1977


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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCU
THE WEST AND SOUTHERN AFRICA:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND SUPPORT
FOR SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION, 1960-1972

by

Leonard Taapopi

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies through the Department of
Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at The University of Windsor

Windsor, Ontario, Canada
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ABSTRACT

The central purpose of this thesis is to analyze comparatively and in a quantitative fashion the nature of the relationship between the economic involvement of Western states in Southern Africa and their support for Southern African liberation during the period 1960-1972. It is in essence a study of the relationship between one "environmental input" (economic interests) and one type of foreign "policy output" (support for liberation) or, in other words, an assessment of the interplay between business and politics. A cross-section of eleven Western states is examined in terms of the above.

Following a discussion of the existing literature pertinent to the subject at hand, the thesis examines: 1) the nature and extent of the eleven states' economic involvement in Southern Africa, 2) the nature and level of their support for Southern African liberation, and 3) the relationship between these two variables.

The states' economic involvement, as an independent variable, is measured in terms of 1) trade with and 2) investment in Southern Africa; whereas their support, as a dependent variable, is measured in terms of 1) their voting records in the United Nations General Assembly on resolutions dealing specifically with decolonization in Southern Africa.
and 2) their financial contributions to United Nations programmes related to efforts at Southern African decoloni-
ization during the period under review. The relationship between the two variables is evaluated by employing
Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficient ($r_s$).

The research project found that almost all the eleven states in the study maintained relatively strong
economic relations with Southern Africa and exhibited relatively low levels of support for Southern African
liberation during the period under study. It also found that there was, indeed, an inverse relationship between
the states' economic interests in the region and their support for Southern African liberation over the same
period.
This thesis is dedicated to:

All the Namibian Freedom Fighters,
past and present,
and
All the Forces of National Liberation
throughout Southern Africa
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Terence A. Keenleyside, my principal advisor, for his indispensable guidance and patience throughout my research. I am also deeply indebted to Dr. Walter C. Soderlund, who offered invaluable constructive criticism and many useful suggestions. My thanks also to Dr. Edward J. Crowley for his time and advice as third reader, and to Dr. David Wurfel for originally encouraging me to undertake this research project.

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Finally, I would like to gratefully acknowledge the Canadian International Development Agency scholarship which made my studies in Canada possible. Despite the assistance offered, I alone remain responsible, however, for the interpretations in this study and for any errors in fact.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Southern Africa is, for the purpose of this study, both a geographical and a geopolitical term denoting the southern segment of the African continent, which includes, inter alia, the three former Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau*, the rebellious British colony of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), the apartheid republic of South Africa and its territory of Namibia (South West Africa).** These countries share a common historical attribute, namely colonial and racist domination and economic exploitation of an African majority by a white minority. They have also shared a common liberation struggle against their white masters.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, especially in the early 1960's, a process of decolonization swept southwards across the African continent only to be thwarted

*Although Guinea Bissau is geographically located in West Africa, it has been treated in geopolitical terms as an integral part of the Southern African region primarily because of the close association of its liberation struggle with that in the other Portuguese colonies. The African people in these three colonies waged protracted national liberation wars for more than a decade until a new Portuguese government acceded in 1974 to their demands for independence.

**Southern Africa also includes the independent African states of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, and Zambia, which are not included in the present study.
at around the tenth parallel. As a result of persistent colonial and racial oppression and economic exploitation of Africans in the region on the one hand, and the intensification of their liberation struggle on the other, Southern Africa has since been one of the main focal points in the realm of international politics and relations. The problems of the region have been complicated and exacerbated by foreign, mainly Western, economic involvement with (and thus strengthening of) these white minority regimes in the area.

This research project seeks to establish empirically the relationship between the degree of economic or commercial involvement of Western states with Southern Africa's white minority regimes and the level or quality of their support for the attainment of African independence in the region during the period 1960–1972. It is an attempt at a comparative assessment, based on data for eleven Western states, of the proposition that the higher the degree of a state's economic involvement in Southern Africa, the lower its level of support for decolonization efforts in the region is likely to be. In effect, then, the study is an attempt to prove the validity of the assertion that "business and political interests, far from being separate and independent, interact closely with each other,"¹ in the relationships

of Western states with Southern Africa.

1) A Review of Pertinent Literature

A good deal has been written, especially since the mid-1960's, on Western states' economic and other involvements with Southern Africa's colonial regimes and on how such involvement has bolstered and buttressed these regimes, thus impeding the process of African liberation in the region. Prominent among such studies is the recent Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia, which was sponsored by Africa Publications Trust (London) and by academic institutions in the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the Scandinavian countries. The purpose of this project "was defined as the examination of the extent, nature and role of external investment in South Africa and Namibia by means of factual, objective research commissioned from scholars, journalists and others with specialist knowledge of the specific topics..." pertaining to Southern Africa.² The Study Project, in a generally non-quantitative approach, addressed itself to

²Study Project on External Investment in South Africa and Namibia (S.W. Africa), Africa Publications Trust, 1975. It was also jointly sponsored by the Institute for the Study of International Organization at the University of Sussex; the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver, Colorado; the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies at the University of Uppsala; and the African Politics Research Unit at the Free University of Berlin. It consisted of five volumes, two of which (Vols. II and III) dealt specifically with foreign economic relations with the two Southern African countries.
assessing the relationship between foreign economic (as well as politico-military-strategic) involvement and decolonization in the two Southern African countries over the period between the early 1960's and the early 1970's. It came up with a substantial amount of descriptive data on foreign, mainly Western, trade with and investment in South Africa and Namibia. The Study Project concluded that rather than undermining apartheid in the two countries examined, foreign investment and trade tended to reinforce it. 3

In 1974, the Africa Research Group, an independent research and educational organization in the U.S., analysed Western states' economic (and other) relations with Southern Africa's white minority regimes, especially during the late 1960's and the early 1970's. This study concluded that the Western states in general, and the U.K. and the U.S. in particular, have greatly benefited economically from their participation in the plunder of the region's abundant resources. As a result of this profitable involvement, the study further observed that the Western states concerned have not only become indifferent and reluctant to support in a dynamic fashion the African liberation cause, but also have become sympathetic to and supportive of these oppressive

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3 Ibid. In its first volume, the Study Project analysed Western investment in the military-industrial complex of the oppressive regimes in the region. Volume IV of the Study Project dealt with conditions of the black workers in the foreign-owned enterprises, whereas the last volume discussed the arguments for and against foreign economic involvement in Southern Africa without committing itself to any specific policy recommendations.
regimes in the region.\(^4\)

Perhaps the most revealing story about Western, especially British, complicity in foreign economic exploitation of Southern Africa was told by Ruth First, Jonathan Steele, and Christabel Gurney in their comprehensive study published in 1972, which was well-documented and supported with investment and trade data. This study found, inter alia, that apart from the U.K., which maintains by far the largest economic stake of any foreign country in Southern Africa, other capitalist states, such as the U.S., West Germany, Japan, France and Italy, have over the years developed increasing economic interests in the colonized countries of the region, particularly South Africa and Namibia. The authors expressed concern that such involvement tended to strengthen the colonial regimes in the region and also that a certain number of persons in policy-making positions in these Western states had direct (as well as indirect) corporate interests in Southern African operations, with serious implications for their approach to the formulation of policies pertinent to the region.\(^5\)

In 1970, a United Nations study analyzed the extent of foreign investment in South Africa and Namibia during the late 1960's and found that the U.K. (followed by the


U.S. and France) was the largest investor in the two Southern African countries during that period. Similar findings were also documented in an earlier study done by du Plessis on the same subject.

In 1964, a more general, descriptive study was published by Colin Legum, a well-known British specialist on African affairs, on Western economic and other links with South Africa and Namibia. The value of this study lay not so much in its revelations of the extent of such involvement as in its prophetic warning of the "crisis" this would inevitably lead to in the West's formulation of political policies towards the region.

A more condemnatory analysis of Western economic and other ties with the regimes in Southern Africa was done by Dr. Alfred Babing, an East German scholar, who contended that the hands of the Western and other capitalist states

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were too enmeshed in the economic exploitation of Southern Africa's plentiful resources for them to be able to render meaningful support to the African liberation struggle in the region. Instead, Dr. Babing argued, the Western states, especially the U.S., the U.K., West Germany, France and Japan, appeared to have opted (consciously or unconsciously) for supporting and strengthening those regimes so that they would be better able to protect Western economic and other interests. ⁹ Along these same lines, Jack Spence, a naturalized British citizen from South Africa and a specialist on Southern Africa, wrote recently: "Indeed, it can be plausibly argued that the relative indifference of the Western powers to South Africa's inhuman domestic policies has traditionally been based on the view that the polity is politically stable and economically profitable." ¹⁰ Whereas, as Katherine Roberts has argued, black African governments in the region "would be less stable...and would probably be less firmly pro-West." ¹¹

⁹ Dr. Alfred Babing, In Alliance with the Racists of South Africa, for the Anti-Imperialist Solidarity Committee of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Berlin, 1974.


The presence of elements of this nature in the thinking of Western states toward African liberation in Southern Africa have long been detected by attentive African leaders. In 1966, for instance, President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania noted disappointedly that lack of action by Western states against the white minority regimes in Southern Africa had been largely due to "international economic links of the capitalist world" with them.\(^{12}\) Eduardo Mondlane\(^{13}\) and Amilcar Cabral,\(^{14}\) leaders of the former national liberation movements in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau respectively, on several occasions expressed their disquietude about Western states' connivance in Portuguese colonial oppression because of their economic interests in these colonies. In a 1972 study, which was a generally descriptive yet factual analysis, William Minter substantiated these black African accusations, and argued that Portugal, a backward and underdeveloped country, was able

\(^{12}\)Julius K. Nyerere, "Rhodesia in the Context of Southern Africa," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1966, pp. 377 and 385. See also "Stability and Change in Africa," President Nyerere's Speech delivered at the University of Toronto, October 2, 1969.

\(^{13}\)Eduardo Mondlane, *The Struggle for Mozambique* (London: Penguin African Library, 1969), see especially pp. 197-214. Dr. Mondlane was the President of FRELIMO, the Mozambican National Liberation Front, which is now the Government of independent Mozambique. He was assassinated in February, 1969 by Portuguese secret police.

\(^{14}\)Amilcar Cabral, *Revolution in Guinea* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), see particularly pp. 7-23. Dr. Cabral, former President of PAIGC liberation movement, now the Government of Guinea Bissau, was assassinated in 1973 by the Portuguese secret police.
to maintain its African colonies mainly because of the economic and military interests of the Western powers, particularly the U.S. and the U.K., in its preservation of control.¹⁵

Several other authors concerned with the affairs of Southern Africa, like Larry Bowman,¹⁶ Keith Irvine,¹⁷ and David Hirschman,¹⁸ have stressed that the Southern African minority regimes have been kept going because of the economic interests of the capitalist world and the West's "rigidity toward meaningful change" in the area. Similarly, Rodney Morrison¹⁹ and Kenneth Good²⁰ have observed that the "economic exigencies" of the major Western powers seem to "have once again taken precedence over


moral concerns..." that is, the liberation of black Southern Africans. That Western economic and other interests in Southern Africa constitute an impediment to African liberation in the region has also been a subject of discussion, debate, and analysis in several United Nations-sponsored studies.

In addition to these cross-national studies, there is an extensive literature on individual states' economic involvement in Southern Africa. Most of these studies have centered on the United States and the United Kingdom. One of the most incisive analyses of U.S. corporate involvement in the region, particularly South Africa, during the 1960's was provided by Elyén B. Jackson, whose findings strongly suggested that the United States' industrial


development and technological advancement had been fueled to a significant extent by minerals extracted from Southern Africa over the years. Largely based on the findings of Jackson's study, Ian Mackler, in a similar, non-quantitative, yet factual examination of U.S. economic involvement in the region, observed that "a good investment climate", or in other words the high degree of profitability of investment, in part as a result of cheap black African labour, had attracted massive U.S. corporate investment there. As a result, he argued, "an intricate and binding connection existed between United States foreign policy and the American multi-national corporations..." operating in Southern Africa. Jennifer Davis similarly surveyed the nature and extent of U.S. economic involvement in Namibia and Portugal's African colonies of Angola and Mozambique, coming to basically the same conclusion. Indeed, in their analyses of U.S. foreign policy toward African liberation

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in Southern Africa, a large number of critics of American policy have emphasized that United States economic interests (as well as global strategic considerations) have been largely responsible for the general lack of American official support for the African cause in the region.  

In comparison with the extensive literature on U.S. relations with Southern Africa, the material dealing exclusively with the United Kingdom is less profuse, probably because the U.K. looms so large in the general studies on Western states' relations with the region referred to above. However, Charles Harvey,28 Kenneth Kirkwood,29 Dennis Austin30 and Conrad Royle31 have all dealt specifically with British economic involvement in Southern Africa. So, too, have studies undertaken by concerned interest and pressure groups located in Britain.32

With regard to Canada, its economic relations with Southern Africa have been the subject of a few academic studies over the years. In his recent examination of Canadian relations with the region, Professor Robert Matthews


of the University of Toronto observed that Canadian trade with and investment in South Africa and Namibia had increased tremendously during the last decade and a half, and argued that the "interests of Canadian and other Western businessmen who see better-than-normal opportunities for trade and investment" in the region had impaired Canadian Government support for African liberation in the area. While partaking in "ceremonial condemnation of apartheid" and colonialism in Southern Africa, Matthews declared, the Canadian Government simultaneously "encourages potential investors in South Africa, actively promotes trade between Canada and South Africa, and extends to South African goods Commonwealth preferential access to Canadian markets..." With regard to Namibia, he contended that, although the Canadian Government recognized the "illegality and invalidity" of South Africa's presence (in accordance with both the United Nations and the International Court of Justice), Canada has consistently refused to recognize any obligation on her part to prevent Canadian corporations from exploiting Namibia's natural

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33This phrase was borrowed from Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (New York: Crest Books, 1967), p. 580, and was also quoted in Stewart Smith, op. cit., p. 132.

resources in cooperation with South Africa and has failed as well to extend even humanitarian assistance to the Namibian people engaged in the struggle for freedom. 35

In an earlier analysis, Professor Matthews warned that "if Canada's economic involvement in that region increases, it will become more difficult for her to oppose the white minorities. Canada might then find itself aligned with South Africa, Portugal, and Rhodesia against Black Africa." 36 Similarly, studies by the YWCA of Canada, 37 the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa, 38 and the Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa 39 have underscored the hypocrisy and inconsistency in the


38 Words and Deeds: Canada, Portugal and Africa, by the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern Africa (TCLSAC), Toronto, Canada, 1976.

Canadian policy of condemning apartheid and other forms of colonial domination in Southern Africa while at the same time promoting trade and investment in the area. Douglas Anglin, Cranford Pratt, John Saul, and Clyde Sanger.


have also over the years expressed concern about the inadequacy of Canadian policy toward Southern Africa in light of Canadian business interests in the region.44

A modicum of similar material to the above is available on Australia,45 Belgium,46 France,47 Italy.48


47 French economic relations with Southern Africa have been highlighted by arms sales to the white minority regimes in the region, particularly South Africa. For details, see Economic Relations Between France and South Africa, 1966-1969, a Zambian Government study published in 1970.

48 Italian economic relations with the region, which have also been highlighted by arms sales to South Africa, were surveyed by Liberazione E. Sviluppo, "Rome-Pretoria Axis," in Sechaba, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1976), pp. 44-48.
Japan, 49 and Sweden, 50 but there are no studies of a similar nature available on the remaining two Western states (Denmark and the Netherlands) under analysis in this study.

In addition to the economic factor dealt with above, a number of authors have also pointed to other factors, particularly strategic considerations of and cultural affinity with the white regimes in the region as having been influential variables in determining (or at least influencing) the Western policy orientation toward that part of the world. However, since the present study is concerned with Western economic involvement in Southern Africa and its relevance to support for black African liberation, a detailed survey of this literature has not been included here. 51


As can be discerned from the review above, most authors tend to agree that Western states' economic involvement and interests in Southern Africa hamper decolonization in the region in basically two ways. First, such involvement strengthens the oppressive regimes, thus making their overthrow more difficult to achieve. Second, the magnitude of the involvement is such that the Western states concerned


are reluctant to render the support needed for the success of efforts at decolonization in the region. Most of the studies to date have tended to emphasize the former rather than the latter effect of economic involvement to the extent of suggesting that the raison d'être of this economic activity is to facilitate the survival of the white minority regimes. Far less attention has been given to the impact of economic involvement on the political outlook of various Western states (as opposed to its direct effect on the Southern African regimes).

Further, no known study has attempted to compare systematically and in a quantitative fashion a number of Western states' official support or non-support for African liberation relative to their economic involvement in Southern Africa over a specific period of time. The few analyses of this nature that have been attempted have been limited both in scope and substance. For instance, George Shepherd looked in a general, descriptive fashion at humanitarian assistance to Southern African liberation movements provided by Western countries, mainly non-governmental support groups, and international organizations.\(^5^2\)

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Ronald Segal, Amelia Leiss, and Elliot Zupnick, among others, published studies which looked at the merits and demerits of concerted international actions, ranging from economic sanctions to military pressures, that might be brought to bear against the white minority regimes in Southern Africa to bring about black African freedom and independence. However, none of these studies looked at the relationship between states' willingness to support such measures and the degree of their economic involvement in the region.

The review above clearly indicates that, in spite of the existence of other variables, the economic factor dominates the existing literature on Western relations with Southern Africa as the most influential variable affecting

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55 Elliot Zupnick, "Trade Boycott: Can It Work?" Objective Justice, Vol. II, No. 1 (January, 1970), pp. 30-31. All three authors, i.e., Segal, Leiss, and Zupnick tend to agree and emphasize that in order to bring about the desired results, collective measures by states need the cooperation of "certain key members", particularly the United Kingdom and the United States, the two Western powers which top the list of foreign states with extensive economic involvements and interests in Southern Africa. For similar views, see Katherine Roberts, "Sanctions in Southern Africa...," op. cit., pp. 68 and 80-86; Ernest A. Gross, op. cit., pp. 746-753; and William A. Hance, "The Case For and Against United States Disengagement from South Africa," in Hance, op. cit.
those relations. Given this fact, it would be useful to establish empirically how Western states' economic involvement in the region affects their support or lack of support for African liberation in the area, something which the studies to date have not attempted. Thus, the present study constitutes a modest beginning in this direction. In exploring this subject, the study is, in effect, interested in determining how important Southern Africa is economically to the eleven Western states under examination rather than how important the eleven states are to Southern Africa's minority regimes.

