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THE ROOTS OF RURAL COLLECTIVE ACTION:
AN EXAMINATION OF A HIGHLAND PEASANT MOVEMENT IN BOLIVIA

by

Kathleen E. Gordon

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
through the
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the material processes that underlay the collective mobilization of peasants in the highland areas of the Department of La Paz, Bolivia. By researching secondary English language documents, I examine macro and micro level socio-economic transformations that occurred following the 1952 Bolivian Revolution. Although the Revolution established the preconditions for the incorporation of peasants into national economic life, post-Revolutionary structural processes at the macro level blocked the full integration of these peasants into national economic structures. Marginalized by macro economic forces, peasants in the La Paz highlands re-created community institutions and practices to ensure the reproduction of households and communities. Although peasants had some command over their production activities and relations, the autonomy to fully control their economic circumstances was restricted by national policies and processes. I argue that this constrained autonomy, as well as reliance on the community for survival, engendered the collective organization of these peasants during the 1970s.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION

In November, 1979, indigenous peasants in the Bolivian highlands organized to form roadblocks as a protest against state policies, backed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to increase the price of essential products. This independent action halted motorized transport in the altiplano and valleys for a week while their leaders negotiated with the Bolivian government for restricting increases of transportation costs, freezing the prices for flour, rice and sugar, and reducing taxes on agricultural products (Dunkerley 1984). In subsequent years, peasants in the altiplano submitted proposals to the government that emphasized autonomy for peasant communities to manage their own resources (Albo 1987). While the focus of these peasant actions were economic, they also addressed the need for peasants to establish their "own identity and presence" (Albo 1987:404). Marginalized from national political, economic and social life for centuries, these indigenous peoples were also declaring their right to be "respected and listened to in reality, as first-class citizens, by the government, [and] the country ..." (Albo 1987:404). This thesis examines the material processes that underlay this

1 Bolivia has a varied geography. The altiplano refers to the high plains area in the western part of the country. A series of valleys lie between the altiplano and the eastern lowland rain forest region. A map of Bolivia showing the ecological zones and the departments can be found on page vii.
mobilization of peasants in the Bolivian highlands and it explores the foundation of this collective action as a possible alternative to Western models of development.

Rather than alleviating socio-economic problems such as poverty and hunger, development programs have generally exacerbated the living conditions of the majority of people in Latin America and other regions of the so-called Third World. In rural areas, the promotion of capitalist agricultural production has forced many indigenous peoples on to marginal lands incapable of supporting earlier ways of life. Hunger (Pearse 1975), urban migration and unemployment (de Janvry et al. 1989) have been just a few of the subsequent results. These repercussions of development have prompted recent writers (Escobar 1992a, 1992c) to suggest that there is an urgent need to formulate alternatives to development. These alternatives refer to the projects and ways of living that arise out of the collective efforts of various subordinated groups in their struggles to produce and reproduce their lives. The question I raise is whether the seeds of such alternatives lie in the collective efforts of indigenous peoples in Bolivia to obtain the autonomy to control their own resources.

One of the undercurrents of the collective mobilization of peasants in the Department of La Paz altiplano is Katarism. Katarism is the ideology of the Aymara and Quechua identity movement, Katarista, that emerged in urban areas among rural migrants during the early 1970s. Based on the name of Tupac Katari, the leader of the 1781 Bolivian
Indian Rebellion, the movement challenges the exclusion and marginalization of indigenous peoples by the Bolivian elite creole class (Albo 1987; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). According to Albo (1987), by asserting the value of indigenous culture and history and fostering an awareness of indigenous peoples' exploitation, Katarism articulates the experiences of rural indigenous communities in the La Paz altiplano (Albo 1987).

Inseparable from this ethnic identity is the marginalization and exploitation rural indigenous peoples experience as a class of peasant producers (Albo 1987). The demands of peasants in the La Paz altiplano are focused on the need for structural changes that facilitate the provision of basic necessities required for the production and reproduction of rural life, as well as on the elimination of ethnic barriers to full participation in Bolivian society. Autonomy for rural communities and the authority to manage resources without state interference are central to this rural movement's petitions. Yet, rather than seeking isolation from the state, this indigenous peasant movement is pursuing full participation in state politics and demanding that the Bolivian government recognize the diverse needs of Bolivia's population (Albo 1987; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987).

Prior to the emergence of the La Paz altiplano peasant movement, Bolivia underwent a revolution, in 1952, that overthrew an oligarchical regime and installed a new

2 Creole refers to the dominant class whose members consider themselves 'white', or of European origin.
government modelled on the Western liberal democratic state. The new revolutionary government implemented political enfranchisement for all Bolivian peoples and an Agrarian Reform Law that redistributed lands of large estates to former colonos. Accompanying Agrarian Reform were other government policies that promoted capitalist agricultural production at the expense of peasant production. My research explores the post-revolutionary structural changes in the Bolivian political economy and the material conditions that preceded the rise of the La Paz altiplano peasant movement in the early 1970s. I examine what role these transformations played in the mobilization of peasants in the Department of La Paz altiplano and their ability to promote and constrain the implementation of alternatives to development. Essential to my analysis is an examination of the economic and political structures that promote peasants to form collective opposition to the government and other external forces. Also critical to this exploration is an investigation into the economies of La Paz altiplano peasant communities and the way in which they were integrated into regional, national and international economies. In the following discussion I outline the theoretical frameworks and historical method which inform my examination of these issues.

II. PEASANT POLITICS

The recognition of subaltern group politics poses a problem when examining the efforts of peasant communities to

3 Landless men and women settled on large estates.
establish alternatives to development. The literature dealing with issues of social change frequently suggests peasants are apolitical reactors to external forces rather than active agents of history. Recent critiques of this literature point out the dichotomous portrayal of peasants as either passive political actors or actively engaged in rebellious acts (Arat-Koc 1991; Stern 1987). Both modernization and classic Marxist theories associate the countryside with tradition and perceive peasants as a fragmented and conservative group unable and unwilling to undertake the risks of change (Arat-Koc 1991). Yet, when provoked to rebel, peasants are noted to play a critical role in revolutionary movements. Consequently, they can make a significant contribution in the shaping of history (Skocpol 1979; Wolf 1969).

J. Scott (1985, 1986, 1990) is noted for his focus on the politics involved in daily peasant life. He contends that social ties, such as ritual kinship and patronage, and the repression present in peasant societies form obstacles to overt collective acts of rebellion. As a result, peasants engage in individual, clandestine acts of resistance, in J. Scott's (1986:5) words:

'... the ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups: foot dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on.'

Underlying these acts of resistance is a 'hidden transcript' (Scott 1990) of a covert sub-culture that, when given the

---

4 Ritual kinship refers to kin-like networks among people where no biological relationship occurs.
opportunity, can publicly contest elite domination. The implication of Scott's argument is that peasants' subordination and forced exclusion from the dominant sectors of society releases them, to some extent, from the hold of society's commanding hegemony. Rather than succumbing to ruling ideologies and thereby consenting to their own subjugation, peasants transform and subvert these ideologies into an inimical vision that, in addition to being played out in acts of resistance, may form the basis of a counter-hegemony.

J. Scott (1985, 1986, 1990) does draw attention to a variety of forms of resistance often unrecognized as political action and his suggestion that an alternative group consciousness arises from the seclusion and subordination engendered by relations of domination adds another layer of possibilities for peasant politics. However, his placing of a fixed meaning on activities such as pilfering and feigned ignorance leaves no distinction between acts of survival and acts of resistance (G. Smith 1989). In J. Scott's (1985, 1986, 1990) analysis, political acts that defy relations of domination are disguised rather than overt. Consequently, he does not provide links between this alternative consciousness and peasants' collective political engagement with dominant social structures. Nor does he explain how acts of

5 Scott (1990:191-192) has responded to this critique by maintaining that such distinctions are irrelevant as "these [acts] are the forms that political struggle takes when frontal assaults are precluded by the realities of power."

The classic approaches to peasant politics fail to account for much of the political activity of Bolivian peasants and peasants in the Andean region in general. Although this area is noted for a long history of peasant rebellions, in more quiescent times 'Andean' peasants have engaged in numerous political activities directed toward obtaining better conditions for the production and reproduction of their lives. These activities vary and include: negotiations with courts of law for land claims (Seligmann 1993; G. Smith 1989), roadblocks and demonstrations (Korovkin nd; Lagos 1994; Nash 1992; Zamosc 1994), community vigilante groups (Starn 1992) and peasant community unions (Albo 1987; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987; Stroebel-Gregor 1994). Essential to the understanding of these forms of collective action is the recognition of the political component of daily life. Insights of new social movement theories provide some guidance in establishing linkages between these collective political acts and dominant social structures.

III. NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY

Like J. Scott's (1985, 1986, 1990) analysis, new social movement theories emphasize how aspects of everyday life can become the focus of political contestation. Relations and structures of power, as well as the increasing
bureaucratization and commodification of social life, have generated antagonisms beyond the traditional sites of class struggle, such as the work place, into the wider social domain (Escobar 1992a, 1992b; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Evers 1985; Laclau 1985; Slater 1985). Conflicts now develop in numerous social spaces in which a variety of social agents are constituted. People identify with, and collectively organize around issues such as the environment, gender relations, community services, and equality for different ethnic groups. These issues become politicized by people publicly demanding rights and changes, and directing attention to these concerns.

New social movements emerge through the construction of collective identities and the development of oppositional and alternative meanings (Alvarez and Escobar 1992; Laclau 1985). These identities and meanings are not given. They arise out of daily life and are further formulated through negotiation, conflict and interaction both internally and with broader social political forces such as the state, political parties and other institutions of civil society (Alvarez and Escobar 1992). Although these external interventions shape and constrain the actions, political content and discourse of social movements, Alvarez and Escobar (1992) argue that they do not negate social movements' autonomy. Autonomy remains a "core movement value and a shrewd political strategy" that actors perceive as "essential to forging and preserving identity and community" (Alvarez and Escobar 1992:322).
New social movement theorists maintain that traditional Marxist concepts of class and class struggle are insufficient for the analysis of these new social struggles as they do not account for the variety of social actors and the politicization of areas beyond the sites of production (Alvarez and Escobar 1992; Laclau 1985; Slater 1994). Rather than waiting to be led into revolution by a vanguard proletariat class, the movements themselves are the vehicles through which actors articulate their demands. Adam (1993:331) suggests that the "wisdom" of new social movements is found in their ability to engage in "social restructuring around and under the state and capital." Their employment of the liberal democratic rights rhetoric attempts to democratize areas beyond the traditional electoral sphere and their demands re-affirm "claims for the good of communities against pure profit" (Adam 1993:331). New social movements' potential to "create something new ... should be taken seriously" for these movements may bear the "germs of change" (Lindberg 1994:100).

What is valuable about new social movement theories for my analysis is their recognition that the political sphere can encompass all aspects of daily life and their acknowledgment of the transformative potential of these movements' activities. The theories also point out that people will collectively organize and openly engage in political contestation over identities and issues generated by dominant social structures.

Indigenous peoples in Bolivia are organizing around an identity imposed on them for five centuries, a mobilization
which continues their long history of political and economic engagement with the non-indigenous population. Nonetheless, the La Paz altiplano peasant movement is not just an ethnic movement. Albo (1987) suggests that the movement's demands are also centred on issues of class struggle. The analyses of new social movement theories may have abandoned too much of Marxist theory (Adam 1993) to fully account for the class aspects of the La Paz altiplano peasant movement. Although these theories place social movements in the context of the power, domination and politics inherent in the capitalist system, they provide little analysis of these movements' interaction with the capitalist economy. Nor do they examine class divisions within the movements themselves (Brass 1991). The question of whose interests are being represented in any mobilization for social change needs to be investigated and the systems of domination and exploitation that are produced and reproduced by the full dynamics of capitalism must be taken into account. In addition to the socio-political forces that interact with social movements' trajectories, the impact of structures engendered by capitalist economic systems requires examination. Identities and meanings may arise from the conditions of daily life, yet these conditions are embedded in and shaped by the larger political economy (Adam 1993). The basis of social movements is not just "struggles over meanings at the level of daily life" as Escobar (1992c:71) argues, but also over the material conditions and practices that constitute daily life and from which meanings and identity emerge.
For people who live on the margins of the capitalist economy there are perpetual reminders of the threats to livelihood. Peasant communities are continually confronted with the realities of their precarious situation through the loss of land and livestock, their subordinate position in the marketplace, and in their lack of opportunities for employment in urban areas. The strivings of peasant communities, however, are not just economic survival struggles.

In peasant communities, the production and reproduction of life often entails the utilization of non-commodified factors of production. Households frequently depend on the community for access to resources, communal labour groups and other ties of reciprocity. These community institutions change over time and the ensuing difference that occurs between their practice and meaning can become a focal point of discussion when a community is engaged in political mobilization against external actors to obtain or retain land and other essential resources for livelihood. Communal negotiations over the meanings and practice of these institutions can impart a "political dimension to the preservation" (G. Smith 1989:222) of these institutions that can remain during times of acquiescence (G. Smith 1989). The preservation of these institutions and the community itself can become a focal point of subsequent political demands made to the state and other external agents. For Bolivian peasants, we see that what lies at the heart of their current quest for autonomy to develop their own communal decision making processes are the implementation of land
reforms and the subsequent national level policies that threaten the survival of rural communities.

IV. ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF PEASANT COMMUNITIES

Peasant communities do not necessarily generate institutions or relations of equality. Embedded in the world capitalist economy, peasant communities are subject to class stratification, political favouritism, state intervention and commoditisation6 - factors that can limit the ability of any organized subaltern group to subvert capitalist relations of inequality and implement alternative ways of producing and reproducing life. My research examines the interaction between these factors and the political and economic organization of Bolivian altiplano peasant communities. Essential to my analysis is the investigation of both the social relations of production in which community members engaged, and the manner in which these communities were integrated into regional, national and international economies during the two decades following the Revolution.

Peasant communities are not homogenous economic units. The level of wealth between households varies so that within any given peasant community poor, middle and rich households can be found. Access to production resources, as well as household size, will influence the level of wealth a household can obtain. Poor households are unable to

6 Bernstein (1979) uses the term commoditisation to refer to the process where households increasingly rely on relations of commodity production and exchange for their reproduction.
reproduce themselves with their own household production resources, middle households are able to meet their reproduction needs through their own production activities, and rich households produce a surplus (Bernstein 1979; Deere 1987; Llambi 1988). Class stratification can emerge from this economic differentiation. When community institutions are unable to provide adequate access to reproduction factors, members of poor households will seek wage labour to ensure their household reproduction, that is, they will become fully or semi-proletarianized. When the opportunities exist, rich households may invest their surplus products back into their own households' production resources, that is, they engage in expanded reproduction which facilitates their ability to become capitalized producers (Bernstein 1979; Deere 1987; Llambi 1988; Roseberry 1976).

The presence or absence of class stratification within peasant communities is contingent on a number of factors both internal and external to the community. Processes within the community that will influence the establishment of class stratification include an individual household's ability to access production resources, the reliance of households on community institutions and resources for their reproduction, and the degree to which the idioms of reciprocity and redistribution that accompany community exchange relations reflect the practice of these relations (Lehmann 1982, 1986; G. Smith 1985, 1989). When rich or capitalized households depend on these community institutions and resources for their reproduction, these
households will support the continuation of these reproduction mechanisms. Any collective action undertaken by peasant communities may therefore include rich or capitalized households (G. Smith 1985, 1989).

External factors influencing economic differentiation and class stratification include market processes and the availability of production activities and employment outside the community. Both factors will promote the emergence of capitalized and proletarianized households. Rich and capitalized households will profit from capitalized market-oriented activities because the sale of their goods will provide the cash income required for capitalist investment (Bernstein 1979). On the other hand, the establishment of stronger ties to the cash economy will foster the transformation of poor households into a proletarianized work force as they are unable to meet their reproduction needs without a cash income (Bernstein 1979; Painter 1986, 1991). While off-farm activities will provide the means through which poor households ensure their survival, rich households will be able to utilize the additional income derived from this employment to expand their production base (Deere 1987).

The literature indicates that the presence and degree of internal differentiation and/or class stratification within peasant communities can vary greatly (Deere 1987; Lehmann 1982; Painter 1986; G. Smith 1989). In the Bolivian case, peasant communities in Northern Potosí have been observed to have little differentiation and no class stratification (Harris 1982) or a high degree of
differentiation without class divisions (Platt 1982), whereas peasant communities in Cochabamba can be marked by a high level of class stratification (Lagos 1994). For the current situation in peasant communities in the department of La Paz, I do not know of any recently published research7, in English, that addresses the issue of the degree of economic differentiation and class stratification within these communities. However, both Rivera Cusicanqui (1987) and Strobel-Gregor (1994) suggest that 'traditional'8 institutions of communal democracy, reciprocity and redistribution are vocalized values of these communities. Nevertheless, these vocalized 'traditions' may only hide internal domination and exploitation. The possible presence of class stratification raises questions about the possibilities for the La Paz altiplano peasant movement to articulate the concerns of all peasant households in this area and therefore its ability to promote alternatives to development.

V. METHOD

In this thesis I analyze the structural changes within the Bolivian political economy and their interactions with

7 Current refers to published research from 1980 to the present. Studies of communities in the Department of La Paz were conducted during the 1960s and early 1970s. I used reports of these studies in my research.

8 'Traditional' refers to cultural institutions and practices that are said to be derived from the past. These institutions and practices are not static and they will reflect current circumstances. I use quotation marks to indicate this dynamic in 'traditions'.
peasant communities in the Department of La Paz altiplano by examining secondary English language documents pertaining to peasants in this area. Employing the method of C. Smith (1985), I integrate ethnographic accounts of peasants in the Department of La Paz with information on regional and national structural changes. I investigate ethnographies, land reform reports and other publications that examined peasant communities and their production activities in the Department of La Paz, as well as research reports and other publications concerned with the Bolivian political economy. My research centres on the time period beginning immediately prior to the 1952 Bolivian Revolution and ending with the early 1970s.

The major question guiding my research is: What were the material conditions and structural changes that led to the collective action of La Paz altiplano peasants in the 1970s? My exploration of structural changes in the Bolivian political economy and how these changes interacted with transformations at the local level allows me to analyze the processes underlying this mobilization. The second question directing my exploration is: What is the potential for this collective action to implement alternatives to Western models of development? The answer to this question is contingent upon the capacity of these peasants to challenge dominant economic and political structures and to create alternative means of reproducing life which, in turn, hinges on the nature of these communities' ties to the dominant political economy.
I have organized the presentation of the information I collected and my analysis in the following manner. Chapter Two discusses Bolivia's post-Revolutionary macro structural transformations. The way in which these changes materialized at the micro level is the focus of Chapter Three. La Paz altiplano peasant politics at both the national and local level is explored in Chapter Four. In Chapter Five I integrate the macro and micro processes examined in these three chapters and analyze how these processes led to the mobilization of La Paz altiplano peasants. I tie this analysis to the capacity for these peasants to implement alternatives to Western models of development. In Chapter Six I draw conclusions from this analysis and make recommendations for further research.
CHAPTER TWO
NATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE BOLIVIAN ECONOMY:
THE 1950s TO 1970s

I. INTRODUCTION

Bolivia's oligarchical regime was overthrown in April 9-11, 1952, by a multi-class alliance headed by the MNR (National Revolutionary Movement), the event now known as the 1952 Bolivian Revolution. Reforms implemented in the following years of MNR rule radically altered the structure of Bolivian society. The all-encompassing power of the ruling class was dismantled and the basic rights of citizenship inherent in formal democracy were granted to all classes. However, since the policies of the MNR and subsequent military regimes paved the way for capitalist development and Bolivia's 'modernization', the radical left's goal of a worker-peasant state never materialized. In this chapter I examine the post-Revolutionary macro-economic processes at the national level so that we may comprehend the macro structural conditions that influenced micro structural processes and the emergence of peasant collective action. Included is an investigation of national economic and agriculture policies and political processes that occurred during the two decades following the Revolution. In the next chapter I explore how these macro level processes materialized at the micro level and the concomitant local transformations.
II. BOLIVIA BEFORE THE REVOLUTION

Bolivia was predominantly a rural society at the time of the 1952 Revolution. According to the 1950 census, only 22.8 percent of the total population of 2.7 million lived in towns and cities of 5,000 or more people (Klein 1992). Agriculture and the export of primary commodities, especially tin, formed the basis of Bolivia's economy. A small manufacturing industry did exist, nevertheless, it employed only four percent of the economically active population and contributed less than nine percent to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Dunkerley 1984; Klein 1971). Mining also employed a small sector of the economically active population, 3.2 percent, yet it produced 25 percent of the GDP and accounted for a major portion of Bolivia's foreign exchange earnings (Dunkerley 1984). By contrast, agriculture employed 72 percent of the economically active population and contributed 33 percent to the GDP (Dunkerley 1984; Klein 1992).

