lose the protective and supportive weight of the Church and minimize the latter's ability to maintain an effective and socially-relevant presence at the local level. Finally, others believe these comunidades will not be representative of the Church since their membership will be extremely low given the fact that most of the laity are not willing or able to accept the degree of commitment demanded. It is entirely likely, however, that as these inherently small but strong grass-roots groups begin to have a greater impact in terms of concrete results in the community than did the traditional structures, their membership and numbers will grow much more extensively.

The growth and development of comunidades cristianas de base, then, should be followed closely as one of the key forms of implementing the normative change in the Peruvian Church. Its ability to promote grass-roots Christianity built around deeper faith and its subsequent greater awareness, commitment and action will deter-
mine its relevancy in a society of an increasingly politicized lower class. The process of developing comunidades, as we have seen is a slow one, however, and it will be many years before extensive results of this growth will be seen.

Though comunidades de base may, in the future, form the progressively-oriented foci of the local Church, there are also some important developments of the laity at the national level which deserve brief attention here. The movement of Fe y Acción Solidaria (FAS) has become the major focal point in this regard. It is the successor to earlier, unsuccessful attempts to reform Accion Catolica, formerly the official arm of the Church in carrying out the lay apostolate.

Particularly following the Vatican Council, the leadership of Accion Catolica repeatedly came into conflict with its clerical co-ordinator over the former's attempts to secure greater responsibility for the Church's laity and to update their formation to include greater social application of their objectives. Already weak in

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33 At the ONIS meeting held in July 1975, participants from all over the country noted the high degree of unrest among workers and campesinos, and that spontaneous action, rather than that directed by their own union leadership, was becoming prevalent.

numbers, its members were actually divided into many groups within the overall structure of Acción Católica, and could not reconcile their different approaches for strong, concerted lay action. As a result, Acción Católica itself was disbanded as an official national organization while it and its subgroups continue as individual lay organizations.35

The national lay movement is still very weak, but it is attempting to overcome the isolation and lack of perspective of its various groups through their co-ordination in FAS. More specifically, the purpose of FAS, which was initiated in 1971 under the name of Una Iglesia Solidaria, is to aid in the creation of a popular Church by linking together those groups and individuals who are trying to implement their faith in a social context, and to more effectively develop concern for the poor, particularly among the middle class.36 On a regional level, it is proposing to act as a central body to focus and coordinate the activity of local lay groups, including comunidades de base, and to present a more forceful image of the Church with regard to specific issues.

It is the intention of FAS organizers to work from

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35Interview with Dr. Miguel Vallier, former Director of Acción Católica, June 21, 1975.

within the institutional Church, though it has yet to be recognized by the hierarchy and its relations with the latter have been notably cool and often mutually critical. It does receive support, however, from the lower clergy, especially from the foreign priests and through the clerical organization of ONIS which is affiliated with the movement.

The major lay organizations which comprise FAS include Unión Nacional de Estudiantes Cristianas (UNEC), Juventud Obrera Católica (JOC), and Movimiento de Trabajadores Cristianos (MTC). Within the last year, it appears that the latter two, which are worker-based organizations, are becoming more influential in directing the national attention of FAS away from an intellectual discussion of the laity's role toward a greater concern with the real problems of their regional groups and how various local experiences can be used as guidelines to action. This seems to be the result of efforts by regional committees to decentralize the national organization which they feel has been lacking in direction, has neglected relations with its regional branches, and continues without representatives of the campesino and worker sectors. 37 Even within each region, there are serious problems in the sti-

mulation of dynamic groups, communication, the co-ordination of programmes, the lack of clerical support and the integration of their Christian principles with specific action in the community. In addition, the dioceses of each region have so far produced only a few generally weak groups to comprise its membership. These problems, of course, are part of the developing process of FAS but nevertheless must be resolved soon if the organization is to survive.

In the case of the Chiclayo diocese, previously strong groups of students and young workers have lost much of their base over the past years, and have just recently begun to rebuild their ranks. Of the four co-operative parishes, for example, that in Pátapo is the only which currently has groups linked to the regional FAS organization. These include JOC, MTC and UNEC. None of these, however, are well-developed, although, along with their counterparts in the "Diego Ferre" parish where such groups seem to be somewhat stronger, they are beginning to go other parishes to help those expressing interest to become aware of what FAS is and what its component groups can do locally.

Though FAS is still in its embryonic stage, as it develops and becomes more co-ordinated within its loose national structure, it promises to more clearly become a

\[38\] "Conclusiones de la Jornada..."
legitimate and forceful spokesman for the laity in stimulating and helping to direct change within the Church.

It is not surprising, however, that in what is still an elite-dominated social institution the most vocal and organized members seeking to effect change in it are the lowest-ranking elite members themselves, those being the priests. The specific group in question is that of ONIS (Oficina Nacional de Información Social) which, for the most part, is composed of lower clergy but does include four bishops among its members as well. Because of its significance as the most clearly-recognized progressive sector in the Peruvian Church, the ONIS organization will be discussed at length in this thesis. This will encompass a look at its purpose, changes in its internal composition and approach, as well as in its relationship to the Church as a whole, and to the hierarchy in particular. Following this, the regional grouping of ONIS-Chiclayo will be examined briefly. Finally, there will be a look at the general opinions of a number of clergy interviewed by the author to illustrate the degree to which the development of this progressive organization has been accepted.

The founding purpose of the organization was to give concrete support for, and promotion of, the principles of liberation theology through conscientization and drastic structural reform within the society, and to
do so from within the institutional structure of the Church.\(^{39}\) In the latter characteristic, ONIS differs from many organizations of Third World priests who foster an identity of independence from the national Church. Like them, however, it has attracted the most socially-progressive elements among the clergy including, as mentioned, a few influential members of the hierarchy. In addition, it received, at least initially, the verbal support of the Cardinal which has given its members somewhat greater flexibility in the activity which they undertake. Finally, ONIS can be seen as the first attempt by priests of the Peruvian Church to organize themselves into a recognized body in order to achieve a shared goal.\(^{40}\)

In terms of size, ONIS membership has been recently estimated to be 250,\(^{41}\) though it is likely that its active


\(^{40}\) Macaulay, "Ideological Change..." p. 17.

members number no more than 150, or approximately six percent of the total clergy, a percentage which has remained the same over the past five years despite a rather high turnover rate.

ONIS was begun in 1968 as a movement of Peruvian priests but, within two years, its greatly expanded membership showed that the percentage of foreign priests had more than doubled to approximately sixty percent of the total.\footnote{Macaulay, "Ideological Change...," Table VIII, p. 79.} This reflects a more accurate cross-sectional sample of the national ratio.\footnote{Macaulay reports that, in 1972, 38.4% of ONIS members were Peruvians which compared almost exactly with their national position which was 38% of the total clergy. See Table VI, p. 72.} It does not imply, however, that its policy direction is determined by its non-Peruvian elements. On the contrary, the latter have expressed the desire that national leadership positions be filled by Peruvians while they would fulfill whatever role is deemed appropriate for them by that leadership.\footnote{Interviews with foreign members of ONIS-Chiclayo, August, 1975.} They have little desire to dominate the organization locally or nationally as this would be counterproductive to their desire to promote an indigenous Peruvian Church no longer dependent on outside resources.

Another internal change of some importance in ONIS is the increase in the percentage of religious, as op-
posed to secular, priests within its ranks. This tends to minimize the degree of authority which the bishops can exercise over the organization since, as was mentioned previously, these men answer first to their own superiors. Taken together, these last two factors indicate, as Michael Macaulay points out, that ONIS is composed of priests that are the most "secure from reprisals" by the hierarchy rather than of the core of secular Peruvian priests. 45 Though this may seem to be a negative factor in the short run, we contend that, realistically, it is a positive sign for the future Peruvian Church that now these "independent" elements, which are often the most dynamic, have opted to actively identify the priesthood with the progressive documents of the Church, and thereby break the ground, and act as a buffer, for the Peruvian priests who have the desire but not the support of their superiors to do so.

ONIS is essentially a decentralized organization giving its local groups relative autonomy in setting forth the strategy to be followed at that level. There are a number of regional groups, including one in Chiclayo, which elect a responsable, or co-ordinator, to form the national council. Though some members have expressed dissatisfaction with what they feel is a lack of sufficient communication with the regional groups to assess their

45 Macaulay, "Ideological Change...," p. 74.
views, it is agreed that this national body should generally approve and issue the statements for the organization as a whole. 46

Perhaps the most significant characteristic of ONIS mentioned above is that its members very consciously work from within the institutional structure of the Church. This is indicative of a number of factors. First of all, its members wish to stimulate reform of and by the institution as a whole rather than to set themselves apart and abandon it as insignificant for the modern world.

Secondly, it clearly manifests the priority of its individual members, to be that of faith, the only basis from which their "political" action should and will follow. This is crucial since, as Macaulay clearly states, "ONIS is not a priests' organization concerned only with priestly matters. In Peru the absence of a strict religious-civic dichotomy makes clerical organizations much more potent in that their interests are easily politicized; their very position in society is a fundamentally political one." 47

Therefore, it is important to note that the Gospel rather than marxist theory provides the motivation for ONIS priests who use the organization as the most suitable.