2) **Research Design**

The formulation of a hypothesis, or simply the precise statement of the research problem, constitutes the "first step in a scientific inquiry." The hypothesis explored in this study can be stated in the following fashion: There is an inverse relationship between the degree of Western states' economic or commercial involvement with the regimes in Southern Africa and the level of their support for African liberation; i.e., the greater the degree of economic involvement, the lower the level of

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support, and *vice versa*.

There are two key variables in this hypothesis. Western states' *support* for African liberation is the *dependent variable* representing the phenomenon that the study is trying to account for. These states' *economic involvement* with the regimes in Southern Africa is the *independent variable*, representing the factor that is thought to influence the nature of the *dependent variable*. It is being hypothesized here that the nature of the relationship between the two variables is *inverted*, i.e., the greater the *independent variable*, the smaller the *dependent variable*, and *vice versa*.

As the *independent variable*, Western states' *economic involvement* in Southern Africa refers in this study to the nature of the commercial activities of a cross-section of eleven, Western industrialized states in that part of Africa. The states being analysed here are: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The independent variable is measured in terms of these states' 1) trade with and 2) investments in Southern Africa. Trade is analyzed in terms of its dollar value, the nature of the basic commodities exchanged, the proportion of the states' total trade (exports plus imports) with Southern Africa to their world trade, and the rates of their Southern African trade growth. The ratio of the states' Southern African trade to their
world trade is ultimately adopted as the most reliable instrument for measuring the importance of their trade relationships for reasons discussed later in the study.

The eleven states' investments in Southern Africa are measured in terms of: book value, proportion to total world investments, earnings or profits as a proportion of the states' total world investment earnings or profits, and the states' rates of return on their investments.

Support, as a dependent variable, refers to the same eleven states' political and diplomatic activities (expressed in terms of policy outputs)\textsuperscript{57} favourable to the promotion of Southern African liberation. These are measured in terms of the states' 1) voting records in the United Nations General Assembly on resolutions dealing with Southern African liberation, and 2) their financial aid to the United Nations programmes related to decolonization efforts in the area and to the African liberation movements in the region. The U.N. General Assembly resolutions, because of their "recommendatory"\textsuperscript{58} rather than


"legally binding" nature, may not constitute the most important measure of states' support or non-support for African liberation. However, they are the best available indicator of states's policy behaviour that is amenable to quantitative measurement. The resolutions selected for this study are only those on which individual states' votes were recorded.

The eleven states' financial contributions to U.N. programmes in Southern Africa, as an indicator of their support for Southern African liberation, are measured in terms of what proportion they are annually of individual states' Gross National Products.

Data on states' trade with Southern Africa were derived from the annual publications of Direction of Trade, Quarterly, Vol. XXI, Part 2, April, 1972, pp. 272-275; and Henry Field Haviland, The Political Role of the General Assembly (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1951).


published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). This publication collects data mainly on the dollar value of states' trade, from which the proportions of states' Southern African trade to their world trade, as well as the rates of their Southern African trade growth, were computed. Information about the nature of the commodities exchanged was compiled from *Commodity Trade Statistics*, published annually by the United Nations' Department of Economic and Social Affairs. References were also made to individual states' statistical sources. Data on the states' trade with Southern Africa were, on the whole, adequate and satisfactory.

By contrast to the availability of trade data, data on individual states' investments in Southern Africa are, with the exception of the U.K. and the U.S., very scanty. Various U.N.-sponsored studies, as well as individual state studies referred to in the above review of pertinent literature served as sources for the collection of those investment data which were available. In addition, letters requesting information and data on investment were mailed to all eleven states; only the U.K., Sweden, Australia, and Denmark replied, furnishing some additional investment data.

Data on states' voting records in the General Assembly were compiled from the annual publications of the *United Nations Yearbook*, from which a total of 145 Assembly
resolutions dealing with Southern African liberation, and on which individual states' voting were recorded, were selected. The states' financial contributions to the United Nations programmes related to decolonization in the region were also drawn from the same source. In addition, letters were mailed to the eleven states requesting information and data on their economic assistance to Southern African liberation movements. Another letter was dispatched to the Organization of African Unity Liberation Committee with the same request. Only Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, replied to this request, supplying some additional information.

The nature of the relationship between the two variables, the states' economic involvement in Southern Africa and their support for Southern African liberation, is measured by employing the Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficient, the formula for which is discussed later in the study.

Chapters II, III, and IV examine the findings emanating from this enquiry. Chapter II assesses the nature and extent of the eleven states' economic and commercial involvement with the white minority regimes in Southern Africa during the period 1960–1971, while Chapter III examines the nature and level of these states' support for the African liberation struggle in the region during the 1961–1972 period. Chapter IV entails an assessment of the nature of the relationship between the two variables,
i.e. the hypothesis advanced in this study is actually tested in this Chapter. Finally, a brief conclusion summarizes the overall findings of the research project.
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF STATES' ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT
WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA

As has already been spelled out in the introduction, the variable of economic involvement is measured in this study in terms of trade and investment; that is, the extent to which each of the eleven Western states traded with and had firms and/or nationals operating investments in the colonized countries of Southern Africa during the period 1960-1971.

It has also been pointed out above that, in the past, most of the studies conducted on Western economic involvement with the colonial and racist regimes in Southern Africa have tended to emphasize the role that such involvements have played in the bolstering of those regimes. The present study, although not ignoring the above-said approach in as far as it is found relevant to this study, is concerned with the extent to which the economic involvement of Western states with Southern Africa is important or indispensable to their economic welfare and way of life. In other words, how important Southern Africa is economically to the eleven Western states under examination here, rather than how important these states are to the region's colonial and racist regimes constitutes the central approach of this study.
1) Western Trade with Southern Africa

This research project has found that each of the eleven capitalist states maintained growing trade links with the colonized countries in Southern Africa over the period 1960–1971. The fundamental basis underlying Western trade links with these countries has been that of an exchange between raw materials cheaply supplied by the latter and manufactured goods provided by the former. That is, with a few exceptions in the case of apartheid South Africa, 1 Southern Africa in general has been serving both as a cheap supplier of a variety of raw resources needed to fuel the industries of Western Europe, North America, Japan, and Australia, and as a relatively useful market for the finished surplus goods provided by these states. 2 In addition to raw materials, the countries of Southern Africa, being large but sparsely populated, also have tremendous "food-producing potential", and this has been another of their attractions to a world faced with food shortages. 3

1 South Africa, in addition to being a source of raw materials, also exports some packages of finished goods, including processed foodstuffs, liquors, wines, and a host of other beverages.


All the eleven Western states under analysis here are industrially developed, with high standards of living, but, with few exceptions, scarce and/or diminishing natural resources. The United Kingdom, for example, has been vitally concerned for years with the development of overseas sources of supply "since most of the food needed to feed its large population is imported, as are raw materials needed to keep its industry alive." Being located "at the centre of a complex network of international trading relationships" has served to modify significantly its otherwise insular island position. Some of Britain's needed food and raw materials come from Southern Africa, and the area thus plays a role in the United Kingdom's efforts to compensate for the disadvantages of geography. The United States needs vital raw materials such as gold to support its currency, and chrome, uranium, oil, and other strategic minerals needed for the development and

4Canada, for example, has resources such as petroleum and natural gas, uranium, copper, nickel, zinc, iron ore, and other minerals; yet, Canada is still interested in Southern Africa's raw materials, e.g., oil in Angola, nickel in South Africa and Namibia, etc.

maintenance of its military-technological-and-scientific-industrial complex. A sizeable portion of these crucially strategic raw resources is produced in Southern Africa. Japan's expanding industrial economy, coupled with its problem of limited mineral resources at home, has made it necessary for it to seek and import needed raw materials, some of which come from Southern Africa. Also, like Britain, Japan's requirement for food to feed its large population inhabiting crowded islands makes it necessary for it to import foodstuffs, including goods from Southern Africa. France, Italy, Belgium, and the other states in this study all vie for Southern Africa's raw materials because they are there and are obtainable cheaply at competitive international prices. Escher Rhodie, bringing attention to the economic importance of Southern Africa to the West, has pointed out succinctly that:

(the colonized) countries in the South are sitting on top of the greatest treasure chest the world has ever known—gold, uranium, diamonds, copper, platinum, chrome, asbestos, iron, vanadium, and a host of other minerals; these are essential for the industrial development of the West.6

However, as mentioned above, the importance of Southern Africa to the Western states as a cheap source of vital raw materials needed to bolster the industries of these

states should not obscure the other side of the coin. The region also serves as a relatively important export market for Western manufactured goods. A number of the states in the study have economies which are highly dependent on foreign trade for their welfare; that is, a large percentage of their Gross National Product (GNP) derives from international trade. For example, over the period 1968-1971, foreign trade accounted for 56% and 76% of GNP for Belgium and the Netherlands respectively. Obviously, foreign trade is of critical value to the economic viability of these two states, among others, in the study. The share of world trade in the GNPs of other states in the study, such as Denmark (48%), Sweden (42%), Canada (40%), the United Kingdom (34%), and Italy (30%) was also quite substantial over the same period. The percentages were 27%, 24%, and 19% for Australia, France, and Japan respectively, but only 8% for the United States.7 Thus, for a number of these states, a large bulk of their world trade is accounted for by their exports. Manufactured goods exported by these countries are particularly important to them not only because of their commodity and capital

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exchange value, but also because of their job-producing effects in these states. On the whole, foreign trade, like other commercial activities, is a "gainful occupation"; directly or indirectly, it provides employment opportunities in the countries that engage in it. In short, the vital importance of foreign trade to the economies of these states necessitates that they seek, develop, and maintain all possible markets, including those in Southern Africa.

Given the above, it is not unreasonable to assert that without international trade, including trade with Southern Africa, the high standard of living in these eleven states, as well as in other Western countries, would decline as their economies would be adversely affected. Therefore, out of sheer need for raw materials and markets for processed goods and, in fact, because of the "better-than-normal opportunities" for trade with Southern Africa, the eleven states in the study, as well as other Western countries, have been carrying on commercial relations with the colonial and racist regimes in Southern Africa for a long time.

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9 Although quoted from a Canadian source, this phrase could be representative of the views of other Western states which are economically involved with Southern Africa. For details, see Foreign Policy for Canadians: The United Nations Charter, op. cit., p. 19; see also E. W. Thompson, International Trade and Domestic Prosperity (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970).
In order to get a clear picture of the extent and scope of each of the eleven states' trade relations with the region, this section examines each state's trade pattern with the area in general and with apartheid South Africa in particular. The trade data have been divided into three periods of equal length: 1960-1963; 1964-1957; and 1968-1971, as has already been indicated above.* The analysis concentrates basically on the following dimensions, namely: the dollar value of trade and basic commodities exchanged; the proportion of the states' Southern African trade to their world trade; and the rate of the states' Southern African trade growth.**

a) The Dollar Value of Trade; Its Geographic Distribution; and the Nature of Commodities Exchanged

Table 1 below indicates the total annual, as well as the overall, dollar value of the two-way trade between Southern Africa and each of the eleven states under study during the period 1960-1971. Over this twelve year period, the total dollar value of the eleven states' two-way trade with the region combined amounted to $40

*For the sake of brevity and convenience, the three periods are designated as Periods I, II, and III for 1960-63, 1964-67, and 1968-71, respectively, and are henceforth thus referred to in the study.

**No attempt is made to rank order these dimensions in terms of their relative importance.
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Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Monetary Fund OF TRADE Annual Publications, 1960-1971, Washington

Note: Countries are ranked in descending order in terms of trade.
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Sources: National Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), DIRECTION

Washington, D.C.

Note: The table presents data on import and export figures rounded in millions of United States dollars. The Totals column represents the sum of imports and exports for the years 1960-1971, while the Total Trade column provides the cumulative value of trade over the same period. The dollar value of Total Trade, 1960-1971, is also highlighted.
billion. Of this amount, the United Kingdom accounted for more than $15\frac{1}{2}$ billion or 38% whereas the United States, which ranked second, accounted for more than $9$ billion or 23% of the total. The corresponding figure for Japan, which ranked third,* was a little over $5$ billion or 14% of the total over the same period. Trailing substantially behind these three states are France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada, all of whose total trade with Southern Africa fell between $1-2$ billion. Australia, Sweden, and Denmark comprise a third category of states with total trade of less than one billion dollars each.

Thus, the eleven states tend to fall into three categories of high, medium, and low, in terms of the dollar value of their total trade with Southern Africa over the period under study. The top three states, the U.K., the U.S., and Japan, accounted for $29.5$ billion or 74% of the eleven states' total trade with the region over the period under review. The following five states, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Canada, accounted for 21% of the total; while the bottom three states, Australia, Sweden, and Denmark, accounted for only 5% of the total trade of the eleven states with Southern Africa over the same period.

Each of the eleven states in the study maintained

*West German trade with Southern Africa exceeded that of Japan, but it has been excluded from the study because of its non-membership in the United Nations during the period under study.
constantly expanding trade links with Southern Africa from Period I to Period III. The value of these states' total two-way trade with the region combined amounted to $8.3 billion during Period I as compared to $14 billion during Period II and $16 billion during Period III. With only one exception, the states maintained the ranking indicated in Table I throughout the three periods. 10

The trade data in Table I reveal also that, by and large, the eleven states exported more to Southern Africa than they imported therefrom in terms of the dollar value of trade. Of the total two-way trade of the eleven states, $22 billion or 55% was accounted for by exports to the region, indicating that Southern Africa has served as an important salesground for most of these capitalist states' processed goods.

Although most of the eleven states had in most of the years under study a "favourable balance of trade" with Southern Africa, only three states, the Netherlands, Australia, and Sweden, maintained a constant excess of exports to the region over imports. On the other hand, only two states, Japan and Belgium, annually bought more from Southern Africa than they sold to the region.

The six remaining states in most years exported more to Southern Africa than they imported therefrom in terms of the dollar value of trade. In the case of the

10 During Period I, Italy's two-way trade with the region exceeded that of France.
United Kingdom, for instance, only in 1968 and 1969 did its sales lag behind its purchases. The U.S. had an unfavourable trade balance only in 1962 and 1963 and Canada only in 1971. France and Italy had an "unfavourable balance of trade" with the region only during the first third of the twelve-year period and Denmark only in 1970 and 1971 (Table 1).

The terms "favourable balance of trade", meaning an excess of merchandise exports over imports, and "unfavourable balance of trade", meaning an excess of merchandise imports over exports,\(^{11}\) can, of course, be misleading at times. They do not, for example, take into account changes in prices of goods traded and fluctuations in exchange rates, two factors which affect the real value of trade between states. When such factors are considered, states like Japan and Belgium, which have been in deficit positions in their Southern African trade, have still benefitted from such trade just like other states in terms of getting needed raw materials. Thus, they might not be concerned about their specific trade imbalance with the region if their world trade balance is satisfactory.

Furthermore, the nature of the goods traded is also important in determining which state is the primary benefactor from a trading relationship. Thus, for example,

an "unfavourable balance of trade" with a particular state may be quite acceptable if the state in the deficit position is selling valuable finished goods while importing cheap raw resources. Likewise, a "favourable balance of trade" may not be that acceptable if the state in the surplus position is selling in return for scarce and/or strategic raw materials inconsequential manufactured goods. This important aspect - the nature of the commodities - of the eleven states' trade with Southern Africa is examined more closely later in this subsection. However, first, it is worthwhile to have a brief look at each of the eleven states' major trade partner in Southern Africa.

This study has found, inter alia, that the pivotal point of the eleven states' economic activities and interests in Southern Africa has been the apartheid republic of South Africa and its colony of Namibia.* Of the $40 billion two-way trade of the eleven states with the region over the twelve-year period (Table I), $35.3 billion or 86% was conducted with South Africa and Namibia alone.\[12\] The United Kingdom and Canada had an annual average of 94% and 93% respectively of their Southern African trade with South Africa and Namibia during the twelve-year period.

\*Statistical sources incorporated Namibian figures within those of South Africa.

\[12\] Data were computed from trade figures in IMF and IBRD, Direction of Trade, Annual Publications, 1960-1971, op. cit.
In other words, only 6% and 7% respectively of the two Western states' total trade with the area were accounted for by the three remaining countries in the region (i.e., Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia).\textsuperscript{13}

Seven of the nine remaining states, Japan, Italy, France, Australia, United States, Sweden, and Belgium, had well over 80% of their Southern African trade with South Africa and Namibia while the figures for Denmark and the Netherlands were 75% and 66% respectively.\textsuperscript{14} However, an accurate indication of the degree to which each state's Southern African trade has been with South Africa may be affected by the fact that from the mid-1960's onward trade with Rhodesia was often hidden in the South African figures due to the United Nation's economic sanctions against the illegal racist minority regime in Salisbury.\textsuperscript{15} It is clear, nevertheless, that for all the eleven Western states in the study, South Africa and Namibia were their primary trading partners in the region during the period 1960–1971. Western states' economic affinity with South Africa is also reflected in the special treatment that

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid.

some states accord their trade relations with that country. For example, the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Australia, and France, all maintain some kind of preferential trade arrangements with the republic on a bilateral basis. It is also interesting to note that for most of the eleven states in the study, the degree of their trade concentration with South Africa and Namibia was highest during Period I and lowest during Period III. This trend towards diversification, in the area tends to support the assertion that South Africa itself has served over the years as a "spring-board" and a "stepping stone" from which Western trade and other commercial activities and interests have been expanded to the rest of Southern Africa, thus enhancing the region's economic importance.

16 Ruth First, Jonathan Steele, and Christable Gurney, The South African Connection... op. cit., pp. 35-37.


18 "Trade Agreement Between Canada and the Union of South Africa," Treaty Series, 1933, No. 4, Printer to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, Ottawa, 1935, Article 7.