Land tenure in rural areas was varied and ownership included small-holders, free-holding indigenous communities known as comunidades, and large estates or latifundia. It was in the hands of the latter group that the majority of land was concentrated. According to the 1950 agricultural census, eight percent of all agricultural production units were greater than 500 hectares and controlled 95 percent of

1 Eckstein (1983) points out that this figure is a conservative estimate of agriculture production because it does not take into account the fact that peasants produce their own subsistence.
all arable land (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Estates larger than 10,000 hectares controlled 50 percent of all arable land and represented less than one percent of all production units. Although they represented 69 percent of all production units, holdings less than 10 hectares controlled only 0.41 percent of arable land (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987; also see Burke 1970; Dunkerley 1984; Heath 1969a). This land distribution indicates Bolivia's rural sector had a highly inequallitarian social structure.

The bulk of Bolivia's rural and urban population was concentrated in the highlands, the area that encompasses the high plateau known as the altiplano, the temperate valleys, and the tropical valleys called the Yungas. This area does not include the tropical lowland regions, known as the Oriente, which constitutes the major portion of Bolivia's land mass. It was in the highlands that haciendas and their accompanying labour system of colonato were most prevalent. Colonos received usufruct rights to small parcels of land owned by hacendados in return for their provision of unremunerated labour obligations. The "almost feudal" (Kelley and Klein 1981:77) system of labour and land rights on the haciendas gave landlords almost complete control over colonos' lives. Hacendados had the power to execute whippings, remove land and privileges, settle disputes and impose decisions about peasant private life. According to Dunkerley (1984:19) the system maintained a "tradition of economic and social oppression of the indigenous masses that was not unlike a combination of serfdom and apartheid."
All highland peasants, however, were not confined to the servile labour of haciendas, nor did large estates have a long history of being a predominant feature of the countryside. Although the latifundia system existed in Bolivia for centuries, it was not until the late 1800s that haciendas began their large scale usurpation of indigenous lands (Klein 1992). In the early 1800s, less than one-third of the peasantry was attached to landed estates. The majority lived in comunidades which covered three-quarters of arable land (Pearse 1972a). These indigenous lands were not parcelled out by landlords into private estates until the latter half of the 19th century, a process which usually involved the reduction of those who occupied the lands to "personal serfdom" (Pearse 1972a:257). Estimates suggest that in 1854, 67 percent of all altiplano peasants lived in comunidades (McBride 1921). By 1900, this percentage was reduced to 27 (Klein 1971) and the number of comunidades declined from an estimated 11,000 in 1846 (De Shazo 1973) to 3,783 in 1952 (Carter 1964; De Shazo 1973; Dunkerley 1984 cites the number as 3,799). At the time of the Revolution, haciendas occupied approximately two-thirds of altiplano land. The importance of this relatively short history of hacienda land tenure becomes clear in Chapters Three and Four where I argue that it was one of the factors that facilitated the continuation of many indigenous institutions including political structures and relations of production.

Rural landlords were not the only members of Bolivia's pre-revolutionary ruling class. Mine ownership was also concentrated in the hands of a few. Three families owned 80
percent of the industry that provided Bolivia with its only secure tax base and source of foreign exchange (Dunkerley 1984). The ability of these three families to influence government policy was great and is reflected in the development of infrastructures to service the needs of mining companies and the mobilization of the military against miners during labour struggles (Dunkerley 1984).

The power of the ruling oligarchy was essentially uncontested until the 1920s when small groups of the political left began to question Bolivia's social and economic structure (Dunkerley 1984). Most writers, however, point to the Chaco War of 1932-35 as the precursor to large scale challenges to oligarchical rule (Bergsten 1964; Dandler-Hanhart 1971; Dunkerley 1984; Hahn 1992; Klein 1971; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Bolivia was severely defeated in this war with Paraguay over the flat lowland desert region known as the Chaco. Of the 200,000 who fought in the Chaco War, more than 60,000 died or disappeared and another 10,000 were held prisoner (Klein 1968). Many Bolivians blamed the high loss of life on the "stupidity, corruption [and] cowardliness of the Bolivian officer corps." (Klein 1968:109). Serious political and social repercussions arose from the war. Indigenous peoples, the working class and middle class were brought together on the front lines enabling them to develop a more comprehensive understanding of Bolivian political and social life (Dunkerley 1984). Young, middle class soldiers returned from the war bitter and disillusioned and, perceiving upper class leadership as having failed Bolivia, they began to reject the traditional
politics of the ruling elite. One outcome was the emergence of new political parties, ranging from the radical left to the moderate right, on the political scene (Klein 1968). Another was the recognition of the need to liberate indigenous peoples from the caste-like system of servitude. Emerging popular groups, including radical labour organizations, began to regard the peasantry as an important resource and ally in their struggles against the ruling class (Dandler-Hanhart 1971).

The years following the Chaco War were marked by rising popular discontent, evident in the formation of new political parties, mounting rural unrest, and increasing labour struggles (Dunkerley 1984; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Populist parties achieved a voice in national politics and reform governments of the 1930s and mid 1940s sought for social justice and equality, popular participation in politics, nationalism, and economic independence from foreign capital and the tin oligarchy (Dunkerley 1984; Klein 1992). Policies implemented to benefit the popular masses were usually revoked and violent repression of popular groups was enacted when the oligarchy regained government control, as it did in 1939-43 and again in 1946-52 (Dunkerley 1984).

However, as Garcia Arganaras (1992) suggests, the Chaco War itself is insufficient to explain Bolivia's mid 20th century crisis. Bolivia's social and economic structure, an export-oriented capitalist sector combined with an "archaic, stagnant and provincial" agricultural organization (Dunkerley 1984:6), had ceased to meet the needs of the
Bolivian state. The mining sector began to stagnate during the 1930s. Richer, more accessible tin sources became exhausted which, coupled with little capital investment, led to declining quantity, quality and value of tin exports (Dunkerley 1984; Klein 1971). The cost of living index rose from a base of 100 in 1931 to 5,041 in 1951 (Dunkerley 1984). This inflation, along with rising unemployment, was eroding the living standard of popular classes (Dunkerley 1984).

Simultaneously, the latifundia system became increasingly incapable of meeting the food requirements of the population. The largest landholders cultivated the least amount of land (Burke 1970; Dunkerley 1984; Klein 1971) and those that controlled 50 percent of arable land contributed only 13 percent to total cultivation (Dunkerley 1984). Between 1925-29, food imports accounted for 10 percent of total imports. By 1950, this figure had risen to 19 percent (Klein 1971). Many Bolivians, as well as international groups, came to view the latifundia system as the source of Bolivia's "stagnant and backward ... agrarian sector" (Burke 1970:412). According to the United Nations:

"The real reason for the stagnation of agriculture and its retarding effect on Bolivia's economic development lies in the continuance of these forms of tenure of farm property and systems of work." (United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America 1951, cited in Burke 1970:412).

Population increases also placed greater pressure on land and access to land became one focal point of colono-landlord struggles (Garcia Arganaras 1992).
The resulting popular discontent was collectively mobilized by the MNR with its rhetoric of "economic growth and distributive social justice" (Malloy and Borzutsky 1982:44) allowing the MNR to become the "political expression of widespread opposition against a common enemy" (Garcia Arganaras 1992:47). This multi-class coalition seized control of the government and inaugurated a new era in Bolivia's history.

III. POST-REVOLUTIONARY ECONOMIC PROCESSES

Once in power, the MNR initiated a number of reforms. The traditional army was almost completely dissolved in April 1952 and replaced by armed worker and peasant militias in factories, mines and the countryside. Implementation of universal suffrage abolished the previous voting requirement of Spanish language literacy, thereby increasing the voting population to about one million from the prior level of about 200,000 (Queiser Morales 1992). The three major mining companies were nationalized in October 1952 to form the state mining company COMIBOL and the agrarian reform decree was enacted in August 1953. These four major reforms had a great impact on Bolivia's socio-economic structure during the twelve years of MNR governance and the subsequent period of military rule.

In the following discussion I examine national economic policies and conditions during the MNR and military periods. Since the Agrarian Reform, implemented by the MNR, and other national agricultural policies of Bolivia's post-Revolutionary governments had a more direct influence on the
peasantry, I explore these structural transformations and processes separately in Section IV.

A. Economic Processes Under MNR Governance

At the time of the Revolution, Bolivia was perceived by both national and international groups as a 'backward' capitalist country that needed to mobilize its resources to release the masses from their abject poverty. According to Burke and Malloy (1974), the two major goals of the MNR were to; 1) break the Bolivian economy's dependence on the industrial centres of the United States and Europe, and 2) destroy the semi-feudal rural structure in order to liberate human and natural resources for state sponsored development. One particular region of focus for development was the vast tropical lowland area which was considered to possess both large oil reserves and good production land for the cultivation of import substitution crops. Economic pressures at both the national and international level, however, modified these goals of state sponsored national development.

Funding for Bolivia's economic development was expected to be derived from the income obtained through the nationalization of the mines. Nonetheless, the anticipated revenues never materialized (Flores 1954; R. Scott 1972). Diminishing mineral resources continued after nationalization and, coupled with the de-capitalized state of the mines, led to increasing production costs. Simultaneously, the world price of tin decreased dramatically. Within three months of nationalization, world
tin prices dropped from $1.20 U.S. to $0.80 U.S. per pound. These declining prices, combined with falling output, reduced 1958 earnings from tin to less than one-half of those in 1952 (Dunkerley 1984). The impact of the tin situation on Bolivia's foreign exchange reserves was exacerbated by the monetary compensation granted to the previous mine owners. This amount totalled $27 million U.S. which, at the time, was greater than two-thirds of Bolivia's foreign exchange reserves (Dunkerley 1984).

Yet, the MNR did initiate social welfare programs during the first years of the revolutionary government, in particular, the expansion of education programs to rural areas. Some argue these expenditures increased inflationary pressures which led to a rise in the cost of living and a decline in the exchange rate of Bolivian currency (Kelley and Klein 1981; R. Scott 1972). Cost of living rose from a base of 100 in 1952 to 2,270 at the end of 1956 (Dunkerley 1984). The exchange rate of the boliviano was 190/$1.00 U.S. in 1953. By the end of 1956 it had dropped to 16,000/$1.00 U.S. (Carter 1964). Food shortages in urban areas furthered the mounting economic difficulties.

Within less than two years of the Revolution, Bolivia's economy was in a state of crisis and the country faced a possible famine in urban areas (Dunkerley 1984; R. Scott 1972). Foregoing the policy of national independence, the MNR turned to the United States for aid in October 1953. Nine million U.S. dollars was provided for famine relief and other essential commodities (Dunkerley 1984). This move initiated a "process that would lead to Bolivia receiving
the highest rate of food aid per capita in the world and becoming dependent on US funds for a third of her total budget by 1958-82 (Dunkerley 1984:82; also see R. Scott 1972).

During the first years of revolutionary government, the MNR maintained some semblance of populist rule and policies. This was a necessary step in the MNR's efforts to consolidate its alliance of middle class, peasants, and labour. A key strategy for labour support was the creation of a national labour organization, the Bolivian Labour Central (COB). The COB was highly influenced by parties of the political left and radical labour unions, most notably FSTMB, the miners union. According to Dunkerley (1984), the COB would eventually become one of the most militant union confederations in the world. In 1952, the MNR formally gave the COB some voice in the formulation of government policies by creating worker ministries within the government. These positions were to guarantee government recognition of union demands and ensure that the MNR did not retreat from popular politics. The ministers, however, were never appointed by unions, nor did they seek direction from the COB or allow themselves to be recalled by labour. Consequently, the MNR

2 Although Bolivia received large amounts of food aid, few researchers discuss the role of this aid in Bolivian agriculture. Burke (1971b) and Eckstein (1983) argue that the United States' donations of wheat and flour marginalized Bolivian wheat producers and millers because they could not underprice the subsidized imports. How this food aid affected peasant producers in the Department of La Paz is not addressed by researchers of this area. Since this Department was not an important wheat growing region, the effect was most likely minimal.
could avoid any real recognition of joint government while reaping the benefits of its appearance. Nonetheless, the COB was able to push for reforms the MNR was initially hesitant to enact, including revoking anti-worker legislation, nationalizing the mines, and implementing agrarian reforms. In addition, the COB achieved government recognition of its independence (Dunkerley 1984).

The economic crisis of the early 1950s and the entrance of United States influence in Bolivian affairs also altered the populist course of the MNR. The first major move towards a more capitalist oriented state program came with the United States and International Monetary Fund (IMF) backed Stabilization Plan of 1956. In return for $25 million U.S. in aid, the MNR implemented this plan that directly attacked the economy initiated in 1952 (Dunkerley 1984). The Stabilization Plan called for a 40 percent decrease in government spending, elimination of price controls and government subsidies, decreased tariffs, increased domestic taxes, and wage and salary freezes (Dunkerley 1984; R. Scott 1972; Zondag 1982). Although inflation was halted within one year of the Plan's implementation, it occurred at great social expense. National production contracted as the manufacturing sector was opened up to international competition (Dunkerley 1984), unemployment increased (Dunkerley 1984; R. Scott 1972), and real wages declined in all sectors except those in rural areas (Dunkerley 1984; Patch 1961). According to Zondag (1982:34), "shortages and long queues disappeared overnight
and prices became so high that few people could afford to buy anything."

One of the conditions of the Stabilization Plan was stronger support for the armed forces. The military portion of the national budget increased from 6.8 percent in 1958 to 16.8 percent in 1964. Military manpower also rose from 5,000 in 1958 to 15,000 in 1964. By 1964, the United States was contributing $1.5 million U.S. to Bolivia's military budget (Dunkerley 1984).

Compliance with United States directives deepened the divisions within the MNR. While MNR members aligned with the right were resurrecting the military and opening Bolivia to international capitalist political and economic forces, those more oriented to the left were cut off from government power (R. Scott 1972; Zondag 1982). These divisions, in addition to the Stabilization Plan, initiated the alienation of left-oriented labour groups from the MNR regime. The revamped military and peasant militias were mobilized to repress the mounting labour struggles engendered by the government's embrace of programs that marginalized the social, political, and economic conditions of the rural and urban working classes.

By 1964, Bolivia had entered another level of crisis marked by economic turmoil, popular struggle and state military repression. The disintegrating MNR was unable to alleviate the situation and the way was paved for Rene Barrientos' 1964 military coup which inaugurated an 18 year period of almost uninterrupted military dictatorship.
B. Economic Processes Under Military Rule

Barrientos remained in power in Bolivia until his death in 1969. His regime was marked by the continued promotion of capitalist development, the presence of United States influences, and the repression of labour. According to Malloy and Borzutsky (1982), the two main aspects of economic development during this period were: 1) the revival of the private sector and 2) the attempt to modernize the economy through private and public corporate enterprises. Finances were directed towards the development of industry and commercial agriculture in the tropical lowland regions and for the establishment of infrastructure to serve these modern capitalized sectors (Malloy and Borzutsky 1982).

The economy was also further opened up to foreign capital. Foreign firms were given access to mining operations and private companies accounted for 24 percent of all mineral production by 1967 (Dunkerley 1984). Oil production shifted towards favouring foreign capital producers. In 1964, the Bolivian state-owned oil company, YPFB, held 95 percent of all oil production compared to Gulf Oil's three percent share. Within three years these proportions had switched with Gulf Oil's share rising to 82 percent and YPFB's declining to less than 20 percent (Dunkerley 1984). Foreign banks also entered the country and by 1969 controlled 58 percent of national deposits (Dunkerley 1984). According to Dunkerley (1984:127), Barrientos' policy permitting large repatriation of profits allowed Bolivia to become a "net exporter of capital; between 1965 and 1968 private foreign capital investment
amounted to $27.7 million while repatriated profits exceeded $320 million."

During Barrientos' regime, the economy maintained a "reasonable growth in GNP" (Malloy and Borzutsky 1982:49) and inflation remained at the low rate established in the late 1950s (Garcia-Rodriguez 1982). Beneficiaries of this stability were confined to a small national capitalist class, foreign capital investors, and the urban middle class. It was the popular sectors that paid the social costs of this capitalist development. Wage freezes, combined with annual inflation rates of six percent, decreased the real wages of many members of the working class (Malloy and Borzutsky 1982). Miners suffered mass layoffs and cuts in wages of up to 50 percent (Dunkerley 1984; Malloy and Borzutsky 1982; Weil et al. 1974). Subsequent labour struggles in the mines led to military occupation of the mines, the exile of FSTMB leaders, and the enactment of a decree prohibiting all non-government controlled worker organizations including the COB. The COB, as well as many other banned organizations, continued some of their activities clandestinely (Dunkerley 1984; Malloy and Borzutsky 1982; Weil et al. 1974).

Following Barrientos' death in 1969, there was a period of political opening with the military regimes of Ovando (1969-1970) and Torres (1970-1971). Both Ovando and Torres were sympathetic towards labour and both, critical of United States involvement in Bolivian affairs, revived the nationalist policies of the early MNR years. During Ovando's regime, Bolivian Gulf Oil was nationalized and the
state mining bank was given a monopoly over mineral exports (Well et al. 1974). Torres nationalized two small mining companies and terminated the Bolivian Peace Corps program (Well et al. 1974). Although Ovando opened up the political space for the working class, it was under the Torres government that the left collectively organized under the Popular Assembly which was founded with the purpose of forming an alternative government structure. The Assembly, however, was never able to form a unified front and effective political voice because the left, although it had survived the 1960s attack, had been weakened and factionalism within the left was high3 (Malloy and Borzutsky 1982).

The political opening of these two short-lived regimes was annulled with Hugo Banzer's military coup of 1971. Staying in power until 1978, Banzer continued previous programs of industrial and agricultural capitalist development, resumed ties with the United States, and initiated massive oppression of all opposition. In addition to the large scale purge of left radicals, which included journalists, priests, labour leaders, students, and university faculty (Well et al 1974), independent union activity and freedom to participate in politics was abolished, and popular mobilization against the regime was violently repressed. Although the COB was declared illegal, it continued to exist covertly (Dunkerley 1984). According

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3 Factionalism was not confined to left political groups. Malloy and Borzutsky (1982) note that factionalism was also prevalent among right-wing political groups.
to Dunkerley (1984:209), this "imposition of a blanket control enabled Banzer to enforce the highly unpopular economic measures required of his government by the IMF." Bolivian currency was devalued 67 percent in 1972 which led to a 39 percent increase in the cost of living over the next year. Since wage raises were restricted to 10-20 percent, the decrease in real wages was about 19 percent (Dunkerley 1984; also see Wennergren and Whitaker 1975). The conditions for the popular classes were further exacerbated with the elimination and reduction of state subsidies on certain basic goods and services in 1974.

Banzer's economic development model was centred in the tropical lowlands where oil and natural gas production and agro-industrial export sectors were heavily financed (Dunkerley 1984; Malloy and Borzutsky 1982). Foreign capital investment was also encouraged with policies that allowed repatriation of substantial profits, elimination of tariffs on capital goods and primary materials, and the removal of taxes on production and manufactured goods (Dunkerley 1984). Although Bolivia's economy did grow during this period, favourable world prices for Bolivian exports during the early 1970s were largely responsible for this growth. World prices for both tin and oil increased and prices were high for export agriculture crops such as sugar and cotton (Dunkerley 1984; Garcia-Rodriguez 1982; Ladman 1982). Bolivia's foreign debt also increased substantially during this period. The 1971 foreign debt of $782.1 million U.S. rose to $3,101.8 million U.S. in 1978.
Simultaneously, the debt service increased from 17.3 percent to 32.0 percent of the value of exports (Dunkerley 1984).

In summary, the economic policies that emerged from the post-Revolutionary goals of nationalism and modernization promoted the development of Bolivia's capitalized industrial and agricultural sectors. The MNR, during the early years of government control, did implement social policies that would have directed some of the potential monetary gains of these economic plans towards popular sectors. Nonetheless, economic forces at the international level diminished the ability of Bolivia to realize the anticipated financial returns. The resultant economic crisis led the MNR to seek financial aid from international agencies and other countries, most notably the United States. This action instituted the means through which the political and economic goals of international capital could enter into and direct Bolivian economic, social and political policies. Although popular sectors did not passively accept government initiatives that marginalized their living conditions, their struggles only resulted in massive military repression which was supported by the United States and other international organizations such as the IMF. The establishment of military rule entrenched the alliance between Bolivia's government and international capital. Implementing policies that encouraged the growth of large-scale capitalized sectors, Barrientos and Banson promoted both the capitalist modernization of Bolivia and the economic interests of international capital.
Yet, for all the efforts directed towards the development of the Bolivian economy, the emphasis placed on capital intensive extraction industries resulted in no appreciable transformation in the standard of living and political participation of the majority of Bolivians. Infant mortality rates and levels of malnutrition, indicators of people's access to basic necessities of life, remained high (Dunkerley 1984) and the political voice of popular groups, although never completely silenced, was quelled through violent and non-violent state repression. The majority of the population remained in rural areas with 42 percent living in towns or cities of 2,000 or more people in 1976 (Klein 1992). Those who did migrate to the cities, partly in response to increasing pressures on land, found few opportunities for employment. By the mid 1970s, only nine percent of Bolivia's labour force was employed in the industrial sector (Romero-Pittari 1982). Thus, any state policy that was to be directed towards the majority of Bolivians should have focused on the rural areas of the country and on agricultural production. In the next section I examine the efforts made by the Bolivian state in this area.