46 For organizational details, see Macaulay, "Ideological Change...", chap. iv, pp. 56-77.

47 Macaulay, "Ideological Change...", p. 18.
vehicle currently available through which to focus their activity, as well as to place the latter in its national perspective, and to receive moral support from their peers to persevere in it. The organization likely will be readily transformed or replaced by its members when it no longer serves the purposes mentioned.

Thirdly, despite its rhetoric for radical social change and the acceptance of the inevitability of class struggle by many members, ONIS has automatically limited the degree of its radical orientation in electing to remain within the current authority structure. Rather than actually help to foster a sudden upheaval as some of its advocates and critics seem to contend, the priests of ONIS prefer, in practice, to both motivate and channel pressure on the decision-making hierarchy and the civil authority from the base of the Church and from the lower echelon clergy. This is done through a more gradual process of increasing their awareness of the reality and needs of the majority of the Church’s members, and in developing strategies through which to guide that awareness in effective action.

Finally, the move is a pragmatic political one in that its continued identification with the Church supplies ONIS with greater legitimacy in the eyes of the people and government elites than it would otherwise have. It also supplies it with protection from retaliation by the
latter, a factor which had become more crucial by mid-1975 as the military regime had increased its repression of popular opinion. This repression was accomplished, for example, through control of the media and deportation of the leadership of many key groups such as the press, political parties and unions. With many of its members helping to mobilize small, local groups and a membership network that can assemble and co-ordinate information from all areas of the country, it is easy to see why the government might view ONIS with suspicion. Although the names of activist ONIS priests were reportedly on the list of deportees which was subsequently cancelled as a result of the change of military presidents in August of that year, the government had delayed until that late date in attacking the group because of its fear of confrontation with the Church as a whole. On the other hand, as Macaulay again points out, the Church also benefits from having a sector of the clergy clearly identified with the oppressed classes. It not only takes some of the public pressure off the hierarchy, at least initially, to do something to implement its statements, but also it gathers together in one visible body most of the clergy likely to come into conflict with the majority of conservative bishops who jealously guard their right of authority over their priests.48

Further in this regard, although there have been few major clashes between ONIS and the upper hierarchy, rela-

tions between the two groups have never been warm and have recently become less so. This, perhaps, can be attributed to a change in the emphasis of ONIS activity. The organization has adapted its orientation roughly in correspondence to the political situation. Initially, in its documents, ONIS demanded action to be taken regarding specific reforms, including agrarian reform. It then played the role of legitimator of early attempts by the government under General Velasco to accomplish a number of basic structural changes. During this period, Velasco happily noted the support of this group in some of his major speeches. Because ONIS activity was still at the level of verbal declarations which caused no stir with the government, there was little cause for concern by the hierarchy. ONIS has since become increasingly critical of the regime for, as its own approach has become more analytical, the government has continued to expand state control beyond basic industries to include popular mobilization and participation, while at the same time fail-

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51 As mentioned previously, the government has attempted to accomplish this by setting up state-run organizations parallel to the existing ones which have popular support.
ing to persevere in the implementation of many of its reform policies. This is true regarding some aspects of the Agrarian Reform Law, including distribution of land to the campesinos of the sierra. In Puno, for example, ONIS members report that, despite government statements to the contrary, less than one-tenth of the land has been affected while unemployment remains high and only the wages of the more prosperous farmers have increased.

Also affecting the orientation of ONIS activity is the fact that in the latter part of 1974 and early 1975, there had been no new major reform policies announced by the government so that the members of ONIS have been less preoccupied with theoretical matters enabling them to push ahead more vigorously with their efforts to support the formation of local groups of active laity, including, of course, comunidades de base specifically. This activity also helps to ease the bind in which the national organization finds itself. As one researcher has stated, it is afraid to lash out too strongly against the government since it risks supplying ammunition for regression to the rightist opposition both secular and religious, while in not reacting at all would in effect signal its tacit approval of the situation. Many members of the hierarchy, although they do not approve of the current widespread government control, feel that the more pointed criticism

52 Patrick Maloney, personal correspondence.
of ONIS may only lead to a situation which would be more repressive than before, particularly for the Church. As a result, there has been increasing frustration within ONIS with the lack of hierarchical response to some government activity.\footnote{This can be seen, for example, in the reported incident in which the bishops refused to add their written support to an ONIS comunicado condemning a massive deportation of intellectuals and labour leaders. Consequently, ONIS published its strongly-worded statement before the hierarchy could issue its own if it wished, in an effort to effectively limit the latter’s wording to include at least tacit approval of the ONIS position. It is possible, however, with the change in government leadership, tensions such as these will be eased, at least for a time.}

The conservative opposition in the Church which has furthered the cooling of relations between ONIS and the hierarchy has been centred in the Opus Dei group. This is an association of professional laymen and priests with a few prominent bishops, including Monseñor Orbigo of Chiclayo, among its members. Many of the priests are of Spanish origin while the group as a whole, a branch of that founded in Spain, is still very much influenced by Spanish spiritual thought. Its members are essentially interested in a technocratic development of society and are bitterly opposed to socially-progressive orientations within the Church, as well as to any threat from the clergy or laity to the hierarchical nature of the institution. Monseñor Orbigo and others have openly denied the validity of the Medellin documents along with those of a similar theme in
the Peruvian Church and, as these are starting to be implemented at the local level by such as ONIS, their organized opposition has been increasing.

In general, then, it appears that ONIS members are not currently well-received by the hierarchy though, despite mutual internal criticism, there has not been an open split between the two, nor is there any desire by either side to create one, thereby weakening the Church in its possibilities for influencing the reform process, such as it is.

Turning now to a closer look at a specific regional group, we see that the sector of ONIS based in Chiclayo had eight active members in 1975. This number is evenly divided between those of Peruvian and foreign nationality, including the two Canadian priests from Cayaltí and Pedro Vasquez from Pátapo. The other co-operative priests have declined to join, for a variety of reasons, despite earlier efforts by the organization to enlist their membership. Although the author could not obtain a response from the pastor in Tuman, his counterpart in in Pucalá feels that ONIS is a group of narrow-minded priests who have nothing constructive to offer, only very negative criticism of the whole socio-economic system. Pedro Vidalon in Pomalca, on the other hand, respects the dedication of ONIS members to the social plight of the oppressed but, as we have seen, he still personally favours a more sacramental ap-
proach which leaves little time to keep up on all the political details he feels necessary to be associated with that organization. Finally, Cesar Herrera in Pátapo is sympathetic to the theological emphasis of ONIS members but dislikes what he sees as their inherent confrontation with the institutional Church. He prefers to develop his own priestly style independent of any formal association.

On the other hand, the three active members do not feel that ONIS is an aggressive organization but rather, using the official documents of the Church as strong basis, it is simply helping to legitimize changes in and by the Church, particularly regarding support for the autonomous rights of the people.

The bishop, as mentioned previously, is a member of Opus Dei and, although he does not approve of the organization, he has not seriously hampered the activity of the ONIS-Chiclayo group. In the name of basic social justice he has even joined ONIS priests in supporting a hunger strike by a number of workers who were fired from the Cayaltí complex, but also criticized workers and authorities alike for not making a united effort to employ the available technological means needed to solve the economic problems of the co-operative. Since then, however, he has only tacitly given them his permission to act on

54 Macaulay, "Ideological Change...", p. 92.
their own without implying any further approval on his part. In 1972, for example, the Chiclayo members, as part of the initial ONIS-Norte group, brought the attention of the government to focus on the problems of workers on the northern agro-industrial complexes through a nationally-published declaration. In it they have outlined that some of the main obstacles to the intended implementation of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1969, are the continued paternalistic and bureaucratic mentality of the administrators, and the workers' fear of repression by the government in response to any criticism.55

More recently, in 1974, the Canadian team of four priests published an open letter in the Chiclayo newspaper protesting the arrest and detention without charge or trial of four union leaders from Cayaltí following a labour dispute.56 Though it is difficult to determine the extent of their direct influence, they probably were instrumental in securing the release of the men three weeks later. Finally, it has been the local ONIS group which has supported the aspirations and activity of a number of young Peruvian priests in the diocese who are concerned with the social


56"Carta Abierta al General German Véjarde Lozano", appeared also in Paginas, No. 47, September 1974, pp. 32-34.
relevancy of the Church. In this, they have been facing increasing pressure from the bishop to desist from such "political" orientations. It is against such opposition as this that ONIS groups have been able to supply the needed moral encouragement to the progressive yet most vulnerable element of the clergy - the Peruvian diocesan priest.