19 Ron Winton, "Australia and Apartheid...", op. cit.


21 Direction of Trade, op. cit.

22 First, et al, op. cit., pp. 30, 37, and 255-278; see also Colin and Margaret Legum, South Africa: Crisis for the West, op. cit., pp. 124-141; and Race to Power..., Africa Research Group, op. cit., p. 129.
to the Western states.\textsuperscript{23}

The significance to the eleven states in the study of their trade links with Southern Africa is reflected, \textit{inter alia}, in the nature of commodities traded. As has already been said, Southern Africa, especially South Africa, has been serving not only as a convenient supplier of scarce and cheaply obtained raw resources but also as a major export market for the industrialized capitalist countries' manufactured goods.\textsuperscript{24} Of each of the eleven states' total annual exports to Southern Africa during the period under review, about 99\% was finished or semi-processed goods. A large portion of the dollar value of each state's manufactured goods exported to the region during the same period was made up of capital goods such as construction and mining machinery; metalworking machinery; agricultural machinery; transport vehicles and equipment; mechanical handling equipment such as lifting and loading machinery,


etc. These capital exports have exploitative effects on the economies of the colonized countries of Southern Africa. The mining machinery, for example, was needed in the area for extracting mineral resources from the region's soil by the Western multinational corporations operating there. Construction machinery could be used to build roads, railways, and related installations to connect points of extraction and/or tilling with ports for shipment. Transport vehicles and equipment could be used among other purposes to facilitate the transportation of minerals thus unearthed and other raw resources harvested from places of their procurement to ports from where they were shipped to various Western destinations.

Regarding the nature and significance of the items imported by Western states from Southern Africa, about 85% of each of the eleven states' total annual imports from the region over the period under study consisted of basic raw resources such as chromium and uranium ores; iron and steel ores; platinum; copper; asbestos; diamonds; other base metals and minerals; and animal skins. The remaining 15% or so was accounted for by packages of processed and semi-processed foodstuffs, as well as alcoholic beverages, basically from South Africa. By the late 1960's, South


26 Ibid.
Africa had also reached an industrial stage where it was producing other finished goods, such as machinery and transport equipment, which a few states in the study imported.

It is also well-known that South Africa's gold, which has been purchased independently or exclusive of other commodities, has for decades "backed up the major currencies of the Western monetary system - the dollar, the pound, 'the mark, and the franc." As of 1970, South Africa accounted for some 85% of "free world" production of gold; provided 40% of non-Communist world production of platinum; and supplied 35% of the non-Communist world's production of antimony. Other Southern African raw resources imported by a large number of the eleven states in the study during the period 1960-1971 included oil and coffee from Angola; lead, zinc, and karakul pelts from Namibia; and cashew nuts, tea, sisal, and silver from Mozambique.

27 Unspecified machines and transport equipment were imported by Belgium, while Sweden imported electric and non-electric machinery as part of their overall imports from Southern Africa during the late 1960's and the early 1970's.

28 Race to Power..., ARC, op. cit., p. 128; see also Blyden Jackson, "Apartheid and Imperialism...", op. cit., p. 30.

29 Ibid.


31 Jackson, op. cit., p. 22.
It might be helpful in understanding the importance to the eleven states of their trade with Southern Africa to look briefly at the uses made of some of strategic materials they import from the region. Platinum, for example, is used in "telephone contacts and telegraph instruments, relay magnetoes for aircraft (no jet engine is without platinum), vehicle and boat engines, etc."\(^{32}\) It is also used in the petroleum industry "as a catalyst for the production of lead-free gas."\(^{33}\) Chromium, for which there is no substitute, "is a most vital component in the production of stainless steel without which such products as jet planes, surgical equipment, etc., could not be manufactured."\(^{34}\) Antimony, another strategic mineral, "is unsurpassed for... use in lead, plastics, ceramics, and glass... in ammunition, primers, tracer shrapnel, smoke generators, flame retardants, etc."\(^{35}\) Asbestos is used mainly "in paper, cement products, textiles, friction materials, plastics and filters,"\(^{36}\) as

\(^{32}\)Ibid., p. 23.

\(^{33}\)Ibid.


\(^{36}\)Jackson, \textit{op. cit.}
well as in "building materials for insulation purposes, in ships, vehicles, and air plane production."\textsuperscript{37} Uses for other minerals such as iron and steel, uranium, diamonds, oil, etc., and non-mineral products from Southern Africa, such as coffee, fruit, tobacco, etc., to mention but a few, need no further comment. In short, the industrial utility of the region's raw resources, which the Western countries have been importing over the years, is quite indisputably apparent.

A short summary of the nature of the two-way trade of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada with Southern Africa will help to illustrate the general pattern of Western trade with the region. The United Kingdom, for example, exported to the area, particularly South Africa, a variety of finished goods which included: heavy machinery for the mining, manufacturing and construction industries; electrical and non-electrical machinery; railway vehicles and equipment; chemicals; and textile products.\textsuperscript{38} In addition, Britain sold to South Africa military matériel, ranging from radar and other electronic devices to aircraft, warships, coastguard vessels, and other naval equipment.\textsuperscript{39}

\textsuperscript{37}Mackler, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 46.


\textsuperscript{39}First, et al, \textit{The South African Connection...}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 36.
These and other finished and semi-finished goods constituted some 99% of Britain's total exports to Southern Africa over the period under review.

Britain's imports from the region over the twelve-year period ranged from raw resources to foodstuffs. More than 80% of total British annual imports from Southern Africa was made up of crude minerals and base metals such as copper; nickel; tin; manganese; asbestos; zinc; platinum; chrome; vanadium; uranium; diamonds; antimony; silver, etc. Non-mineral raw materials and foodstuffs constituted the remaining 20% or so of her total imports from the region; these included items such as karakul pelts; wood, lumber, and cork; maize; beef; coffee; fruits; cashew nuts; vegetable preparations; fish and products; and animal feeding-stuffs.\(^\text{40}\)

With regard to the nature of the items traded each way between the United States and Southern Africa over the period under review, it would not be an overstatement to assert that, among the eleven states in the study, the U.S. has been by far the most important supplier of heavy and sophisticated machinery and equipment to the region, especially South Africa, and the largest consumer of the area's raw resources, particularly its strategic

\(^{40}\)United Kingdom International Trade, op. cit., pp. 66-67; see also Commodity Trade Statistics, op. cit.
minerals, regardless of its second rank position in terms of the dollar value of the eleven states' total trade with Southern Africa (Table 1). During the 1960-1971 period, almost 100% of U.S. exports to the region was composed of finished products. Prominent among them were: construction, mining and metalworking machinery; agricultural machinery; transport vehicles and telecommunication equipment; electro-medical and X-ray equipment; computers and accounting machines; aircraft and aircraft (including jet) engines; other electric and non-electric machinery; chemicals; medicaments; and other manufactures.$^42$

The export of these and other American products to Southern Africa reflect the region's market importance for the U.S. as for other Western capitalist countries' manufactured goods. At the same time, the U.S. is dependent in return upon the area's raw materials, especially its minerals. Some of the minerals which the U.S. must import are found only, or primarily in Southern Africa, and access to such minerals has, therefore, been of utmost concern to the U.S. For example, the U.S. has to import 100% of its chromium requirements, about 50% of which

$^{41}$ Gervasi and Lowenstein, "Southern Africa in the World Economy," op. cit.

comes from Rhodesia and South Africa.\textsuperscript{43} Also, "virtually all asbestos used in the United States must be imported."\textsuperscript{44} Most important in this regard is the fact that amosite and crocidolite, two of the three composites of asbestos, "are almost unknown" outside of South Africa. One hundred percent of world production of amosite comes from South Africa.\textsuperscript{45} "Twenty-five percent of all South African amosite is exported directly to the United States."\textsuperscript{46}

A rather similar situation exists with regard to manganese. A U.S. Government source disclosed that "there remains no satisfactory substitute" for this strategic mineral. Therefore, the Federal Government has been greatly interested in assuring an adequate supply\textsuperscript{47} of this mineral, 36% of which comes from South Africa.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{43} Mineral Facts and Problems, op. cit., pp. 223-224.

\textsuperscript{44} Blyden B. Jackson, op. cit., p. 22.

\textsuperscript{45} Mineral Facts and Problems, op. cit. This exemplifies the fact that the quantity or the dollar value of the mineral is not the only decisive factor to be noted; perhaps more important is its availability.

\textsuperscript{46} Africa Today, January, 1966, p. 21.

\textsuperscript{47} Mineral Facts and Problems, op. cit., p. 553.

In addition, the U.S. has been buying all of its supply of corundum, an important abrasive material, from Rhodesia, Mozambique, and South Africa over the years. Ninety-three percent of U.S. imports of lithium comes from Rhodesia "and a small amount from South Africa." As of 1963, forty percent of U.S. imports of uranium had been extracted from the mines of South Africa, and the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission is said to have become almost the sole recipient of South African uranium since the late 1960's. In the production of this mineral, South Africa ranks third in the world after Canada and the United States. As of 1970, South Africa supplied 40 percent of "free world" production of platinum, a large bulk of which has been imported into the U.S. indirectly through the United Kingdom.

Other important mineral and non-mineral resources produced in Southern Africa and imported by the U.S. over the period under review included: crude petroleum and

\[50\] Jackson, op. cit., p. 22.
\[51\] Ibid., p. 20.
\[52\] Ibid.
\[53\] Ibid., pp. 21-22.
coffee from Portugal's colony of Angola;\textsuperscript{54} cashew nuts\textsuperscript{55} and sugar from Mozambique and South Africa;\textsuperscript{56} copper, lead, zinc, vanadium, tantalite, cadmium, silver, and other minerals, as well as karakul pelts and large quantities of pet food and rock lobster from Namibia;\textsuperscript{57} chromium and other minerals from Rhodesia;\textsuperscript{58} and diamonds as well as other precious stones from South Africa, Angola, and Namibia.

With regard to the U.S. purchases of sugar from Southern Africa, it is interesting to note that the U.S.

\textsuperscript{54}Newsclippings, Southern African Information Group (SAIG), Ottawa, No. 10, March 1973, p. 4. During the 1960's, the U.S. was the first major customer for Angola's biggest commodity, coffee, importing annually more than 50% of Angola's total annual coffee exports. By the late 1960's, about 7% of "all coffee imported into the U.S. came from Portugal's African colonies, especially Angola and Mozambique, which thus ranked third on the list of U.S. coffee suppliers, following Brazil (33%) and Colombia (12%)." See Jennifer Davis, "Allies in Empire: U.S. Trade with Angola and Mozambique," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 16.

\textsuperscript{55}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 17.

\textsuperscript{56}\textit{Race to Power}, ARG, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{57}The U.S. has been one of the most important markets for the "pelts of the rare karakul sheep reared primarily in Namibia and which supply over half of the world's karakul. U.S. purchases, which were worth $7 million in 1969, were estimated at almost 25 percent of total Namibian raw resources." For details, see Courteney and Davis, \textit{Namibia: U.S. Corporate Involvement, \textit{op. cit.}}, pp. 8, 16 and 27-29.

\textsuperscript{58}See a United States Congressional Bill known as the "Byrd Amendment Act" passed in 1971 which authorized U.S. companies and Government agencies to import Rhodesian chrome and other minerals: "Department Comments on Legislation on Rhodesian Chrome Imports," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXVI, No. 1720 (June 12, 1972), pp. 815-816.
"does not buy sugar from Cuba" (which is just some 150 kilometers away from its shores) "because it disapproves of Cuba's policies and hopes to disrupt its economy by imposing a trade boycott."⁵⁹ Instead, the U.S. prefers to buy part of its sugar requirements from apartheid South Africa, which lies more than 11,000 kilometers away from its shores. Thus:

when the United States revoked Cuba's sugar quota after the 1959 revolution there, it reassigned part of it to South Africa. The quota guarantees South African sugar producers a constant volume of American business at a fixed price above the average world market price.⁶⁰

In sum, the importance of apartheid South Africa, and Southern Africa in general, to the United States as a supplier of a wide range of important and crucial raw resources is readily apparent.

Turning to Canada, a similar situation exists with regard to the nature and significance of items traded each way with Southern Africa during the period under review. Canadian manufactured goods exported to the region during the twelve-year period consisted mainly of electric and non-electric machinery; telecommunications and transport equipment; railway and road vehicles; ships and boats; aircraft and marine engines and parts; sports

⁵⁹Race to Power, ARG, op. cit.

⁶⁰Ibid.'
firearms and ammunition; and wood pulp and paper.\textsuperscript{61} One
source listed Canada, along with France, the U.K. and the
U.S., as one of the countries from which South Africa
received unspecified military assistance during the period
under study.\textsuperscript{62} Whether true or not, the importance of
Southern Africa to Canada as a market for its manufactures
during this period is, nevertheless, unmistakable.

Southern Africa was also clearly of importance
as a source of raw materials for Canada during the period
1960-1971. Prominent among Canada's imports from the
region during this period were; magnesium and manganese;
chromium, nickel, cobalt, lead, and copper ores; crude
petroleum; diamonds; karakul lamb furs; tobacco; coffee;
packages of foodstuffs;\textsuperscript{63} and wines and distilled alcoholic
beverages.\textsuperscript{64} None among these and other items appears to

\textsuperscript{61}Trade of Canada: Exports by Countries, Annual Series,
1960-1971, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. See also Com-
modity Trade Statistics, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{62}Robert C. Sellers, Armed Forces of the World, Third

\textsuperscript{63}Trade of Canada: Imports by Countries, Annual Series,
1960-1971, Dominion Bureau of Statistics. See also
Commodity Trade Statistics, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{64}Apartheid South Africa's "Paarl" wine and brandy
have become so popular in Canada that they are advertised
frequently in Canadian and other North American magazines
and TV commercials. For example, South Africa's "Five
Star Paarl Brandy" is often advertised as "Canada's best
have attracted more public attention and aroused more political controversy in Canada than the importation of Angola's oil and "blood-stained" coffee, as well as its purchases of South Africa's wines and fruits during the period under review. In 1970 alone, for instance, Canada imported $24 million worth of crude petroleum and $10.2 million worth of coffee from Angola. By the year ending September, 1972, Gulf Oil Company, operating in Angola's Cabinda province, had produced some 6.2 million tons of crude petroleum, of which 2.3 million tons or 37% had been shipped to this country. Also, according to Statistics


68 The rest of the oil went to the U.S., Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, Trinidad and Tobago, and South Africa, among others, to the extent that Angola "had to import additional quantities of diesel oil, gasoline and kerosene to meet local needs." For details, see "Foreign Exploitation in Angola," in Objective Justice, Vol. VI, No. 1 January/February/March, 1974, pp. 38-39.
Canada, "at least 11 percent of Canada's green coffee imports" was coming from Angola during the early 1970's, making Angola Canada's second largest supplier (after Brazil) of this commodity.\(^{69}\) Thus, the importance of Southern Africa to Canada, as to the other Western states in this study, is quite apparent.

It must be added in parentheses, however, that, although almost every Western state in the study exported to Southern Africa goods of a military nature (or potential) in exchange for raw resources during the period under review, perhaps no country outranked France as the region's largest arms merchant. Over the period 1961-1971, South Africa's apartheid regime acquired $145 million worth of arms from France, as compared to arms worth $97 million from the U.K., $40 million from the U.S., and $11 million from other countries, according to very conservative estimates.\(^{70}\) Italy and Belgium are also among the countries

\(^{69}\) Statistics Canada: Trade Report, January-September, 1972.

\(^{70}\) Bruce Oudes, "United States' Year in Africa," in Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, 1973-74 (New York: Africana Publishing Corporation, 1975), p. A43, according to information supplied by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). It is difficult, however, to evaluate precisely the aspect of the states' arms trade with Southern Africa because such trade was in some cases not direct. Some states, especially the NATO allies, for instance, recorded their arms sales to Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique (Portugal's three African colonies), as sales to Portugal. For further details, see S.J. Bosgra and C. van Krimpen, Portugal and NATO, op. cit., pp. 32-45. In addition to this handicap, states do generally tend to
which maintained constant sales of arms to the regimes in the region as sizeable portions of their trade relations with the area during the period under review.\textsuperscript{71}

In sum, whether or not the nature of the items traded each way by each of the eleven states at all affects the rank ordering of states indicated in Table 1 cannot be readily determined. What the commodities do reflect, however, is the importance to virtually all of the eleven states\textsuperscript{72} of their trade relations with Southern Africa, regardless of the dollar value of that trade for each state or the proportion which it comprises of each state's world trade. This is a consideration which needs to be borne in mind when later this thesis examines the comparatively low level of support for Southern African liberation of virtually all the states in the study.

\textsuperscript{71}For states' arms sales to regimes in Southern Africa, see \textit{Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbooks, 1968-1975}, Annual Publications.

\textsuperscript{72}Denmark could be a possible exception, for its two-way trade with the region during the period covered here was the least significant in almost all respects. Available trade data indicate that Southern Africa has been neither a significant export market for Danish processed goods nor an important supplier of raw materials to Denmark.
b) **The Relative Importance of the States' Southern African Trade**

Of equal if not greater importance than the total dollar value of trade in measuring the significance to a state of its trade with Southern Africa is the percentage of its world trade that its trade with the region represents. Tables 2 and 3 show the percentages of each state's world trade accounted for by its exports to and imports from Southern Africa during the period under study. They reveal that a higher proportion of the United Kingdom's world trade is with Southern Africa than is true of any other state in the study. This is particularly true with respect to exports. During the entire period 1960-1971, the United Kingdom's annual exports to the region constituted roughly 5% of its total world exports. This average was highest (about 6%) during Period II. Imports from the area as a percentage of world total British imports also reached their highest point during this period (about 4%), suggesting that the British economy was undergoing a certain degree of expansion.

With regard to both exports and imports, the U.K. is followed by Japan and the U.S., but for both states their trade with Southern Africa during the period under study represented a substantially lower percentage of their total world trade than for the U.K.

Table 4 compares Southern Africa's share in each of the eleven states' total world trade (i.e., exports and imports combined).
## TABLE 2

**EXPORTS: PERCENTAGE OF EACH STATE’S TOTAL WORLD EXPORTS GOING TO SOUTHERN AFRICA**

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## TABLE 3

**IMPORTS: PERCENTAGE OF EACH STATE’S TOTAL WORLD IMPORTS COMING FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA**

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Source: Data in both tables were computed from trade figures in IMF and IBRD, Direction of Trade, Annual Series, 1960-1971; op. cit.
### TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF EACH STATE'S TOTAL TRADE WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA AS A PROPORTION OF ITS TOTAL WORLD TRADE, 1960-1971 (States are ranked in descending order according to their totals).

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</table>

Source: Direction of Trade, IMF and IBRD, _op. cit._

Not surprisingly, the United Kingdom is again in the leading position. Throughout the period 1960-1971, an average of 4% of the U.K.'s total annual world trade was conducted with Southern Africa. As in Tables 2 and 3, Japan placed second and the U.S. followed close behind.