IV. THE AGRARIAN REFORM AND NATIONAL AGRICULTURE POLICIES

A. The Agrarian Reform

The Agrarian Reform Decree was enacted in August 1953. This Decree immediately transferred to colonos ownership of the lands they had usufruct rights to. The purpose of
Agrarian Reform was not simply the creation of thousands of small-holders as there were a number of political and economic objectives inherent in the Agrarian Reform Law. In the following discussion, I examine these objectives and the processes implemented at the national level to carry out land redistribution. The local impact of these processes and objectives will be discussed in Chapter Three.

Two main factors created the conditions that necessitated implementation of Agrarian Reform. First, the latifundia system was perceived by many Bolivians as an inefficient form of agricultural production (Hahn 1992; Mendelberg 1985). Second, rural unrest that began before the Revolution was mounting and colonos appeared to be on the verge of revolt if they did not obtain their demands for land rights and abolition of labour obligations (Hahn 1992; Mendelberg 1985). Nonetheless, the MNR had no clear program for the countryside (Hahn 1992) and each faction within the MNR had its own vision of Bolivia's future agrarian structure. Members aligned with the right agreed to the elimination of free labour services but were reluctant to initiate large scale land distribution. The left faction promoted the need for the elimination of latifundias and the redistribution of these large estates to colonos. By contrast, the radical left called for an agrarian revolution with total distribution of the land, establishment of collectives, and the creation of a labour-peasant government and people's army (Dandler-Hanhart 1971). These differing views were represented in the Agrarian Reform Commission
established in January 1953 to study the rural situation and
develop the Agrarian Reform Law.

Although Heath (1969a) argues the Reform represents a
number of compromises to meet the differing objectives of
the Committee members, others (Dunkerley 1984; Eckstein
1983; Goodrich 1971) maintain that the development of
capitalist agriculture was clearly one main objective of the
Reform. This latter contention is evident in the six main
objectives of the Agrarian Reform outlined in the Decree's
preamble. These objectives were:

1) The provision of adequate land parcels to
peasants with little or none on the condition that
these lands were worked. Expropriation of
latifundia lands were to be used for this purpose.

2) To restore to comunidades their lands that had
been usurped since 1900 and to cooperate with
their modernization while respecting their
collective traditions as far as possible.

3) To abolish service obligations required of
colonos.

4) To increase productivity and commercialization
of agricultural goods, encourage capital
investment, provide technical aid, and open up
capabilities for credit.

5) To protect natural resources by adopting modern
technology and scientific means.

6) To promote migration from the altiplano to the
tropical lowlands (Carter 1964, 1971; Clark 1971;

Note that capitalist investment and modernization were key
aspects of the Decree.

The only properties recognized and therefore protected
by the Decree were those that fulfilled a "useful function
for society" (Flores 1954). These properties included;
small properties worked exclusively by peasant families; medium-sized properties that utilized paid labour and/or modern technology and engaged in market production; agricultural 'enterprises' which were identified by their paid work force, capital investment and high level of technology and mechanization; and comunidades. Latifundias, the large unproductive estates that utilized servile labour were not recognized by the Decree and were, therefore, the main lands to be expropriated. However, colonos living on estates classified as medium properties or agricultural enterprises did receive ownership of the lands to which they had usufruct rights (Carter 1971; Flores 1954; Graeff 1974; Flores Moncayo 1965; Powelson and Stock 1987). The preservation of holdings that employed capitalist production techniques and/or capitalist relations of production along with the creation of many peasant small-holdings generated a dual agrarian system of capitalist agriculture and simple commodity production (Eckstein 1983). Future Bolivian agriculture policies would be directed towards the benefit of the former sector.

Although the Agrarian Reform Decree established guidelines for the identification of the different types of properties, both the language of the Reform and the criteria for size - important in the classification process - were

4 In order to account for the varying levels of land productivity, size limits for the different property categories differed according to the geographic region in which the property was located (Graeff 1974). For example, maximum holding size for medium properties located in the altiplano ranged from 80 to 350 hectares (Carter 1964).
unclear. This lack of clarity created problems in making distinctions between different types of holdings which, in turn, affected the amount of land to be expropriated. Consequently, loopholes inherent in the Decree enabled some landlords to maintain lands that should have been expropriated (Graeff 1974; Goodrich 1971; Heath 1969b; Mendelberg 1985).

Property classification was not the only problem encountered in the implementation of the Agrarian Reform. The expropriation process also generated difficulties. A National Agrarian Reform Service was established to execute the Decree. Proceedings were usually initiated by peasants, although some landlords also started the process (Heath 1969a). Once the process was inaugurated, a team of agrarian judges, topographers and other officials was sent to the area to settle the claim and distribute titles. The Reform Service received little funding and, consequently, peasants often paid for this service that was to have been provided free of charge (Carter 1971; Clark 1969; Heath 1969a). Settling a claim was also a lengthy, complicated procedure. The number of bureaucratic channels that claims went through allowed for political favours and pay-offs enabling some landlords to maintain lands to which they had no right according to the Decree (Dunkerley 1984; Heath 1969a). The lengthy process also meant that many peasants did not receive title to their lands for several years. Of the 15,322 cases initiated between 1953-1966, 8,000 were still pending in 1967 (Carter 1971; Clark 1971) and only 8 million hectares out of a possible 36 million hectares had
been officially redistributed between 1954 and 1968 (Dunkerley 1984). Yet, as Hahn (1992) points out, these figures pertain to legal land distribution. Most peasants in the altiplano and valleys obtained de facto ownership to their usufruct lands immediately following the Decree's enactment in 1953 (Clark 1971).

Prior to agrarian reform, peasants frequently had usufruct rights to 60-85 percent of estate lands (Pearse 1972b). This land access, coupled with post-Reform preservation of medium properties and agricultural enterprises, and, in some instances, landlords continued ownership of lands that had been cultivated exclusively for their benefit, meant that most ex-colonos did not receive greater access to land. In addition, when land farmed solely for the landlord was distributed, it was usually parcelled out to landless adult children of ex-colonos. As a result, little land was available to increase the size of ex-colonos' usufruct plots. In 1967, 59 percent of all families in the altiplano and valleys owned less than five hectares of land and only three percent had holdings larger than 50 hectares (Eckstein 1983). Ex-colonos' main benefit from agrarian reform was therefore the elimination of labour obligations, not increased holding size (Burke 1970; Heyduk 1974; Kelley and Klein 1981; Mendelberg 1985).

In summary, although Agrarian Reform did give colonos legal title to their usufruct lands, it promoted the development of capitalized agriculture by establishing a land tenure system based on private property and by legitimizing the ownership of large land parcels farmed
according to capitalist relations and modern techniques of production. Lack of clarity in the Agrarian Reform Law and the bureaucratic system instituted for land transfers enabled some landlords to maintain ownership of lands to which they had no legal right. In addition, the lengthy proceedings not only extended the expropriation process for many years, they forced some ex-colonos to pay for services that should have been free of charge. The maintenance of medium and large land holdings, coupled with the provision of land to the landless offspring of ex-colonos, resulted in few ex-colono households obtaining access to larger land parcels. On the other hand, the Agrarian Reform did have the potential to provide some benefits to ex-colonos because their labour and the products of their labour was released from landlord control. In Chapter Three I examine the ways in which peasants in the Department of La Paz utilized their labour and products.

B. National Agriculture Policies

Between 1960-1971, an average of only 3.2 percent of Bolivia's public investment was directed toward the agrarian sector. By comparison, mining and petroleum, and infrastructure development received, respectively, 37 percent and 38 percent of public funds over the same time period. In addition, the proportion of funds for infrastructure development supporting agriculture was less than five percent (Wennegren and Whitaker 1975; also see Cariaga 1982). Of the funds allocated for agriculture,
almost none were directed towards peasant producers and most available moneys benefited the production of import substitution and export crops on large farms in the tropical lowlands (Eckstein 1983; Ladman and Tinnermeier 1981; Wennergren and Whitaker 1975). For example, between 1968-1972, 83.5 percent of all Bolivian Agriculture Bank (BAB)5 loans supported the production of beef cattle, cotton, sugar cane and rice (Eckstein 1983) and 79 percent of BAB credit and almost all commercial bank credit was directed to large and medium farmers in the Department of Santa Cruz (see map) between 1964-1976 (Torrico 1982). Although this system that supported large scale commercial agriculture rather than peasant producers was initiated by the MNR government, the MNR, as we shall see, did allocate some funds and establish some programs for peasant production. During military regimes, a greater emphasis was placed on the development of capitalized agriculture with a concomitant decrease for the already minimal support for peasant producers.

This greater support for commercial agriculture reflected Bolivia's agriculture policies of decreasing food imports through the cultivation of import substitution crops, the promotion of export crop production, and the maintenance of low food prices in order to decrease inflationary pressures and thereby benefit the urban population (Torrico 1982; also see Eckstein 1983; Wennergren and Whitaker 1975). Yet, it was not only the Bolivian government that promoted capitalist agriculture production

5 The Bolivian Agriculture Bank is the primary state lending agency for agriculture.
in the tropical lowlands. Until the late 1970s, international investors and lending agencies, most notably the United States, directed almost all of their funds for agriculture support to this sector (Eckstein 1983). Estimates suggest that, between 1965-1975, 42 percent of bank loans to agriculture were financed by international aid agencies (Torrico 1982).

Some statistics indicate that these agriculture policies provided some benefits to Bolivia. Writing in 1975, Wennergren and Whitaker (1975) point out that agriculture imports were currently about 25 percent of Bolivia's total imports compared to 35 percent in the early 1950s. They claim this was largely due to increased domestic production, especially that of beef, rice, sugar and cotton. Wennergren and Whitaker (1975) also note that Bolivia was never a large food exporter and that food always comprised less than 14 percent of all Bolivian exports. During the early 1970s, however, food exports increased and they became a more important source of foreign exchange. This rise in food exports was the result of both increased production (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975) and increased world prices (Dunkerley 1984; Wennergren and Whitaker 1975).

On closer examination, these benefits may be somewhat illusionary. In terms of foreign exchange earnings, world food prices fluctuate and, in 1976, the world price of sugar and cotton decreased (Eckstein 1983). Also, the manner in which agricultural loans were provided to medium and large farmers resulted in costs to the Bolivian government. Loan delinquency was a problem for BAB and this delinquency was
concentrated among large farmers (Dunkerley 1984; Eckstein 1983; Ladman and Tinnermeler 1981; Torrico 1982). At the end of 1971, 15 percent of BAB's loan portfolio was overdue (Ladman and Tinnermeler 1982). By 1979, large farmers owed 69 percent, or $666 million U.S., of BAB's unpaid debts (Dunkerley 1984) and the Bank declared bankruptcy that year (Eckstein 1983). In addition, during Bänzer's regime, loans were offered at interest rates far below those charged for commercial loans. When combined with inflation, these rates resulted in a transfer of income to large commercial farmers (Ladman 1982; Ladman and Tinnermeler 1981).

Despite the promotion of capitalist agriculture and the investment directed to that sector, small scale peasant producers still produced the major portion of Bolivia's domestic food production. Small farmers, comprising 95 percent of the rural population, produced 80 percent of Bolivia's agricultural production (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975; also see Burke 1970). Wennergren and Whitaker (1975) argue that peasants, by producing their own subsistence and providing 33 percent of the urban food supply, fed the majority of the Bolivian population.

"That is, the campesinos feed themselves, plus about one-third of the urban population, or 77 percent of Bolivia's total population. Commercial agriculture and imports thus must be feeding about 23 percent of the population." (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975:136).

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6 Wennergren and Whitaker (1975), not having access to the 1976 Bolivian census, estimated the rural population at 67%. This estimation is higher than the 1976 census figure of 58% as reported in Klein (1992).
This great productivity on the part of peasants does not mean peasants were not living in conditions of poverty. According to United Nations statistics, 85 percent of Bolivia's rural population lived below the poverty line in 1965. By 1988, this figure rose to 97 percent. In addition, Bolivia's per capita daily calorie supply as a percentage of the requirements established by the World Health Organization was only 78 percent in 1970 and 84 percent in 1988-1990 (International Fund for Agricultural Development, United Nations 1993).

Thus, while the Bolivian economy may have obtained some benefits from government policies during this period, the gains were ephemeral as the reliance on export crops tied Bolivia's economy even more closely to the vagaries of world price trends. Furthermore, loans granted to capitalized producers resulted in income transfers to these borrowers owing to low interest rates and the high level of default. Although little effort was made to support peasant agricultural production, these producers continued to grow the bulk of Bolivia's food supply. The level of this production, however, was not necessarily adequate to meet the needs of Bolivia's rural population and most peasant households continued to live in poverty with limited food resources. Factors that contributed to the continued marginalized situation of the peasantry following the Revolution include population pressures on the land, the lack of off-farm employment opportunities, and the limited support for peasant production.
1. Land Pressures, Limited Employment and Agriculture Colonies

Bolivia's rural population is concentrated in the altiplano and valleys, an area that contains 41 percent of national land territory and, in the 1960s, 93 percent of the population (Edelmann 1967). Within a few years of Agrarian Reform, this population density, in some areas, led to high population pressures on the land. For example, in certain rural areas of the Department of La Paz, the population density reached 125 people per square mile in the early 1960s (Carter 1964). Exacerbating the effects of land pressure on peasant production was the small size of holdings received with Agrarian Reform. When coupled with inheritance rights that passed land on to all male and sometimes female offspring, land pressures led to decreasing plot size. The Bolivian economy during the two decades following the Revolution, however, was unable to absorb the resulting surplus labour (Burke 1970). People seeking off-farm employment frequently searched for either temporary employment in the low paying capitalist agriculture sector, mines, and construction, or in the informal sector or small craft shops (Mendelberg 1985).

Relief of some of the population pressures in the highlands was one of the goals of the colonization program directed towards the lowland areas of the Alto Beni, Santa Cruz and Chapare, initiated by the MNR and continued by military governments (Edelmann 1967; Heath 1969b). Other goals of this program included the promotion of national unity (Edelmann 1967), encouragement of lowland agriculture
production, attraction of workers to these regions, and the provision of land to more militant peasants in order to allay their demands for a more thorough agrarian reform (Gill 1987). Three types of colonies emerged throughout the 1950s and 1960s - spontaneous, government-directed and semi-directed. Spontaneous colonies, those with little or no government assistance, usually formed along rivers and roads when small groups of highland settlers migrated to these regions in search of new agricultural lands and opportunities. Government-directed colonies were pre-planned settlements that provided settlers with a number of provisions including land parcels, production equipment and advice, schools, health services and temporary dwellings. Although semi-directed colonies provided similar assistance, fewer controls were placed on production and community activities (Henkel 1982).

Bolivia's goal of resettling 100,000 families between 1962-1971 did not materialize and by 1970 only 30,000 families were settled in these new areas, predominantly in spontaneous colonies (Clark 1971). The program's failure was not simply the result of the inability to attract settlers. During the 1960s, colonies experienced a high rate of abandonment, between 44-70 percent, depending on the colony type and location (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975).

7 Japanese, Okinawan and Mennonite colonies were also established during this time period in the Department of Santa Cruz. The Japanese and Okinawan colonies were formed through an agreement between the United States, Bolivia and Japan. Their purpose was to resettle families that had been displaced by the establishment of United States air bases in Japan (Henkel 1982).
There were numerous reasons for abandonment including inadequate marketing structures, poor transportation networks, high disease rates, and inadequate access to land (Henkel 1982). Although average plot sizes were 10 hectares in spontaneous colonies and 20 hectares in directed colonies, an estimated 50 hectares is considered the minimum productive land size for the rotational cycle required in the lowland areas (Henkel 1982; Stearman 1973). The subsequent greater production intensity led to soil impoverishment and land abandonment (Henkel 1982). In addition, in directed colonies, restrictions were placed on colonizers' activities. For example, unions were forbidden (Gill 1987), the government controlled the crops to be grown, and settlers had to repay the cost of all supplied services and equipment within fifteen years (Henkel 1982). For the majority who stayed, poverty was the outcome and, in the Santa Cruz area, many settlers became semi-subsistence producers who sold their labour power to nearby large capitalized sugar and cotton operations (Gill 1987).

In summary, limited land availability restricted the agricultural production base of many highland peasant households. These households, by necessity, sought alternative activities to ensure their reproduction. The Bolivian economy, however, was unable to provide sufficient opportunities for wage labour to these peasants. Although the government did initiate a program for migration to the less populated tropical lowland areas, conditions and services instituted to support farming activities in these colonies were inadequate to meet the basic requirements of
tropical agriculture production. The outcome was limited migration to these colonies and the re-creation of conditions of poverty for the majority who did relocate. Yet, colonization was not the only government program provided to peasant producers. My discussion now focuses on these other interventions.

11. Government Programs for Highland Peasant Production

In general, peasants who remained in the highlands received little government support for their production. In terms of financial credit, although peasants received one-third of all BAB loans between 1964-1971, the amount of money received by peasants represented only four percent of all BAB funds (Eckstein 1983; also see Wennergren and Whitaker 1975). However, two programs directed towards peasant producers were established by the MNR government and continued by military regimes; the Agricultural Extension Program and the National Community Development Service (SNDC). The purpose of the Extension Program was to offer assistance and advice to local farmers and to demonstrate new production technology and management practices and the use of new seeds. In 1961, the program suffered financial cuts that left few funds for an operating budget. Extension agents, lacking resources for gas and auto repairs, were subsequently confined to a small area of the vast regions they had to cover. Few communities, therefore, had access to extension services (Preston 1978; Wennergren and Whitaker 1975). The SNDC backed programs, targeting communities with populations of less than 500 people, supported community
development projects. Trained community development workers helped organize committees and assisted with the institution of projects such as schools, clinics, potable water systems, and small irrigation systems (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975). According to Wennergren and Whitaker (1975:210), SNDC promoted a "self-help approach" and was fairly successful. Communities themselves, however, had to bear 50 percent of total project costs (Eckstein 1983; Wennergren and Whitaker 1975).

The available evidence indicates that Bolivian governments, in the twenty years following the Revolution, supported the production of import substitution and export crops on large capitalized farms. These agricultural policies reflect the power of capitalist producers vis-a-vis the peasantry as well as the interests of international capital in gaining access to extractive resources from Bolivia. The lack of support for peasant producers most likely contributed to the conditions of poverty in which the majority of rural Bolivians continued to live. Yet, despite the lack of support, peasants produced the bulk of Bolivia's food supply and they were able to transfer their products to rural and urban markets.

V. PEASANTS AND MARKETING PROCESSES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL

Prior to the Agrarian Reform, landlords controlled the marketing networks that connected rural areas with urban and mining centres. Products that entered this system were those that were produced for the landlord. Colonos, however, were not absent from this marketing system. One of
the service obligations of colonos was the transport of agricultural goods to the landlords' stores in urban centres and the sale of these goods in the stores (Powelson and Stock 1987). In addition, members of comunidades participated in a rural marketing network that connected the altiplano with the valleys and Yungas. This system continued an ancient trade that distributed the various products from these different geographical regions among the inhabitants of these areas (Leonard 1952; Powelson and Stock 1987; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). With the Revolution and Agrarian Reform, the landlord marketing structure was dismantled and, although the immediate consequence was food shortages in the urban areas, new marketing networks, established by peasants and urban transporters, soon emerged (Carter 1971; Clark 1971; Pearse 1972b). These new marketing networks were not strictly focused on rural-urban trade. New rural fairs mushroomed in the countryside and, in some instances, new towns were established. These fairs provided outlets for peasant products as well as new employment opportunities, in the form of trade, transportation and sale of goods, for the rural population (Carter 1971; Clark 1968, 1971; Pearse 1972b).

Marketing of peasant products was not established in the absence of state influence. In the city of La Paz, free

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8 There was a debate about whether or not peasants were able to produce enough food for the urban and rural population. Both Carter (1971) and Clark (1968, 1971) argue that the decline in the urban food supply was the result of marketing adjustments. They also point out that the altiplano suffered a severe drought in 1956 and that 1957 and 1958 were years of dryness.
markets, those without seller fees, were instituted to encourage peasants to sell their products in the city (J.M. Buechler 1972). The state also intervened with price controls in their efforts to keep urban food prices low for urban consumers. Yet, the effects of price controls on altiplano producers may have been minimal. According to Wennergren and Whitaker (1975), only prices for wheat, rice and sugar-cane were not determined by the free market and the prices of these products reflected price agreements made between government marketing boards and producers' associations. Prices of altiplano crops were generally determined at the market level (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975). Although the retail price of certain basic foods was frequently fixed by state institutions, these prices were often not enforced (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975) and sellers, by bribing officials, usually charged the amount they perceived as necessary (J.M. Buechler 1972).