Quite significantly, the attitudes of those priests interviewed indicate that members of ONIS face almost as much disapproval among their fellow clergymen as they do from the upper hierarchy. The most common criticism still is that this group of priests is much too involved in the political sphere with the consequent danger that they are neglecting the transcendental basis of their ministry. Further, they have been accused of attracting attention with their militant words without the base support to warrant it and have actually succeeded only in disorienting a great many laymen. Again, ONIS is seen by many as having moved too quickly to the left and as being too uncritical of marxism and its theory of class struggle. It has also been labelled as being both too much under foreign influence and being too nationalistic vis-a-vis the universal Church. It has obviously succeeded in creating greater division among the clergy, or more properly, in bringing such division into the open where it must be resolved if the Church is to more fully implement its progressive
The minority who spoke positively of ONIS felt that they are the only members of the Church who have really taken up the prophetic role in trying to implement the progressive documents and in forcing the hierarchy to react similarly. Perhaps most often noted was the productive role which ONIS has played in the formation of its member priests. It has conscientized them into re-appraising their whole pastoral approach so as to place greater emphasis on defence of the poor, increased lay involvement and group formation, and greater awareness of the political implications of their activity.

In assessing the most important accusation, that ONIS is too politically-oriented, it must be remembered that, in our opinion, the organization's greatest impact has been felt through the local activity of its individual members whose overlapping membership in various other Church structures, such as CEAS-Campesino, and the promotion of lay groups at the grass-roots, have proceeded for the most part from a strong scripture-oriented normative base. Again, at the level of the national organization, ONIS is increasingly avoiding direct identification with specific political groups. A case in point: its decision to send a letter of support rather than to formally attend the annual meeting of the Confederacion de Campesinos Peruano, the popularly-backed federation
of peasant unions, to which it was invited. It felt that such an organization can and must be purely a grass-roots phenomenon and that ONIS participation would not only hinder this but also would compromise its own independence to play the prophetic role, or whatever other role it deems necessary.

Despite continued opposition, ONIS strength seems sufficient to provide a vehicle for the conscientization and co-ordination of activity of those progressive priests who see the usefulness of a national organization to bolster their individual efforts.

Before closing this chapter on structural change in the Peruvian Church, it is important to note that the effect of ONIS activity and the general development of the theology of liberation has been a polarization of the left and the right within the Church. As was mentioned previously, Opus Dei, exhibiting a strong Spanish spiritual orientation, embodies the core opposition to the new progressive directions within the Church. It fears that the latter are stimulating a degeneration of the Church and with ONIS at the forefront, there is a great deal of bitterness between the two groups and a concerted effort by Opus Dei to check the progress of the "left" wing of the Church. The general feeling is that members of this organization, although their numerical strength is not known, are becoming more influential, paralleling a simi-
lar rightist shift in the military regime\textsuperscript{57} which may prove to be mutually reinforcing. Thus far, the impact of Opus Dei has been felt most at the episcopal level where its prelate members and those of ONIS have strongly split the advisory body to the Cardinal, limiting his ability to support the progressive priests more openly.

It is evident, then, that there has been some significant structural innovations in the Peruvian Church. In terms of the institutional organization itself, there has been, for example, a limited opening of communication between hierarchical levels and the creation of CEAS-Campesino. Regarding mass and elite group formations, the \textit{comunidades cristianas de base} for the former and ONIS for the latter have been the most important. Although most of the new structures, including the \textit{comunidades}, thus far have greater potential than actual impact on widespread change in the Church, others such as ONIS have already provided a catalyst and framework for the crucial re-orientation of the institution. Despite more recent and concerted opposition to them, these changes clearly increase the capacity and enhance the probability that the Church will implement its progressive verbal declarations which we examined earlier.

\footnote{\textit{Latin America}, Vol. X, No. 1 (1976), p. 2.}
CHAPTER 5

THE ATTITUDINAL DIMENSION

As outlined at greater length earlier in the thesis, any fundamental transformation of the Church will be the result of interdependent change in its three basic dimensions, that is, in its normative orientation, its structure and in the attitudes of the clergy whose accompanying behaviour would actually stimulate implementation of the espoused changes. Again, attitudes, while not the equivalent of behaviour, are nevertheless the most direct indicators of what that behaviour likely will be. Thus far, we have examined change in the first two dimensions, and generally found that it is most extensive at the normative level of verbal statements, though the potential in terms of the impact of structural innovation is also significant.

In this chapter, we will analyze the third dimension, that of the attitudes of the lower clergy. This analysis will more clearly reflect the effects which normative and structural change has had on those members of the hierarchy who have the greatest influence at the local level. It will also help to assess the probability that such change will continue to be supported in the future.

In trying to determine more specifically what the
lower clergy feel should be the role of their Christian faith for modern man, the general indication from sixty per cent of the respondents is that this role still should be one whose orientation is essentially sacramental. More specifically, the majority view religious belief either as a source of comfort for the suffering, a focus to provide meaning for daily life, a cultural norm against anti-Christian social customs, or as a bond of continuity in the national society. On the other hand, a minority, though significantly a large one, feel that at the present time in Peru their faith should exhibit a greater social orientation or, more importantly, one which integrates more closely both its sacramental and social aspects.

They believe it should be a stimulus and a legitimizing force for societal development and offer a prophetic challenge to the society in its struggle for human rights and dignity. This tends to clarify somewhat the lack of clear-cut support for the theology of liberation pointed out earlier, and perhaps to reflect the increase in the more traditional orientation of some of the later episcopal documents.

Nevertheless, there seems to be a definite inconsistency among these clergymen in their perception of the role of faith. The examination of the above question alone, would not reveal the aforesaid inconsistency. The traditional orientation indicated by this attitude is in clear
contrast to that of another question with which the clergy identified strongly: the Second Vatican Council and the Medellin Conference, as the two most important events that have influenced the direction of the Peruvian Church in the last twenty-five years. These events were mentioned in an open response by 58.5 per cent and 54.8 per cent of the clergy, respectively. No other development figured as significantly, including the change in government to reformist military rule. This, of course, substantiates the importance accorded to these events in an earlier analysis where it was suggested that they spurred a more socially-progressive orientation within the Peruvian Church. Similarly, in an additional question put to about half of the sample, Church figures noted for their progressive stance were overwhelmingly named as those personalities who have had the most determining impact on the Church during this period. Gustavo Gutierrez alone was named by over one-third of the respondents.

Again, the clergy often show what would be considered a more progressive stance than suggested by their perceived role of faith itself, on a number of other specific issues. For example, the majority of 58.5 per cent identify the most crucial problems facing the Church in Peru to be those with a popular, or charismatic, focus as opposed to the more traditional ones which concentrate on the Church as an institution. In this regard, most
feel that the need to build stronger and more effective comunidades de base is currently more important than the lack of sufficient candidates for the religious life. Again, the protection of human rights and the necessity for the hierarchy to take clearer stands on the important issues of the day are seen as more crucial than the quality of religious practice among the laity and the need to maintain unity in the Church amidst a diversity of opinion and attitudes. In terms of future behaviour, this may indicate that the lower clergy will at least be more inclined to emphasize the laity in the Church and to work more closely with them in accepting the social responsibilities entailed in the "integrated" interpretation of the Gospels, which only the minority specifically prefers at present. Clearly, then, a look at a number of issues more adequately reveals the complexity of clerical attitudes.

The above impression concerning possible future behaviour of the clergy is strengthened by the fact that those interviewed, most of whom express a definite interest in national politics, overwhelmingly regard as acceptable the use of the teachings of the Church to justify socialism in a nation. More precisely, about eighty per cent feel that either it is not mixing religion and politics to apply Church doctrine in this manner, or if it is, combining the two distinct spheres is done legitimately.
As will be seen, attitudes on this question are polarized within a number of the independent factors. Most regard the political realm as important and can accept a direct application of religious belief to it, but the vast majority do not as readily condone the involvement of the clergy in this area. Well over three-quarters of the priests interviewed feel that at least some, if not many, of their fellow clergymen have become too involved in partisan political activity. Though this peer disapproval may tend to relegate some priests to a role of espousing doctrine rather than implementing it more directly with regard to social issues, it may also encourage the concerned clergy to stimulate their lay followers to create more and active communities which some see, as stated earlier, to be the primary basic structure for the future Church.

Indicating the clergy's perception of the secular needs of the laity which may comprise these communities, is their identification of the key tasks currently facing the government. Undoubtedly, their main concern is that the government devote greater attention to the economic situation of the lower classes. Nearly seventy-five percent of those interviewed felt that the government must improve the standard of living of this sector or, similarly, that it should ensure a more equal distribution of society's resources and benefits. The second priority is less
definitely cited to be that of reform which either implies or would lead to a broader sharing of political power. Issues concerning nationalism or an increase in economic productivity without regard to its distribution are not seen as important, while a drive against the political leftists in the country is clearly judged to be insignificant. It seems, then, that satisfying the economic needs of the population through structural change is primary to most priests though ensuring that this is done through greater participation is very much a secondary concern.