Italy, Australia, and Belgium also showed significant levels of trade with Southern Africa relative to their total world trade, i.e., levels in the one percent range, while for France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and Denmark, their
trade with the region consistently amounted to less than one percent of their total world trade during the period under study.

In sum, relative to states' total world trade, Southern Africa has been of high importance only to the U.K. It is of just moderate importance in world terms to Japan, the U.S., Italy, Australia, and Belgium, and of still lesser importance of the five remaining states in the study.

c) The Growth Rate of the States' Southern African Trade

The importance to the eleven states in the study of their trade with Southern Africa can in part be measured by how fast that trade grew during the period under review. The data in Tables 5 and 6 show the average annual rates at which each state's exports to and imports from the region increased over the twelve-year period. France led on the exports side with an annual average rate of increase of some 20 percent; whereas on the imports side, it was Denmark which took the lead by quite a wide margin - an annual average rate of increase of 37%. France's strong standing in the growth rate of its exports was in sharp contrast to its situation in respect to the growth rate of its imports from the area, as it ranked second last with an annual rate of increase of only 4%. Its high average rate of increase in exports was attributable, in part, to the boost it had between 1962 and 1963 when its exports to Southern Africa
### TABLE 5

**STATES' TOTAL EXPORTS TO SOUTHERN AFRICA: ANNUAL AVERAGE RATE OF INCREASE**

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<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 6

**STATES' TOTAL IMPORTS FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA: ANNUAL AVERAGE RATE OF INCREASE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
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<td>12.8</td>
<td>26.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>11.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>11.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
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<td>4.3</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12.5</td>
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<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Data in both tables were computed from IMF and IBRD, Direction of Trade, op. cit.
increased by 81%, the highest for any country in a single year. On the imports side, France experienced a sharp drop from an annual average rate of increase of 13% during Period I to -2% during Period II.

Similar contrasting situations exist with regard to Australia and Canada. For example, while it ranked second on the exports side with an annual average rate of increase of 16%, Australia ranked last on the imports side with an average rate of increase of barely 4%. Likewise, Canada, which ranked third on the side of imports with 22% as its annual average rate of increase, placed last on the side of exports where it maintained an annual growth rate of less than 1% over the period under review.

On the whole, while there was no discernible trend in the growth rates for both exports and imports, it is clear that the annual average rate of increase of imports was generally higher than that for exports. This suggests that increasingly Southern Africa has become important to the West as a supplier of raw materials rather than as a market area for the finished goods of Western states.

With regard to overall growth rates in the eleven states' trade with Southern Africa during the period under review, the data in Table 7 show that Japan and Denmark had the highest annual average rates of total trade increase.

### TABLE 7

 STATES' TOTAL TRADE WITH SOUTHERN AFRICA:  
ANNUAL AVERAGE RATE OF INCREASE, 1960–1971  
(States are ranked in descending order of  
their totals).

<table>
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<td>Australia</td>
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<td>6.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
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<td>9.3</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Direction of Trade, op. cit.*

(20% and 19%, respectively) during the twelve-year period, followed fairly closely by France and Belgium. Although, on the whole, no clear-cut categories are discernible among the states in terms of growth rates in their Southern African trade, the above four states have clearly experienced the most rapid rates of increase while for the remainder the pace of growth has not been as spectacular. It is also interesting to note that the U.K. and the U.S., which (together with Japan) were prominent in terms of the total
dollar value and percentage of their world trade with Southern Africa, placed last and second last in terms of growth rates. By contrast, Denmark, which was last in dollar value and percentage terms of its world trade going to Southern Africa, was second under this category.

Most of the eleven states experienced marked fluctuations in the growth of their trade with Southern Africa. For instance, for Denmark, France, Australia, Canada, the Netherlands, and the United States, the annual average rates of increase declined from Period I to Period II, picking up again during Period III. Belgium, on the other hand, showed a declining trend from Period II to Period III. Only Japan, Italy, and the United Kingdom showed a steadily declining trend in the rate of increase of their trade, while only Sweden's rate of increase climbed steadily over the three periods. The fluctuating nature of the growth rates of most of the eleven states' trade with the region impairs the utility of this measure in rank ordering states in terms of the importance to them of their Southern African trade. It is not, however, without value. Rather than suggesting that Southern African trade may be of lesser importance to the U.K. and the U.S. than the earlier tables indicated (for their trade with the region in volume and relative world terms is already significant whether or not it experiences rapid future increases), it perhaps suggests that for states like Denmark, which ranked low employing the other measures, trade with Southern Africa is,
nevertheless, still important because of its growth potential.

In conclusion, it can be said that the importance to the eleven Western states in the study of their trade with Southern Africa during the period 1960-1971, manifests itself in different ways depending on what basis of measurement is used. For example, for the U.K., the U.S., and Japan, their Southern African trade is highly important to them in terms of its dollar value, the nature of commodities exchanged (particularly as demonstrated in the U.S. case), and its proportion of their world trade. For Japan, Denmark, and France, on the other hand, it is important to them in terms of its growth rate. However, for all the eleven states in the study, their Southern African trade seems important in one way or another, and particularly in terms of the region's value both as an export market for surplus finished goods and as a convenient supplier of needed raw materials. This finding is of importance for the later explanation of the relatively low level of support of all eleven states for Southern African liberation.

For the purposes of comparing the eleven states' Southern African trade with their support for African liberation in Chapter III, not all three measures of trade importance employed above are used. The dollar value measure is discarded because it does not take into account the relative strengths of the economies of the eleven states in the study. The growth rate measure is also rejected because
of the difficulties stemming from the fluctuations in these data and because this measure does not take account of the already substantial trade ties of states like the U.K. and the U.S. with the region. Thus, the proportion of the states' Southern African trade to their world trade (Table 4) has been selected as the best measure for comparing the states' trade relation with the region with their support for Southern African liberation in the analysis in Chapter III.

2) Western Investment in Southern Africa

Another important way to assess the nature and extent of a state's economic involvement with another state is to examine its investment in the host country. The present section seeks to look at this particular aspect of the eleven capitalist states' economic involvement with the colonial regimes in Southern Africa with a view to evaluating the significance to them of their investment in the region during the period 1960-1971. In doing so, specific attention is drawn to the value and profitability of such investment. Foreign investment in Southern Africa, like investment elsewhere, takes many forms: long-term and short-term; private direct and private non-direct; official funds invested in government stock; loan stock; shares, bills; current accounts, as well as other forms of debt, except
contingent liabilities. However, for the purpose of the present study, it is private direct investment that deserves the closest attention for two basic reasons. First, foreign private direct investment in Southern Africa represents the largest bulk (about 70%) of all foreign capital invested in the region; and second, and perhaps most important, it constitutes investment in enterprises which are controlled from abroad, and thus represents a more significant economic stake in the area than do other forms of investment.

This study has found that each of the eleven capitalist states in the study has maintained some level of investment operations in Southern Africa over the period under review. However, the available data on each state's investment in the region are too sketchy to allow for a systematic and empirical comparative analysis. Thus, this section will only briefly sketch the nature of Western investment in Southern Africa, illustrating that 1) virtually all of the states in this study have relatively important investment links with the region and 2) to some extent at


75 Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa, Unit on Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1970, p. 3.

least the investment pattern reinforces that of trade; in particular the United Kingdom and the United States, which ranked first and second in terms of the importance to them of their trade links with the area similarly rank first and second with respect to the importance to them of Southern Africa as an outlet for foreign investment.

The total value of foreign assets in South Africa and Namibia was $3,685 million at the end of 1960\(^77\) (investment elsewhere in Southern Africa has been very modest). Of this amount, $2,344 million or 64% was accounted for by the United Kingdom, followed by the United States with $456 million or 13% of the total. France and Belgium accounted for 6% and 2% respectively of the total; whereas the remaining 15% was accounted for by other states and international organizations.\(^78\) By 1966,\(^79\) Britain accounted for $3,042 million or 57.3% of the total value of foreign assets in South Africa and Namibia, while the U.S. accounted for $697 million or 13% of the total, France for $279 million or 5.3%, and Belgium-Luxembourg for $58 million or 1.1%

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\(^78\) Ibid.

\(^79\) Since 1966, no more investment data has been made available on individual countries' capital holdings in South Africa and Namibia.
of the total.\textsuperscript{80}

With the U.K. and the U.S. accounting for the bulk of total foreign assets in South Africa and Namibia, it follows that they also have the largest share of foreign private direct investment there. During the early 1960's, the U.K. and the U.S. "owned 64.2 and 14.2 percent respectively of total foreign direct investment in the apartheid republic" and Namibia.\textsuperscript{81} French investors in the area have generally lagged far behind in this respect, as they have tended to prefer non-direct private investment over direct investment.\textsuperscript{82}

During the period 1960–1963, or Period I, the total book value of the U.K.'s direct investment in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, and Rhodesia combined averaged $867 million per year.\textsuperscript{*} It amounted to $1,414 million during Period II (1964–1967) and $1,767 million during Period III (1968–1971).\textsuperscript{83} Thus, the annual average book value of the

\textsuperscript{80}Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa, 1968, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{81}Oil, Banking, and Insurance Companies are excluded. See du Plessis, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 186.

\textsuperscript{82}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 186–187.

\textsuperscript{*}The value of British direct investment in Angola is not available.

\textsuperscript{83}These figures, which exclude oil, banking, and insurance companies, were furnished by the U.K. Department of Industry in response to a letter from the author. For further details, see Board of Trade Journal, September 23, 1970; Trade and Industry, November 15, 1973; and Business Monitor, Miscellaneous Series, Overseas Transactions, M4, 1971. For conversion of data from pound sterling into U.S. dollars, see R.L. Bidwell, \textit{Currency Conversion Tables} (London: Rex...
U.K.'s total direct investment in the four Southern African countries was $1,349 million during the period 1960-1971, representing more than 11% of total British direct investment overseas during this twelve-year period. British direct investment in Southern Africa during the 1960's was exceeded only by her investment in Australia and Canada which was 17% and 13% respectively of the U.K. total. 84 Her direct investment in the region even surpassed that in the U.S. which represented only 9% of her total during the 1960's. 85

Furthermore, British total direct investment in Southern Africa during the decade ending 1971 constituted 74% of her total direct investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. It was 36% of total British direct investment in all Commonwealth developing countries, equal to 50% of her direct investment in the European Economic Community (EEC) countries, and was 74% of her similar investment in South and Central America during the same period. 86 By the end of 1971, over 700 British firms or their associates were conducting

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85 Ibid., p. 10.

86 Data were computed from investment figures in Trade and Industry, Vol. XIII, No. 7 (November 15, 1973), pp. 368-369.
private investment operations in Southern Africa, more than 80% of which were planted in South Africa. Both the British Government and its agencies have shares in one or the other British corporation operating in the region. For example, British Petroleum (BP) "is the largest industrial grouping in the United Kingdom, with 49% of its shares owned by the United Kingdom Government." The United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority has substantial interests in the British mining company, the Rio Tinto Zinc Corporation, for the supply of uranium from Namibia and South Africa. In addition, a large number of British Members of Parliament hold directorships in British corporations which have Southern African connections. These relationships do clearly suggest policy implications for the U.K. Government toward the region.

For the United States, which is the second largest investor in Southern Africa, the average annual book value

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87 This information was contained in a letter to the author from Mr. G.S. Peckham (per Mr. J.F. Bacon) for the U.K. Department of Industry, dated June 4, 1976.


of its direct investment in South Africa and Namibia\textsuperscript{91} amounted to $341 million during Period I; it was $566 million during Period II and $820 million during Period III for an overall average of $576 million during the period 1960–1971.\textsuperscript{92} This represented 1.1% of the United States' total direct investment abroad during the period under review. Looking at U.S. direct investment in Africa as a whole, between 25% and 30% was in South Africa and Namibia during the decade ending 1971.\textsuperscript{93} By 1971, some 400 U.S. companies or their associates\textsuperscript{94} and 6,000 U.S. agencies\textsuperscript{95} were active in South Africa and Namibia. Given the extent of U.S. dependence on Southern Africa's strategic minerals, "an interrelationship developed" between the American-based multinational corporations operating in the region and the U.S. Government to the extent that "the corporations involved in the

\textsuperscript{91} Data on the value of the United States direct investment in Angola, Mozambique, and Rhodesia were not available.


\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Ibid.}
extractive sector benefitted from official U.S. Government loan assistance in the development of mines and infrastructure..." and the U.S. Government "increasingly assumed the role of a major recipient - or buyer of the minerals produced by these corporations."  

In comparison with the United Kingdom, the United States' direct investment in Southern Africa is smaller in terms of book value, its proportion to U.S. total investment abroad, and the number of corporations involved. However, the significance to the U.S. of its direct investment in the region goes far beyond what figures alone could indicate. Unlike the U.K. investors, who invest in almost every existing industrial sector, the American corporate investment in the region concentrates mainly in the most strategic sectors of the economy, such as mining and smelting, petroleum, and manufacturing. This strategic investment by the U.S. corporations has contributed heavily to industrialization, long-range economic growth, technological development, and military capability.  

Regarding the book value of the direct investment in Southern Africa of other states in the study over the period under review, the data are too scantly to allow for

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96 Ian Mackler, Patterns for Profit..., op. cit., pp. 47-48.

97 See Race to Power, ARG, op. cit., p. 107, and Ruth First, "Foreign Investment in Apartheid South Africa," op. cit., p. 25.
meaningful analysis. It does appear, however, that France ranks third in terms of the book value of its investments in the region. Its direct investment in South Africa and Namibia amounted to $92 million in 1961, and was $134 million by the end of 1966 (these are the only two years for which data are available). Interestingly, as with its exports to the region, French investments in Southern Africa have been concentrated in the military sector, including the manufacture of Panhard armoured cars and the development of an all-weather surface-to-air missile system. In terms of total foreign assets in South Africa and Namibia up to the end of 1966, Belgium ranked fourth, as indicated above, but no more recent data is available for that country. Its investments have been concentrated in the military sector

\[98\] du Plessis, op. cit., p. 185.
\[99\] Ibid.

\[100\] "Nearly all the N.A.T.O. countries permit their corporations to invest in the South African armaments industry. . . . All these governments permit their citizens to accept jobs in the South African arms industry. " France, the U.S., the U.K., Italy, Belgium, etc., are such countries. In fact, one of the U.S. auto companies, Kaiser Jeep, operates in Southern Africa. It is one of the world's largest manufacturers of tactical military vehicles and has supplied jeeps to the armies of the white racist and minority regimes in the region over the years. For details, see Jackson, op. cit., pp. 36-37; Race to Power . . ., op. cit., pp. 124-125; and Ruth First, et al, The South African Connection , op. cit., pp. 135-136. In any case, most, if not all, Western investment operations in Southern Africa have military potential. The auto plants there, viz., General Motors, Ford, Chrysler, Leyland, etc., can be easily converted into producing military vehicles."
and banking.\textsuperscript{101}

Turning to Canada, for which some data on its investment in Southern Africa are available, the annual average book value of its direct investment in South Africa and Namibia amounted to $38 million over the period 1965-1967 and $67 million over the 1968-1970 period.\textsuperscript{102} Canada's direct investment in these two countries over the 1965-1970 period represented 1.2\% of its total direct investment abroad,\textsuperscript{103} the same percentage as for the U.S. Canada's direct investment in Southern Africa constituted more than 60\% of its direct investment in all Africa during the decade ending in 1971.\textsuperscript{104} Canadian-based multinational corporations have trebled their presence in the region from about 10 in the mid-1960's to about 30 by the early 1970's.\textsuperscript{105}


\textsuperscript{103}Data were computed from Statistics Canada, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{104}See, for instance, Robert O. Matthews, "Canada and Anglophone Africa," in Lyon and Ismael, eds., \textit{Canada and the Third World, op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{105}Clyde Sanger, "Canadian Firms Just as Bad," \textit{Guardian}, May 26, 1973.
With respect to Swedish investment in Southern Africa during the period under review, it, too, has been concentrated in South Africa with 77% of total Swedish assets in Africa being located in South Africa by 1970.\textsuperscript{106} The Swedish Central Bank reported that the annual book value of Swedish investment in the apartheid republic was in the range of $5 - 5.4 million over the 1961-1970 period.\textsuperscript{107}

However, an independent research report revealed that the value of Swedish investment in South Africa amounted to $14 million at the end of 1960 and $48 million in 1970.\textsuperscript{108} Another source estimated Swedish investment in South Africa at $60 million by 1971.\textsuperscript{109} Sixteen Swedish firms (or 70% of all Swedish companies on the African Continent\textsuperscript{110}) were active in production and marketing in South Africa at the

\textsuperscript{106}This information was revealed in a study conducted by the Swedish Industries Association in 1970. See Ake Magnusson, \textit{Swedish Investments in South Africa}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 13.

\textsuperscript{107}This information was contained in a letter to the author from the Swedish Export Council, dated July 15, 1976.