The way in which new markets were established, the relations between market participants, and the influence of markets on peasant communities will be one focus of Chapter Three. I have stressed in this chapter that peasants not only produced a major portion of Bolivia's food supply, they also participated in the sale and transport of their products in rural and urban areas. Although the state did intervene in some aspects related to the trade of goods, peasants, as I illustrate in Chapter Three, did have some control over marketing processes. Peasants, therefore, entered the national Bolivian economic sphere through the marketing system. These activities were not the only means
through which the peasantry became more involved in national Bolivian structures. As we shall see in Chapter Four, through their rural unions, peasants were also active participants in national politics. Before I examine this political participation, an exploration of how the macro structural transformations, discussed in this chapter, materialized at the micro level is required. We turn our focus to these processes in the next chapter.
CHAPTER THREE
LOCAL LEVEL TRANSFORMATIONS: THE DEPARTMENT OF LA PAZ

I. INTRODUCTION

Chapter Two examined economic processes in Bolivia at the macro level. I argued that, following the Revolution, national and international economic and political factors led to a greater opening of the Bolivian economy to international forces of capitalist development. Concentration of investment in highly capitalized extractive export industries and agro-industry, coupled with policies that benefited the interests of international capital, such as low tariffs and those allowing repatriation of profits, marginalized the majority of Bolivians from Bolivia's so-called economic development. Although organized groups of the political left and labour did contest policies that adversely affected popular sectors, governments of the later MNR years and subsequent military regimes utilized the resurrected military and peasant groups to repress these struggles. The peasantry received little state support for their production activities. Nonetheless, peasants continued to reproduce themselves through subsistence and market production and with the income from off-farm employment. In this chapter my focus turns to the altiplano region of the Department of La Paz. I explore how post-Revolutionary structural changes materialized at the local level and the economic and political means through which peasant communities and households sought their survival. In particular, I examine land tenure arrangements, off-farm income sources, agricultural production techniques, labour
relations, and marketing networks. I also highlight differences between two regions in the Department of La Paz; the altiplano and the Yungas.

II. THE DEPARTMENT OF LA PAZ: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION

The Department of La Paz is the most densely populated Department in Bolivia. According to the 1950 census, 948,446 people, close to one-third of the total population, lived in this Department. By the time of the 1976 census, this figure had risen to 1,484,151, or approximately 32 percent of Bolivia's population (Klein 1992). Although a large proportion of the population of the Department of La Paz resides in the capital city of La Paz, the rural areas are one of the most densely populated regions in Bolivia.

Three main geographical regions are found in the Department of La Paz; the altiplano, intermediate valleys, and the Yungas. The high plateau known as the altiplano lies at altitudes between 3,500 to 4,900 meters. It is a dry, cold area suitable for raising sheep, camelids and cattle and for the cultivation of grains, such as barley, quinoa, oats and wheat, and tubers such as potatoes. The most fertile areas of the altiplano are found in the region surrounding Lake Titicaca. Here, the somewhat warmer temperatures allow for the production of certain vegetable crops such as onions. Located south of the city of La Paz are the intermediate valleys which are the upper zones of the Andean valleys. The temperate climate favours the

1 The population of La Paz city was 321,073 in 1950 and 654,713 in 1976 (Klein 1992).
growth of maize, fruits such as pears, plums, grapes and cherries, and vegetables like tomatoes, cauliflower, cabbage and carrots. The Yungas, steep slopes at altitudes of 600 to 2,400 meters, lie north and north-west of the city of La Paz. Production of cash crops such as coffee, coca, and citrus fruits is favoured by the rainy, sub-tropical climate. Just north of the Yungas is the colonization zone known as Alto Beni. Rice and tomatoes are the principal cash crops grown here (J.M. Buechler 1972).

The majority of the rural population in the Department of La Paz are Aymara speaking peasants. Prior to the Revolution, the Aymara generally resided in three types of settlements: haciendas, where they lived as colonos cultivating crops for landlords and their own subsistence; comunidades, or free-holding indigenous communities, where households accessed land through usufruct rights and directly controlled their own labour and products; and villages and towns where mestizos dominated the local economy and politics. In the latter settlements, the Aymara lived in the towns or in the surrounding area where they owned land (J.M. Buechler 1972).

Following Agrarian Reform, peasants continued to live in similar settlements. Those on ex-haciendas, however, were no longer under the power of landlords and, in some towns and villages, mestizo domination was diminished as peasants took on a greater role in village and town political and economic life. We now turn our attention to rural economic and political processes at the community level.
III. PRE-REFORM LAND DISTRIBUTION AND TENURE

For the total altiplano region, the area which encompasses the high plateau located in the three Departments of La Paz, Oruro and Potosí, haciendas occupied an estimated two-thirds of land by 1952 (Carter 1964). I am not aware of any estimates for the amount of land occupied by haciendas specifically in the Department of La Paz altiplano. Since this Department contains the most productive altiplano land, it is likely that the proportion of land controlled by haciendas was greater than two-thirds (Carter 1964). The size of these estates varied and, in some areas, were very large. J.M. Buechler (1972) cites hacienda size range as 335 to 9,408 hectares. However, the hacienda of Schweng's (1962) study was 10,800 hectares and Carter (1964) notes that one hacienda was reportedly 800,000 hectares. Most estates engaged in mixed farming, combining crop cultivation with livestock raising (J.M. Buechler 1972).

There were generally three types of lands within a hacienda; land produced solely for the landlord's benefit, which I refer to as the landlord's land, land utilized by the colonos, and land available for both landlord and colonos use. The latter type of land was frequently only suitable for livestock grazing (J.M. Buechler 1972) whereas the landlords' land was usually the most productive estate lands (Benton 1972). Colonos had access to three types of land; sayanas or houseplots, aynokas which were small plots scattered throughout the hacienda, and wastelands for grazing (Benton 1972; H.C. Buechler 1969). Colono
households had exclusive access to their sayana. Here they built their house and were free to make all decisions regarding cultivation and livestock raising. Since sayanas were usually passed on to all sons of the next generation, these plots were frequently fragmented and, in some cases, scattered into small plots. The amount of land allotted for sayanas varied between and within haciendas and plot size ranged from a few hundred square meters to a few dozen hectares (H.C. Buechler 1969).

Aynokas were colonos' individual plots within the large tracts of land cultivated on a rotational basis. The rotational cycle, that is, the crops grown and the fallow periods that followed, was determined by the hacienda administration. Land in fallow was generally used as communal grazing land. Wastelands were those unsuitable for crop cultivation and were used as communal grazing lands by colonos and landlords (H.C. Buechler 1969).

Colono land access was contingent upon the provision of labour obligations by colono household members. The amount of land received was determined by the number of days of labour provided to the landlord and this number varied among haciendas. In general, persona mayores, households with full colono status and with the largest land parcels and the greatest labour obligations, were required to provide three to sixteen labour days per week (J.M. Buechler 1972; Clark 1968 gives the figure of three to twelve days per week).

2 Sometimes colonos' sons and daughters inherited equal amounts of land. Usually daughters only received a few furrows in the family land plots (H.C. Buechler 1969).
Some haciendas, however, had higher labour obligations. For example, in Compi, the ex-hacienda studied by Buechler and Buechler (1971), full colono status required the provision of 24 labour days per week (also see J.M. Buechler 1972). Households with media personas status received less land and gave fewer days of labour per week to the landlord. In Compi, these households provided twelve labour days per week (J.M. Buechler 1972). Labour obligations were not the only requirements for usufruct rights. Colonos used their own tools and animals when engaged in activities for the sole benefit of the landlord. They were also expected to provide products from their own household production, such as eggs, cheese and lard, to the landlord (Clark 1968). Peasants without access to land also lived on estates. Their presence was arranged by colono households who provided landless peasants with food and lodging in return for labour on the household's usufruct plots or to fulfil colono labour obligations (H.C. Buechler 1969; Preston 1978).

Thus, prior to Agrarian Reform, land distribution within and between haciendas was not equal. The amount of land each colono household cultivated for its own needs was contingent on their labour obligations to the landlord and the amount of land available through inheritance. Common to all non-administrative hacienda residents was the economic and social restrictions placed on their activities. Colonos were limited in the type and quantity of goods they could exchange in local markets. In addition, they were forbidden to speak Spanish and to wear manufactured clothes. Failure to meet their obligations and to conform to the restrictions
met with fines, physical punishment and/or eviction (J.M. Buechler 1972; Clark 1968).

Although access to land in comunidades was not contingent on the fulfilment of labour obligations to a landlord, land tenure patterns in these communities paralleled those of haciendas. Rather than individual titles, title to the land was held by the comunidad as a collective group and household usufruct rights were based on membership status (H.C. Buechler 1969). Originarios, original members with a long family history of comunidad membership, had usufruct rights to the greatest amount of land. They also paid the full land tax to community authorities who collected the tax for the state. Agregados, members with a more recent family history of community membership, had access to one-half the amount of land of originarios and they paid one-half the amount of land tax (LaBarre 1948; Leonard 1952; Klein 1992; McBride 1921). Inheritance rights in comunidades were the same as those in haciendas. Consequently, plots were divided with each successive generation. Therefore, the inequalities in land distribution that existed in haciendas were also present in comunidades.

Absence of a landlord who appropriated the product of colono labour did not mean that comunidad members, known as comuneros, were not exploited. Comuneros were required to meet a number of obligations to local town and state political authorities. In addition to land taxes, comuneros provided unpaid labour for the building and maintenance of public works, such as roads and irrigation
ditches (Crandon-Malamud 1991; LaBarre 1948), and they performed personal services for local authorities (H.C. Buechler 1980; McBride 1921). Surplus product was appropriated from comuneros through their unequal trade relations with mestizo town dwellers (Preston 1978). Comuneros were also subject to abuses such as imprisonment and confiscation of livestock (Preston 1978). Production activities of comuneros were not confined to those oriented towards subsistence. Most comunidades were over-populated which, along with the need to obtain cash for the payment of taxes (Crandon-Malamud 1991), led comuneros to seek external income sources to supplement agricultural production (Buechler and Buechler 1971; Crandon-Malamud 1991). These activities included fishing; trade with the Yungas and the city of La Paz; working for peasants in the Yungas; employment in local mines; and temporary or permanent migration to urban centres for wage labour (Buechler and Buechler 1971).

The hacienda system in the Yungas differed somewhat from that in the altiplano. Although colonos were subject to labour obligations and landlord domination and abuse, the scarcity of labour and the abundance of land created different conditions. In order to attract labour, landlords usually provided land holdings large enough for cash crop production. In addition, labour obligations tended to be lower. According to Leons and Leons (1971), households with full colono status provided six days of labour per week. As this amount of labour was often inadequate, landlords employed migrant wage labour to supplement colono labour
(H.C. Buechler 1969; Heath 1969c; Leons and Leons 1971). Colonos also utilized migrant workers from the altiplano to cultivate their own plots or to fulfil their labour obligations to the landlord (Heyduk 1974; Leons 1967). Colonos in the Yungas were integrated into the cash economy to a greater extent than altiplano peasants. Able to produce cash crops for local and urban markets and to purchase goods in local markets, Yungas colono production activities on their usufruct plots were less oriented towards subsistence (Heyduk 1974; Leons 1967).

Peasants of the La Paz altiplano, whether colonos or comuneros, lived under similar conditions. In comunidades, hacienda labour duties were replaced by obligations to local and state political authorities. Although comuneros may have had a greater degree of direct control over their labour and the product of their labour, both colonos' and comuneros' surplus product was appropriated by the dominant mestizo group and both were subject to mestizo power and abuse. Conditions were similar for colonos in the Yungas. Their ability to produce cash crops for the market, however, meant that these peasants were more integrated into the local cash economy. Prerequisites for land access in haciendas differed from those in comunidades. Nonetheless, land distribution in haciendas paralleled indigenous land rights in comunidades, giving some households access to greater amounts of land than others.
IV. POST-REFORM ECONOMIC CHANGES

A. Land Tenure

In the last chapter I argued that peasants benefited very little from the Agrarian Reform in terms of increased land access. Here I explore the ways in which land was redistributed among landlords, colonos and comunidades, and how this redistribution altered the means through which the rural population accessed land.

The effects of the Agrarian Reform varied among the different regions of Bolivia. Landlords in some areas, for example the Department of Chuquisaca, retained large amounts of land that had been utilized solely for their benefit (Preston 1978). In the altiplano of La Paz, some landlords lost access to all their land whereas others maintained rights to all, or portions, of the land that had been worked for their benefit (Buechler and Buechler 1971; Carter 1964; Preston 1978). According to Carter (1971), the amount of land to which landlords received title ranged from 0-1000 hectares. Buechler and Buechler (1971) note that, in the region surrounding Lake Titicaca, landlords retained up to 80 hectares in addition to pasture land. As we have seen, lack of clarity in the Agrarian Reform Law regarding the amount of land that constituted small, medium and latifundia properties created loopholes that enabled landlords to manipulate Reform proceedings to their benefit. Since the Agrarian Reform considered land productivity when defining maximum property sizes, maximum holding sizes varied even within a geographic region of the Department of La Paz. For example, in the altiplano of this Department, the maximum
size for medium properties in the area influenced climatically by Lake Titicaca was 80 hectares, whereas the maximum size of those without this influence was 150 hectares (Carter 1964). Preston (1978), in his research report of La Paz altiplano peasant communities, argues that landlords used a variety of methods to maintain their lands including; dividing holdings among heirs so that properties were not considered latifundia, and claiming that they employed mechanized production methods so that their properties were considered capitalized enterprises.

Since the pre-Reform labour system was abolished, landlords had to pursue other methods to obtain labour when they did maintain their estates. The options available included wage labour and sharecropping. Wage labour was never successfully implemented in the La Paz altiplano (H.C. Buechler 1969), and sharecropping became the principal means by which landlord land was cultivated in this area (H.C. Buechler 1969; J.M. Buechler 1972; Graeff 1974; Pearse 1972b). Under sharecropping, ex-colonos received 50-70 percent of the product. Arrangements were made between either the landlord and individual ex-colonos or between the landlord and the ex-hacienda community as a whole. In the latter case, peasant unions usually mediated the terms of the contract (H.C. Buechler 1969).

Landlords also sold the land that had been worked exclusively for their benefit (Buechler 1969; Clark 1969; Graeff 1974; Preston 1978). In Preston's (1978) study of ten ex-haciendas in the Lake Titicaca region, landlord lands of eight ex-haciendas had been purchased by ex-colonos.
These land sales frequently occurred before Agrarian Reform proceedings were completed or initiated. Although the land sold may have been fully expropriated, sales were often perceived as beneficial by both colonos and landlords. For colonos, the purchase insured their claim to the land, whereas for landlords, the sale guaranteed financial compensation (Preston 1978). Landlords also gained from the sale because it was frequently the only method of realizing a cash income from the land. Peasant unions, which were strong in the La Paz altiplano, pressured landlords to stay away from the estates and they frequently mobilized ex-colonos to refuse to enter sharecropping agreements with estate owners (Clark 1969; Graeff 1974).

When landlord lands were expropriated or purchased by ex-colonos their future use was varied. The MNR government promoted the establishment of production cooperatives on these lands. However, cooperative organization implemented by the government ignored customary production relations and land use rights of Aymara peoples (H.C. Buechler 1969; J.M. Buechler 1972). Consequently, cooperatives were usually abandoned within the first few years of their formation (H.C. Buechler 1969). When cooperatives were not formed, or when they were dismantled, landlord lands were distributed among colonos. Since landless ex-hacienda members, including those who worked for colonos and the children of colonos, received rights to land, little land was available to increase the size of household land holdings in many ex-haciendas (H.C. Buechler 1969; Preston 1970).
As a result of both landlords maintaining access to lands utilized for their own benefit and the need to provide land to landless ex-hacienda members, the amount of land available for redistribution among La Paz altiplano colonos was limited. The situation for comunidades was no better. Although they were to receive land that had been previously expropriated from them, few, if any, comunidades gained access to greater amounts of land (H.C. Buechler 1969; Crandon-Malamud 1991; Preston 1978; Well et al. 1974). In the next section I examine how this lack of land for redistribution affected land parcel sizes within ex-haciendas and comunidades.

B. Peasant Landholdings

1. Land Parcel Size

Colonos received legal rights to the land they held in usufruct before Agrarian Reform. As a result, inequalities that existed prior to 1953 were perpetuated by the Reform (Carter 1964, 1971; Clark 1971; Crandon-Malamud 1991; Erasmus 1967; Graeff 1974; Heyduk 1974). The maximum amount of land the Agrarian Reform Law legally allotted to ex-colonos was based on the legally recognized size for small holdings. This parcel size, based on land productivity, varied according to region. In the Lake Titicaca area, the maximum size was ten hectares (Carter 1964). For other areas of the La Paz altiplano, maximum small plot sizes were as high as twenty (Carter 1964) and twenty-five (Preston 1978) hectares. Despite this maximum plot size, some households obtained rights to land that exceeded the allowed amount (Carter 1964; Preston 1978). Yet, for most
households, land access was less than the legal maximum and, in some cases, barely enough for subsistence production (Carter 1964; Crandon-Malamud 1991). Carter (1971) found peasant land parcels averaged ten hectares in size. In Burke's (1970) study of four ex-haciendas in the Lake Titicaca area, average land parcel size was six hectares. Burke (1970) also notes that, in another study of sixty ex-haciendas in the La Paz altiplano, average plot size was 7.13 hectares.

Average land size does not reflect the disparities in land holdings between households within communities and between communities. According to Carter (1971), peasant property sizes ranged from less than one hectare to greater than twenty-five hectares. In Preston's (1978) study of ten ex-haciendas in the Lake Titicaca area, the average amount of land per head in each community ranged from 3.5-10.8 hectares. Within these communities, the range of holding size was as varied as 0.5-10.0 hectares (Preston 1978). Carter (1964) found similar variations in his study of seven ex-haciendas in the La Paz altiplano where sayana holdings ranged from 0.3-43.62 hectares. Carter (1964) also maintains that, within any ex-hacienda, rich households had access to as much as five times the amount of land of poor households.

Unequal land distribution was also present in comunidades. Receiving no land benefits from the Reform, pre-Reform inequalities remained. Preston (1978) found, in his study of four comunidades in the Lake Titicaca region, average land allotments in comunidades ranged from 1.3-6.4
hectares per head. Within comunidades, the range of holdings was as large as 0.5-7.0 hectares.

As well as perpetuating inequalities, Agrarian Reform did not alter the fragmentation of holdings nor did it change the pre-Reform tenure system of sayanas and aynokas. When Agrarian Reform proceedings did try to consolidate peasant holdings or when aynoka lands were deemed to be communal lands by agrarian judges, ex-colonos continued their pre-Reform patterns of tenure (H.C. Buechler 1969; Carter 1964). In addition, when efforts were made by agrarian judges to equalize land parcels, the legal titles granted were frequently ignored as peasants continued to cultivate their pre-Reform usufruct lands (Clark 1969, 1971). This resistance to higher level directives indicates that Agrarian Reform implemented from above became transformed at the local level so that customary land tenure practices of the peasantry re-emerged as the predominant system of land allocation within ex-haciendas (Carter 1964; Clark 1969, 1971).

ii. Land Pressures

The small land allotments granted to most peasant households in the 1950s led to land pressures as the population increased with successive generations. Even at the time of the Agrarian Reform, population pressure on the land was high in some areas of the La Paz altiplano (J.M. Buechler 1972). Based on research conducted in the 1960s, writers (Buechler and Buechler 1971; Burke 1970, 1971a; Carter 1964, 1971) noted problems of land scarcity in
peasant communities of the La Paz altiplano. In the four ex-haciendas of Burke's (1970) Lake Titicaca area study, the population increased by 50-100 percent by the mid 1960s. Chua, one ex-hacienda in this region, was reported by Buechler and Buechler (1971:3) as "too crowded to accommodate the younger generation." Carter (1964:23) states that complaints of peasants in the La Paz altiplano "indicate land scarcity is already troubling them deeply." Increased population most likely led to even greater land pressures by the mid 1970s. Crandon-Malamud's (1991) mid 1970s study of Lake Titicaca area settlements supports this contention as she notes that the size of average land parcels had decreased since 1952.