Above, the need for greater lay participation was identified as a primary problem facing the Church. This focus is even more clearly revealed in the response to questions dealing with structural issues. For example, the priests interviewed prefer a more popularly-oriented basis for episcopal authority as opposed to the current structure which, for all practical purposes, is still highly centralized. About sixty per cent of the respondents believe either, that collegiality and dialogue are the modern methods by which authority should be exercised and that, consequently, solutions to problems should be arrived at through consensus, or, that essentially autonomous *comunidades de base* which would form the fundamental basis of the Church should, through representatives, participate in the important decisions of the diocese. Though these two options are still too radical for many, signifi-
cant support for them in this survey suggests that there is at least a strong element within the lower clergy already willing to support the broadening of episcopal authority to include the laity as a major factor. The remaining forty per cent of the clergy in the sample, on the other hand, feel that even though the laity should have more than a passive role in being allowed to express their opinions to the hierarchy, they should thereafter accept and obey whatever decision the bishops make. It should be noted that not one of the priests questioned felt that the bishops alone should be involved in the decision-making process.

Similar differentiation is evident on the related question of how the bishops should be elected, but with a somewhat stronger overall preference for those methods allowing greater input from the laity. Approximately sixty-eight percent of the respondents felt that Christian communities should either elect the bishops or at least be consulted in the selection process. The other thirty-two per cent prefer to maintain essentially the present system by which the Pope appoints the new bishop in consultation with the papal nuncio of the country and the national episcopal conference, or that the lower hierarchy, that is, the priests alone should control the selection process.

In indicating how far they feel the Peruvian Church
will actually move in the near future in terms of developing new ways by which ecclesiastical authority will be decentralized, the respondents are again rather divided in their opinion. The largest number are cautious, saying that it will progress only somewhat in this direction, while one-fourth of the sample is hesitant to believe it will develop at all, along this line. It may be reasonable to view this as indirect evidence that the upper hierarchy have thus far given little indication, despite their public statements, of a desire to surrender any of their institutional power, as was suggested earlier in chapter three.

Further, in selecting one of two suggested models of the Church, a majority of over sixty per cent indicate that they favour that model which emphasizes a more deeply committed laity. The latter would be ready to face strong opposition over current societal issues if that became necessary to follow the teachings of the Gospel, even if it meant, according to the model, that there would remain only a small minority of Christians willing to make that kind of commitment. Such a model, of course, implies support for a future Peruvian Church built on a network of comunidades de base as described earlier in the study. Even a slight majority of the remaining respondents feel that this model should at least be implemented in combination with the other, more traditional one.
This leaves only a small group of priests who feel that the other alternative of preaching the Gospel and making the sacraments available to all Christians should be maintained as the basis of church structures and the primary focus of clerical effort. Significantly, all of those favouring the first model mentioned, also believe that the resulting small voluntary communities should actively live their faith in stimulating social, economic and political reform in society rather than limiting their prophetic stance to that of personal behaviour.

Clearly then, in terms of their own personal attitudes, the clergy are predisposed toward a future Church in which voluntary base communities will play a significant functional role. They are much less clear, however, on how far they feel this structure will evolve within a period of the next few years. Although there are substantial numbers at both extremes, that is those who feel that it will advance either very far or very little in this direction, a majority of sixty-two per cent are only moderately optimistic that it will progress significantly in terms of becoming a "community of comunidades de base". Given the lack of a definite consensus that the Church will meaningfully decentralize its authority within this same period, this cautious attitude is probably the most realistic.

A somewhat larger majority, however, are inclined
to feel that the Peruvian Church, even as it is presently structured, will become more actively critical of the societal injustices around them. Nearly seventy per cent of the priests in the sample feel that the Church will progress at least a good deal in terms of presenting a greater prophetic challenge to the socio-economic order. It should be noted, however, that in response to another question, fewer are confident that this development will extend below the level of the clergy, only fifty-seven per cent of the respondents believing that new lay leaders will be able to have a significant and beneficial impact on the Church in the near future. These particular priests feel that the efforts of such laymen will result in a closer working relationship between the clergy and laity, a stronger community base among the general membership, a greater awareness and critical attitude among the latter as well as an improvement in the quality of their religious practice. There is a substantial minority, nevertheless, which is of the opinion that the lay impact will either be negligible or counterproductive in creating greater factionalism among the faithful, and/or merely becoming clericized laymen in the limited capacity of priests' assistants within the present structure.

The last major issue to be dealt with in the survey is that of the impact of foreign resources, both human and financial, on the development of the Peruvian Church. The
respondents, two-thirds of whom are foreign-born, are generally much more positive in their assessment of the manpower contribution to the Church than they are of that involving financial assistance. Well over one-quarter of these clergymen unconditionally approve of the former while this figure drops to as low as six per cent with respect to the latter. Reviewing these two aspects individually, it is evident that although very few express the totally negative attitude that the foreign clergy have made very little contribution despite their large numbers, the majority do have serious reservations. The most common feeling is that many of these priests do not adapt well enough to Peruvian society to have an effective impact on the Church. Others state that generally the foreign element has been a positive influence but that many dilute their effectiveness by not properly concentrating their energies and resources.

With regard to foreign financial aid, although the majority, that is fifty-eight per cent, implicitly acknowledge its necessity for the Church, they also feel that it must be better utilized it it is not to have negative results. Again, however, a fairly large minority of twenty-seven per cent express the stronger criticism that such aid has merely sustained the Church artificially and, as a result, has prevented the Peruvian hierarchy from realistically perceiving and dealing with the problems
which confront it. Very few hold the opinion either that this assistance is totally justified by the inability of the Church to maintain itself, or that such aid involves at least an implicit political purpose.

Having dealt generally with the attitudinal trends of the clergy, the author will now attempt to examine the manner in which these attitudes are diffused among the respondents on the basis of a number of independent factors.

The first of these is place of residence, and according to this variable, there seems to be somewhat of an urban-rural dichotomy as the priests from the agricultural production co-operatives and those from the pueblos, or small rural towns, often exhibit similar attitudes, as opposed to the clergy based either in the central parishes of the cities or in the markedly different barriadas, or slum areas, which surround the latter. Again, on some issues, there is a tendency for the central urban clergy alone to be distinct, and usually more conservative, in their response.

In terms of defining the basic role of faith in their lives, however, it can be seen in Table 5-1 that the most notable difference is that which occurs between the priests from the pueblos, who have unanimously expressed an integrated or more social orientation, and the urban clergy of the central areas who, on the whole, strongly hold to a more traditional or sacramental approach to their faith.
TABLE 5-1
ROLE OF FAITH ORIENTATION
BY
PLACE OF RESIDENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Residence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban (n=20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramental</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated/Social</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=45

They are followed in this by the remaining respondents, though notably with large minorities of the latter in disagreement. In a similar division, although all groups generally approve of justifying socialism with the teachings of the Church, there is a distinctly larger number of those from the central urban parishes who feel that this is mixing religion and politics in an unacceptable manner. Somewhat paradoxically, it is the pueblo priests who have the lowest percentage of those expressing a strong personal interest interest in national politics, while three-quarters of the urban clergy state such an interest. It is the clergy serving in the co-operatives, however, who are the most consistent as a group since all exhibit great concern in this area.

As mentioned previously, there is a slight overall
majority of priests who identify the key problems currently facing the Church to be those focusing on its popular rather than institutional basis. There is a sharp distinction on this question between those from parishes in the pueblos and sugar co-operatives on the one hand, and those based in urban and barriada parishes on the other. As can be seen in Table 5-2 below, the former very clearly emphasize the need to focus on issues such as the comunidades de base while the latter are either evenly divided in their focus or slightly more concerned with institutional problems such as maintaining unity within the Church.

TABLE 5-2.

FOCUS OF MOST CRUCIAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CHURCH

BY

PLACE OF RESIDENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Urban (n=20)</th>
<th>Barriada (n=11)</th>
<th>Pueblo (n=7)</th>
<th>CAP (n=5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=43

Finally, regarding their orientation toward government priorities, on the basis of residence, the clergy
terviewed are somewhat more homogeneous. Although most see economic reform to benefit the lower classes as the key task, it is notable that the priests from the co-operatives are unanimous in this focus. As a second option, there is greater compatibility between the urban and CAP priests who turn to the political issue of increased popular participation as important while the other two groups continue to see the economic situation, whether dealing with greater production or distribution, as crucial.

In terms of specific structural issues, the urban clergy, as shown in Table 5-3, are again more traditionally or hierarchically-oriented than those serving elsewhere.

**TABLE 5-3**

**PREFERRED BASIS OF EPISCOPAL AUTHORITY BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis</th>
<th>Urban (n=17)</th>
<th>Barriada (n=10)</th>
<th>Pueblo (n=7)</th>
<th>CAP (n=5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>52.9%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
<td>71.4%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=39

This is evident with respect both to their preferred basis
for episcopal authority and the method for the selection of bishops. Generally over the two questions, the other respondents show relatively strong support for the broadening of ecclesiastical authority to give the laity a more participatory role, with the barriada priests being the most divided on the issue.