\textsuperscript{108}Magnusson, \textit{op. cit.}


\textsuperscript{110}Magnusson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 13. "Swedish manufacturing companies operate in several African states, but the factories are usually smaller than those in South Africa... Out of ten Swedish companies situated on the Continent of Africa, seven were situated in South Africa... and 82% of the corresponding employees in Africa worked in plants located in South Africa."
beginning of the 1970's.\footnote{See Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-72, op. cit., p. B369.}

Regarding Australia, the book value of its direct investment in South Africa and Rhodesia combined amounted to $11.4 million during 1969-1970, and was $13 million at the end of 1971, according to information supplied by the Australian Treasury Department.\footnote{This information was contained in a memo from Australia's Treasury Department, dated August 19, 1976, in response to a letter from the author.} However, an independent source contends that "Australia's direct capital invested in South Africa" ran "into hundreds of millions..." of dollars by the early 1970's.\footnote{See Ron Winton, "Australia and Apartheid: The Ties that Bind," in Australian Quarterly, op. cit., p. 27.} It is estimated that a total of 53 Australian companies were operating in Southern Africa by this time.\footnote{Ibid.}

As for the Netherlands, the value of its investments in Southern Africa was estimated at $55 million by 1970,\footnote{See Africa Contemporary Record, 1971-72, op. cit., p. B369.} the only year for which data are available. No statistical information is available for Japan, Italy and Denmark. However, Japan's investments in the region are known to have mushroomed in the late 1960's and early 1970's, and some 70 Japanese firms are active in the automotive,
electrical appliance and rubber industries.\textsuperscript{116} Italy, on the other hand, has important investments in the region's military sector, including the manufacture of jet-fighter bombers.\textsuperscript{117}

With regard to the rate at which the value of Western direct investment in Southern Africa has been growing during the period under study, the available data which are limited mainly to the U.K. and the U.S. indicate a relatively high rate of increase. The book value of the U.K.'s direct investment in the region increased by 143\% from $786 million in 1961 to $1,912 million in 1971.\textsuperscript{118} For the U.S., the corresponding increase was 210\% from $311 million in 1961 to $964 million in 1971.\textsuperscript{119} Thus, despite its smaller magnitude, U.S. direct investment in Southern Africa has been growing faster than that of the U.K. However, for both states, the rate of their investment growth in the region has been 3-5 times faster than that of their


\textsuperscript{118}Data were derived from Board of Trade Journal, \textit{op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{119}Data were derived from Survey of Current Business, \textit{op. cit.}
trade during the period under study. As for Canada, the value of its direct investment in South Africa and Namibia increased by 128% from $32 million in 1965 to $73 million by 1970.\footnote{120}

On the whole, Western investment in Southern Africa has been growing faster during the late 1960's and the early 1970's than it did during the early 1960's. In fact, the growth rate of foreign direct investment in the region was retarded in the early 1960's, especially in the immediate aftermath of the Sharpeville massacre\footnote{121} at the beginning of 1960. Other related political events during this period, such as the incipient international boycotts and campaigns against apartheid in South Africa (leading, \textit{inter alia}, to its expulsion from the Commonwealth), generated fears among foreign investors in the region. Apprehensive that the profits they were so earnestly seeking in that country would soon be placed in jeopardy as a result of political change, foreign investors withdrew large sums from the troubled

\footnote{120}{The data were derived from Statistics Canada, \textit{Canada's International Investment Position: 1926-1970}, op. cit.}

\footnote{121}{On the 21st of March, 1960, some 20,000 unarmed and harmless Africans in South Africa were staging a peaceful demonstration in protest against the racist policies and practices of the South African regime, and demanding only their rightful existence in the land of their birth. As they approached municipal offices at a small South African town known as Sharpeville, the South African police opened fire on the marching crowd, killing 67 Africans and wounding 186 others, including 40 women and 8 children. For details, see Muriel Horrell, \textit{Days of Crisis in South Africa}, South African Institute for Race Relations, Fact Paper, No. 5/1960, pp. 9-10.}
republic. However, as confidence was restored, foreign funds began to flow back again into South Africa at an accelerated rate by the mid-1960's. For example, "a net outflow of $59 million in 1964 became an inflow of $358 million in 1965." British and American companies reversed the declining trend of investment by pumping into the South African and Namibian economies massive amounts of capital, which averaged $170 million and $98 million, respectively, per year during the period from 1968 to 1971.

With regard to types of direct investment in Southern Africa, the principal sector during the early stages of foreign direct investment was mining. This, however, was overtaken by investments in manufacturing and petroleum during the 1960's. Then, as the region's boom in base metals began to unfold in the late 1960's and the early 1970's, and as the Western states, especially the United States,
became "more and more dependent on Southern Africa" for their supplies of strategic minerals, the wheel turned full circle and mining became "once again an expanding area for Western investment in Southern Africa."\textsuperscript{126} The significance of the mining sector in foreign, especially U.S., investment in Southern Africa is one indication of the importance of that investment to the investing states, for it serves to facilitate the region's role as a supplier of raw resources for the industrialized economies of the West, as discussed in the section on trade.

Profits from investment provide another effective measure of the importance to states of their investment in Southern Africa. Although "the glitter of diamonds and gold provided the initial attraction for the large-scale investment of foreign capital in Southern Africa,"\textsuperscript{127} the principal factor that has led to the continuing interest of Western states in investments in the region has been the high degree of profitability of such investments. The

\textsuperscript{126} See Ruth First, et al, \textit{The South African Connection...}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 86.

\textsuperscript{127} See du Plessis, "Foreign Investment in South Africa," in Litvak and Maule (eds.), \textit{Foreign Investment...}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 181.
existence of plentiful, cheap African labour;\textsuperscript{128} the absence of strikes;\textsuperscript{129} the leniency of investment laws;\textsuperscript{130} and the "confidence" of foreign investors in the economic and

\textsuperscript{128} African workers are paid the lowest possible wages in Southern Africa. For example, an African mine worker gets $25 while his white counterpart gets $396, or 16 times more, per month. For details, see Industrialization, Foreign Capital, and Forced Labour in South Africa, Unit Against Apartheid, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, United Nations, New York, 1970. See also Heribert Adam, Modernizing Racial Domination: The Dynamics of South African Politics (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971), Chapters 5 and 6.

\textsuperscript{129} African workers constitute the largest pool of unskilled labour in Southern Africa and are prohibited by laws from forming labour and trade unions, or any kind of collective bargaining machinery. The black man in the region is considered neither a person nor an employee, but just a labour "unit." For details, see Joel Carlson, a white South African lawyer in exile, "South Africa's Violent Society," in New York Times, July 17, 1971. Apartheid legislation, such as the Industrial Conciliation Act and Native Labour Act, forbid strikes by African workers and penalise any such "law-breaker" with either a $1,400 fine or three years in jail, or both. For details, see Alex Hepled, South Africa: Workers Under Apartheid (London, 1969), pp. 12-78.

\textsuperscript{130} For example: "no legal disabilities or restrictions of any kind and consequence attach to foreign, as opposed to domestic, investments in the republic of South Africa... no foreign investment has ever been expropriated or nationalized in this country... scrupulous care has always been taken to ensure that the interests of foreign investors are in no way prejudiced..." The apartheid authorities "have never taken any steps to deny a foreign investor a fair and regular return, in terms of cash transfers, on his investment in the republic." Furthermore, the apartheid "exchange control authorities have always permitted the repatriation of dividends, interest, and even profits without restriction... this favourable treatment accorded foreign investors, together with the relatively high returns as well as the other advantages enjoyed by them in the republic, have probably made such investors less inclined to take any action which might incur official disfavour...." See du Plessis, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 195-196.
political stability of the Southern African regimes\textsuperscript{131} are the main factors making for what the \textit{New York Times} once described as "a good investment climate"\textsuperscript{132} in Southern Africa. An American journalist once summed up effectively the profitability of investments in Southern Africa:

The apartheid republic of South Africa has always been regarded by foreign investors as a gold mine, one of those rare and refreshing places where profits are great and problems small. Capital is not threatened by political instability or nationalization. Labour is cheap, the market booming, the currency hard and convertible. Such are the market attractions...\textsuperscript{133}

Actual figures for direct investment earnings are only available for the United Kingdom and the United States, the two leading investors in Southern Africa, but they are most likely indicative, for the reasons stated above, of the general profitability of investments in Southern Africa.

\textsuperscript{131}The managing director of Ford Company operating in apartheid South Africa once spoke of "the faith we have in South Africa." See "Industrial Review of Africa," \textit{New York Times}, May 7, 1956, p. 36. The president of the Jeffrey Company of Ohio states: "We have complete faith in the soundness of the South African economy, full confidence in the stability of the country, and know that the substantial investments we have made in the past and further investments we are presently making are all in good hands." Quoted in the Report of the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization, UN General Assembly Official Records, 21st Session, 1966, Document A/6300 Rev. 1, p. 270. Another Western business executive noted "I think South Africa is going to remain a strong country, led by White people." See \textit{Dun's Review and Modern Industries}, June, 1961, pp. 35-37.


of the eleven Western states under study.

Britain's total earnings from its direct investment in Southern Africa (excluding Angola) averaged $99 million yearly over Period I, $188 million over Period II, and $228 million over Period III, amounting to an annual average of $172 million during the 1960-1971 period.\textsuperscript{134} As for the U.S., its corporate earnings from the region (exclusive of Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia) averaged $66 million, $110 million, and $124 million annually during the three periods for an annual average of $100 million during the twelve-year period.\textsuperscript{135}

The U.K.'s corporate profits in Southern Africa increased by $164 million or 203% from 1960 to 1971 and the average annual rate of return over the period was 13%.\textsuperscript{136} The earnings from the U.K.'s direct investment in the region represented 15% of Britain's total earnings from its overall direct investment abroad during the period under study.\textsuperscript{137} The average rates of return on British direct

\textsuperscript{134} Data were derived from: Board of Trade Journal, op. cit.; Trade and Industry, op. cit.; and Business Monitor, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{135} Data were derived from Survey of Current Business, op. cit. See also Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa, United Nations, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{136} Data were derived from: Board of Trade Journal, op. cit.; Trade and Industry, op. cit.; and Business Monitor, op. cit. See also Foreign Investment..., U.N., op. cit.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.
investment in Southern Africa over the twelve-year period (1960-1971) "were not only substantially higher than corresponding rates on all British overseas direct investment, but were also, in each year of the period, more favourable than those recorded by British direct investment in major recipient countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia."

From the British government's point of view, the high rate of profits on investments in Southern Africa was particularly beneficial from the standpoint of its favourable effect on Britain's balance of payments position.

A similar situation exists with regard to U.S. corporate profits from the region. U.S. corporate earnings from Southern Africa increased by $91 million or 182% between 1960 and 1970, and the average annual rate of return on investments was 19% during the period 1960-1971. This represented 2% of U.S. total earnings form all its direct

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138 Average rates of return on British direct investment in these countries ranged between 6% and 10% annually over the same period. See Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa, United Nations, op. cit., and Trade and Industry, op. cit.


140 Data were derived from Survey of Current Business, op. cit., and Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa, United Nations, op. cit.
investment abroad during this period.\textsuperscript{141} A Wall Street investment-banker stated in 1961 that American corporations doing business in Southern Africa during the early 1960's were "averaging profits of 27 percent on invested capital."\textsuperscript{142} Another source, this time an official publication of the U.S. Department of Commerce, acknowledged in 1963 that average returns on U.S. corporate investment in South Africa and Namibia exceeded those in the U.S.\textsuperscript{143} Indeed, average rates of return on U.S. corporate investment in the region were higher than returns on U.S. investments elsewhere in the world which averaged between 9\% and 11\% annually. As with the U.K., American corporate profits from Southern Africa were desirable from the government's standpoint, since they contributed favourably to the U.S. balance of payments position over the period under study.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{141}Ibid.


\textsuperscript{144}Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa, United Nations, 1970, op. cit., p. 27.
In short, both the United Kingdom and the United States benefitted greatly during the 1960-1971 period from their corporate profits in Southern Africa, in terms of their dollar value, average rate of return, and their ratio to total direct investment earnings, according to available data. 145

In conclusion, the following points can be made regarding the economic involvement of the eleven states under study with Southern Africa on the basis of the above discussion of investment. First, the data reinforce the United Kingdom's standing (based on trade relations) as the country with easily the most important economic relationships with the region, and the United States as the second ranking state in this regard. Japan's second ranking position with respect to the eleven states' trade relations with Southern Africa has not been matched by its

145 While data are not available for the other states in the study, an unofficial Australian source estimated that the annual average rate of return on Australian investments in Southern Africa was 14% in the early 1970's. See Ron Winton, op. cit., p. 27. Canadian investment earnings from the region during the early 1970's were believed to be about 2% of Canada's total direct investment earnings. It is worth noting, in this regard, that statistics relating to foreign investments in Southern Africa are notoriously undervalued. See "Foreign Investment in Apartheid South Africa," Notes and Documents, No. 21/72, United Nations, op. cit., p. 2. "No company tells the truth. We all lie as much as we think we can get away with. We even lie about figures, so you can just imagine how much we lie about everything else," explained an American auto company executive resident in apartheid South Africa. For details, see John Blashill, "The Proper Role of U.S. Corporations in South Africa," op. cit., p. 91.
standing with respect to these states' investment in the region. Second, the analysis above also confirms Denmark's position as the state with the least important economic links with Southern Africa during the period covered by this study. Third, it is clear that the other states in the study fall between these two extremes, but no adjustments to the rank ordering indicated in the trade section are possible here because of the absence of sufficient investment data on these states. The third and fourth place rankings of France and Belgium with respect to the book value of the eleven states' investments in the region do suggest, however, that the two states' economic stake in Southern Africa is quite substantial despite their relatively low ranking in terms of trade with the region. Finally, it needs to be pointed out that ten of the eleven states in the study have significant investment relations with Southern Africa (particularly when the high rate of return on investments in the region is borne in mind), a factor which may help to explain why virtually all the states in the study have exhibited relatively low levels of support for Southern African liberation, as the next chapter will disclose.
CHAPTER III
THE NATURE OF STATES' SUPPORT FOR
AFRICAN NATIONAL LIBERATION
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

This chapter examines the nature and extent of the eleven states' official support for efforts at national liberation in Southern Africa during the period 1961-1972. The support period has been advanced one year compared to the period for economic involvement on the grounds that there is probably a lag time of at least one year before trade and investment figures are well known to decision makers and are capable of having an effect on the formulation of support policy. Support is empirically measured in this study in the following two ways: 1) states' voting records on the United Nations General Assembly resolutions, which called for decolonization in Southern Africa during this period; and 2) states' voluntary multilateral financial contributions to United Nations programmes related to efforts at decolonization in the region during the same period. Further, other forms of states' support in this regard are also looked into as available information permits.

However, as has already been admitted, the two methods being employed here, are certainly not the most perfect and accurate instruments for effectively gauging
the states' support or non-support for African liberation in Southern Africa. Voting for or against General Assembly resolutions calling on states to support Southern African liberation is one thing. Acting upon and abiding by the recommendations of those resolutions is a different matter. The former provides only a rudimentary way of measuring states' support or non-support, whereas the latter would provide a more effective way of measuring states' support or non-support for liberation efforts in the region. Similarly, states' provision of humanitarian assistance, whether financial or material or both, directly to recognized National Liberation Movements in Southern Africa would provide a better measure of support than their indirect aid to United Nations programmes related to the region. However, neither of these two instruments of measurement could be employed in this study due to lack of data for many of the states in the study. Nevertheless, the two measures employed here do provide satisfactory, if not ideal, means of assessing states' support or non-support for African liberation in the region during the period under review.
1) States' Voting Records on United Nations General Assembly Resolutions Calling For Support For Southern African Liberation

All the eleven states in the study voted, in one way or another, on a total of 145 United Nations General Assembly Resolutions (listed in Appendix A) which were selected for the purposes of this study. These resolutions, covering the period 1961-1971, inter alia, recognized the right of the oppressed people of Southern Africa to national freedom and independence; deplored, condemned, and called for the total liquidation of colonialism, racist domination, and foreign economic involvement and exploitation in the region; and, as a corollary, endorsed the legitimacy of the Southern African liberation struggle and reaffirmed United Nations support for efforts at decolonization in the region during the period under review.¹

For the purposes of this study, the central focus is on affirmative votes on the 145 resolutions examined. All of the resolutions were so worded that any affirmative vote would be indicative of support for African liberation.

¹These were not the only U.N. General Assembly resolutions passed on the subject during the period under examination. However, they were the only ones on which the votes of individual states were recorded. Some 50 or so additional Assembly resolutions pertinent to decolonization in Southern Africa were passed during the same period, but could not be included in this study because the votes were not recorded. For rules and procedures on voting in the U.N. General Assembly, see Sydney D. Bailey, The General Assembly of the United Nations... op. cit.
Abstentions and negative votes are regarded in this study as indicating non-support, and are disregarded in calculating states' levels of support. Thus, the measure of support with respect to UN voting is the number of affirmative votes cast relative to the total number of resolutions.

The data in Table 8 reveal that among the eleven states in the study, Japan (by a wide margin), Sweden, and Denmark were the states with the highest percentages of affirmative votes, 72%, 61%, and 59% respectively, out of the total of 145 roll-call votes. If one were to set 50% as the minimum score reflecting support, then only five of the eleven states were "supportive" of liberation with Italy and Canada only barely qualifying. The six remaining states fell below this minimal level, France and the U.K. easily ranking the lowest, with levels of support of only 32% and 30% respectively.

The data in Table 8 also reveal that the general level of support for UN resolutions on Southern African liberation was highest during Period I (1961-1964). Only two states, the U.K. and France, were below a 50% level of support. During this period, Sweden was ahead of all states in supportive voting. Eighty-one percent of its votes cast were supportive. In fact, Sweden's supportive voting during Period I was the highest of any state in the study during all three periods. Japan and Denmark ranked second, both voting affirmatively on 78% of resolutions. Italy, Canada, the U.S., and the Netherlands followed closely behind in
### TABLE 8

**The Eleven States' Voting Records on the United Nations' General Assembly Resolutions Calling for Support for the Decolonization of Southern Africa**

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<td>Japan</td>
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<td>27/38 - 71</td>
<td>49/71 - 69</td>
<td>104/145 - 72</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>29/36 - 81</td>
<td>18/38 - 47</td>
<td>41/71 - 58</td>
<td>88/145 - 61</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>28/36 - 78</td>
<td>16/38 - 42</td>
<td>41/71 - 58</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>26/36 - 72</td>
<td>14/38 - 37</td>
<td>32/71 - 45</td>
<td>72/145 - 50</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
<td>25/36 - 69</td>
<td>15/38 - 40</td>
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<td>Austral.</td>
<td>21/36 - 58</td>
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<td>Nethlds.</td>
<td>23/36 - 64</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
<td>19/36 - 53</td>
<td>14/38 - 37</td>
<td>31/71 - 44</td>
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<td>France</td>
<td>14/36 - 39</td>
<td>11/38 - 29</td>
<td>21/71 - 30</td>
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<td>U. K.</td>
<td>16/36 - 44</td>
<td>12/38 - 32</td>
<td>16/71 - 23</td>
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**Source:** Data were compiled and computed from United Nations Yearbook, Annual Publications, 1961-1972, Office of Public Information, United Nations, New York.

That order. The relatively high level of support of the U.S. for resolutions during this period is noteworthy in light of its poor performance in the later periods.

Period II (1965-1968) witnessed a failure of all states, but Japan, to support Southern African liberation
at a meaningful level in the UN General Assembly. Sweden and Denmark, however, again led the remaining states while France and the U.K. placed last (32%).

During Period III (1969-1972), Japan again topped the list, voting affirmatively on 69% of the decolonization resolutions. Sweden and Denmark (58%) were, as in the first period, the only other states which voted affirmatively on more than 50% of the resolutions, while the U.S. (34%), France (30%), and U.K. (23%) showed the lowest levels of support.