Land pressures were exacerbated by the required rotational cycle used by peasant producers. Crops of the La Paz altiplano have long been cultivated according to a rotational cycle that allows a certain number of years of fallow time (Carter 1964; Leonard 1952; Preston 1978). In general, land was cultivated in crops for two to three years and then left to fallow, depending on soil fertility and land availability, for one to twenty-five years (Preston 1978; also see Carter 1964). Consequently, the amount of land actually utilized for crop production at any given time may only have been a fraction of a household's total land holdings. Carter (1964), in his study of La Paz altiplano communities, found that only 25-30 percent of total available land was cultivated. The majority of land was either wasteland, mountain pasture or in fallow. Increased population pressures on the land led to decreased fallow
times following the Agrarian Reform (Carter 1964) and the resultant decrease in soil fertility.

iii. Land Exchanges

Peasant households were not restricted to solely cultivating the land to which they had legal rights. Land within and outside the community could be accessed in a number of ways, including cash rent, sharecropping, and, in some instances, through purchase (Carter 1964; McEwen 1975; Preston 1978). Within communities, the most common lands for these exchanges were those of migrant families. Maintaining ties and access to land within their home communities, migrant families frequently rented land or made sharecropping arrangements with relatives or friends in the community (Buechler and Buechler 1971; Preston 1978). Although it is feasible that households with rights to large land parcels might have engaged in land exchanges, none of the studies I reviewed provided any information regarding this situation. Accessing land within a comunidad or ex-hacienda was not simply a matter of negotiating the exchange with the land owner. Land access was also contingent upon the fulfilment of community obligations such as attending community meetings, assuming political office, and participation in fiestas (H.C. Buechler 1980). Non-community land sources included landlord lands and land available from other communities. As I have already noted, landlords who maintained ownership of the lands previously cultivated for their own benefit frequently rented, sharecropped or sold these lands. Although these
arrangements were often made with the community as a collective group, they were also made with individual households.

In some instances, communities with excess land would rent their land to neighbouring communities. Preston (1978) gives the example of one ex-hacienda that had few households per hectare because the hacienda had been engaged in livestock production exclusively. Colonos, lacking the funds to raise livestock, found they were unable to fully utilize their land with their community resources and therefore rented it to a nearby community. Land sales within a community were rare. Preston (1978) argues that since land was a valued resource, those with excess were more likely to enter sharecropping agreements. Preston (1978:108) also points out that although individual land ownership was recognized in ex-haciendas and comunidades, "there is a feeling that in some way all the land does belong to the community as a whole."

Land exchanges, in addition to providing some households with the adequate means for their reproduction, may have enabled some households to extend their means of production thereby allowing them to engage in expanded reproduction. Preston (1978) notes that some town dwellers of peasant origin were able to access greater amounts of land through land exchanges. For example, one town dweller in Preston's (1978) study, was farming fifteen hectares in the early 1970s although he inherited less than one-half hectare. In addition to working the land himself, this individual employed others to cultivate the land for him.
iv. Yungas Landholdings

I have pointed out how pre-Reform land tenure in the Yungas differed from those in the La Paz altiplano. These differences remained following Agrarian Reform. Since land was abundant in this area, many colono households obtained legal rights to the maximum size of holdings for this region, which, according to Leons (1967), was ten hectares. When there was insufficient land on the ex-hacienda to equalize colono land holdings, the inequalities that existed prior to Agrarian Reform were perpetuated with the Reform (Leons 1967, 1970). Like altiplano landlords, landlords in the Yungas did maintain ownership to some of their lands. This situation appears to have occurred more frequently in the Yungas as many estates were classified as medium properties by expropriation proceedings. Lands that remained in landlord hands were usually sold to ex-colonos, sharecropped, or rented (H.C. Buechler 1969; Graeff 1974; Leons and Leons 1971; McEwen 1975).

v. Summary

In summary, the availability of land for redistribution under Agrarian Reform was limited. In addition, the disparities in colono holding size that existed prior to the Reform were not equalized with expropriation proceedings. As a result, some peasant households were able to maintain access to greater amounts of land than other households. Nonetheless, most peasant households received small land parcels. When combined with a rising population which exacerbated population pressures on the land, these small
plots provided a precarious reproduction base. Some households were able to expand their reproduction resources by obtaining access to land through community and non-community land tenure arrangements. As we shall see, others sought off-farm production activities to ensure their household reproduction.

C. Transformations In Production Activities

In the years following Agrarian Reform, some transformations took place in the production activities in which La Paz altiplano peasants engaged. The liberation of labour time from landlord obligations and the gain in control over farm products, as well as the increased presence of the cash economy in rural areas, opened the way for peasants' greater participation in Bolivia's national economy. In the following discussion I explore peasants' off-farm employment activities and the agricultural production techniques they utilized.

i. Off-Farm Production Activities

Population pressures on the land led to the need for many peasant households to seek off-farm employment to supplement their subsistence and/or market-oriented production (Crandon-Malamud 1991; McEwen 1975; Preston 1978). In one ex-hacienda in the Lake Titicaca region, approximately one-half of 48 households interviewed sought at least part-time work outside the community in the mid 1960s (Burke 1970). According to Burke (1970), earnings from their employment contributed as much as 25 percent to
total household earnings. In Compi, another ex-hacienda in the same region, 75 percent of the men had secondary employment in the mid 1960s (McEwen 1975). This employment, however, was not necessarily in the permanent wage labour sector of the national economy. As I argued in Chapter Two, the Bolivian economy was unable to absorb the increased supply of labour that occurred as a result of the demise of the latifundia system and the liberation of colono labour (Burke 1970; Crandon-Malamud 1991). Wage labour options for peasants were limited and they often relied on their own resources for employment. Rural and urban activities included; carpentry, masonry, tailoring, weaving, and the manufacture of products such as pottery and musical instruments (H.C. Buechler 1980; Buechler and Buechler 1971; McEwen 1975). Many of these activities were located in small-scale workshops or they formed part of a household's production activities. Trade of locally and non-locally produced goods was the most common source of off-farm income. I examine the development and operation of these marketing networks later in this chapter.

Migration, both temporary and permanent, was an important way in which off-farm employment was obtained. Temporary migrants frequently travelled to other agricultural zones, such as the Yungas and colonization areas, for seasonal work in agriculture (H.C. Buechler 1980; Leons and Leons 1971; Preston 1970). Many also migrated to urban centres for temporary work (Preston 1970). Migrants were typically away from their home communities for two to four months and many returned home in time to participate in
agriculture production (Preston 1970). Referring to migration to agricultural zones, Preston (1970) states it is difficult to estimate how much temporary migratory labour contributed to household income and suggests this labour may have been a slack period occupation which provided alternative food sources rather than income.

Permanent migration, especially to the city of La Paz, was not a new post-Revolutionary occurrence. Prior to the Revolution, land scarcity in comunidades and the harsh conditions in haciendas led some peasants to seek alternative livelihoods in urban centres (H.C. Buechler 1980; J.M. Buechler 1972; McEwen 1975). Yet, permanent migration, both pre- and post-Revolutionary, did not necessarily sever the ties between migrants and their rural home communities. Urban dwellers were an important resource for rural communities as they helped new migrants from their home community to establish themselves in the city. Rural communities were also important for migrants involved in trade as home communities were a source of marketable goods (H.C. Buechler 1980; Buechler and Buechler 1971; J.M. Buechler 1972). In order to maintain relations with their home community, migrants were required to participate in community activities. For example, migrants would participate in fiestas, and they would sponsor community projects (H.C. Buechler 1980; Preston 1978). The maintenance of land rights by permanent migrants was also contingent on their fulfilment of community obligations and participation in agricultural production (H.C. Buechler 1980; J.M. Buechler 1972). Thus, many permanent migrants,
like temporary migrants, continued to contribute to the reproduction of their rural community and many remained tied to the agricultural cycle.

II. Agricultural Production Activities

Altiplano peasants maintained the mixed farming of crop production and livestock raising that was prevalent before Agrarian Reform. Although in some areas, like the Lake Titicaca region, vegetable cash crop production was initiated, the major crops grown continued to be those of subsistence, for example, potatoes and quinoa (Buechler and Buechler 1971). The type of livestock raised also remained unchanged with sheep, cattle, camelids, chickens and guinea pigs constituting the most important animals. Immediately following the Reform, the number of animals in the altiplano decreased. This situation has been attributed to the sale of livestock by landlords and animal death from neglect (H.C. Buechler 1969; Burke 1971a). By the mid-sixties, however, livestock herds had been built up to their pre-Reform numbers (Burke 1971a). Whether or not peasant households had equal access to livestock is unclear. Preston (1978) found few households in the Lake Titicaca region had greater than two to three head of cattle. Carter (1964) found similar cattle distribution in four La Paz altiplano communities. Carter (1964) also argues that there was no great disparity in the number of sheep per household. Yet, 13-14 percent of the households in his study owned greater than 30 head of sheep whereas 34-36 percent had ten head of sheep or less. The number of sheep and cattle per
household may have declined after the mid-sixties because the availability of pasture land decreased with the increased intensity of crop production. In the Lake Titicaca area of Crandon-Malamud's (1991) study, most households had owned a cow or ox in the early 1950s. By 1977, few families owned these animals. Since cattle were important for ploughing, households without access to them returned to the footplow to cultivate their fields (Crandon-Malamud 1991).

In the last chapter I argued that most state and private investment in agriculture was directed towards the capitalized sector in the tropical lowlands. Lack of state support for peasant production is evident in the agricultural production techniques employed by the majority of La Paz altiplano peasants. Carter (1964) maintains that the techniques and methods utilized were largely unchanged from those of the sixteenth century. Households employed "simple tools" (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975:110) such as footplows and hand tools. The source of power was livestock, when available, and human labour. Seeds were saved from the harvest for next year's planting and animal dung remained the principal source of fertilizer. Purchased production factors were generally small items such as hand tools, plough tips, sickles and knives (Carter 1964; Preston 1978; Weil et al. 1974; Wennergren and Whitaker 1975).

Modern factors of production such as tractors, high yield seeds, and chemical fertilizers and pesticides were not absent from the La Paz altiplano. According to Preston (1978), in the early 1970s, some communities and/or
households did have access to these commodities through local and urban markets. Their high cost (Preston 1978; Wennergren and Whitaker 1975), however, likely limited their availability to most peasant households. Thus, as Carter (1964) argues, peasant producers of the La Paz altiplano relied largely on 'traditional' methods of agriculture production.

D. Labour Exchanges and Relations

Just as agricultural production resources and methods were 'traditional', so too was the labour employed in La Paz altiplano peasant production. Rather than wage labour, which was largely absent from peasant production (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975), most households relied on family labour for their farming activities. Household labour exchanges, mediated through communal institutions, also contributed to production. Ayni3, a reciprocal labour exchange whereby one household receives the labour of another with the obligation of returning the same amount of labour at a later date, was the most important labour relation between La Paz altiplano peasants (Buechler and Buechler 1971; Carter 1964; McEwen 1975). Although ayni occurred almost exclusively with members of a household's extended family (H.C. Buechler 1969; Carter 1964), help from outside the family was also occasionally enlisted (H.C. Buechler 1969).

3 Painter (1991) describes similar labour exchanges for Aymara speaking peasant communities located on the north shore of Lake Titicaca in Peru. In these communities, ayni and minka entailed the same type of labour exchanges found in La Paz altiplano peasant communities.
Cooperative labour relations between peasant households also occurred in relation to the land and other production resources. Waki was a mutual arrangement between a household with excess seed and a household with excess land. In this arrangement, both households cultivated and harvested the crop and the product was split equally (H.C. Buechler 1969; Carter 1964). Sattakha, described by Carter (1964) as a form of social security, was a cooperative agreement whereby the elderly had crops cultivated for them or where landless households gained access to land. In the former case, the older household provided the seed to real or fictive kin who cultivated and harvested the crop for the older household. In the latter case, the landless household helped cultivate and harvest the crop of another household in return for access to a few rows in the field (Carter 1964).

Minka is labour that is paid in kind or in cash (Carter 1964; H.C. Buechler 1969). Since this labour exchange does not involve any long-term commitment, many households, according to Carter (1964), preferred minka to ayni. Minka was able to establish ties between landless persons and those with land and was sometimes the principal means by which the former insured their survival (Carter 1964). Although Carter (1964) describes minka as salaried labour,  

waki exchanges differed in the Peruvian Aymara peasant communities of Painter's (1991) study. For these communities, waki entailed the exchange of labour for land and the harvest was to be split equally between the two parties involved. Painter (1991) does not indicate whether or not sattakha or similar types of exchanges occurred in the communities of his study.
households did offer their labour to another household in order to obtain seed or products they were unable to cultivate in their own fields (Carter 1964; Preston 1978). Preston (1978) notes that peasants with insufficient cash funds to purchase new high yield potato seeds would use minka arrangements to obtain this production resource. Thus, although minka may have taken on the attributes of paid labour in some situations, in others it may have been beneficial to both parties (Graeff 1974).

Wage labour was more important in the Yungas than in the La Paz altiplano. Temporary migrants from the altiplano and landless people who resided in the Yungas were the majority of wage labourers in this region (H.C. Buechler 1969; Leons and Leons 1971). According to H.C. Buechler (1969), the abundance of land and the high returns from cash crops created the conditions for wage labour because both factors meant that sharecropping was less profitable than hiring wage labourers. Leons and Leons (1971) also note that Yungas peasants preferred hiring wage labourers as they perceived the relation as more reliable than ayni exchanges. In addition, there were no obligations to return labour when wages were paid (Leons and Leons 1971). Ayni, however, did remain an important labour exchange between households in the Yungas (H.C. Buechler 1969; Leons and Leons 1971). Since ayni required no cash outlay, it was an indispensable source of labour for households with limited cash resources. Wealthy peasants also used ayni exchanges because of community social pressures to engage in their traditional labour relations (Leons and Leons 1971). Therefore, most
households in the Yungas used a combination of wage labour and ayni to meet their outside labour needs.

Kin relations were also important in peasant household reproduction. Peasants who wished to migrate often relied on their kin ties with urban dwellers to obtain jobs as labourers or factory workers. For those involved in trade, kin relations were important in developing and maintaining a network of customers and suppliers of goods (J.M. Buechler 1972). Compadrazco, a fictive kin tie that establishes bonds between two couples and their children, was also important for household reproduction. This fictive kin relation entails reciprocal obligations between the two families involved and the ties created can be unequal or equal (J.M. Buechler 1972). In the former case, a poorer household enters a compadrazco relation with a wealthier family or one in a position of power in order to access resources the household would otherwise be unable to obtain. The poorer household encounters costs in this unequal tie because the wealthier household is in a position to exploit their labour and/or appropriate the products of their labour. Compadrazco can also be established between families of equal wealth and power. This relation of equality can form the basis for mutual aid between households and foster group solidarity (Carter 1964). Crandon-Malamud (1991) argues these symmetrical compadrazco ties, because they enabled peasant households to pool their resources, became more important as rural economic conditions declined in the years following the Revolution. Asymmetrical ties, however, were still important for
households with upwardly mobile goals (Crandon-Malamud 1991).

In summary, La Paz altiplano peasants expanded their production activities in the post-Reform years to include some wage labour and the small-scale manufacture of products. This situation was the outcome of a number of factors including the liberation of colono labour time from landlord control and the limited land access that restricted the agricultural production base of many peasant households. Rather than selling their labour power as a commodity in the Bolivian national economy, however, many peasants relied on their own resources to insure their household reproduction. Agriculture remained an important factor in this reproduction and even individuals and families who had permanently migrated from rural communities continued to participate in the activities associated with their home community's survival. 'Traditional' methods and relations of production remained a predominant feature in community and household reproduction activities. Agricultural production resources were available through non-commodified means and labour was frequently utilized in a non-wage form. Many households relied on kin relations, both real and fictive, and non-commodified labour relations to access necessary resources for their survival. Nonetheless, altiplano peasants did not maintain their households and communities outside the cash economy. Peasant producers became important participants in rural and urban marketing systems. The following section explores the way in which peasants participated in these markets and examines the
degree to which cash became a factor in peasant household economies.

E. Marketing Networks

Prior to the Revolution, there was a dual marketing system for the trade of agricultural products in the Department of La Paz. Peasants were essentially excluded from the markets that were based on large transactions. Dominated by landlords, these markets involved the sale of goods to large urban centres and the mines. A more subsistence-oriented trade occurred between peasants and between peasants and mestizo middlemen at the weekly and annual fairs that took place throughout the rural areas (Buechler and Buechler 1971; Clark 1968). At these markets, peasants bartered or sold small amounts of their surplus goods in order to obtain needed household items they were unable to produce themselves (Buechler and Buechler 1971; J.M. Buechler 1972; Clark 1968). Items traded included manufactured goods such as cloth, pots and knives, and products from different geographical zones of the Department. Individuals involved in the marketing of these items frequently engaged in trade routes that connected them with different regions (J.M. Buechler 1972). J.M. Buechler (1972) gives the example of two men from two comunidades located near Lake Titicaca. Their routes carried them from their altiplano communities to the city of La Paz and on to the Yungas. The main product of their trade was coca which they purchased in the Yungas and sold in the city and at rural fairs. Other trade connections among peasants
involved ties between peasants who had migrated to La Paz in order to engage in city marketing activities and peasants who remained in their home communities producing goods for these traders. When the landlord marketing system was dismantled with the Agrarian Reform, these connections among peasants and mestizo middlemen, as well as the rural fairs in which they traded, were developed in the re-creation of a new marketing system.

1. Rural Fairs

The number of rural fairs increased in the post-Revolutionary period. By the end of the 1960s, an average of sixteen fairs were held on each day of the week in the Department of La Paz (Buechler and Buechler 1971; also see J.M. Buechler 1972). In addition to weekly fairs, goods were traded at annual fairs and fairs associated with a community's patron saint feast day (J.M. Buechler 1972). These local fairs were the main outlet for the sale of peasants' surplus products (Preston 1978; Wennergren and Whitaker 1975) and, for the altiplano as a whole, accounted for seventy percent of all marketing (Wennergren and Whitaker 1975). New fairs generally started small and often began as a roadside meeting place between peasants wishing to sell their products and one or two trucks carrying buyers from La Paz (Preston 1978). Regular, weekly fairs emerged from these meeting places through the organizational efforts of peasants, peasant unions and middlemen (Clark 1963, 1971). Knowledge of a new fair was frequently spread by vendors at the other markets they attended. New fairs were
also advertised on the Aymara radio station (J.M. Buechler 1972). By 1966, most fairs visited by Clark (1968) in his La Paz altiplano study had an average of five to nine trucks in attendance. Some, however, had as many as 150 trucks participating in the fair. J.M. Buechler (1972), in her study of markets in the same area, also noted considerable variation in the number of vendors with 41 in a recently established market and 1,454 in a 30 year old fair.

There were numerous reasons for establishing new fairs. First, the collapse of the landlord marketing network created a void in the flow of agriculture products to cities that new markets filled (Clark 1968). Second, an established market facilitated a community's ability to access other resources, such as a school, from the state (Clark 1968). Finally, new markets, when founded by peasants, frequently provided more favourable conditions for vendors of peasant products. Rural fairs were regulated by local town authorities who established rules regarding market activities and who charged vendors a fee for their stall in the market (J.M. Buechler 1972; Preston 1978). Fairs established before Agrarian Reform were usually controlled by mestizo town dwellers who often overcharged peasant vendors and/or inflicted fines and other abuses on these vendors (J.M. Buechler 1972). New markets were frequently controlled by peasants who instituted regulations and fees to meet the needs of their community members (J.M. Buechler 1972; Crandon-Malamud 1991; Preston 1978). A fair's reputation regarding vendor regulations and the authorities organizing the market were an important factor
in a fair's success or failure (J.M. Buechler 1972). J.M. Buechler (1972) notes how one new fair was able to replace a pre-Reform market because the latter fell into disrepute as a result of the abuses practised by authorities.

Participants in rural fairs included peasant producers from the local area and more distant communities, peasant merchants, mestizo merchants and mestizo town dwellers. In new markets, peasant producers were the most numerous participants (Preston 1978). They attended fairs to sell the products they produced and to buy needed household items. People who purchased their goods included merchants, who bought locally produced goods and sold manufactured items and products from other regions, and other peasant producers. The basis of exchange was both barter and cash (J.M. Buechler 1972; Preston 1978). Buyers came from local and neighbouring communities, rural communities of greater distance, and urban centres (J.M. Buechler 1972; Preston 1978). Factors that influenced the origin of merchants included the fair's distance from La Paz; the level of cash income in the area the fair served; the availability of cash crops at the fair; and the trading history of the community where the fair was held. J.M. Buechler (1972) found a higher percentage of La Paz-based merchants in markets close to La Paz, in areas with a high level of cash income and at fairs where a major cash crop was available. Markets located near a community with a long history of trading activities were more likely to have the community's rural merchants as middlemen in the market (J.M. Buechler 1972).
For many merchants, a rural fair was just one point on a trading route that covered different regions and the city of La Paz. For example, pre-Reform routes that connected the La Paz altiplano with the Yungas and La Paz city continued as traders from the altiplano sold altiplano products in the Yungas and returned to highland fairs with tropical products cultivated in these valleys. La Paz city was a connection point where products from both regions were sold (H.C. Buechler 1969; J.M. Buechler 1972). La Paz-based merchants also attended markets to buy altiplano products which they sold either directly to city customers or to city vendors (J.M. Buechler 1972). These merchants were often rural migrants who relied on kinship ties in their home community for many of their trade connections (H.C. Buechler 1980; J.M. Buechler 1972). Mestizo town dwellers participated in rural fairs, especially those operated by mestizo authorities, as retailers in shops. During market day, many carried on their retail trade in market stalls (Preston 1978).

ii. Trade Relations

Peasants could be exploited in rural fairs through unequal terms of trade with middlemen. This situation existed in the Yungas where middlemen paid less than the real value for peasant products by manipulating the weight of the unit of exchange used for agriculture products (Heath 1971; McEwen 1975). Yungas peasants also became tied to middlemen as the latter would extend credit to peasants, during the off season, for the purchase of production inputs.
and household needs (Heath 1971; Leons and Leons 1971; McEwen 1975). Whether similar relations of inequality existed between peasant producers in the La Paz altiplano and middlemen is an issue rarely discussed by researchers of this region. Both Crandon-Malamud (1991) and Preston (1970) argue that rural mestizo shopkeepers entered into exploitative relations with local peasant producers. Shopkeepers, utilizing barter, obtained peasant products at low cost which they then sold at a high profit (Preston 1970). Asymmetrical compadrazgo ties with peasants also benefitted shopkeepers. In addition to dealing exclusively with their compadre shopkeeper, peasants would offer gifts from their fields such as potatoes and quinoa (Crandon-Malamud 1991). The majority of peasant trade, however, occurred in local fairs (Preston 1978). Preston (1978) argues that the trade relations between middlemen and peasant producers in these local fairs were symbiotic rather than exploitative. He argues that both parties offered needed goods and services and, unlike the case for shopkeepers, the negotiations engaged in were fair.