In further pursuing their attitudes regarding Church structure, the question concerning suggested models for the Church again reveals the urban-barriada versus pueblo-co-operative differentiation noted earlier. The clergy working in the latter areas are much more in favour of the progressive structure, which would stimulate a foundation of grass-roots communities, than are their urban and barriada counterparts, as Table 5-4 clearly illustrates. In

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Residence</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban (n=16)</td>
<td>Barriada (n=9)</td>
<td>Pueblo (n=6)</td>
<td>CAP (n=5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=36
addition, they are also more optimistic regarding the extent to which structural change in this direction will actually take place in the near future. This is true particularly in terms of a decentralization of ecclesiastical authority and, specifically, in a re-orientation of the Church toward the formation of voluntary base communities as its fundamental framework. The latter is shown in Table 5-5 below. It is not surprising, then,

**TABLE 5-5**

*FUTURE MOVEMENT OF CHURCH TOWARD COMUNIDAD DE BASE FRAMEWORK BY PLACE OF RESIDENCE* 

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Progress</th>
<th>Urban (n=19)</th>
<th>Barriada (n=11)</th>
<th>Pueblo (n=7)</th>
<th>CAP (n=6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very far</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good deal</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>31.6%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=43

that the co-operative and pueblo clergy are considerably more positive as well in assessing the probable impact of the new lay leaders on the Church.
The respondents are somewhat more homogeneous in their very optimistic view that Church leaders and members will assume a greater prophetic stance in society. Similarly, in dealing with the issue of foreign resources in the Peruvian Church, there are no crucial attitudinal distinctions based on residence beyond the fact that the priests in the barriada parishes, though still expressing reservations, tend to be the least critical regarding the overall contribution of the foreign clergy.

Turning now to the second proposed factor of differentiation, that of national origin, generally speaking, there does not appear to be any strong difference in attitudes between the Peruvian and foreign clergy as a whole. More often, the distinction occurs between the priests from Canada and the United States on the one hand, and the rest of the clergy on the other. Nevertheless, on some normative questions, the Peruvian clergy tend to express attitudes that are more similar to the North American element than to the Spanish. This, however, does not hold concerning attitudes on structural issues. Because of their very small number in the sample and the distortion this would create in the analysis, the responses of the other European clergy were eliminated from the cross-tabulations.

It is strikingly evident in Table 5-6 that the Spanish priests, to a greater extent than the rest, per-
TABLE 5-6

ROLE OF FAITH ORIENTATION
BY
NATIONAL ORIGIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>National Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peruvian (n=15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramental</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated/Social</td>
<td>60.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=40

ceive the role of their faith to be sacramentally-oriented in terms, for example, of providing a cultural norm for society. In contrast, the Peruvian and North American clergy, though more closely divided in their attitude, definitely feel that this role should be one which integrates religious teachings and the societal reality in a more prophetic function. Further, it is evident that the Spanish priests are expectedly much less inclined to approve the legitimization of socialism through Church doctrine. The Peruvian clergymen as a group, though certainly not as reticent as the Spanish, are not quite as ready to apply their faith in this manner as are their North American counterparts. This can be seen in Table 5-7. On the other hand, the Peruvians tend to be much less critical than the rest concerning partisan political activity gener-
ally among the clergy and religious.

TABLE 5-7
USE OF CHURCH DOCTRINE
TO JUSTIFY SOCIALISM
BY
NATIONAL ORIGIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>National Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peruvian (n=14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=30

In terms of their own interest in national politics, the data seems to indicate that the national differentiation noted above is maintained. While the Spanish are split in their degree of interest, with a substantial minority expressing little or none at all, the Peruvians comprise the greatest percentage of those who are very concerned personally with the political sphere while, similarly, all of the North American missioners have at least a moderate interest in this regard. With respect to the issue of the tasks facing the current government, the North Americans are the only group of clergy who do not overwhelmingly feel that its primary task is that of securing
lower-class oriented economic reforms. Rather, this sector of the respondents stated the need for greater popular participation and national identification as the important problems to be solved.

In citing the most critical problems facing the Church today, opinions are very closely divided within all groups with the exception, again, of the North American clergy. Among the latter, the vast majority emphasizes these problems in terms of the popular rather than institutional nature of the Church, as Table 5-8 clearly reveals.

**TABLE 5-8**

**FOCUS OF MOST CRUCIAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CHURCH**

**BY NATIONAL ORIGIN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Peruvian (n=14)</th>
<th>Spanish (n=14)</th>
<th>N. American (n=10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=38

While the rest of the clergy are evenly divided or institutionally-oriented in their attitude, a slight majority of Peruvians also identify problems concerned with greater
lay participation as the most crucial.

On the more specific structural issue concerning the basis of episcopal authority, again, as demonstrated in Table 5-9, the only group not closely divided on the question are the North American priests who indisputably favour greater popular input in the decision-making process within the Church. The Spanish maintain their hier-

\begin{center}
\textbf{TABLE 5-9}
\end{center}

\textbf{PREFERRED BASIS OF EPISCOPAL AUTHORITY}

\begin{center}
\textbf{BY NATIONAL ORIGIN}
\end{center}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis</th>
<th>Peruvian (n=12)</th>
<th>Spanish (n=13)</th>
<th>N. American (n=10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(N=35\)

archical stance on this issue as well, while the Peruvians are more clearly split.

Despite their similarly progressive normative attitude, the priests from North America, much more concerted-ly than their Peruvian counterparts, are more comfortable with the proposed model of the Church which would demand greater commitment and participation of the laity. This,
of course, is opposed to the traditional model geared to the administering of sacraments which is most strongly preferred by the Spanish sector. It should be noted, however, that unlike the latter, a large minority of the Peruvians do favour at least a combination of the two models. The native clergy, then, seems to be somewhat more cautious, though certainly not traditional, in their attitudes on this question. In Table 5-10 below, these attitudinal differences are illustrated.

### TABLE 5-10

**PREFERRED MODEL OF CHURCH BY NATIONAL ORIGIN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>National Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peruvian (n=12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Spanish (n=11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N. American (n=10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of how far they feel the Church will actually progress in decentralizing its authority and becoming more fundamentally structured on the basis of grass-roots communities, the Peruvians along with the Spanish priests tend to be more optimistic than the North American element.
If Table 5-11 is compared to Table 5-9, it can be seen that those most strongly in favour of a less hierarchical Church are also among the most pessimistic concerning its prospects.

**TABLE 5-11**

**FUTURE MOVEMENT OF CHURCH TOWARD DECENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY**

**BY NATIONAL ORIGIN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Progress</th>
<th>National Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peruvian (n=15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very far</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good deal</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=39

Regarding a third direction in which the Church may move in the near future, however, the clergy as a whole, but in particular the North Americans, are much more confident that it will assume a greater prophetic role in society. No doubt stimulating this in part is their feeling, more consistently stated by the North Americans than by the others, that the new lay leaders in the Church will
have a substantial role in, and positive impact on, the direction of the Church within the next few years.

Finally, concerning the issue of foreign clergy within the Peruvian Church, there are no clear divisions between the native clergy and those who are foreign-born with respect to assessing the quality of their impact. This is illustrated in Table 5-12 below. The North American missioners and to a lesser extent the Peruvian priests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>Peruvian (n=14)</th>
<th>Spanish (n=14)</th>
<th>N. American (n=9)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some too dispersed</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor cultural integration</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionately small benefit</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5-12
ASSESSMENT OF
CONTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN CLERGY
BY
NATIONAL ORIGIN

are more inclined than the Spanish to have serious reservations in this respect. The former, then, seem to be the most self-critical among the foreign clergy. Again, con-
cerning the impact of the financial aid received from outside, the Canadian and American clergy are the most critical, the majority feeling that it has helped to artificially maintain the Peruvian Church or has always had political strings attached. This is in contrast again to the Peruvian attitudes, nearly seventy per cent of which implicitly approve of it, though with the reservation that it could be better utilized.

In examining the data now with regard to a third factor, that of age, there is an indication of a definite distinction of attitudes, on a number of both normative and structural issues, between the youngest members of those clergy interviewed (that is, those from 25 to 35 years of age) and the remaining age groups, with the middle sector often appearing to be more traditionally-oriented than their older counterparts.¹

As might be expected, the basically traditional or sacramental view of the role of faith in man’s life increases with age, particularly among those over forty-five, as is evident in Table 5-13. However, it is somewhat surprising that, considering their strong attitudes on other questions, the youngest group of clergy does not

¹Although the small cell sizes do not permit statistical controlling for a third variable, the author, in cross-tabulating age with national origin, determined that its relatively equal distribution in this regard has sufficiently demonstrated the minimal possibility of a spurious factor in the following analysis.
TABLE 5-13
ROLE OF FAITH ORIENTATION
BY AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-35 (n=16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramental</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated/social</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=45

exhibit a more concerted progressive stance. For example, regarding the issue of justifying socialism on the basis of Church doctrine, there is a very clear division between them and the rest of the clergy in that, as Table 5-14 illustrates, all feel that this is a legitimate implementa-

TABLE 5-14
USE OF CHURCH DOCTRINE
TO JUSTIFY SOCIALISM
BY AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-35 (n=14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=34
tion of their faith while fully one-third of the priests at the other age levels see this as a dangerous form of mixing religion and politics. Similarly, all of the younger priests are at least moderately interested in national politics while such concern decreases significantly with age, a third of the oldest group expressing very little interest in this sphere.