Thus, the level of the eleven states' supportive voting for Southern African liberation in the Assembly was on the average highest during Period I and lowest during Period II, with Period III falling in between the two. The relatively high level of supportive voting of Western states during Period I reflects in part the fact that the bulk of the Assembly resolutions during this period were mainly declaratory in nature and mild in tone as compared to a large number of action resolutions which evolved during the succeeding periods. Period II had the largest number of action resolutions, and in both the second and the third periods, the language of the resolutions was much stronger and harsher than it previously had been.²

²For the nature and tone of the General Assembly resolutions, see Thomas P. Keating, "Canadian Voting Behaviour on United Nations General Assembly Resolutions Dealing with Questions of Self-Determination and Decolonization," A Major Paper for a Master's degree, University of Windsor, 1976, pp. 21-25; see also pp. 26-44. For a more comprehensive analysis of factors likely to influence states' voting
It is worth noting that the level of support for Southern African decolonization displayed by Western states in the UNGA has always been generally lower than that manifested by Third World and Communist states. For instance, Assembly voting of states like Algeria, Cuba, India, Nigeria, Tanzania, the United Arab Republic, USSR, Yugoslavia, and Zambia, was 97% - 100% supportive of Southern African liberation during the period covered by this study. Thus, the level of affirmative voting by Japan, Sweden, and Denmark was high only relative to other Western, developed states.

A cursory look at the nature of some of the more important resolutions on Southern African decolonization, and how states voted on them in the UNGA during the period under review, helps provide additional insights into states' voting behavior in this regard.

Perhaps the most heralded resolution in the history of the United Nations General Assembly's concern over colonialism in general was Resolution 1514(XV) of December 14, 1960, which threw the entire world body behind efforts

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...on General Assembly resolutions, see Gabriella Rosner Lande, "The Effect of the Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly," op. cit., pp. 87-98. Professor Lande identified seven possible variables in this connection, namely: time and circumstances under which resolutions were adopted; nature of resolutions; methods and means; characteristics of votes; attitudes and expectations of member states; legal status of resolutions; and language of resolutions.

at decolonization. It was an authoritative interpretation and reinforcement of the United Nations Charter. It was more than a resolution, as it sounded like a political manifesto, a declaration of intent, purpose, and action. Hence, its title: "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."⁴ Eighty-nine states, including Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden, voted for it. Australia, Belgium, France, the U.K., and the U.S., of the states in the study, did not support it.⁵ A few excerpts from this declaratory resolution help to illustrate its significance.

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the people of the world in the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small... Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence... Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories... Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and, that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith,...


⁵ Ibid.
Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory, Solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations; And to this end Declares that: The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation. All peoples have the right to self-determination; ... Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as pretexts for delaying independence... Immediate steps shall be taken, in ... all... territories which have not yet gained independence, to transfer powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, ... All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration...

All subsequent General Assembly resolutions on the subject of decolonization and liberation of Southern Africa were, in one way or another, based on this declaration. In order to implement this declaration, a special committee was set up by Assembly Resolution 1654(XVI) of November 27, 1961. All but France, the U.K. and two other states supported the resolution. The committee, originally titled "The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to

6Ibid.

Colonial Countries and Peoples" consisted of twenty-four member states, including Australia, Denmark, Italy, the U.K. and the U.S.; hence, its name, the "Special Committee of 24". More recently, it has been referred to simply as the "Special Committee on Decolonization." In 1969, Australia withdrew from the Committee, and in 1971, the U.K. and the U.S. also withdrew. 8

The Assembly resolutions on colonial problems in Southern Africa during the period under review were generally overlapping and repetitious in nature. The subject matter which they dealt with ranged from the colonial and decolonization situation in the individual territories of the region to foreign economic involvement and exploitation in the area. Six major issue areas are identifiable in the resolutions: Namibia; apartheid in South Africa; Portugal's African colonies; Rhodesia; foreign support for and collaboration with the racist and colonial regimes in the region; and foreign economic involvement and interests in the area.

a) The Namibian question was dealt with in 31 resolutions for which there are recorded votes during the period under review. Prominent among them was General Assembly Resolution 2145(XXI) of October 27, 1966, by

which the United Nations terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia and placed the Territory "under the direct responsibility of the United Nations..." until it attains national independence. All the states in the study, but France and the U.K., supported this resolution. In order to implement this resolution, a United Nations Council for Namibia was established by General Assembly Resolution 2246 (XXII) of May 19, 1967, to take over from South Africa and administer the Territory until its independence. Only Japan, among all the states in the study, supported this step. Further, Assembly Resolution 2871(XXVI) of December 20, 1971, inter alia, reaffirmed the inalienable right of the Namibian people to national freedom and independence, the legitimacy of their national liberation struggle, and the United Nations' "direct responsibility" to lead the Territory to independence; welcomed the International Court of Justice's ruling (June 21, 1971), which reaffirmed the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and advised states to review their economic relations with the Territory accordingly; and urged the UN Secretary-General "to nominate as soon as possible a full-time United Nations Commissioner for Namibia...." Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden were the only states, of those in this

10Ibid., 1967, pp. 709-710.
study, which supported this resolution.\textsuperscript{11}

b) South Africa's apartheid policies and practices were lambasted in 42 General Assembly resolutions for which there are recorded votes over the period under study. Typical of the more moderate resolutions in this category was Assembly Resolution 1598(XV) of April 13, 1961, which decried and deprecated South Africa's policies "based on racial discrimination as reprehensible and repugnant to human dignity..." It was supported by all the states in the study.\textsuperscript{12} However, General Assembly Resolution 2624 (XXV) of October 13, 1970, which called upon all States to intensify arms embargoes against South Africa, as requested by Security Council Resolution 282 (1970) and previous Council and Assembly resolutions, was supported only by Belgium, Denmark, Japan, the Netherlands, and Sweden, of the states in this study.\textsuperscript{13} Resolution 2784(XXVI) of December 6, 1971, reaffirmed Assembly Resolution 2202A(XXI) of December 16, 1966, to the effect that apartheid is "a crime against humanity" and that the situation in South Africa "continues to pose a grave threat to international peace and security..." Both resolutions were supported only by Denmark and Sweden,

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Ibid.}, 1971, pp. 562-563.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}, 1961, p. 151.

among all the states in this study.\textsuperscript{14} Even as mild a resolution as Assembly Resolution 2923(D)(XXVII) of November 15, 1972, by which the General Assembly requested all Member States, in consultation with the Organization of African Unity, UNESCO, ILO, and other UN specialized agencies, to promote the widest possible dissemination of information about the evils and dangers of apartheid, racism, and colonialism in Southern Africa, as well as the United Nations' efforts to eradicate these evils, could not secure the support of all the states in this study. France, the U.K., and the U.S. did not support it.\textsuperscript{15}

c) Portugal's colonialism in Africa was dealt with by the UNGA in 17 resolutions on which the votes of individual states were recorded during the twelve-year period. The subject began to attract UN attention in the early 1960's and was one of the major colonial concerns in the General Assembly thereafter. Prompted by the Angolan people's popular uprising in 1960, the Assembly, by its Resolution 1603(XV) of April 20, 1961, viewed with concern the repressive measures taken by the colonial authority there; called upon the Portuguese government to heed the popular yearning for freedom and independence of the Angolan people; and established a sub-committee on Angola to examine

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., 1966, p. 89, and 1971, p. 402.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., 1972, p. 105.
conditions there and report back to the Assembly. Canada, Denmark, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the U.S., were the only states, of those in this study, which supported this resolution. 16 The report of the committee (which was expanded to cover all the Portuguese colonies) was approved by Assembly Resolution 1807(XVII) of December 14, 1962, which also condemned Portugal's colonial policies and practices and called upon it to decolonize its colonies according to UN demands. The resolution also requested the Security Council "to take all appropriate measures" against Portugal if it failed to comply. Only Japan and Sweden, of all the states in this study, supported this resolution. 17

Several other Assembly Resolutions, such as 2184 (XXI) of December 12, 1966; 2270(XXII) of November 17, 1967; and 2707(XXV) of December 14, 1970, which inter alia, reaffirmed "the inalienable right of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, and other Territories under Portuguese colonial domination to self-determination and independence..." and the legitimacy of their national liberation struggle, were supported only by Japan, of all the eleven states under study. 18 However, as the wars of national liberation in Portugal's African colonies gathered

16 Ibid., 1961, p. 140.
17 Ibid., 1962, p. 416.
momentum during the late 1960's and the early 1970's, support for Portugal's resistance to decolonization became less pronounced even among Portugal's NATO allies. In 1972, for instance, Assembly Resolution 2918(XXVII) of November 14, which, inter alia, affirmed that the African nationalist liberation movements in Portugal's African colonies "are the authentic representatives of the true aspirations of the people in those Territories," was supported by all states in the study, except for Belgium, France, the U.K., and the U.S.\(^\text{19}\)

4) The Rhodesian constitutional problem has been discussed in the UNGA since the early 1960's, but it did not become an acute issue in the Assembly until the unilateral declaration of independence by white minority settlers in that colony in November, 1965. The Rhodesian question was considered in 22 General Assembly resolutions for which there are recorded votes during the period under review. The Assembly's first reaction to Rhodesia's unilateral declaration came only a few hours after it was declared. In its Resolution 2024(XX) of November 11, 1965, the Assembly "condemned the unilateral declaration of independence made by the racist minority in Rhodesia..." and called upon the United Kingdom, which is the Administering Power, to crush the rebellion immediately. All the states in the study, except France and the United Kingdom, supported the

\(^{19}\text{Ibid, 1972, pp. 599-601.}\)
resolution. Resolution 2652(XXV) of December 3, 1970, inter alia, reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) to national freedom and independence and the legitimacy of their efforts to achieve that right. The Assembly also affirmed that any negotiated settlement with the racist minority regime in Salisbury had to be within the bounds of the provisions of GA Resolution 1514 (XV) to be acceptable; condemned the U.K.'s failure to topple the rebellion and to expel South African armed forces from that Territory; and called upon the United Kingdom to ensure that captured freedom fighters in Zimbabwe were treated as Prisoners of War. Only Japan, of all the states in the study, supported this particular resolution.

Assembly Resolution 2769(XXVI) of November 22, 1971, "reaffirmed the principle that there should be no independence before majority rule" in Zimbabwe and that any settlement for the future of that Territory had to be "worked out with the fullest participation of all nationalist leaders representing the majority of the people of Zimbabwe and must be endorsed freely by the people." Of all the states in this study, only Denmark, Japan and Sweden supported this resolution. In its Resolution 2945(XXVII)

20Ibid., 1965, p. 131.
21See pp. 96-98 above.
23Ibid., 1971, p. 110.
of December 7, 1972, the Assembly, inter alia, called upon the United Kingdom Government, the Administering Power in Rhodesia, to ensure the unconditional release of all political prisoners, the repeal of all repressive discriminatory pieces of legislation, and removal of all restrictions on African political activities in that country. It also urged the U.K. to convene, as soon as possible, a national constitutional conference on Zimbabwe and ensure a settlement acceptable to the majority of the people there. Only Australia, Denmark, Japan, and Sweden, of all the states in this study, supported this resolution. 24

e) That states should deny any kind of assistance to the colonial and racist regimes in Southern Africa, and instead provide support to African liberation movements in the region was stipulated in 30 Assembly resolutions for which there are recorded votes of each state during the period covered by this study, especially in resolutions of the late 1960's and the early 1970's. For instance, in its Resolution 2202A(XXI), which was supported only by Denmark and Sweden, of all states in this study, the Assembly, inter alia, deplored states' increasing collaboration with the apartheid regime in South Africa; called for economic, financial, military, and political disengagement by states from that regime; and appealed to all states to provide

24 Ibid., 1972, pp. 132-133.
"effective political, moral, and material assistance to all those combatting the policies of apartheid...". In its Resolution 2879(XXVI) of December 20, 1971, the General Assembly, inter alia, reaffirmed the vital importance of the "widest possible dissemination of information on the evils and dangers of colonialism..." and the "virtues of national liberation struggle..." in Southern Africa. Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, and Sweden, were the only states, of the eleven in this study, which supported this resolution. In its Resolution 2980(XXVII) of December 14, 1972, the Assembly reaffirmed that the recognition by the United Nations of the legitimacy of the national liberation struggle in Southern Africa, "entails, as a corollary, the extension by the United Nations system...of all the necessary moral and material assistance to the national liberation movements" in the region, especially in their liberated areas. At the same time, the Assembly urged that all specialized agencies and organizations within the UN system "withhold" from colonial Portugal, apartheid South Africa, and the illegal racist minority regime in Zimbabwe, "any financial, economic, technical, and other assistance...until they renounce their policies of racial discrimination and colonial oppression...". This resolution was supported.

25 Ibid., 1966, p. 89.
26 Ibid., 1971, pp. 523-524.
only by Australia, of all the states in this study.27

f) Finally, the problem of foreign economic involvement with Southern Africa's colonial regimes, as an impediment to decolonization of the region, was cited in 15 resolutions of the General Assembly for which there are recorded votes during the period under review, especially in the resolutions of the late 1960's and the early 1970's. In its Resolution 2054A(XX) of December 15, 1965, for example, the General Assembly, *inter alia*,”urgently appealed to the major trading partners” of South Africa "to cease their economic collaboration" with that country's racist regime. Only Denmark and Sweden, of the eleven states in the study, supported this resolution.28 In its Resolution 2554(XXIV) of December 12, 1969, which was supported only by Japan, of the states in this study, the General Assembly, *inter alia*, attacked the activities of foreign and international financial interests which, the resolution argued, impede the process of decolonization of Southern Africa; condemned the exploitation of human and material resources of the colonized territories in the region by the colonial powers and their international financiers; and "requested the administering powers and states concerned whose companies

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and nationals are engaged in such activities to take immediate measures to put an end to all practices" of exploiting colonized peoples and their territories in the region. 29

Further, in its Resolution 2765(XXVI) of November 16, 1971, the General Assembly called upon the United States Government to heed UN sanctions against Rhodesia and stop its Rhodesian chrome imports. Of the states in the study, this resolution was supported only by Australia, Denmark, Japan, and Sweden. 30 In its Resolutions 2946(XXVII) of December 7, 1972, and 2979(XXVII) of December 14, 1972, both of which were supported only by Australia, of the states in this study, the Assembly contended that the activities of foreign economic, financial, and other interests in Southern Africa "constitute a major obstacle to political independence and to the enjoyment of the natural resources by the indigenous inhabitants..." of the region; condemned the continued collaboration in trade of South Africa, Portugal, and the United States with the rebel colony of Rhodesia; and requested all Governments "to ensure strict compliance by all individuals and bodies corporate under their jurisdiction" with the United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia's illegal regime, and to widen the scope.

29 Ibid., 1969, p. 653.

of those sanctions to include South Africa and Portugal. It also "invited" all Governments, specialized agencies, and other organizations within the United Nations system "to give widespread and continuous publicity" to all sanctions-busters and to the UN decolonization efforts in this respect.31

The above data illustrate very generally the differing voting behaviour of the eleven states on moderate, declaratory Assembly resolutions: Japan, Sweden and Denmark (and Australia during the period of Gough Whitlam's Labour Government) were most frequently able to support these resolutions, although these states objected to the language and/or content of at least some of the resolutions; the U.K., U.S., and France were the least frequently able to support these resolutions; while the other states in the study fell in the middle.

Not surprisingly, the same broad groupings emerge when one examines negative as opposed to affirmative votes on the 145 Assembly resolutions under analysis. For the U.K. and the U.S., 30% of their votes cast were negative. The percentages for Australia, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Canada and Italy were 16%, 15%, 13%, 12%, 7%, and 3% respectively, while only 1% of the votes of Japan, Sweden,

31 Ibid., 1972, pp. 134-136, and 567-569. See also Weidi N. Mwasakafyuka, "Foreign Economic Interests - A Major Obstacle to Decolonization in Southern Africa," op. cit.
and Denmark were negative; in other words, these three states tended to abstain rather than vote against those resolutions about which they had reservations.\textsuperscript{32}

Finally, it is important to point out that none of the eleven states in this study exhibited high levels of support for the General Assembly's important action resolutions dealing with Southern Africa during the period covered by this study. Even for states like Japan, Sweden and Denmark their supportive voting was substantial only for moderate, declaratory resolutions. Thus, none of the eleven states in this study supported any of the following "action" resolutions on decolonization in Southern Africa: i) Resolution 1899(XVIII) of November 13, 1963, which warned South Africa that "any attempt to annex a part or the whole" of the Namibian territory "constitutes an act of aggression;" urged all states not to supply South Africa with any arms or military equipment; and requested the Special Committee on Decolonization to study foreign economic involvement in Namibia and report back to the Assembly.\textsuperscript{33}

ii) Resolution 1761(XVII) of November 6, 1962, which reaffirmed the Assembly's conviction that South Africa's apartheid policies "constitute a threat to international peace and security;" requested all UN Member

\textsuperscript{32}Percentages were calculated from states' voting on the GA resolutions contained in Appendix A of this study.

\textsuperscript{33}See United Nations Yearbook, op. cit., 1963, p. 466.
States to: break off all diplomatic relations with apartheid South Africa, close their seaports and airports to South African vessels and aircrafts, prohibit their ships from entering South African ports, boycott all South African goods and stop all exports to that country; and which established a United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid.\textsuperscript{34}

\textit{iii) Resolution 2786(XXVI) of December 6, 1971, which called for the creation of a UN Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid.}\textsuperscript{35}

\textit{iv) Resolution 2107(XX) of December 21, 1965, which recognized the legitimacy of the African liberation struggle in Portugal's African colonies and called upon States to support that struggle; requested all States to prevent their nationals and corporations from operating in Portuguese colonies; and urged all States to collectively: break off diplomatic relations with Portugal, close their ports to all Portuguese vessels, prohibit their ships from entering Portuguese ports, refuse landing and transit facilities to Portuguese aircraft, and boycott all trade with Portugal. Portugal's NATO allies were specifically requested to stop supplying Portugal with arms, ammunition, and all military equipment.}\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{34}\textit{Ibid.}, 1962, p. 99.

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}, 1971, p. 408.