Two main factors may be related to the differences in trade relations experienced by La Paz altiplano peasants and peasants in the Yungas—the availability of alternative ways of selling products and the level of integration into the cash economy. As I have already noted, population pressures on the land were higher in the La Paz altiplano than in the Yungas. Most peasant producers in the Yungas had access to enough land to ensure household reproduction without turning to off-farm employment. By contrast,
limited access to land for La Paz altiplano peasants required that they seek supplemental and/or alternative means of reproducing the household. Participation in the trade of goods became a primary activity in which these households engaged. Household members, especially women, frequently migrated to the city, both temporarily and permanently, to sell products from their home community (J.M. Buechler 1972). Even members that remained in the rural community would visit La Paz on a regular basis to sell their products (J.M. Buechler 1972; Clark 1968; Preston 1978). Peasants travelling to the city would also act as middlemen for community members not wishing to make the journey (J.M. Buechler 1972). In some communities (for example, Compi, which is located close to Lake Titicaca) peasant unions negotiated with La Paz city officials for a vending site in the city weekend market. Here, community members could sell their products without having to arrange their own market stall (J.M. Buechler 1972, McEwen 1975). When in La Paz, peasants would stay with relatives or friends who had migrated from the home community (J.M. Buechler 1972; McEwen 1975; Preston 1978). In addition to selling their products in the city, La Paz altiplano peasants had a range of rural markets from which to choose and would sell their products at more than one weekly rural fair. According to Clark (1968), most peasants participated in two to three weekly fairs and some as many as five.

Thus, whereas Yungas peasants relied on middlemen as the only outlet for their product, peasants of the La Paz altiplano, by necessity, became involved in the trade of the
products from their own household production. Even when middlemen were involved in the trade of goods, they were often kin or friends who, having important ties to the community, most likely had a vested interest in the reproduction of the community as a whole. In addition, the variety of outlets for the trade of household products may have decreased the power of middlemen to set unequal terms of trade.

III. Degree of Reliance on the Cash Economy

The level of participation in the cash economy was another difference between Yungas peasants and the peasants of the La Paz altiplano. As I have already noted, peasants in the Yungas were engaged in cash crop production before the Revolution and this type of production continued after Agrarian Reform. Coffee and coca, the two main cash crops produced in the Yungas, had a high market value. The cultivation of both crops requires the investment of many years because the plants take time to produce the first harvest and, once established, will produce for many years. Consequently, producers are less likely to switch to alternative crops once they are involved in coffee and/or coca cultivation. High income yields and the investment of time involved in production, coupled with the availability of household items in local markets, made cash crop, rather than subsistence, production a likely choice for Yungas peasants.

Although peasants became more integrated into the cash economy in the years following Agrarian Reform, evidence
suggests that non-commodified factors of household reproduction persisted despite the increased flow of cash goods. One of the major changes brought by the Revolution and Agrarian Reform was the expansion of the cash economy into peasant areas like that of the La Paz altiplano. Peasants not only increased the volume of goods they sold in the market, the amount of cash goods they purchased also rose. Although the La Paz altiplano is best suited for the cultivation of staple or subsistence crops such as potatoes and quinoa, areas close to Lake Titicaca are also capable of growing some vegetable cash crops like onions. Some communities, for example Compi, did orient some of their production towards this type of cultivation (Buechler and Buechler 1971; McEwen 1975). Cash crop production and the sale of other agricultural and household products, coupled with the income from off-farm employment, increased the flow of cash in peasant households and communities. The availability of manufactured and imported goods at local markets and the presence of these goods in peasant communities (Buechler and Buechler 1971; J.M. Buechler 1972; Clark 1968, 1971) are evidence of households' greater participation in the cash economy. Radios, bicycles, sewing machines, metal roofing, manufactured clothing, bread, noodles, sugar, coffee and other processed foods were all reported as common goods in the La Paz altiplano during the 1960s (J.M. Buechler 1972; Clark 1968, 1971). Clark (1968) estimates that, for a family of five, cash purchases in the early 1960s were greater than four times those in 1952. Barter, however, was still an important aspect of peasants'
household economy (Clark 1968, 1971) and peasants continued to barter small quantities of agricultural products for "other daily consumption items" (Clark 1971:150; also see J.M. Buechler 1972; Preston 1978). Carter (1964) found, in his early 1960s study of La Paz altiplano communities, foods purchased with cash accounted for a small proportion of households' total food supply. J.M. Buechler (1972) gives an example of women traders from communities whose production activities were largely herding. These women exchanged handfuls of llama wool for handfuls of barley, potatoes and onions at rural fairs.

Based on research conducted in the early 1960s, Clark (1968, 1971) states that barter was less frequent than before the Revolution. However, deterioration in the rural economy in the late 1960s and early 1970s may have led to an increase in the reliance on barter for access to needed household items. Crandon-Malamud (1991:74), referring to conditions in the mid 1970s in the Lake Titicaca area, argues that vagaries in the Bolivian economy and the scarcity of cash made barter a "blessing in recent years". Although commercially produced foods were available in the shops of the town of Crandon-Malamud's (1991) study, peasants stayed with potatoes, quinoa, barley and other 'traditional' foods because they could be obtained outside the cash economy. According to Crandon-Malamud (1991:88), barter exchange provided peasants the "flexibility to withstand the constrictions and convulsions of the national economy".
Food was not the only factor of household reproduction that could be obtained outside the cash economy. I have already noted that labour and other agriculture inputs were often non-commodified. Households relied on the non-wage labour of its members and the labour accessed through ayni and minka. Seeds were obtained from the previous harvest and livestock provided fertilizer in the form of manure. Even newly introduced production inputs, for example high yielding seeds, could be exchanged for labour rather than cash (Preston 1978). As Wennegren and Whitaker (1975:127) note, "most of the factors of production used in Bolivian agriculture are not traded in formal markets".

This is not to argue that La Paz altiplano peasant producers were uninfluenced by conditions of the broader national economy. Although their production was oriented towards subsistence, peasants did sell their products. Consequently, the crops they cultivated and the prices they obtained were influenced by the market (Preston 1978). I maintain, however, that La Paz altiplano peasant producers could access many resources through non-commodified relations. These relations and other non-commodified production factors offered some protection from commodity market and national economic forces and, therefore, helped to ensure the reproduction of households and communities as a whole.

iv. Summary

Peasant households of the La Paz altiplano were significant participants in the recreation of marketing
networks that transferred agriculture products in the Department of La Paz. Although markets can be a site of exploitation as peasants may enter unequal exchange relations with middlemen, the options available to La Paz altiplano peasants for the sale of their products may have decreased the ability of merchants to enforce unequal terms of trade. In addition, peasant households were actively involved in the organization and regulation of markets and in the trade of goods. The outcome was a rural marketing system that may have been more oriented to the needs of the indigenous peasantry. The expansion of rural markets did facilitate peasants' increased involvement in the cash economy. Yet, non-cash trade exchanges did not disappear and this barter provided an essential basis of trade for households with limited cash resources.

Barter was not the only non-commodified element in rural markets. Buyers and sellers relied on real and fictive kin ties for the source and outlet of their products and connections between rural communities and migrant urban dwellers facilitated the flow of goods. Thus, just as production activities entailed a mix of commodified and non-commodified factors of production, market relations involved both commodified and non-commodified elements. Given the unpredictability of the Bolivian economy discussed in Chapter Two, it was these non-commodified resources and relations that ensured the reproduction of many peasant households. Since these resources and relations were mediated through communal institutions, such institutions may have become a focal point through which political
concerns were expressed. In the next chapter I examine the local organizations and political processes at the regional and national level to set the final stage for my analysis in Chapter Five of the processes which led to the collective action of La Paz altiplano peasants.
CHAPTER FOUR
PEASANT POLITICS AT THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL

I. INTRODUCTION

Chapter Three examined the ways in which macro level economic processes materialized at the micro level. I argued that, as a result of limited resources for household agricultural production and the inability of the Bolivian economy to offer sufficient opportunities for wage labour, peasants in the La Paz altiplano created their own off-farm production activities to ensure their household reproduction. These activities, in particular the trade of agricultural and non-agricultural goods, as well as the cultivation of crops for subsistence and the market, established the means through which La Paz altiplano peasants participated in national economic structures. I have maintained, therefore, that, although marginalized by national economic processes, La Paz altiplano peasants became more integrated into national economic life during the post-Revolutionary years.

Participation in the national economy was not the only means through which the peasantry became more involved in national structural processes. Bolivian peasants also became active participants in national political life. In this chapter I explore the ways in which peasants were integrated into national political structures. I demonstrate that rural unions, established by the MNR immediately following the Revolution, enabled peasants to enter into national political processes. The chapter begins with an examination of peasant political structures at the
macro level. This exploration is followed by an investigation of community level union organization, structure and functions.

II. PEASANTS AND NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESSES

Immediately following the Revolution, agents of the MNR, which included representatives of labour unions and other political parties aligned with the MNR, were sent to the countryside to organize peasants into local unions for the purpose of abolishing pre-Revolutionary landlord-tenant relations (Carter 1971; Clark 1971; Heath 1969a; Lord 1967). This peasant unionization was not the first time Bolivian peasants were collectively organized. Rural indigenous peoples of Bolivia have a long history of collective resistance, evident in both localized revolts and large scale rebellions such as those that were led by Tupac Katari in 1781 and Willka Zarate in 1899 (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987).

In the fifty years prior to the Revolution, numerous localized revolts occurred in the highlands as comunidades tried to protect their lands and colonos protested their conditions of servitude (Dandler-Manhart 1971; Dandler and Torrico 1987; McBride 1921; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Although peasant demands can be viewed as limited in scope because they focused on local issues of land access and/or labour obligations (Dunkerley 1984), efforts were made to organize at a national level. National Congresses of Quechua Speaking Indians were held in 1942 and 1943. Issues of land and labour obligations were the features of the
first Congress. The objectives of the second were to organize sit-down strikes among hacienda colonos and to seek agreements with urban workers (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Although both Congresses were influenced by left political parties and labour organizations, Rivera Cusicanqui (1987) argues that indigenous leaders established their own links with labour unions during this time.

In 1945, wider connections among the peasantry, and with labour, were made with the First National Indigenous Congress. Prior to the Congress, indigenous organizers were able to forge a network of contacts with local hacienda and comunidad peasant leaders and to develop ties with other labour organizations (Dandler and Torrico 1987). This Congress also brought the first government recognition of indigenous rights. Held under the auspices of the Villarroel government, one outcome of the Congress was a government decree that abolished colono personal services for the landlord and established regulations concerning landlord and colono obligations and rights (Dandler and Torrico 1987). Landlords, however, refused to recognize the decree, which, along with Villarroel's overthrow in 1946, led to a greater intensity of rural unrest which took the form of both strikes and land seizures (Dandler-Hanhart 1971; Dandler and Torrico 1987; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Thus, it appears that peasants were beginning to organize prior to the efforts of the MNR. Although this pre-Revolutionary collective action was influenced by political parties of the left and labour unions, it was not a mobilization imposed from outside. Peasants and their
leaders were not under the full control of non-peasant organizations. This independence, however, changed with the Revolution.

One of the main motives behind the MNR's organization of peasant unions was the potential political power in the countryside. Peasants became an important source of political support with the granting of universal suffrage. The rural union structure, connected to the MNR government, established paths through which political support and favours could be channelled (Dandler-Hanhart 1971; Powelson and Stock 1987; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). In addition, government instituted unions gave the MNR some control over the peasant unions (Powelson and Stock 1987).

Peasant unions were organized into a pyramid type structure. At the local level, each hacienda or comunidade was the base for a community union. These unions were grouped together at the county, or canton, level and the organization was known as the sub-central. County units were combined at the provincial level into the central provincial and these latter units were joined in the Departmental Federation of Campesino Workers. These Federations were united at the national level in the body known as the National Confederation of Bolivian Campesino Workers (CNTCB) (Lord 1967). Although the CNTCB was

1 Essentially all hacienda colonos were organized into unions. Comunidades, on the other hand, were rarely organized into unions and they relied on their already established local political organizations to deal with the state. These local political issues are discussed later in this chapter.
officially affiliated with the COB (Bolivian Workers Central, discussed in Chapter Two), peasants had little influence in this organization because the COB was dominated by industrial labour unions and these labour concerns overshadowed those of the peasantry. Issues important to peasants were generally channelled through the Ministry of Campesino Affairs which was created by the MNR government (Lord 1967).

The original function of local unions was to obtain land for colonos. Therefore, it was local peasant unions that usually initiated land expropriation procedures with the National Agrarian Reform Service (Heath 1969a; Lord 1967). In some ex-haciendas, the importance of the union declined once land titles were secured. For many communities, however, unions took the form of local government and became the vehicle through which communities voiced their concerns to the state and obtained access to resources such as schools and public works projects (Clark 1971; Graeff 1974; Heyduk 1974; Powelson and Stock 1987; Weil et al. 1974).

The MNR used the distribution of land and the provision of community services to create patron-client ties between the government and the peasantry. In return for peasant leaders' pledges of support, communities frequently received government backing for local projects and services, particularly education. This system of political favours generated a dependency relation between peasants and the government whereby communities came to rely on the
government for services such as schools and other community projects (Albo 1987).

Patron-client ties also set up the conditions for the emergence of caudillos, or 'strongmen', within the peasant union structure. Leaders at different levels in the peasant political hierarchy, by accumulating a following from below, would receive benefits from above. In some areas of the highlands, this dispensing of political favours, coupled with the factionalism present within the MNR government, led to factional struggles between different leaders and their followings. Strong caudillos emerged in some areas of the Departments of Cochabamba and La Paz and these districts became centres of regional struggle (Dandler-Hanhart 1971; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987).

However, even with this factionalism, the MNR was able to coopt the peasantry to support its Revolutionary goals. In addition to the provision of land rights and community services, the MNR granted civilian status to indigenous peoples, deemed non-citizens before the Revolution. Universal suffrage and the official replacement of the pejorative term 'indio' with 'campesino' promoted the concept that the indigenous peasantry were free and equal citizens. These measures created an image of the MNR as a "benevolent superior" (Albo 1987:385) and enabled the government to mobilize peasants for political rallies, demonstrations, and, when mining unions began to contest MNR policies, the repression of labour struggles (Lord 1967).

Barrrientos continued this hold on the peasantry through the provision of small gifts, assignment of loyal peasants
to subordinate government posts, and through his settlement of the peasant dispute in Cochabamba. The peasant-government alliance was consolidated in 1966 with the formation of the Peasant-Military Pact which aligned peasants with the military. Like the MNR, Barrientos utilized this affiliation to quell industrial labour struggles (Albo 1987; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Albo (1987) argues that the outcome of these patron-client ties between the peasantry and the Barrientos regime was the subordination of peasant interests to those of the Barrientos government. Rather than a balanced two-way communication system that enabled peasants to articulate their concerns to the state, unbalanced channels emerged that primarily directed state prerogatives to peasants (Albo 1987). Yet, the government's hold on the peasantry was never complete. The unquestioned peasant support Barrientos sought for his regime and the Peasant-Military Pact was only predominant in the Department of Cochabamba. Patron-client ties between peasants and the state were not as entrenched in other highland areas (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). In addition, as Dunkerley (1984:133) suggests, the fact that the system of clientelism had to be imposed from above and that it delivered few benefits to most rural peoples "signalled a structural weakness" that became critical in later years.

The first major official break between peasants and the state occurred with the formation of the Independent Peasant Block (BCI) in 1969. In December 1968, Barrientos attempted to impose a land tax on peasants. Although protests to this
tax occurred everywhere, the strongest voice of dissent emerged from the Departments of La Paz and Oruro. The tax became an issue around which former peasant leaders, who had been displaced by the Barrientos or previous governments, mobilized; the outcome was the establishment of the BCI (Albo 1987; Clark 1971). As a voice that challenged the government, the BCI was clearly independent of the government and it was, therefore, able to align itself with the COB and several parties of the political left. By promoting their organization in the press and on the radio, the BCI did become known among the peasantry. Nonetheless, the BCI's relationship with the peasant population never became strong. Few BCI leaders maintained links with the rank and file peasantry. Consequently, rather than becoming an effective instrument to articulate peasant concerns, the BCI became the COB's and political left's peasant voice (Albo 1987; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987).

The final break between the peasantry and the state occurred in 1974 when Banzer used the military to violently repress a peasant protest in the Department of Cochabamba. About 20,000 peasants in the Cochabamba Valley had formed roadblocks in order to publicly contest the reduction of state subsidies on a number of basic goods, such as sugar, coffee, rice and flour; an action which had resulted in dramatic increases in the price of these products (Dunkerley 1984; also see Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Rather than complying with the protesters' request that he meet with them personally, Banzer ordered a military attack that included the "use of fighter aircraft" and the "automatic
weapons of ... armoured vehicles" (Dunkerley 1984:212). The number of deaths in this incident, which became known as the 'Massacre of the Valley', was estimated at 80 to 200 people, none of which included military personnel (Dunkerley 1984; also see Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Although the outcome of this massacre did not include a change in government policies, the Peasant-Military Pact lost all credibility with Cochabamba peasants - the last peasant stronghold supporting the state (Dunkerley 1984).

Prior to the 1974 repression of Cochabamba peasant collective action, La Paz altiplano peasants had begun to organize at the grassroots level - an action that separated this mobilization from both state and BCI control. During the early 1970s, groups organized around an indigenous identity began to emerge in urban and rural areas of the Department of La Paz. These groups were concerned about the discrimination and exploitation indigenous peoples experienced in national Bolivian society and they promoted the value of indigenous culture and history. In rural areas, problems indigenous peasants faced as a class of agricultural labourers also constituted some of the issues these groups mobilized around. By the mid 1970s, these groups organized to form a political party, known as MINK'A, which articulated the concerns of La Paz altiplano peasants. In the late 1970s, debates occurred within MINK'A over the degree of emphasis to be placed on issues of ethnic identity and issues related to class. The outcome was the
establishment of two political parties; MITKA, which focused on indigenous identity and MRTK which centred on concerns related to both ethnicity and class. The MRTK eventually resulted in the formation of the Unified Sindical Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia (CSUTCB) which became a member of the COB and, during the 1980s, the strongest peasant organization in Bolivia (Albo 1987; Dunkerley 1984; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). According to Albo (1987) and Rivera Cusicanqui (1987), the CSUTCB's focus on issues related to both class and indigenous identity, as well as its roots in the rank and file peasantry, enabled this organization to truly represent the voice of the peasantry. In summary, prior to the Revolution, Bolivian peasants were beginning to organize to protest their conditions of servitude. In addition, they began to make connections with labour organizations and parties of the political left. The Revolution brought a greater degree of formal national organization for the peasantry and official channels were created that connected community political structures to the state. This organization, however, was imposed from above which, combined with the dispensing of political favours and community resources and services, led to the development of patron-client ties between the MNR government and local peasant unions. The MNR therefore coopted the peasantry to support its program of capitalist development and to participate in the repression of labour

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2 MITKA never developed the large following among the peasantry that the MRTK and the CSUTCB established (Dunkerley 1984; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987).
struggles - actions that severed peasants' ties with labour. Although Barrientos entrenched the peasant-state alignment with the establishment of the Peasant-Military Pact, he did not receive unquestioned support from peasant communities in the Department of La Paz. During the 1960s and 1970s, government policies that effected the living conditions of peasants, formulated by both the Barrientos and Banzer regimes, led to growing peasant opposition to the state. The final split between the peasantry and the state came with the violent repression, in 1974, of the Cochabamba peasant protest.

During the early 1970s, peasants in the La Paz altiplano, experiencing discrimination and exploitation on the basis of their indigenous origins, began to mobilize around their ethnic identity. This mobilization was the precursor to the establishment of the CSUTCB, an independent, grassroots, peasant organization that articulated concerns about class and ethnic exploitation and discrimination of the La Paz altiplano peasantry. I now turn my attention to the local level political processes that influenced this grassroots mobilization.