Again, there is a notable split between the youngest respondents and the rest regarding the most serious challenges for the Peruvian Church at this time. As shown in Table 5-15, the former are clearly concerned with those

**TABLE 5-15**

**FOCUS OF MOST CRUCIAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CHURCH**

**BY AGE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25-35 (n=15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

problems that have a focus on securing greater lay involvement in the fulfillment of the Church's mission. The remaining clergy, on the other hand, are more closely divided on the question with the middle group tending to
be somewhat more conservative, a slight majority identifying institutionally-oriented problems as the primary focus.

With regard to the political sphere per se, there is a greater consistency of attitudes according to age as all levels feel economic reform favouring the lower classes to be the foremost tasks for the government today. The young group tends to be somewhat more concentrated on this issue while a minority of the others also identify greater popular participation as important.

This apparent attitudinal division among the clergy at the relatively low differentiating age of thirty-five is evident on a number of structural issues as well. Concerning the preferred basis of episcopal authority as well as the method for the selection of bishops, the younger priests are clearly and considerably more popularly-oriented than are the other two groups. It can also be seen in Table 5-16 that the priests over forty-five years of age tend to be less interested in maintaining the traditionally hierarchical stance on these questions than are those a bit younger in the middle age category.

It is not surprising, then, that the youngest clergy overwhelmingly feel that any proposed model for the Church must demand a stronger commitment from the laity, and that they also express a willingness to accept the possibility that as a result, only a small number of Christians will
TABLE 5-16
PREFERRED BASIS OF EPISCOPAL AUTHORITY
BY AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis</th>
<th>25-35 (n=15)</th>
<th>36-45 (n=11)</th>
<th>over 45 (n=13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>45.5%</td>
<td>53.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

remain to actively apply their faith in the world. Support for this grass-roots community model drops off rapidly with an increase in age as Table 5-17 shows, though it should

TABLE 5-17
PREFERRED MODEL OF CHURCH
BY AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>25-35 (n=13)</th>
<th>36-45 (n=9)</th>
<th>over 45 (n=14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>66.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N=36</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

be noted that the greatest number of older priests prefer a combination of this model and the traditional one espous-
ing a sacramental focus.

In comparison to the other, more cautious age groups, the younger clergy are extremely optimistic that the Church will actually develop very far within the next few years in the direction of becoming a Church of voluntary base communities. In contrast, age is not a factor of differentiation with regard to the consistently positive attitudes on the probable degree of decentralization in authority structures, and on the general impact of lay leaders. However, in estimating the extent to which the Church will likely present a greater prophetic challenge to society, the oldest group of priests is definitely less confident that this will occur to any significant degree. The majority of the other clergy feel the Church body will develop at least a great deal in this direction with nearly half of those under thirty-five expressing an even more strongly optimistic view.

In their attitudes concerning the contribution of the foreign clergy to the Church in Peru, as well as the impact of foreign financial assistance, distinctions between age levels are not as clear as on other issues. With respect to the former, however, the youngest respondents, with a slight majority having serious reservations, tend to be the least critical overall, as Table 5-18 illustrates.

Of the five factors being employed as bases of dis-
TABLE 5-18

ASSESSMENT OF
CONTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN CLERGY
BY AGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>25-35 (n=16)</th>
<th>36-45 (n=12)</th>
<th>over 45 (n=14)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some too dispersed</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor cultural integration</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>41.7%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionately small benefit</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A distinction in clerical attitudes, that of clerical status, or one's recognition as either a secular or religious priest, is that by which the respondents exhibit the least differentiation. Despite differences, for example, in their respective formation processes and primary foci of authority, both secular and religious priests express similar opinions with regard to most issues. Tables 5-19 and 5-20 are typical of this homogeneity of attitudes on both normative and structural questions.

The only normative differences of note are that the secular clergy, perhaps because of their lack of community support, tend to be more critical of partisan political
TABLE 5-19
ROLE OF FAITH ORIENTATION
BY
CLERICAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secular (n=29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacramental</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated/Social</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 5-20
PREFERRED MODEL OF CHURCH
BY
CLERICAL STATUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Status</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Secular (n=21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>61.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combination</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N=36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

activity by clergy and religious. On the other hand, the religious priests, though more polarized, generally appear to have less interest in national politics than their secular counterparts. In terms of their attitudes regarding the structural basis of episcopal authority, nearly seventy per cent of the religious priests, in comparison to 53.8
per cent for the secular, favour the decentralization or popular development of this authority. This preference is not maintained, however, for three-quarters of the secular clergy prefer greater effective lay participation in the selection of bishops compared to only 57.1 per cent of the religious priests.

The only other question over which there is some difference of opinion concerns the extent to which the Church will decentralize its authority within the next years. While the secular priests tend to be cautious in their estimates, the religious clergy are much more inclined to feel that there will, in fact, be very little advancement in this direction.

Dealing now with associational membership as the final basis for examining the attitudinal behaviour of the respondents, the most striking distinction is that of the expected but still dramatic polarization of attitudes between the members of ONIS and those priests who either have openly declared their affiliation with the Peruvian sector of the Opus Dei society or who are generally known to at least strongly sympathize with the views and functions of that association.

Normatively, the dichotomy just mentioned is clearly revealed in Table 5-21. The ONIS members are the only group of priests in which the majority express a social or integrated orientation toward the role which faith
TABLE 5-21
ROLE OF FAITH ORIENTATION
BY
ASSOCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>ONIS (n=8)</th>
<th>Opus Dei (n=6)</th>
<th>Other/None (n=29)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sacramental</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>58.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated/social</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>41.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=45

should play in the life of modern man, while the Opus Dei priests unanimously exhibit a sacramental focus in this regard. This normative cleavage is further substantiated with respect to the somewhat more specific issue of justifying socialism using Church teachings. The ONIS clergy are in complete agreement that this is legitimate while the few Opus Dei associates who responded totally disagree, arguing that this is improperly combining two distinct spheres, those being religion and politics. Worth noting, also, is the fact that the remaining clergymen definitely support the view taken by the ONIS group even though their own approach to faith is much more spiritualized.

Not surprisingly, then, the most critical of clerical involvement in partisan political activity are, clearly, those associated with Opus Dei. Similarly, they are the least personally interested in national politics.
while the ONIS priests, as a group, express a very consistent concern for this aspect of the broad social reality. They are followed in this by the other respondents who note a more moderate interest, as seen in Table 5-22.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Interest</th>
<th>ONIS (n=8)</th>
<th>Opus Dei (n=6)</th>
<th>Other/None (n=27)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little/none</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=43

This associational polarization is revealed again in the identification by the clergy of the key problems presently confronting the Church. While the clergy who are members of ONIS clearly regard as most important those issues involving a focus on the popular nature of the Church, the Opus Dei priests, again unanimously feel that problems which threaten the Church as an institution per se should have priority. The remaining clergy are much more closely divided but with a slightly greater number citing a popular focus as more important in determining crucial
problems.

Finally, in naming the key tasks to be taken up by the national government, the first priority of emphasizing an improvement in the economic situation of the poor is supported by all ONIS members while the rest of the clergy are more dispersed in their foci. Only the residual group express a strong preference for greater popular participation as the overall second priority cited. It should be noted, also, that despite the condemnation by ONIS of national economic and cultural dependency in Peru, not one member felt that promotion of a stronger national consciousness and/or culture is a primary concern for the government at this time. In practice, they seem more interested in the concrete situation of their local parishes.

It is quite evident that the sharp differences in attitude already revealed are maintained with respect to the issues dealing more specifically with Church structure. As expected, with reference to both the preferred basis of episcopal authority and the manner of selecting bishops, the attitudes of the ONIS and Opus Dei priests stand in distinct contrast as Table 5-2 shows. The remaining clergy again are more favourable to the ONIS attitude emphasizing the popular basis of Church authority. Confirming the above, the ONIS group as a whole states its preference for the Church model which would stimulate a more committed laity and allow them a more responsible
functioning within that structure. On the other hand, the small number of Opus Dei clergy who replied prefer either the more traditional model for the Church or a combination of the two.

**TABLE 5-23**

**PREFERRED BASIS OF EPISCOPAL AUTHORITY**

**BY ASSOCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis</th>
<th>ONIS (n=8)</th>
<th>Opus Dei (n=5)</th>
<th>Other/None (n=24)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>80.0%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=37

Despite these personal preferences, the group of Opus Dei priests feel that the Peruvian Church will progress a great deal in the next five years in decentralizing its authority structure. Those who are members of ONIS appear more guarded, tending to be quite pessimistic in this regard. The remainder are also cautious but somewhat more hopeful than the latter that this direction will be followed. Though a few more of the ONIS group feel that good progress will be made in terms of creating a Church of grass-roots communities, most of them are again conserva-
tive in their estimates regarding this future development of the Church. The majority of those associated with Opus Dei are also pessimistic on this question.