\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Ibid.}, 1965, p. 614.
v) Resolution 2877(XXVI) of December 20, 1971, which, inter alia, rejected the findings of the Pearce Commission on a Rhodesian settlement; invited the Security Council "to consider taking appropriate measures" within the relevant provisions of the UN Charter to secure national independence for Zimbabwe; and welcomed the Security Council decision to invite Mr. Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU "to appear before the Council" in connection with the future status of their country. 37

vi) Resolution 2105(XX) of December 20, 1965, which inter alia, "recognized the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial rule..." including Southern Africa, and "requested all States and international institutions", including the UN Specialized Agencies, "to withhold assistance of any kind to the governments of Portugal and South Africa until they renounce their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination," and called for support for national liberation in the area. 38

vii) Resolution 2621(XXV) of October 12, 1970, which, inter alia, reaffirmed the Declaration on Decolonization (Resolution 1514(XV)) and called for intensification of UN sanctions against Rhodesia to include Portugal and South Africa. 39

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37 Ibid., 1971, pp. 112-113.

38 Ibid., 1965, p. 554.

viii) Resolutions 2878(XXVI) of December 20, 1971, and 2908(XXVII) of November 2, 1972, which, inter alia, reaffirmed the Assembly's conviction that the continuation of colonialism, apartheid, foreign economic and other exploitation of the peoples and countries of Southern Africa as well as the perpetration of colonial wars and all anti-freedom efforts in the region pose "a threat to international peace and security." 40

In short, the degree of positive support of the states under study for Southern African liberation, as measured by UN General Assembly voting, was only modest even for the most supportive of these states.

2) The Eleven States' Economic Assistance to Efforts at Decolonization in Southern Africa

The success of efforts at African liberation in Southern Africa depends partly upon international economic assistance. Assistance of this kind has been provided to liberation efforts in the region by both governments and non-governmental organizations from throughout the world. This section looks at the extent of the eleven states' contributions to two United Nations programmes which have been related to efforts at decolonization in Southern Africa during the period under review. While this is perhaps not the most important aspect of economic assistance, it is the

one type for which information is available for all the eleven states in this study, making a formal rank ordering possible.

The United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa (UNTFSA) and the United Nations Educational and Training Programme for Southern Africa (UNETPSnA) are the two programmes examined in this section. The Trust Fund was established by General Assembly Resolution 2054B(XX) of December 15, 1965, with the purpose of providing relief, legal, and educational assistance "through appropriate international agencies, to families of all persons persecuted by the government of South Africa...for acts arising from their opposition to the policies of apartheid." 41 The Educational and Training Programme was created by Assembly Resolution 2349(XXII) of December 19, 1967, as an amalgamation of separate but similar programmes for Namibia, South Africa, Portugal's African colonies, and Zimbabwe. This integrated programme was set up with a view to providing educational and technical training facilities to the oppressed, dispossessed, and struggling peoples of these countries "so as to prepare them" to assume administrative and other responsibilities under their countries' future governments, thus enabling the "maximum contribution to that area's

future development... "42 Both projects were to be financed with funds made up of "voluntary contributions from States." 43

The data in Table 9 reveal that, of the eleven states in the study, Denmark and Sweden provided the largest contributions to the two funds combined both in absolute terms and in terms of the size of their contributions relative to their Gross National Products. Although Sweden outranked all the states in the study in terms of the dollar value of contributions, Denmark topped the list of the states in terms of contributions as a proportion of GNPs, which is the most meaningful way of measuring the states' levels of support.

Ranking the states on the basis of the size of their contributions relative to their GNPs, the United Kingdom placed third, followed by the Netherlands and Belgium, while Canada ranked sixth, followed by France, Japan, and Italy. The U.S. (which did not contribute to either programme after 1968) ranked last, followed by Australia, which did not contribute to either of the two funds until after

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42 Ibid., 1967, pp. 97-98 and 649-650. As efforts at channelling these funds to reach those in need inside the designated countries were being thwarted by the regimes there, most of the beneficiaries came to be those who were forced into and operating from exile, especially, those political refugees who resided in independent African states.

43 Ibid., 1965, p. 114 and 1967, p. 650. Both projects were set up by General Assembly resolutions with non-recorded votes. The vote for the Trust Fund was 95 in favour, 1 opposed, and 1 abstention. For the Educational and Training Programme, it was 113 in favour, 2 against, and 1 abstention.
### TABLE 9

**THE ELEVEN STATES' VOLUNTARY FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA (UNETPSnA) AND THE UNITED NATIONS TRUST FUND FOR SOUTH AFRICA (UNTFSA) (U.S. dollars)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>1965-1968 $</th>
<th>1969-1972 $</th>
<th>Total 1965-1972 $</th>
<th>Proportions of Average GNPs*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>549,377</td>
<td>639,581</td>
<td>1,188,958</td>
<td>0.00008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>696,380</td>
<td>664,438</td>
<td>1,362,818</td>
<td>0.00005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. K.</td>
<td>380,006</td>
<td>481,635</td>
<td>861,641</td>
<td>0.00007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>55,344</td>
<td>143,823</td>
<td>199,167</td>
<td>0.00007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>83,001</td>
<td>103,001</td>
<td>0.00004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>32,407</td>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>192,407</td>
<td>0.00003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0.00002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>0.00001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>30,007</td>
<td>43,493</td>
<td>73,500</td>
<td>0.000009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>0.000002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 2,075,521 2,575,971 4,651,492

Sources: Yearbook of the United Nations, op. cit. For the states' GNPs, see Yearbook of National Accounts, op. cit.; National Accounts Statistics of OECD Countries, op. cit.; and OECD Main Economic Indicators: Historical Statistics, op. cit.

*Proportions to GNPs were computed from these sources.*
the period covered by this study.\textsuperscript{44}

Of the total amount ($4.7 million) of the eleven states' contributions to the two funds over the 1965-1972 period, $3.2 million or 68% was accounted for by the Educational and Training Programme (UNETPSnA). The majority of the states in the study contributed to this programme more regularly than to the Trust Fund. For instance, the U.K. and the U.S. each contributed only once (in 1967 and 1968 respectively) to the Trust Fund over the 1965-1972 period.\textsuperscript{45} Of those states, such as Denmark and Sweden, which contributed regularly to both programmes, their contributions to the UNETPSnA were always larger than those to the Trust Fund.

On the whole, states' contributions to the two funds combined increased by some 24% from the 1965-1968 period to the 1969-1972 period. It is clear, however, that with the exception of Denmark and Sweden (and perhaps the United Kingdom), the overall level of states' financial support has been generally low. The contributions certainly have not been commensurate with the states' ability to pay, especially for states like the United States, Japan, France,

\textsuperscript{44} The Australian Government decided to start contributing to the two projects in 1973. In 1974, its total contribution amounted to $48,787; see United Nations Yearbook, and Unit on Apartheid, No.1/74 (January, 1974), pp. 6-7, and No. 6/75 (March, 1975), pp. 10-11.

\textsuperscript{45} By 1974, the U.K. and the U.S. were the only states, of those in the study, not contributing to the Trust Fund. See also George W. Shepherd, Jr., "Humanitarian Assistance to Liberation Movements," op. cit., pp. 81-82.
and Canada. For Japan, in particular, the situation is quite ironic, given that Japan ranked first in the United Nations voting record (Table 8). Thus, Denmark and Sweden are the only states, of those in the study, which tried to match their words with their deeds in respect to their commitment to support materially decolonization efforts in Southern Africa during the period under review.

3) Other Forms of Assistance

In addition to the above measures of support for Southern African liberation, there are other perhaps more important indicators which unfortunately do not lend themselves to a systematic, empirical analysis because of the absence of complete information. Some discussion of these additional forms of support is desirable, however, particularly since this information helps to reinforce some of the support rankings indicated above. This section looks at these other forms of more direct assistance to Southern African liberation movements to the extent that such information is available.

Available information reveals that, of the eleven states in the study, Sweden has been the foremost state in maintaining a conscious and deliberately comprehensive governmental programme of direct humanitarian assistance to the national liberation movements in Southern Africa since 1968.46 This assistance has been mainly in the form

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46 *Inter-Office Memorandum Regarding Swedish Assistance to Liberation Movements in Southern Africa*, provided to the
of funds provided by the Swedish Government directly to African liberation movements in the region.\(^\text{47}\) According to one Swedish authority:

The Government's programme of assistance has been designed in accordance with the rules of international law and in accordance with recommendations and resolutions adopted by the United Nations. The programme is supported by all political parties in the Swedish Parliament.\(^\text{48}\)

Humanitarian assistance by the Swedish Government to African liberation movements in the region has also been provided in the form of goods and services, such as medical care, education, clothing, and transport vehicles for improving "ambulance services and to facilitate the distribution of the goods provided."\(^\text{49}\) The total value of Swedish aid given to Southern African liberation movements over the 1968-1972 period amounted to some 25 million Swedish crowns or $5 million.\(^\text{50}\)

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[Author's note: As cited by the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, 1976.]

\(^{47}\) Ibid., p. 1.

\(^{48}\) Ibid. See also "Aid to the Liberation Movements of Southern Africa," in The Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Southern African Countries (TCLASC), a mimeographed memorandum, Toronto, 1974, p. 4.

\(^{49}\) Ibid.

\(^{50}\) Ibid. The total value of Swedish governmental aid granted to African national liberation movements in Southern Africa over the period 1968-1977 amounts to about 100 million Swedish kronor or $20 million. See Inter-Office Memorandum..., op. cit., p. 2.
The above does not include other Swedish humanitarian assistance to the victims of colonialism and racial oppression in Southern Africa channelled mainly through international organizations, such as The International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF); The OAU Bureau for Placement and Education of African Refugees (BPEAR); OAU Assistance Fund for the Struggle Against Colonialism and Apartheid (AFSCA); International University Exchange Fund (IUEF); Amnesty International (AI); and the World Council of Churches' Programme to Combat Racism, etc.; as well as assistance to ad hoc projects pertaining to liberation in the region during the period under review. For instance, during the 1964/65 budget year, Sweden made a grant of $17,400 for educational work among refugees from Mozambique at Rutamba in Tanzania; provided some $90,000 over the 1964/66 fiscal years to the Mozambique Institute's educational programme in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania), more than 50% of which has been financed out of Swedish funds; provided $12,000 in educational assistance to Angolan refugees in the Congo; and, in addition, granted scholarships for 124 Angolans in the Congo during the 1965/66 budget year.\footnote{51}

In 1970, the Swedish Government contributed 200,000 Swd. Kr. or about $40,000 to the Luthuli Foundation;\footnote{52} and

\footnote{51} Documents of Swedish Foreign Policy, Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, New Series I: C: 1967, p. 117.

\footnote{52} Ibid., New Series I: C: 20, 1970, p. 109. The Luthuli Foundation is named after the late Chief Albert Luthuli, a South African Freedom Fighter and a Nobel Prize-winner.
in 1971, the Swedish Government granted 500,000 Swd. Kr. or $100,000 to the International Defence and Aid Fund and 100,000 Swd. Kr. or $20,000 to Amnesty International "for the work of these organizations in Southern Africa." Similar grants by the Swedish Government to the two organizations operating in the region totalled $107,285 in 1972. In addition to the aid channelled through these organizations, the Swedish Government supports Southern African refugees for studies at the Kenya Science Teacher's College in Nairobi. Further, the Swedish Government provides scholarships to Southern Africans through their liberation movements to study in Sweden.

Given the above, the magnitude of Sweden's total aid designed to assist efforts at decolonization in Southern Africa during the period under review is readily apparent. Sweden easily outranked all the other states in the study in this respect.

On the political and diplomatic side, Sweden is the

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...The Foundation was established in 1970 with the aim of continuing Chief Luthuli's work "in the fight against racial discrimination and oppression." See ibid.

53 Ibid., N.S. I:C:21, 1971, p. 152. In a symbolic gesture of solidarity with the oppressed people of Southern Africa, Sweden releases its annual contributions to all funds related to decolonization efforts in the region around March 21, the date of the brutal Sharpeville Massacre of Africans in 1960 in South Africa.

54 Ibid., N.S. I:C:22, 1972, p. 171.

55 Inter-Office Memorandum... op. cit., p. 3.
only state, of those in the study, which has initiated and maintained governmental contacts with the leaders of Southern African national liberation movements (since 1968). Matters pertinent to the Southern African liberation struggle have been discussed and debated openly and intensely in regular sessions of the Swedish Parliament since the mid-1960's. In 1966, Sweden withdrew and closed its consulate in Namibia shortly after the UN General Assembly's revocation of South Africa's mandate over the Territory. The following year, Sweden snubbed South Africa by refusing to allow its envoy in Pretoria to take part in a journey into Namibia by heads of foreign diplomatic missions in South Africa.

Indicative of the Swedish government's political support for Southern African liberation was the following public statement by the Swedish Foreign Minister in 1968 calling for action rather than words:

We should recognize that it is not enough for us to just talk and to adopt resolutions and... What then, can we do as visible proof of the solidarity we feel with those oppressed peoples?...We must now consider in a realistic manner what further action...could actually lead to the result we all have in mind, i.e., the liberation of Southern Africa* ....

56 In 1968, for instance, the Swedish Government invited the leaders of national liberation movements in Portugal's African colonies to go to Sweden and explain to Prime Minister Olof Palme and Foreign Minister Nilson their special requirements for help in the liberation struggle.


*Emphases added.
The struggle is still continuing and...a number of the leaders of the African liberation movements...have asked us for assistance. We are prepared to help Africans...in the same way as we help the Liberation Front in South Vietnam....It is humanitarian aid that is in question, aid that puts the members of these movements in a better position to continue their struggle for the liberty of their peoples.58

All these and similar moves manifested by the Swedish Government were indicative of Sweden's official support on the political and diplomatic front for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa during the period under review.

Denmark is the only other state, of those in this study, that had a record in any way comparable to Sweden's during the period under study. However, Denmark's assistance programme was not as extensive as that of Sweden. The Danish Government has contributed to various international organizations which have been engaged in relief and humanitarian assistance efforts in Southern Africa, such as the International Defence and Aid Fund; the World Council of Churches; International University Exchange Fund; World University Service; and the Danish Refugee Council.59

In addition, the Danish Government has also extended humanitarian assistance directly to African liberation movements in Southern Africa since the late

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58 Documents..., ibid., N.S.I:C:13, 1963, p. 84 and N.S.I:C:17, 1968, p. 117.

59 "Aid to the Liberation Movements...", The Toronto Committee..., op. cit., p. 1.
1960's. This assistance has been provided in the form of money, materials, and educational goods and facilities. However, the Danish Government's programme of bilateral assistance to liberation movements does not appear to have been as comprehensive as that of Sweden. The monetary value of Denmark's humanitarian assistance, which has been in the millions of kronors, has been quite substantial, nevertheless, especially when the size of the Danish economy is taken into consideration. 60 Danish authorities stress that:

Assistance is bound to countries and territories in Southern Africa in relation to which the Security Council has passed resolutions recognizing the legality of the struggle of the people in pursuance of their human and political rights and calling on members to increase their moral and material assistance... Assistance of this kind is considered a natural extension of the many expressions of solidarity with the aims of these people to which Denmark has clearly committed herself in the United Nations and elsewhere. 61

Apart from the two Scandinavian states, Sweden and Denmark, no other state, among the remaining nine in the study, had official contacts with the African national liberation movements of Southern Africa during the period under review. However, it is worthwhile observing that Canada apparently did spend $41,300 in bilateral aid to

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60 Total Danish aid to Southern African liberation movements amounted to about $3.5 million over the 1972-1976 period, Danish Humanitarian and Educational Assistance through Liberation Movements, an official memorandum acquired from the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in response to a letter from the author.

61 Ibid., p. 1.
Namibia, presumably educational assistance, during the 1970-1972 period; $118,700 on bilateral educational assistance for Zimbabwean students over the period 1971-1972; and $75,000 provided multilaterally for the Commonwealth Rhodesian Scholarship Programme in 1972. A Canadian Government official hastened to stress, however, that: "It should be noted that as such no funds have been given to the Southern African Liberation Movements themselves, but merely to the people of those countries on a humanitarian basis."  

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62 This information was supplied by the Canadian Government's Department of External Affairs, through the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), in response to a letter from the author. Canadian contributions to the UN Fund for Namibia, JUEP, and the Rhodesian Commonwealth Scholarship Program, totalled $550,000 over the 1973-1975 period, according to the same source.

In 1970, the U.S. Government also took what could be described as a diplomatic step in support of decolonization efforts in Namibia. On the 20th of May of that year, the United States Government announced the following policy decisions:

1) It will officially discourage investment by U.S. nationals in Namibia.  
2) Export-Import Bank credit guarantees will not be made available for trade with Namibia.  
3) U.S. private investment negotiated through the South African government since the termination of its mandate over Namibia (1966) will not receive protection against the claims of a future lawful government of Namibia.  
4) The USA will encourage other nations to take similar actions.  

However, whether these steps taken by the United States Government were intended to be effective or were mere window dressing for public consumption has not been established. Whatever, their significance was mitigated by the U.S. Government decision the following year to import Rhodesian chrome, an act that many saw as a clear stabbing in the back of the African liberation cause in that part of the world.

In addition, the U.S. move on Namibia must also be seen in the light of the U.S. secret strategy, which was

reportedly adopted in 1969 for Southern Africa for the 1970's by Kissinger and the Nixon administration. This strategy, known in the White House jargon as the "Tar Baby Option", was reportedly based on Option 2 of a U.S. secret document, the National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39), which, if true, represented a clear and definite tilt towards the white minority regimes in the region. It specifically recommended, inter alia, an encouragement and fostering of closer U.S. trade with and investment in Southern Africa. The strategy sought to protect U.S. and other Western "economic, scientific and strategic interests and opportunities in the region, including the orderly marketing of South Africa's gold production."