III. LOCAL LEVEL POLITICS

In Chapter Three I argued that 'traditional' methods and relations of production were re-created by La Paz altiplano peasants in the post-Revolutionary years. As we shall see, economic processes were not the only indigenous institutions that these peasants continued to utilize. Although community unions were organized from above I argue
that 'traditional' indigenous political processes influenced the way in which unions materialized at the local level.

Before I explore post-Revolutionary local level politics a discussion of pre-Revolutionary local political structures is required. Comunidade and hacienda political structures, like land tenure, paralleled one another. The head of each comunidade was known as the jilikata. This position was responsible for many aspects related to the community's reproduction, including organizing the agriculture cycle, collecting taxes, distributing land to households, and settling disputes between households (LaBarre 1948; Leonard 1952; McBride 1921). According to McBride (1921), jilikatas were appointed by local village and town authorities. Other researchers (Leonard 1952; McEwen 1975), however, note that the jilikata was the top position in the hierarchy of posts tied to the religious-political festival cycle. Fulfilment of this position was therefore a communal obligation of all married males within the comunidade and election to the post required the mutual consent of all comunidade members. Other political posts, like the jilikata, were responsible for activities associated with the reproduction of the community. For example, alcades de campo regulated the cultivation of the fields, distributed irrigation water and performed activities to insure crop protection (McBride 1921).

Although the political structure in haciendas did not differ greatly from that in comunidades, the duties of the positions were transformed to meet the needs of the landlord rather than the colono community. In many haciendas, the
political posts remained tied to the religious-political festival cycle and colonos were elected to the posts by colono members. However, jilikatas in some haciendas, especially in the years just prior to the Revolution, were appointed by the landlord or hacienda administrator (Benton 1972; McEwen 1975; also see Leonard 1952). Jilikatas aided the administrator and their duties entailed the direct supervision of colonos in the fields (H.C. Buechler 1969; Leonard 1952). Relations between jilikatas and colonos were therefore ambivalent. Although colonos respected the jilikata as the top figure of their organization they often perceived this person as siding with the landlord (H.C. Buechler 1969; Leons 1970; McEwen 1975). According to H.C. Buechler (1969:202), the jilikata was "often less a leader of his people than an instrument of the patron to make them [colonos] work". Other political posts in the hacienda were related to agriculture production. Alcades, the position just below the jilikata in the hierarchy, helped the jilikata. Campos were involved in the rotation of crop cultivation and in the protection of crops (H.C. Buechler 1969).

After the Revolution, colono political posts of the hacienda were abolished with the elimination of these estates and the formation of local peasant unions (Carter 1964). Rather than taking the 'traditional' political structure as a base, peasant unions were modeled on industrial labour unions. These unions were to be uniform throughout the country and each union was to have thirteen officers with specific responsibilities (H.C. Buechler 109
1969). Nonetheless, research suggests only the office of Secretary General, the office of leader, was uniform throughout unions (H.C. Buechler 1969). Other offices were not always filled at the local level. These positions were the Secretary of Relations, Recording Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Secretary of Roads, Secretary of Sports, Secretary of Education, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Livestock, Secretary of Treasury, Secretary of Hygiene, Secretary of Press and Propaganda, and Secretary of Welfare. As their titles suggest, these officers were responsible for many community affairs including recreation, health, finances and education. Although many of these duties were new to ex-hacienda communities, the tasks of some secretaries, for example the Secretary of Agriculture, tended to overlap those of some pre-Refome political posts. When a secretarial position was not filled, the assignments were either not performed or they were carried out by another secretarial position (H.C. Buechler 1969).

Although men3 were to be elected to these union positions annually, terms of office varied among ex-haciendas (H.C. Buechler 1969). In some ex-haciendas, as a result of no elections or their regular re-election, the Secretary General and other Secretaries stayed in power

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3 The research I investigated did not address the issue of women's role in rural community politics. The absence of the role of women in these research reports does not necessarily indicate that women played no part in local level politics. J.M. Buechler's (1972) study of marketing networks in the Department of La Paz indicates that women had important positions in urban market unions and they made a significant contribution to these organizations.
until they died, ceased to perform their duties (H.C. Buechler 1969), or when they asked to be replaced (Heath 1969c). Political posts in other ex-haciendas, especially smaller ones, were rotated annually so that all adult men eventually filled at least one office (Leons 1970). McEwen (1975) suggests peasants fulfilling local union posts had to be approved by higher union officials and that the latter often intervened in the election process by indicating their preference for one person over another. Suitable candidates, however, needed to demonstrate that they had the support of all community members. Without this backing, they were unlikely to be effective in their position (McEwen 1975).

The Secretary General, as head of the community, was the most important position. Responsibilities of this post included overseeing of public work projects (H.C. Buechler 1969; Heath 1969c; Leons 1970); directing union meetings (H.C. Buechler 1969; McEwen 1975); acting as judge (H.C. Buechler 1969; McEwen 1975); initiating land expropriation proceedings (H.C. Buechler 1969; Heath 1969c); representing the community at higher political levels (H.C. Buechler 1969; Heath 1969c; McEwen 1975); and lobbying on behalf of community members (Heath 1969c). These duties of the Secretary General paralleled the purpose of the unions. As I have already noted, although originally formed in order to initiate and carry through land expropriation proceedings, unions came to take on the form of local government (Heath 1970; Heyduk 1974). Unions intervened in land disputes between members, organized and maintained local schools and
other community services, initiated public work projects, and sought access to resources available from the government and agencies, such as the Peace Corps, who were willing to support rural community projects (Heath 1970, 1973; McEwen 1975).

The importance of the union in the daily affairs of community members and the Secretary General's important role in the union, as well as the prevalence of factional politics at the national level, created the pre-conditions for the emergence of local dictatorial leaders. A Secretary General's ability to access resources for the community was often dependent on the legitimation of his authority by higher union levels. Perquisites from higher union officials and government authorities were handed down to Secretaries General in return for their ability to organize community members for displays of public support of higher officials. This system of political favours created a situation where those in positions of authority could seek self-enrichment through their political office (Crandon-Malamud 1991; Pearse 1972b). I have already noted that powerful leaders did emerge at the middle levels of the peasant union hierarchy. Competition between these leaders for lower level support and upper level favours resulted in factional strife and territorial disputes which, in some cases, involved much violence (Crandon-Malamud 1991; Dandler-Hanhart 1971; McEwen 1975).

Whether or not the despotic rule associated with some middle level union officials occurred among Secretaries General at the local level is unclear in the literature.
Carter (1964) maintains that the Secretary General was a position that held all power within the community. Formulating all community policies, the "Secretary General dictates; the people obey" (Carter 1964:58). Pearse (1972b) notes that some Secretaries General administered punishments, including fines, whippings and imprisonment, to those who did not adhere to community rules. Yet, other writers (H.C. Buechler 1969; Heath 1966, 1969c; Leons 1970; McEwen 1975) argue that few despotic leaders emerged at the community level in the Department of La Paz. Major decisions were made at community meetings where all households had an equal voice. Consequently, the ability of leaders to make autocratic decisions was negated. According to Leons (1970:265), the "Secretary General may be in a position to influence an essentially democratic decision making process, but he cannot compel a community against the will of a majority". Heath (1966) describes the communal decision making process that occurred when he asked union officers for their permission to study an ex-hacienda community. Maintaining that the decision was arrived at through group consensus, Heath (1966:35) states:

"many hours were spent in exchanging coca, drinking alcohol, and making and listening to more speeches about our proposed research and its values. Dissenters were quietly heard and their reservations respectfully laid to rest by project members, supported by fellow campesinos. Only when there was general acceptance, demonstrated by abrazos all around, did we feel free to work in a community, and we expected and found virtually complete collaboration after that."

McEwen (1975) argues similar consensual processes usually formed the basis of community decisions in San Miguel, an
Aymara comunidad in the northern area of the Department of Oruro.

La Paz altiplano peasant communities were nonetheless influenced by the factional politics that occurred at higher levels. One of the roles of the union was to procure resources for the community from the government and other agencies. These resources included education services, and materials and financial aid for the construction of community buildings and public utilities like roads and irrigation systems. Obtaining these resources from higher levels sometimes engendered competition between communities. For example, few comunidades formed local unions (Carter 1964; McEwen 1975) because they perceived unions to be agents for land expropriation (Carter 1964). Most government rural programs for peasants, however, were directed towards union members. When comunidad representatives did try to gain access to programs, they were often expelled from the process by ex-colono leaders (Carter 1964). Disputes also arose within large ex-haciendas. Once land was expropriated, the solidarity of the group often broke down as different sections, known as estancias, formed their own political organization and vied for the acquisition and control of resources that were to be available to the whole ex-hacienda (Buechler and Buechler 1971; McEwen 1975). In addition, some communities affiliated themselves with powerful union leaders at higher levels thereby enhancing their abilities to acquire resources over communities that remained unaligned (Crandon-
Malamud 1991; see Dandler-Hanhart 1971 for the Department of Cochabamba).

The involvement of the La Paz altiplano peasantry in factional politics may have declined with the termination of the MNR government. Although Barrientos continued the system of political favours instituted by the MNR government, peasants in the Department of La Paz did not provide the support he obtained from peasants in the Department of Cochabamba (McEwen 1975; Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). In addition, many powerful middle level peasant union leaders left Bolivia when Barrientos came to power (McEwen 1975). As a result, the higher level alignment of one community against another may have been eliminated. The Barrientos period was also a time of decreased programs and resources for peasant producers. Consequently, having obtained land, and with few support services available from the government, local union activities at higher political levels often declined (Crandon-Malamud 1991; Graeff 1974; Pearse 1972b).

The decreased activity of local unions at higher political levels may have facilitated the re-creation of indigenous political organizations within ex-haciendas. We have seen that La Paz altiplano peasants, when adopting union structures, reinterpreted higher level directives and incorporated their own political organization into these structures (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987; also see Heyduk 1974). I have already indicated that many secretarial offices never materialized at the local level. In addition, some ex-haciendas retained the 'traditional' posts of jilikata,
alcade, and campo. Even when pre-Revolutionary posts were abolished, the responsibilities associated with them were often assigned to secretarial offices (H.C. Buechler 1969). Comunidades, not adopting peasant unions, also maintained their indigenous political organization (Carter 1964; McEwen 1975). When peasant unions did decline in importance at the national level during the latter half of the 1960s, indigenous political responsibilities and activities may have taken on greater significance.

In summary, local peasant unions, implemented by the MNR, transformed the peasant political structures that were present in haciendas. These changes, however, were not radical alterations as some aspects of indigenous political processes were maintained in these unions. What was new for community political organizations was the connections that were made between national government structures and local peasant unions. Although these links had the potential to become a balanced communication system that would have allowed peasants to articulate their concerns to the state, the distribution of resources, services and political favours established an unbalanced system that channelled government directives. I have argued that, although peasant interests were subordinated to those of the state, peasants in the La Paz altiplano were never under the full control of the state.

With the implementation of military rule under Barrientos, peasant unions in this area began to decrease their political activities at the national level - an action that may have led to a decline in inter-community conflict,
as well as the severing of ties between these unions and the state. In addition, union organization that was imposed from outside was reinterpreted by La Paz altiplano peasant communities so that indigenous political structures and processes re-emerged within their local unions. These 'traditional' political organizations were important for the reproduction of the community and they allowed for a communal decision making process that enabled all households to voice their concerns regarding community affairs.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE ROOTS OF PEASANT MOBILIZATION

I INTRODUCTION

My thesis began by asking what material conditions and processes led to the mobilization of Bolivian peasants in the Department of La Paz altiplano. I suggested that macro and micro level structural transformations and conditions that occurred following the 1952 Bolivian Revolution shaped the development of this collective peasant action. In this chapter, I integrate and analyze these data, emphasizing how national economic and political changes materialized at the local level. I argue that the lack of state supports for peasant producers enabled these peasants to re-create their own cultural institutions which mediated production and political activities. Their increased participation in national economic and political spheres generated the channels through which peasants were able to articulate their concerns to the state and with each other. I also relate this analysis to the capacity for these peasants to implement alternatives to Western models of development. Here I examine the material factors that promote and constrain the ability of La Paz altiplano peasants to institute social change. My analysis begins with an integration of the post-Revolutionary macro and micro structural transformations presented in Chapters Two, Three and Four.
II POST-REVOLUTIONARY MACRO AND MICRO TRANSFORMATIONS: SUMMARY AND INTEGRATION

As I have already made clear, Bolivia was an oligarchical state ruled by a landowning class and tin barons before the 1952 Revolution. This elite controlled the Bolivian economy which was organized into an export oriented capitalized sector and a non-capitalized agrarian sector. One of the precursors to the Revolution was the declining ability of this economic structure to meet the needs of both the state and popular masses. Utilizing a campaign of social justice and economic growth, the MNR was able to mobilize the growing opposition to oligarchical command. Seizing control of the government in 1952, this multi-class coalition implemented a program of capitalist development under the pretence of popular rule. Economic forces at the national and international level, however, decreased the ability of the MNR to maintain its nationalist policy of state sponsored capitalist growth. The ensuing economic crises prompted the MNR to seek aid from international sources, an action that enabled the economic and political interests of international capital to direct Bolivia's economic, political and social policies. Subsequent divisions between the left and right factions within the MNR, as well as mounting labour struggles, paved the way for Barrientos' 1964 military coup and the inauguration of an almost uninterrupted 18 year period of military dictatorship.

The military governments of Barrientos and Banzer entrenched the ties between the Bolivian state and
international capital and both regimes implemented policies that marginalized the living conditions of most Bolivians. In addition, during both regimes, opposition from the political left and labour was violently repressed by the revamped military and, especially during the Banzer period, through the prohibition of non-government controlled political and labour organizations and the exile of their leaders. The Barrientos and Banzer governments promoted the development and expansion of the large-scale capitalized industrial and agrarian sectors. Yet, the focus on extractive industries, coupled with policies that benefited the interests of international capital, meant that Bolivia's so-called economic development failed to provide any appreciable benefits to popular sectors. Most Bolivians remained employed in agriculture or small-scale and informal production industries and their access to the basic necessities of life, evident in continued high levels of malnutrition and infant mortality rates, was limited.

Yet, the Revolution did bring many transformations to the countryside. Agrarian Reform, granting of universal suffrage and government formation of peasant political organizations all generated the means through which the peasantry, a group previously denied citizenship rights, could directly enter into national economic and political life. These reforms may have been part of an effort to 'modernize' the indigenous peasantry (Rivera Cusicanqui 1987). Nonetheless, economic factors at the national level, in addition to limited state support for peasant production, enabled the peasantry to recreate their own cultural
institutions that mediated economic and political activities.

Although Agrarian Reform abolished latifundia organization and its accompanying system of servile labour, it did not significantly alter land tenure arrangements in the Department of La Paz altiplano. I pointed out that haciendas had a recent history in most parts of Bolivia and that, rather than instituting new political organizations and methods and relations of production, landlords utilized indigenous institutions to meet their own interests. Land tenure arrangements in haciendas therefore paralleled those in comunidades. In both communities, households had access to houseplots, plots within community controlled fields, and community grazing lands. Yet, the amount of land to which each household had usufruct rights was not equal and variations occurred both within and between communities. Land parcel size was contingent on colono status in haciendas and membership status in comunidades.

Agrarian Reform did not equalize these disparities in landholding size nor did it alter the three classifications of community lands, partly owing to the limited availability of land for redistribution. While some peasant households obtained legal rights to relatively large land parcels, most households received little land. In the La Paz altiplano, this situation, combined with population growth, led to greater population pressures on the land and, by the mid 1970s, average land holding size was less than that at the time of Reform in some areas of this region. Peasant households, however, were not restricted to only cultivating
the land they owned. Land could also be accessed through rent and sharecropping. These arrangements were not necessarily solely contractual negotiations. In peasant communities, indigenous land rights influenced these agreements since land access, in any form, remained contingent on the fulfilment of community obligations. These community land access systems, as well as the maintenance of peasants' pre-Reform land plots facilitated the recreation of indigenous land tenure patterns.

Small land plot size also resulted in many households possessing a production base too limited for the exclusive reliance on agricultural activities for their reproduction. Household members therefore sought off-farm employment to meet their reproduction needs. Nevertheless, the Bolivian economy did not expand at a rate capable of absorbing the resultant supply of labour. Some peasants were able to sell their labour power for cash wages in the mining, large-scale manufacturing and capitalized agricultural sectors. This employment, however, was frequently only part-time or temporary work. Most peasants relied on their own resources for off-farm income and they engaged in simple artisan production or in the trade of agricultural and non-agricultural goods.

Migration was an important aspect of these off-farm activities. This movement did not necessarily sever the ties between migrants, their rural home community and agricultural production. Temporary migrants frequently returned home to participate in some activities of the agricultural cycle. In addition, rural connections
maintained by permanent migrants were important for both rural and urban dwellers as they facilitated the ability of each household to obtain resources necessary for their reproduction.

The inability of the Bolivian economy to provide sufficient wage labour opportunities was not the only macro level process influencing peasant production activities. State agriculture policies also placed restrictions on the availability of production resources and technological methods for peasant producers. In Chapter Two I argued that the Agrarian Reform promoted the development of capitalized agriculture by instituting private property as the basis of land tenure and by legitimizing large land holdings utilizing capitalized methods and relations of production. Agricultural policies also reflected the state's desire to modernize the agrarian sector through capitalized means. Although most rural producers were subsistence and simple commodity producers, the major portion of state support for agriculture production was directed towards the capitalized agrarian sector which undertook the cultivation of export and import substitution crops. The few government sponsored programs that were initiated to benefit peasant producers were given inadequate resources to carry out their programs comprehensively. This lack of state support for peasant production suggests that there was little direct state intervention in peasant production methods which, combined with peasant households' limited financial means for purchased agricultural resources, allowed for the recreation of 'traditional' agricultural production methods. These
methods relied on communal institutions, rather than commodity markets, for obtaining factors of production, including labour.

Despite the minimal government support for peasant production, peasants continued to provide Bolivia with the bulk of its food supply. Peasants not only cultivated this food, they were actively involved in the marketing of agricultural and other products in rural and urban areas. Again, the absence of state influence in the establishment and operation of these marketing networks allowed for the re-creation of 'traditional' trading activities and relations within the post-Revolutionary marketing structure. The new connections for the flow of goods that developed in the Department of La Paz altiplano emerged from the pre-Revolutionary peasant marketing system rather than from the trade networks operated by landlords. This situation gave peasants some control over the trade of their products. Although urban-based mestizo middlemen did take part in these new networks, peasants were the major participants as both buyers and sellers of agricultural and non-agricultural products. In addition, many new rural fairs were instituted by peasants, and it was these rural producers who established regulations concerning activities in these rural markets.

New markets did not duplicate the pre-Reform peasant marketing structure. Cash transactions, evident in the supply of cash goods in the La Paz altiplano, became the predominant means of exchange. Barter, however, remained an important exchange mechanism and provided households with
some insurance against fluctuations in the national economy. Thus, although household reproduction became more closely tied to the cash economy, households were not totally dependent on commodities for their reproduction.

I have argued that marketing activities were the principal means through which peasants became more integrated into Bolivia's national economic structure. Yet, like other popular sectors, peasants remained marginalized from any potential gains derived from Bolivia's economic development in the two decades following the Revolution. Lack of national agriculture policies to support peasant production, as well as insufficient land access and limited off-farm employment opportunities, resulted in continued conditions of poverty for the majority of peasants.

Although marginalized from certain macro-economic processes, peasants were integrated into national political structures. The MNR's establishment of an official peasant political hierarchy linked peasant communities to national government structures. In contrast to earlier attempts to mobilize the peasantry collectively at the national level, the Revolution allowed the MNR and its affiliated labour and political organizations to influence the peasantry's political organization directly. A political apparatus implemented from above replaced the pre-Revolutionary hacienda political structures, that had been derived from 'traditional' indigenous political organizations, with local unions. Nonetheless, indigenous political processes and responsibilities were not eliminated with the institution of unions. Originally formed to manage land expropriation
proceedings, local unions became the vehicle through which communities obtained resources, pertinent to their reproduction, from government agencies. Unions also took on the role of local government and it was in this capacity that the responsibilities of indigenous political posts were re-created. In addition, the imposition of peasant unions did not eliminate the process of participatory democracy at the local level. Decisions regarding community life were established through communal methods where all households were able to voice their concerns.