In terms of the Church assuming a greater prophetic role in society than it has in the past, the ONIS group does not exhibit a clear, dominant attitude as Table 5-24 reveals. They tend, however, to be either cautious or even

**TABLE 5-24**

**FUTURE MOVEMENT OF CHURCH TOWARD PROPHETIC ROLE**

**BY ASSOCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Progress</th>
<th>Membership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ONIS (n=8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very far</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A good deal</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very little</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=39

pessimistic in comparison to the other respondents. Given the fact that the ONIS organization has been the most active force in trying to stimulate this direction within the Church and has often been disappointed in its efforts.
so far, its less than optimistic attitude on this question may be a significant indication that most priests do not have a clear idea of what such a role would entail, and that, consequently, their hope is misplaced. This may be the case particularly among the young priests who, as we have seen, feel very positive in this regard.

More or less summarizing their feelings with respect to the movement of the Church in the directions just mentioned, the priests of Opus Dei, a society which itself is largely composed of laymen, are clearly the most positive in their assessment of the effects of new lay leaders on the Church in the next few years. Considering their normative orientation, however, it is most likely that they envisage this role to be one of hierarchical support rather than one of more autonomous, socially-oriented activity. On this question, the other priests are much more closely divided in their opinions, with nearly half feeling that the next five years will prove to be too short a period to reveal a significant change in the form of lay participation, or that this activity will be undesirably limited to the sphere of clerical assistants.

Though views regarding the issues of foreign personnel and financial assistance are generally dispersed within each of these groups of priests, it is clear that the members and/or sympathizers of Opus Dei are much less critical of both factors as present in the Peruvian Church.
While only fifty per cent or less of the other clergymen feel that foreign personnel had made an effective contribution or that their efforts need only be more concentrated, fully eighty per cent of the Opus Dei group hold these same feelings. On the second issue, all of the latter members again imply approval of foreign financial aid though they feel it could be somewhat better utilized. The head of CARITAS in Peru, the central body for receiving and distributing outside funds in the Church, is Monseñor Orbigoso of Chiclayo who, as was noted earlier, is himself a prominent member of the Opus Dei society. In contrast, as Table 5-25 shows, over seventy per cent of the ONIS priests are much more critical and suspicious of such aid.

In a brief summary, then, despite the importance accorded to the Vatican Council and the Medellin Conference, both of which emphasize change within the Church and in its relationship with society, only a large minority of the priests interviewed consciously feel that their faith should go beyond its spiritual function to become a more critical and active force in society. Nevertheless, the majority would not object to the explicit use of their religious beliefs in the political sphere to support a more socialistic politico-economic system. In fact, most take an active interest in the national political situation and are clearly in support of substantial economic reforms within the society. Again, in terms of change within the
### TABLE 5-25

**ASSESSMENT OF FOREIGN FINANCIAL AID BY ASSOCIATIONAL MEMBERSHIP**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment</th>
<th>ONIS (n=7)</th>
<th>Opus Dei (n=5)</th>
<th>Other/None (n=21)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completely Justified</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Should be better utilized</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>57.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artificially maintains Church</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically motivated</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=33

Church itself, most of the respondents consistently favour moves which would demand a greater commitment and contribution by the popular sector but, at the same time, would also allow greater participation by them in the authority structures and processes of the Church. Still, they are generally quite cautious in their opinion that the Peruvian Church will actually progress to a significant degree along this line in the near future. Finally, on the issue of foreign resources in the Church, their overall feeling is favourable but with important reservations. As a result of the analysis, it appears that the above attitudes are most
clearly differentiated according to the factors of associational membership, age and national origin. Place of residence, as well, is an important variable on many issues while clerical status seems to be generally insignificant in this regard.
CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

It is evident from the data presented in this thesis that the Peruvian Church, as defined here, has exhibited significant change in the three dimensions under study, the normative, structural and attitudinal, in the direction of becoming a socially-progressive institution. It is equally evident, however, that its overall impact on political development on a broader scale has thus far been decidedly limited and likely will remain so for some time to come.

The greatest evidence of change is in the normative area. A shift in thematic emphasis in official statements, together with the development of liberation theology, demonstrate a definite normative re-orientation of the Church. This change moves the Church away from an individualistic, sacramental approach to faith toward a more explicit focus on the latter’s implications for all aspects of men’s lives, the right and responsibility of greater lay participation in the Church, and the necessity to recognize and challenge the societal structures which impede social justice, particularly with respect to the lower classes.

Insofar as it acts to transmit values in the society, the Peruvian Church has thus revealed a stance which supports the evaluation of Brian Smith noted earlier, that
that institution can no longer be considered the legitimator of the established interests of the nation. In choosing, at least officially, to more explicitly serve the interests of the majority of Peruvians, that is, the lower socio-economic sectors, the Church has increased the possibility that it can more fully undertake what many authors feel is the extent of its role in development - that of providing normative justification or legitimacy for social change. Indeed, although it is not certain at this point the extent to which the influence of the Church on the populace actually exists, it is obviously assumed to be great by the government, and at the minimum, its support adds further credibility to any reform process taking place in the country. In this respect, it has often demonstrated its approval of the spirit of many of the reforms enacted by the government, particularly during its earliest years, which were intended to benefit the worker and campesino classes. More recently, as the military regime has become less forceful in pursuing some important aspects of these reforms, including land distribution as part of the Agrarian Reform, the Church has also become less vocal in its support of fundamental change.

Still, we disagree with those who feel that the Church is changing only to survive, preferring instead Turner's assessment that its re-orientation is essentially genuine and will persist. We are in accord, however, with
the large number of analysts who feel that any optimism regarding the possibility that this change will lead to clear and forceful national moral leadership must be tempered by the fact that, as Marg Crahan and others maintain, the increasing strength of the progressive line within the Church will provoke an opposite intensification of pressure from its more rightist elements.\footnote{Crahan, "Latin American Church...", \textit{America}, August 1975, p. 90.} The resulting dichotomy of opinion certainly may preclude its strong influence as an institution on the national level.

Indeed our data regarding the Peruvian Church, specifically confirms a shift back from the strongly progressive stance of the immediate post-Medellin period. The relative weakening of the progressive orientation of some of the recent documents no doubt is, in part, a result of its proponents slowing their promotional efforts to assess their objectives and strategies and to deepen the theological base of their approach. But it also reveals a concerted and more co-ordinated reaction by those bishops espousing the traditional orientation to dampen the influence of the progressive sector. Evidence presented here showing a lack of strong acceptance of liberation theology demonstrates that there is a similar division among the lower clergy along these same lines.

As Turner suggests, however, if the process of re-
form in the Latin American Church is to continue in the long run, and he feels that it almost certainly will, then in order for solidarity to be preserved, as we have seen the members of the Church in Peru seem to desire, there may well occur a definite predominance of either the progressive or the traditional line. Of course, this would likely result in the disaffection of some members and, with them, the influence they command.  

Similarly, Vallier feels that for the Church to remain at least a "second front" of support for modernization in the future, it must special its focus and function.  

In order to ensure that the socially-progressive orientation prevails in this regard, its adherents must create the necessary organizational links to the lower class.  

Such links are essential as well, if the progressive sector is to properly listen to what the general populace feels in order not to create unnecessary obstructions to its own efforts.  

The material brought forth in the thesis indicates that, in the case of the Peruvian Church, the strength and pervasiveness of these structural links,  

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2Turner, Catholicism and Political Development..., p. 239.  

3Vallier, Catholicism, Social Control..., p. 158.  


5On this point, see Crahan, "Latin American Church...,"
has thus far been more potential than actual, particularly in the rural areas studied. The most crucial change at the mass level was seen to be the development of the comunidades cristianas de base. Despite at least some specific hierarchical support for them and their effective impact in areas such as the CAP Laredo, the case studies of the co-operative parishes as well as the interview data reveal that the broader development of the comunidades has been very limited. A number of factors have contributed to this situation but the principle one among these was seen to be the scarcity of trained lay leadership.

Much of the stimulus for the growth and development of the comunidades, then, still depends on input from the local clergy. In our data, it is evident that their support, though generally favourable, remains vague and weak. For the most part, the clergy view grass-roots communities as the future life of the Church in Peru but, at the same time, many are apprehensive that they will become either too autonomous, too politicized, or too elitist. It will be some time before their durability and impact are proven, though considering the numerically-precarious situation of the native clergy, it is seen as essential that they survive and develop.