65 The secret document, NSSM 39, was prepared in 1969 by a group of experts from the State and Defence Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), under the guidance of Dr. Kissinger. It outlined five options for U.S. policy towards Southern Africa. Option 2, which called for a "broader association with both black and white States..." in the region, was labelled "communication" by its defenders and "Tar Baby" by those who feared that "once we start it, we'll ever be stuck with it." This option was adopted, nevertheless. It was based on the premises that the whites were there to stay and the only way that "constructive change" could come about would be through them; and that black Africans in the region could not achieve their liberation by violent means. (This same theme was reflected in Dr. Kissinger's Lusaka speech regarding U.S. policy towards Southern Africa on the 27th of April, 1976, in which he asserted that the white South Africans were "not colonialists..." and as an African people, their rights had to be protected. For the text of Kissinger's speech, see The New York Times, April 28, 1976, p. 16C.) On Rhodesia, this policy strategy "recommended retention of the Salisbury consulate, gradual relaxation of sanctions, and possible eventual recognition of the Smith regime." For details on the secret document, see Tami Hultman and Reed Kramer, "Secret Documents on Southern Africa Exposed," in Southern Africa, Vol. VII, No. 2 (February, 1975), pp. 4-7. See also The Observer (London), January 5, 1975.
the secret document, "Nixon advisors wanted to do nothing to upset corporate investors in Southern Africa, since they include all the major U.S. companies and important Nixon campaign contributors." 66

Despite U.S. official assurances that America "stands on the side of those forces of fundamental human rights in Southern Africa...," 67 U.S. actions have tended to point in the opposite direction. The United States has invariably avoided official contacts with African nationalist liberation movements. In 1967, for example, a FRELIMO* delegation visiting the U.S. requested an audience with the State Department. The response was "...the best that could be done would be to arrange for a representative to meet the FRELIMO delegation in some out-of-the-way restaurant either in Washington or New York City." The delegation promptly turned down this proposal. 68 In 1970, President Nixon snubbed a visiting delegation from the Organization of

66 Hultman and Kramer, op. cit., p. 4.


*FRELIMO was a Mozambican liberation front, which is now the government of an independent Mozambique.
African Unity, led by Zambia's President Kenneth Kaunda, which was on a mission to solicit support of Western states for decolonization efforts in Southern Africa. In 1972, "Kissinger and his aides rejected a proposal to meet with Amilcar Cabral...", leader of PAIGC, an African nationalist liberation movement (now the government) of Guinea Bissau. In the same vein, "...American diplomats in Africa were discouraged from maintaining relationships with representatives of liberation movements..." except for the purpose of gathering information.

There is one possible exception, however, with regard to U.S. relations with Southern African liberation movements during the period under study. "The most substantial U.S. Government program related to the liberation movements was the assistance to the students from Southern Africa that was initiated in 1962." Two educational programs, one at Kurasini in Tanzania and the other at Nkumbi in Zambia, "were funded by the U.S. Government and administered by the African-American Institute (AAI)," at a total cost of

69 President Nixon simply said he was too busy and, therefore, had no time to meet with the OAU delegation. See Aaron Segal, "The United States' Year in Africa," in Africa Contemporary Record, op. cit., 1970-1971, p. A132.

70 Hultman and Kramer, op. cit., p. 6.

71 Houser, op. cit.

72 Ibid.
$7,135,000 over the 1962-1972 period, according to U.S. Government figures. Southern African political refugee students who attended these schools were sent there by their liberation movements, and the program "...brought to American universities about 500 students from Southern Africa during the period from 1963 to 1973. According to U.S. Government figures, the program cost $8,585,000 and the AAI estimated the administrative cost of the program to be $1.5 million" at the time the two programs were taken over by the governments of the two African States in the early 1970's.\textsuperscript{73}

As for such states as the U.K.,\textsuperscript{74} the

\textsuperscript{73}\textit{Ibid.}, pp. 117-118. This U.S. Government program was viewed with mixed feelings by the African states concerned and the African national liberation movements. Its value was also difficult to estimate as it is not clear how much was actually spent on Southern African political exiles given that in Zambia about half of the students at the Nkumbi College were Zambians.

\textsuperscript{74}In response to a letter from the author, the U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office pointed out that: "It has not generally been the practice of the Government to offer bilateral assistance, either financial, material, or humanitarian, to liberation movements although both the Liberal and Labour Parties have on occasion given support to movements in Portugal's former colonies and in Rhodesia." However, between 1972 and 1975, the Government provided $24,000 to the United Nations Fund for Namibia, $12,000 to the United Nations Research Institute for Namibia in Zambia, and $84,000 to SWAPO (a Namibian liberation movement) — totalling $120,000, altogether. For further details on British official positions on Southern African problems, see D.D. Watt and James Mayall (eds.), \textit{Current British Foreign Policy: Documents, Statements, and Speeches, Annual Publications, 1970-1972}, (London: Temple Smith, 1970-1972).
Netherlands, and Australia, their official or semi-official contacts with Southern African liberation movements did not start until after 1972. With respect to Belgium, France, Japan, and Italy, there is no information available on their official relationships if any with the African national liberation movements in the region or with any

75 In response to a letter from the author, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed that the Dutch Government provided $192,000 to the UN Fund for Namibia from 1973 to 1976; $34,000 to the Namibian Institute in Zambia in 1976; $1,020,000 to SWAPO between 1975 and 1976; $650,000 to ANC, the Zimbabwe nationalist movement, in 1975; a total of $1,683,000 to national liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau in 1974; $47,000 to the International Defence and Aid Fund and UN Anti-Apartheid Fund between 1975 and 1976; a total of $833,000 to the International University Exchange Fund and the World Council of Churches' Program to Combat Racism between 1974 and 1976; and a total of $221,000 to Namibian and Zimbabwean refugees in Zambia and Botswana in 1975. That is, the humanitarian assistance provided by the Dutch Government through liberation movements and related international organizations, totalled about $5 million during the period 1973-1976. This figure does not, of course, include contributions to the two United Nations programmes, the UNTFSA and the UNEPSMIA, discussed above, which totalled a little under $2 million during the same period (1975-1976). In addition, a Dutch Government "Dairy Assistance Programme" provided about 47 tons of skimmed milk, whole milk powder, and cheese to the Mozambique Institute in Tanzania and to the Guinea Bissau Institute in Guinea (Conakry) between 1972-1973. For details, see "Aid to Liberation Movements...", Toronto Committee..., op. cit., p. 2.

76 In response to a letter from the author, the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs indicated in its Humanitarian Assistance to the African National Liberation Movements, Memorandum, No. 150, December 22, 1974, that Australia had joined other states in providing this kind of assistance. The Government provided $195,000 to Southern African liberation movements during its 1974-1975 fiscal year. It also contributed a total of $14,000 to the UN Fund for Namibia from 1973 to 1974. See also David Goldsworthy, "Australia and Africa: New Relationships?" op. cit., p. 65.
international organizations assisting these movements during the period under review. 77

In sum, although no formal rank ordering of states is possible with respect to the aspect of support discussed in this section, it is clear on the basis of available information that Sweden, closely followed by Denmark, outranked all other states in the study regarding the magnitude and diversity of their assistance rendered to efforts at decolonization in Southern Africa during the period covered by this study. The U.S. did provide relatively substantial educational assistance of a specific nature to Southern Africans, but for other reasons the genuineness of its support for African liberation was suspect during the period under study. Canada also tried to provide some educational assistance to Southern Africans in the late 1960's and the early 1970's, but it did not have governmental contacts with the liberation movements and the funds involved were limited. The remaining seven states do not appear to have provided any assistance to, or had any contacts with the Southern African national liberation movements or with international bodies assisting them, other than through the two United Nations programmes discussed earlier.

77Japan, however, contributed to the UN Fund for Namibia a total of $30,000 from 1972 to 1974. See UN General Assembly, 27th, 28th and 29th Sessions, Documents Nos. 72-20074 A/8841, (16/10/72); A/9225 (17/10/73); and A/9725 (12/9/74).
CHAPTER IV

THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE STATES' ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT IN SOUTHERN
AFRICA AND THEIR SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN
LIBERATION IN THE REGION

The central purpose of this Chapter is to establish empirically whether or not there existed an inverse relationship between the eleven states' economic involvement in Southern Africa and their support for African liberation in the region during the period 1960-1972.

In order to measure the nature of the association between the two variables (without assuming causality), Spearman's rank-order correlation coefficient ($r_s$) is employed. The Spearman $r_s$ formula, as has already been indicated above under the research design of this study, is:

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{6 \sum D^2}{N(N^2 - 1)},$$

where:

- $r_s =$ correlation coefficient
- $D =$ differences in rank ordering (of states on variables 1 and 2)
- $N =$ Number of states

The value resulting from the application of this formula is "+1.0 whenever the rankings are in perfect agreement, -1.0 if they are in perfect disagreement, and zero if there is no relationship whatsoever." ²

By using the $r_s$ formula, this study has found that the computed value of $r_s$ is -0.32 for the correlation between the eleven states' trade with Southern Africa and their support via voting in the United Nations General Assembly for decolonization efforts in the region (Table 10). Similarly, the value of $r_s$ is -0.51 for the correlation between the states' trade with Southern Africa and their financial contributions to United Nations programmes related to liberation efforts in the area (Table 11).

Thus, since the value of $r_s$ for both correlations is in the negative, the formula indicates that there was, indeed, an inverse correlation (and thus relationship) between the eleven states' economic involvement with Southern Africa's colonial regimes and their support for African liberation in the region during the period 1960-1972. However, the United Kingdom and the United States are the only states in the study whose rankings were perfectly inverted as between economic involvement and supportive voting in the UN General Assembly (Table 10). Likewise, Denmark and the Netherlands are the only two states in

²Blalock, op. cit., p. 416.
TABLE 10

SPEARMAN'S COEFFICIENT OF RANK-ORDER CORRELATION (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Rank on Economic Involvement: Trade</th>
<th>Rank on Support: U. N. Voting</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>D²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>290</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
r_s = 1 - \frac{6(290)}{11(120)} = 1 - 1.32 = -.32
\]

D = differences in rank ordering
TABLE II
SPEARMAN'S COEFFICIENT OF RANK-ORDER CORRELATION (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States</th>
<th>Rank on Economic Involvement: Trade</th>
<th>Rank on Support for UN Assistance Programmes</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>D²</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 332

\[ r_s = 1 - \frac{6(332)}{11(120)} = 1 - 1.51 = -0.51 \]
the study which had perfectly inverted positions in their rankings with respect to economic involvement and aid through United Nations programmes to Southern Africa (Table 11).

On the basis of the above rank orderings, it can be inferred that the United Kingdom's high degree of economic involvement in Southern Africa during the period 1960-1971 affected negatively its willingness to support United Nations General Assembly resolutions related to decolonization in the region, but not its readiness to support UN programmes of assistance to Southern Africans during the 1961-1972 period.

Similarly, the overall standing of the United States suggests that its relatively high degree of economic involvement with the region probably contributed to its low level of support for African liberation, both in terms of UN General Assembly voting and economic aid through United Nations assistance programmes for Southern Africans. By contrast, it can be inferred that Sweden's and Denmark's low levels of economic involvement with Southern Africa may have facilitated their high levels of support for African liberation with respect to UN General Assembly voting and the UN assistance programmes.

For Belgium and the Netherlands, the figures do show that their middle ranking status with respect to economic involvement corresponds with a medium level of support for Southern African liberation. With respect to
Japan, Australia, France, Italy and Canada, however, the results show no consistent relationship between economic involvement in Southern Africa and support for Southern African liberation.

When the Spearman formula was applied separately to the data for the three four-year periods, similar results were obtained to those in Tables 10 and 11 in each case. Thus, the degree of the inverse relationship between economic involvement and support for Southern African liberation apparently has not varied at different points in time for the eleven states under study.

On the whole, the findings do show that there is an inverse relationship between the extent of the eleven states' economic involvement with Southern Africa and their degree of support for African liberation in the region over the period covered by this study. However, the relationship is only of medium strength.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

This study has shown that all of the eleven states examined (save Denmark) had significant economic relations with Southern Africa during the period under review. Similarly, while their policy behaviour differed substantially, none of these states exhibited a particularly high level of support for Southern African liberation. It can be inferred from this that their economic involvement in Southern Africa probably negatively affected their willingness to support liberation in the region.

The study has also shown that there is, in fact, an inverse relationship between these states' economic involvement with Southern Africa and their support for African liberation in the area. Since the eleven states examined here are representative of Western states operating in Southern Africa, it is reasonable to infer that, based on the findings of this study, had all Western states been studied, an inverse relationship would likely have been found between their economic interests in the region and their support for Southern African liberation during the period covered by this study.

This situation has serious implications for the posture that Western states may adopt in the future as the
contest for Southern African liberation intensifies, particularly when it is borne in mind, as discussed in Chapter Two, that the economic involvement of Western states in the region is in most cases steadily increasing. Put bluntly, will their economic stake in Southern Africa induce some of them at least (the United States and the United Kingdom, for instance) to intervene on the side of the white minority regimes in the event of serious African revolution in order to protect their vested economic interests!

The United Kingdom and the United States in particular showed high levels of economic involvement and low levels of support for liberation in the region. Conversely, Denmark and Sweden are the two states, of those in the study, which had relatively low levels of economic involvement in Southern Africa and high levels of support for liberation in the region. Belgium and the Netherlands were in a medium position in both respects. For the remaining five states, there was no clear inverse relationship between the two variables.

The absence of a strong inverse correlation between the two variables tends to suggest that factors other than just economic considerations must also have had an effect upon the eleven states' supportive or non-supportive behaviour toward Southern African liberation during the period under study. The extent to which additional factors influenced the Western states' generally
non-supportive posture probably varied from state to state. For instance, political-strategic considerations in the context of East-West conflict might have been an influential negative factor, especially for the United States and the United Kingdom, the most important N.A.T.O. allies of Portugal, one of the colonial powers in Southern Africa.² Second, colonial responsibilities could also have affected, in one way or another, the policy behaviour of states, such as the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Belgium, and the Netherlands, all of which had had colonial power experience.

Third, Western cultural or racial affinity with Southern Africa's white minority regimes could also be another explanatory variable in the case of all these states except Japan. Fourth, influential business interest and pressure groups within the Western states might have had some impact on these states' negative policies toward the region. Fifth, the nature of the political party in power in each state may have affected the level of its support for African liberation at different points in time. For example, while Harold Wilson's Labour Government in Britain adhered to and enforced the United Nations arms embargoes against apartheid South Africa, the Conservative Government of Mr. Heath reversed this policy and practice upon coming to


\[3\text{See The Labour's Record on Southern Africa, by Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, 1971.}
power, and decided in 1971 to resume the sale of British arms to South Africa.\(^4\) Similarly, Australia's supportive voting in the United Nations General Assembly increased markedly only after Gough Whitlam's Labour Party victory in 1972.\(^5\) Finally, factors such as foreign policy-making "elite images" and the "idiocyncratic predispositions"\(^6\) of decision-makers in each state may have had some bearing upon state's policy behaviour toward Southern Africa during the period under review. For instance, the liberal-oriented activist approach to international affairs of Olof Palme, leader of Sweden's Social Democratic Party and Prime Minister of Sweden from 1966 to 1976, was instrumental in the shaping of Sweden's more supportive policy behaviour toward Southern Africa liberation during the late 1960's and the early 1970's compared to his predecessors. Similarly, the strikingly different approach to foreign affairs in general of Gough Whitlam, Australia's Labour Prime Minister from 1972 to 1976, was doubtless a contributing factor to his Government's more


\(^5\)See Appendix A of this study. See also \textit{United Nations Yearbook}, 1971 and 1972.

\(^6\)For details on foreign policy-making elite's psychological predispositions, such as ideology and perceptions of reality, see Michael Brecher, \textit{et al.}, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour," \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 80-81 and 85-87. See also Joseph Frankel, \textit{The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision Making} (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 81-148.
supportive stance on Southern African liberation compared to that of his predecessors.  

This list may not be exhaustive, but these are other likely factors affecting the eleven states' policy behaviour toward the region. If they could have been controlled for, it would have greatly enhanced the value of the present findings.

However, neither the economic factor, nor these other factors suggested above, have been admitted openly by the Western states concerned as having been the reasons for their generally low level of support for Southern African liberation. Instead, pretexts such as the "illegality", "unconstitutionality", and "impracticality" of the United Nations General Assembly resolutions dealing with Southern Africa, have been used frequently by these states as rationales for their non-supportive voting. Similarly, "moral" opposition to the use of political violence as a means of bringing about freedom and independence in the region has always been put forward by these and other Western states as grounds for their reluctance to deal positively with the African national liberation movements in Southern Africa. However, whatever the reasons given by

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7Prime Minister Whitlam is a member and contributor to the Southern Africa Defence and Aid Fund, an international organization providing humanitarian assistance to Southern African liberation movements; see "Aid to Liberation Movements of Southern Africa," The Toronto Committee..., op. cit.
the Western states as grounds for their general lack of substantive support for efforts at decolonization in the area during the period under study, it is always possible that they were at least to some degree cloaks behind which the economic factor always loomed large.

Finally, it must be pointed out, however, that, in the end, it is not the degree of support or non-support of Western states for Southern African liberation which will ultimately determine the success of liberation efforts in the region. Rather, the strength and will-power of the oppressed African people themselves, spearheaded by their genuine national liberation movements, constitute the decisive factor in shaping the destiny of Southern Africa. Thus, regardless of the extent of economic involvement and interests of Western states in the region and hence the relatively high degree of their resistance to political change, they will most likely not be able to deter or prevent Southern African liberation from occurring, as events elsewhere have indicated, when the yearning and determination for national independence of black Africans in the region become irrepressible.
APPENDIX A

RECORDED VOTES OF THE ELEVEN STATES ON UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS DEALING WITH DECOLONIZATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1961-1972.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resolution Call No.</th>
<th>Aus</th>
<th>Bel</th>
<th>Can</th>
<th>Den</th>
<th>Fr</th>
<th>It</th>
<th>Jap</th>
<th>Net</th>
<th>Swd</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1593(XV)</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1596(XV)*</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>A</td>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>A</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>A</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>004</td>
</tr>
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<td>Y</td>
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<td>A</td>
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<td>Y</td>
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*most important resolutions

Key to voting symbols:  
Y = Affirmative  
N = Negative  
A = Abstention  
O = Did not vote or no record
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The Times (London)
Toronto Globe and Mail
Toronto Star
Vancouver Sun
Wall Street Journal
Washington Post
Windsor Star
Winnipeg Free Press
VITA AUCTORIS

Leonard Taapopi, son of Mr. Gabriel and Mrs. Rauna Taapopi of Windhoek, Namibia (formerly South West Africa), received his Primary and Secondary Education in Namibia.

Has lived abroad in political exile since 1965. Attended Nkumbi International College in Zambia (1965–67). Spent two years (1968–69) in political prisons of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania due to differences with the SWAPO leadership in exile.

Attended the University of Nairobi, Kenya (Extra-Mural Division), 1970–71.

Registered at the University of Windsor, Faculty of Social Science, in 1971–72 for Honours Baccalaureate program in Political Science. Received Bachelor of Arts (Honours) degree in Political Science in 1974 at the University of Windsor. Was admitted (1974–75) to the Faculty of Graduate Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Windsor, for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science.