The change that did accompany the MNR's promotion of peasant unions was the establishment of official channels between local level political organizations and national political structures. Although these channels had the potential to become a two-way communication network through which both the peasantry and the government could articulate their concerns, the establishment of patron-client ties generated an unbalanced system that predominantly channelled government directives. Yet, these patron-client ties were never fully entrenched among the Department of La Paz altiplano peasantry and it was here that rural indigenous organizations, independent of the government, re-emerged during the 1970s. In the following discussion I identify the material factors that underlay this mobilization as aspects that promote and constrain the implementation of alternatives to Western models of development.
III THE MATERIAL FACTORS PROMOTING AND CONSTRAINING
ALTERNATIVES TO DEVELOPMENT

In the Introduction, I noted that alternatives to Western models of development refer to the projects and ways of living that arise out of the collective efforts of subordinated peoples to produce and reproduce their lives. I maintain that the seeds of such alternatives lie in the creation of different ways of reproducing life—activities that may oppose capitalist methods and relations of production. The capacity to implement these means of survival is contingent upon the autonomy and political space for subordinate groups to institute social change. In the following discussion I explore how dominant economic and political transformations generated the conditions that both promoted and constrained alternatives to development in La Paz altiplano peasant communities. I link the macro level analysis to the micro level processes, relating local level economies and politics to dominant structural processes. The analysis begins with an examination of the factors that advance alternative ways of reproducing life, then I investigate processes that act as constraints.

A. Factors Promoting Alternatives to Western Models of Development

Factors that favoured the promotion of alternatives to Western models of development were La Paz altiplano peasants' re-creation of 'traditional' methods and relations of production and non-commodified mechanisms of exchange; community political processes and the post-Revolutionary political activities of these communities; inter-connections
between peasant communities in the Department of La Paz and; these people's use of an ethnic identity to articulate their concerns at the national level.

1. 'Traditional' Production Activities and Non-Commodified Mechanisms of Exchange

The re-creation of indigenous relations and methods of production indicates La Paz altiplano peasants were reproducing themselves through means that involved the institution of alternative methods of reproducing life - a situation I maintain promotes alternatives to Western models of development. I am not suggesting that the Revolution excluded peasants from the promotion of capitalist development in Bolivia for it did establish the preconditions for the proletarianization of peasant households. Free from the control of the landlord, peasants were in a position to sell their labour power for wages. Land scarcity, which decreased the production base of many households, as well as increased ties to the cash economy, decreased the ability of many households to reproduce themselves through their own production activities. Theoretically, these households would have turned to wage labour. Nonetheless, in Bolivia, macro economic conditions blocked the proletarianization process. Peasant households therefore created their own off-farm production activities to ensure household reproduction. When establishing these vocations, peasants utilized indigenous cultural institutions as well as production activities and methods derived from the past.
Facilitating the re-creation of these indigenous means of reproduction was their historical resiliency and the limited state interventions in peasant production activities. The expansion of haciendas in the La Paz altiplano during the late 1800s and early 1900s did not destroy indigenous institutions. Although altered to meet the needs of the landlord, these institutions generally remained intact. In addition, these community institutions continued to be vital to the reproduction of comunidades that persisted during this time. The Revolution did not lead to the demise of 'traditional' indigenous institutions related to household production and reproduction. Few government directives existed to shape the development and establishment of peasant production. Post-Revolutionary marketing networks in the La Paz altiplano emerged through the efforts of peasant producers, peasant traders, and urban-based middlemen. Artisan and small-scale manufacturing activities were frequently household based operations that continued 'traditional' indigenous production activities such as the manufacture of pottery and musical instruments, tailoring and weaving. Farming methods continued to rely on 'traditional' production factors, such as seeds from the previous year's harvest, and labour exchanges like ayni and minka.

Although La Paz altiplano peasants increased their ties to the cash economy during the post-Revolutionary years, peasant households maintained some autonomy from the cash market. The basic resources for minimal household reproduction were available through non-commodified means.
Within communities, ayni and minka, along with real and fictive kin ties, enabled all households to obtain production resources through non-cash mechanisms. Resources necessary for household reproduction that were not available in the community, such as agricultural products from different geographic regions, could be acquired in rural markets through barter. Crandon-Malamud (1991) contends that non-commodified factors and relations of production enabled poorer peasant households to survive during the economic decline of the early 1970s. Lacking cash resources, these peasant households relied on their 'traditional' indigenous institutions of exchange and reciprocity for their reproduction, relations that existed alongside commodified relations and means of exchange.

Indigenous peasant institutions related to household reproduction were therefore re-created during the two decades following the Revolution. The roots of these institutions were within peasant communities and in these peasants' struggles to reproduce their lives. This situation works toward the potential for La Paz altiplano peasants to implement alternatives to development. Relying on their own methods and relations of production, rather than those imposed by dominant capitalist structures, suggests that political contestation over these peasant production activities could be framed in actions that oppose Western models of development. Future research is required in order to understand whether such politicization of peasant production activities took place in the La Paz altiplano. I have demonstrated that changes in economic
conditions did occur in La Paz altiplano peasant communities during the 20 years following the Revolution. In order to reflect these economic circumstances, the re-creation of peasant production institutions and activities, instead of duplicating activities of the past, most likely entailed transformations in their practice. G. Smith (1989) suggests such alterations generate community discussions over the meaning and practice of these institutions - negotiations which impart a political dimension to their continued existence. Whether such discussions took place in La Paz altiplano peasant communities is an important subject for future research.

ii. Political Processes and Activities

Political processes within La Paz altiplano peasant communities and their activities at broader levels also promotes alternatives to development. The Revolution created channels that enabled peasants to bypass local mestizo authorities whose rule they were under prior to 1952. Utilization of these channels for land expropriation and mediation for community resources, coupled with participation in local political structures, fostered the development of a politicized peasantry cognizant of national political structures and processes (Heath 1966, 1969c, 1973; Leons and Leons 1971; McEwen 1975; Preston 1978). This experience in, and knowledge of, national level politics strengthened these peasants capacity to negotiate with the government for social change. Furthermore, peasant community political structures were involved in the
regulation of production resources and activities. Evidence suggests that all households were able to articulate their concerns regarding this regulation through the democratic processes that existed within these communities. This role of peasant community political organizations, as well as post-Revolutionary political transformations, helped to create political pre-conditions for the institution of alternatives to development. Households had a vehicle through which they could discuss issues related to their reproduction and the links between these communities and national political structures created the channels through which communities could express their concerns to the state.

iii. Inter-Connections Between Communities

Economic and political inter-connections between peasant communities facilitates the ability of these communities to forge a collective front in order to challenge government policies and request the autonomy to determine their own life conditions. These inter-connections therefore promote alternatives to development. I demonstrated that peasant communities in the La Paz altiplano were not isolated social units. In the economic sphere, production activities of individual households frequently transgressed community boundaries and marketing networks integrated communities under similar economic processes. Migrants, both rural and urban, and peasant traders all interacted with members of other communities. Furthermore, most peasant producers regularly participated in more than one rural market and many travelled to La Paz
city to sell their own products. In some instances, ties between individuals and households in different communities led to the establishment of comadrazco relations between households (J.M. Buechler 1972). Whether these activities and relations generated the development of informal communication channels through which news of other community economic and political concerns were conveyed is an issue that requires future research.

In the political sphere, peasant communities were bound together through the formal peasant political structure instituted by the MNR government. In addition, La Paz altiplano peasants were developing political connections among themselves before the Revolution, a situation which indicates that these communities were able to forge their own political ties in order to collectively mobilize around issues of inter-community concern. This pre-Revolution political communication suggests that the severing of ties between local peasant unions and the government did not necessarily lead to the dismantling of inter-community political connections. Rivera Cusicanqui (1987) maintains that peasant communities, by separating themselves from government political interference, recognized that government instituted patron-client ties had induced inter-community conflicts. Whether such recognition fuelled the development of political bonds between communities as the government became an acknowledged source of community strife also remains a question to be answered by further research.
v. Ethnic Identity

Although the Revolution was to integrate indigenous peasants into national economic, social and political life, five centuries of racist ideology and practice were not eliminated with the Revolutionary transformations. Indigenous peoples in Bolivia continued to face discrimination in cities and in villages and towns of the countryside. According to Rivera Cusicanqui (1987), this common experience of racial oppression fuelled the collective action of La Paz altiplano peasants.

Spokespersons for the peasant political movements that emerged in the La Paz altiplano during the early 1970s maintained that their use of an indigenous identity instead of the class-associated term of campesino was more unifying nationally and globally (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 19781). Identification as campesinos was understood to be an identity that separated the peasantry from other exploited groups with indigenous origins, for example, the miners. For these indigenous rights groups, the use of an indigenous identity helped to create a unifying front that bridged the differences in production relations in which Bolivia's working class and peasantry engaged. At the global level, the use of an indigenous identity helped to forge ties with other oppressed indigenous peoples around the world, bonds that

1 This publication of the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs is a collection of documents produced by the indigenous rights movement that emerged in Bolivia during the early 1970s.
they maintained were negated with a campesino identity (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 1978). In their words:

"At the present time we feel that the use of the two terms "indio" (Indian) and "campesino" (peasant) gives rise to a certain confusion around us. When we call ourselves peasants we dissociate ourselves from the worldwide group of Indians, but when we use the name of "indios" we fully identify ourselves with other social sectors such as the miners, factory workers, workmen, etc. . . ." (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 1978:32).

These indigenous rights groups also maintain that the official replacement of 'indio' with 'campesino' denies the existence of discrimination that indigenous peoples have experienced in national Bolivian society. Furthermore, by using the term campesino, the history of Bolivia's peoples is homogenized so that the policies that excluded and oppressed indigenous peoples are erased from national memory. Again, in their words:

"For Bolivians, using the word "peasant" is just another way of calling the Indians "indios", but is (sic) also means killing them culturally and physically by confining them to being just a "social class", as if Indians and whites . . . had the same cultural background, the same ancestors, the same past, as if we never had been discriminated against and always are their "peasant brothers and sisters", making it look as if we are intellectually incapable of becoming doctors and only can aspire to eternally being farmers and wrongdoers." (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs 1978:15).

Some authors (eg. Romero-Pittari 1982) contend that the use of a non-class discourse to contest issues of class concern may only redirect class struggles in a way that reinforces the disadvantaged group's oppression. According
to Romero-Pittari (1982:310), La Paz altiplano peasants' use of an ethnic identity could limit the "effectiveness of peasant action" because an emphasis on ethnicity can mask the material roots of their struggles. In Bolivia, however, ethnic labels are inseparable from class position (Crandon-Malamud 1991; Pearse 1972a). Indigenous peoples are distinguished by cultural traits such as language and clothing, and, most importantly, their occupation, the performance of agricultural labour (Lagos 1994; Leons 1970; Pearse 1972a). La Paz altiplano peasants, by challenging the oppression and discrimination they faced as indigenous peoples and by requesting the autonomy to manage their own production resources and activities, were contesting the exploitation they experienced as peasant producers. I have argued that these peasants rely on methods and relations of production derived from their indigenous past. For La Paz altiplano peasants, these 'traditional' practices facilitated their survival when the process of proletarianization was blocked by national and international capitalist economic forces. Consequently, mobilization around issues of ethnicity were not simply identity struggles, they were struggles over material factors related to household and community reproduction.

At the macro level, the use of an indigenous discourse that promotes the value of indigenous culture and institutions related to production emphasizes the oppositional nature of La Paz altiplano peasants' demands. Therefore, the employment of an ethnic identity helps to politicize issues of contestation which, in turn, promotes
alternative means of reproducing life. Nevertheless, at the local level, the use of ethnicity to mobilize peasant political action can conceal class differences that may exist within peasant communities. Such a situation may permit the economic concerns of capitalized peasant households to overshadow those of poorer households - a situation that works against alternatives to development. Class stratification within peasant communities is only one outcome of the connections between these communities and national economic and political structures that can hinder the establishment of alternatives to Western models of development. In the following section I examine the factors that constrain the realization of these alternatives in the Department of La Paz altiplano.

B. Factors That Constrain Alternatives to Western Models of Development

Some authors (eg. Hahn 1992) suggest that Bolivia's post-Revolutionary economic structure was that of a dual economy composed of a capitalized industrial and agricultural sector and a peasant sector not requiring capital investment or the sale of labour power. I have argued that La Paz altiplano peasants were not isolated from the national Bolivian economy and were active participants through their agricultural, trade and other production activities. Furthermore, as part of the Bolivian peasantry, these peasants formed one part of the collective group of producers whom, I maintain, produced the bulk of Bolivia's food supply. La Paz altiplano peasants were therefore not only active participants in the national economy, they were
essential elements of it as well. Furthermore, peasant communities became integrated into national political structures after the Revolution. These economic and political connections decreased the autonomy of peasant communities to determine their own life conditions and created the channels for the economic and political interests of capital to influence reproduction activities at the community level. In this section I examine both the macro economic conditions that constrained alternatives to Western models of development and the power of the state to repress any mobilization that works toward social change.

1. Economic Factors That Constrain Alternatives to Western Models of Development

Although the re-creation of 'traditional' methods and relations of production may have been partly the outcome of peasant household wishes, evidence suggests rural economic circumstances generated by national economic policies and conditions necessitated the reproduction of these institutions as households came to rely on them for their survival. These institutions and their accompanying activities were therefore shaped by national economic processes. This situation hinders alternatives to development as economic conditions generated at the national level influence the ability of peasant households to reproduce themselves. In addition, integration into the national economy enables dominant capitalist production methods and relations to enter into peasant production activities which, in turn, establishes the pre-conditions for the emergence of capitalized producers within peasant
communities. The presence of these producers can establish exploitative relations between households within a peasant community - a situation that also constrains alternative means of reproducing life. Furthermore, when the interests of these households overshadow those of the majority, questions are raised about the ability of peasant mobilization to articulate the concerns of all peasant households and therefore promote alternatives to development.

I have maintained that economic conditions in the La Paz altiplano declined during the late 1960s and early 1970s, an argument supported by Crandon-Malamud's (1991) analysis of economic conditions during the early 1970s in this area and by United Nations (International Fund for Agricultural Development 1993) statistics on rural poverty in Bolivia. I have also demonstrated that national policies, influenced by the interests of international capital, supported large scale capitalist agricultural production at the expense of peasant production. These policies were one factor inducing the conditions of poverty during this time period. Thus, although peasants were able to reproduce themselves through their own production activities, economic conditions generated at the national and international level meant that this survival only provided the basic necessities of life. Marginalized by national economic processes, La Paz altiplano peasants continued to live in poverty and their integration into national economic life maintained their exploitation and oppression. Lacking the capacity to fully determine their
own life conditions works against the realization of alternatives to development for peasants in the La Paz altiplano.

Although many researchers noted economic differences between households in La Paz altiplano peasant communities, none of the literature directly addressed the issue of class stratification within these communities. The presence or absence of class stratification within these communities therefore remains an important area for future research. I demonstrated, however, that three pre-conditions for the emergence of capitalized peasant producers did exist in the La Paz altiplano during the two decades following the 1952 Revolution; unequal distribution of production resources among peasant households; participation in off-farm production activities and; engagement in market oriented production. Pre-Reform inequalities in land holding size were not eliminated by the Agrarian Reform. Given the post-Revolutionary opportunities to engage in market-oriented production, households with larger landholdings were in a position to engage in expanded reproduction. Furthermore, market activities were not confined exclusively to agricultural production. Peasants themselves became involved in the transport and trade of their products. Although these market activities were an important source of off-farm employment for households with an insufficient agricultural production base, they also offered the means through which rich households could supplement their production activities and thereby aid the expansion of their production resources. Rich households were also in a
position to exploit the labour of poorer community members. Poor households' insufficient production base required that they engage in numerous activities to ensure their survival. Intra-community options of which poor households took advantage included labour exchanges such as ayni and minka. When these labour exchanges were performed between rich and poor households, not only was the latters' reproduction ensured, a rich household's ability to produce a surplus may also have been strengthened. Further research is required to determine whether ayni and minka labour exchanges enabled rich households to exploit the labour of poorer households.

ii. State Repression of Opposition

The repression of collective action constrains the ability of any subordinated group to implement alternative means of reproducing life. For La Paz altiplano peasant communities two government actions worked against their ability to realize alternatives to development - patron-client ties between the government and peasant communities and violent and non-violent repression of any form of state opposition.

Although the peasant union hierarchal structure had the potential to become a channel through which peasants communicated their concerns, the dispensing of political favours to communities in return for their political support created an unbalanced system where government directives were passed down to local communities. As a result, peasant interests were subordinated to those of the state. In addition, patron-client ties, along with the factional
politics prevalent within the government and middle and upper levels of the peasant political structure, generated struggles between communities over the acquisition of resources. Thus, the utilization of official political connections between peasant communities and national government structures to channel government directives, as well as inter-community dissension, constrained alternatives to development in the La Paz altiplano. Peasant demands were not only quelled, but their facility to forge a collective front was diminished. Even when peasants did collectively mobilize to challenge government policies, their efforts, like those of industrial labour groups, were repressed through violent action. Although violent and non-violent state measures never silenced oppositional voices, they severely restrained the capacity of peasants and other subordinated groups to implement socio-economic change.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS

My thesis began by asking what post-Revolutionary material transformations led to the mobilization of La Paz altiplano peasants during the 1970s. I demonstrated that although the Revolution was to incorporate Bolivia's indigenous peasantry into national economic, political and social life, economic and political conditions originating at the national and international level continued to marginalize the living conditions of peasants in the La Paz altiplano. Never excluded from national economic processes, these peasants remained important producers of Bolivia's food supply. Government support for their production activities, however, was minimal as the promotion of capitalist economic development was one primary goal of the MNR and military governments. The Agrarian Reform had the potential to redistribute land among the peasants. Nonetheless, the ability of landlords to maintain lands to which they had no right and the legitimation of large capitalized estates meant that most peasant households were granted a minimal production base. Unable to sell their labour power for wages, peasants in the La Paz altiplano recreated their own production activities and relations to ensure their survival.

Production activities and relations, derived from the past, were not the only 'traditional' peasant institutions and activities re-created in the post-Revolutionary period. Although the implementation of rural unions did alter political organization within La Paz altiplano peasant
communities, 'traditional' political duties and processes reemerged within these unions. Unions, taking on the role of local government, became important in the regulation of community affairs, including those related to household reproduction. In addition, communal decision making procedures enabled all households to articulate their concerns at the local level. The post-Revolutionary union hierarchal structure that linked peasant communities to national government structures had the potential to establish a two-way communication system between the national government and local communities. Patron-client ties that developed between government and union officials, however, inaugurated a one-way system that channelled government directives to communities. As a result, peasant interests were subordinated to those of the state.

Thus, we see that two processes emerged in the Department of La Paz altiplano during the 20 years following the Revolution. Through their production and political activities, peasants obtained some autonomy over the way in which they reproduced their lives. On the other hand, economic and political circumstances, generated at the national level and influenced by international interests, severely restrained the ability of La Paz altiplano peasants to fully determine their own life conditions. I maintain that it was the interaction of these two processes that engendered the collective action of these peasants during the 1970s. Facilitating these peasants' capacity to mobilize was their association with national government structures during the post-Revolutionary years. Land
expropriation procedures and negotiations for community resources created a peasantry knowledgable of national political structures and processes.

The second question I sought to answer in my research was what were the material factors that promoted and constrained alternatives to Western models of development. I argued that activities and processes originating within La Paz altiplano peasant communities worked towards alternative means of reproducing life. These peasants' use of indigenous institutions and non-commodified resources and relations to reproduce themselves created the potential to oppose capitalist methods and relations of production. In addition, the links between community political and production activities, combined with communal decision making processes, enabled all households to articulate their concerns regarding the means and conditions for reproducing their lives. Economic and political ties between peasant communities in the La Paz altiplano facilitated their capacity to forge a collective front to challenge government policies and request the autonomy to determine their own life conditions. Finally, I argued that the use of an ethnic identity worked towards alternatives to development as it emphasized the oppositional nature of these peasants' demands.

Constraints to alternative means of reproducing life emerged from the integration of La Paz altiplano peasants into national economic and political processes. National economic conditions influenced the circumstances under which these peasant lived. Although able to reproduce themselves,
survival was based on the minimal provision of the basic necessities of life. Integration into national economic life also created the pre-conditions for the establishment of capitalist relations and methods of production within peasant communities. In the political sphere, patron-client ties between national and local political officials closed the communication channel that had the potential to direct peasant concerns. In addition, when peasants did collectively organize to challenge national policies, their efforts were met with violent repression. Both situations diminished the ability of peasants to voice their concerns at the national level.

My research has answered some questions regarding the mobilization of La Paz altiplano peasants during the 1970s. Nevertheless, new questions emerged from the research process. Two important issues for future research are the presence or absence of class stratification within peasant communities and the way in which activities related to production became politicized within these communities. The presence of capitalist producers within peasant communities raises concerns regarding whose interests are represented in the mobilization of La Paz altiplano peasants. The concerns of capitalist producers may only continue the exploitation of poorer peasants. Knowledge of the way in which activities related to production became politicized within peasant communities will help us to better understand the nature of La Paz altiplano peasants' demands as well as the processes involved in generating social change.
I have shown that the collective mobilization of peasants in the Department of La Paz altiplano was the outcome of their struggles to survive in the face of macroeconomic forces that marginalized their living conditions. Although their efforts to fully implement alternative means of reproducing life were restrained by the state and capital, the collective organization of these peasants to contest national policies raises possibilities for the contemporary situation. Such action may enable them to obtain the autonomy to determine their own life conditions. This possibility is also an important subject for future research.
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