In terms of important structural innovation at the
elite level, the clerical organization of ONIS clearly has made the most concerted attempt to effect the progressive normative stance of the Church. Again, it was seen that, though they have been both a stimulus and support to the socially-progressive elements within the institution, ONIS members are relatively few in number, not widely supported by the bishops or their fellow clergymen, and have been the catalyst to a stronger co-ordination of the more conservative sector of the clergy. The latter point mentioned is reflective of some of the hierarchical strains identified by Donald Smith as being present under conditions of change in complex religious institutions. A bit more optimistically, however, this division appears to be indicative of what one observer points to as a vertical, rather than horizontal, split within the hierarchy - that is, regarding ideological differences, there are progressive bishops and clergy facing conservative bishops and clergy, in place of the previous situation in which traditional bishops dominated more progressively-minded clergy.6 This ensures a greater possibility of continued dialogue which is important considering that, despite the intensity of views in some quarters, neither side desires an open split in the Church.

Finally, indicating the probability of maintaining

6 Williams, Latin American Christian Democratic Parties, p. 171.
and furthering change within the Church, the attitudinal dimension is crucial. The interview data examined in the thesis shows that the general attitudes of the clergy are mixed at best. In favouring greater popular emphasis within the Church on a number of questions, particularly those dealing with Church structure, they obviously see the need for change. They still, however, consciously exhibit a sacramental orientation to their faith, are unsure of the clerical role in the process of change, and are not overly optimistic with respect to more rapid change in the Church in the near future. The clear impression is that most of the lower clergy (and, indeed, the bishops) are still unwilling to risk the actual implementation of a more popular basis to the Church. Nevertheless, they are definitely receptive to the progressive orientation and, together with the reinforcements of the structural changes already fostered, this keeps alive the hope that progressive Church development, though a long-and arduous process, will eventually take place on a much broader scale.

The Church in Peru is fortunate, as some suggest, in that, first of all, the government itself has been reformist and not as repressive as that in either Brazil or Chile; secondly, the ecclesiastical hierarchy at worst does not obstruct the progressive sectors; and thirdly,

the marginal groups are already emerging through such organizations as peasant and labour unions. These factors will help to give the progressive sector additional time in which to achieve a more active and widespread acceptance before the credibility of the Church decreases any further in the eyes of the lower class majority.

Thus, in promoting societal, and in particular political, development, the impact of the Church has so far been limited but the interdependent changes that have taken place in its normative, structural and attitudinal dimensions have somewhat increased its capacity and flexibility to do so to a greater extent in the future.

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is needed in assessing the possibility that the government, in assuming greater control over many traditional institutional activities of the Church, such as those of schools, and hospitals, may unconsciously be pushing the Church in Peru toward a more popular apostolate at a much faster rate than it otherwise would go. It may be that in some areas, the clergy, religious and active laity will be left with little other choice than to concentrate their efforts in a grass-roots pastoral approach which will impart a Christian basis to the laity's social, economic and political activity in order to stimulate them as citizens to assume responsibility for ensuring that social justice accompanies economic growth in the development process.
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. What events or developments during the past twenty-five years, in your opinion, have had the most significant impact on the Peruvian Church and the direction it has taken?

Who are the key personalities who have had the greatest influence in shaping developments in the Peruvian Church during this period?

2. Of the following contributions of religion to mankind today, which do you feel are the most important? (Choose three in order of importance)

   a) it is a source of comfort to people in moments of suffering and sorrow, and provides meaning for daily life
   b) it helps to articulate and protect the best religio-ethical norms and values in Peruvian society
   c) it acts as a norm and a critical force against social customs and practices that are in conflict with Christianity
   d) it provides a bond of continuity and order in the nation
   e) it is a stimulus and legitimizing force for social and economic development in the nation
   f) it is a prophetic force protecting basic rights and human dignity

   Orientation (first response)   Response
   Sacramental                   a, b, c, d
   Integrated/Social             e, f

3. Which do you consider the most urgent problems facing the Church in Peru at the present time? (Choose four in order of importance)

   a) the quality of religious practice and belief among the laity
   b) the need to build stronger and more effective comunidades de base
c) i) the shortage of priestly and religious vocations
   
   ii) the lack of finances to support needed Church apostolates

d) the need to supplement the number of priests with more qualified laymen in the ministry

e) Church-State relations

f) the protection of human rights and dignity in society

g) the need to maintain unity in the Church amidst a diversity of opinions and attitudes

h) the necessity for bishops and priests to take clearer stands on important issues and thus give more forthright moral guidance on the problems of our times

Focus (first response)  Response
Institutional a, c, e, g
Popular b, d, f, h

4. It seems that there are at least two distinct models for the Church being proposed by contemporary theologians throughout the world.

A. Some feel that the Church should preach the Word and offer the sacraments to all baptized Catholics of every social condition and should make the necessary adjustments to each society so that the Gospel can be preached and the sacraments celebrated.

B. Others feel that the Church should require from the faithful a deep commitment that many will be unable or unwilling to make, but that the Church must be ready to face conflict with the world in order to be true to the Gospel— even if this means that it may not reach everyone and might remain a small minority of committed Christians in society.

Which of these two descriptions of the role of the Church today are you the most comfortable with?

5. If you have chosen the second model for the Church, with which group proposing this option are you in most agreement?

A. those who say that voluntary Christian communities should take a prophetic stance in the world by the quality and depth of their religious prac-
tice, but should not try or hope to make significant changes in the existing structures of this world – social, economic or political

B. those who say that voluntary Christian communities must make a constitutive part of their faith an engagement in the social and economic and political transformation of the world.

6. Regarding the selection of bishops, which way do you feel is the best method?

a) the Pope should appoint them in consultation with the nuncio and the national episcopal conference

b) Christian communities should in some way be consulted in the process

c) Christian communities should elect them

d) priests alone should participate in the selection process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>a, d</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>b, c</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Which of the following descriptions of episcopal authority are you in most accord?

a) the hierarchy is the authority created by the Lord and so the bishops must be obeyed even when Catholics are not fully in agreement with what they say

b) the Lord asks an active obedience of Catholics: they should express to the hierarchy their views and afterwards respect whatever decision the bishops make

c) collegiality and dialogue are the modern ways of exercising authority in the Church; there should be discussion with those in authority until a consensus is reached on problems

d) the fundamental base of the Church should be fairly autonomous comunidades de base: these groups should participate in the important decisions in the diocese through representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Basis</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>a, b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular</td>
<td>c, d</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. With which of the following statements concerning foreign priests serving in Peru do you agree the most?
   a) they make an effective contribution to the Peruvian Church
   b) in general, they make an effective contribution but there are some who run around too much and disperse their energies
   c) those who adapt themselves to our country well make an effective contribution, but there are many who do not
   d) despite their large numbers, their positive contribution has been proportionately small

9. Do you feel that some priests and religious in Peru over the past decade became too involved in political activity?
   a) yes, many
   b) yes, some
   c) few/none

10. What impact do you feel new lay leaders will have on the direction of the Peruvian Church in the next five years?

11. In recent years there have been various laymen and priests who have legitimized different political regimes on the basis of Catholic principles and teachings. Others, however, have felt that such attempts involved mixing religion with politics in a dangerous way. Would you say that those who justify socialism for these reasons were mixing religion and politics?
   a) yes
   b) yes, but legitimately so
   c) no

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitude</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>b, c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12. With which of the following statements regarding foreign financial assistance to the Peruvian Church are you in most agreement?
   a) it is completely justified since our Church is today incapable of supporting itself
   b) it should be better utilized; otherwise it can
produce negative effects in our Church

c) it has served to maintain our Church artificially - because of this, it has prevented us from perceiving and confronting our problems realistically

d) it is never impartial, and always involves political purpose, at least implicitly

13. Since all governments have to make choices about the tasks they will carry out, what would you consider the most essential tasks for the Peruvian government today?

a) to improve the standard of living, especially for the less privileged

b) to develop the economic productivity of the nation even if this meant no immediate increase in the standard of living

c) to ensure peace and order

d) to deal fairly with all social and economic groups

e) to create a new national consciousness and a sense of national purpose

f) to ensure an equal distribution of all the material goods available in the society

g) to ensure freedom of expression for all reasonable points of view

h) to create a genuine national culture

i) to institute a system of free elections

j) to eradicate marxism from the country

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus (first response)</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic reform</td>
<td>a, f</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic production</td>
<td>b, c</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular participation</td>
<td>d, g, i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greater nationalism</td>
<td>e, h</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. How far do you feel that the Peruvian Church will move during the next five years, in each of the following directions:

i) very far ii) a good deal iii) somewhat iv) very little

a) modernization of Church structures involving new ways of exercising ecclesiastical authority along more decentralized lines
b) a Church built up of voluntary base communities in which membership becomes a free and loving choice of individuals

c) greater prophetic challenge to the socio-economic order by Church leaders and members

15. How interested would you say you are in national politics?

a) quite interested
b) moderately interested
c) not much interested
APPENDIX B

LIST OF DOCUMENTS
USED IN
ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE DIMENSION

Pastoral Letters: 1950 - 1975


-182-


Statements of the National Episcopal Conference: Post 1968


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